Towards a Semiotics of Brand Equity Jul 2011

8/4/2019 Towards a Semiotics of Brand Equity Jul 2011 http://grossolatos.blogspot.com

1/39

w w w . g r o s s o l a t o s . c o m Page 1

Towards a semiotics of brand equity: on the interdependency of meaning surplus and

surplus value in a political economy of brands

George Rossolatos BA(Hons), MSc, MBA, PhD candidate

The commodity achieves its apotheosis when it is able to impose itself as a code, that is, as

the geometric locus of the circulation of models, and hence as the total medium of a culture

(and not only of an economy) (Jean Baudrillard, For a critique of the political economy of the

sign, p.206)

Introduction

To announce a semiotic approach to branding and by implication to the study of brand equity

is equivalent to a tautology. And yet, it is through this tautology that semiotics emerges as one

of the proper fields of research for brands as marks or /semeia and branding, as

process whereby products (commodities) assume meaning in acts not only of financial, but

even more foundationally of semiotic exchange.

The focal points of this paper rest with (i) demarcating branding discourse as a field of

marketing research through the metalanguage of semiotics, (ii) the delineation of the signs

and signifying practices of this discourse and its key terms, such as brand, differential brand

positioning, intended and received positioning, brand elements, primary and secondary brand

associations and brand equity in semiotic terms (iii) applying semiotic key terms, such as

sign and code to the study of brand equity and revealing their potential operational value in

managing brand equity (iv) explaining in semiotic terms why brand equity is equivalent to

surplus of meaning and why brand stretching or brand extensions as a brands combinatorial

possibilities can be accounted for by means of a theory of the code(s) (v) discussing why and

how the conceptual rigor of semiotics may contribute to brand equity research, thus

constituting an indispensable brand management tool.

Overview of inter-textual transfers between branding and semiotics

The bulk of research in the wider field of marketing semiotics has been concerned with

advertising and not with branding, even though the latter constitutes the starting point for


2/39


making sense of advertising. Based on the assumption of the autonomy of the sign1,

advertising messages have been analyzed extensively by drawing on their dimension as

cultural signs and by implication by drawing on brands as cultural (eg. McCracken 1986,

Williamson 1978, Stern 1996;1998), rather than commercial products. Despite the

unquestionable validity of such readings from within cultural theory, media theory and

semiotic perspectives, and the plethora of resourceful insights that have been generated in

the process, interest on behalf of marketing researchers in operationalizing semiotic concepts

in addressing various marketing phenomena has been limited, with the exception of

Hirschman and Holbrooks The Semiotics of Consumption, Jean Umiker Sebeoks editing of

the collective work Marketing Semiotics (a collection of papers on various applied semiotic

approaches to marketing, such as consumer behavior, advertising, corporate image, new

product development), Micks and McQuarries extensive publications on semiotic approaches

to decoding and processing advertising messages, J.M.Flochs Smiotique, Marketing et

Communication. At the same time, applied semiotics agencies have been flourishing over the

past twenty years, providing insights to marketing practitioners and generating interpretive

models by drawing on semiotic concepts. Yet, no uniform branding theory has appeared so

far with the inter-textual import of a robust conceptual framework drawing on particular

semiotic theories. Despite the operationalization of semiotic concepts in discreet areas of

marketing theory and practice, such as Flochs (1990) application of Greimas semiotic

square in positioning studies, Kawamas (1987) application of Peirces topline tripartite

conceptualization of the sign as index, symbol, icon into the process of product design and

coining of a Color Planning System, Kehret-Wards (1987) application of the Saussurean

concept of the syntagm in what he calls syntagmatic marketing research aiming to unearth

latent syntactical similarities in the way products are used and in their promotion/advertising,

while pointing to its operational value in the field of new product design, cross-promotions and

shelf strategy in retail outlets, McQuarries (1989) interpretation of how ads resonate

meaning through the employment of figurative speech that transforms the relationship

between signifiers and signifieds in instances of verbal and visual signs, by drawing on

1As Ransdell (1992:[6]) stresses by allusion to the Peircean notions of sign and interpretant It is implicit in regarding

semiosis as the production of the interpretant by the sign itself that signs are not regarded as being governed byrules in the sense of "falling under" them. The idea is rather that the disposition or power of the sign to generate aninterpretant is the rule, which thus does not stand over and above the sign, as it were, but is rather an immanentprinciple therein. This is the basis for characterizing semiosis processes as autonomous or self-governing.


3/39


Barthes Rhetoric of the Image, none of the existing semiotic approaches to marketing

phenomena has attempted to provide a conceptual platform for operationalizing the concept

of brand equity, which is the focus of this paper. Needless to say that the orientation of the

inter-textual grounding of a theory of brand equity in semiotics in the context of this paper is

foundational and by no means exhaustive as to the conceptual and methodological

implications of a full-fledged semiotic theory that is yet to come. As preliminary

methodological remarks in such an endeavor as a semiotic theory of brand equity Micks

following words of caution are taken on board:

First [ ], there is a troubling tendency on the part of marketing and

consumer researchers to use terms such as semiotics or semiology in a

flippant manner [ ] Unfortunately, all too often these words [my note: signs

and communication] are raised in marketing and consumer research without

a reasonable discussion of which particular semiotic tradition or concepts the

research is drawing on, and even sometimes without any accompanying

references to major semioticians. Second, it is equally important that

researchers strive for greater rigor in applying semiotics. All too often

semiotic concepts and analytic approaches are not adequately clarified

before their implementation. As a result, the value of using semiotics is

ambiguous (Mick, in Brown 1997:244).

Brands as signs

A brand is a sign or more particularly a super-sign in Ecos terms: Super-signs must be

considered as strictly coded expression-units susceptible of further combination in order to

produce more complex texts (1976:231) . A logo as the sign of a branded product or the

brand identity of a brand name is a super-sign, as its components (eg. curves, lines, fonts,

words, colors) do not make sense outside of its strictly coded context. Individual components

as signs themselves may be tokens of different types, but in the context of super-signs they

do not assume meaning as tokens of general types, but as semantically hierarchized

components in the structure of the super-sign as sign system (eg a curve may be reproduced


4/39


in an exactly identical fashion as a curve employed in the sign structure of a super-sign,

however it may not produce the meaning of the super-sign inductively simply by assuming the

place of an elementary component within the syntax of the super-sign). We might say that

individual signs making up a brands identity may be hierarchized semantically based on their

synecdochic potential of evoking the brands name in the absence of all other signs. For

example, Nikes curve is a hierarchically superior structural component of the brand Nike, as

super-sign, as in the absence of all other elements synecdochically it may stand for the super-

signs name. By implication, a colored shoe without the Nike curve could by no means

connote the brand Nike. Would the same hold for the standalone presence of the curvy M

sign indicative of McDonalds? Perhaps, but in a fuzzier sense, as the yellow and red colors

are inextricably linked with the curvy M. But amid a range of interpretive possibilities it would

stand a better chance of recognizability. Brand identity is not equivalent to branding and

certainly not homologous to brand equity, but it is a crucial component of a brands

architecture. What brands as super-signs point to is that brands function as cultural units in a

semiotic space as strictly coded gestalts or assemblages or constellations of signs that are

not meaningfully reducible to their elementary components, but wherein combinatorial

possibilities are allowed for. The semiotic secret of brand names lies in the fact that they are

not simply indices but also symbols and icons. As an icon it evokes mental images of the

possible qualities of the product that are expected to be present in an item purchased with the

brand name. The quality of a brand is also a symbolthat is associated with our knowledge,

experiences and our contact with that product (Nth,2010).

