Title VIII. - NUISANCE(n)
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:(1) Injures
or endangers the health or safety of others;or(2) Annoys or offends
the senses; or(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
or(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or(5) Hinders or impairs
the use of property.Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private.
A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A
private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of
property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property
started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the
same manner as the one who created it.Art. 697. The abatement of a
nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.Art. 698. Lapse of time
cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.Art. 699.
The remedies against a public nuisance are:(1) A prosecution under
the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or(2) A civil action; or(3)
Abatement, without judicial proceedings.Art. 700. The district
health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies
against a public nuisance are availed of.Art. 701. If a civil
action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public
nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal
mayor.Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether
or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.Art. 703. A private person may file an
action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.Art. 704. Any private person may abate a
public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or
if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same,
without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary
injury. But it is necessary:(1) That demand be first made upon the
owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;(2) That
such demand has been rejected;(3) That the abatement be approved by
the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the
local police; and(4) That the value of the destruction does not
exceed three thousand pesos.Art. 705. The remedies against a
private nuisance are:(1) A civil action; or(2) Abatement, without
judicial proceedings.Art. 706. Any person injured by a private
nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying
the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a
breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is
indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a
public nuisance by a private person be followed.Art. 707. A private
person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance
shall be liable for damages:(1) If he causes unnecessary injury;
or(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be
not a real nuisance
EMILIO GANCAYCO,- versus -CITY GOVERNMENT OFQUEZON CITYAND
METROMANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance
may beper seorper accidens.A nuisanceperse is that which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be
abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]Clearly, when
Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the
city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or
its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section
447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, theSangguniang Panglungsodis empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms
of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that theSangguniang
Bayancannot declare a particular thing as a nuisanceper seand order
its condemnation.It does not have the power to find, as a fact,
that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisanceper se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation
and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and
resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot
be determined by a mere resolution of theSangguniang Bayan.
(Emphasis supplied.)RUFINA SALAO and LUCIO
LUCAS,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.TEOFILO C. SANTOS,
Moreover, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisanceper seand
nuisanceper accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under
any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace
to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that
which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance. (Iloilo Ice and Cold
Storage Co.vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24 Phil., 471;
Monteverdevs.Generoso, 52 Phil., 123, 127.) Appellants' smoked fish
factory is not a nuisanceper se. It is a legitimate industry. If it
be, in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, then it
would be merely a nuisanceper accidens. (Iloilo Ice and Cold
Storage Co.vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo,supra;
Monteverdevs.Generoso,supra.) Consequently, the order of the
municipal president and those of the health authorities issued with
a view to the summary abatement of what they have concluded, by
their own findings, as a nuisance, are null and void there having
been no hearing in court to the effect.HIDALGO ENTERPRISES,
INC.,petitioner,vs.GUILLERMO BALANDAN
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance
(the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the
doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in
this Jurisdiction inTaylor vs. Manila Electric16 Phil., 8.The
doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on
his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith
or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in
the premises. (See65 C.J.S., p. 455.)The principle reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although
its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring
to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on
or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).Now, is a swimming pool or water tank
an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little
children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive
nuisance?The great majority of American decisions say no.
VIII TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS ASIDE FROM THOSE ART
2176
1. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ART 32Art. 32. Any
public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:(1) Freedom of
religion;(2) Freedom of speech;(3) Freedom to write for the press
or to maintain a periodical publication;(4) Freedom from arbitrary
or illegal detention;(5) Freedom of suffrage;(6) The right against
deprivation of property without due process of law;(7) The right to
a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;(9) The right
to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonablesearches and seizures;(10) The liberty of abode and of
changing the same;(11) The privacy of communication and
correspondence;(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;(13) The right to take
part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances;(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude
in any form;(15) The right of the accused against excessive
bail;(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;(17) Freedom from being
compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and(19) Freedom of access to the courts.In any of
the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.The responsibility herein set forth
is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
ABERCA VS VERMoreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their
right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the
following text:However, when the action (for injury to the rights
of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must
be brought within one year. Even assuming that the suspen
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer
or employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for
violating the constitutional rights and liberties of another, does
not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are
excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts
or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal
Code or other penal statute.However, the decisive factor in this
case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an
officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible
for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for
damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also
to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
2. DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.3. NEGLECT OF DUTY
BY PUBLIC OFFICERSArt. 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action
4. EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OF DEFENDANT FOR FELONIES OR ACTS
PUNISHABLE BUT WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.If in a criminal case the
judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect,
it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.Art. 30. When a separate civil
action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.Art. 31. When
the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.RULE 111 SEC 3&4Section 3. When civil
action may proceeded independently. In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)Section 4. Effect of
death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent
civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which
thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other
sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against
said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardianad
litemfor the minor heirs.The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.A final judgment
entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of the deceased.If the accused dies before
arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any
civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (n)VS RULE 111 5&6Section 5. Judgment in civil action
not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving
the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject
of the civil action. (4a)Section 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (6a)MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner
Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.From the complaint, it can
be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from,
or based on, quasi-delict.30Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while
petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:"4. That
sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on
board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate
speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila
together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;"5.
