Torres, The Case of the Failed 1942 Pan-American Games

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The limits of Pan-Americanism: thecase of the failed 1942 Pan-AmericanGamesCesar R. Torres aa The College at Brockport , State University of New YorkPublished online: 15 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: Cesar R. Torres (2011) The limits of Pan-Americanism: the case of the failed1942 Pan-American Games, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 28:17, 2547-2574,DOI: 10.1080/09523367.2011.627198

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The limits of Pan-Americanism: the case of the failed 1942

Pan-American Games

Cesar R. Torres*

The College at Brockport, State University of New York

Although there had been suggestions to organise Pan-American Games as early asthe 1910s, it was during the 1930s that such an event became a certain possibility.The cancellation of the 1940 Olympics due to the Second World War promptedsport officials in different countries of the Americas to vie for the organisation of ahemispheric festival to compensate for the temporal loss of the Olympic gathering.This article studies the failed attempt to organise Pan-American Games in BuenosAires, Argentina, in 1942. In doing so, it situates the efforts of Argentine sportleaders within the structure of international sport, the rhetoric of Pan-American-ism and the complex dynamics of US-Argentine relations. The story of the failed1942 Pan-American Games embodies and represents the limits of Pan-American-ism in the 1940s. It also reveals that these limits would be redefined, in an ironicway, in 1951, when Pan-Americanism through sport was finally made possible atthe inaugural Pan-American Games held in Buenos Aires.

Keywords: Pan-Americanism; Pan-American Games; Buenos Aires

Pan-Americanism represents the idea that the countries of the Western Hemispherehave a special relation to each other and share a common set of interests. This meansthat cooperation is, therefore, useful to advance these parallel interests and that thecountries of the hemisphere do not need to go outside their borders for assistance.Although this idea can be traced back to the 1820s, it was not until the late 1880s thatthe first serious steps were undertaken to materialise an inter-American system ofcooperation. However, the perceptions of Pan-Americanism differed within thehemisphere. While the United States saw it as a stratagem to disseminate its politicaland commercial interests and professed for itself a leading role, Argentina consideredPan-American unity a perspicacious form of domination and zeal for hegemony by theUS. As Argentina sought leadership within South America, it was suspicious of USdesigns for the region. These opposing views created conflicts between the two countriesin the diplomatic arena and generated much anguish and rivalry for a long time.1

During the 1930s, the US fostered the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ for dealing withLatin America. This new approach involved a renunciation of military interventionand an attempt to establish a collective-security organisation. Many in LatinAmerica welcomed the Good Neighbour Policy as much for its apparent spirit as for

*Email: [email protected]

The International Journal of the History of Sport

Vol. 28, No. 17, December 2011, 2547–2574

ISSN 0952-3367 print/ISSN 1743-9035 online

� 2011 Taylor & Francis

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its substance. Even though it neither eliminated the rivalry between Argentina and theUS nor the abandonment of their respective ambition to hemispheric leadership, theGood Neighbour Policy refreshed the cooperative spirit of Pan-Americanism. Indeed,it generated a fruitful period of cultural interlocution throughout the hemisphere.2

This hemispheric sense of cooperation extended to the realm of sport. Althoughthere had been suggestions to organise a hemispheric sport festival modelled after theOlympic Games as early as the 1910s, it was during the 1930s that the organisationof such an event became a certain possibility. For instance, in 1933 US Colonel CurtG. Pfeiffer, who had proposed Pan-American Games in 1916, renewed his wish inlight of ‘our ‘‘new and vigorous campaign to establish a true Pan-American alliancesocially and economically’’’.3 Pfeiffer’s proposal did not prosper, but it was anindication of the possibilities for inter-American sport cooperation resulting fromthe changes in US foreign policy and the improved relations between the US andLatin America. During the 1930s, the convenience of a Pan-American sport festivalwas discussed in several forums throughout the hemisphere, which led, in part, to thesport contests at the 1937 Greater Texas and Pan-American Exposition held inDallas. However, in spite of its significance as an expression of hemispheric sport,this event was limited in scope and mainly represented the initiative of a group ofTexans whose ultimate goal was to celebrate the state’s one-hundredth anniversaryof independence from Mexico in 1836.4

The cancellation of the 1940 Olympics due to the yet unnamed war in Europegave a new impetus to the prospect of Pan-American Games. By the end of the1930s, sport officials in different countries of the Americas were vying to host ahemispheric festival to compensate for the temporal loss of the Olympic gathering.Initially conceived as a one-time event to keep the Olympic spirit alive in thehemisphere, the proposed Pan-American Games rapidly evolved into a comprehen-sive scheme that included an inter-American bureaucracy intended to organise theevent quadrennially on a rotational basis. All proposals underlined the potentialbenefits that the Pan-American Games could have in improving inter-Americanrelations. They came to symbolise both the wish and the enormous difficulties toachieve inter-American cooperation.

The proposals

In the late 1930s, sport officials from across the Americas, removed from thetribulations and miseries of the war escalating in Europe, saw in the cancellation ofthe 1940 Olympics an opportunity to organise a hemispheric sport festival. Therhetoric behind these proposals emphasised the practical requisite to compensate forthe temporal loss of the Olympic Games and the promotion of the Pan-Americanideal so much needed in the hemisphere in those trying times. However, despitehaving similar stated goals, the proposals for Pan-American Games had variedmeanings in the respective countries where they were articulated. Avery Brundage,who by virtue of his various offices (including the presidency of the AmericanOlympic Association [AOA] and membership in the International OlympicCommittee’s (IOC) executive board) was the most powerful sport official in thehemisphere, acted as a de facto correspondence centre for these proposals.5 ThusBrundage came to have a broad perspective on the different Pan-American Gamesinitiatives, allowing him to ensure the larger interests of his beloved Olympicmovement were advanced if such an event was to be inaugurated.

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Brundage first heard from Alexander J. Hogarty, a fellow US citizen employedduring the 1920s and 1930s by different South and Central American governmentsand National Olympic Committees to advise in sport matters. In April 1938,Hogarty proposed Havana as the site for the 1940 Olympics, in case the war eruptedin Europe. Even though he did not propose a hemispheric sport festival, Hogartythought that the Caribbean city ‘through bringing all the countries of North andSouth America together, would have a tremendous effect on cementing the goodneighbor policy which is being fostered by [the] U.S.’.6 Interestingly, Hogarty’sinitial proposal came even before Tokyo gave up the organisation of the1940 Olympics. He was convinced that ‘With Japan about to throw up thesponge and with war clouds hovering over Europe which would make Finlanda bad bet, what more logical site could be selected than the romantic city ofHavana’.7

Hogarty proved to be right in his predictions on the effect that the war wouldhave upon Olympic sport. Nevertheless, his Havana project evoked moderate, if any,interest in Brundage. A month before the Japanese declined organising the 1940Olympics, Brundage replied that ‘I doubt if anyone had thought of Havana as a sitefor the Games although I might very well do in an emergency’.8 Yet he clarified thatseveral cities were capable of organising a limited version of the games on shortnotice. Although Hogarty may have been temporarily discouraged by Brundage’sresponse, a year later he reformulated his proposal to stage just a hemispheric sportfestival. Supported by Miguel Moenck, a Cuban IOC member, Hogarty wrote toBrundage in April 1939 that

I came through Havana recently and interested him [Moenck] in a set of Proposed Pan-American Games in case War should interrupt the Olympics in Finland. . . .Even if war should not come in Europe, the above plan could be put through in 1941

or 1942 and would serve the good neighbor policy much better than a conference suchas the one at Lima, Peru.9

The reformulated proposal had two interesting changes. First, it was notconditional on the cancellation of the 1940 Olympics. Second, it asserted that sportcompetitions are a superior medium to traditional diplomacy for advancing acountry’s foreign policy and/or promoting international goodwill, a notion withmuch credibility among international sport officials. This time around, Brundage’sresponse was supportive. However, he wondered whether ‘it [would] not be betterto hold a contest between the United States and a combined South American orSouth and Central American team’,10 which reveals his limited knowledge andunderstanding of the historic relations between the US and the rest of theAmericas. Nothing would have been more provocative to the people of theAmericas than a proposal to host a sport competition between an ‘all star’ Southand Central American team and a US team. That kind of paternalism was resentedin the Americas. Hogarty’s years in the region had given him a bettercomprehension of its political, social, cultural and economic dynamic. Appealingto Brundage’s experience and knowledge, Hogarty suggested a path to follow:

Of course that from a standpoint of organization, the U.S. would be the best place tohold it, but these people down here resent the big brother attitude and would cast theeye of suspicion on it if such a meet were announced for the U.S. while they wouldwelcome such a meet in Cuba. . . .

