Towards a characterization of economic sanctions

CHAPTER ITowards a characterization of economic sanctions1.1 Definitions and types of sanctions

Problematique

The term ‘sanction’ is a very broad one that encompasses a number

of different meanings dependent upon the context. It is certainly

a word that’s heard often throughout popular culture in relation

to matters concerning international affairs. Sanction is

generally defined as range of actions taken by states, either

collectively or unilaterally in response to a particular unlawful

act in order to ensure that the state performs a right or

obligation1. While this is a fairly straightforward explanation

for this phenomenon, the broadness of such a statement dictates

that the concept of a sanction be subdivided into the distinct

categories that better suit the reality of such an implement

being put into practice. Indeed, there are a number of different

varieties of sanctions currently in place worldwide, each with a

specific host of implications and expected results.

1.1.2 Types of sanction

1 Decaux, Emmanuel. 2008. 'The Definition Of Traditional Sanctions: Their Scope And Characteristics'. International Review Of The Red Cross 90 (870): 249. doi:10.1017/s1816383108000283.

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Trade embargoes

Bans on imports of raw materials or goods from the sanctions

target

Financial sanctions on individuals in government, government

bodies and associated companies, or terrorist groups and

individuals associated with those groups

Travel bans on named individuals

By no means has a recent development, the application of

sanctions existed for millennia. There are records dating this

particular brand of activity at least as far back as ancient

Greece. A prime example of this is the Megarian Decree, a law

that was enacted by Athens in 432 BC that prevented the merchants

of nearby Megara from frequenting Athens’ ports and commercial

markets. This course of action was adopted by Athenian lawmakers

as a result of multiple perceived transgressions committed by the

inhabitants of Megara towards their neighbors. Although there are

numerous theories as to the exact reason such a law was created,

it is clearly evident that what these early lawmakers had

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achieved was the creation of a de facto 'trade embargo'.2

Naturally, the law affected many individuals and is considered by

many academics to have ultimately been a failure because of its

undesired end result; many historians describe the decree as a

major factor in the outbreak of the Peloponessian war.3 Whether

or not this was actually the case at the time, the Megarian

Decree certainly set an important precedent for many subsequent

governments to follow in terms of how to deal with adverse

behavior on the part of both individuals and groups of people.

The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Megarian

Decree go a long way to showing how, for centuries the use of

sanctions went hand in hand with acts of warfare. For a prime

example of this, one needs look no further than 17th century

Japan. It was there that, due to the growing influence of

European missionaries and their resulting success in converting

local Japanese peasants to Christianity, tensions had developed

over time. Eventually, a battle pitting 30,000 persecuted

peasants and Christians against a samurai army of more than2 Lendering, Jona. 2005. 'Megarian Decree - Livius'. Livius.Org. http://www.livius.org/concept/megarian-decree/.3 Historia Nerdicus,. 2013. 'The Causes Of The Peloponnesian War - The Megarian Decrees'. https://historianerdicus.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/the-causes-of-the-peloponnesian-war-the-megarian-decrees/.

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100,000 erupted. It was a battle that would end with heavy losses

for both sides. Once what was to become known as the Shimabara

Rebellion was finally over, the resulting conditions saw

progressively tighter restrictions imposed on foreigners. Soon

Japan’s ruling elite would levy such tight sanctions, that most

non-Japanese were ordered expelled from the country. Despite all

arguments against such harsh regulation, Japan would go on to

maintain this strict policy of relative isolation, through a

series of laws and decrees, for over 200 years.4 In this

particular case, one can assume that the costs of maintaining

such a strict regime of reclusion were outweighed by the benefits

that such a strong measure of internal control provided.

Even though economic sanctions were used prior to World War I to

compliment the military actions, it was until after WWI that the

idea of sanctions would be considered to substitute completely

armed hostilities.5 Understandably, this represented a

comparatively strong shift in perspective from the way countries

resolved conflicts. It is Woodrow Wilson, the American President

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Japan5 Alikhani, Hossein. 1995. In The Claw Of The Eagle. London: Centre for business studies.

