-
Gregorianum 86, 4 (2005) 723-741
test or preserve? The prohibition of Gen 2.16-17
in the thought of two second-century exegetes.
Why forbid the tree? Of ali the questione that arise from a
reading of the Genesis protology, that over why God prevented Adam
and ve from
partaking of the tree of knowledge is of perennial curiosity. Of
ali the trees in Paradise humanity is given to eat, except that
which it seems most logi cai, and indeed desirable, for a loving
God to provide to his beloved crea tion. That which is denied is
knowledge, not of evil only but also of good, and in the most
absolute manner. On the day that you partake of it, on that
very day you shall surely die (Gen 2:17). The tree of knowledge,
whose
subject is so deeply at the heart of the human image of God that
many rea ders equate it, partially or fully, with the divine imago,
is the only element of existence which God forbids his
newly-fashioned creature.
Why should God do such a thing? Reflections on this question go
back
to the earliest days of Christian theological consideration,
predating even the advent of what most would cali theology proper
(usually attributed to Irenaeus), figuring prominently in the work
of the apologists. Yet the abi
ding fascination, and in many cases discomfort, with the dilemma
reveals its continuing centrality and importance to Christian
visions of the nature of God in his relationship to humankind. In
our own day it holds the same
power to challenge the Christian mind as it did in the first and
second cen turies ad, and thus is eminently deserving of our
continued consideration. In what follows, I shall aim to explore
the contrasting answers to the que stion posed by two
second-century sources: the apologist Theophilus in Antioch (fi. c.
180)1 and the heresiologist and proto-theologian Irenaeus
1 The dates for Theophilus are difficult. Eusebius' Chronicon
sets the start of his episcopacy at ad 169, concurrent with the
papacy of Soter. His successor, Maximus, served concurrently with
Eleutherus of Rome (177-193), to whom Irenaeus was commended by the
Church in Lyons. Theophilus lived at least past 180, since he
mentions the death of M. Aurelius at Ad Autolycum (hereafter
AdAutol.) 3.28, which took place on 17 March of that year. On the
dating of Theophilus, cf. R.M. Grant, Theophilus of Antioch - Text
and Translation, Oxford, 1970, ix-x; F.W. Norris,
Theophilus of Antioch in E. Ferguson, Enciclopdia ofEarly
Christianity, London, 1998,1122.
-
724 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
in Lyons (c. ad 140-202/3).2 Though Theophilus' contribution to
our study will be the shorter of the two (for his treatment of the
text is less extensive than that of Irenaeus), we shall see that it
is of no less importance. In the end, the views of these authors
will be brought together in what we might consider a composite
response to the matter at hand.
The stage is set
While it may now be commonplace in Pentateuchal scholarship
to
identify multiple authors and source accounts in the Genesis
protology, and
specifcally two creation narratives in chapters 1-3 of that
text, we must note from the outset that Christian commentators and
expositors of the second century did not share this source-critical
methodology or its con clusione. For the two sources presently
under consideration, namely Theophilus and Irenaeus, the account of
creation in Genesis is single and unifed, with modem scholarship's
second account (i.e. Gen 2:4-25) understood by both authors as a
clarification and expansion of the broader details of what modem
scholarship calls the first (Gen 1:1-2:3). The pro gression of the
creation narrative from Gen 1 to Gen 2 is seen as the unfol
ding revelation of a single whole, which may be divided
thematically more
appropriately than by source influence. Gen 1:1-25 speaks of the
creation of the cosmos and the physical world with its non-human
inhabitants; 1:26-27 recounts the creation of the human person,
then situated by 1:28-2:3 into the cosmos previously fashioned; Gen
2:4-24 goes on to focus more closely upon this human formation in
its particular elements (constitution of the
person, relationship to the earth, relationship to God). For
both Theophilus and Irenaeus, the details of Gen 2 expand on those
of 1:26-27, with the nar rative's second chapter containing what we
might cali anthropology proper, whereas Gen 1 had contained,
insofar as it touched upon man, only the basic anthropogony (though
with the text's most potent declaration of the fundamental
anthropological reality of the imago Dei). In Gen 2, the cha racter
of human nature is set out in its being called forth into existence
and
placed into the context of the cosmos prepared for the sake of
its develop
2 Early suggestions of ad 98 (Dodwell) or 120 (Lightfoot) for
Irenaeus' birth have largely
given way to the between 130 and 140 of Osborn (E. Osborn,
Irenaeus ofLyons, Cambridge, 2001, 2) based on Irenaeus'
recollections of Polycarp (d. 155/156) whom he saw as a young man.
For Grant, this suggests a rather firm date of about ad 140
(ibid.), though for Osborn this makes Irenaeus too young to take up
the episcopacy c. 177/178. On the date of Irenaeus' death, the
usually-ascribed date is sometime at the dose of the second or
beginning of the third
century, in agreement with the record in Jerome's Commentary on
Isaias 64, which reports Irenaeus' martyrdom in 202/203 (often
discounted as a later interpolation); cf. R.M. Grant, Irenaeus of
Lyons, London, 1997, 2; J. van der Straeten, Saint-Irne fut-il
martyr? in Les
martyrs de Lyon, Paris, 1978,145-52.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 725
ment and growth. Gen 3, then, expands on 2:16-17 (the
prohibition against the tree of knowledge), recounting the events
which led to the disruption of the intended course of that
development.
In this reading the prohibition of 2:16-17 stands at the
pinnacle of the
anthropological narrative of Genesis. The earth has been
fashioned, filled and handed to humanity, and as God presents this
new life and order to the first humans, his final words in the
creative monologue are those forbidding access to the tree of
knowledge.
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the
garden
you may freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil you shall
not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely
die.
Ali that has gone before has led up to the placement of man in
Paradise and his being gifted by God with stewardship of the place.
As the anthropo gony thus concludes and the story of the human
economy proper begins, it is this - a prohibition - that serves as
its initiation.
