To Ban International Vote Buying? Rethinking Corruption Norms and their International Applicability

To Ban International Vote Buying? Rethinking Corruption Norms and their International Applicability

Isaac FreedmanGeorgetown University

Abstract: This paper explores the understudied norms that characterize the field of international vote buying and asks if the international community should support a ban of the practice.Three traditional arguments against domestic vote buying – equality, efficiency and inalienability – are analyzed and applied internationally. I find that each is premised on non-transferable assumptions and is not applicable to the international arena. Using an analogy from the domestic level, this paper proceeds to offer an alternative conception of international vote buying as a legitimate practice akin to the legal vote trades politicians make within domestic governments. Since there is no international public good to which sovereign states are accountable, the international community should not condemn the practice of international vote buying.

I: Introduction

On 29 November 1990 the United Nations Security Council

passed Resolution 678 twelve votes to two, authorizing United

States-led military force to stop Iraq from invading Kuwait. In

the months leading up to the vote, the US spent its time lobbying

other members of the UN Security Council to support its proposal.

In fact, it used its dominant position in the International

Monetary Fund and World Bank as well as its own bilateral aid to

coerce and entice other countries. For example, it offered an

undisclosed amount of military equipment as well as millions of

dollars in debt forgiveness to the Democratic Republic of the

Congo. In return, the US received not only an affirmative vote

from the DRC but also preferential treatment when it was

President of the Council: the DRC refused to convene a meeting to

discus US military tactics at the bequest of other Council

members. Indeed, the US withheld $70 million in aid from Yemen,

who did not receive an IMF loan for six years. The US told Yemen

that it was the costliest decision they’ve ever made. 1 November

1990 was not an isolated incident.

Significant evidence suggests that international vote buying

(IVB) occurs in a variety of institutions with many countries

participating.2 I define IVB as a transaction that occurs when a

state bestows or threatens to withdraw a benefit from another

state in exchange for a state’s vote in an election in an

international organization. It is important to note that

throughout the paper the term IVB describes a process by which

one international political actor uses material inducements to

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persuade another actor to vote a certain way. It is not used

pejoratively as it is in the domestic setting. Such a moral

stigma casts a dark shadow on the practice internationally, but

does not offer a simple solution. Should it be morally condemned

and banned in the international arena? Or, is it fundamentally

different from the types of vote buying prohibited domestically?

In order for the domestic prohibition to apply internationally,

the rationales supporting its ban must also apply to the

international setting.

This paper explores three common arguments against domestic

vote buying – equality, efficiency and inalienability – and

transposes them onto the international arena. It discovers, based

on the non-transferability of the assumptions each argument

makes, that all three of these rationales cannot support a ban on

the practice. Rather than end the discussion at that point,

however, the paper proceeds to offer an alternative conception of

IVB as permissible using an analogy from the domestic level. IVB

is akin to the legitimate and legal vote trades political

officials frequently make within the government itself. I define

a political official as a member of the government that exercises

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not only regulatory, but also political power. Behind the

comparison is the condition of anarchy that characterizes both

the government itself – there is no third party that can enforce

rules between political officials – and the international arena.

Anarchy means that as long as public channels conduct the IVB and

the benefits of the practice accrue to the general citizenry of a

country, it should not be banned.

Vote buying and the larger field of corruption are usually

considered and studied from a horizontal, society-to-society

viewpoint. This paper, in contrast, shifts the spotlight to the

vertical society-to-international perspective. It suggests that the

public-private line of separation may not only differ from

society-to-society, but that it may change altogether when we

shift our focus from society to the international arena.

The paper proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the relevant

literature on IVB and shows how and where this paper fits within

that literature. Part III provides empirical evidence – both

statistical and anecdotal – of IVB. Part IV analyzes the

applicability of the traditional domestic rationales against vote

buying to the international arena. Part V contains the core

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argument: a proposal for an alternative way of examining vote

buying internationally by applying an analogy from the domestic

setting. Part VI concludes the paper and offers some general

implications of this work for the field of political corruption.

II: Presenting a New Framework for International Vote Buying

This paper presents a new way of perceiving the understudied

field of international vote buying. The majority of the

literature addresses the topic indirectly from two perspectives –

neither of which provides a clear direction to this paper’s

overarching normative focus. The relatively recent international

political economy literature treats IVB as an understudied

political economic phenomenon in which states trade to attain

certain foreign policy goals. Older work, which studies vote

buying in the domestic setting, is extensive. It, however,

altogether lacks application of its analysis to the international

arena. Only three scholars have directly touched on the subject

from a normative perspective and attempt to apply this extensive

literature internationally.

On one side of the debate is Gillespie, who in a 2004 study

of the International Whaling Commission, argues that IVB should

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be banned because it is not in “good faith, good neighbourliness,

or any form of reasonable diplomatic practice.”3 Gillespie’s

bases his argument on an assumption that vote buying is corrupt

because it destroys the foundation of democracy. Since, he

believes, “the international arena is… predicated on principles

that are very similar to those in democratic domestic systems”,

the same rationales apply.4 IVB undermines international

democracy by introducing corrupt practices to the system and

preventing countries from expressing their own position. But

while vote buying as a form of corruption does weaken democracy

domestically, it is incorrect to assume that the same principles

govern the domestic and international structure. International

relations scholars have pointed out for decades that the

fundamental “ordering principles” of international and domestic

systems are different,5 and Gillespie’s understanding makes no

mention of this.

On the other side of the debate is Ofer Eldar who argues

that IVB may be net welfare positive.6 For the majority of the

cases he analyzes, IVB generates important benefits with only

minimal costs. But it is important to recognize that in contrast

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to Gillespie’s assumption that the international and domestic

arenas are very similar, Eldar assumes that the principles

governing each arena are different. That is, there is nothing

fundamentally wrong about vote buying like there is domestically.

In doing so, Eldar avoids many of the fundamental arguments

against vote buying, such as equality or inalienability in the

domestic area.

In the middle of the debate is Natalie Lockwood, who

provides a new normative framework.7 Rather than taking a strong

position, Lockwood chooses to complicate the debate by examining

existing domestic rationales against vote buying. Asking if these

rationales apply to the international order, she finds that

certain rationales are more easily transferable than others, but

there are still important differences that prevent the complete

adoption of the even the more favorable rationales. The different

institutional structure of the international system is critical:

“Domestic voting is simpler… it takes place in settings that are

institutionally well-delineated.”8 States and institutions in the

international order play many different roles. Unlike the

domestic system, there are not citizens, legislators, judges and

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an executive. States and organizations act in different

capacities in different circumstances. Nevertheless, Lockwood

leaves support for an international adoption of a ban on IVB to

the reader. This paper fits within the aforementioned literature

by taking Lockwood’s analysis a step further and attempting to

answer her question – left to us, the readers – of whether IVB

should be illegal.

