Title: \" From Kant's categorical imperative to Fritz Jahr's bioethical imperative: toward the globalization on ethics. \"

CORNEJO PLAZA, María Isabel y RODRÍGUEZ YUNTA, Eduardo. 2016.

“From Kant’s categorical imperative to Fritz Jahr’s bioethical

imperative: toward the globalization on ethics”. En Fritz Jahr

(1895-1953) From the origin of bioethics to integrative bioethics.

Byk, Christian y Martin-Sass, Hans editores. Esika, París.

Title: “From Kant’s categorical imperative to Fritz Jahr’s

bioethical imperative: toward the globalization on ethics.”

Authors:   María Isabel Cornejo-Plaza and Eduardo

Rodríguez-Yunta1

Interdisciplinary Center for Studies on Bioethics, University

of Chile

ABSTRACT

There are evident coincidences among the moral principles and

maxims of Immanuel Kant’s: “human beings should be treated as

ends rather than as means”, “one should never act in a way

that one could not also will that this maxim should be a

universal law”; and Fritz Jahr’s bioethics imperative:

"respect every living being in general as an end in itself

1 Isabel Cornejo Plaza, Lawyer LL.M. Eduardo Rodríguez-Yunta, PhD in

Biology. Comments by Prof. Fernando Lolas are appreciated.

Interdisciplinary Center for Studies on Bioethics, University of Chile.

and treat it as such, as much as possible”. Both ethical

maxims consider humans as a superior being, donned with

dignity and autonomy. It is evident in both that human

beings have the freedom to willingly make decisions for

themselves due to their capacity of discernment. Jahr´s

bioethical imperative can be considered "categorical" such as

in the Kantian imperative. But, in Jahr´s imperative is not

always categorical. It is first of all a hypothetical

imperative, which could become categorical if every living

being could actually be treated as an end in itself. If this

actually does happen, then the hypothetical imperative would

become categorical. Jahr asserts that to respect nonhuman

living beings “as much as possible” is going a step further

by incorporating the effects of human decisions on other

living beings that live with humans in a delicately

interconnected ecosystem. In a globalized world, this vision

is more relevant than ever since technological

advances impose dilemmas and challenges that cannot be

addressed locally. Efforts to find relevant solutions for a

multicultural and globalized world require a universal

ethics. This is a position rooted in continental European

tradition rather than North American bioethics, perhaps more

appropriate for a globalizing proposal. For the role of

bioethics it could be a good way to revitalize the Kantian

ethical principle that humans act with such responsibility

and dignity so that their actions could be considered moral.

But in a global world, the ethics proposed by Jahr are even

more ambitious and necessary in the fragile world in which we

live.

INTRODUCTION

Bioethics as a science has been progressively set as a common

platform where experts collaborate from disciplines as

diverse as medicine, philosophy, law, theology, anthropology

and social sciences to solve common problems in the

healthcare field, relationships with the biosphere, the

environment and the impact of technology on medical and

scientific applications. While bioethics has developed mainly

in the biomedical healthcare field, in relation to healthcare

professionals and their interactions with patients, concerns

are increasingly encompassing global issues including respect

and protection of living beings in general. This global

conception was present in the origin of the term bioethics by

the German theologian Fritz Jahr and by the United States

oncologist Van Rensselaer Potter. Since the beginning,

bioethics has had the mission of bridging science and

humanities, by reflecting on the relationship between

science, technology and ethics both in procedural and

sociocultural ways. Bioethics contributes with its

methodology in the development of dialogue between science

and philosophy in a pluralistic, interdisciplinary and

humanitarian environment. In the scientific and technological

era in which we live, a philosophical and anthropological

reflection complementary to ethics is particularly necessary,

in order to protect human beings and the environment. Science

and technology tend to be considered as exclusive criteria of

knowledge and immediate basis for decision making.