To test and inspire: Theophilus ofAntioch
For Theophilus, how we understand this prohibition sets the
tenor of our whole conception of God's relationship to man, and
indeed our vision of the cosmos and humanity's place within it. He
addresses his exposition to three particular questions prone to
arise from a reading of the text: Was the tree evil? Is knowledge
evil? Does (and if so, why does) God hold back his
blessings from man? The first two questions are interrelated,
and the most obvious to arise
from a basic reading of the prohibition. Assuming that God is
benevolent and loving in his interactions with the human formation,
one may conse
quently assume that he would only prevent from the latter's
access that which is harmful or damaging. As such, are we to
understand that there is in the tree of knowledge something which,
though we may not necessarily wish to cali it evil, nonetheless is
in some sense negative? This seems a feasible reading, but
Theophilus comes down staunchly in the negative:
The tree of knowledge was itself good, and its fruit was good.
For the tree did
not contain death, as some suppose; death was the result of
disobedience. For
there was nothing in the fruit but knowledge, and knowledge is
good when one
uses it properly.3
3 Ad.Au.tol. 2.25. Cf. the Apocalypse ofjohn in NagHammadi
Corpus (II,1) 21.21-36, for an
example of one Gnostic tradition (ofValentinian descent) that
flts the caricature of Theophilus'
anonymous some. A similar sentiment is expressed in the Gospel
ofTruth in NagHammadi
Corpus (1,3) 17.18-20. Grant puts forward Apelles, of Marcionite
background, as the some to
which Theophilus may have been referring (cf. R. M. Grant,
Theophilus ofAntioch, 67 . 1).
-
726 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
To attribute evil or fault to the tree or the knowledge it
contains is, by Theophilus' reading, fundamentally to misunderstand
the text. There can be no evil in the tree, for the tree contains
but knowledge, which of itself is
good when one uses it properly. Indeed, how could it be else -
for we must not forget that the tree was created and planted by God
(cf. Gen 2:9), for
ming part of the creation which God beheld and saw that it was
good, yet very good. Whatever evil may come from the partaking of
the fruit must not, therefore, be attributed to the fruit or its
contents. Rather, Theophilus identifes the source of the evil - of
the death promised in Gen 2:17 - with the act of disobedience by
which Adam and ve partook of the fruit forbid den them by God. It
is in this, in the sin of transgression, that the tree brings
death, itself only the passive agent and focal object of the act.
The conse
quence of sin, namely death, springs up from the will of man,
not the fruit of the tree.
This reading, however, only begs more urgently the great puzzle
of the narrative: why did God prohibit the eating of this
particular tree in the first
place? Given Theophilus' statement that there was nothing in the
fruit but
knowledge, and knowledge is good when one uses it properly,
God's pre vention of man's approach to this fruit seems even more
inexplicable than it might, were we to consider that there was
something genuinely negative in the tree from which God was
protecting man. But the tree is good, its
contents are good, and from these God holds man back. In
explication of this seeming paradox, Theophilus puts forward a
reading of Gen 2:16-17 which would, by and large, become the
standard among future expositors. He writes later in the same
passage:
God wanted to test [Adam], to see whether he would be obedient
to his com mand. At the same time, he also wanted the man to remain
simple and since re for a longer time, remaining in infancy. For
this is a holy duty not only befo re God but before men, to obey
one's parente in simplicity and without malice.
And if children must obey their parents, how much more must they
obey the God and Father of the universe!
The prohibition is a test. It is not a malignant test, wrought
at God's hands as a domineering gesture of power, but a test
designed to foster
humanity's obedience to its maker. God wishes to see whether
Adam will be obedient (here a strong similarity to the Akedah, cf.
Gen 22:1,12, where God is similarly said to have wanted to see
whether Abraham would be obe dient), yet he wishes also to
encourage and engender obedience. Theophilus' implication is that
one cannot be obedient without a law or command to which obedience
might be given, and thus God provides the prohibition in order that
man might learn to obey the God and Father of the universe.
In his reading of the prohibition, Theophilus' point of emphasis
may be
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 727
identified as the propriety of humanity's relationship to God.
The creator establishes the divine command in order that proper
humility and obe dience might be engendered in the human formation.
The evil (including death) which comes from the transgression is
the result of those virtues
being distorted and abused. God sees, and ultimately man also
sees, that
propriety, obedience, is not evident in humanity, and from this
revelation the economy of salvation can be set properly in
perspective.
We might also note that Theophilus hints at, but does not
greatly deve
lop, the reality of the tree of knowledge as indicative of a
dynamic relation
ship between God and man. To say that knowledge is good when one
uses it properly suggests that there may at some point be a time
when the discretion to do so shall lie within man's power.
Theophilus calls to mind a child who must drink milk before
progressing to solid foods, and even says outright that as one
grows in age and in an orderly fashion, so one grows in
ability to think.4 The impropriety of partaking of the tree of
knowledge is
temporary, temporal. Theophilus does not further expand this
notion within the context of the prohibition against the tree,
though he does so in other contexts in the Ad Autolycum. We find,
however, that it lies right at the heart of the reading of the
prohibition put forth by Irenaeus of Lyons.
To protect and preserve: Irenaeus of Lyons
It seems to be of importance for Irenaeus that Gen 2:16-17,
which pre sente the prohibition in question, is offset from the
full account of the tran
sgression (Gen 3), appearing earlier in the text as part of the
creation narra
tive of Gen 1-2 and indeed bisecting that narrative. The verses
which prece de it describe the contente of the Garden (including
the tree of life and the tree of knowledge in 2:9), and those to
follow address Adam's activities in his new home, while the
contents of 2:16-17 represent the first words, the first commands,
given by God since his pronouncement of a blessing upon the
completed six days' work (Gen 2:3). Irenaeus extrapolates, from
the inser tion of this prohibition into the very heart of the
creation saga in its anthro
pogonic element, that the commandment itself forms part of the
formative work of the creator for his creation. The prohibition is
an active manoeuvre of God in fashioning his human formation, even
as were the drawing up from the dust and the breathing of the
divine breath. It is not merely a nega
4 Ad.Autol. 2.25. The allegory of the newborn child unable to
eat solid food and thus nou
rished by its mother's milk, but which, with increasing age,
comes to solid food, is employed also by Irenaeus, drawing from
this text in Theophilus, at Adversus haereses (hereafter AH)
4.38-39. See also Ad.Autol. 2.26. In 2.24, Theophilus specifcally
indicates that God intends
Adam to grow into perfection and ascend to heaven, having been
declared a God. Cf. A.J.
Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the
History of Culture, TUbingen, 1989, 104.
