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A Preliminary Exploration of the Ideal of Compensatory Justice CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to determine whether or not the ideal of compensatory justice

is an attractive way to determine wage rates. Currently in most societies, the

market largely dictates how much workers receive in exchange for their

labour. I believe that the market does not determine wage rates in a just

manner. As a replacement, I propose the ideal of compensatory justice.

Compensatory justice is an ideal of distributive justice that focuses on what

people get paid in exchange for performing their jobs. Compensatory justice is

compensation for the work a person performs in her chosen occupation.

Imagine if incomes were adjusted so that each individual was compensated

with money for the work they did: those who worked very hard at horrible

tasks would be paid very well to compensate for their great sacrifice, and

those who did little at their cushy jobs would be compensated with a smaller

amount to reflect how little they sacrifice. This would fulfil the requirements

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of the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is egalitarian

because it seeks to equalise peoples package of workload -plus-income. It is

also liberal, as it takes into account how worthy workers are of compensation.

Defenders of the ideal of compensatory justice, either in part or in full,

include Joel Feinberg, James C. Dick, William Galston, Arthur DiQuattro,

Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, H. D. Dickinson and George Bernard Shaw. The

main thrust of the ideal is also reflected in Ronald Dworkins theory of

equality.

Dworkin believes a system of distribution should be ambition sensitive and

not endowment sensitive.1 This means that what people receive should be

relative to their choices and the effort they put into those choices, rather than

influenced by factors that are beyond their control. This captures the

underlying principles of the ideal of compensatory justice. In compensating

for the work people do, the distribution of income is sensitive to the choices

people make and the effort they exert in their occupation. And because

compensation comes for the work a person actually does (lifting pianos,

trading currency, etc.), not what they are (doctor, model, etc.), how talented or

untalented someone is will not affect the amount they are paid.

1 Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2 : Equality of Resources , Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.10, no.4, 1981, p.311.


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Compensatory justice is an intuitively fair ideal. 2 Some people work under

dangerous or unhealthy conditions, and many people work in stressful or

boring jobs. It seems fair that these people be adequately compensated for the

burdensome aspects of their jobs. Compensatory justice, for example, might

support compensation for hard workers due to their greater effort, and gives

lower pay to lazier workers, because they do not have as much need for

compensation. Compensation means an individual gets paid relative to how

hard she works and how much she enjoys or dislikes her job. All other things

equal, if a person loves her job and works at an easy pace at convenient hoursfor a short time, she would struggle to convince others that she should receive

a higher income than someone who hates her job, and works very hard during

her long and awkward working hours.

Compensatory justice combines values from liberalism and egalitarianism. It

is liberal in the sense that individuals are personally responsible for their

income. Unlike straightforward equality of income, compensatory justice

rewards those who work hard and those who perform arduous tasks for a

living, while giving less to those who do not work hard or have undemanding

jobs. It is also egalitarian, however, in the sense that people are to end up

equally well off when both income and labour burden are combined as a

package. As Dick says,

2 Joseph H. Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, Economics and Philosophy , v.1, 1985, p.41.

Comment [TD1]: Not sure I have thisintuition independently of the we needthe unpleasant job done consideration. Icould spend my days sorting though arubbish dump. It would be hard andunpleasant, but that surely doesnt entitleme to compensation of no one wants medo it. But if its the fact someone wants t job done, then it doesnt look like its theeffort or unpleasantness.One issue here is who is meant tocompensate on the hard and unpleasantview.

Comment [TD2]: Is this a subjectivemeasure? Suppose I hate teaching stage 1classes, while some of my colleagues donmind. The task is the same for all of us buthe subjective disutility varies dramaticallShouls I get higher compensation?


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the guidi ng principle should be that workers at all jobs be sorecompensed that when that nature of their work and theamount of their pay are considered together, all are treatedequally in the workplace. 3

Inequalities in income are only morally permissible under a system of

compensation if they reflect relative occupational disutility. Choices and

effort influence income; morally arbitrary factors do not. Egalitarian and

socialist proponents of compensatory justice view it as morally superior to the

neoclassical labour market where natural and social advantages (as well as

more general instances of luck) are allowed to influence income. Conversely,

liberals see compensatory justice as morally superior to the socialist model of

equality of income, as people are made responsible for the income they

receive.

One possible weakness of compensatory justice is that it does not reward

economic contribution. As Carens points out, under a compensation scheme,

lavatory attendants would probably get paid more than engineers. 4 This would

be fair according to the ideal of compensatory justice due to the relative

pleasantness of the two occupations. The problem may be however, that

without reliable material rewards for individuals who contribute more, society

may suffer from labour shortages in important areas. Without the appeal of a

high income, a would-be engineer might instead take a job as a lavatory

3 James C. Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.4, 1975, p.272. 4 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.42.


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attendant simply because she would garner a greater income in the more

unpleasant job. Proponents of the neoclassical labour market value its natural

reactivity to labour shortages in highly valued industries. The same inherent

efficiency is not found in compensation schemes. This means that some of

those who support the ideal of compensatory justice make room for material

incentives out of a concern for productive efficiency and economic output. 5

However this is to be seen as an outside concern and not part of the ideal of

compensatory justice; within compensatory justice such incentives would not

be permissible. Incentives for highly productive or particularly valuable

occupations would have to come out of a desire for enhanced efficiency.

Efficiency should be seen as a competing value that might justify constraining

aspects of compensatory justice, not as part of it. So, since what I am

concerned with at present is the ideal of compensatory justice, I will not take

this version of distributive justice to include efficiency-enhancing material

incentives.

Another potential problem for the ideal of compensatory justice is

measurement: how should the relative unpleasantness of certain jobs be

measured? One option is to assign the government the task of deeming the

amount of compensation necessary for all the various occupations. This would

mean that the measure of how enjoyable a job is would be objective; it would

5 Ibid, pp.42-3.


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be decided outside of how particular individuals felt about it. For example, if

someone worked as a receptionist but greatly disliked interacting with people,

her greater burden would not be compensated; she would receive the same

amount of income as all the other people doing the same job as her. Another

option then would be to have a subjective measure of labour burden one

where how people felt personally about their work determined their level of

compensation. Both approaches have problems.

For example, the objective method of measuring labour burden, as in the case

of the misanthropic receptionist, does not take into account the fact that

people will certainly feel differently about performing the same job. 6 But the

subjective means of measurement, which avoids this problem, does not react

to cases where peoples preferences for work are malformed. 7 If, as a child,

Bertrand was brainwashed to think plastering was the most venerable and

desirable occupation by his plasterer father, we might think it unfair if he does

not get paid as much as Damien who did not receive such messages regarding

his chosen occupation. A way around these problems is suggested by James

Dick. According to Dick, the correct amount of compensation can be

determined by a persons transfer earnings.

