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G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE,petitioner,vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, ! " s #$%$# t& $s 'u(g) o* t") R)g o!$+ T $+ Cou t, - $!#" I/, Ro0$s C t&$!( POTENCIANO APUNAN, SR., respondents.

Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.

GUTIERRE , 'R., J.:

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 !ila"er Christian #nstitute v. Court of $ppeals, 190 %C&$ '(() revie*in+ the appellate court s conclusion that there e-ists an e"ployer e"ployee relationship bet*eenthe petitioner and its co defendant !untecha. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the in/uries caused by !untecha on the +rounds that the latter *as not an authori ed driver for *hose acts the petitioner shall be directly and pri"arily ans*erable, and that !untecha *as "erely a *orkin+ scholar *ho, under %ection 1', &ule , 2ook ### of the &ules and &e+ulations #"ple"entin+ the 3abor Code is not considered an e"ployee of the petitioner.

The private respondents assert that the circu"stances obtainin+ in the present case call for the application of $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code since !untecha is nodoubt an e"ployee of the petitioner. The private respondents "aintain that under $rticle 4150 an in/ured party shall have recourse a+ainst the servant as *ell asthe petitioner for *ho", at the ti"e of the incident, the servant *as perfor"in+ an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. !untechaalle+edly did not steal the school /eep nor use it for a /oy ride *ithout the kno*led+e of the school authorities.

$fter a re e-a"ination of the la*s relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. e reinstate the Courtof $ppeals decision penned by the late 7ustice 8esiderio 7urado and concurred in by 7ustices 7ose C. Ca"pos, 7r. and %erafin . Ca"ilon. $pplyin+ Civil Codeprovisions, the appellate court affir"ed the trial court decision *hich ordered the pay"ent of the P40,000.00 liability in the :enith #nsurance Corporation policy,

P10,000.00 "oral da"a+es, P',000.00 liti+ation and actual e-penses, and P;,000.00 attorney s fees.#t is undisputed that !untecha *as a *orkin+ student, bein+ a part ti"e /anitor and a scholar of petitioner !ila"er. asa. >oreover, it is also thehouse *here !untecha *as allo*ed free board *hile he *as a student of !ila"er Christian #nstitute.

$llan >asa turned over the vehicle to !untecha only after drivin+ do*n a road, ne+otiatin+ a sharp dan+erous curb, and vie*in+ that the road *as clear. T%?, $pril ', 195;, pp. (5 (9) $ccordin+ to $llan s testi"ony, a fast "ovin+ truck *ith +larin+ li+hts nearly hit the" so that they had to s*erve to the ri+ht to avoid acollision. @pon s*ervin+, they heard a sound as if so"ethin+ had bu"ped a+ainst the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. $ctually, the Pinoy /eep s*ervedto*ards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan *ho *as *alkin+ in his lane in the direction a+ainst vehicular traffic, and hit hi". $llan affir"ed that !untechafollo*ed his advise to s*erve to the ri+ht. Ibid ., p. (9) $t the ti"e of the incident 6A;0 P.>.) in &o-as City, the /eep had only one functionin+ headli+ht.

$llan testified that he *as the driver and at the sa"e ti"e a security +uard of the petitioner school.

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*as not the school driver or *as not actin+ *ithin the scope of his /anitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebuttin+ the presu"ption juristantum that there *as ne+li+ence on its part either in the selection of a servant or e"ployee, or in the supervision over hi". The petitioner has failed to sho*proof of its havin+ e-ercised the re=uired dili+ence of a +ood father of a fa"ily over its e"ployees !untecha and $llan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the for"ulation of suitable rules and re+ulations for the +uidance of its e"ployees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons *ith *ho" the e"ployer has relations throu+h his e"ployees. 2ahia v. 3iton/ua and 3eynes,supra, at p. 645F Phoeni- Construction, v. #nter"ediate $ppellate Court, 1'5 %C&$ ;B; D195(E)

$n e"ployer is e-pected to i"pose upon its e"ployees the necessary discipline called for in the perfor"ance of any act indispensable to the business andbeneficial to their e"ployer.

#n the present case, the petitioner has not sho*n that it has set forth such rules and +uidelines as *ould prohibit any one of its e"ployees fro" takin+ control

over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibitin+ the driver and son of the !ila"er president fro" authori in+ another e"ployee to drive the schoolvehicle. !urther"ore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had i"posed sanctions or *arned its e"ployees a+ainst the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obli+ation to pay da"a+es for in/ury arisin+ fro" the unskilled "anner by *hich !untecha drove the vehicle. Can+co v. >anila&ailroad Co., ;5 Phil. (65, ((4 D1915E). #n the absence of evidence that the petitioner had e-ercised the dili+ence of a +ood father of a fa"ily in the supervision of its e"ployees, the la* i"poses upon it the vicarious liability for acts or o"issions of its e"ployees. @"ali v. 2acani, 69 %C&$ 46; D19(6EF Poblete v. !abros, 9;%C&$ 400 D19(9EF Kapalaran 2us 3iner v. Coronado, 1(6 %C&$ (94 D1959EF !ranco v. #nter"ediate $ppellate Court, 1(5 %C&$ ;;1 D1959EF Pantranco ?orth

-press, #nc. v. 2aesa, 1(9 %C&$ ;5' D1959E) The liability of the e"ployer is, under $rticle 4150, pri"ary and solidary. asa, *as not "ade a party defendant in the civil case for da"a+es. This is =uiteunderstandable considerin+ that as far as the in/ured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, *as concerned, it *as !untecha *ho *as the one drivin+ thevehicle and presu"ably *as one authori ed by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not no* be left to suffer *ithout si"ultaneous recoursea+ainst the petitioner for the conse=uent in/ury caused by a /anitor doin+ a drivin+ chore for the petitioner even for a short *hile. !or the purpose of recoverin+da"a+es under the prevailin+ circu"stances, it is enou+h that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs *ere able to establish the e-istence of e"ployere"ployee relationship bet*een !untecha and petitioner !ila"er and the fact that !untecha *as en+a+ed in an act not for an independent purpose of his o*n butin furtherance of the business of his e"ployer. $ position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily de"onstrated.

< & !O& , the "otion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby H&$?T 8. The decision of the respondent appellate courtaffir"in+ the trial court decision is & #?%T$T 8.

%O O&8 & 8.

&epublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT>anila

T

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punish"ent be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and "ind of the pupil or student.

#n %a"isoc v . Bri""antes , invoked by petitioner, the Court held the o*ner and president of a school of arts andtrades kno*n as the >anila Technical #nstitute, Jue on 2lvd., >anila, responsible in da"a+es for the death of 8o"inador Palisoc, a student of #nstitute, *hich resulted fro" fist blo*s delivered by Gir+ilio 3. 8affon, another student of the Institute . #t *ill be seen that the facts of %a"isoc v . Bri""antes brou+ht it e-pressly *ithin the (thpara+raph of $rticle 4150, =uoted aboveF but those facts are entirely different fro" the facts e-istin+ in theinstant case.Persons e-ercisin+ substitute parental authority are "ade responsible for da"a+e inflicted upon a third personby the child or person sub/ect to such substitute parental authority. #n the instant case, as already noted, 7i""y%olo"on *ho co""itted alle+edly tortious acts resultin+ in in/ury to petitioner, *as not a pupil, student or apprentice of the &epublic Central Colle+esF the school had no substitute parental authority over %olo"on.

Clearly, *ithin the confines of its li"ited lo+ic, i .e ., treatin+ the petitioner s clai" as one based *holly ande-clusively on $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial /ud+e *as correct. 8oes it follo*,ho*ever, that respondent Colle+es could not be held liable upon any other basis in la*, for or in respect of thein/ury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent school to dis"issal of petitioner s co"plaint in respectof itself

The very recent case of the %hi"ippine choo" of Business 'dministration (% B') v . #ourt of 'ppea"s , 5 re=uires

us to +ive a ne+ative ans*er to that =uestion.#n % B' , the Court held that $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code *as not applicable *here a student had been in/uredby one *ho *as an outsider or by one over *ho" the school did not e-ercise any custody or control or supervision. $t the sa"e ti"e, ho*ever, the Court stressed that an i"plied contract "ay be held to beestablished bet*een a school *hich accepts students for enroll"ent, on the one hand, and the students *ho areenrolled, on the other hand, *hich contract results in obli+ations for both partiesA

hen an acade"ic institution accepts students for enroll"ent, there is established a contract bet*een the", resultin+ in bilateral obli+ations *hich parties are bound to co"ply *ith. !or itspart, the school undertakes to provide the student *ith an education that *ould presu"ablysuffice to e=uip hi" *ith the necessary tools and skills to pursue hi+her education or aprofession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school s acade"icre=uire"ents and observe its rules and re+ulations.