-
728 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
tive proscription, but a positive affirmation of the proper
limits of human
knowing in its present stage of development. It is in this sense
that Irenaeus utilises the text of the prohibition at Epideixis
(hereafter Epid.) 15, where it is placed at the end of his long
treatment of the creation saga, in some sense completing ali that
has gone before:
But, in order that the man should not entertain thoughts of
grandeur nor he exal
ted, as if he had no Lord, and, because of the authority given
to the man and the
boldness towards God his creator, sin, passing beyond his own
measure, and adopt an atttude of self-conceited arrogance against
God, a law was given to him from
God, that he might know that he had as lord the Lord of ali. And
he placed certain
limits upon him, so that, if he should keep the commandment of
God, he would
remain always as he was, that is, immortai; if, however, he
should not keep it, he
would become mortai, dissolving into the earth whence his frame
was taken. And
the commandment was this: You may eat ffeely from every tree of
Paradise, but of
that tree alone, whence is the knowledge of good and evil, you
shall not eat; for on
the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die (Gen
2:16-17).
Such words clearly demonstrate Irenaeus' understanding of the
prohibi tion against the tree of knowledge as an active work in
forming the character of man. Even as the physical limitations of
the flesh provide the boundaries within which humanity's carnai
nature is meant to be expressed, so does the
divinely imposed limitation of the Edenic law provide the
boundary within which its intellect and free will shall properly
function. The prohibition again st eating from the tree of
knowledge is, for Irenaeus, God's establishment of the proper realm
within which the human creature's intellect and reason may be
employed in the course of its growth. This is a unique observation
on Irenaeus' part, and one whose implications have not figured
prominendy enough in modem scholarship. Through it, Irenaeus puts
forth the idea that
knowledge itself, as an element within the composite being of
humankind, must have reign only within the proper scope of its
capabilities and prepa redness at any given point in its
development. Knowledge must not exalt man to a state of
self-professed grandeur that exceeds his own measure. To do so is
to use improperly the authority, the rational faculty given to man
by God, for a purpose beyond that for which it is intended. The
prohibition of 2:16-17 is a safety provided to guard against a
potential danger inherent in man's possession of a free and
self-determining will.5
It is only possible to understand fully the manner of Irenaeus'
analysis if one reads Epid. 15 in the light of A/75.20.2, where he
employs Gen 2:16 in an ad hominem manner against the heretics;
5 See S. Korolyov, Heavenly Life on Earth in Journal of the
Moscow Pairiarchate 3 (1983) 74 for a modem writer's assertion of
the same point: The commandment not to eat of the fruit of the Tree
of Knowledge of Good and Evil was given in order to train man's
will through obedience to Goodness.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 729
Itbehovesus [...] toavoidtheir doctrines, and to take careful
heed lest we suffer
any injury from them; but to flee to the Church and be brought
up (educari) in
her bosom, and be nourished with the Lord's scriptures. For the
Church has been
planted as a garden (paradisus) in this world; therefore the
Spirit of God says, You may freely eat from every tree of the
garden, that is, you may eat from every
scriptum of the Lord, but you shall not eat with an uplifted
mind, nor touch any heretical discord. For these men profess that
they themselves have the knowled
ge of good and evil, and they set their own impious minds above
God who made
them. On this account they form opinions on what is beyond the
limits of under
standing. Wherefore also the Apostle says, Do not be wise beyond
what it is fit
ting to be wise, but be wise prudently (cf. Rom 12:3), that we
not be cast forth
from the paradise of life by eating of the knowledge of these
men - that know
ledge which knows more than it should.6
If we accept the common dating of Irenaeus' two works and place
the
composition of the Epideixis after the completion of the
Adversus haereses (and there is no convincing reason to challenge
this7), it seems hard not to conclude that Epid. 15 is a refined
and generalised summation of what Irenaeus had written within a
narrower context at AH 5.20.2. Both passages take as their
grounding Gen 2.16-17 {Epid. 15 directly quotes both verses; AH
5.20.2 quotes only 2:16 but makes obvious allusion to 17), and both
treat the prohibition as dealing with the fitting and proper
limitations to be pla ced on man's use of his intellect and reason.
The heretics profess a full
knowledge of good and evil, and set their own impious minds
above the God who made them - precisely the state of affairs
against which, Irenaeus
argues at Epid. 15, God had originally invoked the prohibition
as a guard. Irenaeus' use of Paul, via Rom 12:3, in his argument in
the Adversus haere ses clarifies that he does not regard the wisdom
of the tree itself as proble matic, or even the genuine subject of
God's prohibition; rather, the com mandment guards against the
misuse of such knowledge as the tree repre sents and grants,
against the act of being wise beyond what is fitting.8
6 Sources Chrtiennes 153, 258-61. This is the only instance in
the corpus where Irenaeus relates the garden of Paradise to the
Church.
7 The intriguing sentiments of J. Behr (see J. Behr, The
Formation of Christian Theology, voi. 1: The Way to Nicaea, New
York, 2001, 30 . 34; Id., Ori the Apostolic Preaching, New York,
1997,118 n. 229) and others notwithstanding, I am unconvinced of
the validity of those argu ments in favour of inverting the
traditional chronology of these texts, based in part upon what seem
to be refnements in argumentative structure front the ad hominem
motif of the Adversus haereses to the more general, and more
coherent, systematisation of the Epideixis - as for exam
ple is evidenced in the two passages presenty under review. For
a more developed considera
tion of this question, see my eariier comments in M.C.