Economists distinguish two different types of pay in an individuals income:

(1) transfer earnings and (2) economic rent. Dick defines transfer earnings as

6 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, pp.42 -3. 7 Ibid, pp.42-3.


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the amount necessary to keep [a person] from transferring to another job 8

and economic rent as the difference between what [a person] actually

receives and the amount that would be enough to prevent him from

transferring. 9 Take the case of Alec, a successful novelist, who is paid an

average of $100 000 a year. Alec loves writing novels, and would continue to

write them even if he was earning much less than $100 000 per year. Alec

would only stop writing novels for a living if his income dropped below $40

000, in which case he would take a job as an English tutor at a language

school. So Alecs transfer earnings are only 40% of his total income $40000. The rest of his salary, $60 000, is economic rent. An individuals transfer

earnings equal the amount required to compensate her for her labour burden.

Under a scheme of compensatory justice, Alec would receive $40 000 per

year for writing novels.

Compensatory justice is a relatively unexplored concept in distributive justice.

However, the idea that incomes should reflect the relative disutility of an

occupation is common outside the realm of academia, although expressed

rather differently. For instance, it is not unusual for people to complain that

television celebrities salaries are exorbitant for the perceived amount of work

that they do. I believe cC ompensatory justice also has significant intuitive

8 Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, p.268. 9 Ibid, p.268.


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appeal to those of an egalitarian ilk. Given the large amount of egalitarian

theories in the field of distributive justice, it makes sense to see whether

compensatory justice is any kind of match for the more well-known ideals that

dominate the current academic landscape.

This thesis takes the ideal of compensatory justice and puts it under a

microscope, albeit a somewhat weak one, the ultimate aim of which being to

find out how promising attractive compensatory justice is as a just a means of

determining wage leveldirective for just distributions . This thesis can be seen

as a launch pad for a more rigorous examination of compensatory justice

, not a complete study in and of itself.

I begin by addressing compensatory justices prima facie compatibility with

egalitarianism. The aim of this initial task is to see what kind of egalitarian

might favour compensatory justice . I think this is a valuable exercise because

the answer to the question of whether or not the ideal of compensatory justice

is an attractive way to determine wage rates will depend on whom we ask.,

This process willand also help to clarify the moral grounds on which it

compensatory justice rests by analysing how it relates to various accounts of

equality . Chapter 21 sets out the categories of egalitarianism. Chapter 32

begins with an overview of compensatory justice, and goes on to assess es its

the prima facie compatibility of compensatory justice with the previously

demarcated types of egalitarianism. In this chapter I also give my opinion of

Comment [TD3]: I think the beginningneeds to be reworked a bit. If your topic iabout income reflecting disutility, then Iwould be inclined to start with that, rathethan with the general example of compensatory vs . distributive justice. (Myimmediate thought was that it was an oddpair: why would compensatory justice b=an element of distributive (as opposed, foinstance to corrective) justice?

Comment [TD4]: Too apologetic I think.Describe the project you are doing and sayoure doing it, rather than apologise fordoing some other project.


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whether or not compensatory justice is likely to be complementary to, or to

conflict with, each incarnation of egalitarianism.

The following two chapters look at the underlying moral foundations of

compensatory justice. I believe these to be desert, and, equality of

opportunity. In order to know if compensatory justice is an attractive

ideal, we need to see what is at its heart. We need to know what moral

stuff it is made of (so to speak). I believe the concepts of desert and equality

of opportunity lie at compensatory justice s core. However, these ideals are

broad, and only a particular kind of each will lend their support to

compensatory justice. Chapter 43 takes the concept of desert and whittles it

down to the precise variation that underpins compensatory justice; chapter 54

does the same to equality of opportunity. The resulting principles are deontic,

non-radical, moral, pre-institutional desert, and substantive equality of

opportunity (also called responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism). Chapter 54

ends with my attempt to show that these two principles are really one and the

same.

At this point I turn my attention to a key objection to compensatory justice:

the self-ownership objection to redistributive taxation. If the self-ownership

objection holds, compensatory justice cannot even get off the ground because

taxation is its most vital practical component. The question of whether or not

the finer points of compensatory justice are just is moot if it is not morally


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acceptable to redistribute income in the first place. Therefore the strength of

the self-ownership objection is of importance to any study of compensatory

justice. Chapter 65 is my attempt to show that the thesis of self-ownership

does not preclude taxation, and that furthermore, self-ownership is yet to be

defended adequately.

My final point of interest is an elementary part of compensatory justice:

labour burden. Compensation suggests remuneration for a burden, but what

constitutes burden in occupations? A metric for labour burden is the first step

required to flesh out the concept of compensatory justice from an amorphous

principle to an articulated system of redistribution. This is why the nature of

labour burden is the subject of chapter 76. In this chapter I look at several

possible measures of labour burden, coming to the conclusion that it is best

defined as subjective disutility in the area of work. Subjective disutility is a

welfarist metric, so subsequently, and finally, I talk about the expensive tastes

objection to welfarism and what it means for compensatory justice. Finally,

chapter 8 sums up my thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE2 : EGALITARIANISMS - DIFFERENT VIEWS FROM

DIFFERENT WINDOWS

I. Introduction

This chapter will identify the different branches of egalitarianism and locate

what distinguishes them from one another. As we shall see, different types of

egalitarianism have different ramifications for how one might view the idealof compensatory justice. The purpose of this, and of the following chapter, is

to discover what kind of egalitarian might find compensatory justice

attractive. I think those of an egalitarian persuasion are the most likely to see


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Comment [TD5]: I think somewhere hereyou need to say clearly what you think compensatory justice is: The discussionseems a bit unmotivated. You might start with an example a case which you couldthen use to structure the discussion.

Also or perhaps instead, need to saysomething (more) about why youre talkiabout egalitarianism.


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the value of compensatory justice because it seeks to equalise how well-off

people are when both income and labour burden are combined as a package. I

think it is possible that other theories of justice can see something valuable in

compensatory justice, but I deal with only egalitarianism here. As we shall

see, different types of egalitarianism have different ramifications for how one

might view the ideal of compensatory justice. In order to move on to the

analysis in the next chapter, I need to explain how I have categorised the

many ways to be egalitarian. In this chapter I set out the distinctions between

variants of egalitarianism by focusing on how each one values equality.