#nstitutions of learnin+ "ust also "eet the i"plicit or built in obli+ation of providin+ their students *ith an at"osphere that pro"otes or assists in attainin+ its pri"ary undertakin+ of i"partin+ kno*led+e. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or hi+her "athe"atics or e-plore the real" of the arts and other sciences *hen bullets are flyin+ or +renades e-plodin+ in the air or *here there loo"s around the school pre"ises a constant threatto life and li"b. ?ecessarily, the school "ust ensure that ade=uate steps are taken to "aintainpeace and order *ithin the ca"pus pre"ises and to prevent the breakdo*n thereof. 3

#n that case, the Court *as careful to point out thatA

#n the circu"stances obtainin+ in the case at bar, ho*ever, there is, as yet, no findin+ that thecontract bet*een the school and 2autista had been breached thru the for"er s ne+li+ence inprovidin+ proper security "easures. This *ould be for the trial court to deter"ine. $nd, even if there be a findin+ of ne+li+ence, the sa"e could +ive rise +enerally to a breach of contractualobli+ation only. @sin+ the test of #an$co , supra , the ne+li+ence of the school *ould not berelevant absent a contract. #n fact, that ne+li+ence beco"es "aterial only because of thecontractual relation bet*een P%2$ and 2autista. #n other *ords, a contractual relation is acondition sine *ua non to the school s liability. The ne+li+ence of the school cannot e-istindependently of the contract, unless the ne+li+ence occurs under the circu"stances set out in

$rticle 41 of the Civil Code.

The Court is not un"indful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obli+ation of schools, above"entioned, for conceptually a school, like a co""on carrier, cannot be an insurer of its studentsa+ainst a"" risks. This is specially true in the populous student co""unities of the so called

university belt in >anila *here there have been reported several incidents ran+in+ fro" +an+

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*ars to other for"s of hooli+anis". #t *ould not be e=uitable to e-pect of schools to anticipate alltypes of violent trespass upon their pre"ises, for not*ithstandin+ the security "easuresinstalled, the sa"e "ay still fail a+ainst an individual or +roup deter"ined to carry out anefarious deed inside school pre"ises and environs. %hould this be the case, the school "aystill avoid liability by provin+ that the breach of its contractual obli+ation to the students *as notdue to its ne+li+ence, here statutorily defined to be the o"ission of that de+ree of dili+ence*hich is re=uired by the nature of obli+ation and correspondin+ to the circu"stances of person,ti"e and place. 7

#n the % B' case, the trial court had denied the school s "otion to dis"iss the co"plaint a+ainst it, and both theCourt of $ppeals and this Court affir"ed the trial court s order. #n the case at bar, the court a *uo +ranted the"otion to dis"iss filed by respondent Colle+es, upon the assu"ption that petitioner s cause of action *as based,and could have been based, only on $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code. $s % B' , ho*ever, states, acts *hich aretortious or alle+edly tortious in character "ay at the sa"e ti"e constitute breach of a contractual, or other le+al,obli+ation. &espondent trial /ud+e *as in serious error *hen he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code. &espondent trial /ud+e should not have +rantedthe "otion to dis"iss but rather should have, in the interest of /ustice, allo*ed petitioner to prove actsconstitutin+ breach of an obli+ation e+ contractu or e+ "e$e on the part of respondent Colle+es.

#n line, therefore, *ith the "ost recent /urisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial"iscarria+e of /ustice, and puttin+ aside technical considerations, *e consider that respondent trial /ud+eco""itted serious error correctible by this Court in the instant case.

$CCO&8#?H3I, the Court &esolved to H&$?T 8@ CO@&% to the Petition, to T& $T the co""ent of respondent Colle+es as its ans*er, and to & G &% and % T $%#8 the Order dated 49 ?ove"ber 195;. Thiscase is & >$?8 8 to the court a *uo for further proceedin+s consistent *ith this &esolution.

Gutierre , -r., Bidin, avide, -r. and Romero, --., concur.

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,vs.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.

Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..TRENT, J.This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P !,"! , together #ith the costs of the cause.Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred $ % &in limiting the general damages #hich plaintiff suffered to P',(((, instead of P)',((( as claimed in the complaint,& and $)% &in limiting thetime #hen plaintiff #as entirely disabled to t#o months and t#enty-one days and fi*ing the damageaccordingly in the sum of P),+++, instead of P+,((( as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.&The ttorney- eneral on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred $a% in finding thatcollision bet#een the plaintiff/s motorcycle and the ambulance of the eneral 0ospital #as due to thenegligence of the chauffeur1 $b% in holding that the overnment of the Philippine Islands is liablethe damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision #adue to the negligence of the chauffeur1 and $c% in rendering judgment against the defendant for the of P !,"! .The trial court/s findings of fact, #hich are fully supported by the record, are as follo#s

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that #hen the plaintiff, riding on amotorcycle, #as going to#ard the #estern part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the #estside thereof at a speed of ten to t#elve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft venue and #hen he

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#as ten feet from the south#estern intersection of said streets, the eneral 0ospital ambulance,upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning to#ard the south, after passing the center thereoso that it #ould be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and thMotor 2ehicle ct, turned suddenly and une*pectedly and long before reaching the center of thstreet, into the right side of Taft venue, #ithout having sounded any #histle or horn, by #hichmovement it struc3 the plaintiff, #ho #as already si* feet from the south#estern point or from

the post place there.4y reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff #as so severely injured that, according to 5r.6aleeby, #ho e*amined him on the very same day that he #as ta3en to the eneral 0ospital, he#as suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a #ould in the same place and in the bac3 part of his head, #hile blood issued from his nose and he #as entirely unconscious.The mar3s revealed that he had one or more fractures of the s3ull and that the grey matter an brain #as had suffered material injury. t ten o/cloc3 of the night in 7uestion, #hich #as thetime set for performing the operation, his pulse #as so #ea3 and so irregular that, in hisopinion, there #as little hope that he #ould live. 0is right leg #as bro3en in such a #ay that thefracture e*tended to the outer s3in in such manner that it might be regarded as double and th#ould be e*posed to infection, for #hich reason it #as of the most serious nature.

t another e*amination si* days before the day of the trial, 5r. 6aleeby noticed that the plaintiff/s leg sho#ed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg ver#ea3 and painful at the point of the fracture. 8*amination of his head revealed a notablereadjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently #as slightly deafhad a light #ea3ness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter #ea3ness #as al#aysnoticed #hen the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially #hen he attempted touse his money for mathematical calculations.

ccording to the various merchants #ho testified as #itnesses, the plaintiff/s mental and physical condition prior to the accident #as e*cellent, and that after having received the injuriethat have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for hhad lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident aone of the best constructors of #ooden buildings and he could not no# earn even a half of theincome that he had secured for his #or3 because he had lost '( per cent of his efficiency. s acontractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reacthe highest parts of the building.

s a conse7uence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his #or3 as a contractorhe had to dissolved the partnership he had formed #ith the engineer. 9ilson, because he #asincapacitated from ma3ing mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg anof his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the :yChaco building.&

9e may say at the outset that #e are in full accord #ith the trial court to the effect that the collision bet#een the plaintiff/s motorcycle and the ambulance of the eneral 0ospital #as due solely to thenegligence of the chauffeur.The t#o items #hich constitute a part of the P !,"! and #hich are dra#n in 7uestion by the plaintiff are $a% P',(((, the a#ard a#arded for permanent injuries, and $b% the P),+++, the amount allo#ed fothe loss of #ages during the time the plaintiff #as incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. 9e findnothing in the record #hich #ould justify us in increasing the amount of the first. s to the second, therecord sho#s, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff/s services as a contractor #ere #orth P ,((( per month. The court, ho#ever, limited the time to t#o months and t#enty-one days, #hich the plaintiff

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#as actually confined in the hospital. In this #e thin3 there #as error, because it #as clearly establishedthat the plaintiff #as #holly incapacitated for a period of si* months. The mere fact that he remained ithe hospital only t#o months and t#enty-one days #hile the remainder of the si* months #as spent inhis home, #ould not prevent recovery for the #hole time. 9e, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, #ithout any fault on his part, is P ;,("'.

s the negligence #hich caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of theovernment, the in7uiry at once arises #hether the overnment is legally-liable for the damageresulting therefrom.ct

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have also fi*ed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. 5oes thct authori?e us to hold that the overnment is legally liable for that amountB If not, #e must loo

else#here for such authority, if it e*ists.The overnment of the Philippine Islands having been &modeled after the Federal and 6ta

overnments in the :nited 6tates,& #e may loo3 to the decisions of the high courts of that country foaid in determining the purpose and scope of ct 1 4ourn vs. 0art, >= Cal., =) 1 )"

m. 6t. Eep., )(=1 6tory on gency, sec. = >.%s to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state #here the cause o

action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in =+ Cyc., > ', thus4y consenting to be sued a state simply #aives its immunity from suit. It does not therebyconcede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or e*tend its liabilitto any cause not previously recogni?ed. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pree*istinliability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose anla#ful defense.