BIOETHICS BACKGROUND

Bioethics was founded on a system of ethical argumentation

with four levels of justification: theories, principles,

norms and individual cases. In a philosophical framework, the

North American principle based way of arguing has been the

more developed school of thought, which is derived from

diverse theories differing in the justification of

principles, but coinciding in norms derived and decision

making procedures based on principles. Beauchamp and

Childress2 established four important principles in

reflection about clinical practice: the duty to respect the

self-determination of the patient (autonomy), the duty of

doing good (beneficence), the duty of avoiding damage (non

maleficence) and the duty to promote equality (justice).

These principles are a point of departure, but they are not

absolutes, but intermediate prima facie, that is they lead to the

judgment of ethical actions and they are instruments of

analysis, helping to discern whether an action is right or2 Beauchamp T and Childress J, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 1979.

wrong. They are useful for argumentation since they are

accepted by different ethical theories, being universal and

with a greater consensus than theories. One difficulty lies

in the argumentation; the four principles must be weighed or

subjected to hierarchical order, since they frequently enter

into conflict when making decisions. For example, autonomy of

the patient facing the point of view of beneficence of the

physician or to benefit a particular case against equality

when there are scarce resources. The diverse origin of the

theories giving base to principles raises diverse problems.

It is difficult to conciliate a deontological Kantian ethic,

in which the center of moral action is duty, with utilitarian

bioethics, in which the center of moral action is the

consequences, when the decision making arguments may be

opposing. People may have difficulty in understanding each

other because they have different concepts of the world and

of life and therefore they differ in the hierarchy of values.

Furthermore, these four principles need to be complemented by

other principles when referring to the relationship with the

environment. The power of human beings over themselves and

over nature grows and is modified thanks to biotechnology

development, but risks and the possibilities of perverse use

to damage the biosphere also increase. The philosopher Hans

Jonas advocates the principle of responsibility, which must

extend up to the effects that human actions reach, which can

manipulate life and deeply alter the environment. This

responsibility implies at least two exigencies: that future

generations will have an environment and a biodiversity at

least similar to the current one and that human genetic

identity must not be altered3. When considering large

temporal and special periods, new moral obligations towards

generations and towards other non-human living beings appear,

for which a special, non-rational, treatment is expected.

In order to be grounded, bioethics needs, beyond

intermediary principles, an ontological unifying principle

facing the conflicts between science, technique and ethics.

Since it is the human being who reflects ethically, there

must be an anthropological foundation to provide a real basis

to ethics. There is an ethical premise that allows meta

ethical justification based on anthropology: the Kantian

principle stating that a human being is a person with dignity

which can not be treated as a means, only as an end in

himself/herself. United in this premise is that all human

beings are equal in dignity, everyone, without distinction,

deserves respect. Ethics cannot be based only on reason, even

when gaining universality, since reason needs principles and

normative content with a basis, which is located in the

anthropological constitution of humans. The ethical

preoccupation for others can not be simply based on looking

for common agreements by consensus to safe guard particular

interests, nor on a coercive system based on normative

3 Jonas H. El principio de responsabilidad. Ensayo de una ética para la civilización tecnológica,1979.

universalization according to a Universalist logic of reason.

Rather, the ethical preoccupation for others, including human

and other living beings, is understood by an anthropology

which includes human capacity to interact with others. The

philosopher Brussino believes that human beings inserted in

reality originate an “ontological community”, from which

ethics receives its first principle, since it is the unique

absolute principle, which has neither exceptions nor

prescriptive content4. This principle is “respect, equal

treatment and consideration to all human beings in virtue of

their personal dignity” and to other living beings in virtue

of their intrinsic dignity. This principle is not based on

reason, rather pre-rational, and all rationalities must

respect it and allow it to govern the process of reasoning,

other principles and decision making procedures. Bioethics

must depart from the respect to the dignity of human and the

dignity of other living beings, acknowledging all the

elements that it encompasses.