Steenberg, Cosmic Anthropology: Genesis 1-11 in Irenaeus ofLyons,
with special reference to Justin, Theophilus and select Gnostic
contem
poraries, D. Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 2003, 24-5. 8
This in distinction, for example, to the Gnostic Apocryphon ofjohn,
where in 21.21-36
the tree is described as godlessness, whose fruit is deadly
poison and its promise death: Nag
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730 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
Should human knowledge be kept within appropriate bounds (not
passing beyond its own measure), then it is a knowledge that eats
freely from
every tree of the Garden and nourishes man in his growth.9 The
notion that specific proscriptions of the Law are meant to
prevent
the overreaching of nature or of the bounds imposed on one's
relationship to the cosmos through his or her own nature, is found
well antecedent to Irenaeus. Philo had interpreted many of the
regulations of the Old Testament in such a manner: proscriptions
against covetousness mitigate more deeply against uncontrolled
desire, which leads to such antisocial activities as plunderings,
robberies, false accusations, adulteries, even murders;10 the
Decalogue's commandment against covetousness and desire strives to
prevent injustice and warfare;11 and the proscription of murder is
handed down for the benefit of public utility ( ).12
In a similar vein, H. Maier has composed a study on the ancient
rea
ding of legai traditions through such an interpretive
methodology, which in Philo he rightly attributes to Stoic
influences.13 By his analysis both of Philo and of similar
interpretations of metaphysical proscriptions from within the
philosophical tradition,14 Maier conceives primarily of social
motiva tions for such readings. His brief survey of Sirach, for
example, concludes with the declaration that regulations on wealth
and riches are meant ulti
mately to protect the social structure of the Israelite
community. Maier
notes, For this writer [i.e. the author of Sirach], then, the
proper use of
Hammadi Corpus (II, 1) 21.21-36. Yet cf. the anonymous Origin
ofthe World in Nag Hammadi
Corpus (11,5) 110.8-111.1 on the tree of gnosis which shall open
the mind of man. For one of the few scholarly reflections on the
prohibition as protection, see D. Ramos-Lissn, Le rle de la femme
dans la thologie de saint Irne in Studia Patristica 21 (1989)
167-8.
9 William Wordsworth put forward a similar concep, showing its
popularity - if not predo minance - throughout history. The poet
discemed in life the need for a limitation on knowledge and
freedom, as an aid required to prevent men front becoming those who
have felt the weight of too much liberty (Wordsworth, The Sonnet,
i). His Ode to Duty spells out a view of divine law
quite similar to that Irenaeus takes front Genesis: Stern
Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear / The Godhead's most benignant grace;
/ Now know we anything so fair / As is the smile upon thy face: /
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds, / And fragrance in thy
footing treads; / Thou dost pre serve the stars front wrong; / And
the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong (Ode
to Duty, stanza 7). It is precisely this sense of preserving front
wrong that Irenaeus detects in the prohibition against partaking of
the tree of knowledge before the appointed time.
19 See Spec.Leg. 4.80-94. 11 See De.Dec. 152-53. 12 De.Dec. 170.
Cf. similar readings in Dee. 142; De agric. 43; Spec.Leg. 1.173-74,
2.190; De
praem. et poen. 15; Quod omn. prob. 20, 79; De Joseph 29 ff.
These and others mentioned with discussion in H.O. Maier, Purity
and danger in Polycarp's Epistle to the Philippians: The sin of
Valens in social perspective in Journal ofEarly Christian Studies 1
(1993) 240 n. 40, ofwhich we shall say more below.
13 See ibid. 240. 11 Ibid. 239-41.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 731
riches indicates an allegiance to the ideals of the community of
Israel.15 This pattern is traced through apocalyptic Judaism, where
the abusers of wealth [...] certainly bring social ills, but more
importantly they symbolize an unredeemed realm of sin awaiting
destruction,16 indicating primarily that they are excluded from the
true community of Israel. Ali this is the preamble to the
centrepiece of Maier's argument, namely that the brief refe rence
to the sin ofValens in the epistle of Polycarp [Poi. 11) reveals a
similar social context through which Polycarp understood the
proscriptions of the law. Maier's thesis here is
straightforward:
In the case of Polycarp, to connect avarice with defllement is
to establish a group
boundary and to relegate greed to the space outside the
community; the primary
danger of avarice is that it leads one away to a dangerous state
of idolatry.17
Maier may be reading a bit much into what is, after ali, an
extremely brief and almost passing reference to Valens in the
Polycarpian epistle, but his analysis of the tradition of legai
interpretation through the philosophi cal schools, into Judaism
through Philo and the apocalyptic era, right into the Apostolic age
is of interest. Throughout, he discovers an awareness on the part
of the ancient authors that the divine commandments are to some
degree protective. They do not simply establish boundaries based
upon God's authority and regal intent for his people, but based
also on what is best for that people in light of the naturai
limitations or weaknesses of its character.18
To this end, Maier's conclusions have hearing upon our present
look at Irenaeus' reading of the prohibition on the tree of
knowledge. Just as Philo could say that prohibitions against greed
of money were meant to prevent warfare and general immorality, and
as Polycarp could imply that avari ciousness leads to the
destruction of communal or societal order, so can Irenaeus come to
regard the prohibition of Gen 2:16-17 as God's control
against a weakness in humanity's immature character. And even as
wealth
may be good when used wisely, so, too, can the knowledge of the
tree one
day come to be of good to humankind.
The relationship of knowledge and obedience
Ali this is in stark contrast to the Gnostic view on knowledge,
which Irenaeus has been attacking throughout the AH and to which
our above
15 Ibid. 240-1. 16 Ibid. 242. 17 Ibid. 243. 18
Precisely the end toward which Barnabas' interpretation of the
Mosaic dietary regula tions is aimed (cf. Barn. 10).
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732 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
text, AH 5.20.2, refers in summation. For these, a knowledge
that knows more than it should is, provided that the knowledge in
question is true and
genuine, hardly a possibility. It is only false knowledge -
deception or igno rant belief - that is harmful; the restoration of
true knowledge and true
knowing is indeed the primary aim of Gnostic praxis.19 Irenaeus,
however, insists that at humanity's creation even true and genuine
knowledge, be it in too full a measure for the limited status of
the newly-formed creature, can be harmful to man. Here he follows
Theophilus precisely, from this latter's comments in the AdAutol.
that we have already discussed. There is nothing iniquitous in the
knowledge the tree contains, which will be passed along to the
human creature who partakes of its fruit. Yet in eating of this
fruit, evil does come to the partaker, though the source of this
evil lies in the disobe dience of the one who has eaten in
contradiction to God's commandment not so to do.