Section II explains what I consider egalitarianism to be. Section III discusses

the first type of egalitarianism: intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism.

Section IV moves onto the second branch, which I define as intrinsic personal

beneficial egalitarianism. Section V outlines instrumental impersonal

beneficial egalitarianism as the third variant of the equality view. The next

branch of egalitarianism is instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism and

it is explained in section VI. In section VII I talk about justice egalitarianism,

which differs from all the previous branches because it sees equality as just, as

opposed to good. Lastly, in section VIII, I note that procedural egalitarianism

is an also a kind of egalitarianism.


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II. The equality view

While prioritarians are generally considered egalitarians of a kind, myMy use

of the term egalitarian from now on refers to those who hold what Denis

McKerlie calls the equality view. 10 The equality view deems the relative

position of people to one another as morally important. Whether or not any

one person or group is badly off, the fact that any person or group is worse off

than another is a concern for egalitarians. Hence, egalitarianism is concerned

with relationships between individual lives, not the content of individual lives.

This poses a significant challenge for egalitarians because many philosophers

question the relevance of relative well-being in questions of distributive

justice. The core idea of their objection is that what egalitarians are really

concerned about, is the fact that some are badly off while others are well off,

not that there are different groups with different levels of well-being per se .

As Joseph Raz states:

What makes us care about various inequalities is not theinequality but the concern identified by the underlyingprinciple. It is the hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy,

the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are worseoff in the relevant respect than their neighbours is relevant. Butit is relevant not as an independent evil of inequality. Itsrelevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their needmore pressing, their suffering more hurtful, and therefore our

10 Denis McKerlie, Equality and Priority, Utilitas , v.6, no.1, May 1994, p.25.

Comment [TD6]: Again explain what thimeans. Its hard to see where it comes fro


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concern for the hungry, the needy, the suffering, and not ourconcern for equality, makes us give them priority. 11

Views such as Razs are prioritarian. Prioritarians advocate giving priority to

the concerns of the worst off, which could conceivably conflict with the ideal

of equality. Despite the objections to the equality view inherent in

prioritarianism, it is still considered highly valuable by egalitarians.

Egalitarians who are not prioritarian can be broken into several distinct groups

according to their defence of equality, which results in a number of different

types of egalitarianism. 12

The branches of egalitarianism I discuss in the next section are concerned

with outcomes. To be concerned with outcomes means to value equality in the

final distribution of things like resources or welfare. 13 In contrast to this view,

there is a kind of egalitarianism that is more concerned with what is often

called procedural equality, that is, the realisation of equal opportunities for

people to procure things like resources and welfare. For now though, I wish to

concentrate on types of egalitarianism that focus on outcomes .

11 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom . Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.240.12 I have left out prioritarianism in this preliminary investigation into the value of compensatory justice.13 Egalitarians disagree about the correct metric for equality. Here I suggest resources andwelfare because they are well-known and suffice as examples of the kind of metricegalitarians use to measure equality. I am putting aside the debate about what equality shouldbe measured by.


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III. Intrinsically impersonally beneficial egalitarianism

Different egalitarians value equality for different reasons. These variations

reflect important differences in the various strands that sit under the umbrella

term of egalitarianism. These differences have significant ramifications

when each ideal is applied to a situation or issue. So, with the overall aim of

analysing the application of the different versions of egalitarianism to the

labour market, I shall now clarify how different forms of egalitarianism differ

from one another, drawing attention to the specific manner in which each

assigns value to equality.

These distinctions are somewhat artificial because it is possible to be an

egalitarian for a number of confluent reasons. So, while the two overlap at

times, these categories should be viewed as tools of clarification and

comprehension as opposed to actual strains of thought. There are five main

ways to value equality: (1) as intrinsically impersonally beneficial; (2) as

intrinsically personally beneficial; (3) as instrumentally impersonally

beneficial; (4) as instrumentally personally beneficial; and (5) as a

requirement of justice. Let us begin with (1), the view that equality is

intrinsically impersonally beneficial.


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This brand of egalitarianism values equality between persons as an end in

itself. Equality is then intrinsically valuable because it is considered a stand-

alone virtue. On this view, equality need not produce any positive effects

because equality itself is the aim. Through this strictly intrinsic account of the

value of equality, this view also commits itself to an impersonal view of the

good. 14

This means that the question of whether or not something is beneficial can be

answered autonomously independently of how it affects people. So an

impersonal view of equality that holds equality as valuable does so even when

equality affects people adversely. Indeed, whether people are favourably

affected, adversely affected or not affected at all, equality still has value

according to this particular view.

Finally, this branch of egalitarianism takes equality to be beneficial as

opposed to just. Equality is taken as an ideal alongside notions such as justice

and freedom; it is not defended by an appeal to fairness such as views about

equal shares of societys resources. Also, inequalities are taken to be bad

even when they are not caused by human activity or cannot be altered. 15 This

14 This idea of equality being defensible as an impersonal good is taken from Larry Temkinsarticle titled Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection in Matthew Clayton andAndrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality . New York, St. Martins Press, 2000.15 The view that inequalities are bad even when they are unalterable refers to a distinctionmade by Derek Parfit in his article Equality or Priority? in Clayton and Williams, The Idealof Equality , p.90. Here Parfit makes a dis tinction between Telic egalitarians and Deonticegalitarians by demonstrating that Telic egalitarians find equality to be bad even when noform of social activity brought it about, and even when social activity could not rectify it.

Comment [TD7]: I wouls sayindependently


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take on egalitarianism that I refer to as beneficial has been categorised by

different philosophers under such headings as non-instrumental

egalitarianism, 16 non-derivative intrinsic egalitarianism 17 and telic

egalitarianism (short for teleological) 18.

An intrinsic impersonal beneficial conception of equality can be said to be the

most pure and stringent version of egalitarianism. This is because it values

equality so highly and in so many cases. Imagine a society where there are

two groups, Rich and Richer. Both these groups are materially and

emotionally rich but Richer is slightly more so than Rich. This type of

egalitarianism would judge the inequality between Rich and Richer as bad,

even if making the two groups equal would affect the members of both groups

negatively. It should be noted that proponents of this view of equality can

value other ideals alongside equality utility and freedom being two

examples that would also play a part in advocating any change to a society.

So a concern for utility could conceivably override a move to equality for

Rich and Richer. However, this does not change the fact that this type of

egalitarianism still values equality irrespectively of how it affects people.