That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way,
the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind
by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD
478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very
fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;"6. That
as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described
motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards
the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and
that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which
maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a
total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the
pre-trial and trial of this case;"7. That also as a result of said
incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988,
copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and
made an integral part hereof;"8. That the vehicular collision
resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely
due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio
Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast
speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules
and regulations;"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line
Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
(sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x
x"31Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?In
exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of
Appeals said:To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit:
that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving
bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the
accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while
closely following the jeep"; x x xWe do not agree.The swerving of
Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it
was beyond the control of accused-appellant.x x x xAbsent evidence
of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.32From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:(b) Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.In spite of
said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.33A quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34It
is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35In other
words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his
guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted
on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or
ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict
to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted
on grounds other than the delict complained of.As regards civil
liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence
in aquasi-delictis entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant
in the civil case37based on quasi-delict or culpa aquilianaFor
failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.We now go to the
award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
ofP40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by
respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47As regards the
awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the
circumstances, must be modified. TheP100,000.00 awarded by the
trial court as moral damages must be reduced
toP50,000.00.48Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good.49The amount awarded by the trial
court must, likewise, be lowered toP50,000.00.50The award
ofP15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in
order and authorized by law.51
IX DAMAGES
DAMAGESCHAPTER 1GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively
applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.Art. 2196.
The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special
provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code.
Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death,
injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing
damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.Art. 2197. Damages may be:(1)
Actual or compensatory;(2) Moral;(3) Nominal;(4) Temperate or
moderate;(5) Liquidated; or(6) Exemplary or corrective.Art. 2198.
The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted
insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.b. Damages
distinguished from injuryCivil Law Torts and Damages Damnum Absque
Injuria Actionable WrongPacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the
properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and spouses
Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasas
house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the
Santoses.Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos
built a fence around their property. This effectively deprived
Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the
Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages.
Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade done by
the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It
ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent
easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation.
The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified
the ruling by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages:
P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).ISSUE:Whether
or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.HELD:No. The award
is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.There
is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.In this case, it
is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his
tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However,
when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He built
the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement
agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his
property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It
was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement
was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of
the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against
Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable
wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage
has to be borne by Mabasa.
c. Distinguished from restitution and injunctiond. Requisites
for recoverye. Kinds of Damages1. Actual or Compensatory
Damages
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.Art. 2200.
Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of
the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain. (1106)Art. 2201. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time the obligation was constituted.In case of fraud, bad faith,
malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation. (1107a)Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts,
the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It
is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.Art. 2203. The party
suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act
or omission in question.Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.Art. 2205. Damages may
be recovered:(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;(2) For injury to
the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.Art. 2206.
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) The defendant shall
be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing
the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured,
and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company
does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall
be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;(2)
When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;(5) Where the defendant acted in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;(6) In actions for legal
support;(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;(8) In actions for indemnity
under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;(9) In a
separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime;(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;(11) In
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.In
all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of
a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
(1108)Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.Art. 2211. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in
a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.Art.
2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon
this point. (1109a)Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon
unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonably certainty.Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts,
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.Art. 2215. In contracts,
quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably
mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case
referred to in the preceding article, as in the following
instances:(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms
of the contract;(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as
a result of the contract;(3) In cases where exemplary damages are
to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of
counsel;(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;(5) That
since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to
lessen the plaintiff's loss or injuryFILSYN VS DELOS SANTOSin view
of the absence of sufficient proof of its exercise of due
diligence, Filsyn cannot escape its solidary liability as the owner
of the wayward bus and the employer of the negligent driver of the
wayward bus. x x xAs to the amount of the damages awarded by the
CA, petitioner claims that it is not in accord with the evidence on
record. It explained that the amounts used in computing for
compensatory damages were based mainly on the assertions of the
respondents as to the amount of salary being received by the two
deceased at the time of their deaths.1awphilThis Court, in its
ruling,16expounded on the nature of compensatory damages,
thus:Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages
include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a
person already possesses(dao emergente)and the other, for the
failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained
to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated by the Court inPNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals:17Under
Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and
are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate
for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions
based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained
of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is
the loss of what a person already possesses(dao emergente), and the
other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante).18The burden of proof is on the
party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on
either side. The burden is to establish ones case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a
whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other.
Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts
that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot
be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. As the
Court declared:As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party
to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove
the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence,
as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an
award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.19
2. BF METAL VS LOMOTANExcept as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.10Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an
injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he
had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement.
To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to
claims which are duly supported by receipts.11InPeople v.
Gopio,12the Court allowed the reimbursement of only the laboratory
fee that was duly receipted as "the rest of the documents, which
the prosecution presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by
the victim, were merely a doctors prescription and a handwritten
list of food expenses."13InViron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos
Santos,14the Court particularly disallowed the award of actual
damages, considering that the actual damages suffered by private
respondents therein were based only on a job estimate and a photo
showing the damage to the truck and no competent proof on the
specific amounts of actual damages suffered was presented.In the
instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually
spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses
Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove the alleged
actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Exhibit "B," is a job estimate
by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair cost of the jeep
atP96,000.00, while Exhibit "M," estimated the cost of repair
atP130,655.00. FollowingViron, neither estimate is competent to
prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.15
EMETRITA DE GUZMAN VS TUMOLVACIACs award of actual damages,
however, is indeed not proper under the circumstances as there is
no concrete evidence to support the plea. In determining actual
damages, onecannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could
afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual
damages.[12]Article 2199 of the New Civil Code defines actual or
compensatory damages as follows:Art. 2199. Except as provided by
law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he hasduly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.Unfortunately, De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to
satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage incurred.Contrary
to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of reconstruction
costs made by Engineer Santos and attached to his affidavit cannot
be given any probative value because he never took the witness
stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit
and be cross-examined on them.
A. DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS AND QUASI CONTRACTS
CARIAGA VS LAGUNA
Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the
damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but
who acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the
parties had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the time
the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to
Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this
premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo
Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the
total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the
opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn
if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding
board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category
because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at
the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB.
At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a
reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first rate
(Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient to
justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in
due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a
medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado
Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be
expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished
his studies.
B. Damages in Crimes and Quasi Delict with Death (Civil
indemnity separate and distinct from moral)
PEOPLE VS VILLARICO
Penalty and DamagesThere is no question that the CA justly
pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, and punished them withreclusion perpetuapursuant to Article
248[52]of theRevised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 2, of theRevised Penal Code,considering the absence of
any generic aggravating circumstance.However, the CA did not
explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of
civil liability in the amount ofonlyP50,000.00. Thereby, the CA
committed a plainly reversible error for ignoring existing laws,
like Article 2206 of theCivil Code,[53]which prescribes a death
indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of
theCivil Code,[54]which requires exemplary damages in case of death
due to crime when there is at least one aggravating circumstance;
and applicable jurisprudence, specifically,People v.
Gutierrez,[55]where we held that moral damages should be awarded to
the heirs without need of proof or pleading in view of the violent
death of the victim, andPeople v.Catubig,[56]wherewe ruled that
exemplary damages were warranted whenever the crime was attended by
an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary. Here,
the aggravating circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or
qualifying in its effect, justified the grant of exemplary
damages.Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the
heirs of HaideP75,000.00 as death indemnity;[59]P75,000.00 as moral
damages;[60]andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[61]Asclarified
inPeople v. Arbalate,[62]damages in such amounts are to be granted
whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by
Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and proved herein.
Indeed, the Court, observing inPeople v. Sarcia,[63]citingPeople v.
Salome[64]andPeople v. Quiachon,[65]that the principal
consideration for the award of damages xxx is the penalty provided
by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not
the public penalty actually imposed on the offender, announced
that:The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the
civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed,
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
toreclusion perpetua.People vs Apattad
Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death.
Instead, they have to imposereclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the
principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender.Pertinently, as early as July 9, 1998, this Court has held
that when the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the
imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the
award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP
75,000,[79]racionating that [t]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure
of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity.[80]Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of
PhP 75,000 is warranted,[81]without need of pleading or proving
them.[82]In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of
rape to warrantper sethe award of moral damages.[83]Further, the
Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000,
despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances,[84]to deter
others from committing similar acts or for correction for the
public good.[85]HEIRS OF CASTRO VS BUSTOS (ipad pix Phil law on
Torts & Damages)
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil
obligations arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws, "...
subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and
of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art.