In Apfelbacher vs. State $ ') ', the ct of > =,#hich authori?ed the bringing of this suit, read

68CTIA< . uthority is hereby given to eorge pfelbacher, of the to#n of 6ummit,9au3esha County, 9isconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as

he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies #hich he mano# have #ith the 6tate of 9isconsin, or its duly authori?ed officers and agents, relative to themill property of said eorge pfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the 6tate of 9isconsin on the4ar3 Eiver, and the mill property of 8van 0umphrey at the lo#er end of

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the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit no# stands just as it #ould stand bet#een private parties. It is difficult to see ho# the act does, or #as intended to do, more than removethe state/s immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose osettling plaintiff/s controversies #ith the estate. >.%

In %ennin" vs. State $ )= Cal., = +%, the provisions of the ct of ;>=, relied upon and considered, as follo#s

ll persons #ho have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against thestate not allo#ed by the state board of e*aminers, are hereby authori?ed, on the terms anconditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of thstate of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practicin civil cases shall apply to such suits, e*cept as herein other#ise provided.

nd the court saidThis statute has been considered by this court in at least t#o cases, arising under different factsand in both it #as held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against thstate #here none e*isted before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liabilitas #ould have e*isted if the statute had not been enacted. $Chapman vs. 6tate, (! Cal., +>(1 !

m. 6t. Eep., ';1 Melvin vs. 6tate, ) Cal., +.% statute of Massachusetts enacted in ;;" gave to the superior court &jurisdiction of all claims agains

the common#ealth, #hether at la# or in e7uity,& #ith an e*ception not necessary to be here mentionedIn construing this statute the court, in $urdoc& Grate Co. vs. Co on(ealth $ ') Mass., );%, saidThe statute #e are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a ne# andheretofore unrecogni?ed class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribun#here #ell recogni?ed e*isting liabilities can be adjudicated.

In Sipple vs. State $>>

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That the obligation to indemnify for damages #hich a third person causes to another by his fauor negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same @a# =, Title ', Partida ", on that the persoobligated, by his o#n fault or negligence, ta3es part in the act or omission of the third party #hocaused the damage. It follo#s therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of la#, is noresponsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in conse7uence of acts performe by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fau

nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organi?ation of branches o public service and in the appointment of its agents1 on the contrary, #e must presuppose aforesight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the genera#eal an that of private persons interested in its operation. 4et#een these latter and the state,therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil la# can arise e*cept in a case#here the state acts as a judicial person capable of ac7uiring rights and contracting obligations$6upreme Court of 6pain, anuary ", ;>;1 ;= ur. Civ., )!.%That the Civil Code in chapter ), title +, boo3 !, regulates the obligations #hich arise out offault or negligence1 and #hereas in the first article thereof. (), #here the general principle is laid do#n that #here a person #ho by an act or omission causes damage to anotherthrough fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made t

acts or omissions of the persons #ho directly or indirectly cause the damage, the follo#ingarticles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those #ho maintain fi*erelations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the la# presumethat in conse7uence of such relations the evil caused by their o#n fault or negligence isimputable to them. This legal presumption gives #ay to proof, ho#ever, because, as held in thelast paragraph of article >(=, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases #hen the personmentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a familto avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to ans#er in a direct and not asubsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardianand o#ners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not al#ays, e*cept #henit acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault

negligence, #hich is the original basis of this 3ind of objections, must be presumed to lie #iththe state.That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in articl

>() respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolution#hich by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in thname and representation of the state itself and as an e*ternal e*pression of its sovereignty in the*ercise of its e*ecutive po#ers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said thave been occasioned to the petitionersby an e)ecutive official , acting in the e*ercise of his po#ers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property ta*es o#ing by the o#nerof the property #hich they hold in sublease.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article >(= to the case #herein it actsthrou"ha special a"ent $and a special agent, in the sense in #hich these #ords are employed, is one #horeceives a definite and fi*ed order or commission, foreign to the e*ercise of the duties of hioffice if he is a special official% so that in representation of the state and being bound to act asagent thereof, he e*ecutes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to ane*ecutive agent #ho is an employee of the acting administration and #ho on his o#nresponsibility performs the functions #hich are inherent in and naturally pertain to his officeand #hich are regulated by la# and the regulations.& $6upreme Court of 6pain, May ;, >(!>; ur. Civ., =;>, =>(.%

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That according to paragraph ' of article >(= of the Civil Code and the principle laid do#n in adecision, among others, of the ;th of May, >(!, in a damage case, the responsibility of thestate is limited to that #hich it contracts through a special agent, duly empo#ered by adefiniteorder or co ission to perfor so e act or char"ed (ith so e definite purpose (hich "ivesrise to the clai , and not #here the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a publicofficial charged #ith some administrative or technical office #ho can be held to the proper

responsibility in the manner laid do#n by the la# of civil responsibility. Conse7uently, the trialcourt in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused ban official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed th provisions of articles >() and >(= of the Civil Code. $6upreme Court of 6pain, uly =(, >

)) ur. Civ., !+.%It is, therefore, evidence that the 6tate $the overnment of the Philippine Islands% is only liabaccording to the above 7uoted decisions of the 6upreme Court of 6pain, for the acts of its agentofficers and employees #hen they act as special agents #ithin the meaning of paragraph ' of article

>(=, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the eneral 0ospital #as not such an agent.For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, #ithout costs in this instance9hether the overnment intends to ma3e itself legally liable for the amount of damages above setforth, #hich the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, blegislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, #e are not called upon tdetermine. This matter rests solely #ith the @egislature and not #ith the courts. Arellano, C. *., +orres, *ohnson, and $oreland, **., concur.G.R. No. L:55938 D)#);6) 1, 19 9SPOUSES 'OSE FONTANILLA AND /IRGINIA FONTANILLA,petitioners,vs.HONORA-LE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN $!( NATIONAL IRRIGATIONADMINISTRATION,respondents.

G.R. No. L:314 5 D)#);6) 1, 19 9NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,appellant,vs.SPOUSES 'OSE FONTANILLA $!( /IRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.#eci"io /. uare , -r. for pouses 0ontani""a.

0e"icisimo #. /i""af"or for !I'.

PARAS, J.:

#n H.&. ?o. 3 BB96;, the petition for revie* on certiorari seeks the affir"ance of the decisiondated >arch 40, 1950 of the then Court of !irst #nstance of ?ueva ci/a, 2ranch G###, at %an7ose City and its "odification *ith respect to the denial of petitioner s clai" for "oral ande-e"plary da"a+es and attorneys fees.

#n H.&. ?o. 610'B, respondent ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration seeks the reversal of theaforesaid decision of the lo*er court. The ori+inal appeal of this case before the Court of

$ppeals *as certified to this Court and in the resolution of 7uly (, 1954, it *as docketed *iththe aforecited nu"ber. $nd in the resolution of $pril ;, this case *as consolidated *ith H.&.?o. BB96;.

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#t appears that on $u+ust 41, 19(6 at about 6A;0 P.>., a pickup o*ned and operated byrespondent ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration, a +overn"ent a+ency bearin+ Plate ?o. #? 6B1,then driven officially by aasin, %an 7ose City alon+ the >aharlika

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4. The decision of the trial court had "ade an i"pression that respondent?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration acted *ith +ross ne+li+ence because of theaccident and the subse=uent failure of the ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistrationpersonnel includin+ the driver to stop in order to +ive assistance to the, victi"s.Thus, by reason of the +ross ne+li+ence of respondent, petitioners beco"eentitled to e-e"plary da"a+es under $rts. 44;1 and 4449 of the ?e* Civil

Code.;. Petitioners are entitled to an a*ard of attorney s fees, the a"ount of *hich

40L) had been sufficiently established in the hearin+ of >ay 4;, 19(9.

'. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of revie*in+ the findin+s of the lo*er court upon *hich the disallo*ance of "oral da"a+es, e-e"plaryda"a+es and attorney s fees *as based and not for the purpose of disturbin+the other findin+s of fact and conclusions of la*.

The %olicitor Heneral, takin+ up the cud+els for public respondent ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration, contends thusA

1. The filin+ of the instant petition is rot proper in vie* of the appeal taken byrespondent ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration to the Court of $ppeals a+ainst the

/ud+"ent sou+ht to be revie*ed. The focal issue raised in respondent s appealto the Court of $ppeals involves the =uestion as to *hether or not the driver of the vehicle that bu"ped the victi"s *as ne+li+ent in his operation of saidvehicle. #t thus beco"es necessary that before petitioners clai" for "oral ande-e"plary da"a+es could be resolved, there should first be a findin+ of ne+li+ence on the part of respondent s e"ployee driver. #n this re+ard, the%olicitor Heneral alle+es that the trial court decision does not cate+oricallycontain such findin+.

4. The filin+ of the $ppearance and @r+ent >otion !or 3eave to !ile Plaintiff

$ppellee s 2rief dated 8ece"ber 45, 1951 by petitioners in the appeal C$H.&. ?o. 6(4;( &F and H. &. ?o.610'B) of the respondent ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration before the Court of $ppeals, is an e-plicit ad"ission of saidpetitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. #nconsistent procedures are"anifest because *hile petitioners =uestion the findin+s of fact in the Court of

$ppeals, they present only the =uestions of la* before this Court *hich postureconfir"s their ad"ission of the facts.

;. The fact that the parties failed to a+ree on *hether or not ne+li+ence causedthe vehicular accident involves a =uestion of fact *hich petitioners should havebrou+ht to the Court of $ppeals *ithin the re+le"entary period.

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*as a re+ular driver of the vehicle, not a special a+ent *ho *as perfor"in+ a /obor act forei+n to his usual duties.

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and particularly *hen it collects revenues fro" it, the function is considered a proprietaryone, as to *hich there "ay be liability for the torts of a+ents *ithin the scope of their e"ploy"ent.

The ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration is an a+ency of the +overn"ent e-ercisin+ proprietaryfunctions, by e-press provision of &ep. $ct ?o. ;601. %ection 1 of said $ct providesA

%ection 1. ?a"e and do"icile. $ bod1 corporate is hereby created *hich shallbe kno*n as the ?ational #rri+ation $d"inistration, hereinafter called the ?#$ for short, *hich shall be or+ani ed i""ediately after the approval of this $ct. #t shallhave its principal seat of business in the City of >anila and shall haverepresentatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.