This is contrasted with the Deontic egalitarian view that nothing can be said about forms of

inequality that were not caused by social activity, or forms of inequality that cannot bealtered, because this view is only concerned with what should be done. If an inequality wasnot achieved through the actions of people then there has been no wrongdoing becausenothing has been done at all; and if an inequality is unalterable then nothing can be done, sonothing can be done wrongly.16 Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, p.1 30.17 Clayton and Williams, Some Questions for Egalitarians , in Clayton and Williams, The

Ideal of Equality , p.17.18 Parfit, Equality or Priority?, p.84.


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Many egalitarians see this as unjustifiable, if not incomprehensible if it is

irrelevant whether anyone is affected positively, why is equality even a

concern? Proponents of such a view value equality only if it is viewed as

beneficial to those who live under it. An example of this is intrinsically

personally beneficial egalitarianism.

IV. Intrinsically personally beneficial egalitarianism

This view differs from the previous one in that it values equality because it

has beneficial effects on people. This means that this brand of egalitarianism

has a personal view of the good, that is, that whether an outcome is good or

not depends on whether or not it is good for the people who live under the

conditions of that outcome. However, this view retains the idea that equality is

intrinsically valuable, which means that this view also contains the idea that

equality is beneficial to people in and of itself. To understand this conception

of equality, take T. M. Scanlons claim that equality is valuable because it rids

society of stigmatising differences in status. 19

19 T.M. Scanlon, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality in Clayton and Williams, The Ideal of Equality , p.46.


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Large differences in material well-being can be objectionableon the same ground: when the mode of life enjoyed by somepeople sets the norm for a society, those who are much worseoff will feel inferiority and shame at the way they must live.

The egalitarian character of this objection is shown by the factthat it provides a reason specifically for the elimination of thedifferences in question rather than an improvement of the lot of the worse off in some more general sense. This is obviously sowhere the differences are purely ones of status. But even wherethe basis of inferiority is a difference in material well-being,the aim of avoiding stigmatisation can in principle provide areason for eliminating the benefits of the better off (or forwishing that they had never been created) even if these cannotbe transferred to the worst off. 20

This illustrates the way in which equality can be seen simultaneously as

intrinsically valuable and good for people. The measure for equalitys

intrinsic worth is that it affects people in a favourable way. It is possible to

challenge my labelling and claim that stances like Scanlons are in fact

representative of an instrumental view of the value of equality. For example,

one could appeal to Derek Parfits position on the distinction between

instrumental egalitarians and intrinsic egalitarians:

Equality has many kinds of good effect, and inequality manykinds of bad effect. If people are unequal, for example, that canproduce conflict, envy, or put some people in the power of others. If we value equality because we are concerned withsuch effects, we believe that equality has instrumental value:we think it good as a means. 21

20 Ibid, p.43.21 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.


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I believe however that while in many cases this would be true in the case of

conflict for example in a case like Scanlons (this may or may not be the

only one), even though equality of sense of status can be labelled an effect,

because it is extremely likely to be brought about by equality and only

equality can bring it about, save enlisting some kind of brainwashing

machine, it is reasonable to summarise that it is equality itself that is valued,

and not its role in bringing about some other ideal. So it makes sense to say

equality is intrinsically valuable to Scanlon and others, so long as they are

able to defend the position that equality and only equality bring about aparticular good effect on people.

So, to those who I have convinced at least, this conception of the value of

equality is still intrinsic, and not instrumental, because equality itself is

viewed as a good. It is however different in the sense that it derives equalitys

intrinsic worth from its promotion of the personal good, and not from what

may be a more amorphous and potentially harder to defend impersonal

good. This can be seen as a slightly softer and more defensible version of

egalitarianism. Let us then apply this version of egalitarianism to the case of

Rich and Richer and see how it differs from the previous one.

In the case of Rich and Richer, this type of egalitarianism would still

recommend a move to equality, but this would be on the basis that the new

equality between people would affect those people favourably. As with the


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first brand of egalitarianism, it is possible for egalitarians that hold this view

of equality to be pluralistic about their approach to distributive justice. So, as

before, concerns sourced from other ideals like utility and freedom could

theoretically outweigh any benefits that equality is expected to produce.

However, equality is still considered an ideal; a concern that should be given

significant weight and consideration even when it is merely one of several

ideals that constitute a pluralistic moral outlook.

Finally, as with the first view of equality, this view takes equality to be

beneficial as opposed to just. Equality is attributed value as something which

is good. Equality is believed to make an outcome better than one that is

unequal, not more just. Equality is a good according to this view, not a

requirement of a theory of fairness.

So, the view that equality should be understood as intrinsically personally

beneficial values equality because it affects people positively in a morally

important way; it relieves feelings of inferiority for example. The next brand

of egalitarianism I will discuss values equality because it causes something

that is beneficial in a morally important way. This approach differs from the

view that equality is intrinsically personally beneficial in two respects: a) it

values equality only in so far as it brings about another ideal, and b) this end

goal ideal is thought to be good independently of its effects on people. This

type of egalitarianism is (3) instrumentally impersonally beneficial.


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V. Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism

Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism views equality as a means

rather than an end. This type of egalitarianism demonstrates an important shift

from valuing equality in itself to valuing equality for its effects. This

difference between intrinsic egalitarianism and instrumental egalitarianism

reflects a large discrepancy in their underlying principles. Parfit denies that

instrumental egalitarians are in fact r eal egalitarians: For true Egalitarians,

equality has intrinsic value. 22 Instrumental egalitarianism treats equality as a

mere means, which makes it far less devoted to equality in the theoretical

sensefor its own sake . So instrumental egalitarians tend to have greater

allegiance to whatever ideal they believe equality will promote than equality

itself while intrinsic egalitarians are committed to equality for its own sake.

Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism deems equality as

instrumentally valuable, it is also, however, characterised by the kind of ideal

it is ultimately concerned with. The end goal that equality between persons is

intended to promote is an impersonal good: an ideal that is valuable regardless

22 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.

Comment [TD8]: I think you mean for itsown sake?


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of how people are affected. Take political equality as an example. A

proponent of the view that considers equality to be instrumentally

impersonally beneficial might be primarily concerned with achieving political

equality between persons. Realising equality in the distribution of well-being

could be seen as a way of achieving political equality. Equality of resources

for example would discourage the concentration of wealth, which can often

lead to the concentration of political power. Equality in distribution could in

this way be instrumentally valuable to a proponent of political equality.

