Today’s Lecture One more thing about your first assignment Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments.

Today’s Lecture

• One more thing about your first assignment

• Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments

One more thing about your first assignment

• I need your first assignments back. It won’t take long, but I forgot to do something with them. I’m afraid that I won’t be able to return your second assignment until I see your first assignment. Sorry about the inconvenience.

A second possible argument in the reading

• Some questions that fall out of our discussion of the Ontological Argument:

• (1) Should we grant that it is possible that God does exist? What if the concept of God is incoherent?

• (2) What if we deny that God exists based on, say, the problem of evil? Wouldn’t that entail, given the form of this argument that it isn’t possible that God exists?

Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments

Several problems plague Cosmological Arguments: (i) Though the Principle of Sufficient Reason is an

important methodological principle, it may actually be false.

(ii) The argument treats the universe as if it is a thing, rather than short hand for a perhaps infinite, number of things.

(iii) There is no compelling reason to think that a causal chain of succeeding events in this universe could not go backwards infinitely (i.e. not have a beginning).

Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments

The Kalam, or Kalaam, Argument is now in vogue again. It is hoped by many religious philosophers that its modern incarnations will be more successful than its Cosmological cousins.

The Kalam, or Kalaam, Argument originates within Islamic philosophy.

One of its more prominent Christian proponents in the current literature is William Lane Craig.

Moreland: The Kalam Argument

The Overview of the Kalam Argument goes as follows (I have highlighted the major premises in bold type):

(1) Either the universe had a beginning or it did not. (2) It can’t be the case that the universe did not have a

beginning. (3) So, the universe had a beginning. (4) Either the beginning of the universe was caused or it was

not caused. (5) It can’t be the case that the universe was not caused. (6) So, the beginning of the universe was caused.

Moreland: The Kalam Argument (7) Either the cause of the beginning of the universe was

personal or it was not. (8) It can’t be the case that the cause of the beginning of the

universe was not personal. (9) So the cause of the beginning of the universe was

personal (see the diagram on page 23 of your CP). As I recount it here, this argument is made up of sub-arguments

known as disjunctive syllogisms. They have the form: P or Q ~Q Therefore P.

Moreland: The Kalam ArgumentActual and Potential Infinities

Actual Infinite: An actual infinite series is without beginning or end.

An actual infinite has the following properties:

(i) It is a total series which neither increases nor decreases its members (CP, p.24).

(ii) A proper subset of the whole can be put into one to one correspondence with all of the members of that infinite series.

Importantly, a proper subset of a finite series (even if it is potentially infinite) cannot be put into one to one correspondence with all of the members of the series (CP, p.24).

Moreland: The Kalam ArgumentPotential Infinite: A potential infinite is a finite series that

can, in principle, increase its members through successive addition into infinity (CP, p.24).

A potential infinite has the following (additional) properties:

(i) A potential infinite series is always a finite series (it will never become an actual infinite).

(ii) At no time will a finite series traversed at a given time equal a proper subset of the whole series (CP, p.24).


Note that this distinction between actual and potential infinities will become important to showing that IF the Kalam Argument successfully calls into question the existence of actual infinities, then God cannot be omniscient.

This will have a ripple effect in at least two directions: (i) The God of Christianity, the Judaic Tradition or Islam, if ‘He’ exists at all, is not a Perfect Being and so (ii) the Ontological Argument does not concern the existence of the Christian, Jewish or Muslim God.

Moreland: The Kalam Argument• Now there seems to be a straight forward solution to this

problem. Orthodox Christians, Jews or Muslims can either jettison the view that God is a Perfect Being (thus abandoning the Ontological Argument but keeping the relevant version of the Kalam Argument), or they jettison the relevant version of the Kalam Argument and keep their view that God is a Perfect Being.

• The complication is this. They can’t, without amending what is now meant by orthodox theology, give up the view that God is a Perfect Being. They also can’t give up the denial of actual infinities, otherwise the universe need not have had a beginning and they must go elsewhere for arguments for God’s existence (more on this later).


• It gets worse.

• The relevant version of the Kalam Argument may be right...there may be no actual infinities. If this is right, and the orthodox Christian, Judaic and Islamic Traditions are committed to the existence of a Perfect Divinity, it becomes plausible to suppose that these forms of theism have a conception of God that is fundamentally incoherent.