III: Empirical Evidence of International Vote Buying

There is a mounting body of evidence on international vote

buying which finds that vote buying is conducted in a variety of

international institutions including the UN Security Council, the

UN General Assembly, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade

Organization, and bilateral aid. The research finds that Western

countries use their dominant position in the IMF, World Bank, and

World Trade Organization to achieve certain desired outcomes in

the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

In a study of 97 countries from 1984-2005, Kilby finds

evidence that the WB focuses less on a country’s macroeconomic

conditions when determining structural adjustment loan

disbursements if that country is aligned with the US on important

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UN votes.9 Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele find significant

statistical evidence, using panel data for 143 countries, that

the US bilateral aid, particularly as general budget support and

untied grants, buys votes in the UN General Assembly.10 In a

study of 157 countries over the years 1970-2004, Dreher, Sturm &

Vreeland find a robust positive statistical relationship between

temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of

projects a country receives from the World Bank.11 Dreher, Sturm

& Vreeland also find a robust positive relationship between

temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF

programs and the conditionality of IMF loans.12 Temporary

countries on the UNSC have less strict conditions attached to

their loans. In a later study, focusing on rewards and

punishments for actual voting behavior in the UN Security

Council, Dreher and Vreeland find a similar relationship. They

explain:

Voting with the US is rewarded and voting against the US is punished. The substantive effect of voting with the US is statistically significant, but small… voting against the US is also statistically significant, and larger – by an order of magnitude… the United States uses its influence at the IMF to buy votes on the UN Security Council.13

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Statistical studies, rather than descriptive analyses, tend to

better identify these trades since the trades are, by their very

nature, secretive.

Nevertheless, there are a few public cases. In the months

leading up to the vote on UN Resolution 1483, which granted the

US and the UK the right to occupy Iraq, the US leveraged billions

of dollars in foreign aid and access to the US economy. To

support the United States, the UN offered Turkey a $15 billion

trade package. Pakistan received a new loan from the IMF of which

the US has the largest voting share; and Bulgaria was granted the

title of “market economy” to protect itself from dumping

allegations by US businesses. Countries that withheld support,

such as Chile who had delayed approval processes for free trade

agreements, were punished. In another example, Iran paid the

Solomon Islands almost a quarter of a million dollars for future

UN General Assembly votes against Israel.

Why do countries participate in IVB? The benefits for

developing countries are relatively straightforward compared to

developed countries. On the one hand, bilateral aid and

development loans from the World Bank can help improve domestic

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infrastructure and living conditions. Developing countries in the

midst of balance of payments crises us structural adjustment

loans from the IMF. Developed countries, on the other hand, gain

international legitimacy. As Dreher and Vreeland write, “The

power of the UNSC is… to legitimate hostile actions that states may

take against each other ... to persuade some people because of

its moral force and to credibly signal information about the

severity of global security threats.”14 Recognizing that IVB does

occur, the next part of the paper applies domestic rationales

against vote buying to the international setting, asking whether

these rationales are, in fact, internationally applicable.

IV: Domestic Rationales against Vote Buying

This section applies domestic rationales to the

international area. The motivation for this comes from recent

work by US legal scholars that continue to find similarities

between the way that norms and laws function in the domestic and

international setting. As Martha Finnemore explains, scholars in

field of IR “generally assumed that the existence of a coercive

state able to enforce laws made domestic order very different

from international order.”15 That is, the condition of anarchy

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implied the inapplicability of domestic norms. But recent legal

work, emphasizing the importance of norms on social behavior in

domestic settings, has shown that “the processes through which…

norms work domestically… are entirely consistent with the

research done by scholars in IR and suggest that IR norms

research might also learn from domestic analogies.”16

Which domestic analogies are worth considering? In 1982, the

US Supreme Court in Brown vs. Hartlage decided that the law

“prohibits a political candidate from giving, or promising to

give, anything of value to a voter in exchange for his vote or

support… [Since] no body politic worthy of being called a

democracy entrusts the selection of leaders to a process of

auction or barter.”17 It does seem intuitive that a ban against

vote buying exists in at the domestic level.18 Buying and selling

votes violates the electoral principles upon which democracies

are based. In contrast to a comprehensive review of all domestic

rationales, I focus here on the three traditional normative

rationales: equality, efficiency and inalienability.19 Each

rationale addresses different dimensions of the international

setting and utilizes separate insights to reinforce the claim

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that domestic vote buying is wrong. In this part of the paper,

rather than questioning each rationale’s soundness at the

domestic level, I first assume that the domestic rationale holds,

and then consider if it is applicable at the international level.

Ultimately, I find that none of the existing rationales against

vote buying domestically can be compellingly applied to the

international arena.

Equality

Domestic Equality Rationale

General economic theory grounds the domestic equality

argument against vote buying. The principle of the declining

marginal utility of money states that a dollar is worth more to a

poor person than it is to a rich person.20 As a person

accumulates more dollars, each dollar becomes less valuable. A

few dollars to poor person may put some food on the table, but a

few dollars is not worth much to a rich person with millions.

Accordingly, the value of the sum of money paid for a vote – the

marginal benefit of a vote – will be worth more to the poor than

to the rich, while the cost – or value lost – of purchasing the

vote will be less to the rich than the poor. In a free and

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competitive marketplace, the rich will have an incentive to buy

votes and the poor will have an incentive to sell votes. As such,

the rich will control a disproportionate number of votes, elect a

candidate that best promotes their interest, and skew the

political system in their favor thereby distorting political

equality, or as Richard Hasen puts it, a condition of

“egalitarian pluralism” in which “each person has roughly equal

political capital regardless of preexisting disparities in

wealth, education, celebrity, ability or other attributes.”21 As

Susan Rose-Ackerman notes, “vote selling is widely recognized to

be inconsistent with egalitarian democratic principles because it

biases political decisions in favor of the wealthy.”22

Underlying Assumptions of the Equality Rationale23

Assumption 1: The existence of economic and social inequality

In order for the rich to buy the votes of the poor, there

must be both a rich and a poor class. Levmore suggests that

accepting this assumption may weaken the equality argument, since

“if we could correct for wealth differentials, vote selling would

surely be more attractive to many observers.”24 But this

counterargument is questionable at best since there are many

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different traits that may distinguish one group of people from

another. Even if wealth were approximately equal across voters,

many of the same negative results of buying would still exist.

For example, some voters – for whatever reason, including

education, upbringing, etc. – will be more apathetic than others,

and the marginal value of a vote will be less to them. With legal

vote buying, but equal wealth, this individual would have an

incentive to sell their vote to another who values it more. While

this would not lead to political inequality on the basis of

wealth, it would lead to an unequal distribution of political

power based on the capacities Hasen identifies in his definition

of political equality.25 Thus, there need be some degree of

inequality between people.

