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Pe et. al vs. Pe
Pe et. al. vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.
Bautista Angelo J.:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.
Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita
Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of
age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house
on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and
conducted clandestine trysts. When the
parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going
to their house. The affair
continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared
from her brothers house where
she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was
found inside Lolitas aparador
The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil
Code. The lower court dismissed
the action and plaintiffs appealed.
Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in
a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the New Civil Code.
Held: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolitas affection cannot lead to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with
her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to
Lolitas family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New
Civil Code.
University of the East vs. Jader G.R. No. 132344
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner vs. ROMEO A. JADER,
respondent.
FACTS: Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from 1984-88.
During the first semester of his
last year in law school, he failed to take the examination for
Practice Court I in which he
obtained an incomplete grade. He filed an application for
removal of the incomplete grade given
by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by
Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28
and on May 30, the professor
gave him a grade of 5.
His name was still on the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Likewise, his
named appeared in the invitation for the commencement exercises
which was held on April 16,
1988. When he learnt of his deficiency, he dropped from his Bar
Review classes thereby made
him ineligible to take the bar exam.
He filed a civil suit against UE for damages because he suffered
moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and sleepless nights due to
UEs negligence. The petitioner denied liability arguing that it
never led respondent to believe
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that he completed the requirements for an LlB degree when his
name was included in the
tentative list of graduating students. The court ruled in favor
of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not UE be held liable for damages to the
respondent.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The court ruled that the petitioners liability arose from its
failure to promptly inform the
result of the examination and in misleading respondent into
believing that the latter had satisfied
all the requirements for graduation. However, while petitioner
was guilty of negligence and thus
liable to respondent for the latters actual damages, we hold
that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. As a senior law student respondent should
have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement,
are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ordered to pay the sum of Php 35, 470 with legal
interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully
paid; the amount of Php 5000 as
attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. The award of moral
damages is deleted.
Tanjanco v CA 18 SCRA 994
Facts: Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he
promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas for carnal
knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her
condition, she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable
to support herself and the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry
her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the defendant
to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus
P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages. Issue: WON the acts of
petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21. Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a
breach of
promise to marry. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement superior power
or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. In
this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate
sexual relations with the
defendant, and such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly here
there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff
been deceived, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 138550
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- versus -
NOEL CORDERO,
Defendant.
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 14, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No.
51671,
entitled, Noel Cordero, Plaintiff-Appellee versus American
Express International, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to
its customers, which the latter then use to purchase goods and
services at
accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero,
wife of respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an
American
Express charge card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The issuance of
the charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember Agreement. As
cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card,
manifested her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement.
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An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was
likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also
signed.[2]
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda,
daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a three-day
holiday
trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at
about 7:00 oclock, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop
located at
277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some
chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American
Express
extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk
verified the card by making a telephone call to the American
Express Office in
Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager,
emerged from behind the counter and informed respondent that she
had to
confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American
Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to
respondent,
caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was
done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the
check-out
counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own
American Express charge card.[3]
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up
petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior
Authorizer
Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person
in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number
as
respondents card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called
up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not
in Hong
Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System.
This is the system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for
the company
and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge
cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the
system, the
person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of
the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established,
the card is honored
and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or
confiscated.[4]
When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong
Office, its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in
order
to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure
observed under the Inspect Airwarn Support System. However,
respondent refused.
Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish
the identity of the cardholder.[5] This led to the confiscation of
respondents
card.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages against
petitioner,
docketed as Civil Case No. 92-60807. He prayed for the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a
result
of the humiliation he suffered.
The trial court found that the inexcusable failure of defendant
(petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent herein) of
the
November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the
proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs
extension card which
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exposed the latter to public humiliation for which defendant
should be held liable.[6] On February 20, 1995, the trial court
promulgated its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the former the following amounts,
namely: a) The sum of P300,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
b) The sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; c) The sum of
P100,000.00 as and for reasonable attorneys fees; and d) The costs
of the suit. SO ORDERED.[7]
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the trial courts Decision with modification in the
sense
that the amounts of damages awarded were reduced, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated
February 20, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch V, in Civil Case No.
92-60807 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to modifications with respect
to the amount of damages awarded, which are reduced as follows:
(a) Moral damages from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00; and (b)
Exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00. No pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
A. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the
public humiliation allegedly suffered by
Cordero to Amex.
B. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable
to Cordero for moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.[8]
Respondent filed his comment contending in the main that the
petition raises questions of fact beyond this Courts domain.
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While it is true that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, this Court may review only errors of
law,
however, this rule admits of well-known recognized exceptions,
thus:
. . . (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.[9]
In this case, the inference made by the courts below is
manifestly mistaken. Therefore, we are justified in reviewing the
records of
this case and rendering judgment based on our own findings.
In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered
embarrassment and humiliation because his card was
unceremoniously
confiscated and cut in half by Susan Chong of Watsons Chemist
Shop.
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following
provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.[10]
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise,
there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties. But
there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the
parties. A liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach
of contract would have itself constituted the source of a
quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.[11]
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Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence
must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by
the
plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[12]
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed
respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong
attempted
to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of
respondents card; and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so
is the proximate cause
of the confiscation and cutting of [respondents] extension card
which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which
[petitioner] should be
held liable.[13]
We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card
upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is
the
authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had
respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the
latter to determine
that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly,
no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to
petitioner. If at all,
the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his
refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
That respondent refused to talk to petitioners representative
can be gleaned from the testimony of Mr. Chen Heng Kun a.k.a.