1161, Civil Code)Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil
liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104,id.) and said
consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107,id.)
Since these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to
certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said
provisions.The general rule in the Civil Code is that:In crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
(Art. 2202)When, however, the crime committed involves death, there
is Art. 2206 which provides thus:The amount of damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account
of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;(2) If the deceased
was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.The amount of P3,000
referred to in the above article has already been increased by this
Court first, to P6,000.00 inPeople v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and
lately to P12,000.00 in the case ofPeople v. Pantoja, G. R. No.
L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that
this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be
adjudicatedeven without proofof pecuniary loss, the assessment of
the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court,
according to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)Exemplary
damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when
the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary
damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court
will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)In any
event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity
for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases
wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "... damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art.
2204) but "the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omisson in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be
recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208,
par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate
civil action.Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following
items of damages:1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the
offense P12,000.00, without the need of any evidence or proof of
damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.2. As
indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount to
be fixed by the Court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had
no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability
not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give
support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an
heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.3. As moral
damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the court.
This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased.4. As exemplary damages, when the crime
is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, an amount to
be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered
separate from fines.5. As attorney's fees and expresses of
litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but only when a separate
civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when
exemplary damages are awarded).6. Interests in the proper cases.7.
It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased and for moral damages arerecoverable
separately from and in additionto the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that
these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened
according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except
items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.The award of moral damages
to the surviving spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants,
and ascendants of the deceased, should be made to each of them
individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental
anguish and the depth or intensity of the same. Where it is shown
that one or some did not suffer mental anguish or could not have
suffered the same, no award of moral damages should be made to him
or to them. For example: The evidence shows that the surviving
widow, who had a paramour, when informed of the death of her
husband, said: "Mabuti nga. Ngayon maaari na akong pakasal kay
Pepe." Another example: The evidence shows that the legitimate
children (or grandchildren) were aged one, two and four at the time
their father was killed. In the very nature of things these
children (or descendants) could not have suffered mental anguish.
In these examples there should be no award of moral damages to the
widow and the infant children.PEOPLE VS JOSE COMBATE
This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the
confusion as to the proper award of damages in criminal cases where
the imposable penalty for the crime isreclusion perpetuaor death.
As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types
of criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages.
We shall discuss all three.First, civil indemnityex delictois the
indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart
from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[21]This award stems
from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.Civil liabilityex
delictomay come in the form of restitution, reparation, and
indemnification.[22]Restitution is defined as the compensation for
loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a
victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for
probation.[23]Likewise, reparation and indemnification are
similarly defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong, loss,
or damage sustained.[24]Clearly, all of these correspond to actual
or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.[25]The other
kinds of damages, i.e.,moral and exemplary or corrective
damages,[26]have altogether different jural foundations.The second
type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature.Del Mundo v. Court of Appealsexplained the
nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:Moral damages, upon the
other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries
such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation.These damages must be understood to be in the concept
of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.Although incapable
of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being
left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the
claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases expressed in Article 2219[27]and Article 2220[28]of the Civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)Similarly, in American jurisprudence,
moral damages are treated as compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a
wrong.[29]They may also be considered and allowed for resulting
pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailants
conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness
of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex
of the victim, [and] mental distress.[30]ATTORNEYS FEES AS ACTUAL
DAMAGES
QUIRANTE VS IAC
HELD: NO.present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED attorney's fees may
be asserted either in: the very action in which the services in
question have been rendered -as in this case. the Court may pass
upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum
prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident
of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered.
rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a
certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the
lawyer's services. The rule against multiplicity of suits will in
effect be served a separate action 2 Kinds of Attorney's fees 1.
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil
Codewherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment
creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution 2. claims are based on the contract for professional
services, with the attorney as the creditors and the clients as the
debtors It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged
by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that
therecoveryof the amounts claimed is subject to certain
contingencies We are of the considered view that the
orderlyadministrationof justice dictates that such issue be
likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also
necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the
propriety and assessing the extent ofrecoveryof attorney's fees by
both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a
betterposition, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the
decision of the respondent court which holds that the
allegedconfirmationto attorney's fees should not adversely affect
the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the
eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same
objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be
pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be
presented for consideration by the trial court.
SPS ANDRADA VS PILIPINO SALES CORP.