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in office at the time, who is credited with being the main

proponent behind this evolution of diplomatic thought. A logical

reaction to develop considering the grisly carnage he would

witness firsthand. In support of his progressive views on the

subject, Wilson would famously proclaim “A nation that is

boycotted is a nation in sight of surrender. Apply this economic,

peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for

force”.6 One can readily assume from such a quote that he

considered sanctions to be both a powerful tool for governments

and an effective deterrent to armed conflict. Despite the fact

that the veracity of such a claim has been disputed a number of

times by various parties, it is a view shared by many to this

day.

Sanctions usually consist of a ban on the sale and shipment of

products to a country, along with restrictions on the purchase of

its exports as well. Examples of this type of measure in

contemporary society abound. Such activity would naturally belong

to the category of economic sanction, a classification which the

aforementioned Megaran Decree would also fit into. Sanctions like

6 Hufbauer, Gary. 1997. 'Economic Sanctions: America's Folly'. Presentation.

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these are commonplace and overlap with similar terms such as

boycott, tariffs and embargo. They range from import duties being

levied on shipped goods to production quotas and are constantly

being implemented and revised within the framework of today’s

rapidly changing economic landscape. This particular brand of

sanction has been characterized by economists as embodying a wide

spectrum ranging from mild activity, such as the failure to renew

some benefits, to more comprehensive measures such as the

complete seizure of assets.7 Hence the severity of the intended

result has a direct and proportionate effect on the gravity of

the conditions imposed.

The category of economic sanction can be further subdivided into

the following two classifications: trade and financial. While

trade sanctions target specific imports and exports, financial

sanctions are often intended to impede finance and involve

restrictions on loans, available credit and even state financial

aid.8 Actions taken by nations against other nations for

political reasons either multilaterally or unilaterally encompass7 Lowenfeld, Andreas F. 2002. International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.8 Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg. 2008. 'Sanctions'. The Concise Encyclopedia Of Economics. Washington DC: Library of Economics and Liberty.

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sanctions. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as an

international, rather than economic, sanction as a means to

differentiate between the two. Thus large scale bans on economic,

sporting and cultural contacts between countries coexist

alongside minor ‘individual’ sanctions such as withholding visas

from citizens of another state.9 In certain cases, the two are

used in tandem. Sanctions can be intended to achieve either

political goals, such as those linked to foreign policy, or

commercial goals, such as the withdrawal of tariff protection. To

elicit different outcomes, different areas of legislation can be

targeted.

Although sanctions penalize delinquent parties for their negative

behavior, their use is above all intended to persuade individual

entities to change actions or policies in the future. For

example, sanctions imposed upon South Africa during the apartheid

era have been described as having been created “…not to punish

white South Africa for the sins of Apartheid, but rather to push

it to the conference table to negotiate a handover of power to

9 Rossignol, Michel. 1996. Sanctions. [Ottawa]: Library of Parliament, Research Branch.

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bring about majority rule”.10 Thus whatever the ramifications,

either intended or otherwise, the purpose of creating these types

of restrictions most often is above all coercive in nature.

On a global scale, sanctions were adopted as a means of policy

enforcement by the League of Nations after WWI, and subsequently

the United Nations after WWII.11 This is important to note, as

the dynamics implicit within multilateral sanctions are

inherently different than when they are applied unilaterally by

just one country. In terms of nation states, the United States,

either acting alone or with allies, has resorted to economic

sanctions more frequently than any other entity since WWI. Other

significant users include the United Kingdom, the European Union,

the League of Arab States and the Soviet Union/Russia.12 The

relatively large size of these entities is indicative of the mass

needed to successfully enforce such legislation. Indeed,

sanctions lose much of their power when methods of circumvention

are readily available to the affected party. When put into10 Hanlon, Joseph, and Roger Omond. 1987. The Sanctions Handbook. Harmondsworth [etc.]: Penguin Books.11 Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg. 2008. 'Sanctions'. The Concise Encyclopedia Of Economics. Washington DC: Library of Economics and Liberty.12 GC Hufbauer JJ Schott KA Elliott, and B Oegg Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed Peterson Institute for International Economics Washington 2007).