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I would suggest that you get in touch with the Inter-Departmental Committee oncooperation with the American Republics, Washington, D.C., as they would beinterested in putting such a move across for the political purpose of getting all of thesenations together at which time Pan-Americanism, peace pacts and good neighborpolicies could be regulated.11

During the next few months, Hogarty explained to Brundage in great detail thestate of sport throughout the Americas and proposed a complete programme for thePan-American Games. The restless Hogarty even wrote to President Franklin D.Roosevelt and the Department of State explaining the benefits of such games, alwaysemphasising the event’s potential for accomplishing the political goal of ‘cementingfriendship between the U.S. and the American Republics’. Moreover, he added thatgetting these countries together had ‘enormous military advantages’ and that thewhole enterprise would have to be subsidised by the government.12

At about the same time, Brundage, better acquainted now with the sentiments ofthe Americas towards the US, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In thecommunication Brundage explained that because the war would surely preclude theorganisation of the 1940 Olympics, it was suggested that the US join its hemisphericneighbours in arranging a set of Pan-American Games. The closing statement readthat ‘if your department has any official interest in such an enterprise, I am sure thatthe American Olympic Association . . . would be happy to cooperate’.13

Hull’s response soon followed. The Secretary of State assured Brundage that theDepartment of State welcomed any initiative to accentuate the amiable relationsbetween the US and the rest of the Americas and emphasised that ‘there is adefinitive place for friendly athletic competition in’ such relationship. However, Hullexplained that the organisation of the Pan-American Games should be left entirely toprivate initiative and organisation.14 Hogarty had received a similar response, albeitfrom a lower ranking Department of State official.15

Despite the Department of State’s outward endorsement of the prospect of Pan-American Games, there was dissent within its ranks. As early as October 1939, theDivision of International Conferences thought that the Pan-American Games ‘wouldnot tend to promote friendly relations between the United States and the otherAmerican Republics’.16 One reason for this position was the perceived athleticdisparity, which would render US athletes victorious in most events and,presumably, bother people in the rest of the Americas. Another reason was thebelief that international sport competitions were not conducive to goodwill amongcountries. George S. Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State, was convinced thatthe Olympic Games had not only failed to promote good relations among countriesbut had actually interfered with them. He also pointed to the serious rift in both theIOC’s and the AOA’s leaderships. Messersmith thought that neither the governmentnor the Department of State should sponsor the proposed Pan-American Games andthat the organisation should be entirely a private endeavour. In short, for him, anyattempt to associate the Department of State’s own programmes to promotegoodwill among the Americas with the Pan-American Games should beneutralised.17

While Brundage, inspired by Hogarty’s initial proposal, advertised thePan-American Games in the US, the ever more certain collapse of the 1940Olympics due to the war stimulated other sport officials in the Americas to considerhosting hemispheric games. In late September 1939, the Comite Olımpico Argentino([COA] Argentine Olympic Committee) sent the AOA a letter proposing to organise

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a ‘Pan-American Olympic Tournament’ in Buenos Aires in November 1940.18 Thetone of the proposal was similar to that made by Hogarty. The Argentines stressedthat the event was meant to facilitate understanding among the people of theAmericas and help sport progress in the hemisphere. A difference with Hogarty’sproposal was that the Argentines also called a meeting of hemispheric representa-tives in Buenos Aires in February 1940 to discuss the project at length. Their morefar-reaching goal was to institutionalise an organisation that would lead sport in thehemisphere.19 The meeting was called for the same month Hogarty had announcedfor the Havana games.

Predictably, Hogarty immediately downplayed the Argentine proposal. He toldBrundage that it was ‘just a means of getting some cheap publicity’ and listed anumber of supposed weaknesses such as the inconvenient travel to Buenos Aires.20

Nonetheless, a month after the Argentines first contacted the AOA, Frederick W.Rubien, its secretary, cautiously replied that given the circumstances, it wasimpossible for him to advise in regard to the proposed Pan-American Games. YetRubien insinuated that not all hope was lost as the AOA was ‘in an exceedinglyreceptive mood to having some sort of Pan-American competition held in 1940’.21

He also warned the Argentines that there would be competition for hosting the eventbecause ‘A number of American cities including New York, Los Angeles, SanFrancisco, Portland, Oregon, Chicago, Philadelphia and other communities havebeen discussing the organization of Pan-American Games. Furthermore, in Havana,I understand that a commission has been established by the Government for theexpress purpose of organizing international games.’22 As noted in Rubien’s letter tothe COA, a pool of several US cities was discussing the possibility of organising Pan-American Games as a substitute for the 1940 Olympics.23 The increasing interest inholding such games in the US was the result of the escalating war in Europe. By lateJanuary 1940, four major US cities (New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles and SanFrancisco) had officially filed applications to organise the event with the AmateurAthletic Union’s (AAU) Pan-American Games Committee.24 Apparently, a group ofwealthy Texans were ready to fund Pan-American Games in their state provided thatthey ‘have the good-will of the President and the Secretary of State’.25

In the middle of the Pan-American Games effervescence, Lorenzo di Benedetto,president of the AAU, declared that the games ‘were ‘‘a certainty’’ for this year[1940] and might become a permanent series’, adding that the union’s Pan-AmericanGames Committee ‘expects to prepare a constitution for an international associationto have jurisdiction over the Pan-American Games’.26 By the time Finland decidedthat it would be impossible to host the 1940 Olympics, after Japan bowed out, aconsensus developed in US sport circles around the idea that Pan-American Gamesshould be organised every four years in off-Olympic years.27 The Argentinepromoters of Pan-American Games in Buenos Aires had also expressed that theirproject would yield a permanent legacy.28

Although the idea of hosting Pan-American Games first emerged as a substitutein case the war prevented the normal schedule of the Olympic Games, it promptlybecame an independent project, valued for its own sake. The organisers needed towork out a multitude of details, but they had arrived at a basic agreement that thehemispheric sport festival should be a regular event in the international sportcalendar. By late 1939, sport leaders in Argentina, Cuba and the US vied to host thefirst version of what they believed would soon become permanent Pan-AmericanGames. Notably, even before the representatives of the sport organisations from the

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Americas gathered to formally discuss the structure of the future organisation, therewas already a struggle to host the games.

The Argentine proposal prevails

At the same time Hogarty complained to Brundage about the Argentine proposal tohost Pan-American Games in Buenos Aires in November 1940, Cuban governmentalofficials in charge of the proposed Havana games moved forward with their ownplans. They sent through diplomatic channels an official invitation to the USDepartment of State which, after consultation, was forwarded to Brundage. TheDepartment of State, at this point, suggested to the Cuban authorities that theycommunicate directly with the AOA leader.29 Presumably, the Cubans actedvigorously to gain an advantage over the Argentines. However, the initial impetuousspirit of the Cuban proposal soon vanished. On 30 November 1939 Jaime Marine, amajor in the Cuban Army who was responsible for the event, informed the AmericanEmbassy in Cuba that the plans for Pan-American Games in Havana had beenabandoned. He reasoned that in spite of the Cuban efforts, ‘there is not enough timeavailable to terminate the preparations necessary for such an event’.30 Brundage hadadvised Hogarty that February 1940 was too early to organise the games.31 Whilethe Cubans appeared to have wanted to benefit from their early start, Brundage sawno reason to hasten any decision until the situation of the 1940 Olympics was certainand he had a chance to discuss with his fellow leaders in the AOA and AAU what todo in such a case.32 Perhaps discouraged by Brundage’s lack of commitment to theircause and facing increasing competition to host the games, the Cubans abandonedtheir proposal.

One way or another, the Cuban proposal was no longer on the table. In contrast,the Argentines not only continued but increased their Pan-American Gamescampaign. The COA informed the IOC about its plans and invited the Americancountries to a proposed February 1940 congress in Buenos Aires. The IOC did notobject and the American nations welcomed the initiative but requested more time toprepare their delegations to the congress. Thus the Argentines moved the congress toApril.33

Despite their leading role, the Argentines were still waiting to hear fromBrundage regarding their proposal. Early in January, the Argentines appealed for aresponse.34 Presumably, it was not so much the pressure from Buenos Aires but therealisation that the organisation of the 1940 Olympics was a remote possibility thatfinally set Brundage in motion. The AAU had not only formed a Pan-AmericanGames Committee, whose chairperson was Jeremiah T. Mahoney, a former AAUpresident and an influential politician, but was also recruiting leaders in the nationalsport federations to join its efforts ‘in arranging for and in holding in the UnitedStates in 1940, Pan American Games’. Moreover, the AAU believed that it ‘shouldtake a leading part in the organization and conduct of the Pan-American Games’.35

The Argentine efforts were thus a clear challenge to the authority of the AOA.In light of the AAU’s pretension to lead hemispheric sport matters, Brundage

wrote in late February 1940 to the members of the AOA explaining the Argentineproposal. He urged his colleagues to promptly reply as to whether they should send adelegate to the April meeting in Buenos Aires as time was of the essence. Brundage,possibly influenced by Hogarty’s reading of the South American psyche, admonishedthat the Argentines ‘will undoubtedly be offended if we do not participate in their

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meeting’.36 Moreover, soon after, he expressed his ‘personal conviction that if a PanAmerican program is initiated it would be better to start it in South America than inNorth America’.37 Given his influence, Brundage’s opposition to the AAU’s positionleft it with minimal, if any, opportunities for success.

In the meantime, the Argentines insisted that Brundage respond to theirproposal.38 They heard from him, at last, in March. His delayed response wasjustified with a dubious alibi, if not an outright lie. Brundage claimed to have heardthat the Argentines had abandoned their plans for Pan-American Games andindicated that he had therefore not given any further consideration to the matter.However, he assured the Argentines that there was great interest in the US withregard to their proposal and asked them to consider practical issues such as thegames’ dates and programme. Brundage was very encouraging and hoped that if theArgentines decided to postpone the games for a later date, as he obliquely suggested,they would, as well, postpone the meeting.39 His sway over the Argentine proposaland, more precisely, the future of the Pan-American Games would soon becomeevident.