Irenaeus does not disagree with Theophilus here. There are
passages throughout both his works that explicidy identify the sin
of the tree with disobedience to God's command, and more generally
link together sin and disobedience as theological synonyms. Indeed,
disobedience may rightly be called the chief sin in Irenaean
thought. Epid. 2 opens with a brief definition of sin as not
keeping the commandments of God; AH4.41.3 rela tes the effects of
disobedience to the disinheritance one would receive from
parents at a similar act. As disobedience to family brings,
eventually, disinheritance from family, so does disobedience to God
bring a divine disinheritance. At 3.18.6, Irenaeus spells out that
such disobedience - which he specifically equates to sin - renders
man weak, open to the devil's captivating powers. Irenaeus is
nowhere clearer in his identification of diso bedience and sin than
in his discussions on the parallelism between
Eve/Mary and Adam/Christ. He shows that Christ comes to dissolve
the old disobedience of Adam,20 and Mary the knot of ve,21 with
specific attention drawn to the fact that the transgression which
occurred through the tree was undone by the obedience of the tree
and virginal disobedience recti fied by virginal obedience.22
Christ's obedience in the Passion and Mary's obedience to the word
of the angel are both corrections of the sin in Paradise, which is
thus explicitly a sin of disobedience.
This is also spelled out clearly and emphatically in an
important text from the opening section of the Epid.:
19 Cf. H.B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek
Philosophy - exemplified by Irenaeus, Tertullian and Clement of
Alexandria, Assen, 1973, 24-5 on Irenaeus' conception of
knowledge and these Gnostic views. 20 Cf. AH 3.18.6, Epid. 37.
21 Ci. AH 3.22.4. 22
Epid. 33.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 733
Sinners are those who have the knowledge of God, but do not keep
his com
mandments - that is, the disdainful.23
This passage must be qualified in the present context, lest the
identifi cation of sinners with those who have the knowledge of God
be taken in some sense to disqualify Adam and ve from such a title,
given the fact that the tree of knowledge was precisely that of
which they were forbidden to eat. Does this fact free them from the
qualifcation required by Epid. 2 for sinners? In the most basic
sense, Irenaeus' answer is certainly no. Disobedience comes in
defance of such knowledge as man has of God, and
though Adam and ve had not partaken of the knowledge of good and
evil, they nonetheless had a direct knowledge of the God who walked
with them in the Garden and himself spoke in their hearing the law
of life.24 Irenaeus can say elsewhere that the disobedient do not
consent to his doc trine25 - and there was but one doctrine, one
teaching, to which the first humans had been bound - reminding his
readers that the law is the com mandment of God.26 This latter
comment is offered in reference to the devil's activities in the
Garden, summarised by Irenaeus:
In the beginning he enticed man to transgress his maker's law,
and thereby got him into his power; yet his power consiste in
transgression and apostasy, and
with these he bound man to himself.27
Despite their limited knowledge, Adam and ve yet possessed a
know
ledge of their maker's law, that is, God's commandment,
sufficient unto either obedience or disobedience. Their exercise of
the latter was therefore an act of those who have the knowledge of
God, but do not keep his com mandments - an act of disobedience,
and thus of sin.
The dynamic ofmaturing knowledge and responsibility
At the same time, the knowledge of God possessed by Adam and ve
was weak and basic. It was sufficient for the generation in
humanity of the
ability to heed or to depart from the will of God, but minimal
enough to make understandable (if not excusable) Adam and Eve's
susceptibility to a
provoked disobedience. Disobedience, suggests Irenaeus, may be
exercised at any level of knowledge. While the Israelites after
Moses may have had laws by the hundreds bound up in the covenant by
which they were direc ted to live, Adam and ve had only one; yet
even this was sufficient for the
23 Epid. 2; cf. Ps 1.1.
24 J. Behr's sectional title for Epid. 15 (see J. Behr,
Apostolic Preaching, 49); cf. Epid. 6. 25 AH 5.27.1. 26 AH 5.21.3.
27 Ibid. (Sources Chrtiennes 153; 274-5).
-
734 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
act of obedience. Nonetheless, Israel's detailed Law was based
on a deeper and more substantially revealed knowledge of God, was
in some sense a
portion of the knowledge of good and evil greater than that to
which Adam and ve had been privy in Paradise.28 To be disobedient
in such a state
is, for Irenaeus, less understandable than was the disobedience
in Eden, for
humanity as a whole had been given to mature in its knowledge of
God since the era of Paradise. To be disobedient when in communion
with the Church and the new covenant of Christ is less
understandable stili, for the rein has man's knowledge of God been
brought to yet a higher level. This
knowledge makes one stronger in his or her discernment of the
right and the wrong, of good and of evil, and thus makes ever less
pardonable any disobedience from the right. Just as a child, when
maturing through her
years, grows more accountable for her actions and less able to
attribute her falls to the influence of others, so Irenaeus sees
humanity as coming to know better than to sin as the economy
unfolds. Adam and ve, however, were young, inexperienced, immature.
They knew enough to be obedient when tempted otherwise, but not
enough fully to comprehend the nature of such temptation, of
deceit, of wickedness. Thus will Gen 3 present the story, not of
Adam and ve spontaneously or for reasons of self-generated
desire
transgressing God's commandment, but so sinning at the
provocation of a deceiver. On this account, Irenaeus speaks of the
first humans predomi
nantly as being involved in the transgression prompted by the
devil. They maintain personal responsibility throughout for the
fact that the decision to
disobey is ultimately one made by Adam and ve as freely acting,
self-deter
mining individuale, but their decision is motivated by the
actions of a decei ver they were little prepared to combat.29
Irenaeus here makes use of Jesus' parable of the sower to prove his
point:
The Lord, indeed, sowed good seed in his own field. Thus he
says, The field is the world (Mt 13:38). But while man slept, the
enemy carne and sowed tares in the midst of the wheat, and went on
his way (Mt 13:25). Hence we learn that
this was the apostate angel and enemy, because he was envious of
God's work
manship (p/asma), and took up the task of rendering this
workmanship an
enmity with God. For this cause God has banished from his
presence him who did of his own accord stealthily sow the tares,
that is, him who brought about the transgression: but he took
compassion upon man, who, through want of care (neglegenter) no
doubt, but stili wickedly, on the part of another became involved
in the disobedience.30
This passage is dense and speaks predominantly of the devil who
is
28 Cf. AH 2.11.1,2.30.9, 3.10.2. 29 Cf. T.G. Weinandy, St.
Irenaeus and the Imago Dei: The Importance of Being Human in
Logos 6A (2003) 24-6. 30 AH4.40.3 (Sources Chrtiennes 100:
978-81).