Assumption 2: Political inequality is normatively wrong

In modern society, a man and his neighbor are considered

political equals. While justification for the principle of

equality can be traced to the classical philosophers, the

rationale for its modern interpretation starts in the seventeenth

century as a result of natural rights and social contract

theorists. Hobbes first promulgated the idea that because men

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possess an equal capacity to inflict harm on one another, they

possess equal rights.26 Later on, Locke posited since all men are

born with and share the right of freedom and self-ownership of

their mind, body, labor, and property that they would not choose

to live in a political community unless they exercised those same

rights. 27 The categorical imperative, introduced by Kant, treats

all men as equal and deserving of the same respect and dignity.

This principle of political equality crystalized in 1789 with the

French Revolution and is now “accepted as a minimum standard

throughout mainstream Western culture.”28 In 1946, it was

enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. The point is that no individual’s ability to

differentiate between what is good and what is bad – the essence

of voting – is more or less worthy than another’s.

International Applicability of the Domestic Equality Rationale

First, it is necessary to point out that the principle of

political equality can apply to the international arena. That is,

it is entirely possible to substitute “state” for “person” in

Hasen’s definition of political equality and arrive at a suitable

international definition: “it is a condition of egalitarian

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pluralism in which each [state] has roughly equal political

capital regardless of preexisting disparities in wealth,

education, celebrity, ability or other attributes.”29 While some

of these characteristics (celebrity status) are less applicable,

other attributes may be more applicable, such as population size

and natural resources. Each state, according to an

internationally altered conception of political equality, would

be entitled to roughly the same political influence within

international organizations. Whether this should be the case is up

for debate.

Applicability of Assumption 1: Holds

That there is inequality and specifically varying degrees of

wealth – the first assumption – holds. States vary widely in

regard to factors such as wealth, natural resource endowments,

population size and geography, to name a few. Rich states have

higher Gross Domestic Product than poor states. Rich states could

gain a disproportionate influence in international decisions as

they use that wealth to buy poorer states’ votes, since poor

states will value payments for votes more than the rich due to

the same principle of declining marginal utility of money. As

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such, poor states have an incentive to sell their votes to the

rich for a certain benefit, and will consequentially end up with

an unequal amount of power in international institutions.30

Applicability of Assumption 2: Does not hold

The second assumption – that political inequality in voting

is wrong – does not hold in the international system. Indeed, for

many, the 1648 Treaty of Westminster marked the point at which

sovereign equality originated as the prevailing principle in the

international arena. International relations theorists assume

that after this point the principle maintained its significance

and prevalence. For example, Stephan Krasner believes the

“historical legacy of the development of the state system has

left a powerful institutional structure (sovereignty), one that

will not be dislodged easily, regardless of changed circumstances

in the material environment.”31 This idea is also emphasized as

the starting point from which the idea of anarchy evolves – the

primary condition governing the international order. Each state

must support itself in a self-help world. 32 This right of each

state to dictate what happens within its borders is known as the

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legal principle of sovereign equality and it was enshrined in the

United Nations. 33

But as Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin point out, these legal

conceptions of sovereign equality do not necessarily imply

political equality.34 While as a legal term, sovereign equality

has not changed since 1648, as a political concept it has evolved

considerably. There has been a historical tension between

sovereignty claimed by states and nations. Context and relevant

political actors have over time determined how the term

“sovereign equality” should be understood - “the concept is

neither fixed nor constant.”35

The principle of equality is so variable that in terms of

voting in international organizations it is a principle of

inequality. The more powerful a state, the more power it wields

in international organizations. For example, despite the

principle of one state, one vote in the UN General Assembly, the

members of the UN Security Council wield a disproportionate

amount of power. In addition, while this power structure may

appear out of date, a relic of World War II, Jeffrey Dunoff

points out that after the first Gulf War the UN Security Council

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still gained considerable power and importance in the

international arena.36

Moreover, voting power in international economic and

financial organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank and regional

development banks, is based on relative weighted voting

procedures, which take into account the comparative size of each

participating countries economy and their individual contribution

to the organization’s overall funds.37 As Stephen Zamora writes,

“international economic organizations are reflections of the

economic order, determined by – not determining – economic

realities. An international economic organization that does not

reflect actual economic forces in its operations as well as in

its decision making processes, has little promise as an active,

effective agency.”38

Finally, the behavior of states questions whether states

should morally have political equality when voting in

international organizations akin to the notion that individuals

who vote in domestic institutions should morally have political

equality. States are not persons; rather, they are made up of

persons. It is inconsistent, if we accept the person of

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individual political equality, to simultaneously grant states

political equality. What happens when states violate individual

political equality? Should we condemn the state, or assume it is

the political equal of all other states – that it can do as it

wishes?39 From Kosovo to Libya, the principle of human equality

has compelled states to violate the doctrine of sovereign

equality by intervening within another state’s borders. As Dunoff

concludes,

States are not bearers of any inherent value, but exist only for the benefit of individuals within the state. Hence, norms protecting, the sovereign equality of failed or rogue states, such as rules of nonintervention, increasingly appear out of date, and an international legal order premised on them increasingly illegitimate.40

Efficiency

Domestic Efficiency Rationale

The efficiency argument against vote buying considers the

contribution to overall social welfare from the practice of vote

buying and concludes that the practice decreases rather than

increases overall social welfare. It is first important to

understand the lens typically used to determine the social

welfare benefits and costs of policies – Kaldor-Hicks

efficiency.41 Under Kaldor-Hicks efficient laws, winners are

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able, but not necessarily required, to compensate the losers of a

policy. For comparison pareto-efficiency, a similar concept but

with more stringent standards, requires compensation for the

losers. In our case, the legalization of vote buying would be

Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if those who benefited from

the practice could compensate the losers.

The problem with vote buying, however, is that the very

nature of the practice causes it to be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient.

Those who benefit from the practice do so with the intention of

neglecting those who lose out. As Richard Epstein points out,

“Why would one want to purchase a vote? The most probable answer

is to obtain control of the public machinery in ways that allow a

person to recover, at the very least, the money that was paid out

to the individuals who sold their votes, with something left to

compensate the buyer for the labor and entrepreneurial risk.”42

The vote itself is worthless to the buyer unless it grants

political access. Those in control of the government modify the

distribution of goods in way that maximizes only their

preferences. In addition, there are “externalities imposed by

successful candidates who loot the public fisc to pay for the

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votes they have bought.”43

Underlying Assumptions of the Domestic Efficiency Rationale

Assumption 1: Legal vote buying implies Kaldor-Hicks inefficiency

Similar to the equality argument against vote buying, there

are two assumptions on which this argument is based. First, the

enacted policies will tend to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient in places

where vote buying is illegal, while the policies in places where

it is legal will tend to be inefficient. For example, we could

create a scenario in which domestic vote buying might create

Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes. Suppose a legislature proposed a

Kaldor-Hicks inefficient bill. If vote buying were legal, those

opposed to the bill could organize and buy the votes of those who

are indifferent. As long as the negative social welfare costs of

the vote buying were lower than the negative costs of the

inefficient bill, the practice of vote buying would be Kaldor-

Hicks efficient. Thus, “the efficiency argument depends upon an

unstated empirical assumption that there would be less rent

seeking [Kaldor-Hicks inefficient laws] in a political regime

without vote buying than there would be in a regime with vote

buying.”44

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Assumption 2: The majority of decisions are preference decisions

The second assumption is that most of the decisions and

policies that an institution promulgates are preference decisions

in which a socially optimal common good can be ascertained. That

is, a common indicator with a standard measure of value, such as

a dollar, can systematically analyze its costs and benefits.