The concept of dignity (dignitas) was originated in Rome prior

to the Imperium with the meaning of merit attributed to the

way of life, social, political and moral; it was considered a

personal achievement which gave right to power but with the

exigency of a duty5. Then, in the evolution of the concept the

4 Brussino, S. L. Bioética, Racionalidad y Principio de Realidad. Cuadernos de Bioética 1996; 0: 39-48.5 Rodríguez Guerro, A., y Chuaqui Jahiatt, B., “Notas sobre la Evolucióndel Concepto de Dignidad,”Ars Medica, Revista de Estudios Médicos Humanísticos 2002;6: 11-14.

political and the moral were separated, where dignity became

the essential predicate of the person, not restricted to a

specific elite due to merit, but belonging to all human beings

because of being human6. Dignity gives personal character to

human beings. Later, with the expansion of Christian ideas,

the human being was considered a unique and unrepeatable

person, where all individuals of same species have equal

dignity.7 All human beings have equal dignity because they are

the image of God and their life has value as a way of

salvation. In contrast, other living beings have dignity or

intrinsic value according to their own ontology, which human

beings have the capacity to recognize. Thus, “religion can

provide justifying ethics for people who are religious in the

right way; we have ample illustration of this in the familiar

moralizing of sacred texts. Such people understand living well

to mean respecting or pleasing a god, and they can interpret

their moral responsibilities by asking which view of those

responsibilities would best respect or most please that god.

But that structure of thought could be helpful, as a guide to

integrating ethics and morality, only for people who treat

some sacred text as an explicit and detailed moral rule book.

People who think only that their god has commanded love for

charity to others, as Dworkin believes many religious people

do, cannot find, just in command, any answers to what morality

6 Ibid.7 Rodríguez Guerro, A., “La Persona Humana, Algunas Consideraciones”, ArsMedica, Revista de Estudios Médicos Humanísticos 2002; 6: 121-140.

requires. In any case, He believes “that shall not rely on

idea of any divine book of detailed moral instruction here”.

Plato and Aristotle tried to show the true character of each

of the main moral and political virtues by relating each to

others, and then to the broad ethical ideals their translator

summarize as happiness. Dworkin said that we need a statement

of what we should take our personal goals to be that fits with

and justifies our sense of what obligations, duties, and

responsibilities we have to others. This characterization

seems to fit Kant´s moral program. 8

THE BIOETHICAL IMPERATIVE OF FRITZ JAHR

Fritz Jahr was the first to come up with the term bioethics9,

as a new discipline and moral attitude in correspondence with

the notion of biopsychology proposed by the philosopher and

psychologist Rudolf Eisler, whose idea was to define the soul

or psychology present in the different forms of life. For

Eisler10, psychological actions are means to regulate or

8 Dworkin, Ronald. Justice for Hedgehogs. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.2011. Pág 193-195.9 Jahr F. Bio-Ethik. Eine Umschau über die ethischen Beziehungen desMenschen zu Tier und Pflanze. [Bio-Etica: Un análisis de la relaciónética de los seres humanos con los animales y las plantas] Kosmos.Handweiser für Naturfreunde 1927, 24(1): 2-4. Lolas Stepke F. Bioethics andanimal research. A personal perspective and a note on the contribution ofFritz Jahr, Biol Res 2006; 41: 119-123.10 Eisler, ‘Biopsiquis’. Diccionario científico ‘Wörterbuch der philosophischenBegriffe’ (1910, 3. ed., Bol. 1, p. 192).

modify the acts of life and are present in all forms of life

with a developed nervous system.

Jahr proposed a bioethical imperative for all living beings,

derived from Kant’s moral principle for human beings (treat

other human beings as ends in themselves, never as means”):

“respect every living being in general as an end in itself

and treat it as such as much as possible”11. Jahr emphasizes

the importance of ethical feeling, empathy, compassion and

help towards animals and plants as part of moral and social

obligations that human beings ought to feel for others. When

dealing with living beings it must be understood that each

species and nature itself is an ends in itself.