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 735
pre-eminently at fault in the sin, for it is he who actively, in
a deliberate and deceitful way acts against God and man (as later
in the same passage: the devil had designed to make man the enemy
of God). Man's deception by such a force is understandable, and God
himself takes compassion upon his deceived creature. Irenaeus'
notion of knowledge in degree of maturity bears directly upon his
conviction of guilt and responsibility.31 Nonetheless, there
remains a definite culpability in Adam and ve following their
actions. These may have sinned at the provocation of a great foe,
and through want of care (Irenaeus here implies a certain neglect
(neglegenter) in Adam and ve, promoted by the lack of need and
anxiety in the Garden), but stili
wickedly. One may condemn the devil for his role in the
transgression, but
responsibility for the act of disobedience itself must rest with
the man and woman who themselves contravened the divine
command.32
A prohibition but not a test
In ali this, Irenaeus follows Theophilus in his reading of the
same Genesis text, though he has greatly expanded upon the
Antiochene's discus sion. God sets forth the prohibition, and the
departure from obedience to this commandment brings consequences
not through the tree itself or the
knowledge it presente, but from the disobedience of the eater.
Yet Irenaeus
goes notably further than Theophilus, and while he does place
pronounced emphasis upon Adam and Eve's disobedience as at fault in
the transgression of God's prohibition against the tree, he
refrains from any implication that a test of obedience was the
primary reason for that prohibition. Rather, the commandment is an
important and integrai element in the economy of man's maturation,
preventing him from laying hold of that which he is una ble to
bear, preserving the fullness of knowledge for a time - and there
will be a time - when humanity shall be ready and able to partake
of the full
knowledge God offers.33 He will be like God just as the serpent
had pre dicted, however flawed may have been the latter's
intentions and under
standings. Moreover, Irenaeus does not follow the Antiochene
with respect
31 Cf. V.K. Downing, The Doctrine of Regeneration in the Second
Century in Evangelical Review ofTheology 14.2 (1990) 110, where
Adam's sin, according to Irenaeus, is not a radicai infrac don of
the Law but a moral mistake attributable to the spiritual and
intellectual immaturity of
Adam and ve. In this light, it is hard to accept Klebba's
terminology of die Katastrophe vis--vis
the transgression; cf. E. Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hi.
Irenaeus, Munster, 1894,45. 32 On Irenaeus' belief that
responsibility/guilt for disobedience cannot be imputed to
another, seeAH4.27.2-3, 4.33.2, 5.15.2. 33 See AH 4.39.1, where
Irenaeus suggests that the knowledge of good and evil will, at
a
later stage in man's development, become the foundation by which
he shall be able to chose the
one over the other. At 4.38.4, a knowledge of good and evil is
considered part-and-parcel of the
image and likeness.
-
736 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
to the two reasons the latter had put forth in AdAutol. 2.25 for
the prohibi tion, namely, as a test and a preserver of childlike
innocence. There is no
question in Irenaeus' treatment of God wishing to test Adam and
ve. Their disobedience becomes apparent in the transgression, but
God is not pre sented as having provoked the incident as an
investigation of their respon se. Similarly, Irenaeus does not take
up Theophilus' comment on God
wishing for Adam and ve to remain in infancy for a longer
period, but
suggests simply that their infancy required such a time of
expectant growth. Irenaeus extols the beauty and virtue of a simple
and loving faith, but never
suggests that this faith and its connected obedience are
constrained to
infancy and not to maturity.34 To the contrary, he makes a point
of showing that such faith and obedience are perfected with the
maturation of humankind, made stronger and more binding in the
perfect man than
they were in the infant Adam and ve.35 Faith becomes friendship
only in
maturity. Where Theophilus had intimated this idea in describing
knowledge as
good when one uses it properly, as we saw above, Irenaeus is
explicit in his assertion that humanity one day will partake of the
full measure of true
knowledge. This is the subject of his celebrated discussion at
AH 4.38-39, where he speaks most clearly of the growth and
development of the human creature into perfection. Man shall,
indeed, make progress day by day and ascend toward the perfect;
that is, be approximated to the Uncreated One,36 but this only
after he has become accustomed to eat and drink the Word of God
through this arrangement [...] and these harmonies, and a sequence
of this nature - i.e., the divine economy of salvation.37 This
growth into the receptivity of ever increasing knowledge is an
essential part of Irenaeus' larger belief in the growth of the
whole person and of human nature itself, over the course of the
economy, into that which one day shall behold in divine vision its
creator and partake of the life of God.38 Man beco mes physically
able to bear such life through the accustomisation of the Spirit
made possible by the Incarnation of the Son; and even as the body
grows in its receptive capabilities, so too does the intellect. Ali
such growth, however, must be maintained within its due measure;39
and with respect to the intellectual aspect in particular, God thus
prohibits the free eating of the tree of knowledge in Paradise.
34 See AH 2.26.1: It is better [...] that one should have no
knowledge whatever [...] but should believe in God and continue in
his love; 4.12.2.
35 See AH 4.38.4. 36 AH 4.38.3. 37 AH 4.38.1. 38 See
AH4.38.4,4.39.1. 38 Cf. again Epid. 15.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 737
The fall ofknowledge and knowing
Irenaeus thus employs the prohibition of Gen 2:16-17 at Epid. 15
and AH 5.20.2 to considerable effect, and its importance may be
encapsulated in the observance that the divine commandment of those
verses, the sole
prohibition of Eden, is interpreted anthropocentrically by
Irenaeus as per taining to the life and growth of man, and not
primarily to the sovereignty or otherwise independent will of God
who therein tests his new creation. It is not the exertion of God's
authority, but evidence of his dedication to the
perfection of the human handiwork. The third passage in which
Irenaeus makes use of Gen 2:16-17 (and where he in fact makes far
more extensive and contextualised use of these verses than he does
in the passages addres sed above) demonstrates this same
characteristic of interpretation, though it does so by addressing
the prohibition front a different perspective: the devil's
deception of Adam and ve with regard to the command. Irenaeus'
intention at AH 5.23 is primarily to demonstrate the character of
the devil as deceiver, and in this regard the primary example of
such deception is found in his manoeuvre regarding the fruit of the
tree of knowledge. Irenaeus sets
up the situation with a complete quotation of the present
verses, then pro ceeds to explicate the devil's actions, along with
Eve's responses, through quotations of Gen 3:1-5 interspersed with
his own commentary. In this dia
logue, pride of place is given to Gen 3:4-5, the devil's
response to Eve's reas sertion of the divine prohibition, and the
promised consequence that on the day one eats of the fruit, on that
day he will surely die:
Then the serpent said to the woman, You will not surely die. For
God knows
that in the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you
will be like God,
knowing good and evil.40
Irenaeus goes on to explain the content of the deception wrapped
up in the devil's words. First, he speaks of God as absent, as if
the creator were not present in the garden with him and ve; and
then he lies, since the pro mise of death was indeed true.41
Irenaeus is again careful to explain that this death was not caused
by the fruit but by man's disobedience, for disobe dience to God
entails death.42
Irenaeus' wording at the dose of AH 5.23.1 is especially
interesting:
For along with the fruit they did also fall under the power of
death, because
they did eat in disobedience.43
40 Quoted at AH5.23.1 (Sources Chrtiennes 153, 288-9).
41 Cf. AH 5.23.1. The subsequent section constitutes Irenaeus'
principal defence of the notion that the on the same day you eat of
it of Gen 2.17 was not proved false by the long life of Adam and
ve.
42 Afi 5.23.1. 43 Sources Chrtiennes 153, 290-1, emphasis
mine.
-
738 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
The fruit itself, the potential for genuine knowledge of good
and evil, the capability for godly knowledge in humanity, is,
together with that
humanity, become forfeit to death in the eating. Man's
disobedience to the divine prohibition not only entails the death
of his personal being, the immediate and direct consequence of his
defance of God's economy; it entails also the disruption of the
very nature of his potential within the eco
nomy designed and wrought for his sake. Adam and Eve's eating in
disobe dience does not disturb solely the eaters, but the very
fruit of which they are partaking. This represents a substantial
Irenaean insight. The forfeiture of life is both personal and
historical: Adam and ve will die on that same
day, but so also will ali human generations from that time
forward perish and the fruit of the tree of knowledge will become
more elusive stili.
Irenaeus does not expand further upon his comment on the fruit
fal
ling together with man under the forfeiture to death, but his
consideration of the expulsion from the Garden proffers the same
essential point. Adam and ve are expelled from Paradise upon their
transgression; God put the man far from his face.44 To behold God,
to attain to the divine vision, is for Irenaeus the very definition
of full and true knowledge.45 The casting of
humanity out of the Garden, away from God's face and thus from
pure vision, represents the same anthropological teaching as the
falling of the fruit of the tree into the sway of death. The
perfection of true knowledge, so much the goal of the rational
human being that God planted this tree at the
very centre of Paradise, moves outside the grasp of humankind
upon its
transgression. Adam's potential for growth in the course of the
economy has been altered. This loss shall require restoration. Thus
Irenaeus, like
Theophilus, ultimately uses the prohibition and transgression as
means for
establishing the framework of salvation.
Synthesis
Through the eyes of Theophilus and Irenaeus we thus perceive two
dif
fering pictures of the prohibition and its purpose. Each
ascertains a lack of
negative value or evil character to the knowledge of the tree
itself, but the reason for the prohibition against it differs
between them. For Theophilus, God forbids the fruit primarily as a
test. For Irenaeus, he does so primarily to safeguard the proper
limitation of knowledge in an immature humanity. How, then, might
these two views converge in a broader theological fra mework?
As has already been mentioned, Theophilus' understanding of
the
prohibition is that which has predominated throughout history.
Yet of itself,
1 Epid. 16.
5 See AH4.20.5, cf. E. Osborn, Irenaeus, 204-5.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 739
such a test-based vision poses the same ethical problems for
readers today that it did in the second century, when the so-called
Gnostics were keen to point out the cruelty of such an action,
attributing it to a renegade demiurge rather than the benevolence
of the true divinity. Marcion's solu tion was more radicai stili.
The parallel in Theophilus' language vis--vis the event, to the
language in the story of Abraham's near-sacrifice of Isaac,
inadvertently points to the unease with which many readers
encounter both texts: why be it in the nature of a good God to test
in such a manner that which he has created? Either the test is a
joke, given that God knew the true fabric and merit of what he had
made, and in any case as omniscient would already know the outcome
of any such test; or God is not in control of his creation, unable
to know internally the ilk and intention of his own creatures.
Neither is a supposition plausible to most Christian readers. What
then to make of the test?
Irenaeus' response is to go to the other extreme: there was in
fact no test at ali. God was not challenging but defending his
creation. In the face of
knowledge which, when apprehended improperly can so easily
become
knowledge falsely so-called (its moniker in the full title of
the Adversus hae reses), God lays down a commandment designed to
hold back the full breadth of that knowledge until such time as
newly-created man has grown into a ful ler measure of cognitive
capability. It is only of love and in a spirit of paternal
shepherding that God forbids the fruit of this tree, and precisely
because it is that which might seem so appealing to humanity in its
immaturity.
Yet there is an inherent problem in Irenaeus' reading if taken
in extrac -
tion. If there is no element of a test in the prohibition, if
there is solely pre ventative limitation in its intention, then its
weight as commandment is in some sense diminished. Such a reading
makes the prohibition a part of the naturai law - knowledge is
limited as an aspect of humanity's rational fini tude; its fullness
is proscripted not arbitrarily, but necessarily. Man ought not eat
of the fruit of the tree because he cannot receive what it
contains. The prohibition becomes, to some degree, part of the
naturai order of laws and fundamentals in the cosmos and loses its
particularity as a command, which is the source of its role as
harbinger of obedience. Irenaeus will not, of course, allow this -
his reading of the transgression is always sourced from the
disobedience of Adam and ve to the divine law; but he is able to do
this only because he believes that these in some sense failed a
test never
explicitly given as such. God did not actively test his creation
in proscribing the fruit of this tree, but in fading to heed the
divine guidance which forba de it, Adam and ve failed the universal
test of human communion with God: obedience to the divine will.
In the end, then, Theophilus and Irenaeus are not so far apart.