Johnny
Chen during the deposition in Hong Kong,[14] thus:
Question No 9 : Was AEII required under its existing policies
and/or membership agreement with its cardholders to advise said
cardholders of their card have been put under the support INSPECT
Strictly Question (for identification) cardmembers before approving
any charge?
Mr. Johnny Chen : Under the existing policies of AEII, we dont
have to inform the cardholders if they have to pass the INSPECT
Strictly Questions (for identification).
Question No 10 : If the answer to Q9 is in the negative, please
explain why not? Mr. Johnny Chen : The reason why we dont have to
are because, first, we are not
terminating the service to the cardholder. Second, it doesnt
mean that we are going to limit the service to the cardholder.
Third, as long as the cardholder can present an identification card
of his membership, we allow him to use the card. He can show this
by telephoning the company or by presenting us his passport or
travel document. When Watson Company called AEII for authorization,
AEII representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he
refused to talk to any representative of AEII. AEII could not prove
then that he is really the real card holder.
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Mr. Chen Heng Kun was briefly cross-examined by respondents
counsel, thus:
Question No 10 : Question 9 is objected to since the best
evidence would be the
membership agreement between plaintiffs and AEII.
Significantly, paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed
by respondent provides:
16. THE CARD REMAINS OUR PROPERTY The Card remains our property
and we can revoke your right and the right of ay Additional
Cardmember to use it at any time, we can do this with or without
giving you notice. If we have revoked the Card without cause, we
will refund a proportion of your annual Card Account fee. We may
list revoked Cards in our Cancellation Bulletin, or otherwise
inform Establishments that the Card issued to you and, if you are
the basic Cardmember, any Additional Cards have been revoked or
cancelled.
If we revoke the card or it expires, you must return it to us if
we request. Also, if any Establishment
asks you to surrender an expired or revoked Card, you must do
so. You may not use the Card after it has expired or after it has
been revoked.
The revocation, repossession or request for the return of the
Card is not, and shall not constitute any
reflection of your character or credit-worthiness and we shall
not be liable in any way for any statement made by any person
requesting the return or surrender of the Card.[15]
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can
revoke respondents card without notice, as was done here. It
bears
reiterating that the subject card would not have been
confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners
representative and identified
himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude
that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that,
therefore, it cannot
be held liable to respondent for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671 is
REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28,
1995] 15 Aug
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
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Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was
part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in
a manner offensive to
petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy..
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion.
The private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which
referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision declaring the
trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied
the motion for reconsideration by
the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language
of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken
together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those
privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication
in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning
of the word communication
to a point of absurdity.
ITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent
Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old
engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair
of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil
registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be
their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship
with Tenchavez as written
by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested
by Vicentas parents. However
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after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed
for a new marriage. Vicenta
continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single
and when it was approved she left
for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of
Nevada. She then sought for
the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta
married Russell Leo Moran,
an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.
Philippine courts cannot give recognition
on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
because it would be a violation
of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship
of Escano with her American
husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by
Tenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A
foreign divorce between Filipinos
sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the
marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one
spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys' fees.
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Lagon vs. Court of AppealsCorona, J.March 18, 2005
Keywords: Sultan Kudarat property; Oblicon case on tortuous
interference
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two
parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which covers
commercial buildings.
Said commercial buildings were constructed by the unnamed
respondent pursuant to a contract of lease between the respondent
and the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guibar wherein it was
stipulated that the private respondent would put up a commercial
building which would be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be
paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent
was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. It
was alleged by the unnamed respondent that the lease contract ended
in 1974, but it was renewed since the construction of the
commercial buildings had yet to be completed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, respondent started remitting his rent
to the administrator of the deceaseds estate until he was advised
to stop collecting rentals from the tenants because the property
had been sold to Jose Lagon, and Jose Lagon had been collecting the
same.
Respondent thus filed a complaint against Lagon, accusing Lagon
of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to
him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon denied
that he induced the heirs to sell him the property, contending that
the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of
the deceased and this was what led the heirs to sell him the
property. Lagon also maintained that he didnt interfere with
private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease contract
covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the
subject lots.
Lagon further alleged that before he bought the property, he
went to Atty. Fajardo who allegedly notarized the renewed lease
contract but the contract shown to him was unsigned. To refute the
existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in court a
certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that
no record of any lease contract had been entered into their files.
Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract
when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent
from the tenants of the buildings.
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be
unwarranted, Lagon filed his counterclaim for actual and moral
damages.
Lower Court: ruled in favor of unnamed private respondent,
holding the lease contract authentic and genuine.
Court of Apeals: affirmed Lower Courts decision with
modifications.
ISSUE:
WON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the
supposed existence of the private
respondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi,
constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon
should be held liable for damages.
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HELD:
No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in
furtherance of a personal financial interest) and
without bad faith.
RATIO:
Elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relations (So
Ping Bun v. CA):
1. Existence of a valid contract 2. Knowledge on the part of the
third person of the existence of the contract 3. Interference of
the third person without legal justification or excuse
1. Existence of a valid contract: The Court declared that absent
a clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be a prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise
to its execution and delivery. This brought the Court to rule that
the notarized copy of lease contract presented in court appeared to
be an incontestable proof that Bai Tonin Sepi and private
respondent renewed their contract.
