Thursday, August 4, 2011 1:30pm - Do You Wanna Dance: Negotiable Instruments 3:00pm The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, Retired, Distinguished Scholar In Residence, Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA) Alice Whitten, Chapter 13 Trustee (Ft. Worth, TX) Sidney H. Scheinberg, Glast, Phillips & Murray, P.C. (Dallas, TX) Page 1 of 57 INDEX 1. The Chapter 13 Alternative: A Legislative Solution to Undersecured Home Mortgages 2. Enforcement Of Promissory Notes Secured By Real Estate 3. List of Judicial Opinions on Robo-Signers, Lost Promissory Notes, and Loan Servicers that Fail to Account Properly for Mortgage Payments 4. MERS: The Why When and How Page 1
57
Embed
Thursday, August 4, 2011 1:30pm - Do You Wanna Dance ...
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Thursday, August 4, 2011
1:30pm - Do You Wanna Dance: Negotiable Instruments
3:00pm The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, Retired, Distinguished Scholar In Residence, Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA)
Alice Whitten, Chapter 13 Trustee (Ft. Worth, TX) Sidney H. Scheinberg, Glast, Phillips & Murray, P.C. (Dallas,
TX) Page 1 of 57
INDEX
1. The Chapter 13 Alternative: A Legislative Solution to Undersecured Home
Mortgages
2. Enforcement Of Promissory Notes Secured By Real Estate
3. List of Judicial Opinions on Robo-Signers, Lost Promissory Notes, and Loan
Servicers that Fail to Account Properly for Mortgage Payments
4. MERS: The Why When and How
Page 1
DO NOT DELETE 4/22/2011 1:30 PM
1091
ARTICLES
THE CHAPTER 13 ALTERNATIVE: A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION TO UNDERSECURED HOME MORTGAGES
The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession that began in approximately 2008 brought
severe financial difficulties to a large number of homeowners in
the United States. With a rise in the unemployment rate from
4.6% to 10%,1 many lost their jobs and their ability to make their
home payments. At the same time, with an average 30.3% reduc-
tion in housing values2 (which in some places has approached
nearly 60%),3 many homes are now worth substantially less than
* Judge Bufford served as a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge in Los Angeles for twenty-five
years until his retirement in 2010. He is now a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at
Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
1. According to the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
unemployment rates rose from 4.6% in January 2007 to a peak of 10% in December 2009.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL 07-0159, THE EMPLOY-
MENT SITUATION: JANUARY 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_02022007.pdf (noting an unemployment rate of 4.6% in January 2007);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL 09-1583, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION—DECEMBER 2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ar
chives/empsit_01082010.pdf (noting an unemployment rate of 10% in December 2009).
2. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, U.S. Home Prices Keep Weakening as Nine Ci-
ties Reach New Lows According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices
/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p--us (explaining that the 30.3% value reflects the reduc-
tion in housing values from their peak value in 2006 through November 2010).
3. Id. (noting that Las Vegas has seen the greatest decline in housing values since
2006).
Page 2
DO NOT DELETE 4/22/2011 1:30 PM
1092 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1091
the debt owed on mortgages secured by the homes.4 Some 5 mil-
lion homeowners are at least two months behind in their mort-
gage payments, and RealtyTrac predicts that some 1.2 million
homes will be foreclosed on in 2011.5 The housing crisis continues
to get worse, not better.6
Large amounts of public funds, through a variety of programs,
have been expended to try to ameliorate this problem, with dis-
appointing results.7 The federal Home Affordable Modification
Program (―HAMP‖) alone, for example, has been allocated $50 bil-
lion of U.S. government funds, of which $652.4 million has been
expended to produce a meager 520,000 permanent modifications.8
However, none of these government programs has made a sub-
stantial dent in the backlog of 11.1 million homes that are under
water where homeowners cannot make their mortgage pay-
4. See Nick Timiraos, U.S. News: Home-Purchasing Power Increases, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 2011, at A4. As of the end of 2009, nearly 27% of all U.S. homeowners owed more
on their mortgages than their homes were worth. Id.