The lat ter may disagree with the former on the nature of the
prohibition qua prohi bition as itself a test, but this is only as
regards the specific intention of the
-
740 MATTHEW C. STEENBERG
divine proclamation. In effect, if not in cause, humanity's
obedience was tested by the primal law. And Theophilus, in turn, is
not wholly without the notion of prohibition as preventative
limitation which dominates the rea
ding of Irenaeus. Knowledge is good when one uses it properly -
there is a proper use, but one not available at this stage in
humanity's existence. God guards against knowledge improperly
attained and employed by pre venting access to the tree that
represents its fullness.
Modern-day theological readings of the Genesis protology, and
speci fically anthropology, must likewise balance the two views
emphasised in these second-century authors. Each dismisses outright
the notion (ali too common in modem perceptions) that there is
something negative in true, full and genuine knowledge, or that God
for whatever reason simply did not want humanity to possess it.
Then, in the mix, they offer a balance on inter
preting the nature of the prohibition. If we read Gen 2:16-17 as
only God's authoritative demand and test, we lose sense of God's
sovereignty over the
economy and existence as one who acts always for the benefit and
growth of his creation. Thus Irenaeus teaches us to see economie
purpose in the
prohibition: not ali things are beneficiai at ali times, and
God's law works to
protect his creation from exceeding the bounds of that which it
is able pro perly to access and contain. Yet there is always
something of a test in obe dience, always a challenge to humanity's
freely determining and acting will. To be obedient is to obey, and
to obey is a choice, a determination. And if children must obey
their parents, how much more must they obey the God and Father of
the universe!46 Theophilus thus balances Irenaeus with the reminder
that God's law, however economie and salvific its purpose, is
always a challenge set against human freedom. That ali things
are possible, but not ali things beneficiai (cf. 1 Cor 6:12; 10:23)
is the basic presupposi tion of both our authors. Possibility is
set into the context of beneficiality -
God holds back what is ultimately good until we are ready to
receive it, la Irenaeus. Yet, as in the thought of Theophilus, we
must heed God's refrain, should we ever attain to that
goodness.
University of Oxford Fellow in Patristic Theology and Early
Church History Greyfriars Hall
Iffley Road Oxford 0X4 1SB
Matthew C. Steenberg
'Ad.Autol. 2.25.
-
TEST OR PRESERVE? 741
SUMMARY
Why forbid the tree? Of ali the questions that arise from a
reading of the
Genesis protology, that over why God forbade Adam and ve the
fruit of the tree of
knowledge is of perennial curiosity. The present article
examines the exegesis of two
second-century sources, Theophilus of Antioch and Irenaeus of
Lyons, each of
whom considered the question of profound importance in
anthropological and
soteriological reflections. An emphasis on the prohibition as a
test in Theophilus meets the alternate interpretation of the
prohibition as a formative construct in
defining the limits of human intellectual capability according
to Irenaeus. These are
explored in detail, and at the article's end are synthesised in
a reading of the Genesis
prohibition that makes use of both points of emphasis.
Perch vietare l'albero?. Di tutte le questioni che sorgono dalla
lettura della
protologia della Genesi quella riguardante il perch Dio vieti ad
Adamo ed Eva il frutto dell'albero della conoscenza suscita da
sempre curiosit. Il presente articolo
esamina due fonti del II secolo, Teoflo d'Antiochia e Ireneo di
Lione, ciascuno dei
quali consider la questione d'estrema importanza riflettendovi
dal punto di vista
antropologico e soteriologico. Un'enfasi sulla proibizione come
prova in Teofilo
incontra l'interpretazione alternativa della proibizione come
concetto formativo nel
definire i limiti della capacit intellettiva umana secondo
Ireneo. Queste posizioni sono esaminate dettagliatamente e
sintetizzate, infine, in una lettura della proibi zione della
Genesi che tenga conto dell'enfasi di entrambi i punti di
vista.
Article Contentsp. [723]p. 724p. 725p. 726p. 727p. 728p. 729p.
730p. 731p. 732p. 733p. 734p. 735p. 736p. 737p. 738p. 739p. 740p.
741
Issue Table of ContentsGregorianum, Vol. 86, No. 4 (2005) pp.
723-952To test or preserve? The prohibition of Gen 2.16-17 in the
thought of two second-century exegetes [pp. 723-741]The
Inevitability of Allegory [pp. 742-753]Grazia e Ordine nel dialogo
anglicano-romano cattolico [pp. 754-775]Das Naturgesetz als
dialogische Emergenz des Ethischen: Zum Verhltnis zwischen lex
aeterna, lex naturalis und motus rationalis creaturae im
De-lege-Traktat der Summa Theologiae Thomas von Aquins [pp.
776-805]Jews and Judaism in Asian Theology. Historical and
Theological Perspectives [pp. 806-836]Von der Schwierigkeit eines
evidentiellen Arguments gegen die Existenz Gottes [pp.
837-856]Filosofia da Aritmtica em Kant [pp. 857-874]Intensitt oder
die Phnomenalisierung durch reine Erprobung [pp.
875-897]RECENSIONESTHEOLOGIAReview: untitled [pp. 898-899]Review:
untitled [pp. 899-901]Review: untitled [pp. 902-903]Review:
untitled [pp. 903-904]Review: untitled [pp. 904-905]Review:
untitled [pp. 905-907]Review: untitled [pp. 907-908]
PHILOSOPHIAReview: untitled [pp. 909-910]Review: untitled [pp.
910-911]Review: untitled [pp. 912-912]
SPIRITUALITASReview: untitled [pp. 913-914]Review: untitled [pp.
914-915]Review: untitled [pp. 915-917]Review: untitled [pp.
917-919]Review: untitled [pp. 919-919]
HISTORIAReview: untitled [pp. 920-921]Review: untitled [pp.
921-923]Review: untitled [pp. 923-924]Review: untitled [pp.
924-925]Review: untitled [pp. 926-926]
CONCILIAReview: untitled [pp. 927-928]Review: untitled [pp.
928-929]Review: untitled [pp. 929-931]Review: untitled [pp.
931-932]Review: untitled [pp. 932-933]
INDICATIONESReview: untitled [pp. 934-935]Review: untitled [pp.
935-935]
LIBRI NOSTRIReview: untitled [pp. 936-936]Review: untitled [pp.
937-937]Review: untitled [pp. 937-938]Review: untitled [pp.
938-938]Review: untitled [pp. 939-939]Review: untitled [pp.
939-939]
Opera accepta: 16.V.2005 1.IX.2005 [pp. 940-947]Back Matter