%ection 4 of said la* spells out so"e of the ?#$ s proprietary functions. Thus

%ec. 4. %owers and objectives . The ?#$ shall have the follo*in+ po*ers andob/ectivesA

a) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

b) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

c) To collect fro" the users of each irri+ation syste" constructed by it such feesas "ay be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the syste" andrei"burse *ithin a certain period not less than t*enty five years cost of construction thereofF and

d) To do all such other tthin+s and to transact all such business as are directlyor indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attain"ent of the aboveob/ectives.

#ndubitably, the ?#$ is a +overn"ent corporation *ith /uridical personality and not a "erea+ency of the +overn"ent. %ince it is a corporate body perfor"in+ non +overn"entalfunctions, it no* beco"es liable for the da"a+e caused by the accident resultin+ fro" thetortious act of its driver e"ployee. #n this particular case, the ?#$ assu"es the responsibilityof an ordinary e"ployer and as such, it beco"es ans*erable for da"a+es.

This assu"ption of liability, ho*ever, is predicated upon the e-istence of ne+li+ence on thepart of respondent ?#$. The ne+li+ence referred to here is the ne+li+ence of supervision.

$t this /uncture, the "atter of due dili+ence on the part of respondent ?#$ beco"es a crucialissue in deter"inin+ its liability since it has been established that respondent is a +overn"enta+ency perfor"in+ proprietary functions and as such, it assu"es the posture of an ordinarye"ployer *hich, under Par. B of $rt. 4150, is responsible for the da"a+es caused by itse"ployees provided that it has failed to observe or e-ercise due dili+ence in the selection andsupervision of the driver.

#t *ill be noted fro" the assailed decision of the trial court that as a result of the i"pact,!rancisco !ontanilla *as thrown to a distance 78 meters awa1 from the point of impact *hile&estituto 8eli+o *as thro*n a little bit further a*ay. The i"pact took place al"ost at the ed+eof the ce"ented portion of the road. "phasis supplied,) Dpa+e 46, &olloE

The lo*er court further declared that a speedin+ vehicle co"in+ in contact *ith a personcauses force and i"pact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. $s a"atter of fact, the i"pact *as so stron+ as sho*n by the fact that the vehic"e suffered dentson the ri$ht side of the radiator $uard, the hood, the fender and a crac9 on the radiator as

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shown b1 the investi$ation report -hibit ). "phasis supplied) Dpa+e 49, &olloE

#t should be e"phasi ed that the accident happened alon+ the >aharlika ?ational &oad*ithin the city li"its of %an 7ose City, an urban area. Considerin+ the fact that the victi" *asthro*n B0 "eters a*ay fro" the point of i"pact, there is a stron+ indication that driver Harcia*as drivin+ at a hi+h speed. This is confir"ed by the fact that the pick up suffered substantialand heavy da"a+e as above described and the fact that the ?#$ +roup *as then in a hurry

to reach the ca"psite as early as possible , as sho*n by their not stoppin+ to find out *hatthey bu"ped as *ould have been their nor"al and initial reaction.

vidently, there *as ne+li+ence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they *eretravellin+ at a hi+h speed *ithin the city li"its and yet the supervisor of the +roup, ly%alon+a, failed to caution and "ake the driver observe the proper and allo*ed speed li"it*ithin the city. @nder the situation, such ne+li+ence is further a++ravated by their desire toreach their destination *ithout even checkin+ *hether or not the vehicle suffered da"a+efro" the ob/ect it bu"ped, thus sho*in+ i"prudence and reckelessness on the part of boththe driver and the supervisor in the +roup.

%i+nificantly, this Court has ruled that even if the e"ployer can prove the dili+ence in the

selection and supervision the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the e"ployee,still if he ratifies the *ron+ful acts, or take no step to avert further da"a+e, the e"ployer *ould still be liable. >a-ion vs. >anila &ailroad Co., '' Phil. B9().

Thus, too, in the case of Gda. de 2onifacio vs. 2.3.T. 2us Co. 3 46510, $u+ust ;1, 19(0, ;'%C&$ 615), this Court held that a driver should be especially *atchful in anticipation of others*ho "ay be usin+ the hi+h*ay, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons andob/ects in the line to be traversed constitutes ne+li+ence.

Considerin+ the fore+oin+, respondent ?#$ is hereby directed to pay herein petitionersspouses the a"ounts of P14,000.00 for the death of !rancisco !ontanillaF P;,;59.00 for hospitali ation and burial e-penses of the aforena"ed deceasedF P;0,000.00 as "oral

da"a+esF P5,000.00 as e-e"plary da"a+es and attorney s fees of 40L of the total a*ard.%O O&8 & 8.

%adi""a, armiento and Re$a"ado, --., concur.

Me"encio: ;errera (#hairperson,), -., is on "eave.

G.R. No. L: 77 5 A% + 15, 19'OSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, 'OSE A. AMADORA 'R., NORMA A.

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CRU , J.:3ike any prospective +raduate, $lfredo $"adora *as lookin+ for*ard to the co""ence"ent e-ercises *here he *ould ascend the sta+e and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his hi+h school diplo"a. These cere"onies *ere scheduled on $pril 16, 19(4. $s it turned out, thou+h, fate *ould intervene anddeny hi" that a*aited e-perience. On $pril 1;, 19(4, *hile they *ere in the auditoriu" of their school, the Cole+io de %an 7ose &ecoletos, a class"ate, Pablito

8a"on, fired a +un that "ortally hit $lfredo, endin+ all his e-pectations and his life as *ell. The victi" *as only seventeen years old. 1

8affon *as convicted of ho"icide thru reckless i"prudence . 2 $dditionally, the herein petitioners, as the victi" sparents, filed a civil action for da"a+es under $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code a+ainst the Cole+io de %an 7ose&ecoletos, its rector the hi+h school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, to+ether *ith 8affonand t*o other students, throu+h their respective parents. The co"plaint a+ainst the students *as later dropped.

$fter trial, the Court of !irst #nstance of Cebu held the re"ainin+ defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the su" of P49',95'.00, representin+ death co"pensation, loss of earnin+ capacity, costs of liti+ation, funeral e-penses,"oral da"a+es, e-e"plary da"a+es, and attorney s fees . 8 On appeal to the respondent court, ho*ever, thedecision *as reversed and all the defendants *ere co"pletely absolved .

#n its decision, *hich is no* the sub/ect of this petition for certiorari under &ule 'B of the &ules of Court, therespondent court found that $rticle 4150 *as not applicable as the Cole+io de %an 7ose &ecoletos *as not aschool of arts and trades but an acade"ic institution of learnin+. #t also held that the students *ere not in thecustody of the school at the ti"e of the incident as the se"ester had already ended, that there *as no clear identification of the fatal +un and that in any event the defendant, had e-ercised the necessary dili+ence inpreventin+ the in/ury. 5 The basic undisputed facts are that $lfredo $"adora *ent to the %an 7ose &ecoletos on $pril 1;, 19(4, and*hile in its auditoriu" *as shot to death by Pablito 8affon, a class"ate. On the i"plications and conse=uencesof these facts, the parties sharply disa+ree.

The petitioners contend that their son *as in the school to sho* his physics e-peri"ent as a prere=uisite to his+raduationF hence, he *as then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents sub"itthat $lfredo $"adora had +one to the school only for the purpose of sub"ittin+ his physics report and that he*as no lon+er in their custody because the se"ester had already ended.

There is also the =uestion of the identity of the +un used *hich the petitioners consider i"portant because of anearlier incident *hich they clai" underscores the ne+li+ence of the school and at least one of the privaterespondents. #t is not denied by the respondents that on $pril (, 19(4, %er+io 8a"aso, 7r., the dean of boys,confiscated fro" 7ose Hu"ban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to hi" *ithout "akin+ a report to the

principal or takin+ any further action . 3 $s Hu"ban *as one of the co"panions of 8affon *hen the latter firedthe +un that killed $lfredo, the petitioners contend that this *as the sa"e pistol that had been confiscated fro"Hu"ban and that their son *ould not have been killed if it had not been returned by 8a"aso. The respondentssay, ho*ever, that there is no proof that the +un *as the sa"e firear" that killed $lfredo.

&esolution of all these disa+ree"ents *ill depend on the interpretation of $rticle 4150 *hich, as it happens, isinvoked by both parties in support of their conflictin+ positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follo*sA

3astly, teachers or heads of establish"ents of arts and trades shall be liable for da"a+escaused by their pupils and students or apprentices so lon+ as they re"ain in their custody.

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection *ith the above =uoted provision, to *itA-conde v. Capuno 7 >ercado v. Court of $ppeals, and Palisoc v. 2rillantes. 9 These *ill be briefly revie*ed in

this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.

#n the -conde Case, 8ante Capuno, a student of the 2alinta*ak le"entary %chool and a 2oy %cout, attendeda &i al 8ay parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. $fter the parade, the boy boarded a /eep, tookover its *heel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resultin+ in the death of t*o of its passen+ers. 8ante*as found +uilty of double ho"icide *ith reckless i"prudence. #n the separate civil action flied a+ainst the", hisfather *as held solidarily liable *ith hi" in da"a+es under $rticle 190; no* $rticle 4150) of the Civil Code for the tort co""itted by the 1B year old boy.