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practice, sanctions almost always parallel the three basic

purposes of international criminal law: to punish, to deter, and

to rehabilitate.13 This is important as there have been debates

worldwide over which standards should govern how sanctions are

imposed. Some lawyers have argued that sanctions must meet a

standard found in the law of human rights, while others have

suggested that different standards are appropriate when the very

purpose of the sanctions is to enforce said rights and to uphold

peace and security. 14 International humanitarian law standards

and countermeasures have both been proposed as more appropriate

alternatives. In both, the core legal restraint is found in the

principle of proportionality, which means regulating the exercise

of power by nations by setting up specific bounds within which

nations must act.15

13 Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg 14 O'Connell, M. E. 2002. 'Debating The Law Of Sanctions'. European Journal OfInternational Law13 (1): 63-79. doi:10.1093/ejil/13.1.63.15 Europa.eu,. 2015. 'Proportionality Principle'. Accessed January 26. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/proportionality_en.htm.

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1.2 The use of sanctions: between ideology and internal politics

Put into practice, sanctions have not exactly proved to be the

surefire alternative to military action as originally expressed

by President Woodrow Wilson after WWI. In many cases, almost no

resulting change in policy is achieved whatsoever from such

measures. For example, when President Reagan imposed economic

sanctions against Panama in 1988, they were specifically designed

to force then leader General Noriega to relinquish his power

there as he was under federal indictment on charges of illegal

drug trafficking.16 Despite curtailing the possibility of

receiving vital currency payments from the U.S. and the

suspension of various Panamanian imports, the then de facto

president still remained in power for more than a year

afterwards, seemingly unfazed by the effects of these actions. It

wasn’t until the U.S. finally invaded the country and apprehended

him as a prisoner of war that he was replaced as head of state,17

16 The New York Times,. 1989. 'U.S. Expands Its Sanctions Against Panama'. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/13/world/us-expands-its-sanctions-against-panama.html.17 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/panama/7639871/Former-dictator-General-Noriega-claims-prisoner-of-war-status.html

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adding weight to the argument that sanctions are relatively

ineffective on their own without the aid of physical force.

Panama proved to be a complicated issue. Because the U.S. wanted

to destabilize the Noriega regime without hurting their political

allies in the Panamanian financial sectors, their strategy had to

find the balance between these two contrasting interests. What

eventually developed was that sanctions were first imposed

incrementally, but then gradually weakened by a series of

exceptions that reduced their power to the point of inadequacy.18

With all of the time and effort that a campaign of sanctions can

entail, one would expect that only the utmost care would be taken

in their application to ensure their success. Yet the policy

shortcomings the Panamanian situation highlighted were by no

means an isolated incident, as the following cases attest to. For

example, one could argue that a similar trade embargo which was

levied against Nicaragua in the 1980s, whose basic purpose was to

bring about significant changes to the policies of the then-

ruling Sandinistas, played no role in undermining the target

18 Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg. 2008. 'Sanctions'. The Concise Encyclopedia Of Economics. Washington DC: Library of Economics and Liberty.