The petitioners further seek attorneys fees based on Article
2208 (4) of theCivil Code,which provides that in the absence of
stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except xxx (4) in cases
ofclearly unfounded civil action or proceedingagainst the plaintiff
xxx.The petitioners are not entitled to attorneys fees.It is well
accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should be placed on
the right to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled
to an automatic grant of attorneys fees.[10]Indeed, before the
effectivity of the newCivil Code, such fees could not be recovered
in the absence of a stipulation.[11]It was only with the advent of
the newCivil Codethat the right to collect attorneys fees in the
instances mentioned in Article 2208 was recognized,[12]and such
fees are now included in the concept of actual damages.[13]One such
instance is where the defendant is guilty of gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.[14]This is a corollary of the general principle
expressed in Article 19 of theCivil Codethat everyone must, in the
performance of his duties, observe honesty and good faith and the
rule embodied in Article 1170 that anyone guilty of fraud (bad
faith) in the performance of his obligation shall be liable for
damages.But, as noted by the Court inMorales v. Court of
Appeals,[15]the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather
than the rule. The power of a court to award attorneys fees under
Article 2208 of theCivil Codedemands factual, legal, and equitable
justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation and
conjecture.[16]The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate.[17]Herein, the element
of bad faith on the part of Pilhino in commencing and prosecuting
Civil Case No. 21,898-93, which was necessary to predicate the
lawful grant of attorneys fees based on Article 2208 (4) of
theCivil Code, was not established. Accordingly, the petitioners
demand for attorneys fees must fail.INTEREST AS ACTUAL DAMAGES
EASTERN SHIPPING VS CA
(1)The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from
the decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damaes awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
money.
The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J
or EJD.
(2)From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to
run from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from the date
of judgment of the court is made.
(3)The Court held that it should be computed from the decision
rendered by the court a quo.
TERESITA DIO VS SPS JAPOR
n the instant case, the Court of Appeals found that the 5%
interest rate per month and 5% penalty rate per month for every
month of default or delay is in reality interest rate at 120%per
annum. This Court has held that a stipulated interest rate of 5.5%
per month or 66%per annumis void for being iniquitous or
unconscionable.[16]We have likewise ruled that an interest rate of
6% per month or 72%per annumis outrageous and
inordinate.[17]Conformably to these precedent cases, a combined
interest and penalty rate at 10% per month or 120%per annum, should
be deemed iniquitous, unconscionable, and inordinate. Hence, we
sustain the appellate court when it found the interest and penalty
rates in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in the present case
excessive, hence legally impermissible. Reduction is legally called
for now in rates of interest and penalty stated in the mortgage
contract.What then should the interest and penalty rates be?The
evidence shows that it was indeed the respondents who proposed the
5% interest rate per month for two (2) months. Having agreed to
said rate, the parties are now estopped from claiming otherwise.
For the succeeding period after the two months, however, the Court
of Appeals correctly reduced the interest rate to 12%per annumand
the penalty rate to 1% per month, in accordance with Article
2227[18]of the Civil Code.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITYPEOPLE VS LOPEZHowever, we modify the
award for loss of earning capacity. The rule is that documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of
earning capacity.10In this case, Liberty presented a certification
from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres was a photo
correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and that "his monthly salary
ranges fromP1,780 toP3,570 on per story basis."11Liberty presented
another certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that
Melendres received the total amount ofP24,990 representing payment
of honoraria and transportation allowance from 1 January to 31 July
2006.12The Court notes that the defense did not object when the
prosecution presented these documents before the trial court. The
rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.13It
was also established that at the time of his death, Melendres was
41 years old.14Thus, Melendres net earning capacity can be derived
from two sources: (1) his monthly salary15and (2) his honorarium
and transportation allowance.16Loss of earning capacity is computed
as follows:Net EarningCapacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual
Income Living Expenses= [2/3 (80 age at death)] x GAI [50% of GAI]=
[2/3 (80 41)] xP74,94017P37,470= [2/3 (39)] xP37,470= 26
xP37,470Net EarningCapacity =P974,220
HEIRS OF OCHOA VS GS TRANSPORT
While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the
courts to determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:Net
Earning Capacity = life expectancy*x (gross annual income -
reasonable living expenses),53*Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 age of the
deceased)we, however, find incorrect the amount ofP6,537, 244.96
arrived at. The award should beP6,611,634.59 as borne out by the
following computation:Net earning capacity =2 (80-3654)
3x 450,844.4955-50%56
=88
3x 225,422.25
=29.33 x 225,422.25
=P6, 611,634.59
MORAL DAMAGES ART. 2217- 2220
SECTION 1. - Moral Damages
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission.Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral
damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may
be considered.Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:(1) A criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries;(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;(3)
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;(4) Adultery
or concubinage;(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;(6)
Illegal search;(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;(8) Malicious prosecution;(9) Acts mentioned in Article
309;(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.The parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and
brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article, in the order named.Art. 2220. Willful injury to
property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.KIELRUF VS CAELD:
YES.AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Theawardof moral damages to Lucila
and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to
P200,000.00.Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00
Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent
that he/she is no longer capable of givinglove, affection, comfort
and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered
a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and
consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal
to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured
person.Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium,
although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the
evidence on record. The social and financial standing of Lucila
cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. no "rude and rough"
reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no
"abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her
awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct
despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial
standing proper toawardmoral damages toLucila for her physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded
feelings She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and
ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective
operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin
was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered
from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on
her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and
shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.Moral damages,
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in thecategoryof
anawarddesigned to compensate the claimant for actual injury and
are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of defendant in
order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the courtit is nevertheless essential that the
claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual
basis of damagesand its causal connection to defendant's acts. This
is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in thecategoryof anawarddesigned to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of
the defendant's culpable action. Itsawardis aimed at restoration,
as much as possible, of the spiritualstatus quo ante; thus, it must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and
fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be
that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously
excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither
should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.