Such a view would involve a commitment to an impersonal good. In the same

way as the first, this brand of egalitarianism encompasses (albeit indirectly)

the notion of impersonal goods. Political equality is typically defended not on

the basis of it being beneficial at an individual level, but beneficial to a

society. The realisation of political equality through the distribution of well-

being could be defended on the grounds that it has positive effects on people,

making it a personal good this kind of view is discussed next. But if the end

goal is defended as an impersonal good (a beneficial ideal that is beneficial

even when it does not benefit individuals) it would be classifiable as this

particular type of instrumental egalitarianism. Finally, this view also considers

the end goal ideal and its advance via equality as bettering a situation, as

opposed to making a situation more just or fairer.


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Let us now apply the instrumental impersonal benefit view of equality to the

case of Rich and Richer. Let us also use political equality as our first-order

objective. Imagine that in the society made up of Rich and Richer, the Richer

group is more politically influential. If they were not, that is, if both groups

were politically equal, this kind of egalitarianism would not support a move to

equality. But if we take the Richer group of people to be more powerful in

influencing policy (via lobbying, ownership of large corporations and so on)

an instrumental egalitarian with the primary goal of achieving political

equality would defend an equal distribution of resources. Naturally, the biggerthe gap between Rich and Richer, the more likely political equality will be

threatened. So if it was the case that a society had two groups, Rich and

Slightly Richer, equality of resources would not be so much of an urgent goal

because it is likely to be a reasonably politically equal society. Here

instrumental versions of egalitarianism gain an advantage because they tend to

sit better with peoples intuitions. In this case, it is a significantly large gap

that is required before inequality can be objected to. And we shall see that the

next branch of egalitarianism, which is also instrumental, draws a conclusion

about Rich and Richer which is probably intuitive to many people.

VI. Instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism


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The fourth category of egalitarianism, the kind that values equality as

instrumentally personally beneficial, is similar to the previous one in that it

views equality as instrumental in achieving some other end, and because it

considers the attainment of its end goal as a good outcome (not primarily a

fair or just one). Indeed the only real difference is that the ideal that equality is

considered instrumental to achieving is a personal good rather than an

impersonal good. An example of a personal good is the relief of suffering

endured in conditions of poverty. The relief of suffering is normally deemed

to be beneficial because it is good for people themselves not for society to befree of people who are suffering. So taking this as an example, a proponent of

this egalitarian view would value equality on the grounds that it relieves

suffering. Now let us apply this view to the case of Rich and Richer.

Since no one is suffering under impoverished conditions in the society of Rich

and Richer, there is no support for a move to equality. For this brand of

egalitarianism to encourage equality between persons, equality must be

instrumental in bringing about a personal good. So, in this case where the

personal good is the relief of suffering a society of Poor and Rich for example

would be thought of as bad because the inequality in wealth and/or welfare

would affect the poor adversely in this way. As I mentioned earlier, this type

of judgement is more in line with peoples intuitions and makes it more

appealing than intrinsic accounts of equality. Comment [TD9]: Do you do anything wit this taxonomy?


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VII. Justice egalitarians

So far, all the views of equality have seen equality as beneficial. They have

taken equality to be either good for people, good in itself or instrumentally

good. The last category I specified earlier however does not view equality as

beneficial, but as a requirement of justice. This difference is important

because unlike goodness, justice is an artificial virtue, which means that it

applies to products of social interaction only.

To illustrate this, take the case of a baby that is born with only one arm,

purely through chance. It is not unjust that the baby only has one arm because

it could not have been born with two arms; no one is in charge of who gets

healthy limbs and who does not. It may however, be thought to be bad. The

first four categories of egalitarianism feel this way about inequality; inequality

is bad for whatever reason. But for justice egalitarians, inequality is

regrettable because it is unjust. Equality is taken as something social

institutions should promote in order to achieve justice in distribution, not

something which will make things better per se .


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An example of this justice-based view is egalitarianism that is based on a

social contract. According to one this contractarian position, if all people are

engaged in producing, all have a claim to an equal share of what is

collectively produced. All other things equal, equal members of a society who

partake in the production of goods and services should be equally well-off.

Another example takes equality to be the correct distribution by default. When

there is no justification for inequality, equality is then the just outcome. So let

us assume for a moment that in the society of Rich and Richer, Richers

superior wealth is not justified by any principle of justice. Given that this

inequality is unjustified, according to this default position, wealth should be

redistributed equally. Another example is the view that inequalities in natural

abilities should not affect peoples life prospects.

According to this justice-based view, inequalities in individual well-being

caused by natural abilities are unjust. A naturally high IQ for example, should

not ceteris paribus allow someone to end up with a bigger pay packet than

someone who has a naturally low IQ. People should be made equally well-off

because inequalities in ability are simply endowed upon people by nature;

they are not a result of actions or decisions employed by the people

themselves. Note that it is not natural differences in ability that are unjust on

this view, but allowing them to affect well-being through social institutions,

for example the labour market.


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So there are a range of theories within egalitarianism as a requirement of

justice that are all fairly different from one another in the way they attribute

justness to equality. What they have in common is the way in which they

value equality, that is, as a requirement of justice. This is the factor that

distinguishes this form of egalitarianism from the first four types of

egalitarianism. This branch is not concerned with forms of inequality that are

not caused by social activity, or forms of inequality that cannot be altered by

social processes, because it is interested in what should be done. According to

this view, if an inequality was not achieved through the actions of people then

there has been no injustice because nothing has been done at all; and if an

inequality is unalterable then nothing can be done, so nothing unjust can be

done. 23

VIII. Equality of opportunity

Before I move on to the task of comparing compensatory justice with various

types of egalitarianism, Now I would like to add another category of

egalitarianis m.m, Tthis kind of egalitarianism values equality in the procedure

for distributing well-being. This procedural kind of egalitarianism also views

23 Parfit, Equality or Priority? , p.90.


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equality as just, but the metric of equality is different. The equality required

by justice is procedural whereas the former type of egalitarianism required

substantive equality. So instead of favouring equality of outcomes, procedural

egalitarianism favours equality of opportunities. This claim is seen as a less

strong version of egalitarian justice because it allows for large inequalities in

well-being when everyone has an equal opportunity to access well-being. An

example of this type of egalitarian view is demonstrated by John Rawls

notion of fair equality of opportunity.

Fair equality of opportunity, according to Rawls, is the combination of formal

equality of opportunity and the equalisation of social contingencies. 24 Formal

equality of opportunity entails a lack of formal barriers. For example, a law

that prohibits women from enrolling in university would count as a formal

barrier to opportunities for women. The removal of inequalities in social

advantages means that things like education should be made equal. Expensive

private schools that give an advantage to children in wealthy families for

example, would not be permitted. The background idea being that everyone

should have an equal chance at achieving well-being. To use a common

analogy: everyone should start the race at the same place and be subject to the

same rules.