The leaders of the COA complied. They postponed the congress and consultedBrundage on the most propitious date for the AOA to attend.40 Brundage skilfullyavoided proposing a new date for the congress but let the Argentines know ‘for yourinformation and consideration . . . some of my views on this subject [Pan-AmericanGames]’. He thought that the Pan-American Games should be modelled after theOlympic Games, be organised on a quadrennial calendar and be staged on a grandscale that would make the event rank second only to the Olympic Games. Brundageadded that the congress should consider institutionalising a permanent organisationto administer all matters related to the games. Even as he doubted that there wasenough time to organise both the congress and the games in 1940, he left thatdecision to the Argentines. He poignantly indicated, however, that perhaps the Pan-American Games could be opened in 1942, ‘the 450th Anniversary of the discoveryof the Americas by Columbus’.41 In a country that, since 1917, had officiallycelebrated Columbus’s arrival and its Spanish heritage, Brundage’s idea resonatedloudly.42

Indeed, the COA accepted not only the idea of inaugurating the Pan-AmericanGames in 1942 but all of Brundage’s suggestions.43 The congress was finally set for28–31 August 1940. Since May, COA’s officials feverishly worked on the congress’spreparations, from basic logistics to important issues such as its rules andregulations. Late in July, Juan Carlos Palacios, president of the COA, informedBrundage of a number of issues to be referred to the congress. These included thecreation of both a Pan-American sports administrative structure and periodic Pan-American Games, the election of the games’ inaugural site and determination of itsprogramme, and the recommendation that sports be directed in all countries of theAmericas by their respective National Olympic Committees.44 Brundage’s influencewas unmistakable.

Brundage arrived in Buenos Aires on 26 August 1940 after a brief stop in Rio deJaneiro. Palacios greeted him at the airport. That same day, Brundage offered a pressconference. In it, he gave a clue to the general public about what could be expectedduring the congress. He announced he would recommend that the proposed Pan-American Games commence in 1942 and be held every four years. He added that nocountry in the Americas would be able to arrange games on a suitable scale beforethat date. With to the location of the first games, Brundage declared that it would

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depend upon a country’s ability to finance the event and provide the appropriatefacilities, but he suggested that the first Pan-American Games be held in a LatinAmerican country. In his opinion, only Argentina, Brazil and, possibly, Colombiahad the resources to stage the games.45 Clearly, the AAU’s hope to bring theinaugural games to the US had been effectively blocked. Brundage’s agenda,virtually identical to what he had already discussed with the Argentine organisers,would prove the prevailing one during the congress.

Sixteen American countries were represented at the first Pan-American SportCongress. The discussions were prolonged, vivid and fruitful. In the end, thecongressional delegates decided to institute a Pan-American Sport Committee whosegoals were to organise and control the Pan-American Games and to issue and applythe corresponding rules. The committee would be composed of a Pan-AmericanSport Congress as a supreme authority, a permanent commission and an organisingcommittee, which would undertake the direction and responsibility for the games.The permanent commission would serve as the authority of the Pan-American SportCongress during the four years between its meetings and would be composed of fivemembers.46

Predictably, Brundage was appointed president of the powerful permanentcommission. Under his watchful eye, a whole array of decisions was made at thecongress. Three were of particular importance. First, Buenos Aires was elected byacclamation to be the host of the inaugural Pan-American Games in 1942.Second, a tentative list of sports to be contested in the games was proposed.Finally, every country of the Americas not represented at the congress waseligible, upon approval, to become a member of the new organisation. At thecongress’s closing, a radiant Palacios thanked the delegates for their willingness tosupport international sport in the hemisphere. Brundage also delivered a speechin which he emphasised that it was convenient to keep sport strictly separatedfrom politics.47

Before leaving Argentina, Brundage was invited to assist in a meeting of theCOA. The future organising committee asked his advice on how to prepare andmanage the first version of the Pan-American Games.48 Brundage suggested somesuccessful strategies that had been implemented during the 1932 Los AngelesOlympics. On 5 September, Brundage left Argentina. On his way back to the US hevisited Santiago, Chile; La Paz, Bolivia; Arequipa and Lima, Peru; Guayaquil andQuito, Ecuador; and Cali, Bogota and Barranquilla, Colombia.49 Brundage thoughtthat his 20,000-mile journey was worthwhile. He thought that ‘because of theharmonious sporting spirit which actuated the Congress in Buenos Aires, and whichI found in every country, I am sure the new organization will contribute greatly tothe development of friendship, good will, and mutual understanding between thecountries of the Western Hemisphere’.50

Everything went as planned in Buenos Aires, at least for Brundage and the COA.As confirmed by the congressional proceedings, there was now a consensus inhemispheric sport circles and beyond that what was accomplished in Buenos Aireswas quite valuable. The Pan-American Sport Committee became a bureaucracygiving expression to the notion that international sport competition was a vehicle forinternationalism that could promote closer and friendlier ties among the Americancountries. In this optimistic climate, the leaders of the COA started their work forthe 1942 Pan-American Games. Their optimism would be tested sooner rather thanlater.

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Rise and collapse of the 1942 Pan-American Games

The COA immediately assumed the role of the organising committee. One of itsfirst decisions was to set 21 November 1942 as opening date of the first Pan-American Games. By any measure, the organising committee’s application wasnothing short of impressive. Before 1940 came to and end, the organisingcommittee had already set up its operational structure and requested anappropriation to the national congress to carry on with its mandate.51 By January1941, a periodic bulletin was up and running and the official poster of the 1942 Pan-American Games had been designed.52 The organising committee’s master planproposed financing the games through governmental subsidies, a lottery, the sale oftickets and stamps and the commercialisation of radio and cinematograph rights.The design of the games’ stamps and flag was ready in March. By mid-year, theorganisers had developed the competitive programme and decided the venue foreach sport. It had also been decided that the Pan-American village would be set upon the Hindu Club’s grounds, 18 miles from downtown. While the advertisingcampaign was in full swing, schemes for a Pan-American torch relay that would becarried from Greece to the US and then to Argentina through the wholehemisphere as well as a complete entertainment programme were under study.53 ElGrafico, an influential sport magazine, strongly backed the organising committee’swork.54

The organising committee’s purpose rapidly gained governmental endorsement.To its leaders’ delight, President Roberto M. Ortiz and Vice-President Ramon S.Castillo accepted to serve as honorary presidents of the organising committee whileBuenos Aires’ Mayor Carlos A. Pueyrredon joined them as honorary vice-president.In line with the spirit of the games, Castillo declared that ‘The Pan-American Gameswill be a practical form of obtaining popular support of the ‘‘good-neighbour’’policy which links all the countries of America’.55

To spearhead the spirit of the games, publicise organisational progress and secureample participation, the organising committee sent Francisco A. Borgonovo, one ofits members, on an extensive tour of the Americas. Borgonovo spent over 50 days inJuly and August of 1941 visiting both public and private officials includingpresidents, ministers and other governmental dignitaries as well as sport authoritiesin 12 countries from Chile to the US. At every stop Borgonovo informed hisaudiences of the organising committee’s preparations, asked for their support andinvited them to send a team to Buenos Aires in 1942, constantly stressing that theirpresence would secure

the realization of this most worthy project which will play so vital a role in thedevelopment of Inter-American solidarity. We believe that through sport more can beaccomplished to bring together the peoples of the Western Hemisphere in a closer bondof friendship than can be accomplished through any other endeavor.56

In the US, whose attendance and backing were crucial to the Argentineorganisers, Borgonovo found a hospitable reception. Brundage had managed to getnational sport authorities to back the Pan-American Games. The AOA, nowreferred to as the USA Sports Federation, was given jurisdiction over USparticipation at the Pan-American Games. In turn, the rebranded institution formeda Pan-American Games Committee and put Mahoney in a leadership role.57 On 11August, Borgonovo addressed a group of well-disposed US sport officials at the NewYork Athletic Club. His presentation had the desired effect, for Mahoney

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complimented him, noting that ‘from what you have already accomplished, onewould imagine the games were only a few weeks off instead of fifteen months in thedistance’.58 The Argentine preparations were indeed coming along. Mahoney, elatedwith Borgonovo’s expressed sympathy for the US, declared, to the elation of theArgentine, that

America is absolutely united in its desire to cooperate with the Argentine Republic, andthat cooperation will be extended from our great President, Franklin D. Roosevelt,down to our humblest citizen. Our great President was an old athlete, and he isinterested; our courageous Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, is tremendously interested,and I have had most sympathetic talks with him about the developments of the Pan-American idea.59

Subsequently, Borgonovo met with Hull, at which time the US Secretary of Stateexpressed approval of and promised support for the games.60 Brundage had writtento Hull and other officials in the Departments of State and War informing themabout the outcomes of the August 1940 congress in Buenos Aires. The Departmentof War agreed that the Pan-American Games would bolster friendship among thecountries of the hemisphere and offered ‘to assist the committee in any possiblemanner that does not conflict with the intensive training program’.61 By contrast, theDepartment of State’s responses were somewhat distant. Hull answered through anassociate, who was encouraged by the signs of friendship Brundage encountered inthe countries visited.62 Nevertheless, by the time Borgonovo left the US, Hull seemedto have had a positive outlook on the games.

Borgonovo’s tour made quite an impression on the hemisphere. By September,13 countries, including Argentina, had confirmed their participation in the Pan-American Games. Palacios and Jose Gallo Cesana, the organising committee’smanager, had paid visits to the diplomatic legations of the American countries toArgentina to further spread support for the games. They were all appointedhonorary members of the organising committee. The Argentine officials tookparticular care to cultivate their relationship with Norman Armour, US Ambassadorto Argentina, who was offered, and accepted, the position of honorary director ofthe games.63

While momentum for the Pan-American Games kept building, favourable newscame from the US. On 19 November the USA Sports Federation had its quadrennialmeeting. Brundage was re-elected as president and different committees were formedto organise trials and prepare the team that would compete in Buenos Aires a yearlater. Conrado Traverso, General Consul of Argentina in New York, gave a briefspeech.64 He must have felt encouraged with Mahoney’s relay of Hull’s latestperspective on the games:

You may tell those who are working with you that the government of the United Statesis one hundred percent behind you, and you can rest assured that what you are doing isone of the finest things that can be done to cement relations between the United Statesand South America.65

Don Francisco, a Department of State official, reinforced this view. Addressingthe meeting, Francisco urged the expansion of the Good Neighbour Policy, claimingthat ‘Games of this nature are great promoters of international friendship’. He addedthat the organisation and control of sport belong to private institutions, emphasisingthat the role of the government ‘is to facilitate inter-American athletics, not to

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interfere with or to control them’.66 The organising committee rushed a laudatoryletter to Brundage the day following the meeting. The games were a year and dayaway.