2. Knowledge on the part of the interfere that the contract
exists: The Court ruled that Lagon had no knowledge of the lease
contract as he even conducted his own personal investigation and
inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have
made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting
claim over the property; that an examination of the entire property
title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private
respondent and that even the registry of property had no record of
the same.
3. Interference without legal justification or excuse: According
to So Ping Bun v. CA, petitioner may be held liable only when there
was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his
conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for
tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or
must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff.
Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the
renewal of his lease contract
with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove
malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never
established.
The disquisition in So Ping Bun applies squarely in this case.
Lagons purchase of the subject
property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic
interests, absent any proof that he
was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of
Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that
a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is
impelled by a proper business interest. In other
words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily
make a person an officious interferer liable
for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith
involved.
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This case is one of damnum absque injuria or damage without
injury. Injury- legal invasion of a legal right
Damage- the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury
BPI Card Corp vs CA: There can be damage without injury where
the loss or harm is not the result
of a violation of a legal duty.
Attorneys Fees, Actual and Moral Damages cannot be awarded.
Dispositive: Petition is GRANTED. CAs decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994
DELFIN G. VILLARAMA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., respondents.
Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioner.
Armando V. Ampil for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is
reprehensible enough but more so when inflicted by those with moral
ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for
separation from service.
First, the facts. On November 16, 1987, petitioner DELFIN
VILLARAMA was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.,
as its Materials Manager. His starting salary was P6,500.00 per
month, later increased to P8,500.00.
On July 15, 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual
harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-typist assigned in his
department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from
work. Her letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads:
MR. LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO President Golden Donuts, Inc.
Dear Sir:
I would like to tender my resignation from my post as Clerk
Typist of Materials Department effective immediately.
It is really my regret to leave this company which has given me
all the opportunity I long desired. My five (5) months stay in the
company have been very gratifying professionally and financially
and I would not entertain the idea of resigning except for the most
shocking experience I have had in my whole life.
Last Friday, July 7, 1989, Mr. Delfin Villarama and Mr. Jess de
Jesus invited all the girls of Materials Department for a dinner
when in (sic) the last minute the other three (3) girls decided not
to join the groupp anymore. I do (sic) not have second thought(s)
in accepting their invitation for they are my colle(a)gues and I
had nothing in mind that would in any manner prompt me to refuse to
what appeared to me as a simple and cordial invitation. We went to
a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our dinner. Mr.
Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and Mr. Jess de Jesus were drinking while we
were eating and (they) even offered me a few drinks and when we
were finished, they decided to bring me home. While on my way, I
found out that Mr. Villarama was not driving the way to my house. I
was wondering why we were taking the wrong way until I found out
that we were entering a motel. I was really shock(ed). I did not
expect that a somewhat reputable person like Mr. Villarama could do
such a thing to any of his subordinates. I should have left the
company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those
who might be similarly situated. I hope that you would find time to
investigate the veracity of my allegations and make each (sic)
responsible for is own deed. (emphasis ours)
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Thank you very much and more power.
Very respectfully yours,
DIVINA GONZAGA
The letter prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden
Donuts, Inc., to call petitioner to a meeting on August 4, 1989.
Petitioner was then required to explain the letter against him. It
appears that petitioner agreed to tender his resignation. Private
respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private
respondent approved petitioner's application for leave of absence
with pay from August 5-28, 1989. It also issued an inter-office
memorandum, dated August 4, 1989, advising "all concerned" that
petitioner was no longer connected with the
company effective August 5, 1989. 1 Two (2) days later, or on
August 7, 1989, Mr. Prieto sent a letter to petitioner
confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially
separated from the private respondent. The letter reads:
Dear Mr. Villarama:
This is to officially confirm our discussion last Friday, August
4, 1989, regarding your employment with us. As per our agreement,
you will be officially separated from the company effective August
23, 1989.
May I, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your
resignation letter on or before the close of business hours of
August 22, 1989.
Please see the Personnel & Industrial Relations Office for
your clearance.
Very truly yours,
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(SGD). LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO, JR. President
In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter
dated August 16, 1989, petitioner sought reconsideration of the
management's decision to terminate him, viz.:
DEAR SIR:
MAY I REQUEST FOR A RECONSIDERATION ON THE DECISION HANDED
DURING OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1989, TERMINATING MY SERVICES WITH
THE COMPANY EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1989.
THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE MATERIALS DEPARTMENT, WHICH
I HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE PAST 21 MONTHS, TO THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE COMPANY FAR OUTWEIGHS THE ERROR THAT I HAD COMMITTED. AN ERROR
THAT MUST NOT BE A BASIS FOR SUCH A DRASTIC DECISION.
AS I AM STILL OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE UNTIL THE 29th, OF THIS MONTH,
MAY I EXPECT THAT I WILL RESUME MY REGULAR DUTY ON THE 29th?
ANTICIPATING YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.
VERY TRULY YOURS,
(SGD.) DELFIN G. VILLARAMA
For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was
dismissed by private respondent on August 23, 1989. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case
2 against private respondent.
In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V.
Nambi held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of
petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private
respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate
petitiner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA to his former position, without loss
of seniority rights, and pay his backwages at the rate of P8,500.00
per month from August 1989, until actual reinstatement; (2) pay
petitioner the amount of P24,866.66, representing his unused
vacation leave and proportionate 13th month pay; (3) pay petitioner
P100,000.00, as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as exemplary
damages; and (3) pay the attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent
of the entire monetary award.
Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On July 16, 1992, public respondent reversed the
decision of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside and a new one entered declaring the cause of
dismissal of complainant as valid; however, for the procedural
lapses, respondent (Golden Donuts, Inc.) is hereby ordered to
indemnify complainant (petitioner) in the form of separation pay
equivalent to two month's (sic) pay (for his two years of service,
as appears (sic) in the records), or the amount of P17,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition where the following arguments are
raised:
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THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
THE MERE ADMISSION OF THE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS ENTITLES
PETITIONER TO REINSTATEMENT.
IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HIS SALARIES FROM
RECEIPT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
ON 4 FEBRUARY 1991 TO (sic) AT LEAST THE PROMULGATION OF THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION ON (sic) 16 JULY 1992.
IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ALSO ENTITLED TO HIS UNUSED VACATION
LEAVE AND PROPORTIONATE 13TH MONTH PAY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF
P24,866.66, ADJUDGED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.
THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES BY
THE LABOR ARBITER IS JUSTIFIED.
We affirm with modification the impugned Resolution.
At the outset, we note that the Petition was not accompanied by
a certified true copy of the assailed July 16, 1992 NLRC
Resolution,
3 in violation of Revised Circular No. 1-88. Neither was there
any certification
under oath that "petitioner has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such
action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other tribunal or
agency," as required under Circular No. 28-91. It is settled that
non-compliance with the provisions of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and
Circular No. 28-91, would result in the outright dismissal of the
petition.
4
In addition, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
special civil action for certiorari is available in cases where the
concerned "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Antonio v.
National Labor Relations Commission,
5 we held that the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided
by law is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision, and the resolution
thereof, which is not only expected to be but would actually have
provided adequate and more speedy remedy than a petition for
certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is to enable the
court or agency concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes
without the intervention of a higher court.
6 In this case, the assailed July 16, 1992 Resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission was received by
petitioner's counsel on July 23, 1992. 7
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead,
he commenced this special civil action for certiorari. Be that as
it may, we allowed the petition to enable us to rule on the
significant issues raised before us, viz.: (1) whether or not
petitioner's right to procedural due process was violated, and (2)
whether or not he was dismissed for a valid or just cause.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Article
277 (b) of the Labor Code, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security
of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except
for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the
requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code the employer
shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes
for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his counsel if
he so desires in
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accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause
shall rest on the employer. . . . (emphasis supplied)
This procedure protects not only rank-and-file employees but
also managerial employees. Both have the right to security of
tenure as provided for in Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution. In the case at bench, petitioner decided to seek
reconsideration of the termination of his service thru his August
16, 1989 letter. While admitting his error, he felt that its
gravity did not justify his dismissal. Considering this stance, and
in conformity with the aforequoted Article 277 (b) of the Labor
Code, petitioner should have been formally charged and given an
opportunity to refute the charges. Under the facts in field, we
hold that petitioner was denied procedural due process.
We now come to the more important issue of whether there was
valid cause to terminate petitioner.
Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was
unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed. We hold
otherwise. The records show that petitioner was confronted with the
charge against him. Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be
separated from the company. He took a leave of absence preparatory
to this separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to
him by Mr. Prieto dated August 7, 1989. A few days after,
petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated on
the ground that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant
his separation from service. So he alleged in his letter to Mr.
Prieto dated August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner
admitted his "error" vis-a-vis Miss Gonzaga. As a manager,
petitioner should know the evidentiary value of his admissions.
Needless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for
his separation.
Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for
dismissing a managerial employee. It can be proved by substantial
evidence which is present in the case at bench. As further observed
by the Solicitor General:
. . . assuming arguendo that De Jesus and Gonzaga were
sweethearts and that petitioner merely acceded to the request of
the former to drop them in the motel, petitioner acted in collusion
with the immoral designs of De Jesus and did not give due regard to
Gonzaga's feeling on the matter and acted in chauvinistic disdain
of her honor, thereby justifying public respondent's finding of
sexual harassment. Thus, petitioner not only failed to act
accordingly as a good father of the family because he was not able
to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority over the group in
the matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he
actively facilitated the commission of immoral conduct of his
subordinates by driving his car into the motel.
(Comment, April 29, 1993, p. 9)
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting
work ethics. He failed to live up to this higher standard of
responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when
such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he
provides justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and
confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to
protect its employees from over sexed superiors.
To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in
terminating the employment of managerial employees on the ground of
lack of trust and confidence.
8
We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The
public respondent erred in awarding separation pay of P17,000.00 as
indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award
of
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separation pay is proper in the cases enumerated under Articles
283 and 284 of the Labor Code, 9 and in
cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause)
and reinstatement is no longer feasible. But this is not to state
that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal
notice and conduct the necessary investigation before dismissing an
employee.
10 Thus, in Wenphil vs. NLRC
11 and Pacific Mills,
Inc. vs. Alonzo, 12
this Court awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non-observance of
due process.
Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
There was no bad faith or malice on the part of private respondent
in terminating the services of petitioner.
13
Petitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick
leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as held by the labor
arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should
be unaffected by his separation from the service.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution of
public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
award of separation pay is DELETED. Private respondent is ordered
to pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 for non-observance of due
process, and the equivalent amount of his unused vacation/sick
leave and proportionate 13th month pay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which
provided that locally manufactured cigarettes
which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged
an ad valorem tax of 55% provided
that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.
Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,
Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More
(all manufactured by Fortune) as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to
the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA
7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended
that the issuance of the rule violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that
respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended
that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/08/liwayway-vinzons-chato-vs-fortune.html
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The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA,
who dismissed the case on the ground
that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant
did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of
Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties
and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent. However, a
public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers
act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of
the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the
public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is
Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort
is a wrong, a tortious act which has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives
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some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct
and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive
of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not
render lawful an act which is otherwise
an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort
in not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.
Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO,
Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA
DELOLA,
FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER,
Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel,
stayed overnight at the female
locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard
pounding sounds outside, she saw
five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she
was sure were not employees of
the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the
morning, as union officer Soluta
was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida
narrated to him what she had
witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security
Officer. And he fetched a locksmith.
At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived
and started hitting Soluta and his
companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force
open the door, and the latter did.
Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the
office, over the objection of Babay
who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag
was found containing marijuana
flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the
union office and after the police
conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against
the 13 union officers was filed
before the Fiscals Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused.
On appeal, the CA affirmed
with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for
violation of constitutional
rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of
the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages: x x x x
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In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim,
already received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in
the morning of January 11, 1988,
petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the
union office without a search
warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in
illegality. Petitioners violation of
individual respondents constitutional right against unreasonable
search thus furnishes the basis
for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For
respondents, being the lawful
occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of
validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly
or indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Hence, it is not the actor alone who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer
for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such
being the case, petitioners, together
with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the
illegal search, are jointly and
severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to
herein individual respondents in
accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of
Article 32, in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases, among
others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to
in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 135306, Jan. 28,
2003
FACTS: Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local
federation of more than 70
Muslim religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages
against MVRS Publications, Inc.,
arising from an article, which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay
hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila
ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain.
Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin
lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag
nilang 'Ramadan'."
ISSUE:
W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional
distress tort action
HELD:
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The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for
defamation.
DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense
of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is
that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it
involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group
or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did
not specifically identify nor refer to any
particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the
alleged libelous publication. Respondents
can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure
pointedly resulting in damages.
The action likewise is not for emotional distress.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION:
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in
nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility
due to personal attacks on his character. It
has no application in the instant case since no particular
individual was identified in the disputed article
of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article,
assuming there was any, falls under the
principle of relational harm which includes harm to social
relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm
which includes injuries to individual
emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional
distress. In their complaint, respondents
clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in
the community, especially to their
activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in
other non-Muslim communities in the
country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls
within the application of the relational harm
principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the
reactive harm principle on which the concept of
emotional distress properly belongs.
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WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental
distress was extreme and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must
have been so terrifying as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry,
nausea, mental suffering and anguish,
shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress,"
in some jurisdictions, refers to any type
of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may
be generally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis,
chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to
show, among other things, that he or she has
suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it; severity
of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply
a matter of damages.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more
than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether
the tort of outrage had been committed,
a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened
to a certain amount of criticism, rough
language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact
that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as
insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is
not enough.
CHIANG YIA MIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RIZAL
COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, PAPERCON (PHILIPPINES), INC. and TOM PEK,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The instant petition concerns the recovery of a sum of money and
damages, initiated by herein
petitioner, a Chinese national based in Taiwan, against Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation
(hereafter, RCBC or respondent bank) before Branch 151i[1] of
the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 54694, sought
the collection of
US$100,000.00, or its equivalent per Central Bank rates, legal
interest, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
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Petitioners version of the case, which was upheld by the trial
court, alleges that the said
US$100,000.00 was sent by Hang Lung Bank Ltd. of Hong Kong on
February 7, 1979 through
the Pacific Banking Corporation to respondent banks head
office.ii[2] The remittance was for
petitioners own account and was intended to qualify him as a
foreign investor under Philippine
laws. As found by the trial court, it was sent by petitioner
himself prior to his arrival in the
Philippines.iii[3]
When petitioner checked on his money sometime in mid-1985, he
found out that that the dollar
deposit was transferred to the Shaw Boulevard branch of
respondent bank and converted to a
peso account, which had a balance of only P1,362.10 as of
October 29, 1979. A letter of
respondent bank dated August 9, 1985 stated that petitioners
Current Account No. 12-2009 was
opened on February 8, 1979, with an initial deposit of
P729,752.20; a total of P728,390.00 was
withdrawn by way of five checks respectively dated February 13,
19 and 23, 1979 and October 5
and 29, 1979, apparently issued by petitioner in favor of
Papercon (Phils.), Inc., (hereafter,
Papercon) one of the herein private respondents and a business
venture of Tom Pek.iv[4] Thus,
the balance of the account was reduced to P1,362.10 as of
October 29, 1979 and no transactions
were made on the account since.v[5] In the same letter, the bank
stated that it was no longer able
to locate the microfilm copies of the issued checks, specimen
signature cards, and other records
related to the questioned account, since the account had been
inactive for more than five years.
Petitioner insisted that he did not cause the transfer of his
money to the Shaw Boulevard branch
of RCBC, as his instructions in the telegraphic transfer were
for the money to be remitted to the
RCBC head office in Makati, nor its conversion to pesos and the
subsequent withdrawals. Nor
did he authorize anyone to perform these acts.
