Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events
Agenda
Introduction
Attacks on Special Events
Attacks on Hotels
Diagnosis of Tactics Utilized
Mitigation Strategies
Questions
Closing
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Special Event Attacks
Bataclan Theater – Paris, France
Cricket Team Lahore, Pakistan
San Bernardino
Nice, France
• Multiple Attackers
• Military Tactics Used
• Attacked security & LEO
• Employee/Contractor –
insider knowledge
• High Caliber weapons
used
• Suicide vests
• Vehicles
• Explosives
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Impact on Special Events
Anticipate changes to meeting and event
industry
More destination research and
communications regarding risk
More attendee screening
Provide more employee training
Updating procedures and contingency plans
Adding more security staff
Working with local and federal law
enforcement
Developing new security plans
Predict no changes14%
27%
5%
15%
9%
19%
5%
15%
44%
MPI Meetings Outlook, Winter 2016AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Impact on Economy and Business Revenues
Egypt 2013 – 11% of countries
GDP tied to tourism
2014 – tourism reported
slumps of almost 31%, industry
earnings only $5.9bn.
Sinai hotel occupancy has
plummeted and as of January
2016 it is estimated to cost
$230-$300 million per month to
the economy 0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
2010 2011 2012 2013
Egypt Tourism
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
The Mumbai Attack
India’s 26/11
One of the best planned terrorist attacks - audacious and ambitious
Multiple attacks at different locations prevented authorities from developing an overall assessment of the situation
The first “active shooter” type terrorist attack
Precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation both physical and mental
Terrorist reconnaissance done in late 2007 – consistent with other large scale terrorist operations
Terrorist planners stayed in the hotel during their recce and took a guided tour through the hotel, videoing the tour
Terrorists entered at the famous Leopold Café and moved to the rear entrance of the Taj
Walked through the grounds and ground floor of the hotel
Then swiftly moved to the upper floors causing confusion and delaying rescue operations
Suicide attackers who were able to operate effectively over an extended period of time
Heavily armed – assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, improvised explosive devices.
Additional supplies were placed around the hotel
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Taj Mahal
Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Mumbai, India
26 November 2008, approx. 8:30pm
NSA 7 dinner in the Souk Restaurant on
the 25th floor
Approx. 30 fellow diners in the
restaurant – Americans, Europeans and
Indian elite
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Overview
Heard a commotion advised that a fight had broken out
between two rival gangs
NSA team and diners received word that the hotel was
under attack by terrorists
Nobody was responding so Bob assumed leadership role
The restaurant was not safe – surrounded by windows
Found a supply of ‘weapons’ in the kitchen so armed with
meat cleavers and carving knives
Informed that terrorists were making their way to the top
of the hotel
No defence and nowhere to goAT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Reaction
NSA 7 found a conference venue on the same floor that could be secured
Established a ‘holding area’ and moved the restaurant patrons there
Already 120 people there – we were now 150 people
Barricaded the doors
Brought up the elevator and jammed it open
Took out the lights near the entrance
Positioned near each entry point
NSA team member in the ceiling
Addressed the group after every explosion or noise or at 20 min intervals
See the attackers / hear shots and explosions / see and hear activity at the
nearby Trident hotel
Stayed in “holding area” for 5 ½ hours
Moved the group down 25 floors as a fire had broken out below that was
moving towards the holding area
One floor at a time over 1 ½ hours until a safe route out was found AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Run
Group not under actual attack in the restaurant
We believed that the terrorists were heading towards us
Left the secured area only when the threat of fire became
imminent
Move slowly down 25 flights of stairs – took about 2 ½
hours
It took 7 ½ hours to get out
150 people were rescued
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Hide
Terrorists were shooting anyone they could see
We were relatively safe - out of sight and they didn’t
know we were there
Occasionally spotted some of them but had no idea how
many there were
Sophisticated, well-planned attack on multiple venues
Found a hiding place and secured the area
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Fight
We were armed with ‘weapons’
‘Element of surprise’ should a terrorist locate us
We were ready to fight
We had a fighting chance
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Lessons Learned
Communications
2 people called 3 numbers
continuously / hotel lobby, security
manager and the Mumbai police
Getting info from our own people in
India as well as in South Africa
Pros and Cons of Broadcast
Information received was invaluable
BIGGEST CHALLENGE WAS TO
REMAIN UPDATED
Control
Who’s in charge?
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Analysis of Attack Strategies
Armed assailants– Small team tactics used to storm
facilities, creating panic, driving evacuations to secondary attacks
Multi-stage bombing attacks & personnel flow during evacuation– Use of suicide vests as last resort
weapons
– Placement of VBIED near evacuation locations
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Emerging
Strategies
Use of Drone to carry
payload of explosives or
chem/bio into unsuspecting
crowd at event or venue
Weaponization of
chemical/biological
materials
Re-emergence of “Sniper
Attacks”
Nice, France vehicles used
as weapons
Targeting of senior
executives in their homes –
i.e. cripple Marriott by
executing the leaders
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Mitigation Strategies
"Layers of security” – beyond the building perimeter
Lessons from Marriott
Alternate or backup CCTV rooms
Maps or 3D walk-through models of the hotel
Train your staff to recognize surveillance and limit how much information is public.
Surveillance Detection Strategies
Protective Intelligence
Trained and Practiced Threat Assessment Programs
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Mitigation Strategies
Thorough searches at entry points to the location
Where possible, create buffer / reaction zones
Communications - crisis communication strategy and
information management plan
Leadership
Communication training of all hotel staff
Train all staff in evacuation skills and crisis management
Empower staff to handle crises
Appoint key reaction staff on each floor
Ongoing drills and training
Plan for emergenciesAT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Back to Basics – Event Security
Assess
Plan
Secure
ClearPost
Credential
Open
Dynamics of event
security are changing
Basics still apply
AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016
Thank you for attending.
Bob Nicholls
Director
Nicholls Steyn and Associates
+27 (11) 462-7540
www.nicholls-steyn.com
Chuck Tobin
Chairman & President
AT-RISK International
+1-561-998-0064
www.at-riskinternational.com