24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.73.


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So procedural equality is essentially equality of opportunity, whereas

substantive equality (demonstrated by the previous five categories) is

essentially equality of outcomes. In the former, the rules of distribution are

supposed to be fair, and in the latter, the result of distribution is supposed to

be fair. Let us now review the various types of egalitarianism I have outlined.

IX. Conclusion

Firstly I discussed the egalitarian view that equality is intrinsically

impersonally beneficial. This variant of egalitarianism values equality as

intrinsically good irrespective of its effects on individuals. The second

category I outlined views equality as intrinsically personally beneficial. As

with the first, this branch of egalitarianism values equality as an intrinsic

good, but differs in that equality is taken to be beneficial to peoples lives.

The third version of egalitarianism I described views equality as

instrumentally impersonally beneficial. This position holds that equality is

valuable in so far as it promotes a particular impersonal good. The fourth kind

of egalitarianism is the same as the third except that the good it wishes to

advance is a personal good, so it values equality as instrumentally personally


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beneficial. The fifth category is different to all the previous ones because it

views equality as a requirement of justice. Equal outcomes are thought to be

valuable because they are a requirement of justice and not simply beneficial to

people or society. The last category I listed also values equality as a

requirement of justice, but in a different space. While the fifth brand of

egalitarianism took equality of outcomes to be just, the sixth took equality of

opportunity to be just.

These branches overlap in most real egalitarian theories, which is not a

problem for the present analysis because what is important are the underlying

principles that these theoretical categories rest upon. There are clear divisions

that cut across these categories. These divisions are: instrumental versus

intrinsic, impersonal goods versus personal goods, goodness versus justness

and outcomes versus opportunities.

I now have a means of sorting the many types of egalitarianism that will allow

me to find out which of these variants is compatible with the ideal of

compensatory justice. I want to find out whether or not compensatory justice

is an attractive way to set wage levels, especially in the eyes of egalitarians as

I think they are most in tune with it.

Comment [TD10]: I think this chapterneeds, at6 least, some set up work to sho

why it matters to your thesis. It might bethat a fuller introduction would do it, or areordering, or perhaps some motivatingexamples. As it reads its a bit hard to s eethe point of the taxonomy.


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CHAPTER 32: PRIMA FACIE COMPATIBILITY AND POTENTIAL

CONFLICT OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF EGALITARIANISM

WITH THE IDEAL OF COMPENSATORY JUSTICE

I. Introduction

This chapter will examine the prima facie compatibility of the previously

outlined branches of egalitarianism with compensatory justice. Compensatory

justice is a type of labour market organisation that Joseph Carens calls a

liberal and egalitarian ideal 25. It involves restructuring the relationship

25 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social InstitutionsJoseph H. Carens, CompensatoryJustice and Social Institutions, Economics and Philosophy , v.1, 1985 , p.41.


Formatted: Centered


Comment [TD11]: Some version of this hto come earlier. With a sketch of what youre talking about, you might be able toshow why you need a foray into thetaxonomy of egalitarianism.


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between the performance of labour and the distribution of income, with the

overall aim of equality. It is of interestimportant then to test whether the

presumed egalitarian principles underlying compensatory justice are

compatible with all or any versions of egalitarianism.

To begin with I shall explain the ideal of compensatory justice and mention

some of the issues it evokes. ThenIn this chapter I shall discuss the prima

facie compatibility of each branch of egalitarianism with compensatory

justice, focusing on the relationship between how each branch values equality

and the principles intrinsic to compensatory justice. I will also note any

potential areas of conflict.

Section III addresses the question: What is compensatory justice? In section

III begins my searchforay into into compensatory justices prima facie

compatibility by comparing it to intrinsic impersonal beneficial

egalitarianism. Section I IIV looks at how intrinsic personal beneficial

egalitarianism and compensatory justice seem to compare. In section IV,

compensatory justice is set up against instrumental personal beneficial

egalitarianism, and prima facie compatibility between the two is assessed.

Section V I does the same to instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism,

while sections VI I and VII I compare compensatory justice to justice

egalitarianism and procedural egalitarianism respectively.

Comment [TD12]: Grammar/Typo Ibegin?


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II. What is compensatory justice?

Compensatory justice is an ideal of distributive justice that focuses on what

people get paid in exchange for performing their jobs. Compensatory justice is

compensation for the work a person performs in her chosen occupation.

Imagine if incomes were adjusted so that each individual was compensated

with money for the work they did: those who worked very hard at horrible

tasks would be paid very well to compensate for their great sacrifice, and

those who did little at their cushy jobs would be compensated with a smaller

amount to reflect how little they sacrifice. This would fulfil the requirements

of the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is egalitarian

because it seeks to equalise peoples package of workload -plus-income. It is

also liberal, as it takes into account how worthy workers are of compensation.

Defenders of the ideal of compensatory justice, either in part or in full,

include Joel Feinberg, James C. Dick, William Galston, Arthur DiQuattro,

Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, H. D. Dickinson and George Bernard Shaw. The

main thrust of the ideal is also reflected in Ronald Dworkins theory of

equality.

Comment [TD13]: As above, I thinktyouneed some reordering. This should be inintroduction or at least very early on.


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Dworkin believes a system of distribution should be ambition sensitive and

not endowment sensitive.26 This means that what people receive should be

relative to their choices and the effort they put into those choices, rather than

influenced by factors that are beyond their control. This captures the

underlying principles of the ideal of compensatory justice. In compensating

for the work people do, the distribution of income is sensitive to the choices

people make and the effort they exert in their occupation. And because

compensation comes for the work a person actually does (lifting pianos,

digging graves, etc.), not what they are (doctor, model, etc.), how talented oruntalented someone is will not affect the amount they are paid.

Compensatory justice is an intuitively fair ideal. 27 Some people work under

dangerous or unhealthy conditions, and many people work in stressful or

boring jobs. It seems fair that these people should be adequately compensated

for the burdensome aspects of their jobs. Compensatory justice also supports

compensation for hard workers due to their greater effort, and gives lower pay

to lazier workers, because they do not have as much need for compensation.

Compensation means an individual gets paid relative to how hard she works

and how much she enjoys or dislikes her job. All other things equal, if a

person loves her job and works at an easy pace at convenient hours for a short

time, she would struggle to convince others that she should receive a higher

26 Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2, p.311. 27 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.41.

Comment [TD14]: Not sure I have thisintuition independently of the we needthe unpleasant job done consideration. Icould spend my days sorting though arubbish dump. It would be hard andunpleasant, but that surely doesnt entitleme to compensation of no one wants medo it. But if its the fact someone wants t job done, then it doesnt look like its theeffort or unpleasantness.One issue here is who is meant tocompensate on the hard and unpleasantview.