5. Janna Herron, Banks Repossessed 1 Million Homes Last Year—and 2011 Will Be
94. A Chapter 7 trustee would not sell a debtor’s home if the secured creditor was un-
dersecured, because the creditor would be entitled to all of the value in the house and
there would be no benefit for the unsecured creditors. Instead, in due course the trustee
would abandon the property back to the debtor. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007.
Page 18
DO NOT DELETE 4/22/2011 1:30 PM
1108 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1091
mented by filing fees (court costs) and a percentage payment to
the Chapter 13 trustee who administers the case (administration
costs). Private losses in the residential real estate market, if any,
remain private and do not drain the public treasury.
This proposal has two additional important features. First, for
a Chapter 13 debtor who can afford the payments under the re-
structured loan, the debtor can keep the home and make afforda-
ble payments to the lender (or its successor). The debtor does not
incur the loss of the home or the impact of a foreclosure on the
debtor’s credit report, and the debtor can get on with her life.95
At the same time, Chapter 13 is cheaper for the lender.96 The
lender is much more likely to be paid.97 A court-approved repay-
ment plan providing for the payment of reduced mortgage pay-
ments is likely to result in payments to the secured creditor. The
present value of the stream of payments under the plan will most
likely substantially exceed the amount that a bank can realize
from reselling the property after foreclosure (which must be dis-
counted for the delay in the foreclosure process and in the resale
process).98 The lender likely receives no payments during the fo-
reclosure process and certainly receives none during the delay be-
tween foreclosure and resale of the residence.99 In addition, the
lender does not incur the costs and administrative burden of own-
ing and marketing the property, almost surely at a loss, or of re-
cognizing this loss on its balance sheet.100
This change in bankruptcy law also solves the contractual,
practical, and economic problems resulting from the securitiza-
tion of the vast majority of home mortgages. The bankruptcy so-
lution solves the collective action problem that prevents mortgage
owners from finding an economic solution to a mortgage afforda-
bility problem. In addition, under mortgage securitization, mort-
gage servicers are typically the only parties who have any author-
95. The costs to a debtor of foreclosure are usually substantial. The debtor suffers a
loss of community ties, friendships, religious affiliation, ―schooling, childcare, medical
care, transportation, and even employment.‖ Levitin, supra note 15, at 569.
96. See id. at 610–11.
97. See id. at 607.
98. See id. at 606–07.
99. See id. at 629.
100. See id. at 606. Foreclosure imposes larger losses on lenders, on the average, than
bankruptcy modification of their loans. See id. at 618; see also Levitin, supra note 69, at 7.
Page 19
DO NOT DELETE 4/22/2011 1:30 PM
2011] CHAPTER 13 ALTERNATIVE 1109
ity to act on behalf of mortgage holders, and the servicers are typ-
ically prohibited by contract from making loan modifications, or
their right to make such modifications is severely limited.101 The
servicers lack sufficient personnel to handle a large number of
consumer contacts and lack the financial resources to hire such
personnel. In addition, in many cases, foreclosure is more profita-
ble to loan servicers than modification of a loan.102 All of these
problems disappear immediately for loans modified pursuant to
the proposed Chapter 13 change.
Furthermore, such a program makes good politics. Because
such a program would reduce the incentives for a homeowner to
abandon the property, the community bears a smaller burden of
vacant houses, loss of property taxes, and the failure of the resi-
dents to maintain their properties and to support and contribute
to community life.103
IV. CONCLUSION
The principal purpose of this article is to specify the changes
needed in Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to put into
place a Chapter 13 solution for the home ownership problem in
the United States. This solution is both simple and elegant: delete
from § 1322(b)(2) the phrase ―other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal res-
idence.‖ A second change incorporates language from §
1123(a)(5)(H) to make it explicit that a Chapter 13 plan may ex-
tend the maturity date and change the interest rate and other
terms of a debt instrument. Third, some minor technical changes
would implement these alterations.
As the foreclosure crisis continues to deepen, modification of
certain underwater mortgages under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code can make a substantial contribution to the stabiliza-
tion of the housing market. Unlike any other existing or proposed
solutions to the problem, ―bankruptcy modification offers imme-
diate relief, solves the market problems created by securitization,
101. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 69, at 5.