A further qualification of brands as signs is yielded by Nth (1988:4) who contends that the

system of commodities forms a semiotic system par excellence, insofar as each product

category, as well as the ensemble of products as what Baudrillard would call a system of

objects, is structured like a language. Nth proposes a threefold classification of brands as

signs, which he calls prototypical frames, viz. the utilitarian, the commercial and the

sociocultural frame, while adding a tentative fourth frame, viz. the psychological one, which is

not operationalized in Nth s approach. Throughout the multi-frame approach he retains the

Saussurean/Barthesian bipartite nature of the sign as consisting of two planes, viz that of the

signifier and that of the signified, the former denoting the signifying form of the commodity,


5/39


while the latter its concept(s). The utilitarian commodity sign is associated with features

related to its practical use-value (Nth:op.cit.). Semiotic features of the utilitarian sign

comprise technical reliability and economy. The commercial sign signifies the [financial]

exchange value of a commodity in relation to other products of the system of commodities

(Nth:op.cit.). The most direct indicator of this value is price. A brand functions as a

sociocultural sign when its consumer associates it with the sociocultural group(s) to which he

belongs. Most importantly, the frame to which a brand may be assigned is not a matter of

some sort of inherent properties. As Nth observes, the category to which a product

prototypically belongs is not inherent in the product itself, but empirically observable from the

predominant mode of consumption and from the genetic or historical primacy in the evolution

of the commodity (Nth:op.cit.).

In parallel with framing brands under three prototypical categories, Nth (1998) also

distinguishes brands (and product categories) based on the Barthesian distinction between

syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes. While the paradigmatic axis of a language refers to the

possible (e.g. lexical or semantic) alternatives of and oppositions to a sign, the syntagmatic

axis refers to its syntax, the rules for the combination of the signs (op.cit.,italics in the

original text). Barthes himself exemplified this dual function of brands as signs alongside the

paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions by reference to the product category of furniture

(among other categories) in his Elements of Semiology, by stressing that the language of

furniture is formed both by the oppositions of functionally identical pieces (two types of

wardrobe, two types of bed, etc.), each of which, according to its style, refers to a different

meaning, and by the rules of association of the different units at the level of a room

(furnishing) (1968:17).

The distinction between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions of signification is an

important theoretical tool in applied and theoretical approaches to marketing semiotics . As

Kehret-Ward points out, in paradigmatic strategy the ad focuses on attributes which serve as

signifiers of the category in which the product is positioned and in syntagmatic strategy the ad

focuses on the product's ability to combine with related products in use (in Sebeok,

1987:219).


6/39


Differences and similarities between brand value and brand equity

Branding is an ongoing process. Brand equity is the periodic culmination of this process in

terms of brand value and the aim of the brand building process, viz added value for the

producer and shareholders, in terms of superior to the competition financial returns and the

consumer, in terms of increased satisfaction from the use of the brand. Brand equity is not

necessarily correlated with superior to the competition financial returns, but with a higher

probability of superior returns on the assumption that a differential positioning will translate

into differential mindshare and enhanced saliency, hence greater probability of choice.

What is the relationship between brand value and semiotic value?

Brand value is not the same as brand equity, rather brand equity is the plenum of different

types of value. How may value be defined in terms of a semiotics of brand equity? By

addressing it as the outcome of different levels of semiotic exchange that occur in tandem,

based on a brands partaking of different prototypical semiotic categories (utilitarian,

commercial, sociocultural), as above defined by Nth.

The concept of value has been extensively scrutinized among semioticiansand consumer

behavior theorists2

alike. Saussure in his Cours de linguistique gnrale offered a path

breaking analysis of why value is not inherent in a sign but to determinants of the sign

system, insofar as it opens up to the process of signification and the vertical relationship

between signifiers and signifieds to horizontal relationships between signifiers and signifiers

and signifieds and signifieds. [ ] a word can be exchanged for something dissimilar, an

idea; besides, it can be compared with something of the same nature, another word. Its value

is therefore not fixed so long as one simply states that it can be exchanged for a given

concept, i.e.that it has this or that signification: one must also compare it with similar values,

with other words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really fixed only by the

concurrence of everything that exists outside it. Being part of a system, it is endowed not only

with a signification but also and especially with a value, and this is something quite different

2M.Holbrook spearheaded the consumer value research area from a consumer behavior perspective by drawing on

the theory of axiology, defining consumer value as an interactive relativistic preference experience (1999:5) andcoining a framework of consumer value, comprising six typologies or three continua, viz. extrinsic vs intrinsic value,self-oriented vs other-oriented value, active vs reactive value (1999: 9-13)


7/39


(Saussure 1959:115 )3. The value of a brand as a sign, therefore, is accordingly

determined by its environment (ibid:116) in a system of langue and based on relationships of

3For the sake of clarifying Saussures argumentation regarding the initially postulated difference between meaning

and value in his Cours, which ultimately leads to a reduction of meaning to value, in the context of a general

economy of signs as a context of relationships and exchanges, as well as to allow the arguments that emergethrough this process of argumentative elucidation to function as the springboard for legitimating the ensuing key

postulate of this paper that the signifying relationship is reducible to that between sign and signifier, in the absence of

a signified in the context of a political economy of brands that functions through relationships among free-floating

signifiers, I hereby proceed with the exposition of a set of circularities and contradictions in terms embedded in

Saussures argumentation.

The interdependency between meaning and value may be unearthed by addressing the circularity of Saussures

argument about whether meaning generates linguistic value or linguistic value is the cause of meaning . [ ] the

choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is completely arbitrary. If this were not true, the notio n of value

would be compromised, for it would include any externally imposed element. But actually values remain entirely

relative, and that is why the bond between sound and the idea is radically arbitrary (1959:113). In the first and

second above-quoted sentences, it is claimed that it is by virtue of the arbitrary relationship between signifier and

signified that value is relative. In the third sentence, it is claimed that it is because of the relativity of linguistic values

that the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary. So, in order to demonstrate the axiom about the

arbitrariness of the sign Saussure must first demonstrate that linguistic values are relative, but this relativity isincumbent on the demonstration of arbitrariness, which constitutes circularity. At least, what this passage shows is

that the production of linguistic meaning and the production of linguistic value are interdependent. Earlier in the Cours

he calls a sign a linguistic fact and in the section on Values he calls value a social fact. What the above argument

shows is that these two types of fact are interdependent, however, due to the circularity of the argument, what

does not appear clearly, is whether there is a causal nexus between them or just a relationship of mutual

determinacy (if not co-extensiveness) .

By now addressing how signs assume value I shall demonstrate why (a) meaning and value are interdependent, and

hence value arises due to the relative meaning allocated by a community of interpeters to signs, which meaning is

relatively fixed in the context of exchanges among signs in a sign system or a general economy of signs (b) contrary

to Saussure, meaning is not reducible to value or at least this postulate is defeasible. In order to demonstr ate (a) and

(b) I am drawing on the argumentation provided in Chapter IV (On Linguistic Value) and particularly the section on

the value from the point of view of the concept of the signified (which, for Saussure, is of greater gravitas than the

signifier- this is established, for example, in Saussures claim that whether I make the letters in white or black, raised

or engraved, in pen or chisel- all this is of no importance with respect to their signification [1959:120], contrary to

later theorists, such as Baudrillard, who reverse the relative importance between signifier and signified in an

economy of free floating signifiers). How do signs and signifieds assume value ? The three major premises that bear

the burden of proof in this section consist in the following (i) Meaning is not the same as value (ii) A sign assumes

value in a system of values, which may not be reconstructed by adding up individual sign values (iii) But ultimately

meaning is reducible to value (which contradicts i). Let us explore the validity of the statements that function as proof

conditionals for the major premises. Saussure states that indeed value and meaning are often conflated and

attributes this confusion to the subtlety of the distinction. So there must be something wron g about this subtlety.

Lets examine what this subtlety is and what may go wrong, thus giving rise to a confused definition.