Enthused by the latest news and its own progress, two weeks later, the organisingcommittee celebrated the one-year-to-go mark with ‘a real Panamerican feast’ at theAlvear Palace Hotel. The event, attended by Castillo, Pueyrredon and a whole arrayof diplomats, authorities and dignitaries was seriously infused by sport universal-ism.67 The organising committee considered ‘the meeting a great success’ and lookedat the work ahead boldly.68 It was the never-to-be games’ finest hour.

Unfortunately, the optimistic atmosphere did not last long. Five days after the‘Pan-American Feast’ in Buenos Aires’ Alvear Palace Hotel, the Japanese attackedPearl Harbor. A day later, the US declared war on Japan. Palacios, anticipating theimpact of these developments on the Pan-American Games, wrote to Brundageasking his personal opinion on how to proceed but also pointing out that he trustedthe games would carry on. Appealing to Pan-Americanism, Palacios mused that

The surprising war between [the] U.S.A. and Japan finds us with the preparations andorganization of the PAG in full swing. . . .The unanimity with which all the countries of America have solidarized with [the]

U.S.A. makes us think that the same union will persist in every field, including thesporting field.69

Perhaps to show their determination and commitment, the Argentines sentBrundage at least six letters before the end of 1941. Although the letters primarilydealt with logistics of the games, one noted that then, more than ever, the gameswere necessary because the event reflected the ‘solidarity of the peoples of theAmericas’.70 Brundage broke his silence on 21 January 1942. He reassured theArgentines that the opinion of the USA Sports Federation was practicallyunanimous that it was their duty to go on with its participation in the Pan-American Games. Apparently the US Army and Navy shared that sentiment.However, Brundage stated that under the circumstances participation was subject togovernmental approval and, perchance, even support, especially with regards totransportation. Finally, he promised to ascertain whether or not the government hadchanged its view on the games since the US had entered the war.71

Some US sport officials speculated that Brundage had been waiting for Argentinato take a stand for or against the Axis before making any move regarding theparticipation of his country in the Pan-American Games, but that does not seem tobe the case.72 Brundage wrote to Hull and was determined to go ahead full blast withUS participation at the games if the Secretary of State approved such participation.73

In the meantime, Brundage communicated with sport authorities throughout theAmericas requesting notification of whether or not they would send delegations tothe games. The news was not encouraging. Most countries, including the US, did notreply by the 28 February deadline. However, out of those who did, four declinedparticipation, two confirmed it and one was indecisive.74

By then, Brundage had still not received a reply from Hull. This time it wasBrundage who appealed to Palacios for help. Brundage suggested that Armour andFelipe A. Espil, Argentine Ambassador to the US, could exert some positiveinfluence on the government in securing US participation in the games. Perhapsforeseeing Hull’s disinclination for such support, Brundage suggested to Palaciosthat the efforts should be directed at Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, a close

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adviser to Roosevelt on Latin American issues.75 Given that Welles and Hull did notsee eye to eye on many foreign policy issues, Brundage might have wanted to exploittheir differences. Palacios exerted as much diplomatic influence as he could. Hewrote Espil asking him to convince Welles to support the games. He contactedConrado Traverso, Argentine Consul General in Washington, appealing to hispatriotic feelings in order to request his support to secure at least a small USdelegation to the games.76 Palacios also visited Armour. Whether disingenuously ornot, Armour told Palacios that he would recommend US participation in the gamesto the Department of State and promised to use his influence in that regard.77

These initiatives were to no avail. By mid-March, Brundage, having finally heardfrom the Department of State, phoned Palacios with a disquieting premonition.Although convinced about the beneficial value of enterprises such as the Pan-American Games, because of the war effort the Department of State considered ‘itwas quite probable that it would be impossible to obtain transportation for ourteams next November’. To counteract the Department of State’s stance, Brundageproposed sending a small delegation of around 30 athletes that, without taxing theUS transportation capacity, would serve as a symbolic gesture of goodwill. ‘We aresparing no effort to obtain a favorable response’, Brundage said, trying to appeasePalacios.78 Brundage mused that the Department of State’s lack of cooperation wasdue to ‘some unfavorable, or even antagonistic, influence operating which we cannotlocate’. He thought that the source of such influence could be in Buenos Aires andthus asked Palacios to find out if Armour approved of US participation in thegames.79 Palacios frantically sought as much cooperation from Argentine diplomatsas possible in order to reach out to their US counterparts.80

On 1 April, Brundage telegraphed Palacios informing him that the final decision‘from highest quarters’ was that US participation in the Pan-American Games wasimpossible. A few days earlier, Welles had sent a letter to Palacios regretfullyinforming him that ‘on account of the extreme demands which the war is makingupon every part of the nation’, the government had decided that the US ‘shouldrefrain from participation in the Pan American Games’.81 Similar to Welles’s letter,Brundage’s telegram cited the increasing war campaign and transportationdifficulties as the reason for the governmental decision. Despite being under pressureto make a public announcement regarding the US withdrawal from the games,Brundage asked Palacios if he had any suggestion.82

Palacios came up with one last attempt to secure US participation in the Pan-American Games. He sent notes to Roosevelt and Welles before the celebration ofthe ‘Pan-American Day’ on 14 April requesting governmental approval to send asmall US team to Buenos Aires. In addition, Palacios solicited Espil to address theissue directly with Roosevelt during a reception for the ‘Pan-American Day’ plannedat the White House. Palacios told Brundage that if the plan failed, he couldannounce publicly the US withdrawal from the games. Although Palacioss notes toRoosevelt and Welles gave praise to the Good Neighbour Policy, hemisphericsolidarity and sporting universalism, his plan did not work. The fact that Welles’sfirst and last names were misspelled in the note was probably not a crucial issue butsymbolised the long-standing misunderstandings between Argentina and the US.83

Despite having a press release announcing the US withdrawal from the Pan-American Games on his desk, on 14 April Brundage wrote to Nelson A. Rockefeller,Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, outlining, once again, thereasons why the US should participate in the Pan-American Games and making sure

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the government understood the US sport leaders’ point of view. Brundage arguedthat it was their duty as citizens to make the arguments. Brundage, in a passage thatillustrates both the tensions of the moment and the distrust between Argentina andthe US, even contended that it would be diplomatically unwise not to send a team toBuenos Aires: ‘Moreover, the Argentineans being a proud, suspicious, andnationalistic people, will certainly take it as a deliberate slight if we are not there,a reprisal for the Rio Conference and a delicate situation will be further strained.’84

Although Rockefeller’s view of foreign policy was closer to Welles’s than Hull’s, hewas unimpressed. It is likely that most governmental officials agreed with Brundage’sassessment of the Argentines as it is likely that they did not care whether, in Argentina,the absence of a US team in the Pan-American Games would be perceived as retaliationfor Argentina’s opposition to the US in the ThirdMeeting of Consultation of AmericanForeign Ministers held in Rio de Janeiro. On 18 April, Rockefeller, at last, sealed thefate of the US participation, and the games, clarifying that

[a]t the present time, reports from experienced observers in the other AmericanRepublics have convinced us that the harmful effects of attempting to carry out anactive inter-American sports program, no matter how limited its scope, would over-balance those resulting from withdrawal in this field. Further, official authority bywhose opinion we must necessarily to a large extent be guided has pronouncedunequivocally against participation at this time.85

Regardless of what ‘experienced observers’ actually thought, the ‘officialauthority’ trumped the field agents and closed the issue. The following day,Brundage released to the media the statement announcing the US withdrawal fromthe Pan-American Games. The statement said that the decision had been taken ‘withgreat reluctance’. Even more, the statement contained a hint of criticism of federalauthorities, as it predicted that when peace was restored ‘those who have worked tokeep the fine spirit of amateur sport alive will be hailed as patriots of the highestranks’. Yet, the problem with transportation and the necessity to devote allenergies to the war were the reasons given for the withdrawal and this is what themedia emphasised.86 During a press interview, Brundage declared that ‘I sincerelyhope that our measure of necessity will not bring about a cancellation of thegames’.87 His fears were not unfounded. In the next few days, Brazil, Colombia,Mexico and Uruguay announced that their participation in the games wasimprobable.88

Palacios felt both miserable and upset. While the US withdrawal was a foregoneconclusion, he did not expect other American countries to follow suit.89 Althoughthe Argentines immediately contacted all countries qualified to participate in thePan-American Games asking whether they should carry on with the games, Palacioswas convinced that the majority would favour postponing the event. He beggedBrundage to intercede with the American countries to accept November 1943 as thenew date for the games. On 24 April, Armour promised Palacios to influence hisgovernment to support the new date.90 Optimistically, and perhaps confident in themilitary might of the US, Palacios was certain that ‘by then the DemocraticCountries will have defeated the totalitarians and so the world will be in peaceagain’.91 While his reckoning was a bit short in terms of the duration of the war, hisprediction about the postponement of the games was correct. On 5 June, theArgentines formally decided to postpone the games until November 1943.92 Thatdate would prove to be impossible.

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The significance of the failed 1942 Pan-American Games93

The story of the failed 1942 Pan-American Games was shaped by the convolutedrelationship between Argentina and the US. Although governmental and sportleaders in both countries boasted of Pan-American unity, the games could not escapethe deterioration of US-Argentine relations as the war increasingly affected thehemisphere. The postponement of the event in June 1942, which was a de factocancellation, heralded the escalating distance, coldness and open antagonismbetween Argentina and the US during the rest of the war and over the followingyears. Optimistic and restless hemispheric sport officials such as Brundage andPalacios saw their dream of staging the games collapse as the obvious crisis in therelations between the two countries escalated.