102. See id.
103. See Levitin, supra note 15, at 569 (discussing the costs foreclosure can have for
third parties).
Page 20
DO NOT DELETE 4/22/2011 1:30 PM
1110 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1091
addresses both problems of payment-reset shock and negative eq-
uity, screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers
and lenders, and avoids both the costs and moral hazard of a gov-
ernment bailout.‖104 Thus, while the bankruptcy solution is not a
magic bullet, ―it is a quick, fair, efficient, and administrable re-
sponse that would help stabilize the housing market and prevent
the deadweight social and economic losses of foreclosure.‖105
Most importantly, this solution can be accomplished at no cost
to the federal government or any other governmental agency.
Like all bankruptcy law, the costs of this solution rest entirely on
the private sector (and rest principally on those responsible for
bringing on the housing crisis).
104. Id. at 647–48.
105. Levitin, supra note 69, at 9.
Page 21
ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTES
SECURED BY REAL ESTATE
PROF. SAMUEL L. BUFFORD DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE
DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
STATE COLLEGE, PA U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE (retired)
PROFESSOR JULIA M. METZGER ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF LAW
DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
STATE COLLEGE, PA
BRIEF REVIEW OF UCC PROVISIONS
A huge portion of commercial debt in the United States (and elsewhere) is documented
in promissory notes. Along with drafts (including checks), the rights of third parties in promissory notes are governed by UCC Article 3. Article 3 defines what a negotiable instrument is and specifies how ownership of those pieces of paper is transferred. See § 3-104(e). A check is a draft drawn on a bank. See § 3-104(f). Promissory notes and drafts are generally categorized as “commercial paper” or “negotiable instruments.” The rights under Article 3
chiefly apply to a “holder” of a negotiable instrument, usually a third party who is not the original
payee of the instrument. A fundamental feature of the law of negotiable instruments is the doctrine of merger: the
document itself is the claim or the debt that it evidences. Thus the debt is merged into the instrument itself. Under the merger rule, the only way to transfer the debt represented by the instrument is by physical delivery of the instrument itself.
In bankruptcy cases, state substantive law controls the rights of note and lien holders, as
the Supreme Court pointed out more than 40 years ago in United States v. Butner, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
Definition
Page 22
The definition of negotiable instrument is in § 3-104(a). It must contain “an unconditional
promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest . . . .” The instrument
may either be payable to order (i.e., it identifies a specific person on whose order it is payable) or to the bearer (the holder of the instrument). A negotiable instrument may be payable on demand or at a definite time, with or without interest.
In addition, a negotiable instrument must satisfy five other requirements of § 3-104(a):
(1) the obligation must be unconditional; (2) the obligation must be a fixed amount (with or without interest); (3) the obligation must be payable to bearer or to order; (4) the obligation must be payable either on demand or at a definite time; (5) the promise or order may not state any other undertaking or instruction by the obligor to do anything in addition to the payment of money. See § 3-104 Comment 1. The fifth requirement has three exceptions (i.e., other promises that may be included): (1) a promise respecting collateral to secure the payment; (2) authorization of the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral: (3) a waiver of any law intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor. See § 3-104(a)(3).
Negotiation A negotiable instrument is transferred from the original payor by negotiation. §3-201(a). For “order paper,” the instrument must be endorsed and delivered; bearer paper can be
transferred by delivery alone. §3-201(b). However, in either case, for the note to be enforced, the person who asserts the status of the holder must be in possession of the instrument. See UCC § 1-201 (20) and comments.
The original and subsequent transferees are referred to as “holders.” Holders who take
for value, in good faith, and with no notice of defect or default are called “holders in due course,”
and take free of most defenses. See §§ 3-305(b).
Many promissory notes involved in real estate transactions (including consumer home mortgages) do not meet the fifth requirement of § 3-104(a) because they include other undertakings by the borrower. The principal consequence of such a provision is to prevent a subsequent holder from being a “holder in due course.” In the current mortgage crisis, there
has been rather little litigation on the issue of whether a note meets the § 3-104 requirements. Enforcement A central concept for the enforcement of a promissory note is the “person entitled to
enforce.” The maker’s obligation is to pay the amount of the note to the person entitled to
enforce the note. See § 3-412. The maker’s payment to the person entitled to enforce results
in the discharge of the maker’s obligation. See § 3-602. The failure to make payment when due to the person entitled to enforce the note constitutes dishonor of the note. See § 3-502.