The subtlety consists in distinguishing between vertical and horizontal aspects of relationality among signs that

determine the whatness of which signs and signifieds (which are used inconsistently in this passage that should be

concerned only with signifieds) are counterparts. Saussure reduces signification to the vertical relationship of the

signifier to the signified and value to the horizontal relationship of signs to other signs, signifieds to signifieds and

signifiers to signifiers in a system of language.

First, In order to resolve this

paradox, Saussure resorts to an extralinguistic fact (the exchange of 5 francs forbread as a real object), viz that of monetary exchange and monetary value, which merely affords to add another

plane of confusion, insofar as not only horizontal and vertical aspects of signsrelationality have not been established

yet, but resorting to an extralinguistic fact is contrary to what he explicitly assumed as the basis of his analysis in the

beginning of this section, viz the word as linguistic fact and not the real object. Thus when he introduces the

exchange relationship between 5 francs and bread, conceived of explicitly as an extralinguistic fact he only affords to

add confusion on another plane, that of the existence of extralinguistic facts, that is the existence of referents. And

insofar as the linguistic counterpart of this exchange would amount to an exchange between the signified of franc and

the signified of bread, that is an exchange of two dissimilar words at the similar conceptual level of the signified, the

legitimation of the exemplary and analogical usage at the level of an extralinguistic referent renders the signified

dependent on the referent. So another contradiction in terms emerges, viz that whereas in the beginning of the

section Saussure states that the focus will be words and not real objects, which is question begging given that


8/39


objects do not have signification outside of language, he uses as his key example an extralinguistic referent in the

place of the signified.

Secondly, the confusion is augmented by attempting to prove that value is not fixed because of the f act that a sign

can be exchanged with dissimilar things, viz a signified. But this type of exchange occurs vertically, and vertical

relations are pertinent to meaning and not value. Moreover, in this argument another dimension is introduced in the

signifying relationship between sign and signified, that of exchange. Up until now signified only related (in an abstract

sense, not qualified as exchange) with sign by virtue of being the counterpart of a signifier in a relationship of

signification. Now,the signified is postulated as being exchangeable for the sign (concept for word), rightly so based

on the newly introduced principle that words may be exchanged for dissimilar things, but fallaciously so insofar as

no relationship of exchange amongst sign, signifier and signified has been postulated so far.

Third, by allocating the nature of complementarity to the vertical type of exchange in a system of exchanges that

includes both horizontal and vertical exchanges assumes that the two planes are comparable, which does not

hold, as it was postulated that signification and value are not the same, thus it is like complementing apples with

grapes and summing up their total as ?.

Fourth, the proposition that its [eg the signs] content is only fixed by the concurrence of everything that exists

outside it , assuming that content is equivalent to the signs value, would amount to the possibility of determining a

signs value only upon comparison with all other signs values (insofar as value presupposes the existence of a value

system that is not reducible to, but in excess of the sum of its parts). This argument is self -defeating insofar as (i) the

value of a system of values has been defined in excess of the sum of its parts (ii) if a signs value may not be fixed

unless compared to other signs values, then all values are by definition liquid and non-fixable and this postulate

leads to infinite regress as in order to determine the value of X one must first determine the value of Y but the valueof value of Y depends on the fixation of the value of Z and so on ad infinitum. The example mutton-sheep-

mouton does not afford to resolve the above regress insofar as it concerns a definite set of exchangeable signs ,

while the above stated conditional of concurrence of all values concerns an indefinite set. Thus, in order to

determine the value of mutton vs sheep it is not sufficient to compare it to the value in another language, but one

should compare it to the indefinite set of values of signs in the same language, that is mutton vs sheep vs rhinoceros

vs chocolate vs my uncles hat etc. Thus, the culminating proposition the value of each term depends on its

environment does not clarify whether environment is a definite set of signs that are exchangeable due to some sort

of semantic contiguity (even though the example of mouton would suggest that there is a highly pragmatic dimension

to the exchangeability among concepts as in the context of the example exchangeability is instituted in a serving

predicament) or the entire set of signs making up a language. But, given the already stated impossibility of fixing the

value of a sign or signified (which are used inconsistently in this section which is supposed to deal only with the value

of the signified) unless a system of values is presupposed which is not the sum of its parts, then closing off the

argument in a definite set of signs would contradict the openness of the system of values. Therefore, determining the

value of a signified through the concurrence of all other values is both a contradiction in terms (given that the system

is not the sum of its parts) and impossible, insofar as comparison does not necessarily occur within a definite set of

signs (and if it were conditions of similarity should be introduced first).

Fifth, by extension, the concluding argument of this section that renders signification dependent on value (in

contradiction to their non-identity, but complementary to and as a qualification of their initially interdependent nature)

is defeasible. More particularly, Saussure concludes the section with the premise If I state simply that a word

signifies something when I have in mind the association of a sound-image with a concept, I am making a statement

that may suggest what actually happens, but by no means am I expressing the linguistic fact in its essence and

fulness. The proof for the validity of this premise is yielded in the immediately prior conditional statement (its

conditionality rests with the fact that this minor premise was meant originally to lend credence to the major premise

that a sign assumes value in a system of values) [ ] it is clear that a concept is nothing, that is only a value

determined by its relations with other similar values and [ ] without them the signification would not exist, which

postulates two things (i) that the value of the signified is determined by other similar values, while the scope of

similarity was found to rest with an expanded system of values, which transcends part-values (ii) signification is

reducible to value, which is a contradiction in terms, given that value arises through exchanges and exchanges may

occur both through similar and dissimilar things, thus signification as vertical relationship between signified and sign

is not necessarily reducible to value as horizontal relationship between signifieds and signifieds. Thus, insofar as theconditional statement does not hold, the major premise does not hold either and the notion of

fulness is not

justifiable.

From the argumentation thus far it has emerged that based on Saussures terms or, rather, contradictions in terms

meaning is not reducible to value , but they are interdependent insofar as the meaning of a linguistic fact assumes

value as a social fact. Therefore, in order to qualify the mode of relationality between the two terms, it is not a matter

of reducibility of one to the other, but a matter of irreducible exchangeability. Mouton makes sense as it is,

irrespective of whether I am exchanging mutton for sheep in a concrete predicament of exchange between linguistic

facts, while the linguistic fact is exchanged for a social fact when I exchange a piece of mutton for five francs or when

I exclude a piece of rhinoceros and include a piece of mutton as part of a meal.


9/39


similarity and substitutability, prescribed by a system of horizontal (syntagmatic) and vertical

(paradigmatic) relations.

Thus, value as financial value may be defined by allocating a price to a brand as a

commercial sign, as a plenum of intangible assets (such as practiced by Interbrand and Brand

Finance), by comparing and contrasting it to other brands in the same system of signs; value

as the relative utility of owning and using a brand as a utilitarian sign by consumers or a

brands use or functional value that gives rise to and is in turn determined by primary brand

associations, in Kellers terms4, by comparing and contrasting its use value against similar

products; but also sociopsychological value or the intangible aspects exchanged in the act of

owning and using a brand, which give rise to and are in turn determined by secondary brand

associations, in Kellers terms (which may arise even in the absence of actual brand

Regarding the possibility of dropping the signified without violating signification, Saussure distinguishes in his Cours

between real object and linguistic fact, which does presuppose the existence of the extralinguistic referent,

which is not accounted for. I shall draw on this distinction in order to demonstrate why the signified may be dropped

off the picture, just like the referent. the signs that make up language are not abstractions, but real objects[ ]The

linguistic entity exists only through the associating of the signifier with the signified. Whenever only one element is

retained the entity vanishes; Instead of a concrete object we are faced with a mere abstraction(1959:102) This is a

contradiction in terms . If signs as linguistic entities are also real objects, that is independent of the signifying

relationship between signifier and signified, then they exist independently of the signifying relationship. But, according

to Saussure, the necessary condition for the existence of the sign is the signifying relationship. So either the object

does not exist as such or it exists through the relationship of two abstract entities, a signifier and a signified. If it doe s

not exist as such, then it is not a real object and if it only exists as an abstraction then dropping any of the correlates

of the signifying relationship will not make a difference insofar as it exists only as an abstraction and according to