By late 1939, several proposals to host Pan-American Games, in case the 1940Olympics had to be cancelled because of the war in Europe, were circulating on thehemisphere. The Department of State was in favour of such an enterprise. Thissupport is not surprising as it came shortly after both Germany’s invasion ofPoland and the First Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers heldin Panama in October 1939. While Argentine President Roberto M. Ortizcondemned the German aggression, pro-Allied Foreign Minister Jose MarıaCantilo stressed cooperation and went along with the decisions made in Panama,most notably the declaration of neutrality of the American countries and theneutrality zone of 300 miles around the Western Hemisphere. When the neutralityzone was tested in December by the engagement of German and British vessels,ending with the German battleship Graf Von Spee in Montevideo for repairs,Argentina again demonstrated its commitment to hemispheric unity.94 Thehemispheric unity on neutrality, which political leaders throughout the Americasconstructed as a form of inter-American collaboration, was conducive to the causeof Pan-American sport.

All the while, under these auspicious conditions, the COA went ahead with itsproposal, gained the support of Brundage and set 28–31 August 1940 as the date forthe Buenos Aires congress that would ultimately create a Pan-American sportbureaucracy and award the organisation of the inaugural 1942 Pan-AmericanGames to Argentina’s capital. Amidst preparations for the congress, Argentinaoffered a surprising gesture of friendship towards the US. In April 1940, Cantiloproposed to the US that the American countries would abandon neutrality and movetowards ‘nonbelligerent’ status in the European war, ‘thereby favoring the Allieswithout directly entering the war’.95

By committing the US to a programme of collective hemispheric defence plannedby Argentina, Ortiz sought to produce a trade agreement with Washington thatcould be used domestically as a concrete signal to allay pro-Axis groups. Armourrecognised the need to strengthen Ortiz’s position in the divisive governmentalcoalition in order to obtain definitive Argentine cooperation from the friendlypresident. However, in the end, the Department of State rebuffed the Argentineproposal. Historian Joseph Tulchin reasons that the US failed to understand that theproposal was a desperate attempt by the Ortiz administration to maintain controland was reluctant to give Argentina credence in inter-American affairs.96 A fewmonths later, Roosevelt adopted a strategy very similar to the Argentine proposalwithout acknowledging it. In spite of the US neglect, Argentina signed theDeclaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of theAmericas, adopted at the Second Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign

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Ministers held in Havana in late July 1940. It stated that an attack on any Americannation was to be considered as an attack on all the American nations and thatcollective defence measures would be taken upon mutual consultation. This wasarguably the highest point of cooperation between Argentina and the US. Notably,this came after Ortiz, disillusioned and ill, had turned over his mandate to Vice-President Castillo.

A month after the consultative meeting in Havana, the COA organised thesuccessful congress in Buenos Aires. In consonance with the prevailing spirit inhemispheric diplomatic circles, the Argentine sport officials declared that theirproposal was, in part, inspired by the wish to strengthen the ties between the peoplesof the hemisphere.97 Similarly, Brundage was confident that ‘our new organizationwill contribute greatly to the promotion of mutual understanding between thecountries of the Western Hemisphere’.98 In addition, the Department of State wasencouraged by the fact that during his trip through the Americas Brundage hadfound ‘that the work of the Lima and Habana [sic] conferences is regarded with suchapproval’.99 Heartened by the accomplishments of the congress and presumablyencouraged by the unexpected cooperation between the Argentine and USgovernments, the COA formed the 1942 Pan-American Games’ OrganizingCommittee and immediately started working to bring about the event scheduledfor November 1942.

While the organising committee accelerated its pace of work, there were furtherchanges in the upper echelon of Argentine politics. In September 1940, Julio A. Rocareplaced Cantilo as foreign minister. Roca, in turn, resigned early in 1941 and wasreplaced by Enrique Ruiz Guinazu. These changes were affected by Acting PresidentCastillo. In light of US unwillingness to produce a trade agreement with Argentina,both Castillo and Ruiz Guinazu implemented policies that favoured the Axis. Undertheir leadership, further Argentine cooperation with the US appeared unfeasible.Historian David Scheinin notes that while Argentina continued trade with the US‘under unfavorable conditions, the Americans pressed unreasonably for diplomaticand military leadership over the Argentines, demanding at the same time thatArgentina rupture its neutral cordiality with Germany’.100 Although neither Castillonor Ruiz Guinazu interfered with the organising committee’s plans for the games,the Department of State perceived, sooner rather than later, reasons to disapprove ofthe event. Most probably, the reasons were related to the pro-Axis tendencies inCastillo’s government. As early as April, the Department of State had advised theUS Army ‘that it is doubtful whether the Pan American Games will have theapproval of the State Department’.101 This is a strong indication that even beforePearl Harbor hopes for the games, both in Argentina and all across the Americas,had little chance to materialise.

Despite the doubts expressed by some Department of State officials early in 1941,before the attack on Pearl Harbor Roosevelt and Hull apparently supported the1942 Pan-American Games. This is what they told both Argentine and US sportleaders. Surely Castillo, pressed by some pro-Axis groups, did not openly oppose theAxis, but in reality Argentina was not only wedded to neutrality but also to shippingto the Allies much-needed foodstuffs and raw materials. Argentina practised de factopro-Allied neutrality. Predictably, then, the ‘Pan-American feast’ orchestrated by theorganising committee in Buenos Aires days before Pearl Harbor to push the gamesfound no opposition in Argentina nor abroad. Attended by the most prominentArgentine political figures as well as the diplomatic representatives of the American

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nations to Argentina, the event presaged the possibility of an inter-Americansolidarity that included Argentina.

Pearl Harbor dashed hopes for the 1942 Pan-American Games. The USpressured the American nations to sever their ties with the Axis. In January 1942 theThird Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers gathered in Rio deJaneiro and by the end of the conference, only Argentina and Chile refused tocomply with the US’s demand to break diplomatic ties with the Axis. Castillo’sgovernment defended his policy of neutrality partly to diffuse internal politicalopposition. But such a policy came to be viewed, incorrectly, by the US governmentas an implicit endorsement of the Axis. As historian Scheinin observes, ‘WhileWashington vilified Argentina as pro-Nazi, Argentine military authorities saw thegovernment as weak and not up to the task of maintaining order, progress, and astrong military apparatus’.102 Yet the British, benefiting from Argentine exports,accepted the nation’s neutrality. In contrast, the US punished Argentina’s neutralitynot only by freezing weapon sales but also by seeking an economic blockade. Underthese circumstances, the withdrawal from the games was only logical to the USgovernment. Such an action was, as Brundage thought, a reprisal for Argentina’sposition at Rio de Janeiro. The Department of State was disinclined to let theArgentines lead any hemispheric project, even if it was to improve badly damagedArgentine-US relations and spread hemispheric solidarity through sport. Thedesperate attempts to rescue the games mounted by Palacios and Brundage had nochance to succeed.

The trajectory of the failed 1942 Pan-American Games confirms Scheinin’s viewthat in spite of the US’s growing exasperation with what its leaders perceived asArgentine leniency towards the Axis, Argentines at large continued their admirationfor the US, even when Hull called Argentina the ‘bad neighbor’.103 Palaciosrepeatedly insisted that the participation of US athletes in the games was of ‘firstimportance’ because of their standing in international sport. Moreover, he arguedthat US athletic prowess would help increase interest in the games among Argentinesport enthusiasts.104 The COA protested when news reached Buenos Aires that theUS planned to send a team with just a few of its best athletes in fear that athleticdomination would interfere with the spirit of Pan-American cooperation the gameswere supposed to spread. During his New York City’s stop in his hemisphericgoodwill tour, Borgonovo urged US sport officials to

reconsider your decision since the other nations favor the sending of your greatestathletes in full number. The Pan American ideal will not suffer if your marvelousathletes succeed in winning a preponderant share of the victories. We sincerely believethat by competing with and against your representatives, the athletes of the otherrepublics will benefit and improve.105

Unlike fascination with Hollywood, US consumer goods and literature,competitive sport meant putting Argentine and US athletes face to face to comparetheir respective degrees of ability. Argentine sport officials recognised the athleticsuperiority of the US and were not afraid of their likely dominance in the Pan-American Games. Indeed, they thought that athletes from the rest of the Americascould profit by competing against counterparts of such international calibre.Similarly, throughout the games’ saga the COA recognised, sought and benefitedfrom the expertise, advice and leadership of Brundage. More often than not, Palaciosfollowed Brundage’s suggestions to the letter. It is important to highlight, though,

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that while admiring US leadership and exploits in the field of sport, Argentine sportofficials rejected the condescension implicit in the rumours suggesting that the USwould send a diminished team to Buenos Aires in order to avoid overt athleticdomination in the games. Argentines were willing to accept, and even celebrate, USdominance on the playing field but wanted to be treated as equals in the domain ofPan-American sport. If the US was so athletically superior, so be it. For theArgentine sport officials, a US attempt to conceal its athletic capacity would beunacceptably condescending; an attitude resented well beyond sport. Brundageunderstood this early on and endorsed both hosting the inaugural Pan-AmericanGames in Buenos Aires and sending a US team formed through trials similar tothose organised to form US Olympic teams. Similarly, Borgonovo declared that thecountries of the Americas expected ‘from its big strong brother . . . a large andimposing delegation to Buenos Aires’.106