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government. Rather, it was the toll of a heavy insurgency. It has

since been widely established that it was the years of heavy

fighting the country witnessed, and its subsequent effects on the

Nicaraguan populace, that was to prove the cause of the

Sandinista’s rejection by the Nicaraguan public and their

ultimate undoing.19 Similarly, the Soviet decision to withdraw

from Afghanistan, made official in April 1988, was never

considered to be a reaction to economic factors. In fact, it is

much more generally accepted that this happened as a direct

result of Afghanistan’s violent physical resistance to Soviet

occupation, a defiance that manifested itself through the

outbreak of warfare throughout the country. It was a bloody

rebellion that resulted in the Soviets eventual return

homewards.20 Conversely, there are few arguments citing President

Carter's 1979 imposition of economic sanctions against the

U.S.S.R. as the salient reason that Afghanistan eventually gained

its freedom.21

19 Vianica.com,. 2015. 'Sandinista Revolution'. Accessed January 25. https://vianica.com/go/specials/15-sandinista-revolution-in-nicaragua.html.20 http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/Research/Docs/Fivecoat_GalleyProof.pdf21 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa124.html

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Many individuals who have studied the subject have come to the

conclusion that sanctions are, despite their popularity,

generally ineffective in the majority of cases.22 Two oft-cited

authorities on the matter, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey

J. Schott, have stated that in most cases sanctions do not

“contribute very much to the achievement of foreign policy

goals”.23 The reasons for this vary depending upon whom you speak

to. There are some scholars who are more oriented towards

domestic politics that argue how sanctions are often imposed even

if the sanctioning government expects them to fail, as it is a

measure that can satiate public pressure for action in a

crisis.24 Still others maintain that sanctions are a function of

scale and execution. Mechanisms such as embargoes and trade

restrictions must respect stringent criteria such as being

manageable in scope, executed by parties who are capable of

enforcing them and set within a context that can be controlled.

Indeed, only “…by imposing directed and focused sanctions on

22 Oskarsson, Katerina. 2012. 'Economic Sanctions On Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned'.Middle East Policy 19 (4): 88-102. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00562.x.23 Hufbauer & Schott, p.6924 Drury, A. C. 1998. 'Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered'. Journal OfPeace Research 35 (4): 497-509. doi:10.1177/0022343398035004006.

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belligerent states, would it be possible to influence policy

change”.25 Whatever the reasoning, the glaringly apparent

shortcomings of sanctions in practice are currently widely

recognized. In his book Economic Sanctions: examining their philosophy and

efficacy, author Hossein Askari goes so far as to state in his

first chapter how “Sanctioned governments rarely change their

policies to comply with the wishes of the sanctioning country

when sanctions are not in conjunction with military action”.

As previously mentioned, there are many inherent disadvantages to

the concept of applying sanctions. One major flaw of this policy

approach worth mentioning, one that has made itself readily

apparent through the study of this phenomenon, is the elongated

timeframe it often engenders. In many instances it has taken

sanctions months, if not years, to produce even a fraction of the

results desired through their imposition. A definite obstacle to

potential effectiveness, enforcing such a lengthy process can

prove to be a challenge to any nation, powerful or not. Another

negative possible outcome of note are the strong reactions that

25 Johnson, Ian. 2009. 'Economic Sanctions'. Kentlaw.Edu. http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/Ian%20Johnson%20Law%20of%20Nation%20Building%20Paper.htm.

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result from this type of punitive decree, as they can sometimes

create the opposite effect of what was originally intended to

result from such penalties. To elaborate; one can easily find

examples throughout history where enacting a trade embargo to

outlaw the use of something, such as the American policy of

alcohol prohibition that was in place during the 1920s, only

resulted in making it more valuable. This reaction, not at all

uncommon, can be considered as being a true example of diplomatic

failure as the problem was not only not resolved, but it was

actually compounded. Along these same lines, economic sanctions

against a country may only serve to unify a targeted demographic

both in support of its embattled leaders and in the search for

ways to circumvent restrictions. This outcome has been evident in

multiple episodes throughout history: the nationalistic reaction

that blunted the League of Nations’ actions against Italy in the

thirties, the Soviet sanctions against Yugoslavia in the late

forties and early fifties that only succeeded in galvanizing the

country and Indonesia’s embrace of communist ideals in the face

of U.S. oppositional measures in the sixties. Benito Mussolini

voiced this sentiment perfectly when he expressed Italy’s

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nationalistic defiance of the League’s sanctions in 1935 with the