Saussure, dropping either the signifier or the signified would reduce the object to a mere abstraction. So, unless

additional argumentation is provided about the extra linguistic reality of the object, then we may assume that the signis an abstract entity and as such there is no necessity why both signifier and signified should be retained. Thus,

dropping the signified off the picture does not make any difference to the signifying potential of a self-subsistent

relationship between the sign and its signifier. Given that the relationship between sign and signifier is self-subsistent,

thereal object as referent vanishes . Thus we are left only with relationships between signs and signifiers. The

referent does not exist outside of language, but only as a sign/object in a signifying relationship with its formal

properties as signifier and insofar as by virtue of their purely abstract nature dropping the signified off the picture will

not affect the signifying potential of the relationship, then the signified becomes redundant. Why not drop the signifier

ceteris paribus? Because the signifier is the carrier of the formal properties of the sign, thus responsible for its

recognition and without it there would not be a way of recognizing the sign as such. The fact that the signified is not

a necessary correlate in the relationship between sign and signifier becomes even more forcefully apparent in the

political economy of signs and particularly in a political economy of brands. The most eminent example of such

relationships is he fashion system, which is a case of free floating signifiers, as demonstrated in the ensuing section .

What is exchanged in the product category of fashion, simply put, is money for pure form or money for relations

between a sign (eg a dress) and its symbolic properties or its brand image.

The above exposition of the circularities and contradictions in the Saussurean rationale and the critique ensuing

thereupon resulted in (i) dropping the necessity of the signified from the signifying relationship (ii) maintaining the

signifying relationship between sign and signifier (iii) arguing for the impossibility of fixing the value of a sign by

comparison to other signs by virtue of this leading to infinite regress (iv) proving that by virtue of the system of signs

being in excess of its parts exteriority does not refer simply to another s ign, but to a non-appropriatable surplus of the

system (to which I shall return in the closing argument of this paper about absolute exteriority as what lies beyond

the upper semiotic threshold) (vi) demonstrating how Saussure introduces the real object as extralinguistic referent

through the back door.

4K.L.Keller employs the distinction ,in hjs brand equity system, between primary brand associations, viz. product-

related attributes and/or functional benefits (1998:508) and secondary brand associations, viz. non-product relatedattributes and symbolic or experiential benefi ts (1998:515)


10/39


ownership, through mere exposure to brand communications, packaging and word-of-mouth

communication), and all sorts of hypotactically attributable to the above value territories,

which are indirectly reflected in brand valuation and evaluation processes in brand image

scores.

It is unlikely that one will encounter a pricing scheme stricto sensu for the aesthetic value of a

soap brand (which forms part of the sociopsychological value of a brand), yet this value is

reflected as part of a more general equivalence inscribed in the exchange value of the

hypothetical soap brand. The sum of these latent equivalences constitutes the overall stature

of a brand in terms of brand image. Such composite or aggregate image scorings, in

combination with methods of importing perceptions of price elasticity, culminate in overall

brand values, not directly in financial terms, but as relative utilities that reflect an overall

psychological value of each brand and its standing or differential positioning vis a vis the

competition, as a langue or system of brands or differences and oppositions to itself.

Brand equity stands for the differential or surplus value between a brands book and market

value, in accounting terms, which difference resonates the differential positioning of a brand in

a langue as its semiosphere (as a plenum of primary and secondary brand associations, in

Kellers terms), which resonates in its psychological value, thus qualifying Nthsfourth

prototypical category as an aggregate of utilitarian, commercial and sociocultural values,

attached to it by consumers. Thus, surplus of meaning is reflected in surplus financial

value in the concept of brand equity.

The concept of brand equity is equivalent to a promise of safety for consumers and superior

future financial returns for shareholders. From a semiotic perspective, though, safety opens

connotatively to a promise to consumers that the layers of meaning either currently held by a

brand or potentially taken on board and making up its value, will not erode. What is called in

the respective literature "brand equity erosion" denotes precisely the phenomenon of a

brand's losing its semiotic salience among consumers.

The potential of acquisition of equity by a brand as surplus of meaning, as it will be shown in

the ensuing sections, is incumbent on their successful leverage of Code(s).


11/39


Code as the necessary and sufficient condition for the production of brand mean ing

A code is [ ] the set or system of rules and correspondences which link signs to meaning

[ ] Coded realizations of meanings can themselves be recoded [ ] Socio-cultural norms and

conventions can, rather generally, be thought of as codes, such as dresscodes, politeness

codes and institutional codes of practice (Cobley 2001:170-172).

In essence brand equity stands semiotically for the ability of a brand to capitalize on a code or

on a multiplicity of codes, as necessary conditions for the production of signs (Eco, 1978). In

fact, as it will be demonstrated, the vantage point and at the same time destination for

unlocking the conceptual potential of brand equity and concomitantly putting it to work in its

multifarious operationalizations, consists with an elucidation of the semiotic concept of a or

the code .

The extent to which this semiotic transformation will be attained is incumbent on the degree of

fit of a cultural code, as depth grammar or always already ordered cultural practices as texts,

with brands and their producers, as addressers of signs and consumers as addressees and

partakers of a code or consuming subjects.

Thus, the code as an oblique point of reference at the intersection of signs and subjects as

instances and instantiations of the code, constitutes a meaningful surplus that overdetermines

the degree of semiotic fit between addresser and addressee. The conceptual reflex of this

intersection at the level of brands potential for leveraging code(s) is imprinted in brand equity,

insofar as it is concerned with the same surplus, as financial value purporting to measure

meaning surplus. Therefore, the concepts of brand equity and the code are

interdependent.

Brands as dynamic semiotic entities erode in terms of their equity not because of or at least

not necessarily because of their functional and/or non functional attributes, as indices and

symbols erode, but due to the fact that codes mutate, sediment, transgress their boundaries

and the relative appeal of their combinatorial configurations changes. In an era of proliferating

new product development mortality rate and easiness of copying brand attributes and

elements, the only source of sustainable competitive advantage and hence guarding against


12/39


equity erosion, may be yielded by attending closely to codes. The invaluable import of brand

semiotics as a bona fide standalone field of research lies primarily with its being attentive to

the systemic function of code(s) as the underpinning of brand equity.

In order to understand the allegedly cryptic nature of the notion of code as used in

semiotics (which use varies among semioticians themselves, as amply illustrated by Nth

1990:206-221) and disentangle the concept from its more often than not uncritical

employment in common parlance it is deemed mandatory to differentiate between the mode

of discourse of semiotics in toto from that of cognitive psychology, on which brand equity

related marketing research has largely drawn thus far. Whereas at the center of cognitive

psychology lies the subject as processing unit of external environment stimuli, as a stable

substratum underpinning meaning making processes, at the center of semiotics lies the

subject as an already coded carrier of cultural patterns, value and belief systems5. Even

though the application of a mechanistic , Cartesian outlook of the subject as non localized , a-

contextual mind machine is useful in the face of the demand for analytical rigor and the

compartmentalization of various strata of message elaboration, semiotics assumes a more

dialectic outlook on the formation of the subject, as an assemblage of given cultural patterns

and as the outcome of an ongoing enculturation process.

The epistemological and ontological assumptions embedded in these vastly divergent

paradigms surely lie beyond the focus of this paper, however it is crucial to account for them

even at such a sketchy level, which will enable us to make sense of the notion of the code, of

a codes giveness and why, as aforementioned, insofar as brand equity points to the limit of a

brands potential (its added value), its inherent excess is tantamount to the excess of the code

as brand meaning surplus.