SECTION 2. - Nominal Damages
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.Art.
2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every
case where any property right has been invaded.Art. 2223. The
adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon
the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
ROBLES-FRANCISCO VS CFINonetheless, while the CA recognized the
existence of just causes for petitioners dismissal, it found the
petitioner entitled to nominal damages in the amount ofP5,000.00
due to Graphics, Inc.s failure to observe the procedural
requirements of due process.Private respondent was not accorded due
process when petitioner issued and served to the former the written
notice of dismissal dated Jun. 15, 2004.A careful perusal of the
records will show that the notice issued by the employer gives the
employee only twenty-four (24) hours to answer and put up his
defenses against the accusations laid upon him by the company, in
contravention with the rule of a reasonable period as construed
inKing of Kings Transport v. Mamac.Moreover, the scheduled hearing
in front of Leticia D. Lago was on the same date at 1:00 p.m.,
which left private respondent with no recourse to secure the
services of a counsel, much less prepare a good rebuttal against
the alleged evidences for the valid dismissal of the former.x x x
xx x x Considering that petitioner has made efforts in the past to
afford private respondent the opportunity to be able to defend
himself, but the latter, instead of availing such remedy, rejected
the same; We have taken this into consideration, and impose
[P]5,000.00 as the penalty for the employers failure to comply with
the due process requirement.[7]onetheless, while the CA finding
that the petitioner is entitled to nominal damages as his right to
procedural due process was not respected despite the presence of
just causes for his dismissal is affirmed, this Court finds the CA
to have erred in fixing the amount that the Company is liable to
pay.The CA should have taken cognizance of the numerous cases
decided by this Court where the amount of nominal damages was fixed
atP30,000.00 if the dismissal was for a just cause.One of such
cases isAgabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[15]on which
the CA relied in the Assailed Decision and was reiterated inGenuino
v. National Relations Commission[16]as follows:In view of
Citibank's failure to observe due process, however, nominal damages
are in order but the amount is hereby raised to PhP 30,000 pursuant
toAgabon v. NLRC.The NLRC's order for payroll reinstatement is set
aside.InAgabon, we explained:The violation of the petitioners'
right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants
the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.The amount
of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
taking into account the relevant circumstances.Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to
fix it at [P]30,000.00.We believe this form of damages would serve
to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees.At the very least, it provides a
vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the
latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.Thus, the
award of PhP 5,000 to Genuino as indemnity for non-observance of
due process under the CA's March 31, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51532 is increased to PhP 30,000.[17]
SECTION 3. - Temperate or Moderate Damages
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
PNR VS BRUNTYRespondents, however, failed to present evidence
for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be
sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably
incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it
proper to award temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.65This is in lieu of actual
damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing,
despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they
cannot produce receipts.66
APOLINARIO DUENAS VS ALICE AFRICAespondent entitled to temperate
damages in lieu of actual damagesNonetheless, in the absence of
competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a party
is entitled to temperate damages.Articles 2216, 2224 and 2225 of
the Civil Code provide:Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages may be adjudicated.The assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case.Art.
2224.Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can
not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.Art.
2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.APOLINARIO DUENAS VS ALICE AFRICA . House repair in
time for wedding of respondent sis Sally Africa. House construction
was not finished. Respondent denied fault, was due to heavy rains
& order to stop. Respondent prayed for the return of
theP50,000.00 overpayment.She also prayed for an award
ofP100,000.00 for the purpose of repairing what had been poorly
constructed and at leastP200,000.00 to complete the project..
Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.[23]The amount thereof is
usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be
reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more
than nominal but less than compensatory.[24]There is no doubt that
respondent sustained damages due to the breach committed by the
petitioner.The transfer of the venue of the wedding, the repair of
the substandard work, and the completion of the house necessarily
entailed expenses.However, as earlier discussed, respondent failed
to present competent proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary
loss.To our mind, and in view of the circumstances obtaining in
this case, an award of temperate damages equivalent to 20% of the
original contract price ofP500,000.00, orP100,000.00 (which,
incidentally, is equivalent to 1/3 of the total amount claimed as
actual damages), is just and reasonable.
SECTION 4. - Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.Art.
2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed
by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the
measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
NAPOCOR VS NATIONAL MRCHANDISING CORPNPCs appeal, L-33897. The
trial court reduced the liquidated damages to twenty percent of the
stipulated amount. the NPC contends the it is entitled to the full
amount of liquidated damages in the sum of P360,572.80.
In reducing the liquidated damages, the trial court relied on
article 2227 of the Civil Code which provides that "liquidated
damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable."
Apparently, the trial court regarded as an equitable
consideration the persistent efforts of Namerco and its principal
to charter a steamer and that the failure of the New York firm to
secure shipping space was not attributable to its fault or
negligence.
The trial court also took into account the fact that the selling
price of the sulfur was P450,716 and that to award as liquidated
damages more than eighty percent of the price would not be
altogether reasonable.
SOLEDAd LEONOR SUATENGCO VS CARMENCITA REYESStrictly speaking,
the attorneys fees herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated
damages and not the attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney
and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of
Court.[9]Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to
a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof.[10]The stipulation
on attorneys fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes
what is known as a penal clause.A penalty clause, expressly
recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an
obligation.It functions to strengthen the coercive force of
obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the
liquidated damages resulting from such a breach.The obligor would
then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity
of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by
the breach.[11]It is well-settled that so long as such stipulation
does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly
binding upon the obligor.The attorneys fees so provided are awarded
in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.[12]G.R. No. 153874 March
1, 2007TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.UNI-FIELD
ENTERPRISES, INC.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis
is a petition for review1of the 7 January 2002 Decision2and 20 May
2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56816.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 9 September 1997 Decision3of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (trial court) in
Civil Case No. Q-95-24170.The FactsPetitioner Titan Construction
Corporation (petitioner) is engaged in the construction business,
while respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc.4(respondent) is
engaged in the business of selling various construction
materials.From 1990 to 1993, petitioner purchased on credit various
construction supplies and materials from respondent. Petitioners
purchases amounted toP7,620,433.12 but petitioner was only able to
payP6,215,795.70, leaving a balance ofP1,404,637.42. On 19 October
1994, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner.5But the
balance remained unpaid.On 26 June 1995, respondent filed with the
trial court a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages
against petitioner.In its Answer dated 18 August 1995, petitioner
admitted the purchases but disputed the amount claimed by
respondent. Petitioner also interposed a counterclaim and sought to
recoverP204,527.99 from respondent based on damaged vinyl tiles,
non-delivery of materials, and advances for utility expenses, dues,
and insurance premiums on the condominium unit turned over by
petitioner to respondent.On 9 September 1997, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The 9 September 1997
Decision provides:Accordingly, therefore, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff [respondent] as against the defendant
[petitioner] and ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff
[respondent] the following:1. The principal amount
ofP1,404,114.00;2. Interest Charges in the amount ofP504,114.00
plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly
reckoned from July, 1995 up to the time of full payment;3.
Liquidated Damages in the amount ofP324,147.94;4. Attorneys Fees
equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable and
accumulated appearance fees atP1,000.00 per hearing; and5. Costs of
suits.IT IS SO ORDERED.6Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In its 7 January 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals
denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts 9
September 1997 Decision.In its 20 May 2002 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe 7 January 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:A careful reading of the
records of the case shows that in the answer to the complaint, the
existence of the delivery receipts and invoices were not denied by
appellant, rather, it admitted the transactions subject of the
instant case. Clearly, if the damages alleged are liquidated or
stipulated, they are deemed admitted when not specifically denied.x
x x xFurther, appellant cannot question the interest rate on
overdue accounts as the same was provided for in the delivery
receipts and sales invoices, which have not been denied by it.