words “To sanctions of an economic character we will reply with

our discipline, with our sobriety, and with our spirit of

sacrifice”.26

Yet another issue to consider when examining the cause and effect

of sanctions is that they do not always prevent the recourse of

military action when put into force. What happened in Panama with

the case of General Noriega is a prime example of this. Any armed

conflict that results from the effects of sanctions can be

perceived to be a diplomatic failure, as this is exactly the type

of consequence that’s supposed to be avoided. Sanctions are

generally viewed as offering the prospect of a “more civilized

world where international norms are enforced not through military

violence but through the power of trade”.27 This humanitarian

aspect is an important one to consider, as some of the most

serious questions regarding the use of sanctions concern the

impact these measures may inflict upon the populace in question.

To explain, there are many arguments to show that sanctions cause

26 Renwick 1981, p1827 Cortright, David. 1995. 'Humanitarian Sanctions? The Moral And Political Issues'.Wcl.American.Edu. https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i1/cortri31.htm.

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excessive economic hardship and suffering among only the most

vulnerable segment of a population, while having little effect on

those in power that were originally intended to feel the brunt of

such action.28 This kind of outcome really throws into doubt the

usefulness of sanctions as an effective method of coercion, as

overt damage to unintended, ‘vulnerable’ sections of the victim

populace can bring about a host of negative repercussions to the

point of backfire. Conventional theory holds that “the

effectiveness of sanctions is directly proportional to the level

of pain they impose on a target nation”.29 Yet what is implicit

in this statement is that the level of pain that is imposed

throughout the target nation in question is done so in a uniform

manner, which is unfortunately so often not the case.

A strong example of this can be seen in Burma, which has

relatively recently become the recipient of various U.S. trade

sanctions. Although this legislation was intended by the United

States as a way of penalizing various Burmese government

industries for their negative policies, it instead had a

28 Biersteker, Thomas, Sue Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho. 2012. Designing UnitedNations Targeted Sanctions. Evaluating Impacts And Effectiveness Of UN Targeted Sanctions. Geneva: Watson Institute.29 ibid

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devastating effect on the innocent citizens, those being the

working class textile laborers employed in that country. Indeed,

American lawmakers assessing the impact of their handiwork were

in for an unpleasant realization once the effects of these ill-

conceived sanctions were assessed. Congress would go on to

receive State Department reports on how many of these workers, a

group made up largely of low-paid local women, were trafficked

into prostitution in neighboring Thailand as a direct result of

the penalties imposed against their employers and the resulting

loss of work.30 This is perhaps testament to the unpredictable

nature of sanctions in general.

At their core, sanctions are mere foreign policy instruments that

do have their limits. They can only ever indirectly affect their

targets, and even more indirectly influence the political or

economic goals they are supposed to achieve. They require a high

degree of cooperation among the parties involved to be effective,

cooperation that can be difficult to maintain over prolonged

periods of time. Often, they involve using economic instruments

30 Wilson, Trevor. 2012. 'The Real Trouble With Sanctions: The Case Of Myanmar| Global Europe - Independent Thinking On EU External Affairs'. Global-Europe.Org. http://www.global-europe.org/detail-articles.php?articles=0000000037.

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to bring about a desired political change, a challenging

proposition even with a best case scenario. Even if they have

some specific policy change – even regime change – as their

ultimate goal, sanctions cannot actually be used as a mechanism

to ensure such an outcome as they are mainly reactive in

nature.31 One aspect to assess is the difference between trade

and financial sanctions and the parties that are hurt by each.

The damage inflicted by trade sanctions such are export controls

are usually diffused throughout a country’s population, while

financial sanctions such as a freeze on foreign aid are much more

likely to hit the personal pockets of the government officials

concerned who shape local policy.32

As more is learned about sanctions and their toll, measures have

been taken to reduce the negative effects previously discussed.