In its Answer, respondent bank alleged that there is no
indication from its records of the transfer
of US$100,000.00 for petitioners account from Hang Lung Bank
Ltd. through the Pacific
Banking Corporation. However, after plaintiff-petitioner had
adduced his evidence, it filed a
third-party complaint against Papercon and Tom Pek, admitting
that plaintiff conclusively
appeared to have deposited the sum of US$100,000.00 with the
bank and said foreign currency
deposit was converted, adopting the prevailing rate of interest
at the time, to P730,000.00 and
deposited to plaintiffs Current Account No. 12-2009 which he
opened with Shaw Boulevard
branch, after which plaintiff issued Check No. 492327 to
third-party defendant Papercon (Phils.),
Inc. for the amount of P700,000.00 and Check No. 492328 to
third-party defendant Tom Pek for
the amount of P12,700.00.vi[6] Respondent bank thus contended
that should it be made liable to
petitioner, said third-party defendants as payees and
beneficiaries of the issued checks should be
held solidarily liable with it.
Tom Pek and Papercon did not deny receiving the checks worth
P712,700.00 but argued that
unless proven otherwise, the said checks should be presumed to
have been issued in their favor
for a sufficient and valuable consideration.
Based on the evidence and arguments before it, the trial court
determined that the withdrawals
were not made by petitioner nor authorized by him, and held
respondent bank liable for the
US$100,000.00 (and the interest thereon from date of filing of
the complaint), damages,
attorneys fees, and costs.
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It is not disputed that petitioner did not personally go to
respondent bank to open the account; it
was Catalino Reyes, an employee of Tom Pek, who obtained the
blank application forms from
the Shaw Boulevard branch and returned them bearing petitioners
signature; and, the application
forms were not completely filled out. The trial court found the
actuations of the banks officers
of allowing Reyes to take out the forms, approving the
scarcely-completed application form,
validating petitioners signature thereon even when they have not
met petitioner, and permitting
the hefty withdrawals made from the account to be in
contravention with sound and well-
recognized banking procedures, and contrary to its (the banks)
primordial duty of safeguarding
the interest of its depositors, because for having allowed the
same, it enabled an unscrupulous
person to open an account for the plaintiff without the latters
consent.vii[7]
The trial court also took against respondent bank its inability
to present in evidence the
depositors card showing petitioners specimen signatures and the
requisition slip for the
issuance of a checkbook, and disregarded the banks contention
that they could not anymore be
located. From this, the trial court concluded that petitioner
did not submit any card showing his
specimen signature since he did not open the said current
account, and that the withdrawals made
on the said account were unauthorized and in fraud of
petitioner.viii[8]
The trial court further concluded that the withdrawals from
petitioners account could not have
been made possible without the collusion of the officers and
employees of respondent bank. In
its decision dated May 24, 1991, it held respondent bank solely
culpable and fully exonerated the
other private respondents. It also upheld petitioners claims for
moral damages, for the mental
anguish that he suffered, and exemplary damages, to remind
respondent bank "that it should
always act with care and caution in handling the money of its
depositors in order to uphold the
faith and confidence of its depositors to banking institutions
xxx".ix[9] Thus, the dispositive part
of the said decision read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant and
third-party plaintiff, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation,
ordering the latter to pay plaintiff
the following sums:
1) US$100,000.00, or its equivalent according to Central Bank
rate at the time payment is
actually made with interest thereon at 12% per annum from June
26, 1987, when the complaint
was filed, until fully paid;
2) P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) 20% of the total amount due to the plaintiff as attorneys
fees and litigation expenses, all three
foregoing items with interest at 12% per annum from date
hereof.
The defendant banks counterclaims and third-party complaint are
dismissed.
The third-party defendants counterclaims are likewise
dismissed.
-
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.x[10]
Respondent bank and third-party defendants sought
reconsideration of the above decision and on
September 2, 1991, Judge Migrio amended his decision to hold
Papercon and Tom Pek
solidarily liable with respondent bank. He also changed the
interest rate for the US$100,000
from 12% to 6% per annum, charged interest for the awards of
moral damages and exemplary
damages until they are paid, and reduced the award of attorneys
fees from 20% to 10% of the
total monetary awards. Following is the dispositive portion of
the RTC decision, as modified:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
On the Main Action
1. Ordering the defendant Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
to pay the plaintiff Chiang
Yia Min the following sums:
a) US$100,000.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at
the time of actual
payment, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from June 26, 1987,
the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid;
b) P30,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d) 10% of the total amount due for and as attorneys fees, all
three foregoing items with
interest at 6% per annum from date hereof; and
e) the costs of the suit.
On the Third-Party Complaint
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant-third-party plaintiff and against third-
party defendants, ordering the latter, jointly and severally, to
pay and reimburse the third-party
plaintiff the aforeadjudged amounts which it is ordered to pay
to the plaintiff in accordance with
this decision.
The defendant banks counterclaims are hereby dismissed.
The counterclaims of the third-party defendants are likewise
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.xi[11]
-
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found that the opening
of the current account and the
withdrawals therefrom were authorized by petitioner;
accordingly, it reversed the decision of the
RTC and absolved private respondents of liability.