Prior to drawing further parallels between brand equity and the concept of the code, the latter

must be demarcated conceptually and its structural properties must be qualified, otherwise

the concept is operationally of limited value and risks being reduced to an empty signifier. In

order to elucidate the concept I shall draw on three thinkers who have dealt either directly

from within a semiotic paradigm or indirectly, by employing semiotic concepts in the context of

5For a thorough elaboration of the constitutive mechanisms responsible for the formation of the subjec t and a critique

of the Cartesian cogito and by implication cognitivism in toto, see Silverman, 1983, Ch.4


13/39


their theoretical constructs, viz. Baudrillard and his early to mid period writings, Derridas

oblique reference to the code in the context of his reply to Searles criticisms as appeared in

Limited Inc and Ecos qualification of the concept in his early to mid period writings. For

Baudrillard,

what happens in political economy is this: the signified and the referent are

now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers, of a generalized

formalization where the code no longer refers back to any subjective or

objective `reality,' but to its own logic. The signifier becomes its own referent

and the use value of the sign disappears to the profit only of its commutation

and exchange value. The sign no longer designates anything at all. It

approaches in its truth its structural limit which is to refer back only to other

signs. All reality then becomes the place of a semiological manipulation, of a

structural simulation. And whereas the traditional sign... is the object of a

conscious investment, of a rational calculation of signifieds, here it is the

code that becomes the instance of absolute reference" (1975:7). There is no

end to the consumption of the code (1975:10).

The key concept underpinning the function of the code, as may be inferred from the above

extracts, is self-referentiality and the absence of an originary signified to which signifiers are

attached. The abolition of the signified and the reduction of the latter to the plane of the

signifier in the context of the political economy of the sign or commercial discourse as part of

a langue of brands, contrary to the initial qualification of the function of brands as signs by

reference to the planes of the signifier and the signified (as would be postulated by Saussure)

constitutes a valid operative hypothesis in this paper, and has also been endorsed by Eco, as

will be illustrated in due course. The code may be likened to an abstract machine6, to use

Deleuzes metaphor, which produces signifiers that make sense in the context of the codes

own structural limit, which is limitless. There is no autonomy in the object qua referential

reality outside the signifier qua epiphenomenon of the code, save for a social logic

(Baudrillard 1981:68) that is responsible for the generation of codes as models responsible for

6The [

] abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is

yet to come, a new type of real ity (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 142).


14/39


the production of signifiers. What Baudrillard calls social logic as a sort of informal logic

responsible for the production of signifiers without any need for rooting in a system of objects

outside the code resonates a common place across various semioticians and semiotic

theories, from Saussure to Greimas and from Eco to Leeuwen and Kress, viz that signification

or how sign-vehicles assume meaning is a matter of social conventions, which confer relative

stability between a set of signifiers and the sign in which they are inscribed. Baudrillard does

not qualify further the determinants of this social logic in his For a Critique of the Political

Economy of the Sign. However, in The Consumer Societyhe stresses that in the logic of

signs, as in that of symbols, objects are no longer linked in any sense to a definite function or

need. Precisely because they are responding here to something quite different, which is either

the social logic or the logic of desire, for which they function as a shifting and unconscious

field of signification (1998:77). Thus, the kind of social logic to which Baudrillard alludes may

be conceptualized in Derridas terms as structural unconsciousness, as will be

demonstrated in due course. In terms of brand equity language, Kellers secondary brand

associations may, thus, be rendered as secondary non functional signifiers attached to

brands as super-signs without any necessary relationship to primary, functionally related

signifiers. Baudrillards employment of the example of the refrigerator is indicative of this

crucial difference:

1. The refrigerator is specified by its function and irreplaceable in this

respect. There is a necessary relation between the object and its function.

The arbitrary nature of the sign is not involved. But all refrigerators are

interchangeable in regard to this function (their objective "meaning").

2. By contrast, if the refrigerator is taken as an element of comfort or of luxury

(standing), then in principle any other such element can be substituted for it.

The object tends to the status of sign, and each social status will be signified

by an entire constellation of exchangeable signs. No necessary relation to the

subject or the world is involved. There is only a systematic relation

obligated to all other signs. And in this combinatory abstraction lie the

elements of a code.


15/39


16/39


signifier, which is why a political economy of brands does not amount only to a general

economy of signs, but also a general economy of signifiers.

Additionally, even though there is no necessary relation between the sign of the refrigerator

and its signifier, but this correlation is a matter of cultural contiguity, hence the validation of

the arbitrariness of the sign, that assumes a necessary status through repetition and

through a genealogically traceable giveness of the code to which it belongs, the distinction

between necessary and systematic relation Baudrillard draws is operationally useful from a

semiotics of brand equity perspective insofar as it points to the fact that brand differentiation

in essence does not occur at the first level of semiosis in the context of a signs practical

usage, but at the secondary level of semiosis, where a sign enters the semiosphere of

abstract signifiers in a system of interchangeable objects. In a similar vein, this may also

explain why Floch, by reversing Kellers hierarchy between primary and secondary brand

associations (not explicitly so, insofar as Floch did not establish a direct dialogue with Keller),

contends that base brand values, or primary brand associations, do not consist of utilitarian,

but of sociocultural ones (thus anchoring his argumentation in Nth s prototypical categories

classification; cf. Floch, 1990:131). It seems that the more removed from its function as a

utilitarian sign a brand is, thus opening up to the possibilities of being invested with abstract

conceptual signifiers making up the semiosphere of codes, the more it is capable of investing

itself with higher equity, thus rendering the horizon of appropriation of the signifying limit of

the code equivalent to the possibility of higher equity. Thus, brand equity is tantamount to the

approximation of a high semiotic threshold.

In this context, what is interchangeable is not necessarily a salient set of directly competitive

signs, but indirectly competitive signs according to a predominant social logic based on which

codes are woven as contingently necessary amalgamations of second order signifiers.

Thus the value of the product does not rest solely with the exchange financial value of the

sign, but, even more importantly, with the exchange value of the signifier, which is determined

through a systematic relation with other signifiers. This value system as set of systematic

relations is the code and given that systematic relations ramify endlessly the code is the

limitless limit of itself or its own surplus value. By analogy, and this is perhaps the closest


17/39


Baudrillard gets to drawing parallels between the concept of the code and the notion of brand

equity, the commodity achieves its apotheosis when it is able to impose itself as a code, that

is, as the geometric locus of the circulation of models, and hence as the total medium of a

culture (and not only of an economy) (1981:206). The surplus or added value denoted by the

concept of brand equity concerns precisely this potential of a brand to institute a code, to

overdetermine this code as a set of differentially relating signifiers and not necessarily

differential signifiers, while at the same time delineating a horizon of semiosis over and above

what is already given in a semiotic structure. It is the specific weight of signs that regulates

the social logic8

of exchange (1981:66).