Various government organizations in the US do this today by

analyzing the domestic costs and benefits of government policies

and regulations.45 Using the dollar as a unit of value, while not

perfect in theory, works in practice because it is based on the

economic theory of cardinal preferences. This theory calculates and

compares utility across individuals. Theoretically, under this

theory, social welfare maximization can be empirically

determined.46

In contrast are judgments decisions, in which individual

preferences, called ordinal preferences, are neither observable nor

comparable, and are based on value judgments. Institutional

decisions are not calculated and are instead subject to one’s

opinion. As such, these are considered noncomparable preferences.

Kenneth Arrow argues against the possibility of an ordinally

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ranked social welfare model by proving the incompatibility of

several basic economic assumptions.47

International Applicability of the Domestic Efficiency Rationale

Applicability of Assumption 1: Does not hold

The first assumption – that places where vote buying is

illegal are more Kaldor-Hicks efficient - does not hold in the

international arena. Eldar’s analysis, while not exhaustive, is

thorough in terms of the variety and number of institutions he

covers as well as the exchanges he evaluates. He analyzes the

effect of vote buying in the Security Council, the General

Assembly, the World Trade Organization, and the International

Whaling Commission. Because IVB is legal, he asks if this status

quo has facilitated social welfare maximization or if it has

limited it. Ultimately, he finds that decisions made as result of

vote buying are generally in favor of the collective good, while

the effect of those that are not clearly in favor of the

collective good depends, for the most part, on one’s view of the

collective good. Far from inefficient, “there is not one clear

case where [IVB] has reduced global welfare, and there is

substantial evidence that [IVB] can generate benefits.”48 In the

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international arena, vote buying is legal and it appears to

generate Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes.

Applicability of Assumption 2: Does not hold

Assumption 2 – that the majority of decisions are preference

decisions – does not hold either. In regard to the international

arena, countries make preference decisions based on self-interest

when deciding matters related to trade. With judgment decisions,

in contrast, participants are expected to identify and vote

according to the common good – what will benefit the majority of

countries and peoples. Judgment decisions, however, cover the

majority of international decisions and treaties. These decisions

are also made by those organizations where vote buying has

allegedly taken place.49 The point is that the process of common

good identification in judgment decisions is a disputed matter.

As Eldar points out, “any view as to the effects of vote-trading

depends on which view of the collective good is adopted.”50 Thus,

while the effect of IVB on social welfare is not clear and

perhaps net positive, because the majority of decisions made in

international organizations are judgment based and not

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preference, the efficiency rationale against vote buying is not

applicable to the international arena.

Inalienability

Domestic Inalienability Rationale

The alienability argument against vote buying is the most

intuitive rationale. As Rose-Ackerman points out, voting, nearly

universally, is considered an inalienable right. It “need not be

exercised, but the right cannot be sold or given away and some

uses may be forbidden.”51 Margaret Radin believes even as an

inalienable right voting implies “moral or political duties

related to a community’s normative life… subject to broader

inalienabilities that preclude loss as well as transfer.” 52 The

voter performs of abstains from, but does not sell, this implied

act. Moreover, Radin argues that voting rights are

“nontransferable rights that at the same time may implicate

affirmative duties.” She situates them in the category of

community-inalienability. Her claim is non-instrumentalist and

normative, although it is not extensively developed.53 Tsilly

Dagan and Talia Fisher take the point one step further, arguing

that converting votes to dollars “seems to fundamentally

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contradict the essence of what it means to be a part of a

democratic society… voting is not only about preference

satisfaction or personal gain, but also about the realization of

one’s civic personhood.”54

Finally, Michael Sandel takes an even stronger stance,

arguing that the “republican conception of citizenship” rejects

democracy as the aggregation of people’s preferences and the

translation of them into policies. Instead, he believes that this

market model does not belong in democratic politics. The

political institutions where decision-making in democracies

occurs consist of “the moral and civic goods that markets do not

honor and money cannot buy.” 55 Indeed, “commodification corrupts

the good of self-government.”56 The point is, as Karlan notes,

that prohibitions against vote buying, from the viewpoint of the

inalienability argument, are “best justified as protecting the

integrity of the political process rather than the autonomy of

individual voters.”57

Assumption 1: Existence of citizenship-based democracy

The arguments surrounding the inalienability rationale rely

on an assumption that vote buying is wrong in citizenship-based

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democracies. Voting buying is not wrong, for example, in a

variety of cases of corporate governance in firm elections

because these votes are exercised in a business-centered arena in

which vote buying may be beneficial to the firm.58 It is not that

votes in general are inalienable, but rather that votes in

citizenship-based democracies are inalienable because they weaken

the moral and political fiber of democracies.

International Applicability of the Domestic Inalienability

Rationale

Applicability of Assumption 1: Does not hold

The inalienability rationale neglects the fundamental

difference in international systems that international relations

scholars have pointed out for decades – that there is a

fundamental difference in the “ordering principles.” There is no

higher political order in the international arena. There is no

world-government in which states participate. As Kenneth Waltz

has argued:

Domestic politics is hierarchically ordered. The units – institutions

29

and agencies – stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination… International systems are decentralized and anarchic. Domestic political structures have government institutions and offices as their concrete counterparts. International politics, in contrast, hasbeen called “politics in the absence of government.59

This is anarchy, not democracy. The different ordering principle

of the international arena creates different incentives for

actors. The relative power of states is critical to affect

decisions in the international arena. Of course, there are times

when a third state can act as an intermediary and broker

arrangements between other parties. But the permanence of that

agreement depends on that third states ability to enforce the

agreement with force or the threat of it.

Furthermore, states do not depend on one another in the same

sense that citizens must depend on and trust their fellow

citizens. In the domestic realm, citizens consistently rely on

other citizens for their protection and security. When in

trouble, citizens can call emergency services and expect a police

officer, fireman or paramedic to show up to help. Judges –

whether in county courts, federal courts, or the Supreme Court –

arbitrate disputes and apply the laws to specific cases. We trust

other citizens to uphold the principles of democracy. In

30

contrast, as John Mearsheimer points out, in the international

arena all states must be perceived as a threat: “Because there is

no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911,

states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state

tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it

aims to provide for its own survival.”60

V: Rethinking Vote Buying in the International Setting

I have identified various rationales for when vote buying is

impermissible domestically. But because these traditional

domestic rationales are inapplicable at the international level,

it may be worthwhile to consider that IVB should be permissible.