This decision, *hich *as penned by 7ustice 2autista $n+elo on 7une 49,19B(, e-culpated the school in an obiter dictum as it *as not a party to the case) on the +round that it *as riot a school of arts and trades. 7ustice 7.2.3.&eyes, *ith *ho" 7ustices %abino Padilla and $le- &eyes concurred, dissented, ar+uin+ that it *as the schoolauthorities *ho should be held liable 3iability under this rule, he said, *as i"posed on 1) teachers in +eneralF

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=ualify teachers but only heads of establish"ents. The phrase is only an updated version of the e=uivalent ter"s preceptores y artesanos used in the #talian and !rench Civil Codes.

#f, as conceded by all co""entators, the basis of the presu"ption of ne+li+ence of $rt. 190; inso"e cu"pa in vi$i"ando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in thee-ercise of their authority, it *ould see" clear that *here the parent places the child under theeffective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one ans*erable for the torts co""itted *hile under his custody, for the very reasonNthat the parent is not supposed

to interfere *ith the discipline of the school nor *ith the authority and supervision of the teacher *hile the child is under instruction. $nd if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

There is really no substantial distinction bet*een the acade"ic and the non acade"ic schools insofar as tortsco""itted by their students are concerned. The sa"e vi+ilance is e-pected fro" the teacher over the studentsunder his control and supervision, *hatever the nature of the school *here he is teachin+. The su++estion in the

-conde and >ercado Cases is that the provision *ould "ake the teacher or even the head of the school of artsand trades liable for an in/ury caused by any student in its custody but if that sa"e tort *ere co""itted in anacade"ic school, no liability *ould attach to the teacher or the school head. $ll other circu"stances bein+ thesa"e, the teacher or the head of the acade"ic school *ould be absolved *hereas the teacher and the head of the non acade"ic school *ould be held liable, and si"ply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.

The Court cannot see *hy different de+rees of vi+ilance should be e-ercised by the school authorities on thebasis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not see" to be any plausible reason for rela-in+that vi+ilance si"ply because the school is acade"ic in nature and for increasin+ such vi+ilance *here theschool is non acade"ic. ?otably, the in/ury sub/ect of liability is caused by the student and not by the schoolitself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its e=uip"ent. The in/ury conte"plated "ay be caused byany student re+ardless of the school *here he is re+istered. The teacher certainly should not be able to e-cusehi"self by si"ply sho*in+ that he is teachin+ in an acade"ic school *here, on the other hand, the head *ouldbe held liable if the school *ere non acade"ic.

These =uestions, thou+h, "ay be askedA #f the teacher of the acade"ic school is to be held ans*erable for thetorts co""itted by his students, *hy is it the head of the school only *ho is held liable *here the in/ury is causedin a school of arts and trades $nd in the case of the acade"ic or non technical school, *hy not apply the rulealso to the head thereof instead of i"posin+ the liability only on the teacher

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and tradese-ercised a closer tutela+e over his pupils than the head of the acade"ic school. The old schools of arts andtrades *ere en+a+ed in the trainin+ of artisans apprenticed to their "aster *ho personally and directly instructedthe" on the techni=ue and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades *as such a "aster and so *as personally involved in the task of teachin+ his students, *ho usually even boarded *ith hi" and soca"e under his constant control, supervision and influence. 2y contrast, the head of the acade"ic school *asnot as involved *ith his students and e-ercised only ad"inistrative duties over the teachers *ho *ere thepersons directly dealin+ *ith the students. The head of the acade"ic school had then as no*) only a vicariousrelationship *ith the students. Conse=uently, *hile he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students,the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties *ith the", could be so bla"ed.

#t is conceded that the distinction no lon+er obtains at present in vie* of the e-pansion of the schools of arts andtrades, the conse=uent increase in their enroll"ent, and the correspondin+ di"inution of the direct and personalcontract of their heads *ith the students. $rticle 4150, ho*ever, re"ains unchan+ed. #n its present state, theprovision "ust be interpreted by the Court accordin+ to its clear and ori+inal "andate until the le+islature, takin+into account the char+es in the situation sub/ect to be re+ulated, sees fit to enact the necessary a"end"ent.

The other "atter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. #s such responsibility co e-tensive *ith the period *hen the student is actuallyunder+oin+ studies durin+ the school ter", as contended by the respondents and i"pliedly ad"itted by thepetitioners the"selves

!ro" a readin+ of the provision under e-a"ination, it is clear that *hile the custody re=uire"ent, to repeat%a"isoc v. Bri""antes , does not "ean that the student "ust be boardin+ *ith the school authorities, it does si+nifythat the student should be *ithin the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the ti"e of theoccurrence of the in/ury. This does not necessarily "ean that such, custody be co ter"inous *ith the se"ester,be+innin+ *ith the start of classes and endin+ upon the close thereof, and e-cludin+ the ti"e before or after such period, such as the period of re+istration, and in the case of +raduatin+ students, the period before the

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co""ence"ent e-ercises. #n the vie* of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as lon+as he is under the control and influence of the school and *ithin its pre"ises, *hether the se"ester has not yetbe+un or has already ended.

#t is too tenuous to ar+ue that the student co"es under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classesnot*ithstandin+ that before that day he has already re+istered and thus placed hi"self under its rules. ?either should such discipline be dee"ed ended upon the last day of classes not*ithstandin+ that there "ay still becertain re=uisites to be satisfied for co"pletion of the course, such as sub"ission of reports, ter" papers,

clearances and the like. 8urin+ such periods, the student is still sub/ect to the disciplinary authority of the schooland cannot consider hi"self released alto+ether fro" observance of its rules.

$s lon+ as it can be sho*n that the student is in the school pre"ises in pursuance of a le+iti"ate studentob/ective, in the e-ercise of a le+iti"ate student ri+ht, and even in the en/oy"ent of a le+iti"ate student ri+ht,and even in the en/oy"ent of a le+iti"ate student privile+e, the responsibility of the school authorities over thestudent continues. #ndeed, even if the student should be doin+ nothin+ "ore than rela-in+ in the ca"pus in theco"pany of his class"ates and friends and en/oyin+ the a"bience and at"osphere of the school, he is still*ithin the custody and sub/ect to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of $rticle 4150.

8urin+ all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher in char+e *ho "ust ans*er for his students torts, inpractically the sa"e *ay that the parents are responsible for the child *hen he is in their custody. The teacherin char+e is the one desi+nated by the dean, principal, or other ad"inistrative superior to e-ercise supervisionover the pupils in the specific classes or sections to *hich they are assi+ned. #t is not necessary that at the ti"eof the in/ury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connotei""ediate and actual physical control but refers "ore to the influence e-erted on the child and the disciplineinstilled in hi" as a result of such influence. Thus, for the in/uries caused by the student, the teacher and not theparent sha+ be held responsible if the tort *as co""itted *ithin the pre"ises of the school at any ti"e *hen itsauthority could be validly e-ercised over hi".

#n any event, it should be noted that the liability i"posed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. #f at all, the school, *hatever its nature,"ay be held to ans*er for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the +eneral principle of respondeat superior , but then it "ay e-culpate itself fro" liability by proof that it had e-ercised the dili+ence of abonus paterfami"ias.

%uch defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly heldto ans*er for the tort co""itted by the student. $s lon+ as the defendant can sho* that he had taken thenecessary precautions to prevent the in/ury co"plained of, he can e-onerate hi"self fro" the liability i"posedby $rticle 4150, *hich also states thatA

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease *hen the Persons herein "entioned provethat they observed all the dili+ence of a +ood father of a fa"ily to prevent da"a+es.

#n this connection, it should be observed that the teacher *ill be held liable not only *hen he is actin+ in "oco parentis for the la* does not re=uire that the offendin+ student be of "inority a+e. @nlike the parent, *ho *i+ beliable only if his child is still a "inor, the teacher is held ans*erable by the la* for the act of the student under hi" re+ardless of the student s a+e. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school althou+h the *ron+doer *as already of a+e. #n this sense, $rticle 4150 treats the parent"ore favorably than the teacher.

The Court is not un"indful of the apprehensions e-pressed by 7ustice >akalintal in his dissentin+ opinion inPalisoc that the school "ay be unduly e-posed to liability under this article in vie* of the increasin+ activis"a"on+ the students that is likely to cause violence and resultin+ in/uries in the school pre"ises. That is a validfear, to be sure. ?evertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present rulin+, it is not the school that *ill beheld directly liable. >oreover, the defense of due dili+ence is available to it in case it is sou+ht to be heldans*erable as principal for the acts or o"ission of its head or the teacher in its e"ploy.

The school can sho* that it e-ercised proper "easures in selectin+ the head or its teachers and the appropriatesupervision over the" in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and re+ulations for the"aintenance of discipline a"on+ the". #n al"ost all cases no*, in fact, these "easures are effected throu+h theassistance of an ade=uate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students.>s should bolster the clai" of the school that it has taken ade=uate steps to prevent any in/ury that "ay beco""itted by its students.