In addition to confirming the continued Argentine admiration for the US, thecampaign to host the 1942 Pan-American Games bolstered the view that, for the mostpart, Argentine society backed the Allies. This was certainly the case within Argentinesport circles. After Pearl Harbor, and in the face of US hostility towards Argentineneutrality, Pan-American unity and cooperation meant implicit support for the Alliedcause. Right after the Japanese attack, but before the Meeting of Consultation ofAmerican Foreign Ministers in Rio de Janeiro, the organising committee emphasisedthe ‘unanimity with which all the countries of America have solidarized with [the]U.S.A. makes us think that the same union will persist in every field, including thesporting field’.107 These were certainly the aspirations of Argentine and US leaders,although their interpretation of Pan-American unity was quite different. Once the Riode Janeiro meeting concluded and relations between Argentina and the US haddeteriorated dramatically, Palacios remarked the significance of the games ‘regardingthe policy of good-neighbourhood promoted by the President of [the] US and the truehemispheric solidarity in this hour of trial for America’.108

More significantly, even when the 1942 Pan-American Games was a lost cause,Palacios admitted sharing the democratic ideals of the US, ‘for which I am ready tofight’.109 He was not the only one ready to do so within Argentine sport circles. ElGrafico discussed the local contribution to the Allied forces. In 1941 it published atwo-page article on the British and British-Argentine athletes, mostly rugby players,who had volunteered to serve their country or that of their forefathers on thebattlefield. The sportswriter not only referred to ‘our’ players but approved of theirdecision to fight in the war as ‘patriotic’.110 There was no comparable article on theathletes of the German or Italian communities in Argentina. Palacios wished that the‘Democratic countries’ defeat totalitarianism. In late 1942, he repeated the wish for‘our prompt triumph’ against the Axis, ‘and I say ours because everyone here desiresit’.111 By mid-1943, Palacios was congratulating Brundage for the gains by the Alliedtroops, which reaffirmed ‘the final success of the nations which are fighting for therights of our civilization and the maintenance of high democratic principles’.112 Thesupport of the Allied cause and sympathy towards the US are unmistakable. There isan irony in Palacios’s celebration of democracy, though, as a group of militaryleaders staged a coup d’etat in June 1943 to oust the corrupt political regime thatsince the early 1930s had governed Argentina through fraudulent elections whileproscribing political parties.

The failed 1942 Pan-American Games clearly demonstrates that despite mutualpolitical distrust, misunderstanding, and enmity, Argentina and the US could

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fruitfully cooperate in some areas. This was certainly the case with sport leaders inboth countries. The commonly held conception that international sport was anavenue to promote goodwill, friendship and mutual understanding among differentpeoples facilitated cooperation among them. Although Brundage and Palaciosunderstood the constraints imposed by the war, they were equally dumbfounded atthe US government’s disinclination to send even a token athletic representation toBuenos Aires.113 Likewise, they both regretted the suspension of the games. Theirsentiments arose from their belief in sporting universalism and what it couldcontribute to Pan-Americanism. As Palacios put it, the Pan-American Games were ‘amagnificent machine of true and sane Pan Americanism’.114 At the same time thatArgentine and US sport leaders fought to host the games, the Automovil ClubArgentino, the Argentine equivalent of the American Automobile Association,planned the organisation of a 1942 Gran Premio de las Americas (Gran Prix of theAmericas), an ambitious car race starting in Buenos Aires and finishing in New YorkCity. The highly symbolic project, which was originally endorsed by the USgovernment, reinforced the Argentine-US willingness to cooperate in sport. However,despite the Pan-American aura with which the organisers bathed the Gran Premio delas Americas, it succumbed, like the Pan-American Games did, to the realities of thewar as well as to US retaliation for Argentina’s neutrality.115 The common groundfound in sport during the war suggests that the perception of Argentina as pro-Axiswas not as monolithic in the US as some scholars believe it to be.

Significantly, some elements in the Department of State doubted the efficacy ofinternational sport to promote goodwill among nations. This view contended thatevents such as the proposed Pan-American Games and the Olympic Games created,on occasion, animosity within the leadership of particular countries and certainlybetween nations. At least in public, no US politician stated this view, as it was instark contrast to the sporting universalism advanced by popular sport leaders suchas Brundage and Palacios. Regardless of its merit, the view opposing internationalsport at large within the Department of State did not seem to have much credibilityand following. After all, the US had been present at all Olympic Games since theirinception in 1896, including the controversial 1936 Berlin Olympics. Thegovernmental decision to withdraw support for a US team in Buenos Aires in1942 had more to do with Argentina’s neutrality than scepticism about the purposeand value of the Pan-American Games. Similarly, there is no indication that anyArgentine politician or diplomat opposed sporting universalism. Indeed, whetherconvinced about the value of international sport for universal rapprochement oronly to reaffirm its policy of ‘prudent neutrality’ and temper the isolationism itprovoked, the Argentine government quietly supported the games.

This support, though, did not come with any strings attached. The Argentinegovernment left the organisation of the 1942 Pan-American Games entirely to theCOA, a private organisation. In this regard, the Argentine and the US governmentagreed. The Department of State had temporarily supported the games withthe proviso that they were left to private initiative. Ironically, it was the decision ofthe US government to withdraw support for its national team that brought about thecollapse of these privately planned games. Strictly speaking, as Brudange knew, itwas the prerogative of US sport leaders to make the final decision about theirparticipation in the games. However, given their failure to secure governmentalendorsement and cognisant that ‘presently it is impossible to obtain transportationabroad without Governmental approval’, Brundage and his associates decided to

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withdraw from the games.116 They recognised that under the extraordinarycircumstances imposed by the war, appealing to the formal independence andprivate character of sport in the US would not get the USA Sports Federation veryfar.117 The Pan-American Games could not go on.118

The intricacies of the failed 1942 Pan-American Games reveal that althoughsport officials in Argentina and the US represented formally autonomousinstitutions, their altruistic intentions and efforts succumbed to the clashing politicalforces at play on the hemisphere. In the early 1940s, the Argentine vision that Pan-American Games in Buenos Aires ‘will symbolize the crystallization of a wish, longhoped for by the most illustrious men of our hemisphere: the unity of a powerful andvigorous America’119 was wishful thinking. Pan-Americanism through sport wouldhave to wait for a more auspicious political climate.

The ironic aftermath

Immediately after the inaugural Pan-American Games were first postponed in June1942, Brundage consoled Palacios and reassured him by remarking that ‘certainlyyour efforts have not been wasted and one day it will be possible to resume where wehave been constrained to stop’.120 That day was not anywhere in the near future. Thegames were postponed again in 1943 and 1944. However, in 1945, the COA, still ledby Palacios, was certain that there would be Olympic Games in 1948 and, therefore,proposed 1950 as the new date for the Pan-American Games. The Argentines feltthey had the right to host the games. A year later, the IOC awarded the COA theOlympic Cup for 1943, probably in recognition for its efforts to stage the Pan-American Games. With such backing, that same year the COA sent a letter to theNational Olympic Committees of the Americas insisting that the 1950 date behonoured. Unsurprisingly, the Argentine sport leaders stressed that not only didBrundage approve of the new date but also that his approval meant the participationof US athletes. Their participation was, the Argentines insisted, crucial. Early in1947, the COA, following Brundage’s suggestion, proposed to host the Second Pan-American Sport Congress in London in 1948, taking advantage of the fact that mostAmerican nations would be represented in the first post-war Olympic Games.121

In the years between the first postponement of the 1942 Pan-American Gamesand the meeting of hemispheric sport leaders in London in 1948, Argentinaunderwent dramatic changes. The 1943 coup d’etat that toppled Castillo installed ajunta that hoped to improve relations with the US. Segundo N. Storni, the new pro-Ally foreign minister, showed signs that Argentina was committed to Pan-Americancooperation. Hull, however, would take nothing less than an immediate break ofdiplomatic relations with the Axis. Unable to secure an arms deal and economicallysanctioned by the US, the Argentine government finally broke diplomatic relationswith the Axis in early 1944. Nevertheless, Hull wanted further concessions. Theunyielding US pressure strengthened a group of nationalist Army officers opposed tothe US political agenda for the hemisphere. Displeased with their government’sresponse to the US position, the nationalists quickly installed General Edelmiro J.Farrell as president, replacing General Pedro P. Ramırez. With Farrell in power,Colonel Juan D. Peron, his aide, held several important posts in the government,rapidly gaining power.

In November 1944, as Peron was rising to power, Hull resigned as Secretary ofState. These developments opened new possibilities for Argentine-US cooperation.

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Argentina called a Pan-American Union meeting in 1945. By March, Argentinadeclared war on the Axis and at that point the US recognised the Argentinegovernment. Nevertheless, anti-Argentine sentiment did not completely disappearedwithin the Department of State. Spruille Braden, a pro-Hull functionary, wasappointed ambassador to Argentina in early 1945. Peron fiercely contested Braden’srenewed pressure on the Argentine government. Nelson A. Rockfeller, thenAssistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in concert with the Britishgovernment opposed the baseless lucubration of the hardliner Braden, who at theend of the war was recalled to Washington to replace Rockefeller in the Departmentof State. From his new post, Braden insisted on vilifying Argentina, especially Peron,as pro-Nazi. On the eve of the 1946 election in Argentina, Braden released adocument supposedly revealing Argentine ties to the Axis during the war as a meansto destabilise Peron’s candidacy. It backfired as Peron dismissed the document as aninstrument of US interventionist propaganda and ingeniously relabelled hiscampaign ‘Braden or Peron’. Pitching Argentina against the US worked very well,as Peron won the free election in a landslide.