For example: beginning in the 1990s, a host of “targeted

sanctions” aimed specifically at political leaders, drug lords

and terrorists have been frequently used in an attempt to avoid31 Committee of experts of the mechanism for follow-up of implementation of the inter-American convention against corruption,. 2003. Report on its implementation in Colombia of the convention provisions selected for review in the context of the first round. Washington dc: organization of American States.32 Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg. 2008. 'Sanctions'. The Concise Encyclopedia Of Economics. Washington DC: Library of Economics and Liberty.

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the humanitarian fallout resulting from the type of broadly-

sweeping sanctions that can be so damaging to innocent

bystanders.33 The Stockholm Process, an initiative presented to

the UN Security council that explored how to make targeted

sanctions ‘smarter’, developed new financial models for embargoes

and ways for sanctions to become more flexible and responsive.34

Still others advocate the “…closing of loopholes,” that can

enable targeted leaders to not only evade the effects of

sanctions, but to profit from them as well, as a way to improve

the efficacy of sanctions as was the case with Iran.35 Yet

whether these measures prove helpful or not in the long term

still remains to be seen.

Of course, the success of economic sanctions can be judged by how

well they achieve their specific stated objectives. That is not

an easy task, however, because the objectives can be multiple,

muddled, or variable. One example is the U.S. President Ronald

Reagan's imposition of extraterritorial export controls on both

33 ibid 34 http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/griffiths_dermody_feb1335 Foster, Peter. 2013. 'US Congress In Urgent Call To ECB To Tighten Sanctions On Iran - Telegraph'. Telegraph.Co.Uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9894143/US-Congress-in-urgent-call-to-ECB-to-tighten-sanctions-on-Iran.html.

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domestic businesses and those in Western European in an attempt

to deny equipment and technology for construction of a Soviet gas

pipeline in the 1980s. The declared objective of these sanctions

was to induce the Soviets to lift military rule in Poland,36 but

one could also argue that the real purpose these controls were

put in place was to impede construction of a gas pipeline from

Siberia to Western Europe. Given the frosty relations between the

U.S. and U.S.S.R. at the time, allowing Europe to become overly

dependent on the Soviet Union for energy supplies would certainly

be an outcome worth preventing. Within a few months U.S.

officials had, in effect, redefined the declared policy goal and

the President subsequently announced that the sanctions were

being lifted as a result of "substantial agreement" on East-West

issues between the United States and its allies.37 It is perhaps

interesting to note that neither the original declared objective

nor the apparent purpose of impeding construction of the pipeline

had been noticeably advanced.

36 President Reagan, "Statement on Extent of U.S. Sanctions on the Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union," June 18, 1982, quoted in Homer E. Moyer, Jr., and Linda A. Mabry, "Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases," Law and Policy in International Business 15, no. 1 (1983) : 6937 Moyer and Mabry, pp. 83-84.

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is fully applicable

during such a time as sanctions imposed against a state. That

being established, the international community is under a similar

obligation to ensure that it can protect the “core content” of

the rights of the affected people. The inhabitants of a country

do not forfeit their basic economic, social and cultural rights

due to violations of international law committed by their

leaders, so it goes to reason that they shouldn’t be punished as

if they were.38 This should be kept in mind when considering the

subject of sanctions as they are a powerful mechanism that can

override the veracity of such a statement. Due to the

unforeseeable nature of sanctions when put into place, sometimes

even the best intentions can result in suffering on the part of

an innocent party. Often target regimes can insulate themselves

from the harsh impact of such legislation even if the general

population suffers.

38 Globalpolicy.org,. 2002. 'International Law And Standards Regarding'. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/42346.html.