Jahr and his bioethical imperative are visionary and

consistent. If we were able to extrapolate the theory of

systems to globalization, we would say that each living being

is so fundamental in the complex net of the ecosystem that

the survival of any in the long range without one of them

would be impossible. In the theory of systems an entity is

more than the sum of its parts. Thus, the most rational

species –that with greater development of cerebral cortex,

homo sapiens- achieves the realization of civilizations, which

are built based on interdependence and collaboration among

species in a unique proper scenario, the earth.

Living beings aim for preservation and survival. Animal

ethics and human ethics are not in conflict; to the contrary,

they complement each other. While, Kant’s moral imperative11 Jahr F. ‘Tierschutz und Ethik’ (La protección de los animales y la ética), 1928

only considers human beings and has a formal character, the

Jahr’s imperative covers all living beings and their

interactions, having a pragmatic and flexible character. Jahr

analyzes the impact of science and technology on human

ethics, which can be extended to all living beings. The

dignity or “sanctity of life” is the basis for the bioethical

imperative of Jahr, not only for humans as ends in themselves

and subjected to moral law. While animals can not apply this

law to themselves, moral law is applicable to them by human

beings. One cannot treat a living being without dignity with

psychology. Jahr holds that animal protection has a positive

effect on ethical conduct towards human beings, popular and

public education. While the moral Kant’s imperative may serve

as principle to ground a social moral, the Fritz Jahr’s

imperative may serve as principle to ground a global moral.

Between the Kantian imperative and the Jahr imperative there

are evident similarities: the Kantian imperative “act in such

a way, that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or

in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an

end, but always at the same time as an end is categorical.”

Jahr replaces the categorical ‘always’ by a hypothetical and

situational ‘if possible’; thus modifying the inflexible

categorical structure of Kant’s model into a pragmatic and

situational model of balancing moral principles, obligations,

rights, and visions in a Bioethical Imperative: Respect every

living being on principle as an end in itself and treat it,

if possible, as such!.12

When Kant points out imperatively that one should treat

each human being as an end in himself/herself, never as a

means, he does not put his proposal into condition. Kant

argues that:

“When I think of categorical imperative I know at once

what it contains, beyond the law, only the necessity

that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while

the law contains no condition to which it would be

limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of

action is to conform but the universality of a law as

such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative

properly represents as necessary”.13

Jahr, at first, is hypothetical, when he said: “treat every

living being as an end in itself as much as possible”. The

imperative does allow exceptions. On his part, Jahr shows in

his proposal a caveat, which is the condition: “treat every

living being as an end in itself as much as possible”. We

could think that we have a hypothetical imperative when

saying “as much as possible”, so that when it is not possible12 Hans-Martin Sass. The many faces and colors of the bioethics imperative. Ed. Mazur Amir, Hans-Martin Sass. Fritz Jahr and Foundations of Global Bioethics. The Future of Integrative Bioethics. Ethik in der Praxis / Practical Ethics – Studien / Studies,(Berlin),vol. 37, 2012.

13 Eterovic Igor. Kant´s categorical imperative and Jahr´s bioethical imperative. Ed. MazurAmir, Hans-Martin Sass. Fritz Jahr and Foundations of Global Bioethics. The Future of Integrative Bioethics. Ethik in der Praxis / Practical Ethics – Studien / Studies, (Berlin),vol. 37, 2012.

to treat a living being as an end in itself, then we are not

infringing the maxim of conduct.

THE IMPERATIVE BIOETHICAL OF FRITZ JAHR COULD BE CATEGORICAL

AS WELL.

Indeed, we must make a distinction. The first predicate in

Jahr inherently contains a conditional obligation, namely a

future event albeit uncertain, which depends on the birth or

termination of a right. Thus, “if possible, as such!”

contain a hypothetical imperative, because it contains a

condition within it. However, once the uncertainty of whether

or not it is possible that "living things can be treated as

an ends in themselves as much as possible" is dispelled, then

we should distinguish if:

1 -. Condition is met. (To treat every living thing .....),

then the hypothetical imperative becomes categorical and it

must follow the fate of the Kantian imperative.