Page 23
Dishonor entitles the person entitled to enforce to commence enforcement action. There is never more than one person entitled to enforce at any given time. Section 3-301 provides three ways to qualify as a person entitled to enforce a note. First, the person may be a holder of the note in virtue of having met all of the requirements for a holder. Determining to whom a note is payable requires examination not only of the face of the note but also of all indorsements. This determination requires an examination of the original document: a copy, especially a copy made at the time the transaction took place, is insufficient to determine to whom the note is payable. The second way to qualify as a person entitled to enforce a note is to have possession of the note without proper indorsements. If the note has been delivered to such a person with intent to transfer all of the prior holders interest in the note, but it has not been properly indorsed, the new possessor is a person entitled to enforce the note. (Such a person is also entitled to a proper indorsement by the transferor – see § 3-203(c)). The right to enforce may also pass by operation of law, such as through subrogation or for estate administration. Lost Notes The third way to qualify as a person entitled to enforce the note is the only way to enforce a note without possession. This limited situation may apply if the note was lost, destroyed or stolen. To qualify for this alternative, the person must show that (1) the person had possession of the instrument and was entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred, or that the person acquired ownership of the instrument from such a person; (2) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the person or a lawful seizure; (3) the person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the instrument because it was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of a person who cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process. See § 309. The person must prove the instrument’s terms and the right to enforce the instrument. In addition, a court enforcing the note must that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against any loss resulting from a claim by another person to enforce the instrument: this usually requires the posting of a bond. The merger principle (the debt is merged into the instrument itself) requires that the original must be produced to enforce it. Producing the original in such circumstances is a cost of the holder in due course status. In addition, the borrower is normally entitled to a return of the promissory note, duly canceled, when the obligation is paid in full.
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Page 24
The foregoing law can raise difficult evidentiary issues in showing that a person is entitled to enforce. First, the merger rule requires the original note because the obligation is merged into the note. Second, (apart from the lost note provisions) the original promissory note must be provided to show the terms of the note and the proper indorsements (and that there are not any indorsements showing that the person attempting to enforce is not disqualified). It is not necessary to prove that the holder is a holder in due course (and thus that most defenses are inapplicable) unless a defense is raised to enforcement of the note. However, the person entitled to enforce the note must show that the obligor has defaulted. Because virtually all payment records are kept electronically, the party enforcing the obligation must provide sufficient evidence to prove the admissibility of the electronic records. The recent use of “robosigners” to prove the electronic records shows that the lending industry
has not shouldered this responsibility sufficiently. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517-19 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008). The proof of electronic records can be a substantial burden requiring various witnesses with expertise on the computer system and the accounting records. See, e.g., In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005).
RECENT CASE LAW
Misrepresentations to the Court as to Servicer Status
First Circuit decision affirmed the imposition of sua sponte sanctions on Ameriquest by the bankruptcy court for failure to disclose to the court that Ameriquest was not the holder of the mortgage but only its servicing agent. However, the court reduced the sanctions imposed on Ameriquest from $250,000 to $5000 because of lack of harm to chapter 13 debtors and that the sanctions were imposed by the court sua sponte.
The circuit court decision was an appeal from the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy
court’s imposition of $250,000 in sanctions on Ameriquest. The district court had also affirmed the imposition of $25,000 in sanctions against Ameriquest’s local counsel, which were not
appealed. The district court reversed the $100,000 in sanctions against Ameriquest’s national
counsel because it did not sign any pleadings and thus was outside the scope of Rule 9011. In addition, the district court reversed sanctions imposed on Wells Fargo because it was not a party to the bankruptcy court proceedings until late in the case.
Lost Promissory Notes
Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248 (D. Mass. 2010)
District court holding that recorded assignment of mortgage was not sufficient to establish assignee's standing to enforce lost promissory note, and assignee failed to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in his search for note.