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income than someone who hates her job, and works very hard during her long

and awkward working hours.

Compensatory justice combines values from liberalism and egalitarianism. It

is liberal in the sense that individuals are personally responsible for their

income. Unlike straightforward equality of income, compensatory justice

rewards those who work hard and those who perform arduous tasks for a

living, while giving less to those who do not work hard or have undemanding

jobs. It is also egalitarian, however, in the sense that people are to end up

equally well off when both income and labour burden are combined as a

package. As Dick says,

the guiding principle should be that workers at all jobs be so recompensed

that when that nature of their work and the amount of their pay are considered

together, all are treated equally in the workplace. 28

Inequalities in income are only morally permissible under a system of

compensation if they reflect relative occupational disutility. Choices and

effort influence income; morally arbitrary factors do not. Egalitarian and

socialist proponents of compensatory justice view it as morally superior to the

neoclassical labour market where natural and social advantages (as well as

28 James C. Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.4, 1975, p.272.

Comment [TD15]: Is this a subjectivemeasure? Suppose I hate teaching stage 1

classes, while some of my colleagues donmind. The task is the same for all of us buthe subjective disutility varies dramaticallShouls I get higher compensation?


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more general instances of luck) are allowed to influence income. Conversely,

liberals see compensatory justice as morally superior to the socialist model of

equality of income, as people are made responsible for the income they

receive.

One possible weakness of compensatory justice is that it does not reward

economic contribution. As Carens points out, under a compensation scheme,

lavatory attendants would probably get paid more than engineers. 29 This

would be fair according to the ideal of compensatory justice due to the

relative pleasantness of the two occupations. The problem may be however,

that without reliable material rewards for individuals who contribute more,

society may suffer from labour shortages in important areas. Without the

appeal of a high income, a would-be engineer might instead take a job as a

lavatory attendant simply because she would garner a greater income in the

more unpleasant job. Proponents of the neoclassical labour market value its

natural reactivity to labour shortages in highly valued industries. The same

inherent efficiency is not found in compensation schemes. This means that

some of those who support the ideal of compensatory justice make room for

material incentives out of a concern for productive efficiency and economic

output. 30

29 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.42. 30 Ibid, pp.42-3.


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However this is to be seen as an outside concern and not part of the ideal of

compensatory justice; within compensatory justice such incentives would not

be permissible. Incentives for highly productive or particularly valuable

occupations would have to come purely out of a desire for enhanced

efficiency. Efficiency should be seen as a competing value that might justify

constraining aspects of compensatory justice, not as part of it. So, since what I

am concerned with at present is the ideal of compensatory justice, I will not

take this version of distributive justice to include efficiency-enhancing

material incentives.

Another potential problem for the ideal of compensatory justice is

measurement: how should the relative unpleasantness of certain jobs be

measured? One option is to assign the government the task of deeming the

amount of compensation necessary for all the various occupations. This would

mean that the measure of how enjoyable a job is would be objective; it would

be decided outside of how particular individuals felt about it. For example, if

someone worked as a receptionist but greatly disliked interacting with people,

her greater burden would not be compensated; she would receive the same

amount of income as all the other people doing the same job as her. Another

option then would be to have a subjective measure of labour burden one

where how people felt personally about their work determined their level of

compensation. Both approaches have problems.


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For example, the objective method of measuring labour burden, as in the case

of the misanthropic receptionist, does not take into account the fact that

people will certainly feel differently about performing the same job. 31 But the

subjective means of measurement, which avoids this problem, does not react

to cases where peoples preferences for work are malformed. 32 If, as a child,

Bertrand was brainwashed to think plastering was the most venerable and

desirable occupation by his plasterer father, we might think it unfair if he does

not get paid as much as Damien who did not receive such messages regarding

his chosen occupation. A way around these problems is suggested by JamesDick. According to Dick, the correct amount of compensation can be

determined by a persons transfer earnings.

Economists distinguish two different types of pay in an individuals income:

(1) transfer earnings and (2) economic rent. Dick defines transfer earnings as

the amount necessary to keep [a person] from transferring to another job 33

and economic rent as the difference between what [a person] actually

receives and the amount that would be enough to prevent him from

transferring. 34 Take the case of Alec, a successful novelist, who is paid an

average of $100 000 a year. Alec loves writing novels, and would continue to

write them even if he was earning much less than $100 000 per year. Alec

would only stop writing novels for a living if his income dropped below $40

000, in which case he would take a job as an English tutor at a language

31 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, pp.42 -3. 32 Ibid, pp.42-3. 33 Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, p.268. 34 Ibid, p.268.


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school. So Alecs transfer earnings are only 40% of his total income $40

000. The rest of his salary, $ 60 000, is economic rent. An individuals transfer

earnings equal the amount required to compensate her for her labour burden.

Under a scheme of compensatory justice, Alec would receive $40 000 per

year for writing novels.

Setting aside the feasibility of compensatory justice as a model of distribution,

and any potential problems the ideal may intrinsically have, it should be clear

by this point what the ideal of compensatory justice entails. So now I shall

examine if compensatory justice is prima facie compatible with various kinds

of egalitarianism. Comment [TD16]: So I think it is just cleathis material has to come first. It describean interesting puzzle. I think from here(though I havent see how this goes yet) yneed to describe why the puzzles aroundcompensatory justice lead to the discussiof egalitarianism (I don think thats clearyet).


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II I . Intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory

justice

In the previous chapter I defined the branches of egalitarianism according to

why and how each values equality they are as follows: (1) intrinsic

impersonal beneficial egalitarianism; (2) intrinsic personal beneficial

egalitarianism; (3) instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism; (4)

instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism; (5) justice-based

egalitarianism; and (6) procedural egalitarianism. These distinctions are

theoretical and not taxonomical; this is because theoretical distinctions make

it easier to analyse the compatibility of different kinds of egalitarianism with

different modifications to labour market. These categories are defined by the

underlying principles of each brand of egalitarianism. It is these principles

that are important in discerning compatibility with compensatory justice

this is why I separate and compare them on this basis.

So does it seem like the first branch of egalitarianism is compatible with

compensatory justice? Its underlying principles will show whether or not it is.

Intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism takes equality between persons

to be good in itself. This means that equality is intrinsically valuable, or, to

put it another way, equality need not produce any positive effects since

equality itself is believed to be good. How does valuing equality intrinsically


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as goods whose promotion is to the benefit of society. So how does this aspect

of intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism fit in with compensatory

justice? Are the two still prima facie compatible?

