Three Roads to Sustainability - Considering Three Common Narratives in Conservation

The Three Paths to Sustainability

Mark Gibson, PhD StudentMichigan State University

May 2015

Overview

1. The Ideal vs. the Real2. A Sea Monster to the Rescue3. All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand4. Trust Me, We Can Do This Together5. Traversing the Conservation Reality

The Ideal vs. the Real

Theories, Frameworks & Models

Three tools in social science Theory (explanatory/predictive) Frameworks (descriptive) Models (normative)

Today we’ll focus on the types of models used in conservation

At it’s most basic, there are three narratives about how we achieve sustainability

Three Types of Models

These three narratives emphasize: Coercion Incentives Cooperation

I term these narratives: “A Sea Monster to the Rescue” “All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand” “Trust Me, We Can Do This”

A Sea Monster to the Rescue

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651

The State as Sovereign

Basic argument: State of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,

and short” To overcome, we need an absolute sovereign

Today, the leviathan is not a king, but the state

This argument can be applied to conservation

Modern Tragedies Garrett Hardin. 1968. “The Tragedy of the

Commons”. Science

Individually rational, collectively irrational Commons: fish, forests, freshwater, etc. Conclusion

Free access & unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation

Hardin’s Solutions

Hardin suggested two possible solutions: Strong state intervention – coercive force limits

exploitation Privatization – gives incentive to enforce

sustainable use

A Coercion Function

Possible Examples

Yellowstone National Park, est. 1872 Endangered Species Act of 1973 Fuel Economy Standards, first in place in 1978

All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776

The Market Produces the Best Outcomes

Basic argument: “by directing that industry in such a manner as

its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is…led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”

Limit the role of government to administration of justice and provision of public goods

This argument can be applied to conservation

Free Market Environmentalism

Terry Anderson & Donald Leal, 1991 Focus on:

Tort law Property Rights Market incentives

The state is often the problem Fuel subsidies Free access to national parks Lack of property rights

Possible Examples

High Efficiency Light Bulbs Erin Brockovich Pacific Gas & Electric Case North Pacific Halibut, catch shares in 90s

Trust Me, We Can Do This Together

Elinor Ostrom, 1990

Modern Origins?

Recent scholars have noted that sometimes individuals are able to cooperate and overcome the tragedy

This has led to the rise of modern models of conservation based on “cooperation”

It could perhaps be argued that a philosophical precursor can be found in both socialist and religious thought

Marx, 1867

An Institutional Theorist

Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012) 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, shared with Oliver

E. Williamson Indiana University and Arizona State University Founded the Workshop in Political Theory and

Policy Analysis at IU

Common Pool Resources Ostrom’s Law: A resource arrangement that

works in practice can work in theory. Most famous work is on how communities

are able to create their own solutions to manage common pool resources for long time periods

Private Goods (food, clothing, cars)

Common-pool Resources

(fish stocks, timber, coal)Club Goods

(golf course, satellite TV)Public Goods

(roads, air, national security)

Excludable/Non-excludable*

Rivalrous/ .

Non-rivalrous

Example: Alanya, Turkey

Highly Sophisticated Community-Solution

Alanya, Turkey 100 local fishers using 3-person boats Half members of fishing cooperative

Set up rules Every September, list of eligible fishers is prepared Fishing area divided into zones Fishers assigned zones by lots for Sept. to May

period Sept. to Jan., each fisher moves each day to the

next easterly location, after Jan., switch to moving westward

Eight Principles for Cooperative Solutions

P1: Clearly defined boundaries. P2: Rules adapted to local social and biological conditions. P3: Collective choice arrangements. P4: Accountable monitoring. P5: Graduated sanctions. P6: Provide accessible, lost cost means for dispute

resolution. P7: Recognition of rights to organize. P8: Nested systems.

Traversing the Conservation Reality

Conservation is Not “Either/Or”

In practice, we see a mix of these three models Which model dominates? Consider what matters most:

Coercion Incentives Cooperation

For example: Fisheries conservation often requires restructuring

property rights (incentives), but which are enforced by the state (coercion), and typically cannot be set up without fishermen’s support (cooperation)

Conserving Madagascar

Is any model more popular? Scales (2014) argues that there is a “fortress

conservation policy Establishment of protected areas has led to

severe restrictions on natural resource use and the disruption of livelihoods, property systems and cultural values

Horning (2012) notes the ineffectiveness of the the state, the “tame leviathan”

Conserving Madagascar (cont.)

Is another model likely to be more successful? Market Incentives?

Tourism-led conservation But geographically limited: Four national parks

(Andasibe-Mantadia, Isalo, Ranomafana, Montagne d’Ambre) and one special reserve (Ankarana) attracted over 88% of the visitors between 1992 and 2000.

Little employment generation Eco-labeling for fish

Conserving Madagascar (cont.)

Community Cooperation Co-management of nature reserves

Reserves mainly limit access to natural resources

Can Malagasy and conservation biologists agree?

Concessions for fisheries Blue Ventures suggests benefits are possible

Horning (2012) notes “some communities are conserving forests successfully while others are not”

Questions? Thoughts?