Baudrillards most forceful expos of the systemic function of the code with reference to a

particular product category appears in Symbolic Exchange and Death, where he equates

fashion with the enchanting spectacle of the code (1990i:87-99). Why choose fashion as the

most eminent exemplification of the systemic function of the code and reduce the relationship

between the code and its constituting the necessary and sufficient condition for the production

of signifying units as encountered in various product categories to the relationship between

the code and fashion? They [note: all product categories] are all haunted by fashion, since

this can be understood as both the most superficial play and as the most profound social

form- THE INEXORABLE INVESTMENT OF EVERY DOMAIN BY THE CODE" (1990i:87). In

fashion "as an entirely self referential cultural field, concepts are engendered and made to

correspond to each other through pure specularity" (1990i:91). Whereas in the case of verbal

semiosis the code emerges through signifiers as a reflex, in the case of fashion the code

emerges simpliciter as depth grammar and surface structure at the same time, thus

constituting an exemplary simulacrum of infinite semiosis itself. Interestingly, Baudrillard

equates fashion with mode in the sense of trope (it should be noted that la mode stands

for fashion in French). Fashion, thus, constitutes the cultural inscription of the logical category

of modality and in general the field of modal logic and the intersection of rhetoric, or at least

its tropical aspect, with formal logic; as faon it is phenomenologically similar to the

Heideggerian concept of mode-of-Being (in fact if one substituted Being with Code,

8The same sociocentric approach to the way signs assume meaning is assumed by Eco; semiotics is concerned

mainly with signs as social forces (1976:65); la smiotique ne sntresse aux signes que considrs commeforces sociales (1972:62)


18/39


Heideggers existential analytic might as well function as a semiotic analysis of the systemic

function of the Code) or a Wittgensteinian aspect of seeing, which do involve specularity at

their very semantic core. There is no longer any determinacy internal to the signs of fashion

hence they become free to commute and permutate without limit (1990i:87). It exercises an

enormous combinatory freedom (idem) and thus constitutes, one might argue, the ideational

limit of brand stretching. Baudrillard seems to be suggesting that whereas it appears as a

pure play of signs, it affects deep structures such as sex, status, identity, which corresponds

to the aforementioned chain of signifiers making up the semiotic fabric of a brand, which

allows for inter product category comparability. In fact, deep structures are projections or

redundancies brought about by the play of signifiers on the surface structure: not a matter of

investing an a priori signifier with determinate signs (eg status with a suit) but of feigning the

reduction of the pure play of signs into immobile signifiers- the ideational expressive fixation

or sublimation of cultural praxiological content.

Another crucial point raised by Baudrillard concerns the epistemological status of the

dissemination and reception of signs. Baudrillard employs instead of traditional analytical

cognitive categories, that are typical of approaches in the more general field of the philosophy

of Mind, interpretive categories, such as fascination (in For a critique of the political

economy of the sign), enchantment of the code (in Symbolic exchange and death),

passive magic (in Simulation and Simulacra), in an attempt to encapsulate the fact that the

appeal of signs and the formulation of judgments about their truth value and pragmatic

relevance is not necessarily the outcome of a rational calculus, but the outcome of habituation

and enculturation into codes, reminiscent of a Bourdieuan Habitus at play.

It is the cunning of the code to veil itself and to produce itself in the

obviousness of value. It is in the "materiality" of content that form consumes

its abstraction and reproduces itself as form. That is its peculiar magic. It

simultaneously produces the content and the consciousness to receive

it (just as production produces the product and its corresponding need).

Thus, it installs culture in a dual transcendence of values (of contents) and


19/39


consciousness, and in a metaphysic of exchange between the two terms

(1981:119, my emphasis).

Consciousness, instead of constituting the immobile substratum/processing unit responsible

for the compartmentalization of an illusory signified under analytical categories, according to

Baudrillard, is itself a product of the code, just like the content that is processed through it.

A similar point regarding the epistemological status of the code was drawn by Derrida in his

response to Searles performativity theory, as formulated in Limited Inc, where he claims that

there is no such thing as a code - Organon of iterability - which could be structurally secret.

The possibility of repeating and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every code, making

it into a network [une grille] that is communicable, transmittable, decipherable, iterable for a

third, and hence for every possible user in general (1988:8). A key property of the code,

thus, is iterability or its ability to appear as such implicitly through its manifest marks. In

alignment with Baudrillard, it is not some sort of an a priori depth grammar that conditions the

possibility of identifying a relative constancy between signs and signifiers, but an a posteriori

inference based on patterned and recognizably so recurrences of signifying chains.However,

that might constitute a precarious reconstruction of Derridas relatively unqualified argument.

As himself stresses I prefer not to become too involved here with this concept of code which

does not seem very reliable to me" (1988:10). He returns to the notion of the code by using it

as the condition of the meaningful iterability of a performative utterance by posing this

rhetorical question "could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a

"coded" or iterable utterance?". Derrida seems to be setting forward this point assertorically,

yet indirectly in a questioning format, perhaps in order to avoid a sort of reductionism of the

code, hence appearing as liable to criticisms against inherentist structural properties of texts,

against which much of his deconstructive attempts are oriented. Also, the bracketing of the

lexeme /coded/ seems to aim at retaining its meaning in suspense, as a yet non identifiable

sign, whose metatheoretical import purports to elucidate as a heuristic device the fact that

utterances make sense by virtue of their iterability in discrete contexts. Assuming this

bracketing as interpretively valid we are compelled in turn to qualify the sense of this extra-

linguistic, perhaps conventional codedness as condition of the possibility of sense making of


20/39


performative utterances. Is codedness in this instance to be perceived as semantic

codedness or as a contextual codedness? Let us recall that for Derrida there is no such

thing as univocal meaning, save only for contexts (without anchorage). Furthermore, Derrida

contends that oratio obliqua would not be possible to be excluded. In fact, he reverts to oratio

obliqua in order to "elucidate" the isotopy between iterability of the code and cultural

ordinariness, by the cryptic assertoric proposition that "ordinariness shelters a lure" . Thus,

indirectly Derrida lays claim to the function of ordinary language as inevitable polar attractor,

as, what he calls "structural unconsciousness", which prohibits any "saturation of the context".

Bearing in mind that for Derrida there are only contexts, and that the notion of the code, if

possible, would imply a radical non closure and a radical situatedness, then insaturability

would amount to the impossibility of laying bare the code as arche-context, which may also be

read as the impossibility of presencing of the prefix "cum" that comes alongside the text.

Even more interestingly, he employs a similar to Baudrillard rhetorical stratagem in his

oblique reference to the code as lure sheltered in ordinariness, rather as an analytical

principle conditioning the appearance of phenomena. Etymologically, lure includes the

seme decoy (based on Webster lexicon) and in Middle Higher German it used to denote

bait. Also, its derivative allure denotes to entice by charm of attraction. Both of the

above, which resonate Baudrillards predication of cunningness of the code, are included in

his argumentation on how signs function through a logic of seduction and lay claim to the

manner whereby the code constantly transposes itself or abduces itself in an attempt to pin

itself down deductively, hence its insaturability.

In so far as constellations of signs, using Benvenistes term for signifying units, signify by

virtue of the exclusion of other constellations, that is by their exclusion and their negation, the

horizon of signifying possibilities may be likened to an horizon of absolute negativity. The

surplus of meaning as abstract potentiality for appropriating more signifying constellations is

tantamount to the possibility of appropriating the entire horizon of negativity, hence becoming

all inclusive, at the ideal limit where all signs and constellations will have been syntagmatically

juxtaposed, none left out. The concept of brand equity points precisely to that horizon of

negativity as potentiality of appropriation of surplus meaning. Differential positioning, thus,

constitutes a difference in itself, or provisional identity, as the springboard for opening up to


21/39


absolute difference and the appropriation of the surplus of meaning. It is of no surprise that

brands with high equity provide meaning even through extreme cases of polysemy, whereas

for small brand players this would amount to a diffuse positioning and an inability to carve a

distinctive mindscape. The higher the equity, the closer a brand to infinite semiosis, and the

closer to instituting itself as code, the more likely it is to keep surfacing as univocal depth

structure underneath the play of surface signs, therefore the higher its exchange value (not

only in financial terms, but also in terms of the security shelter- provided by the very

partaking of the code that lures).

Despite Baudrillards and Derridas insightful descriptive remarks on the systemic function of

the code, it is not yet clear what is meant by the concept /code/, other than a heuristic

metaphorical device capable of pointing obliquely to the limit of semiosis as combinatorial

possibilities among signs, and how brands assume equity qua potentially instituting

themselves as codes. Thus far it appears that the notion of the code constitutes an ostensive

sign, that is a sign that is pointing towards an abstract horizon of combinatorial possibilities,

which in itself constitutes a step forward compared to the as yet unaddressed issue of the

relatedness among signifiers making up the fabric of a brands equity, yet being wanting in

operational terms.