2 - Condition is not met. Then it becomes true that you

cannot treat such living beings as an end in themselves, nor

as a means, to any degree, then that hypothetical imperative

remains in the same manner.

The intrinsic dignity of human ontology, from the Kantian

perspective, derives from the capacity of reasoning, proper

of the species homo sapiens. Therefore, the dignity assigned to

animals and other living beings is a human construction based

on the help they provide to human beings. Kant in his

“Metaphysics of customs” asks for the care and compassion

towards animals as moral obligation.14

In the categorical Jahr’s imperative this vision is not

opposed, rather “respect[s] every living being on principle

as an end in itself and treat[s] it, if possible, as such!”

indicating that a microorganism and a dog in an ecological

system have importance, but with different degrees of

dignity. The cerebral development of both is what makes the

difference, the biopsychology. While the more human being

attributes are found in a species, the more hierarchy it is

attributed, practically as dignity were a mirror of human

condition and the human being is the parameter with which the

dignity of all species is measured. Nevertheless, dignity is

an ontological idea that we can also build for the rest of

living beings. Cruelty towards other species with cortical

development, especially mammals, is considered in some

legislation a crime. Currently, globalization and its effects

have called into question cruel conducts toward animals and

great efforts are carried out to avoid unnecessary animal

suffering. We know that part of human survival depends on

sacrificing animals, nevertheless, the way in which these

aims are carried out, must be with respect and solidarity.

The idea of avoiding animal suffering is promoted permanently

by diverse groups advocating animal rights, legislations have

been timidly incorporating this aspect and all deontological14 Ob. Cit.9.Pg. 9.

research ethical guidelines consider that experimental

animals must not suffer during experimentation. Even though

these guidelines are not obligatorily endorsed until they are

part of the inner juridical order, their purpose is to aid in

training, developing and promoting a moral idea, which leads

towards the ethics of values and principles that Jahr viewed

prior to the beginning of considering burdens exerted by

globalization and its effects.

GLOBALIZATION AND BIOETHICAL IMPERATIVE

The concept of globalization is recent. After the cold war,

and as a consequence of the triumph of the liberal economic

model, a certain social, political, economic and cultural

phenomenon started to arise and exacerbated with the coming

of the digital era or internet, which modified the way of

communicating and using information. The fall of the Berlin

wall constitutes an icon for this globalized era with the end

of cold war and the triumph of liberalism. Another

paradigmatic example was the change in management of

international security after the terrorist attack to the

World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on September

11, 2001. Since the Second World War, the development of

human rights had acquired a new relevance. Nevertheless,

after this terrorist attack the juridical challenge was to

elaborate theories which could legitimate the series of

restrictions to diverse human rights in favor of

international security and safeguarding new global threads of

international terrorism. Another great challenge under the

juridical point of view was how to carry out the diverse

strategic alliances of international commerce between very

diverse regions, trying not to exacerbate the structural

inequalities among different economies. How can you unify

intellectual property policies in countries whose view of

piracy is cultural and the economic impact so different? Is

it ethical to impose the same parameters of regulation of

industrialized countries to third world countries? No doubt,

these are questions which globalization presents.

Subsequently, when we speak about an ethics for

globalization, we sustain that Jahr’s bioethical imperative

could be considered a principle to establish equality, in the

sense of justice as fairness, universal guiding value, but

going beyond when this value is applied to each concrete

case. But, for this humankind has to be organized as

citizens, as free and equal people, in a democratic political

system where fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of

reciprocity, or mutuality: all who do their part as the

recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a

public and agreed-upon standard.15

The economic and political liberal model, the globalization

era and the internet allow us to view the phenomenon of inter

15 Rawls John. Justice as Fairness. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.(Cambridge,Mass), 2003. P.6

connection as never before. This new reality, mirrors the

concept of a global village. The bewildering effects of

economic growth of industrialized nations were made visible

and quantified. The governments of economic powers consulted

scientists and intellectuals of the moment to analyze the

consequences of predatory growth. Then the theories of Jay

W. Forrester, Meadows and many others were presented, trying

to explain and predict through mathematical models the

consequences of global growth; case is point, the dynamic

theories of social systems. Conferences and Declarations such

as the Club of Rome in 1968 warned about considering the

limits of growth, setting the base for new disciplines such

as ecological politics, which includes environmental topics

and demographic development as a variable to consider public

policies and international relations.