Page 25
Failure or Refusal to Account Properly for Mortgage Payments in Bankruptcy
In re De La Fuente, 430 B.R. 764 (S.D.Texas 2010)
Wells Fargo held in contempt for failure to account properly for post-petition payments made by successfully reorganized chapter 13 debtors and had failed to live up to agreed judgments in the case. Wells Fargo had repeatedly repeatedly failed to correct its records and had repeatedly imposed late charges and other fees on the debtors notwithstanding the fact that the debtors had timely made their payments under the chapter 13 plan.
In re Jones, 418 B.R. 687 (E.D.LA 2009)
Court imposed Accounting Procedures remedy on Wells Fargo after finding it had improperly collected certain charges in violation of terms of debtor’s confirmed plan and in violation of the
automatic stay. The court imposed this remedy and found that punitive damages were insuficient because Wells Fargo had violated a settlement agreement in the case and had “stubbornly” refused to change its procedures notwithstanding findings in several cases that the
procedures failed to comply with bankruptcy law, and that it continued to make the same errors in all its filings in claims and relief from stay motions.
Page 26
List of Judicial Opinions on Robo-Signers, Lost Promissory Notes, and Loan Servicers that Fail to
Account Properly for Mortgage Payments
I. Robo-Signers
Figueroa v. Merscorp. Inc., 2011 WL 3328221 (S.D. FL 2011)
Defendants allege that the persons executing alleged fraudulent assignments in order to gain standing to
complete foreclosures were robo-signers who lacked any knowledge of the truth or falsity of the
documents they were signing.
Jarbo v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, 2010 WL 5173825 (E.D. MI 2010)
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege claims based on foreclosure process problems related to the use of
robo-signers, but the court does mention that the use of robo-signers in the preparation of flawed and/or
fraudulent documents in connection with pending foreclosures is an issue that needs to be and is being
Inability of mortgagee to produce original promissory note underlying mortgage did not preclude
mortgagee from recovering on note after mortgage foreclosure sale left deficiency, under Wyoming
statute.
Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248 (D. Mass. 2010)
Recorded assignment of mortgage was not sufficient to establish assignee's standing to enforce lost
promissory note, and assignee failed to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in his search for note.
III. Loan Servicers that Fail to Account Properly for Mortgage Payments
Failure or Refusal to Account Properly for Mortgage Payments in Bankruptcy
In re De La Fuente, 430 B.R. 764 (S.D.Texas 2010)
Wells Fargo held in contempt for failure to account properly for post-petition payments made by
successfully reorganized Chapter 13 debtor.
In re Thrash, 433 B.R. 585 (N.D.Texas 2010)
In re Moffit, 390 B.R. 368 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008)
Court issued injunction against lender who misapplied and failed to record payments, sent
incomprehensible and frightening mortgage statements, and engaged in further mismanagement of
debtor’s loan.
In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327 (E.D.LA 2008)
Wells Fargo had difficulty producing certain information about claims it submitted. Opinion includes a
good discussion of the Fidelity MSP software platform used to manage home mortgage loans and the AIS
service that scans bankruptcy filings and compares them to the loans issued by Wells Fargo.
In re Jones, 418 B.R. 687 (E.D.LA 2009)
Court found that Wells Fargo had improperly collected certain charges in violation of term’s of debtor’s
confirmed plan and of the automatic stay.
In re Fitch, 390 B.R. 834 (E.D.LS 2008)
Accounting provided by Wells Fargo in this case was an improvement, although there will still some
issues, from the accounting in Stewart and Jones.
In re McKain, 2009 WL 2848988 (E.D.LA 2009)
Detailing the storied career of Ocwen, who once again appears before the court for improperly
administering a loan, providing illegible and radically incorrect mortgage statements, and attempting to
collect fees and costs to which it is not entitled.
Abusive Accounting Processes
In re Christoper W. Schuessler, 386 B.R. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
Page 28
JP Morgan Chase accounting policy preventing bankruptcy debtors from making payments at a bank
branch was an abuse of process.