When the Second Pan-American Sport Congress met in London, Peron had beenin power for over two years. The congress ratified Buenos Aires as the host of theinaugural Pan-American Games and re-elected Brundage as president of the Pan-American Sport Committee’s Permanent Commission. However, the congressmoved the date for the games to 1951 so that the event would not conflict withthe Central American and Caribbean Games scheduled for 1950.122 The COA, nolonger led by Palacios but by officials loyal to Peron, assumed once again thepreparations for the games with the complete support of the government.123 Indeed,the Argentine government spent generously in order to stage the event on a grandscale. This comes as no surprise, since Peron had implemented a policy ofunparalleled support for sport and was aggressively seeking to host the 1956Olympics.124 In this regard, historian Raanan Rein notes that ‘no Argentinegovernment prior to Peron . . . invested as much effort and as many resources in boththe development and encouragement of sport and in the effort to earn politicaldividends from this policy’.125 Internationally, Peron wanted to use sport as aplatform to display his ‘New Argentina’ built upon ‘social justice, politicalsovereignty, and economic independence’.126 His nationalist message containedanti-American and anti-imperialist rhetoric, and did not sit very well with the US.

While Peron worked to materialise his ‘New Argentina’, the US hostility towardsArgentina continued. This was especially perceptible in the economic discriminationexerted by the US against Argentina. The apparent restoration of normal diplomaticrelations between the two countries only diluted some of the rancour. Peron resentedUS intervention in Argentine domestic issues and its heavy-handed ways in worldaffairs as much as the US disliked the political and economic populist nationalismthat Peron evoked. Ironically, the Pan-American Games were finally inaugurated in1951 under a regime that made so much of anti-Americanism and overtly confrontedUS hemispheric leadership – a regime that the stubborn US foreign policy had notonly helped come to power but also fortified. Whereas in 1942 the Argentinegovernment did not get involved in the organisation of the games, in 1951 it was atthe very centre of the event. Yet, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, theUS government could not stop Brundage and his acolytes from sending a team toBuenos Aires. This time around, they dispatched on three different airplanes fromNew York City and Miami a US team of more than 120 athletes.127

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The 1951 Pan-American Games, absolutely ‘Peronised’ by the loyalists amongthe organisers, opened on 25 February in the spanking new Racing Club stadium,officially named ‘Presidente Peron’. Both Peron and his wife, Evita, presided overthe opening ceremony with Brundage standing just behind them. To the delight ofdefenders of sporting universalism, the US delegation, ‘very large in number, wasone of the most eagerly awaited’.128 The Argentines treated US athletes withrespect and celebrated their display of athleticism throughout the games. Despiteenormous sympathy in Argentina for Peron’s policies as well as years of UShostility toward Argentina, the inaugural Pan-American Games illustrated thatArgentina and the US could at least peacefully share the sporting arena. Two daysafter the opening ceremony, the New York Times published a picture of the USteam’s flag bearer. The title shrewdly read ‘The Stars and Stripes in PresidentePeron Stadium’.129 Peron, before declaring the games opened, emphasised to thecrowd that each one should know to win and lose with honour.130 Whose honoursuffered or was dignified in the troubled Argentine-US relations of that time is stilla matter of dispute.

Notes on contributor

Cesar R. Torres is an associate professor in the Department of Kinesiology, Sport Studies andPhysical Education at The College at Brockport, State University of New York. He is a pastpresident of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport and has publishedextensively on the history of Latin American sport.

Notes

1. The following is a brief list of important sources that address Pan-Americanism and itsdevelopment. Caicedo Castilla, El panamericanismo; Harrison, The Pan-AmericanDream; Prevost and Oliva Campos, Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism; Scheinin,Beyond the Ideal; and Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea.

2. The following are among the most important studies of the Argentine-US relations andthe main sources on this subject of this paper. Escude, Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos yla declinacion argentina; Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina; Peterson, Argentinaand the United States; Rapoport, Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentesargentinas; and Tulchin, Argentina and the United States. For an analysis of the GoodNeighbor Policy see Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy; and Woods, TheRoosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment and the ‘Good-Neighbor’.

3. Curt G. Pfeiffer to the President of the United States of America, 8 Aug. 1933, ‘RecordGroup 59’ (hereafter ‘RG 59’), 810.4063/1, National Archives and Records Adminis-tration of the United States (hereafter NARA).

4. See Dyreson, ‘The First Pan American Olympics?’; ‘Sobre la realizacion del ‘‘ParqueCultural Olımpico’’’, Automovilismo. Organo Oficial del Automovil Club Argentino(Buenos Aires) (hereafter Automovilismo) 239 (Nov. 1939), 30; and Harold B. Hinton,‘Division Appears at Parley’, New York Times, 8 Dec. 1936.

5. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On is Brundage’s standard biography.6. Alexander J. Hogarty to Avery Brundage, 18 April 1938, ‘Record Series 26/20/37, Box

58’ (hereafter ‘Box 58’), Avery Brundage Collection, 1908–1982 (hereafter AveryBrundage Collection), University of Illinois Archives.

7. Ibid.8. Avery Brundage to Alexander J. Hogarty, 13 June 1938, ‘Box 58’, Avery Brundage

Collection.9. Alexander J. Hogarty to Avery Brundage, 6 April 1939, ‘Box 58’, Avery Brundage

Collection.10. Avery Brundage to Alexander J. Hogarty, 24 July 1939, ‘Box 58’, Avery Brundage

Collection.

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11. Alexander J. Hogarty to Avery Brundage, 15 Aug. 1939, ‘Record Series 26/20/37, Box202’ (hereafter ‘Box 202’), Avery Brundage Collection.

12. Alexander J. Hogarty to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 28 Aug. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/7,NARA. See also Alexander J. Hogarty to Inter-Departmental Committee onCooperation with the American Republics, 17 Aug. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/5, NARA.

13. Avery Brundage to Cordell Hull, 16 Sept. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/11, NARA.14. Cordell Hull to Avery Brundage, 2 Oct. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/11, NARA.15. Charles A. Thomson to Alexander J. Hogarty, 16 Sept. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/5,

NARA.16. F. B. Lyon to Ben M. Cherrington, 27 Oct. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 810.4063/11, NARA.17. George S. Messersmith to the Secretary and the Under Secretary, 26 Dec. 1939, ‘RG

59’, 811.4063 Olympic Games/401; and 8 Jan. 1940, ‘RG 59’, 811.4063 Olympic Games/402, NARA. Messersmith had opposed the participation of the US in the 1936Olympics. His views were undoubtedly influenced by the debate over such participationand, likely, by what transpired during and after the games. See Wenn, ‘A Tale of TwoDiplomats’.

18. The New York Times informed about the Argentine proposal on 15 October 1939 in anarticle entitled ‘Argentina Seeks Games’. The word ‘Olympic’ was initially used inassociation with the games but following Brundage’s and other IOC officials’complaints, it was dropped. It did, however, occasionally remain in use in the popularpress.

19. Juan Carlos Palacios to F. W. Rubien, 27 Sept. 1939, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

20. Alexander J. Hogarty to Avery Brundage, 24 Oct. 1939, ‘Box 58’, Avery BrundageCollection.

21. F.W. Rubien to Juan Carlos Palacios, 25 Oct. 1939, ‘Record Series 26/20/37, Box 36’,Avery Brundage Collection.

22. Ibid.23. See ‘Plans Games for 1940’, New York Times, 11 Oct. 1939; ‘Brundage Explains

Olympic Situation’, New York Times, 25 Oct. 1939; and Arthur J. Daley, ‘FinnsProceeding on Plans for Meet’, New York Times, 31 Oct. 1939.

24. See ‘New Orleans Man Named A.A.U. Chief’, New York Times, 11 Dec. 1939; ‘Pan-America Meet Held Sure to Go On’, New York Times, 23 Jan. 1940; and‘Will Discuss Big Meet’, New York Times, 6 Feb. 1940. Jeremiah T. Mahoney ton.d., 26 Jan. 1940, ‘Record Series 26/20/37, Box 32’, (hereafter ‘Box 32’), AveryBrundage Collection. This letter was sent to officials in the different US sportfederations.

25. Laurence Duggan ‘Call of Mr. Mc Neal Regarding the Possibility of Holding theOlympic Games This Year In Texas’, 24 April 1940, ‘RG 59’, 811.4063 Olympic Games/403, NARA.

26. ‘Pan-America Meet Held Sure to Go On’, New York Times, 23 Jan. 1940.27. See ‘Finnish Officials Cancel Olympics’, New York Times, 24 April 1940.28. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 26 Feb. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.29. See George S. Messersmith to Avery Brundage, circa Oct. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 837.4063/7;

and George S. Messersmith to Pedro Martınez Fraga, 30 Nov. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 837.4063/11, NARA.

30. Jaime Marine to Coert du Bois, 30 Nov. 1939, ‘RG 59’, 837.4063/12, NARA.31. Avery Brundage to Alexander J. Hogarty, 26 Sept. 1939; and 25 Nov. 1939, ‘Box 58’,

Avery Brundage Collection.32. F.W. Rubien to Juan Carlos Palacios, 25 Oct. 1939, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.33. Juan Carlos Palacios to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 5 Dec. 1939; and IOC Secretary to

COA, 31 Jan. 1940, ‘Argentine. Correspondance. 1907–1965’, Le Comite InternationalOlympique Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland; and Juan Carlos Palacios to AveryBrundage, 12 Jan. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

34. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 Jan. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

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35. Jeremiah T. Mahoney to n.d., 26 Jan. 1940, ‘Box 32’, Avery Brundage Collection. Forthe role of Mahoney in the debate over US participation in the 1936 Olympics, seeWenn ‘Death-knell for the Amateur Athletic Union’.