To do this, I turn to the domestic arena and locate norms that

support the buying and selling of votes. Determining reasons

behind vote buying norms that exist domestically in these

institutional settings might shed light on the norms surrounding

IVB. Because IVB involves states run by regime-based institutions

not individuals, I shift the domestic focus from the existing

literature’s focus on individuals to institutions. This approach

includes inter-institutional vote buying as well as intra-

institutional vote buying. In both of these cases, the individual

31

is still the level of analysis, the difference being that the

individual is in an institutional role as an elected political

official. This approach is more analogous to the international

setting.

Buying votes in quid pro quo exchanges is not an absent

practice in the domestic arena. Scholars consider this the

“principal-agent paradox” of vote buying. Legislators, as the

voter’s agent, are permitted to engage in vote trades with other

legislators while the voter, the principal, is not permitted to

exchange his vote for a benefit.61 As Kochin and Kochin write,

“Votes are not for sale by voters: instead, voters assign them to

agents who sell them on their behalf.”62 Indeed, logrolling is

legal and is the norm in legislatures across the globe.63 It can

even involve inter-branch vote trading as well. For example,

former President Bill Clinton, in order to secure ratification

for the North American Free Trade Agreement, “bought” votes for

millions of dollars. Former Representative Gerry Studds of

Massachusetts reportedly sold his vote to the former President

for $1.2 billion in maritime subsidies, approximately $50 million

of which were directed to a shipyard in his congressional

32

district. In fact, a Clinton official was even quoted at the time

as saying, “The store is open as far as the White House is

concerned.”64

There is a similar and related puzzle involved, which Karlan

considers the “wholesale-retail paradox.”65 Candidates are

legally prohibited at the “retail level” from paying voters to

vote for them, but at the “wholesale level” they can promise

particular benefits, akin to buying votes, to their constituents

if elected. For example, candidates in elections can promise

economic benefits to their constituents, preferential access to

government, and the provision of public services and goods, all

of which are much greater than the small lump sums voters receive

in traditional vote buying schemes. The nature of traditional vote

buying – as private arrangements outside the domain of the normal

processes of government – makes it wrong. As Karlan writes, it is

the act of selling a vote at the retail level that places an

individual’s interest above that of the collective good:

The right to vote is not given to an individual solely for his or her own benefit…. Voters also occupy a position of public trust, and their votes are thus not simply theirs to sell. Because voting is a public function… the worth of an individual's vote to the community as a whole may exceed the worth of the vote to that individual.66

33

In 1982 the US Supreme Court held up the wholesale-retail

paradox. 67 The case Brown vs. Hartlage involved the August 1979

election for County Commissioner in Jefferson County, Kentucky.

Candidate Carl Brown and Bill Creech promised to county voters

that if elected they would considerably lower their salary to

save taxpayers money. Soon after, they both found that their

promises violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act and they

retracted their statements.68 Nevertheless, Brown went on to

defeat his opponent Hartlage, who decided to bring the case to

court. He argued that the result of the election should be

nullified because of Brown’s retracted but nevertheless illegal

campaign promise. The US Supreme Court ruled in Brown’s favor:

restricting promises made by candidates to voters during the

normal campaign processes should be subject to strict scrutiny.69

More importantly, though, the Court ruled that exchanges are

permissible as long as “the hoped-for personal benefit is to be

achieved through the normal processes of government, and not through

some private arrangement.”70 That is, the exchange must be “made

openly, subject to the comment and criticism of his political

opponent and to the scrutiny of the voters.”71 Public coffers

34

must be the source of the funds for the exchange. The benefit

must come once public officials, through the normal processes of

government, approve it. Finally, the benefits must extend to

those who voted for or against a candidate. “The common thread

uniting these factors,” Pamela Karlan points out, “is their

emphasis on ‘public’…Voters and opponents who are aware of an issue

are better able to debate it and evaluate its relevance.”72

Clearly, this decision is applicable to the principal-agent

paradox as well. Vote trading among politicians who act as agents

of individual voters is not only beneficial to society, as James

Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argue, but is also legitimate and

legal because it occurs publicly through normal government

processes.73

Herein lies the central argument of this paper: interactions

between states in the anarchic international arena can be thought

of as akin to vote trades between political officials within the

government itself.74 States, like politicians, are responsible

to their constituents and are incentivized to advocate on their

behalf and promote their interests. Indeed, there are several

35

striking similarities between domestic and international vote

trading that deserve further attention.

First, both arenas contain a relatively small number of actors

casting votes compared to the number of citizens that participate

in general elections. Initially, this may appear to undermine the

acceptability of vote-buying – since votes are worth more, the

value of a vote increases, thereby making the payoff of the

purchase of a vote more valuable and the occurrence more

frequent. In turn, this might lead to a perverse incentive toward

vote buying that over time could devalue the deliberative

processes of institutions.75 But as Kochin and Kochin show, the

opposite actually appears to be true. In small electorates the

cost of overcoming the collective action problem to block a

proposal is low and typically manageable.76 In large electorates,

however, the cost to individual actors of organizing and blocking

a proposal is high and often insurmountable. Vote buying at the

citizen level is banned to protect voters from the high costs of

organization that would be necessary to block a harmful proposal.

Vote trading within legislatures and the international arena is

acceptable because it contains fewer participants.

36

Second, both domains carry negative perceptions of the

phenomena. In the domestic arena, logrolling is one of the most

frequent types of exchanges, but it seldom occurs publicly for

fear of public retribution. 77 As James Buchanan and Gordon

Tullock point out, “with relatively few exceptions logrolling

phenomena have been viewed as deviations from the orderly working

of the democratic process.”78 Focusing on its moral stigma,

William Riker and Stephan Brams continue, “The conventional

judgment on vote trading in legislatures is one of severe

disapproval… the word has always had pejorative connotations.”79

Vreeland and Dreher find that the same is true internationally.

Paraphrasing an interview with former Ambassador John Bolton,

they write: “Explicit public deals are extraordinarily rare, and,

in reality, the public tends to be unaware of specific vote-aid

trades… even if a diplomat wanted to make bald-faced trades of

aid for political support, he would not dare because they would

leak to the press.”80

Despite the perception of vote trading as immoral, Gordon and

Tullock argue that the gains from vote exchanges between

politicians is a beneficial and rightfully legal part of the

37

workings of domestic politics.81 It permits the expression of

preference intensity. For example, representatives of elderly

districts are more concerned with entitlements than foreign

policy issues. Consequentially, “politicians promise higher

Social Security and Medicare benefits when talking to the

elderly, rather than discuss the merits and defects of foreign

aid.”82 Indeed, this argument can be extrapolated to the

international arena. Based on their needs, countries will have

varying preferences on different issues. Vreeland and Dreher

point to the preferences of Zimbabwe: “Rather than worry about

issues of international security, this government cares more

about domestic political issues. It does not value a powerful

voice on issues of global security – this government would prefer

foreign aid from the global community.” In both cases, vote

trades make each actor better off.