Respondent court gave credence to the statements of Catalino
Reyes, an accountant of Pioneer
Business Forms, Inc., another business venture of Tom Pek, who
testified that petitioner and
Tom Pek were close friends and business partners. Sometime in
January or February 1979
Reyes was instructed by petitioner to withdraw the US$100,000.00
from Pacific Banking
Corporation and to deposit the peso equivalent of the same in
the Shaw Boulevard branch of
RCBC. These were undertaken to facilitate petitioners change of
visa from tourist to foreign
investor. Respondent court also accepted Reyess testimony that
he was instructed by petitioner
to prepare two of the checks drawn against the questioned
account, and that he witnessed
petitioner sign these checks and hand them over to Tom Pek. It
declared that Reyess testimony
that petitioner caused the opening of the said account was more
believable than petitioners mere
denial of the same.xii[12] Moreover, Reyess testimony was
supported by a memorandum of the
Board of Special Inquiry, Bureau of Immigration which stated
that the peso equivalent of the
US$100,000.00 had been tendered and delivered to applicant
Chiang Yia Min as evidenced by a
cashiers check dated February 8, 1979 and issued to the
latter.xiii[13] According to the Court of
Appeals, this coincides with Catalino Reyess testimony that
petitioners money was deposited
by him in respondent bank, and was contrary to petitioners
contention that the money was
transferred by Pacific Banking Corporation to respondent bank
through a bank-to-bank
transaction.
Respondent court was also not convinced by petitioners
allegation that the conversion of the
US$100,000.00 and its being deposited in the Shaw Boulevard
branch of respondent bank was
made without his knowledge and consent. It pointed out that it
was petitioner himself who wrote
the Shaw Boulevard branch inquiring about the status of his
current account; thus, he could not
later be heard to maintain that he thought his money was
deposited with the head office of
respondent bank in Makati.
Further contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court
of Appeals determined that the
inward remittance of US$100,000.00 was made while petitioner was
already in the Philippines.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Immigration, petitioner
arrived in the country as a tourist
on or about January 25, 1979,xiv[14] but subsequently applied
for a change of status of admission
to special non-immigrant as a foreign investor.xv[15] Because of
this, petitioners initial argument
--- that he could not have authorized the deposit in the Shaw
Boulevard branch and the
withdrawals therefrom because he was not yet in the country at
the time --- could not be
believed.
Moreover, respondent court found it incredible that petitioner
checked on his dollar remittance
only in 1985, long after it was sent into the country. As for
respondent banks inability to
produce the depositors card bearing petitioners specimen
signatures, the checkbook requisition
slip, and other documents requested by petitioner, respondent
court found plausible the
explanation of respondent bank that it only holds records for a
period of five years after the last
transaction on an account was made. It also noted several other
inconsistencies in the testimony
of petitioner, such as his inability to recall his date of
arrival in the country,xvi[16] the date or
-
even the year when he made inquiries with respondent
bank,xvii[17] or his presence before the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation when he applied for a
change of status.xviii[18]
Thus, petitioner lost credibility with respondent court which
found his testimony to be false on
material points and applied the principle of falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo
is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Herein defendant/third-party plaintiff and
third-party defendants are hereby
absolved of any liability arising out of this case. Likewise,
the third-party complaint is hereby
DISMISSED.
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.xix[19]
Petitioner is now before us seeking the reversal of the above
decision, maintaining that the
evidence on record preponderated in his favor and was enough to
sustain the finding that the
opening of Current Account No. 12-2009 and the withdrawals
thereon were unauthorized by him
and that respondent bank connived with third persons to defraud
petitioner. Private respondents,
for their part, ask that the petition be dismissed and the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals
be sustained.
The grounds set out in the petition are:
1. The findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting hence, an
examination by this Honorable Court of the evidence on record is
in order. There is an
imperative need for this Honorable Court to exercise its power
of supervision and review of the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals as an exception to
the rule (Solidbank vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 91494, July 14, 1995) because the Court of
Appeals for no plausible reason at
all had completely substituted its findings of fact in place of
the well-founded findings of fact
made by the trial court. It is a serious departure from the
well-accepted rules of procedure.
2. There is preponderance of evidence to show that respondent
bank connived with third persons
to defraud petitioner, hence, it should be held liable for
reimbursement with interest and
damages.
3. The application of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
by the Honorable Court of
Appeals is not in accord with law and the applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court. The
Honorable Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
principles in the exercise of
judicial discretion as to call for an exercise of the power of
review and supervision of this
Honorable Court.xx[20]
Settled is the rule that where the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court are at
variance this Court will review the evidence on record in order
to arrive at the correct
findings.xxi[21] Our evaluation of the numerous testimonies and
documentary evidence persuades
-
us that the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-founded
and merit the dismissal of the
instant petition.
The determinative issue in this case, as phrased out in the
instant petition, is whether petitioner
has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that respondent
bank connived with private
respondents and third party defendants Papercon and Tom Pek in
allowing the withdrawals from
Current Account No. 12-2009, knowing these to be unauthorized by
petitioner, and with the
purpose of defrauding him.
A review of the complaint filed before the RTC, however,
indicates that petitioner originally
sued upon an allegation of negligence on the part of respondent
banks officers and employees in
allowing the said withdrawals.xxii[22]
Under either theory of fraud or negligence, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that the
withdrawals were not authorized by him. If he is unable to do
so, his allegations of fraud or
negligence are unsubstantiated and the presumption that he
authorized the said withdrawals will
apply.
Petitioners allegation that he did not authorize the opening of
the current account and the
issuance of the checks was countered by private respondents by
presenting Catalino Reyes as a
witness. Reyes, the accountant of Pioneer Business Forms, Inc.,
another business venture of
Tom Pek, testified that the opening of Current Account No.
12-2009 and the issuance of the
questioned checks were all upon the instructions of petitioner.