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$ fortiori , the teacher hi"self "ay invoke this defense as it *ould other*ise be unfair to hold hi" directlyans*erable for the da"a+e caused by his students as lon+ as they are in the school pre"ises and presu"ablyunder his influence. #n this respect, the Court is disposed not to e-pect fro" the teacher the sa"e "easure of responsibility i"posed on the parent for their influence over the child is not e=ual in de+ree. Obviously,the parentcan e-pect "ore obedience fro" the child because the latter s dependence on hi" is +reater than on theteacher. #t need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child s support and sustenance *hereassub"ission to the teacher s influence, besides bein+ coter"inous *ith the period of custody is usually enforcedonly because of the students desire to pass the course. The parent can instill "ore las discipline on the childthan the teacher and so should be held to a +reater accountability than the teacher for the tort co""itted by thechild.

$nd if it is also considered that under the article in =uestion, the teacher or the head of the school of arts andtrades is responsible for the da"a+e caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of a+e M andtherefore less tractable than the "inor M then there should all the "ore be /ustification to re=uire fro" the schoolauthorities less accountability as lon+ as they can prove reasonable dili+ence in preventin+ the in/ury. $fter all, if the parent hi"self is no lon+er liable for the student s acts because he has reached "a/ority a+e and so is nolon+er under the for"er s control, there is then all the "ore reason for leniency in assessin+ the teacher sresponsibility for the acts of the student.

$pplyin+ the fore+oin+ considerations, the Court has arrived at the follo*in+ conclusionsA

1. $t the ti"e $lfredo $"adora *as fatally shot, he *as still in the custody of the authorities of Cole+io de %an7ose &ecoletos not*ithstandin+ that the fourth year classes had for"ally ended. #t *as i""aterial if he *as inthe school auditoriu" to finish his physics e-peri"ent or "erely to sub"it his physics report for *hat is i"portantis that he *as there for a le+iti"ate purpose. $s previously observed, even the "ere savorin+ of the co"pany of his friends in the pre"ises of the school is a le+iti"ate purpose that *ould have also brou+ht hi" in the custodyof the school authorities.

4. The rector, the hi+h school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of the" *as theteacher in char+e as previously defined. ach of the" *as e-ercisin+ only a +eneral authority over the studentbody and not the direct control and influence e-erted by the teacher placed in char+e of particular classes or sections and thus i""ediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose *ho theteacher in char+e of the offendin+ student *as. The "ere fact that $lfredo $"adora had +one to school that dayin connection *ith his physics report did not necessarily "ake the physics teacher, respondent Celestino 8icon,the teacher in char+e of $lfredo s killer.

;. $t any rate, assu"in+ that he *as the teacher in char+e, there is no sho*in+ that 8icon *as ne+li+ent inenforcin+ discipline upon 8affon or that he had *aived observance of the rules and re+ulations of the school or condoned their non observance.

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apprenticesF $rticle ;B4 of the Civil Code further providesA

$rt. ;64. The relations bet*een teacher and pupil,professor and student, are fi-ed by +overn"entre+ulations and those of each school or institution....

2ut even such rules and re+ulations as "ay be fi-ed can notcontravene the concept of substitute parental authority.The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for thetortious acts of their pupils *as e-plained in %a"isoc vs.Bri""antes '1 %C&$ B'5), thusA

The protective custody of the schoo" heads and teachers is "andatorily substituted for that of theparents, and hence, it beco"es their obli+ation aswe"" as that of the schoo" itse"f to provide proper supervision of the students activities durin+ the*hole ti"e that they are at attendance in the school,inc"udin$ recess time , as *ell as to take the

necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody fro" dan+ers and ha ards that *ouldreasonably be anticipated, includin+ in/uries thatso"e students the"selves "ay inflict *ilfully or throu+h ne+li+ence on their fello* students.

"phasis supplied)Of course, as provided for in the sa"e $rticle 4150, theresponsibility treated of shall cease *hen the persons"entioned prove that they observed all the dili+ence of a +oodfather of a fa"ily to prevent da"a+e.

$nd *hile a school is, ad"ittedly, not directly liable since $rticle 4150 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet,by virtue of the sa"e provision, the school, as their e"ployer,

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"ay be held liable for the failure of its teachers or schoolheads to perfor" their "andatory le+al duties as substituteparents %an+co, Philippine 3a* on Torts 8a"a+es, 19(5ed., p. 401). $+ain, the school "ay e-culpate itself fro"

liability by provin+ that it had e-ercised the dili+ence of a +oodfather of the fa"ily. $rt. 4150. - - -

"ployers shall be liable for the da"a+es caused bytheir e"ployees and household helpers actin+ *ithinthe scope of their assi+ned tasks, even thou+h thefor"er are not en+a+ed in any business or industry.--- --- ---

Parenthetically, fro" the enu"eration in $rticle ;'9 of the CivilCode, supra , it is apparent that the Code Co""ission hadalready se+re+ated the classification of teachers andprofessors vis a vis their pupils, fro" directors of tradeestablish"ents, *ith re+ard to their apprentices.

GUTIERRE , 'R., J., concurrin+A# concur in the Court s opinion so carefully analy ed andcrafted by 7ustice #sa+ani $. Cru .

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colle+es and universities are no different fro" students inliberal arts or professional schools. $pprentices no* *ork inre+ular shops and factories and their relationship to thee"ployer is covered by la*s +overnin+ the e"ploy"ent

relationship and not by la*s +overnin+ the teacherMstudentrelationship.%econd, e-cept for kinder+arten, ele"entary, and perhapsearly hi+h school students, teachers are often no lon+er ob/ects of veneration *ho are +iven the respect due tosubstitute parents. >any students in their late teens or earlyadult years vie* so"e teachers as part of a bour+eois or

reactionary +roup *hose advice on behaviour, deport"ent,and other non acade"ic "atters is not only resented butactively re/ected. #t ,see"s "ost unfair to hold teachers liableon a presu"ption juris tantum of ne+li+ence for acts of students even under circu"stances *here strictly speakin+there could be no in "oco parentis relationship. hy doteachers have to prove the contrary of ne+li+ence to be freedfro" solidary liability for the acts f bo"b thro*in+ or pistolpackin+ students *ho *ould /ust as soon hurt the" as they*ould other "e"bers of the so called establish"ent.The ordinary rules on =uasi delicta should apply to teachersand schools of *hatever nature insofar as +ro*n up studentsare concerned. The provision of $rt. 4150 of the Civil Codeinvolved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Courtcannot "ake la*. #t can only apply the la* *ith itsi"perfections.

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MELENCIO:HERRERA,J., concurrin+ and dissentin+A# concur, e-cept *ith respect to the restricted "eanin+ +iventhe ter" teacher in $rticle 4150 of the Civil Code as

teacher in char+e. This *ould li"it liability to occasions*here there are classes under the i""ediate char+e of ateacher, *hich does not see" to be the intend"ent of the la*.

$s # understand it, the philosophy of the la* is that *hoeverstands in "oco parentis *ill have the sa"e duties andobli+ations as parents *henever in such a standin+. Thosepersons are "andatorily held liable for the tortious acts ofpupils and students so lon+ as the latter re"ain in theircustody, "eanin+ their protective and supervisory custody.Thus $rticle ;'9 of the Civil Code enu"erates the persons*ho stand in "oco parentis and thereby e-ercise substituteparental authorityA

$rt. ;'9 The follo*in+ persons shall e-ercisesubstitute parental authorityA

--- --- ---4) Teachers and professors--- --- ---

') 8irectors of trade establish"ents, *ith re+ard toapprenticesF

$rticle ;B4 of the Civil Code further providesA

$rt. ;64. The relations bet*een teacher and pupil,professor and student, are fi-ed by +overn"entre+ulations and those of each school or institution....

2ut even such rules and re+ulations as "ay be fi-ed can notcontravene the concept of substitute parental authority.The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the

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tortious acts of their pupils *as e-plained in %a"isoc vs.Bri""antes '1 %C&$ B'5), thusA

The protective custody of the schoo" heads andteachers is "andatorily substituted for that of theparents, and hence, it beco"es their obli+ation aswe"" as that of the schoo" itse"f to provide propersupervision of the students activities durin+ the*hole ti"e that they are at attendance in the school,inc"udin$ recess time , as *ell as to take thenecessary precautions to protect the students in theircustody fro" dan+ers and ha ards that *ould

reasonably be anticipated, includin+ in/uries thatso"e students the"selves "ay inflict *ilfully orthrou+h ne+li+ence on their fello* students.

"phasis supplied)Of course, as provided for in the sa"e $rticle 4150, theresponsibility treated of shall cease *hen the persons"entioned prove that they observed all the dili+ence of a +ood

father of a fa"ily to prevent da"a+e. $nd *hile a school is, ad"ittedly, not directly liable since $rticle 4150 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet,by virtue of the sa"e provision, the school, as their e"ployer,"ay be held liable for the failure of its teachers or schoolheads to perfor" their "andatory le+al duties as substituteparents %an+co, Philippine 3a* on Torts 8a"a+es, 19(5

ed., p. 401). $+ain, the school "ay e-culpate itself fro"liability by provin+ that it had e-ercised the dili+ence of a +oodfather of the fa"ily.

$rt. 4150. - - -"ployers shall be liable for the da"a+es caused by

their e"ployees and household helpers actin+ *ithin

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the scope of their assi+ned tasks, even thou+h thefor"er are not en+a+ed in any business or industry.