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1.3 The real goals and hidden interests of sanctions

Because of their power and scope, sanctions are often subject to

a fair amount of examination. Along with their overall effects,

the reasoning behind such legislation can understandably receive

a heightened measure of scrutiny due to their relative importance

internationally. Noble notions such as “deterrence” and

“demonstration of resolve” have often been the driving force

behind the imposition of sanctions, at least when publicly

discussed by political stakeholders. Yet there have been multiple

cases where countries have seemingly used the humanitarian guise

of sanctions to cloak the much more nefarious intentions lurking

behind their actions. As a single sanction can have many

repercussions, it can serve as a convenient method for achieving

multiple goals of varying levels of self-interest, regardless of

whether these goals are in any way connected to one another. This

reality can be best taken advantage of when some of the intended

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goals being aimed for are more palatable to the general public

than others and the state that is imposing the sanctions does not

wish to suffer any negative backlash for their actions. In these

instances, the types of propaganda employed by governments to

maintain a positive self-image both domestically and abroad can

also be used to put a heavy emphasis on the altruistic nature of

their actions despite the existence of more insidious ulterior

motives.

To illustrate, as previously stated, countries often levy trade

embargos against foreign states to bar the entry of a specific

item within their borders, say a natural resource or a factory

produced commodity. This type of sanction could hypothetically be

done as a pressure tactic against a state with objectionable

political leadership, with similar cases of this actually

happening having been documented in the past. Yet while this

action could well have a negative effect on said foreign

country’s objectionable leadership, it could also serve to spur

production of the barred item amongst domestic manufacturers as

well. Thus in this manner, humanitarian actions taken to “help

save a foreign country from despotic leadership” could actually

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help to support the more self-serving interest of removing an

aspect of foreign competition from the marketplace and helping

local manufacturers by giving them an unfair advantage over their

foreign equivalents. This can be a very convenient position for

the sanctioning country to occupy, as any charges of illegal

protectionism can be countered by bringing up the humanitarian

aspect of their legislation. In these types of instances, often

the public perception of the sanctions at play serves an

important role that must also be considered when formulating

policies of this nature.

A prime example of this sort of situation can be seen in the

United States’ political treatment of Cuba for the past few

decades, and the embargo they are imposing upon this much smaller

southern neighbor. The official position of the U.S. towards Cuba

is that they are against the communist policies of a country in

such close geographic proximity. In other words, “the communist

threat” that Cuba represented warranted the need for the

sanctions that were subsequently put in place after the country’s

revolution. The officially recognized reasoning behind this trade

embargo, enacted in 1960 after the nationalization of many U.S.

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interests there, is that it is aimed at producing free economic

markets, along with a representative democracy within this small

Caribbean nation, through various penalties and restrictions. One

could easily argue that there has not been much change in Cuba’s

communist policies throughout the decades the embargo has been in

place, yet they still continue. A lofty goal to aspire to, a more

fitting rationale for this U.S. action was that it was a direct

reply to the seizure of U.S. assets that took place in Cuba under

the newly installed Castro regime.39

Daniel Drezner, a professor of international politics in the

U.S., cites influential econometric studies in his assertion that

sanctions, historically, have been “a purposive tool of foreign

policy to be employed in situations where the United States has a

significant interest in the outcome”. This would certainly apply

in relation to the current U.S. – Cuba situation. It is perhaps

an interesting perspective to explore, as this hypothesis does

support the argument that international sanctions are often used

as a tool for legislating internal, rather than external,

interests. In other words, sanctions are a way of influencing

39 http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/

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domestic problems through the coercive control of neighboring

states. Although there is a lot of evidence to lend credence to

this line of thought, it is a somewhat difficult hypothesis to

defend resolutely, as trade embargoes often restrict the flow of

domestic goods to another country, a consequence which

contradicts this assertion as it negatively impacts the domestic

economy of local businesses. Yet if we do assume this hypothesis

to be correct, and to apply to other countries in addition to the

U.S., we can thusly infer that in many cases where sanctions are

being applied, the intended goals may not be what they appear to

be upon first glance.