Both political officials and states have a limited toolkit to

use to promote their interests. Vreeland and Dreher, in an

interview for their book, note that former US Secretary of State

Madeline Albright described seeing “nothing wrong with [an]

attempt to use foreign aid to entice a country to vote with the

38

United States. As she aptly puts it, ‘There’s not a lot in the

toolbox’ that practitioners can use to pursue foreign policy

goals.”83 Disputes in the anarchic international arena are

political in their character and resolution. No exogenous party

can enforce resolutions. Indeed, this understanding hints at Hans

Morgenthau’s theory of international politics proposed more than

half a century ago: politics is a unique realm in which normative

considerations about right and wrong are not applicable.84

In the international setting, political economic trades

involve private benefits only insofar as a state is a considered

a private entity. But for this to be true, public entities must

also exist. In contrast to how domestic states create a public

realm of government over their territory, no international

institution can or does claim to act on behalf of all countries

and citizens.85 Indeed, as Bruno Frey remarks, it would be a

grave “mistake to assume that [international institutions]

maximize the collective economic welfare either of the

individuals of a particular country or of the world as a

whole.”86

39

The analogous cases of domestic and international vote

trading suggest that IVB should be permissible as long as it

follows the general contours of domestic vote trading. As long as

exchanges are public and not based on private arrangements,

trades between states are perfectly legitimate tools of foreign

policy. In contrast, exchanges are wrong when they involve one

state’s public funds that are directed at the private pocket of a

political leader for a vote in an international organization.

Exchanges that involve private goods from the agent of one state

to another are also wrong.

This indeed implies that exchanges between democracies and

authoritarian regimes should be evaluated carefully. Trades that

enrich a dictator or an elite group without benefitting the

broader citizenry should not occur. Since this IVB is vote

buying, not trading – that is, when it involves the private

pockets of political officials in other countries – it is wrong.

Trades between two democracies or involving a country that is

expected to use the received goods to benefit its citizenry

should occur and be viewed under a favorable light.

40

International institutions of governance do not serve the

same purpose as domestic governments. Limiting the means of

influencing another country to align with domestic expectations

could jeopardize a country’s interests. The negative effects of

vote buying current laws are intended to prohibit domestically

are based on conceptions of institutions that are different from

how we perceive the role of institutions internationally.

VI: Conclusion: International Vote Buying is Not Corruption

Here, I conclude the paper and offer its implications on the

wider field of corruption. This paper explored three traditional

arguments against domestic vote buying – equality, efficiency and

inalienability – and applied them to the international arena. It

found that each rationale does not support a ban on international

vote buying. The paper then proceeded to offer an alternative

conception of IVB as permissible by using an analogy from the

domestic arena. IVB is akin to the legitimate and legal vote

trades political officials frequently make within the government

itself. It should not be banned if it is conducted through public

41

channels and the benefits of the practice accrue to the general

citizenry (not the leaders or elites) of a country.

This conclusion implies that the factor separating

legitimate vote buying from illegitimate vote buying is the

concept of corruption. Prohibitions on vote buying are in place

to prevent individual voters from exchanging a public good (their

vote) for a private benefit – cash in their pocket. Vote trades

occur in the public realm where no public-for-private gain

exists. Friedrich has argued that corruption is “deviant behavior

associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private

gain at public expense.”87 Friedrich’s conception is broad but

gets to the heart of corruption’s wrongness: it raises the self-

interest of a particular actor over and above the public

interest. The international system, however, is devoid of a

private-public delineation. States, as actors, are sovereign. To

whom are they accountable, other than to themselves, and to what

public good are they supposedly answerable, or expected to

uphold? Without the concept of accountability, contemporary

notions of corruption do not apply. The international arena is

42

not a democracy. International vote buying should not be

prohibited.

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52

1 See James R. Vreeland and Axel Dreher, Money and Politics on the International Stage: The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council (Submitted for Review to Cambridge University Press, 2014), 126-128. [Hereinafter Money and Politics]2 See Part III of this paper for a comprehensive overview of the evidence. 3 See Alexander Gillespie, "Good Governance, Corruption & Vote Buying in International Forum," New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 1 (2004). 121. [Hereinafter“Good Governance”]4 See Ibid., 104.5 See below for more discussion of on the Inalienability Rationale against Vote Buying and its inapplicability to the international arena.6 See O. Eldar, "Vote-trading in International Institutions," European Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2008).7 See Natalie J. Lockwood, "International Vote Buying," Harvard International Law Review 54, no. 1 (2013): 97-156.8 See Ibid., 151.9 See Christopher Kilby, "The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World Bank Loan Disbursements☆," Journal of Development Economics 89, no. 1 (2009): 51-61.10 See Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele, "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis," Public Choice 136, no. 1-2 (2008): 139-64.11 See Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland, "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?," Journal of Development Economics 88, no. 1 (2009): 1-18.12 See Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland, "Global Horse Trading:IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review 53, no. 7 (2009): 742-57.13 See Axel Dreher and James R. Vreeland, "Buying Votes and International Organizations," Mortara Center for International Studies Working Paper, May 2011: 21.14 Dreher and Vreeland, Money and Politics, 4.15 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and PoliticalChange," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 893.16 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and PoliticalChange," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 893.17 Brown vs. Hartlage 456 U.S. 45 (April 5, 1982).18 While there seems to be an innate distaste for vote buying in general, there arealso reasons to think that vote buying should not be banned. As Hasen points out, “The ban conflicts with the traditional rule that two competent and willing partiesshould be able to engage in transactions that make each better off without harming other individuals.” Should not voters be able to engage in an exchange of a vote for a good with another party if both consent to the transaction? Supporters of thepractice might contest that individuals have a right to sell their vote since it istheir property. As such, one should be able to do what one pleases with their property. While we may see vote buying as not ideal, we should not prohibit it. Others may argue that vote trading is efficient and welfare maximizing. In a competitive marketplace, voters will sell their vote only until the marginal