Terms such as: sustainable, interconnection, interrelation,

cooperation, solidarity, precaution and responsibility are

included in all academic, political and social discourse as a

way of reasonably facing the accumulative global consumption,

understanding that natural resources are scarce and that

there is only one unrepeatable planet earth with total

interconnection among each living being upon it. As in a game

of chess, each intervention by humans in the ecosystem is a

movement that must be carefully studied, since consequences

may be irreversible. Under this new way of viewing the world,

moral dialogues and new ways to see human rights are

originated. It is now necessary to consider future

generations as subjects which, although may not exist now,

are expected to in the future. Therefore, the challenge lies

in ensuring them the possibility to enjoy a biodiversity,

which enriches and enhances humans in a multidimensional way.

The intrinsic interconnection of the global era is, without a

doubt, a system of infinite networks, such as neuronal

networks. The same thing happens with the view of a sick

person in anthropological medicine, in which patients need to

be seen as a number of superposed texts, read and interpreted

in conjunction even when only one aspect is looked at.

Between psychology and the body, a dialogue flows in such

silence that it can be externalized as evident unequivocal

signs of disease. Humans, as social beings, continue outside

of their own intertextuality to elaborate networks that reach

the environment, community and society in which they live,

forming an impenetrable web of relationships. Humans form a

web of connections among themselves shaping cultures and

civilizations. But the concept reaches other living species,

which are also interconnected in their simple or complex

structures of any nature and successively serving as a host

or parasite in the chain of survival of those more adapted,

as proposed by Darwin, through natural selection.

CONCLUSIONS

Kant’s categorical imperative does not apply to all living

beings, but only to rational human beings.

Jarh’s bioethical imperative, however, extends to all living

beings. With Jahr, the imperative begins as hypothetical, as

it intrinsically contains the condition to treat every living

being as an end in itself, as much as possible.

 If the condition is met, i.e., it becomes true that it

cannot be treated as a means to a living being, then the

hypothetical imperative becomes categorical. Within the

categorical there will be degrees of dignity, in accordance

with the cell and cortical development of every living being.

The categorical imperative, applicable to humans, is expanded

by Fritz Jahr to all living beings. Although in his writings

he is careful to distinguish between his position and those

found in Oriental philosophies, pastor Jahr emphasizes that,

if possible, they deserve respect and care. Not only because

they are capable of pain and suffering, as Kant would argue,

but because they all share with humans the fact that they are

living creatures. His imperative is hypothetical insofar as

it allows for the possibility of respecting them within

reasonable limits.

If within the consensus we understand we can never treat

humans as a means, but always as an end, then it is

categorical that the ontological dignity must be respected by

everyone and in all circumstances. This is not so with a

microorganism or a plant.

However “globalization” requires us to understand that we are

all interconnected and interrelated in such a way that the

whole is more than the sum of its parts and is more than a

political label and should be used in a more comprehensive

meaning.

We must use the principles as rationality, solidarity,

responsibility, equity and sustainability to enable the

survival of the human species. This is the subject to the

survival of all living species, in different degrees.

Finally, for all these considerations, we believe the Jahr’s

ethic, is best suited to the era of globalization.

REFERENCES

1.- Beauchamp T and Childress J, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 1979.

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la Evolución del Concepto de Dignidad,”Ars Medica, Revista de

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análisis de la relación ética de los seres humanos con los

animales y las plantas] Kosmos. Handweiser für Naturfreunde 1927,

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