Reyes stated that he first met
petitioner in January or February 1979 when the latter was
introduced to him by Tom
Pek.xxiii[23] He and his fellow employees were advised by Tom
Pek to personally help (Chiang
Yia Min) in all his personal accounts.xxiv[24] Reyes, in
particular, was charged with working on
the incorporation of Philippine Color Scanning, a new business
venture where petitioner will be
the general manager.xxv[25] He also assisted petitioner when the
latter applied for a change of
visa from tourist to special non-immigrant. Reyes testified that
on the first week of February
1979, petitioner asked him to pick up the US$100,000.00 which he
caused to be remitted in
compliance with the capital requirements for foreign investors
at Pacific Banking
Corporation.xxvi[26] Bringing with him the letter of advise from
the bank, Reyes did as he was
told and the bank released to him a cashiers check representing
the peso equivalent of the
US$100,000.00. Reyes then showed the check to petitioner and
upon the latters instructions, he
went to the Shaw Boulevard branch of respondent bank to open a
checking account in
petitioners name, using the proceeds of the check as initial
deposit.xxvii[27]
Reyes describes the opening of the current account as having
been done in haste, since petitioner
was in a hurry to have the proceeds of the remittance credited
to his checking account.xxviii[28]
Because Reyes was well-known to the officers and employees of
RCBC-Shaw Boulevard, he
was allowed to bring out of the bank the application form,
depositors card, and other forms
which required petitioners signature as depositor.xxix[29] He
then filled out the forms,xxx[30] and
brought them to petitioner for signing. He witnessed petitioner
sign the forms.xxxi[31] Then he
brought the signed forms, and petitioners passport, back to the
bank, which approved the
opening of the current account upon a comparison of the
signatures on the forms and the
passport.xxxii[32]
-
The documentary evidence accurately supports Reyess statements.
Pacific Banking Corporation
confirmed receipt of the US$100,000.00 from Hang Lung Bank, Ltd.
by telegraphic transfer on
February 7, 1979.xxxiii[33] It had instructions to transmit the
money to Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation, Head Office, for (the) account of Chiang
Yia Min;xxxiv[34] however, the
records also show that on February 8, 1979 Pacific Banking
Corporation released the money to
petitioner by way of Cashiers Check No. DD 244955, representing
the peso equivalent of the
US$100,000.00, which check was in turn presented before the
Board of Special Inquiry of the
Bureau of Immigration as proof of petitioners compliance with
the requirements for change of
status from tourist to special non-immigrant, i.e., foreign
investor.xxxv[35] On the same day,
February 8, 1979, Current Account No. 12-2009, in the name of
Chiang Yia Min, was opened in
RCBC-Shaw Boulevard with an initial deposit of P729,752.20,
representing proceeds of inward
remittance received from Pacific Banking
Corporation.xxxvi[36]
As established by the records, there were five issued checks:
two made payable to Papercon, and
three made payable to cash (these three checks were all
negotiated to Tom Pek).xxxvii[37]
Catalino Reyes testified that on two separate instances,
petitioner asked him to prepare two of the
five checks questioned in this case, specifically, the check for
P700,000.00, dated February 19,
1979 and payable to Papercon, and the check for P12,700.00,
dated February 23, 1979 and
payable to cash.xxxviii[38] He witnessed petitioner study the
information typed on the checks,
sign the checks, and hand them over to Tom Pek.xxxix[39]
The microfilm copies of these checks were submitted in
evidence.xl[40] They all bear the
signature of petitioner.
Confronted with such direct and positive evidence that he
authorized the opening of the account
and signed the questioned checks, it is curious that petitioner
did not take the witness stand to
refute Reyess testimony. He did present as his rebuttal witness
a teller of Metrobank (in which
he also maintained a checking account) who testified that she
had assisted petitioner in some
withdrawals with Metrobank and in these instances it was
petitioner himself, unassisted, who
filled out his checks.xli[41] Thus, petitioner attempted to show
that he prepared his own checks as
a matter of practice. However, we note that the Metrobank teller
testified to checks issued on
December 1989, or long after the herein questioned checks were
issued. It would neither be fair
nor accurate to compare the practice of petitioner in issuing
checks in 1979, when admittedly he
was still unfamiliar with the English language, with the manner
by which he prepared his checks
ten years later.
To our mind, the best witness to counter the testimony of
Catalino Reyes would be petitioner
himself, simply because, based on the statements of Reyes, the
only persons present when
petitioner allegedly instructed Reyes to open the account and
signed the checks were Reyes,
petitioner himself, and Tom Pek. (Tom Pek died during the course
of the proceedings.) Besides,
if indeed Catalino Reyes lied in saying that petitioner
instructed the opening of the account and
issued the checks, we cannot imagine a more natural reaction of
petitioner than wanting to set the
record right.
Moreover, petitioners signatures on the questioned checks
amounts to prima facie evidence that
he issued those checks. By denying that he issued the said
checks it is he who puts into question
-
the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures appearing
thereon, and it is he who has the
burden of proving that those signatures were forgeries.
No shred of evidence was presented by petitioner to show that
the signatures were not his. All
that this petition relies on insofar as concerning the
authenticity of the signatures is the finding of
the trial court judge that there was a discrepancy between the
signatures on the bank form and
petitioners passport. As stated in the RTC decision:
xxx An examination of the signatures of the plaintiff on the
said documents will, however,
show to an ordinary person the discrepancy in the said
signatures. The letter H in Chiang
as appearing in the application form is in script whereas the
said letter appearing in his
passport is in print.xlii[42]
The Court, however, believes that since what is at issue here is
whether petitioner issued the
question