benefit of the good or gift received equals the marginal cost of not expressing their political opinion in an election. For example, the marginal cost of no vote – or marginal benefit of a vote – may be minimal to many citizens. It seems reasonable, then, to permit them to exchange that vote with another who places a higher marginal benefit on a vote and to receive something else that one values higher, as this type of exchange would be efficient and maximize social welfare. See Richard Hasen, "Vote Buying," California Law Review 88, no. 5 (October 2000): 1329.19 See Hasen, “Vote Buying.” 2000.20 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed. (Boston, 1998), 500-504.21 What is political equality? While there are different ways to conceptualize the term, I choose to adopt Richard Hasen’s straightforward definition for the sake of the argument. See Hasen, “Vote Buying,” 1330.22 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights”, Columbia Law Review 85, (1985): 963.23 Levmore argues that the equality argument is also based on the assumption of collective actions problems. He argues, “[I]f vote selling were legal, many entitled individuals would sell their votes at trivial prices even as these voters recognize that a large block of votes is a valuable asset. But it does no good for an individual to hold out for the value that a buyer might attach to each vote in such a block because there are many other potential sellers willing to part with their shares for some trivial price. Absent some coordination strategy, these voters reason that since others will sell at a low price rather than be left holding essentially worthless rights, they too may as well sell at a price greater than zero but far less than what might be obtained from an eager buyer if these sellers could coordinate.” Levmore’s argument implies that if the collective action problem could be overcome, it may be legitimate to legalize vote buying. I choose to not address this argument because, as Michael Kochin and Levis Kochin note, these sorts of problems do not exist with small electorates. Compared to the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people voting in domestic elections, international elections involve a couple hundred states at most. See Saul Levmore,"Voting with Intensity," Stanford Law Review 53, no. 1 (October 2000): 137; Also see Michael Kochin and Levis Kochin, "When Is Buying Votes Wrong?," Public Choice 97, no. 4 (1998).24 See Levmore, “Voting with Intensity,” 118. Also, see Rose-Ackerman who similarlypoints out, “In a direct democracy in which choices are made by unanimous consent, the buying of votes does assure choices that benefit all citizens given the existing distribution of resources. This can only be a desirable outcome, however, if the existing distribution is believed to be fair. And even this limited defense of vote selling does not survive the move to a representative system making choicesby majority rule.” Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,” 963.25Lockwood also suggests that because of this, “the equality argument has no persuasive force against vote trading, since each person is endowed with one vote.” Vote trading would, for example, consist of two individuals agreeing to both vote for a candidate in an upcoming election, if both for a candidate in a separate election. It seems plausible, however, that the inequality argument would also apply to vote trading. Vote trading may be influenced by factors other than money, such as social status,. See Lockwood, “International Vote Buying,” 124.

26 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1994; originally published in 1651).27 John Locke, The Second Treatise Of Civil Government, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980; originally published in 1690).28 See Stefan Gosepath, "Equality," Stanford University, March 27, 2001, 2.3 Moral Equality, accessed December 23, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/.29 Hasen, “Clipping Coupons for Democracy,” 6. 30 In 2012, the economy of the United States, at almost $16 trillion, was 440,000 times the size of the economy of Tuvalu, which stood at roughly $37 million. Hundreds of other countries fall somewhere in between. , A bilateral aid payment of$3.7 million would be a tiny earmark for the United States, but would represent 10%of Tuvalu’s GDP. As long as a vote in an international institution was worth more to the US than $3.7 million, which is highly likely, under the principle of one state, one vote in international institutions, there is an incentive for the US to buy the vote of Tuvalu. According to the equality argument, the domestic rationale against vote buying should apply because these disparities exist and create incentives for IVB. See "The World Factbook: Tuvalu," Central Intelligence Agency, Economy; Also see “The World Factbook: United States” Central Intelligence Agency, Economy. 31 See Stephan D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 1 (April 1988): 90.32 See Robert Art and Robert Jervis, "The Meaning of Anarchy," International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision Making, 2d ed. (1985): 5. 33 In Moscow in October, 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China assured the world of "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Of course, that was the United Nations. See New York Times, Nov. 2, 1943, p. 16, cols. 1-4.34 Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48, no. 01 (Winter 1994)35 Ibid., 109.36 See Jeffrey Dunoff, "Is Sovereign Equality Obsolete? Understanding Twenty-First Century International Organizations," Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 (2012). [Hereinafter “Is Sovereign Equality Obsolete?”]37 For example, the US wields 16.75% of the IMF’s total votes, while Tuvalu holds amere 0.03%. Antigua and Barbuda, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Maldives, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Somoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis,St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Timor-Leste, and Tonga hold 0.03% as well. The 85% threshold for the most important IMF votes gives the US an effective veto power over all decisions. In addition, some states – the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Saudi Arabia – have their own representativeon the Executive Board, which runs the day-to-day operations of the IMF. Others arerequired to elect a Director to represent the interests of a group of states. See

"IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power," International Monetary Fund. 38 Indeed, international commodities agreements, environment protocols, the International Maritime Organization, the Convention on International Civil Aviationand the International Labour Organization’s Constitution use similar weighted voting procedures. Political decisions in many international organizations are not based on the principle of political equality, but rather on each state’s unequal capacities. See Stephen Zamora, "Voting in International Economic Organizations", The American Journal of International Law 74, no. 3 (July 1980): 608.39 See Wouter Werner and Janne Nijman, "Legal Equality and the International Rule of Law," Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 (2012) for more on this point.40 Dunoff begins this excerpt with the following: “Concerns over transnational terrorism, internal conflict in failed states, and grave violations of human rightsranging from ethnic cleansing to war crimes to genocide have combined to persuade many that sovereignty-based and state-centric understandings of international law and international relations are outdated, and should be replaced with understandings grounded in a respect for human rights…” See Dunoff, “Is Sovereign Equality Obsolete?”, 110-11.See Dunoff, “Is Sovereign Equality Obsolete?”, 124. 41 See Posner, “The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 487–507. (1980) and “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.” Journal Of Legal Studies 8: 103–40. (1979); also see EdwardStrigham, "Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning," Quarterly Journal of AUS trian Economics 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001).42 See Richard Epstein, "Why Restrain Alienation?", Columbia Law Review 85 (1985): 987-8.43 See Pamela Karlan, "Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System," Virginia Law Review 80, no. 7 (October 1994): 1467. [Hereinafter“Not by Money”]44 See Hasen, “Vote Buying”, 1333.45 See Robert Hahn and Patrick Dudley, "How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?," Review of Environment Economic Policy 1 (2007).46 Social welfare maximization is possible when the effect of the majority of decisions made by an institution can be calculated with cardinal preferences. This distinction is important. If the majority of decisions are judgment decisions, thenKaldor-Hicks efficiency is not an applicable criterion to evaluate those decisions,and thus it will be ineffective at calculating the overall social welfare optimization of an institution. Certainly it can be used to assess individual policies. But because bans against vote buying apply to the election of bodies as awhole, not the type of decision made, it is necessary to consider the aggregate decisions of an institution. 47 See Kenneth Arrow, "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", Journal of Political Economy 5, 4 (August 1950), 328–346.48 See Eldar, "Vote-trading in International Institutions", 40.49 Future research might focus on other international institutions in which the majority of decisions made are preference decisions. This might include the IMF, World Bank, and other regional development banks. The only organization Eldar analyzes in which preference decisions are made is the World Trade Organization, and here the argument is focused less on vote buying and more on vote trading and