In re Nosek, 363 B.R. 643 (Bankr.D.Mass. 2007)
Ameriquest Mortgage Company was sanctioned for failing to adjust its accounting procedures to reflect
payments on pre-petition arrears made through the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Ihebreme v. Capital One, N.A., 730 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C. 2010)
Court denied a motion to dismiss claim that Chevy Chase Bank breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by failing to credit payments made online.
Ferris v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 23 (D. Mass. 1995)
Court held the bank had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to
account properly for payments made to a mortgage escrow account.
Page 29
Page 30
Page 31
Page 32
Page 33
Page 34
Page 35
Page 36
Page 37
Page 38
Page 39
Page 40
Page 41
Page 42
Page 43
Page 44
Page 45
Page 46
Page 47
Page 48
Page 49
Page 50
Page 51
Page 52
Page 53
Page 54
Page 55
PANEL BIOGRAPHIES
Judge Samuel L. Bufford is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Penn State University, where he began teaching in 2011. Prior thereto, he served for 25 years as a bankruptcy judge in Los Angeles, in the Central District of California, one of the busiest bankruptcy courts in the United States. During this time he oversaw more than 100,000 bankruptcy cases, including more than 2500 cases involving the reorganization of business under chapter 11. His most famous case was the
Anna Nicole Smith case, in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed his decision that the dispute with her husband’s rich relatives belonged in a bankruptcy court and did not have to be litigated in a Texas state court.
Judge Bufford is the author of two books, numerous law review articles and 95 published opinions. His book, United States International Insolvency Law, was published in 2009. In addition, he is a frequent lecturer throughout the United States and abroad on issues of bankruptcy law and legal ethics. Judge Bufford served as editor in chief of the America Bankruptcy Law Journal from 1990 to 1994.
Judge Bufford has taught more than 25 seminars for judges and other professionals abroad since 1991. He has taught and consulted recently in Korea, Abu Dhabi, China, France, Mexico, Oman, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Albania, Algeria, Ecuador, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Morocco. He has also conducted seminars in Los Angeles and consulted with visiting judges and government officials from numerous countries including Russia, Serbia, China, Thailand, Romania and Montenegro.
Judge Bufford was Nomura Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School for the winter, 2005 term, where he taught a course in international and comparative insolvency law. He also taught this course at Harvard in 2004, and at the University of Southern California in 2006. He has also been a law professor at Ohio State University. He earned his law degree from the University of Michigan, where he was an editor of the Michigan Law Review and of the Journal of Law Reform. In addition, he holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Texas and was a philosophy professor for nearly ten years.
Alice Whitten was appointed as the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee in Fort Worth, Texas on October 1, 2009. Prior to her appointment as Chapter 13 Trustee she was Senior Vice President - Associate General Counsel for AmeriCredit Corp. & AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. She also served as their Senior Vice President – Special Accounts. From 1995 to 2001 she was in private practice with Forshey & Prostok, LLP and Cantey & Hanger, LLP in Fort Worth, Texas and West, Webb, Allbritton &
Gentry, P.C. in College Station, Texas. Ms. Whitten is admitted to practice before the Northern, Eastern and Southern Districts of Texas, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. She serves as Chairperson of the Non-Mortgage Committee for the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees.
Page 56
Ms. Whitten graduated from St. Mary’s University School of Law with her Juris Doctor Degree, cum laude, in 1995. She received a B.S. Degree in finance from the University of Minnesota in 1992.
SIDNEY H. SCHEINBERG of Glast, Phillips & Murray, P.C., Dallas, Texas received his J.D. from the University of Memphis, Southern Methodist University and a B.B.A. degree from the University of Memphis. Mr. Scheinberg’s practice focuses on the representation of secured creditors such as automobile finance companies and national banking associations in bankruptcy
litigation and in state court matters throughout Texas. Additionally, he litigates commercial disputes and other civil matters. Mr. Scheinberg has spoken at numerous seminars on bankruptcy law and commercial litigation nationwide and has hosted talk radio programs on legal matters. He is a member of the State Bar of Texas, the State Bar College, the Commercial Law League of America, the Executive Counsel for the Southern Region, the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees, the NACTT Creditors Auxiliary, and the American Bankruptcy Institute.