In practice, the benevolent rationale of sanctions can well

provide the perfect cover for implementing policies that would

otherwise be suspect to controversy or perhaps viewed in a

negative light by external parties. The beauty of this is that

the broad ranging effects of sanctions very often have both

explicit results that are obvious to the casual observer, and

implicit results that are only apparent after considerable

research and study. In other words, it can be easier to promote

sanctions in a positive light and maintain an air of innocence in

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the face of legislative subterfuge, as the negative reasons are

sometimes not very obvious. In fact, this potential side effect

of ‘hidden sanction outcomes’ can be seen as a valuable benefit

to those entities that regularly profit from the control of

others, as they facilitate the blind acceptance of aggressive

policies that may not be otherwise justifiable.

It is the French philosopher Louis Althusser who is credited with

inventing the idea of the “Ideological State Apparatus”. This

concept refers to those agencies of the state whose primary

function is “to secure the cooperation and compliance of the

subordinate class to rule by the dominant class”.40 According to

Althusser’s writings, these so called institutions work to secure

the hegemony of a ruling class through the unification of

society. This is in turn achieved through the ideology of

cultural organizations such as churches, schools and, perhaps

most importantly in this context, the legal system, and the

definition of society that they diffuse to the public at large.

The theory prescribes that these organizations establish

40 http://wps.pearsoned.co.uk/ema_uk_he_plummer_sociology_3/40/10342/2647741.cw/content/index.html

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frameworks to enshrine their beliefs and the kind of behavior

they intend to promote, and this in turn shapes society and how

the individual fits in. Therefore, if we assume that these sorts

of institutions do exist throughout the world in various forms,

it would be natural to infer that sanctions would be a useful

tool to enforce their guiding ideologies through persuasion and

coercion, rather than the alternative of brute force. In fact,

one could go so far as to argue that sanctions are in essence a

tool for hiding devious behavior rather than resolving

humanitarian issues, as the prevalence of the existence of these

Ideological State Apparatuses, along with their reason for being,

would dictate the continued use of sanctions at either the

national or international level.

Often, suspicions of sanction ‘foul play’ remain mere conjecture

to be relegated to the realm of fanciful hearsay or conspiracy

theory. For example, despite receiving little press and arguably

fewer proponents, there are activists who maintain that Norway’s

seeming support of Palestinian causes is rooted in the country’s

latent anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment.41 Not exactly a

41 http://eirael.blogspot.ca/2011/10/anti-semitism-true-intent-of-norways.html

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mainstream assertion. At other times, these avaricious secondary

goals are so obviously convenient that they are readily

acknowledged despite never having been openly suggested. As David

Lloyd George, then leader of the British political opposition,

remarked of the pending League of Nations sanctions against Italy

in 1935 “They came too late to save Abyssinia from subjugation by

Italy, but they are just in the nick of time to save the British

Government”.42

Because the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the level of

cooperation at play amongst the states involved in their

imposition, the chances of success are greatly improved when

everyone is on the same page. In other words, sanction success

rates are often negatively impacted when the parties involved are

ideologically opposed to each other despite the combined

interests promoted by the sanction in question. This aspect is a

particularly important issue for larger countries like Russia and

the United States to consider simply due to the sheer volume of

sanctions they maintain. Additionally, because so many of their

sanctions are multilaterally applied in conjunction with other

42 Rowland 1975, p.723

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states, means are required to ensure that these coalitions remain

intact despite differences of opinion. The fact that the U.S.

needs the cooperation of their partners to be more effective with

sanction policy decisions has already been publicly voiced.43

Indeed, the American embargo against Cuba has long been a point

of friction between the U.S. and its allies in Europe, South

America and Canada, an obviously detrimental effect. Similarly,

the U.S. treatment of various Middle Eastern countries, along

with the sanctions that result (such as those against Palestine

for example) have not made them many allies in the Arab world of

late.

43 http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/going-alone-economic-sanctions-hurts-us-more-foes

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