Therefore, the terms and conditions therein have become the law
between the parties, and both are bound by said conditions. Failure
of a party to contest the terms and conditions results in his
admission thereof.Appellant asserts that "nowhere is there any
stipulation that plaintiff is entitled to a 24% interest". This is
absurd. The Sales Invoices and Delivery Receipts, contained the
provision that:"This invoice is the written contract between
Unifield Enterprises, [I]nc. and the above-named customer. This is
payable on demand unless otherwise indicated hereinabove. Interest
of 24% per annum will be charged on overdue accounts, compounded
with the outstanding principal obligation as they accrue. Claims or
corrections hereto or in the goods must be communicated in writing
to Uni-field Enterprises within two (2) days from receipt of the
goods. x x x Should Unifield Enterprises, Inc. be constrained to
effect collection through Court action and proceedings before the
Fiscals [sic], said customer agrees to pay the following additional
sums: (1) 25% liquidated damages based on the outstanding total
obligation; (2) 25% attorneys fees based on the total claim
including said liquidated damages; (3) appearance fees of counsel
atP500.00 per hearing in addition to all other court costs and
expenses. x x x"It is emphasized that contracts are perfected by
mere consent; the stipulations of the contract being the law
between the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them
as they are agreed upon and written, there being no law or public
policy against the stipulated provisions.Verily, this Court finds
no reason to go against the findings of the lower court considering
that the assailed decision was arrived at "after a careful review
and perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in their
pleadings filed before the" lower court.7(Citations omitted)The
IssuesPetitioner raises the following issues:1. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING LEGAL BASIS FOR [AWARDING] LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND INTEREST IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT; and2.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN FACTS OR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
ALTER THE RESULTS OF THE CASE.8The Ruling of the CourtFactual
Findings of the Trial Court and the Court of AppealsBind the
CourtPetitioner asks the Court to review the records of the case
and re-examine the evidence presented before the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.As a rule, only questions of law may be
appealed to the Court by petition for review. The Court is not a
trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of
law.9Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on
this Court.10In this case, the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were based on substantial evidence which
were not refuted with contrary proof by petitioner. We thus find no
reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.On the Award of Interests, Liquidated Damages, and
Attorneys FeesPetitioner insists that the trial court and the Court
of Appeals had no legal basis to award interest, liquidated
damages, and attorneys fees because the delivery receipts and sales
invoices, which served as the basis for the award, were not
formally offered as evidence by respondent. Petitioner also alleges
that the delivery receipts and sales invoices were in the nature of
contracts of adhesion and petitioner had no option but to accept
the conditions imposed by respondent.While the delivery receipts
and sales invoices did not form part of respondents formal offer of
evidence,11records show that the delivery receipts and sales
invoices formed part of petitioners formal offer of evidence.12The
delivery receipts and sales invoices expressly stipulated the
payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees in case
of overdue accounts and collection suits. Petitioner did not only
bind itself to pay the principal amount, it also promised to pay
(1) interest of 24% per annum on overdue accounts, compounded with
the principal obligations as they accrue; (2) 25% liquidated
damages based on the outstanding total obligation; and (3) 25%
attorneys fees based on the total claim including liquidated
damages. Since petitioner freely entered into the contract, the
stipulations in the contract are binding on petitioner. Thus, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in using the
delivery receipts and sales invoices as basis for the award of
interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees.On the allegation
that the delivery receipts and sales invoices are in the nature of
contracts of adhesion, the Court has repeatedly held that contracts
of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts.13Those who adhere
to the contract are in reality free to reject it entirely and if
they adhere, they give their consent.14It is true that on some
occasions the Court struck down such contract as void when the
weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant party and
is reduced to the alternative of accepting the contract or leaving
it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.15Considering that petitioner and respondent have been
doing business from 1990 to 1993 and that petitioner is not a small
time construction company, petitioner is "presumed to have full
knowledge and to have acted with due care or, at the very least, to
have been aware of the terms and conditions of the
contract."16Petitioner was free to contract the services of another
supplier if respondents terms were not acceptable. Moreover,
petitioner failed to show that in its transactions with respondent
it was the weaker party or that it was compelled to accept the
terms imposed by the respondent. In fact, petitioner only
questioned the terms of the contract after the trial court issued
its 9 September 1997 Decision. The Court, therefore, upholds the
validity of the contract between petitioner and respondent.However,
the Court will reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. In this case, aside from the
award ofP324,147.94 as liquidated damages, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals also ordered petitioner to pay respondent
attorneys fees "equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and
payable."17The law allows a party to recover attorneys fees under a
written agreement.18InBarons Marketing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that:[T]he attorneys fees here are in the
nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly
called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or