36. Avery Brundage to the Members of the American Olympic Committee, 24 Feb. 1940,‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

37. Avery Brundage to Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino,2 March 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

38. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 26 Feb. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

39. Avery Brundage to Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino,2 March 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

40. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 31 March 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

41. Avery Brundage to Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino,22 April 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

42. See Cattaruzza, Los usos del pasado, 60–84.43. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 8 May 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.44. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 23 July 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.45. See ‘Brundage at Conference’, New York Times, 27 Aug. 1940; La Nacion (Buenos

Aires) (hereafter La Nacion), 27 Aug. 1940; and La Prensa (Buenos Aires) (hereafter LaPrensa), 27 Aug. 1940.

46. See ‘First Pan American Congress. Summary of resolutions’; and ‘Pan American SportsCommittee. Regulations’, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

47. Ibid. See also La Prensa, 1 Sept. 1940; La Nacion, 31 Aug. 1940; and 1 Sept. 1940; and‘1942 Games to Argentina’, New York Times, 1 Sept. 1940.

48. La Nacion, 3 Sept. 1940.49. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 29 Oct. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection. See also La Nacion, 9 Sept. 1940; and La Prensa, 5 Sept. 1940.50. ‘Report of Avery Brundage on Pan American Sport Congress Held in Buenos Aires.

Aug. 28–31, 1940’, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.51. Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y

balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1939 al 30 de septiembre de 1940,27–9.

52. Boletın de los deportes. Publicacion oficial del comite organizador 1 (Jan. 1941), 8.53. For details of the organising committee’s master plan see Jose Gallo Cesana, ‘Pan

American Olympic Games Plan’, n.d. (circa Dec. 1940), ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection. See also Francisco Borgonovo, ‘Report on Preparations for [the] First PanAmerican Games’, n.d. (circa Aug. 1941), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection; andBoletın de los deportes. Publicacion oficial del comite organizador 2 (March 1941).

54. Larran de Vere, ‘Juegos Panamericanos’, El Grafico (Buenos Aires) (hereafter ElGrafico), 25 July 1941, 20–1.

55. Boletın de los deportes. Publicacion oficial del comite organizador 4 (July–Aug. 1941), 1.56. Borgonovo, ‘Pan American Games’, 4.57. See, for example, Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 17 March 1941, ‘Box 202’,

Avery Brundage Collection. See also ‘Mahoney Is Appointed’, New York Times, 29April 1941.

58. Mahoney, ‘Pan American Ideals’, 8.59. Ibid., 9.60. Boletın de los deportes. Publicacion oficial del comite organizador 4 (July–Aug. 1941), 7.

Details of Brogonovo’s tour can also be found in ‘Recorre la ruta, en avion, el directorgeneral de la prueba D. Francisco A. Borgonovo’, Automovilismo 259 (July 1941), 31;and Borocoto, ‘Con un pie en el estribo’, El Grafico, 20 June 1941, 4–5.

61. The Adjutant General to Avery Brundage, 16 Nov. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

62. Warren Kelchner to Avery Brundage, 6 Nov. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

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63. Jose Gallo Cesana, ‘Management of the Organizing Committee of the First Pan-American Games’, n.d., (circa Oct. 1941), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection; and‘Armour Gets Games Post’, New York Times, 14 Sept. 1941.

64. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 24 Nov. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

65. Kingsley Childs, ‘Hull Expresses Friendship Aim’, New York Times, 20 Nov. 1941.66. Ibid.67. Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y

balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1941 al 30 de septiembre de 1942,29–45.

68. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 3 Dec. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

69. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 Dec. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

70. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 19 Dec. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

71. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 21 Jan. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection. For the apparent sentiments of the US Army and Navy see Roy E. Davis toLew N. Bloom, 29 Jan. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

72. Lew N. Bloom to Roy E. Davis, 27 Jan. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.73. See Roy E. Davis to Lew N. Bloom, 29 Jan. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.74. ‘Replies Re Participation in the First Pan-American Games’, n.d. (circa March 1942),

‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.75. See Juan Carlos Palacios to Felipe A. Espil, 17 Feb. 1942; and Avery Brundage to Juan

Carlos Palacios, 27 Feb. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.76. Juan Carlos Palacios to Conrado Traverso, 12 March 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.77. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 5 March 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.78. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 14 March 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.79. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 21 March 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.80. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 27 March 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.81. For a portion of the letter see the memorandum written by Glenn Barr from the US

Embassy in Buenos Aires on 28 May 1942 to [n.d.] Griffiths, ‘Record Group 84’, 840/6,NARA.

82. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 1 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

83. See Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 6 April 1942; Juan Carlos Palacios toSummer Wells [sic], 6 April 1942; Juan Carlos Palacios to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7April 1942; and Juan Carlos Palacios to Felipe A. Espil, 7 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, AveryBrundage Collection.

84. Avery Brundage to Nelson A. Rockefeller, 14 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

85. Nelson A. Rockefeller to Avery Brundage, 18 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

86. ‘Immediate Release’, n.d. (circa April 1942), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.87. Newspaper clipping (circa April 1942), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.88. Newspaper clippings (circa April 1942), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.89. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 20 April and 24 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery

Brundage Collection.90. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 24 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.91. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 9 May 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.

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92. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 5 June 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

93. The political narrative of the final two sections is based on Escude, Gran Bretana,Estados Unidos y la declinacion argentina; Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina;Peterson, Argentina and the United States; Rapoport, Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos ylas clases dirigentes argentinas; and Tulchin, Argentina and the United States.

94. For details of the battle and the fate of the Graf Von Spee, see Grove, The Price ofDisobedience.

95. Norden and Russell, The United States and Argentina, 17.96. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, 67–75.97. Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y balance

general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1939 al 30 de septiembre de 1940, 25.98. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 29 Oct. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.99. Warren Kelchner to Avery Brundage, 6 Nov. 1940, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.100. Scheinin, ‘Argentina: The Closet Ally’, 191.101. F. V. Fitzgeral to [n.d.] Martin, 21 April 1941, ‘Record Group 407’, NARA.102. Scheinin, ‘Argentina: The Closet Ally’, 195.103. Quoted in Norden and Russell, The United States and Argentina, 17.104. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 15 Feb. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection. See also Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 23 Dec. 1940; and JuanCarlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 14 Feb. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery BrundageCollection.

105. Borgonovo, ‘Pan American Games’, 4.106. Francisco Borgonovo, ‘Report on Preparations for [the] First Pan American Games’,

n.d. (circa Aug. 1941), ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.107. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 Dec. 1941, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.108. Juan Carlos Palacios to Sumner Welles, 6 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.109. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 20 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.110. Free-Lance, ‘Nuestros jugadores en la guerra’, El Grafico, 28 March 1941, 32–33.111. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 6 Oct. 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.112. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 July 1943, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.113. See Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 20 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection and Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, 88–9.114. Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 24 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.115. See Stray Bullet, ‘El intercambio turıstico’ and ‘Fue agasajado el embajador de los

Estados Unidos’, Automovilismo 249 (Sept. 1940), 18 and 21; ‘Voces argentinas en laobra de vinculacion panamericana’, Automovilismo 258 (June 1941), 18; and ‘ElAutomovil Club Argentino goza de extraordinario prestigio en el continenteamericano’, Automovilismo 261 (Sept. 1941), 22–3.

116. According to Raul Mayo Santana, during the war Puerto Rico sent a basketball team toSpain. Although it exceeds the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to investigatehow the transportation for such a trip was arranged. See Mayo Santana, El juguetesagrado, 138–42.

117. Avery Brundage to the Members of the United States Pan American GamesCommittee, 24 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage Collection.

118. This is a play on the infamous words Brundage uttered 30 years later, on 6 September1972, a day after a group of Israeli athletes and coaches were kidnapped by Palestinianterrorists at the Olympic Village and 11 were murdered. During the memorial serviceheld at the Munich’s Olympic stadium, Brundage, then president of the IOC, declaredthat ‘The games must go on’. See Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, ix.

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119. Boletın de los deportes. Publicacion oficial del comite organizador 1 (Jan. 1941), 1.120. Avery Brundage to Juan Carlos Palacios, 28 April 1942, ‘Box 202’, Avery Brundage

Collection.121. See Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y

balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1943 al 30 de septiembre de 1944, 16;Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y balancegeneral-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1944 al 30 de septiembre de 1945, 15–17;Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria y balancegeneral-inventario. XXV aniversario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1945 al 30 de septiembrede 1946, 51–2; and Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino,Memoria y balance general-inventario. XXVI aniversario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1946al 30 de septiembre de 1947, 11, 34–35.

122. See Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria ybalance general-inventario. XXVII aniversario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1947 al 30 deseptiembre de 1948, 22–8; and Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite OlımpicoArgentino, Memoria. Balance general y cuenta de gastos y recursos. XXVIII ejercicio. 1de octubre de 1948 al 30 de septiembre de 1949, 24–32.

123. Confederacion Argentina de Deportes-Comite Olımpico Argentino, Memoria. Balancegeneral y cuenta de gastos y recursos. XXIX ejercicio. 1 de octubre de 1949 al 30 deseptiembre de 1950, 60–92.

124. See Torres, ‘Stymied Expectations’.125. Rein, ‘‘‘El Primer Deportista’’’, 55. Analyses of Peron’s approach to sport can be found in

Alabarces, Futbol y patria, 65–82; and Scher, La patria deportista, 151–201. For accountsof Peron’s government see Horowicz, Los cuatro peronismos; Rock, Argentina, 1516–1987,262–319; and Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, 91–130.

126. Rock, Argentina, 1516–1987, 262.127. ‘Pan American Games Open Today; Wind-Swept Decorations Repaired’, New York

Times, 25 Feb. 1951.128. ‘Estados Unidos’, Mundo Deportivo (Buenos Aires), 15 March 1951, 62.129. ‘The Stars and Stripes in Presidente Peron Stadium’, New York Times, 27 Feb. 1951.130. ‘America’s Games Opened by Peron’, New York Times, 26 Feb. 1951.

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