--- --- ---Parenthetically, fro" the enu"eration in $rticle ;'9 of the CivilCode, supra , it is apparent that the Code Co""ission hadalready se+re+ated the classification of teachers andprofessors vis a vis their pupils, fro" directors of tradeestablish"ents, *ith re+ard to their apprentices.GUTIERRE , 'R., J., concurrin+A# concur in the Court s opinion so carefully analy ed and

crafted by 7ustice #sa+ani $. Cru . any students in their late teens or early

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adult years vie* so"e teachers as part of a bour+eois orreactionary +roup *hose advice on behaviour, deport"ent,and other non acade"ic "atters is not only resented butactively re/ected. #t ,see"s "ost unfair to hold teachers liable

on a presu"ption juris tantum of ne+li+ence for acts ofstudents even under circu"stances *here strictly speakin+there could be no in "oco parentis relationship. hy doteachers have to prove the contrary of ne+li+ence to be freedfro" solidary liability for the acts f bo"b thro*in+ or pistolpackin+ students *ho *ould /ust as soon hurt the" as they*ould other "e"bers of the so called establish"ent.

The ordinary rules on =uasi delicta should apply to teachersand schools of *hatever nature insofar as +ro*n up studentsare concerned. The provision of $rt. 4150 of the Civil Codeinvolved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Courtcannot "ake la*. #t can only apply the la* *ith itsi"perfections.

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*ell as lectronics %ervice"an and $uto"otive >echanics courses... these courses divest 2C! of the nature or character of bein+ purely or e-clusively an acade"ic institution. 8

ithin the pre"ises of the 2C! is an &OTC @nit, the 2a+uio Colle+es !oundation &eserve Officers Trainin+Corps &OTC) @nit, *hich is under the fifth control of the $r"ed !orces of the Philippines. The &OTC @nit, by*ay of acco""odation to the $r"ed !orces of the Philippines $!P), pursuant to 8epart"ent Order ?o. 1',%eries of 19(B of the 8epart"ent of ducation and Culture, 5 is provided by the 2C! an office and an ar"ory

located at the base"ent of its "ain buildin+. 3The 2a+uio Colle+es !oundation &OTC @nit had 7i""y 2. $bon as its duly appointed ar"orer. 7 $s ar"orer of the &OTC @nit, 7i""y 2. $bon received his appoint"ent fro" the $!P. ?ot bein+ an e"ployee of the 2C!, healso received his salary fro" the $!P, as *ell as orders fro" Captain &oberto C. @n+os, the Co""andant of the 2a+uio Colle+es !oundation &OTC @nit, concurrent Co""andant of other &OTC units in 2a+uio and ane"ployee officer) of the $!P. 9 7i""y 2. $bon *as also a co""erce student of the 2C!. 14

On ; >arch 19((, at around 5A00 p."., in the parkin+ space of 2C!, 7i""y 2. $bon shot ?apoleon Castro astudent of the @niversity of 2a+uio *ith an unlicensed firear" *hich the for"er took fro" the ar"ory of the&OTC @nit of the 2C!. 11 $s a result, ?apoleon Castro died and 7i""y 2. $bon *as prosecuted for, andconvicted of the cri"e of

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#n line *ith the case of %a"isoc , 17 a student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat. $recess, as the concept is e"braced in the phrase at attendance in the school, conte"plates a situation of

te"porary ad/ourn"ent of school activities *here the student still re"ains *ithin call of his "entor and is notper"itted to leave the school pre"ises, or the area *ithin *hich the school activity is conducted. &ecess by itsnature does not include dis"issal. 1 3ike*ise, the "ere fact of bein+ enrolled or bein+ in the pre"ises of aschool *ithout "ore does not constitute attendin+ school or bein+ in the protective and supervisory custody of the school, as conte"plated in the la*.

@pon the fore+oin+ considerations, *e hold that 7i""y 2. $bon cannot be considered to have been atattendance in the school, or in the custody of 2C!, *hen he shot ?apoleon Castro. 3o+ically, therefore,petitioners cannot under $rt. 4150 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable *ith 7i""y 2. $bon for da"a+esresultin+ fro" his acts.

2esides, the record sho*s that before the shootin+ incident, &oberto 2. @n+os &OTC @nit Co""andant, $!P,had instructed 7i""y 2. $bon not to leave the office and Dto keep the ar"oryE *ell +uarded. 19 $part fro"ne+atin+ a findin+ that 7i""y 2. $bon *as under the custody of the school *hen he co""itted the act for *hichthe petitioners are sou+ht to be held liable, this circu"stance sho*s that 7i""y 2. $bon *as supposed to bewor9in$ in the armor1 *ith definite instructions fro" his superior, the &OTC Co""andant, *hen he shot?apoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under $rt. 4150 of the Civil Code, a school *hich offers both acade"ic andtechnicalNvocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort co""itted by a student enrolled only in its acade"icpro+ra"F ho*ever, considerin+ that 7i""y 2. $bon *as not in the custody of 2C! *hen he shot ?apoleonCastro, the Court dee"s it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. 24

< & !O& , the decision appealed fro" is hereby & G &% 8 in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable*ith 7i""y 2. $bon for his tortious act in the killin+ of ?apoleon Castro. ?o costs.

%O O&8 & 8.

Me"encio:;errera (#hairperson), %aras, armiento and Re$a"ado, --., concur.

Foot!ot)s

1 Penned by 7ustice %erafin . Ca"ilon and concurred in by 7ustices Crisolito Pascual and 8esiderio P. 7urado.

4 Penned by 7ud+e !ernando %. $lcantara.; &ollo, p. 15.

' Id ., at 4'F &ecord on $ppeal, p. '1F $s stated in the decision of the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court.

B -hibits p. 41.

6 %ee note ', supra .

( Ibid .

5 Ibid .

9 Ibid .

10 &ollo, p. 4'F &ecord on $ppeal, p. '4F $s stated in the decision of the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court.

11 &ello, p. 4'F &ecord on $ppeal, p. '0F $s stated in the decision of the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court.

14 Ibid .

1; &ollo, p. 4'F &ecord on $ppeal, p. '6.

1' Palisoc v. 2rillantes, '1 %C&$ B'5.

1B Ibid .

16 &ollo, p. 19.

1( Palisoc vs. 2rillantes, et al., 3 4904B, Oct. ', 19(1, '1 %C&$ B'5.

15 %chedule of classes at 2C! is fro" (A;0 a.". to 5A00 p.". T%?, 6 7anuary 1951, p. 4B.

40 The *riter, ho*ever, like the ponente in the case of Palisoc for"er >r. Chief 7ustice Claudio Teehankee, also "anifests hisconcurrence *ith the vie*s e-pressed in the dissentin+ opinion of >r. 7ustice 7.2.3. &eyes in -conde Dconcurred in by 7ustices %.Padilla and $. &eyesE that 1) can see no sound reason for li"itin+ $rt. 190; of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not toacade"ic ones. hat substantial difference is there bet*een the" in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vi+ilance over theirpupils. #t cannot be seriously contended that an acade"ic teacher is e-e"pt fro" the duty of *atchin+ that his pupils do not co""it a tort

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to the detri"ent of third persons, so lon+ as they are in a position to e-ercise authority and supervision over the pupil.

G.R. No. 7 81 No=);6) 3, 19 9PURITA MIRANDA /ESTIL $!( AGUSTIN /ESTIL, petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DA/ID U< $!( TERESITA Uiranda s heirs.

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Purita Gestil s testi"ony that she *as not in possession of >iranda s house is hardly credible. %he said that theoccupants of the house left by her father *ere related to hi" one *ay or the other ) and "aintained the"selvesout of a co""on fund or by so"e kind of arran+e"ent on *hich, ho*ever, she did not elaborate ). 7 %he"entioned as "any as ten of such relatives *ho had stayed in the house at one ti"e or another althou+h theydid not appear to be close kin. %he at least i"plied that they did not pay any rent, presu"ably because of their relation *ith Gicente >iranda not*ithstandin+ that she herself did not see" to kno* the" very *ell.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, *ere boarders or "ore of boarders than relatives)*ho paid the petitioners for providin+ the" *ith "eals and acco""odations. #t also appears that Purita Gestilhad hired a "aid, 8olores 7u"ao as, *ho did the cookin+ and cleanin+ in the said house for its occupants. 9

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8#$?O%#% T& $T> ?T, 1965 by ar+en and >ilton Chaton. ?o*, #invite your attention, doctor, to pa+e (B1 of this book under the title &abies. There is on thispa+e, Pro+nosis as a result of rabies and it saysA Once the sy"pto"s, have appeared deathinevitably occurs after 4 ; days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or +enerali edparalysis. $fter a positive dia+nosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected ani"al if the ani"alcannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, +ive rabies vaccine duck e"bryo). 8o youbelieve in this state"ent

$A Ies.JA ould you say therefore that persons *ho have rabies "ay die of respiratory failure *hichleave in the for" of bronco pneu"onia

$A 2roncho pneu"onia can be a co"plication of rabies. 19

On the stren+th of the fore+oin+ testi"ony, the Court finds that the link bet*een the do+ bites and the certifiedcause of death has beep satisfactorily established. e also reiterate our rulin+ in ison v. un Life 'ssurance#ompan1 of #anada, 24 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of thefact of death. #ndeed, the evidence of the child s hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died becauseshe *as bitten by the do+ even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner scontention that they could not be e-pected to e-ercise re"ote control of the do+ is not acceptable. #n fact, $rticle415; of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the ani"al should escape or be lost and so be

re"oved fro" his control. $nd it does not "atter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the do+ *as ta"eand *as "erely provoked by the child into bitin+ her. The la* does not speak only of vicious ani"als but coverseven ta"e ones as lon+ as they cause in/ury. $s for the alle+ed provocation, the petitioners for+et that Theness*as only three years old at the ti"e she *as attacked and can hardly be faulted for *hatever she "i+ht havedone to the ani"al.