The theory ofCode(s) according to Eco and how i t contributes to a semiotic approach

to brand equity

Ecos conceptual contributions are instrumental in elucidating the above. Throughout his

Theory of Semiotics he employs the Hjelmslevian dyadic semiotic model, by equating signs

with sign functions, connecting two functives, that of content and that of expression9. A sign

is everything that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be

taken as something standing for something else (1976:16). Signification, for Eco, does

not necessitate the realm of the signified and is exhausted in the multifarious relationships

between signs (or sign-vehicles, which terms are used interchangeably by Eco) and signifiers,

9Even though, in essence, Hjelmslevs model is tetradic insofar as he allocates two additional planes , one to each

correlate of the dyad, viz. that of form and that of substance. For the sake of simplicity and interpretive clarity themodel will be adhered to in its topline dyadic dimension.


22/39


stretching throughout the planes of denotation and connotation (even though the former is

reducible to the latter in the context of infinite semiosis).

The function of the notion of the code in Ecos theory is systemic. It constitutes a meta-sign,

standing for the cultural glue that unites sign-vehicles into cultural units. Despite the fact

that no coherent definition of the code is offered throughout the Theory of Semiotics, while the

concept is constantly elaborated as the argumentation progresses through various areas of

research within the general field of semiotics, certain definitional patterns allow for a sketchy

classification of definitional approaches to the concept of the code, which appears

occasionally like a deus-ex-machina in various instances of syllogistic aporias, veiled in what

Derrida called the inevitability of oratio obliqua.

A code is a set of signals ruled by internal combinatory laws or a syntactic system, a set of

notions, a semantic system, a set of possible behavioral responses (1976:36-37). Eco

embarks on the definitional journey of the code by opening it up to all aspects of a messages

transmission process, spanning an initial state of a set of signs as a semantic system, the

explicit or tacit rules allowing for the combination of sign vehicles into meaningful gestalts and

the addressee of these gestalts as an already coded recipient of meaningful gestalts

(reminiscent of the codes ability, according to Baudrillard, to provide both the content and the

consciousness for its interpretation). By virtue of the codes all encompassing nature, one

can thus alter the structure of both the content and the expression system, following their

dynamic possibilities, their combinatorial capacities- as if the whole code by its very nature

demanded continual reestablishment in a superior state, like a game of chess, where the

moving of pieces is balanced out by a systematic unit on a higher level (Eco 1976:161).

However, such an all-encompassing definition risks meaning nothing or at least not being

operationally useful, while being reducible to stating the obvious. A preliminary qualification

regarding the semantic dimensions of the code is yielded by Eco by differentiating between

Code simpliciterand system-codes or subcodes10

(henceforth denoted as s-codes).

10The abbreviated form of s-code according to Ecos terminology seems to correspond to system code, even

though no formal definition is furnished in the Theory of Semiotics that explicitly links s with system, but it ismore narrowly inferred as such through the definitional contours. Benveniste, however, uses explicitly the termsubcode in the same fashion as Ecos s-code. Insofar as Code (simpliciter) and in this case I add the qualifiersimpliciter in order to distinguish the definition of Code as such from s-codes, in the same fashion as Nth (1990)adds the qualifier proper- is also of systemic nature, but functions at a more abstract and all -encompassing levelcompared to s-codes, I am retaining the term subcode wherever s-code is operative.


23/39


An s-code is a system of elements, such as syntactic, semantic and behavioral ; a code is a

rule coupling the items of one s-code with items of another (1976:37-38). In La structure

absente he also refers to code (simpliciter) as Hyper-code (1972:111; he also employs the

descriptor Ur-code in the same work, 1972:203), a descriptor, which disappeared in the

Theory of Semiotics. In order to render the nature of the s-code more concrete interpretively

let us take for example the s-code or the consumptive occasion called family table. A family

table is an s-code, there is a manifest syntax (ordering of spoons, forks, knives, plates, seats)

that signifies an intrafamilial bonding occasion as consumptive occasion and certain modes of

comportment of the participating members towards the elements of the syntax. Based on

Ecos theory this is a structure or a cultural unit. It is an elementary unit of analysis insofar as

it is self-subsistent with its particular combinatorial rules and semiotic boundaries, eg if

someone danced on the table instead of eating cereals, he would not be perceived as

partaking of the s-code called familial table. If the forks were placed in the vase they would

still not be perceived as parts of the syntax of the familial table. The existence of a set of

plates on a table by itself is not suggestive of an instance of the s-code called family table. It

is the plenum or gestalt of the (i) individual sign-vehicles (ii) the tacit rules for their ordering

(iii) the manifest syntax of their ordering (iv) the pre-reflective, automatic comportment of the

participating subjects towards the requirements and background expectations of the occasion,

that confer to this semantic system the nature of an s-code. This set of background

expectations also justifies Ecos assertion about the giveness of the code , which might as

well be rendered as a pragmatics of the code, as a matter of learning and enculturation,

rather than a matter of inherent semantic properties of elementary signifying units. In

comparison and contrast to a cognitivist approach, such as Husserls, the forks and plates on

the family table do not assume meaning due to a transcendental egos intentionality that

appropriates for itself as yet unformed stimuli from some sort of unqualified materia prima by

bracketing phenomena through epoch, but due to the pre-phenomenological giveness of s-

codes as intersubjectively shared and subjectivizing conditions11

. S-codes are systems or

11In an attempt to reappropriate the explanatory preponderance of how objects and phenomena assume meaning

from the field of anthropology that was gaining ground over transcendental phenomenology in the 1930s, Husserlemployed the term transcendental intersubjectivity, as an operation that allows the world to appear identical foreveryone (a communalized transcendental life) (Husserl 1931:10). Complementary to the apparent question beggingnature of this heuristic device as a way out of a syllogistic aporia it points on the inverse to what would be dispelledby Husserl as naive empiricism or naive realism, viz an attempt on behalf of a discipline such as structural


24/39


structures that can also subsist independently of any sort of significant or communicative

purpose (1976:38). It is a relational concept, which appears only when different phenomena

are mutually compared with reference to the same system of relations (op.cit.). These

systems are usually taken into account only insofar as they constitute one of the planes of a

correlational function called a code. Through this distinction between code (simpliciter) and

s-codes, Eco seems to be suggesting that the latter is some sort of overarching Ars

Combinatoria that allows for the multiple disjunctions, conjunctions, intersections among the

various s-codes. A semiotics of the code is an operational device in the service of a

semiotics of sign production (1976:128). Codes provide the rules which generate signs as

concrete occurrences in communicative intercourse (p.48), the conditions for a complex

interplay of sign functions (1976:57).

Eco recognizes that the notion of the code is an operational device in the service of the

production of signs. Insofar as signs by themselves do not signify (at least in the context of

commercial discourse, in which brand equity is situated), unless they are conceived of as

parts of one or various s-codes and given that s-codes consist of combinatorial rules for the

production of signs, we may infer that signs constitute combinatorial entities. If signs may not

be conceived of apart from their combinatorial ordering in various s-code syntaxes, signifiers,

as their structural properties, are also dependent on s-codes. Also, insofar as code