the coercive tendering tactics, such as threatening to withhold aid or IMF loans, that developed countries practice when trading votes. Moreover, Eldar points out that even in regards to the latter practices, the overall social welfare effect depends on the view one adopts toward the general impact of the World Trade Organization.50 See Eldar, "Vote-trading in International Institutions", 37.51 See Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,” 936.52 See Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, Harvard Law Review 100, (1987): 1854. 53 Cass Sunstein makes an instrumentalist argument against vote buying focusing on the importance of public-regarding voting. She believes it is wrong because of the effects it could have on the decision-making processes of individuals exercising their right to vote. Voting is not about thinking about what is in one’s economic self-interest but rather thinking about the greater good of the community. Placing a dollar value on a vote changes the way we view the voting process. It neglects Radin’s implied political and moral duties. See Cass Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law", Michigan Law Review 92, (1994): 849. 54 Tsilly Dagan and Talia Fisher, "Rights for Sale," Minnesota Law Review 96 (2011): 122.55 See Michael J. Sandel, “What Money Can‘t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets.” Address at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 21, (2000): 122. [Hereinafter “What Money Can’t Buy”]56 Also, consider Sandel’s view fully explained: “According to the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to share in self-rule. This is more than amatter of voting in elections and registering my preferences or interests. On the republican conception of citizenship, to be free is to participate in shaping the forces that govern the collective destiny. But in order to do that, and to do it well, it is necessary that citizens possess or come to acquire certain qualities ofcharacter, or civic virtues… The republican conception of citizenship… seeks to cultivate a fuller range of virtues, including a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake, a sense of obligation for one’s fellow citizens, a willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the sake of the common good, and the ability to deliberate well about common purposes and ends... Commodification corrupts the good of self-government.” See Sandel, “What Money Can‘t Buy”, 108-9.57 Karlan, “Not by Money”, 1467.58 See Hasen, “Vote Buying”; also see Kochin and Kochin, “When is Buying Votes Wrong?”.59 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub.,1979), 88.60 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 33.61 Refer to the Efficiency Rationale above for more on this argument against retailvote buying.62 See Kochin and Kochin, “When is Buying Votes Wrong?” 646.63 For strong empirical evidence on the global prevalence of logrolling in legislatures, see Thomas W. Gilligan and John G. Matsusaka, “Deviations From Constituent Interests: The Role Of Legislative Structure And Political Parties In

The States,” Economic Inquiry 33, no. 3 (1995).64 See Josh Gerstein, "Pork Greased Reform's Passage," Politico, December 22, 2009.65 See Ibid. Also, Kochin and Kochin point out a very related paradox which they call the conditionality paradox: “Candidates can offer even individual voters benefits in return for votes or support as long as these promises are conditional on the candidates’ reelection. It is far more dubious and frequently illegal for the candidate to offer benefits even to large groups of voters whether or not the candidate is actually elected.” See Kochin and Kochin, “When is Buying Votes Wrong?”, 646.66 Karlan, “Not by Money”, 1466. Italics added.67 4 456 U.S. 45.68 The law reads: “No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or district office shall expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other thing of value, either directly or indirectly,to any person in consideration of the vote or financial or moral support of that person.” See Section 121.055, Revised Statutes of Kentucky. 69 That is, there must not only be “a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one” to prohibit candidates from making promises to voters in exchange for their support. See 4 456 U.S. 45.70 The Court’s full statement in regard to this matter reads: “Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of government officials to the people whom they represent, and assist the voters in predicting the effect of their vote. The fact that some voters may find their self-interest reflected in a candidate's commitment does not place that commitment beyond the reach of the First Amendment. We have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their individual good through the political process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective welfare. So long as the hoped-for personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal processes of government, and not through some private arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable basis upon which to cast one's ballot.” See Ibid.71 Ibid.72 Karlan, “Not by Money”, Italics added. 73 See below for more on their argument. James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Charles Kershaw. Rowley, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004).74 Of course, the norms that affect the behavior of political officials in the domestic realm of government are more institutionalized than those that condition the behavior of states. This is not to say, however, that there are not international norms or institutions that cannot influence behaviors. Internationally, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane have pointed out that institutions can promote cooperation among states. Ethan Nadelmann has also found international norms against a variety of activities, with “those who refuse or failto conform… labeled as deviants and condemned not just by states but most communities and individuals as well.” International law additionally acts as a powerful body of rules and regulation to which most states obey. As Harold Koh

argues, the “overlooked process of interaction, interpretation, and internalizationof international norms into domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations "obey" international law, rather than merely conform their behavior to it when convenient.” But these norms that condition the behavior of states are in factsimilar to the norms that govern political anarchy. The use of violence, of course,is extremely rare (although not entirely absent) within political anarchy as compared to the international arena. Legislative violence engulfed the Taiwanese and South Korean parliaments recently. The biggest difference, it seems, between anarchy in the international arena and political anarchy is the degree of institutionalization of the norms that affect behaviors. The former has a long way to go. See Robert Axelrod, Robert Keohane “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics 38, No. 1. (Oct., 1985): pp. 226-254; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization 44, no. 04 (1990); Harold Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" (1997). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2101; "S Korean Politicians in Mass Brawl," BBC News, July 22, 2009; "Taiwan Politicians Brawl OverProcedure," BBC News, July 05, 200475I wish to thank Professor Michael Johnston at Colgate University for raising thisimportant point. 76 See Kochin and Kochin, “When is Buying Votes Wrong?”.77 See Lars Udehn, The Limits of Public Choice: A Sociological Critique of the Economic Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), 118.78 See James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Charles Kershaw. Rowley, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004).79 See William Riker and Steven Brahms, "The Paradox of Vote Trading," The AmericanPolitical Science Review 67, no. 4 (December 1973): 1235.80 See Dreher and Vreeland, Money and Politics, 97-119. 81 They argue that logrolling is beneficial, aside from the obvious gains that occur from trade, because it can increase the power of minorities and permit the expression of not only ordinal preferences, but cardinal preferences as well. See Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent; William C. Mitchell, "The Calculus of Consent: Enduring Contributions to Public Choice and Political Science," Public Choice 60, no. 3 (1989).82 Kochin and Kochin, “When is Buying Votes Wrong?”, 648.83 Vreeland and Dreher, Money and Politics, 31. 84 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1954).

85 That is not to say that a global collective good does not exist, only that thereis not currently a single institutional authority that legitimately claims to act on behalf of every citizen of the world. For more on the negative impact of political incentives in governments and their role in the ineffectiveness of international organizations to produce efficient global outcomes, see Roland Vaubel, “A Public Choice Approach to International Organization,” Public Choice 51, no. 1 (1986): 53.

86 See Bruno S. Frey, "The Public Choice View of International Political Economy, "International Organization 38, no. 01 (1984): 215.87 See Carl J. Friedrich, "Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective," in Political Corruption: A Handbook, comp. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Brunswick: Transaction Publ., 2009), 15/