• I’ll return to all of these points later.

Moreland: Points to remember - Basic Argument

1. The universe either had a beginning or it did not. 2. If the universe did not have a beginning, then a

beginningless temporal series of events exists. Option 1: 3. An actual infinite cannot exist. 4. A beginningless temporal series of events is an actual

infinite. 5. So, a beginningless temporal series of events cannot exist. 6. So, it is not the case that the universe did not have a

beginning (CP, p.24).


• Option 1’s defense of the first major premise consists of denying the possibility of actual infinities.

• Moreland offers the following considerations for denying the existence of actual infinities. Note these are reductios, which move from the supposition that actual infinities exist to contradictory (or otherwise unwanted) consequences of such a supposition.


• (i) Moreland cites William Craig’s “infinite library holdings” thought experiment.

• (A) Imagine an infinite series of library books, divided evenly into books with red or black covers. If we take the proper subset of books with red covers we can show a one to one correspondence with the whole series of books with red and black covers. But this is absurd. So an actual infinite series cannot exist.


• (B) Imagine an infinite series of library books, divided evenly into books with red or black covers. We can remove a proper subset of this library (e.g. the books with black covers) and yet not reduce the overall holdings of the library. But this is absurd. So an actual infinite series cannot exist.

• Is Moreland (and Craig) right here?


• (ii) Moreland asks us to consider a thought experiment provided by the philosopher Bertrand Russell. Imagine Tristam Shandy is writing his autobiography. He writes so slowly he takes a full year to recount one day of his life. If he lives an infinite number of years, in principle it would seem to be possible for Tristam to finish his autobiography. (I.e. we can put all the days of his life into one to one correspondence with all the years of his life.) But this is absurd. So an actual infinite is impossible (CP, p.24).

Moreland: Points to remember - Basic Argument• Objections to this argument against actual infinities.• (1) Moreland is ignoring infinite set theory in mathematics.

Such a theory implies the existence of a set with the properties Moreland is saying cannot be actually instantiated (CP, p.24).

• (2) Moreland is ignoring the different logic applicable to infinite, as opposed to finite, set theory (CP, p.25).

• Moreland thinks that neither of these objections are persuasive. (1) says nothing about the possibility of an actual infinite in the universe. (2) does not address the ways in which common locutions lose their significance in infinite set theory, and that there is no good reason to accept the possibility of actual infinities independent of some sort of mathematical realism (CP, pp.24-25).


Option 2: 3. It is possible that an actual infinite exists. 4. It is impossible to cross an actual infinite by successive

addition. 5. The temporal series of past events has been formed by

successive addition. 6. So, the temporal series of past events is not an actual

infinite. 7. So, it is not the case that the universe did not have a

beginning.


• The second option for the first major premise consists of allowing that there may be actual infinities but arguing that it is impossible to traverse such infinities through “successive addition” (CP, p.25).

• This is a seemingly straightforward point. It is impossible to traverse an actual infinity one serial member at a time.

• Since the universe consists of a temporal series of events succeeded one serial member at a time, the universe cannot consist of an actual infinite.


• Moreland offers the following considerations for this contention.

• (i) Think of any given event in our environment. This event, it is reasonable to assume, has a preceding set of antecedent causal conditions which, in some sense, give rise to this event. For this, or other events to take place, it must be the case that the appropriate causal conditions have occurred.


• For any given moment, it has as its preceding causal conditions all of the previous temporal moments of the universe. If this is an infinite regress of temporal moments, then some event in the past will not have been actualized (as to get to that point requires traversing an actual infinite). So the present moment should not have occurred. But it has, so it can’t have an infinite regress of temporal causal conditions leading up to it through successive addition (CP, p.25).


• (ii) If we consider counting to infinity we find ourselves considering the process of adding one number at a time through successive addition into infinity. One thing to note is that this process will not stop, we will never reach the end of the process. There is always one more number to add to the series. What’s more, what we have counted thus far will always be a finite set. From this we can conclude that the series going backwards from the most recent addition is finite.