(simpliciter) allows for the constant redistribution of signs among sign systems and the

anthropology to replace transcendental phenomenological principles as explanatory of the formation of empiricalobjects and how they assume sense with a set of cultural practices in the light of which the giveness of the empiricalworld is safeguarded. By the same token, this criticism might be launched against a structural semiotic approach,

which postulates uncritically the giveness of subcodes, against which one might formulate an argument of a so tospeak metaphysics of the code, accompanied by cryptic operative terms such as deep artic ulatory matrix (usedby Eco). In fact, potential criticisms might be launched against either side of the transcendentalist/naive empiricist

divide (either under the guise of a realist or a soft nominalistic approach, such as the one endorsed by Eco) by post -structuralism and critical theory proponents, based on which the relative univocity of sense-making vis a visphenomena is the outcome of power relationships among social networks members and, rather than a product of a

direct reflexive relation of like-minded transcendental egos, an instance of the asymmetrical distribution ofinformation, genealogically discernible contingencies (which may be unearthed through sociological interpretations),

impression management tactics and the very critical abilities of an interpretive communitys members to challengethe set of interpretants or signifiers that are stringed after individual signs. In this respect, a structuralist theory ofcodes may withstand criticism insofar as mutation and sedimentation of subcodes is envisioned as a geneticallyinscribed possibility. Moreover, insofar as signifiers are not predicated of signs in the context of rational calculi, but

rather in the context of a process of enculturation, hence constituting cultural units, rather than logical propositions,claiming that the univocity of meaning is a matter of some sort of tacit agreement among transcendental egos,which would amount to the same processing of individual phenomena through the various functions of atranscendental logical mechanism (imagination, apperception etc) is at best an unverifiable idealist assumption.Insofar as the code furnishes the consciousness, as Baudrillard stressed (even conceived of at such a schematiclevel, just like the concept of social logic or Searles pragmatic mandate that behind the condition of the meaningfuliterability of a speech act lies the replication of the same sort of intentionality) responsible for interpreting phenomenaor making sense of phenomena in a particular manner or within a fuzzily coherent conceptual scope, the postulate ofa transcendental intersubjectivity is at best self defeating in terms of verifiability.


25/39


reordering of s-codes, signifiers also open up to the plane of infinite semiosis . Additionally,

insofar as code (simpliciter) stands for a surplus of meaning as an inherent multiplicity of

combinatorial possibilities among s-codes, and having established that brand equity is

equivalent to the code as added value or the surplus in the exchange of a brand qua coded

product, then the higher the equity the more open a brand is to the plane of infinite semiosis

as combinatorial possibilities among s-codes and by implication as intra s-code combinatorial

possibilities among signs making up an s-code.

In order to render the notion of the code more operationally concrete and relevant in the

context of a semiotics of brand equity, allusion to the derivative notions of overcodedness,

undercodedness and extracodedness is of particular interpretive value.

Overcodedness is tantamount to the closure of meaning or to the maximally elaborated coded

interpretation of a constellation of signs. The operations of overcodedness, when completely

accepted, produce an s-code. In this sense overcoding is an innovatory activity that

increasingly loses its provocative power, thereby producing social acceptance (Eco 1976:

134). Overcodedness is a necessary condition for the recognition of the interpretive stability of

sign-constellations and it operates as a stabilizing social force or a dominant social logic.

Undercoding may be defined as the operation by means of which in the absence of reliable

pre-established rules, certain macroscopic portions of certain texts are provisionally assumed

to be pertinent units of a code in formation, even though the combinational rules governing

the more basic compositional items of the expressions, along with the corresponding content

units remain unknown (Eco 1976:135-136).

Extra-codedness lies in between over and undercodedness and includes the extra semiotic

and uncoded determinants of an interpretation. The as yet unfamiliar to a code elements are

potentially inscribed in a given code (or manage to institute a wholly new one) primarily

through a play of inferential probabilities, which correspond to the logical operation of

abduction. To continue with the example of the family table, dancing on the table may initially

seem awkward. However, upon the potential inscription of such a set of gestural signs in

movies or ad films a certain sort of familiarity of the representation is established or what has

already been called the security offered by partaking of the code (which lures subjects into


26/39


recognizing the giveness of a constellation of signs as meaningful in context). At first, some

early-adopters of cultural insignia may try this at home and thus initially marginally and

perhaps progressively (as an indication of a special achievement to be shared with the rest

family members or as a ritual of passage) institute this sign-vehicle in the constellation of

signs making up the s-code of the family table. In fact, a genealogical approach to cultural

practices would surely point to such instances of extra-codedness, where what initially

appeared as alien to an embedded cultural practice became its entrenched component. Let

us not forget that repetition lies at the heart of a codes coding. Thus, extra codedness is an

indispensable condition of a codes expanding its combinatorial possibilities, towards higher

levels of synthesis, as Eco stressed. Abduction represents the first step of a metalinguistic

operation destined to enrich a code (1976:132). Extra-codedness is a necessary condition

for brand meaning enrichment. It may be claimed that it occurs as an initially destabilizing

social force or an emerging supplement to an existing social logic, which is necessary for

innovation, brand stretching and the sustainability of brand equity.

It is by virtue of subcodes that signs assume meaning as cultural units. In order to understand

more clearly why codes are of the essence as explanatory devices for the meaningful

production of signs one should have to look at limit cases of sign and code production or

instances of extracodedness and undercodedness and instances of signs below the semiotic

threshold. Such instances constitute limit cases as transgressive of boundaries and

generative of types. An anthropological approach, such as Levi-Strausss, points to the fact

that every cultural system is based on a set of prohibitions and it might be claimed that a

cultural order subsists as such precisely due to a system of formal and informal sanctions that

lie at the very center of a cultural order as exchange values for transgressing its boundaries.

Prohibition as the failure to ascribe meaning betrays the dependence of sign production in

general on codes and the compulsory character of the latter, as a system of rules.

Everything that lays claim to a certain compulsoriness exhibits a dependence on the dictates

of the pragmatic-political code (Frank 1989:396).

The imposition of a sanction as a semiotic act implies the prior enactment of destabilization in

the interpretively shared correlation between the levels of content and expression, and

appears as the outcome of a transgression either at the level of content or expression or both.


27/39


It denotes that the semiotic act of circulating a transgressive sign or a code was not meant

to be or that the initiated sign may not be exchanged for one or more signifiers or that the

proposed exchange has already been instituted as prohibited. A mild system of prohibition

embedded in an act of exchange consists in buying a pack of candies and claiming social

status due to that packs possession. The claimant is prohibited by a cultural order the tacit

correlational rules of which bar the institution of such a correlation between the functives of

the sign. There is no subcode in the context of which such an exchange would be recognized.

A heavy system of prohibition consists in the transgression of a traffic sign, in which case a

sanction is imposed not because a correlation has not been instituted as such in a subcode,

but because of a formally instituted correlation between sign and signifier (eg red light being

monosemically correlated with the signifier stop) has been breached. There is no

transcendental operation or intentional positing in making sense of such phenomena or

reducing them to non-sense. The responses as social logic are inscribed and evoked

automatically in a subjects comportment towards the signs, they are part of common-

sense. However, continuing with the mild prohibition example, which is of direct relevance to

a brands differential positioning and equity, such a correlation (between candy and status)

exists as a combinatorial possibility within the code of status, should one wish to approach

this market phenomenon through this subcode (let us recall that coding is an operation that is

largely dependent on the coder, there is no metaphysics of codes). A premium quality candy

may be produced, in premium packaging with premium pricing, distributed in premium

delicatessen outlets. The rate of adoption, repurchase rates and quantified loyalty potential

may be gauged among subjects who buy into the respective code. Upon launch with the

requisite marketing mix such a premium candy may in fact acquire high equity, or be

recognized as of added value or of surplus meaning within its niche. What this example is

intended to demonstrate is that equity is (i) isotopic in a cultural narrative to added value as

the excess of the code instituted in an act of a semiotic exchange (ii) isotopic in a cultural

narrative to surplus of meaning as overcoded semiotic act (that is as an act that

synecdochically points to the limit of a code) What is lacking interpretively is the

establishment of how such a semiotic act is effected on behalf of a subject in the face of a

relatively undercoded incidence of a code. The answer lies in the leveraging of existing sign


28/39


types and their respective structural components of other products that partake of the same

code. The enchantment of the code assumes functional value not because it is put at play in

some sort of metaphysical necessitas, but because of the sussessful re-cognition of the new

brand as a token of a general economy of the code, including types of products with similar

structural components. Thus, the depth grammar of the code is evoked through the surface

Towards a Semiotics of Brand Equity Jul 2011

Documents