#t is *orth observin+ that the above defenses of the petitioners are an i"plied re/ection of their ori+inal posturethat there *as no proof that it *as the do+ in their father s house that bit Theness.

$ccordin+ to >anresa the obli+ation i"posed by $rticle 415; of the Civil Code is not based on the ne+li+ence or on the presu"ed lack of vi+ilance of the possessor or user of the ani"al causin+ the da"a+e. #t is based onnatural e=uity and on the principle of social interest that he *ho possesses ani"als for his utility, pleasure or service "ust ans*er for the da"a+e *hich such ani"al "ay cause. 21

e sustain the findin+s of the Court of $ppeals and approve the "onetary a*ards e-cept only as to the "edicaland hospitali ation e-penses, *hich are reduced to P4,046.69, as prayed for in the co"plaint. hile there is noreco"pense that can brin+ back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least beassua+ed by the civil da"a+es to *hich they are entitled.

< & !O& , the challen+ed decision is $!!#&> 8 as above "odified. The petition is 8 ?# 8, *ith costsa+ainst the petitioners. #t is so ordered.

!arvasa, Ganca1co, Grianila. 2ranch 3###, a+ainst the defendant. !irst >alayan3easin+ and !inance Corporation !>3!C for short), to recover da"a+es for physical in/uries, loss of personal effects, and the *reck of his car as a result of athree vehicle collision on 8ece"ber 1', 195;. involvin+ his car, another car, and an #su u car+o truck re+istered in the na"e of !>3!C and driven by one

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Crispin %icat.

The evidence sho*s that *hile Gitu+ s car *as at a full stop at the intersection of ?e* Iork %treet and pifanio delos %antos $venue 8%$) in Cubao, Jue onCity, north*ard bound, the on co"in+ #su u car+o truck bu"ped, a !ord Hranada car behind hi" *ith such force that the !ord car *as thro*n on top of Gitu+ scar crushin+ its roof. The car+o truck thereafter struck Gitu+ s car in the rear causin+ the +as tank to e-plode and settin+ the car abla e.

%tunned by the i"pact. Gitu+ *as fortunately e-tricated fro" his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle e-ploded. 3!C andTrinidad.

On !>3!C s "otion, the lo*er court +ranted !>3!C s leave to file a third party co"plaint a+ainst Trinidad and ad"itted the third party co"plaint filed there*ith.

$ns*erin+ the third party co"plaint the state of Gicente Trinidad ad"itted that the truck *as operated by the deceased durin+ his lifeti"e. ?evertheless itraised the defense that the estate of Gicente Trinidad *as no lon+er e-istin+ because the sa"e had lon+ been settled and partitioned e-tra /udicially by his heirs.

On $u+ust 4B, 1956, the trial court rendered a decision sentencin+ !>3!C to pay Gitu+ the su" of P1;;,9B0 *ith interest at the le+al rate fro" the filin+ of theco"plaint until fully paid, plus the su" of P10,000 as attorneys fees and costs.

!>3!C appealed in due ti"e to the Court of $ppeals *hich rendered a decision on ?ove"ber 4(, 1959 "odifyin+ the appealed /ud+"ent by orderin+ the thirdparty defendant appellee state of Gicente Trinidad) to inde"nify the appellant, !>3!C, for *hatever a"ount the latter "ay pay Gitu+ under the /ud+"ent. #n allother respects, the trial court s decision *as affir"ed.

!>3!C has filed this petition for revie* on certiorari prayin+ that the decision of the appellate court be reversed and set aside.

On !ebruary 1', 1990, the Court dis"issed the petition for insufficiency in for" and substance, havin+ failed to co"ply *ith the &ules of Court and Circular 1 55re=uirin+ the sub"ission of 1) proof of service of the petition on the adverse party, and 4) a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of $ppeals. >oreover,the petition *as filed late on !ebruary 1, 1990, the due date bein+ 7anuary 4(, 1990.

The petitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration. On $pril 16, 1990. *e +ranted the sa"e and reinstated the petition. ithout +ivin+ it due course, *e re=uired therespondents to co""ent.

$fter deliberatin+ on the petition, the co""ents of the private respondents and the petitioner s reply thereto, *e find the petition to be bereft of "erit, hence,resolved to deny it.

#n the first place, the factual findin+ of the trial court and the Court of $ppeals that the #su u vehicle *hich fi+ured in the "ishap *as still re+istered in the na"e of !>3!C at the ti"e of the accident is not revie*able by this Court in a petition for certiorari under &ule 'B of &ules of Court.

This Court has consistently ruled that re+ardless of *ho the actua" o*ner of a "otor vehicle "i+ht be, the re+istered o*ner is the operator of the sa"e *ithrespect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and pri"arily responsible for the conse=uences of its operation. #n conte"plation of la*, theo*nerNoperator of record is the e"ployer of the driver, the actual operator and e"ployer bein+ considered "erely as his a+ent >IC $+ro #ndustrial Corporationvs. Gda. de Caldo, 1;4 %C&$ 10. citin$ Gar+as vs. 3an+cay. 6 %C&$ 1('F Ta"ayo vs. $=uino. 10B Phil. 9'9).

e believe that it is i""aterial *hether or not the driver *as actually e"ployed by the operator of record. #t is even not necessary toprove *ho the actual o*ner of the vehicle and the e"ployer of the driver is. Hrantin+ that, in this case, the father of the driver is the actualo*ner and that he is the actual e"ployer, follo*in+ the *ell settled principle that the operator of record continues to be the operator of thevehicle in conte"plation of la*, as re+ards the public and third persons, and as such is responsible for the conse=uences incident to itsoperation *e "ust hold and consider such o*ner operator of record as the e"ployer, in conte"plation of la*, of the driver. $nd, to +iveeffect to this policy of la* as enunciated in the above cited decisions of this Court, *e "ust no* e-tend the sa"e and consider the actualoperator and e"ployer as the a+ent of the operator of record. Gar+as vs. 3an+cay, 6 %C&$ 1(5F citin$ >ontoya vs. #+nacio, H.&. ?o. 3B565, 8ec. 49, 19B;F Ti"bol vs. Osias, H.&. ?o. 3 (B'(, $pril ;0, 19BBF Gda. de >edina vs. Cresencia, H.&. ?o. 3 519', 7uly 11, 19B6F?ecesito vs. Paras, H.&. ?o. 31060B, 7une ;0, 19BB.)

. . . ere the re+istered o*ner allo*ed to evade responsibility by provin+ *ho the supposed transferee or o*ner is, it *ould be easy for hi" by collusion *ith others or other*ise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the sa"e to an indefinite person, or to one *hopossesses no property *ith *hich to respond financially for the da"a+e or in/ury done re o vs. 7epte, 104 Phil 10;.)

. . . The re+istered o*ner or operator of record is the one liable for da"a+es caused by a vehicle re+ardless of any alle+ed sale or lease"ade thereon. >IC $+ro #ndustrial Corp. vs. Gda. de Caldo, 1;4 %C&$ 11.)

#n order for a transfer of o*nership of a "otor vehicle to be valid a+ainst third persons. it "ust be recorded in the 3and Transportation Office. !or, althou+h validbet*een the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons *ho rely on the public re+istration of the "otor vehicle as conclusive evidence of o*nership. #n la*,!>3!C *as the o*ner and operator of the # usu car+o truck, hence, fully liable to third parties in/ured by its operation due to the fault or ne+li+ence of the driver

thereof.< & !O& , the petition for revie* is 8 ?# 8 for lack of "erit. Costs a+ainst the petitioner.

%O O&8 & 8.

R!"#$%&c Ac' No. ()94 A"r&% 1), 1992THE *ONS+MER A*T OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and ouse of epresentatives of the hilippines in Con"ress asse bled#TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

8/11/2019 torts page 5-6

36/179

Ar'&c%! 1. Short Title . G This ct shall be 3no#n as the &Consumer ct of the Philippines.&Ar'&c%! 2. Declaration of Basic Policy . G It is the policy of the 6tate to protect the interests of theconsumer, promote his general #elfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industryTo#ards this end, the 6tate shall implement measures to achieve the follo#ing objectives

a% protection against ha?ards to health and safety1

b% protection against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts and practices1c% provision of information and education to facilitate sound choice and the proper e*erciserights by the consumer1d% provision of ade7uate rights and means of redress1 ande% involvement of consumer representatives in the formulation of social and economic policie

Ar'&c%! ).Construction . G The best interest of the consumer shall be considered in the interpretatioand implementation of the provisions of this ct, including its implementing rules and regulations.Ar'&c%! 4. Definition of Terms . G For purposes of this ct, the term

a% & Advertise ent & means the prepared and through any form of mass medium, subse7uentlapplied, disseminated or circulated advertising matter. b% & Advertisin" & means the business of conceptuali?ing, presenting or ma3ing available to th public, through any form of mass media, fact, data or information about the attributes, feature7uality or availability of consumer prod