• Since the succession of moments in our temporal sequence is analogous to this counting process, it must also be the case that, working backwards from this moment, the past must be finite. If it is otherwise (i.e. that the past is not finite but infinite) we could not have reached this moment through successive addition (CP, p.25).


• (iii) Suppose it is possible for us to think backwards through all of the past events or moments that have lead up to this one. So we start with this moment and think backwards. If the series is finite we will, at some point, reach the end of the temporal series. If it is infinite we will not.


• Notice that this is merely the reverse of the direction that temporality actually takes. This means that just as we cannot reach the beginning point working backwards from this moment, we should not be able to reach this moment if we were to actually follow the actual temporal sequence from the infinite past to the present (CP, pp.25-26).


• Moreland considers several objections to his arguments here. The most important one is supplied by William Wainwright and John Mackie. They contend that objections such as those suggested by Moreland and Craig (i.e. suggesting the difficulties with reaching the present from an infinite past) are actually sneaking in thoughts about a beginning, albeit somehow infinitely in the past.


• After all, if they were not, it would actually make no sense to contend that you cannot work from the infinite past to the present moment as you could never reach the starting point to begin the forward journey in the first place. Any starting point you chose would be in the finite past, no matter how far back you took the thought experiment, and so easily traversable (CP, p.26).


• You can perhaps see this in the way that Moreland has designed the thought experiment. He can only get you to think of the puzzle by first getting you to start at a definite beginning point, namely the present. Without such a definitive beginning point, the thought experiment cannot get off the ground.

• But, Wainwright and Mackie will argue, the infinite past (if there is such an infinity) is relevantly dissimilar to the thought experiment suggested by Moreland...it has no definitive starting point.


• Moreland’s response is simply to contend that neither Wainwright or Mackie are taking the infinity of the past seriously in this reply.

• What do you think? Has Moreland cheated?

• I will return to my earlier points about the problems the Kalam Argument raises for the Christian, Jewish and Muslim view of God. We will get back to this.

• Note first that Moreland in his discussion at this point uses a discussion of Big Bang Cosmology and the Second Law of Thermodynamics to argue that science is on the side of those who believe in an absolute beginning of the universe (CP, pp.26-27).


• Moreland’s contentions here are importantly problematic.• He uses both Thermodynamics and the evidence of an

expanding universe from a suggested point in the distant past, to argue that the universe must have had an absolute beginning (see CP, pp.26-27).

• He rejects the model of an oscillating universe largely on the grounds that it falls victim to the earlier arguments about actual infinities, though also because there is no known mechanism to explain the oscillations and there is not enough mass to explain the recurring cosmic collapse (CP, p.27).


• Unfortunately neither Thermodynamics nor Big Bang Cosmology are in themselves antagonistic to a model of oscillating universes.

• Nor is a model of oscillating universes threatened by Moreland’s discussion of actual infinities. After all, time begins and ends with each oscillation. There is no infinity of time suggested by the oscillating universe model. What’s more, if this model, given that it’s talk of infinity is importantly atemporal, is threatened by his previous discussion of actual infinities, so is the claim that God has existed for infinity previous to this current creation. It would seem that Moreland can’t have it both ways.


• What then of Moreland’s contentions that there is no known explanatory mechanism for cosmic oscillations and that there is not enough mass to bring the universe back in on itself anyway?

• Note Moreland can’t non-fallaciously move from an absence of an explanatory mechanism for the model of an oscillating universe to the conclusion that it is thus false or even unlikely. Such an argument would be an argument from ignorance.

• Also note that science in this area is very young. I.e. it’s early days yet.


• God’s creative power is not any more of an explanatory mechanism for the appearance of the physical universe than an appeal to an oscillating model of the universe (at least if you discount appeals to magic in developing an adequate explanatory mechanism). I.e., precluding an appeal to magic, talk of God’s creative power tells us nothing about how it happened, except that God was involved.

• Is Moreland being disingenuous then with those proponents of the oscillating model of the universe?


• The debate on the missing mass is yet to be definitively resolved. Recent studies suggest that there is not enough mass to bring the cosmos back in on itself, but there are still many who think that there maybe enough dark matter or energy to do the job.

Today’s Lecture One more thing about your first assignment Some preliminary comments on Cosmological Arguments.

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