The last constituent principle of intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism

is not as obviously compatible with compensatory justice, but is not obviously

incompatible either. The beneficial value attached to equality does not suggest

straight out incompatibility, but more a potential source of tension and

conflict. Egalitarians of this sort are likely to be moral pluralists; as explained

by Larry Temkin, who advocates moral pluralism including valuing equality

as an intrinsic, impersonal good:

Equality is not all that matters, but it matters some. Advocatesof the Levelling Down Objection are mesmerised by pure

equalitys terrible implications. But equality is not the onlyideal that would, if exclusively pursued, have implausible oreven terrible implications. The same is true of justice, utility,freedom, and probably every other ideal. Recall Kants viewthat justice be done though the heavens should fall. Do wereally think, with Kant, that it would be wrong to falselyimprison an innocent man for even five minutes, if it werenecessary to save a million innocent lives? Or consider theprinciple of utility, which would require us to torture aninnocent person if only enough people had their lives improvedby the tiniest amounts because of our action. Or finally,consider the implications of unfettered freedom to act as onewants without government interference, as long as one doesntinterfere with the rights or liberties of others. Such a principlemight allow complete neglect of the least fortunate, evenregarding basic necessities such as food, clothing shelter, andhealthcare. Such considerations do not show that justice,


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utility, and freedom should be rejected moral ideals, onlythat we should be pluralists about morality. 35

Setting aside the strengths and weaknesses of moral pluralism, how does

adopting intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism within a pluralistic

moral view affect its compatibility with compensatory justice?

Because equality is conceived as a good, it takes on the character of

something that is thought of in terms of the more the better. Without other

ideals to balance equality with, that is, outside a pluralistic view of morality,

intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism would want as much equality as

possible. In a scheme based on the ideal of compensatory justice however,

there would be only limited equality. There would be no equality of income,

but furthermore there would be no equality of job status (doctors may be

respected more than drain layers, for example), no equality of effort exerted

during working hours, no equality of working hours, and no equality of work

experience, to name but a few. Achieving equality in areas such as these is

usually limited by concerns for freedom and efficiency, but if equality is

either a lone ideal or valued highly enough, this may push extensive equality

up the list and make intrinsic impersonal beneficial equality less

companionable with compensatory justice. So while incompatibility is not an

accurate description to give in this case, it seems that without other values to

limit equality, compensatory justice might not meet the standards of intrinsic

35 Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection , p.155.


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impersonal beneficial egalitarianism, in that there may be an inadequate

amount of equality.

IIIV . Intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory

justice

The second branch of egalitarianism I defined in the preceding chapter is

intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism. An intrinsic personal beneficial

egalitarian values equality because she believes equality is good for people.

This view differs from the previous one in that it values equality because it

has good effects on people. This means that intrinsic personal beneficial

egalitarianism has a personal view of the beneficial ability of equality:

equality is good because it is good for people. However this kind of

egalitarianism, like the previous one, also contains the notion that equality is

intrinsically valuable, meaning that it also takes equality to be good in and of

itself only this time equality is supposed to be good in and of itself for

people . So how compatible is this brand of egalitarianism with the ideal of

compensatory justice?


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Intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism values equality in itself. In this

respect, as with the first type of egalitarianism intrinsic impersonal

beneficial egalitarianism it appears compatible with compensatory justice.

As long as a system of distribution produces equality, a type of egalitarianism

that values equality in itself is able to approve of it and is hence compatible

with it. A scheme based on the ideal of compensatory justice must, in order

for it to be satisfactory to its blueprint, produce equality. This equality is in

the area of income-received-plus-labour-burden. Compensatory justice is

compensation for the effort a person exerts at work and the unpleasantness of her occupation. This compensation results in equality of the package of

income-received-plus-labour-burden. The presence of such equality is

compatible with valuing equality as an intrinsic good because equality per se

is deemed valuable; that is, it need not generate any particular good effects

distinct from equality itself. But what about the point of difference between

the first and the second brands of egalitarianism the kind of good each takes

equality to be? Is a personal view, as opposed to the impersonal view, of

equalitys beneficial character also compatible with compensatory justice?

The view of equality as a personal good is the idea that equality is good for

people. This notion is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice.

Taking equality to be good for people and believing that people should be

compensated for their labour burden do not appear to be incompatible ideas.

But while the two are not prima facie incompatible, holding the wider belief


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that all goods are personal goods is not so in tune with the ideal of

compensatory justice.

Believing equality to be a personal good does not in any obvious way commit

one to the belief that all goods are personal goods that is, that goods must be

good for someone to be classified as good. However, it is not unlikely that

someone who believes equality is good for people as opposed to believing

equality is good irrespective of whether or not it is good for people, would

also hold a personal view of the good. If someone takes equality to be a

personal good, as opposed to an impersonal good, this suggests that she finds

the concept of equality being impersonally good (good no matter how it

affects people) unconvincing in the space of equality. It is then easy to

imagine such a person finding other ideals such as justice, freedom, efficiency

and so on, just as unconvincing when thought of as impersonally good. The

core idea that anything could be good if it was not good for someone may be

unconvincing itself to such a person.

John Broome presents the principle of personal good as follows:

The principle of personal good . (a) Two alternatives areequally good if they are equally good for each person. And (b)if one alternative is at least as good as another for everyone anddefinitely better for someone, it is better. 36

36 John Broome, Weighing Goods . Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p.165.


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A commitment to this view could potentially come into conflict with the ideal

of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice works on a premise of desert.

Individuals are compensated for what they deserve, hard workers are paid

high incomes, and lazy workers are paid low incomes; people with

burdensome jobs are paid a lot, and people with carefree jobs are paid a little.

The ideal of people getting what they deserve is a kind of justice, and is an

impersonal good. Under a scheme of compensation, it is possible that every

worker will receive a low income even though the pool of money that comes

in could allow them to be paid more. If every worker is lazy enough, or every

job is cushy enough, according to the principle of compensatory justice, pay

rates for everyone will be low. In an alternative scheme, everyone could work

as slowly as each other in similarly cushy jobs, but all the money would be

redistributed, even though the workers do not deserve it . People would receive

more than they deserved in absolute terms, while relative to one another, they

would fare the same as before. This second scheme would be better for

everyone. Compensatory justice in this case makes everyone worse off than

they could be. If one was open to the idea of impersonal goods, the scheme

based on the ideal of compensatory justice could still be preferable to the

second scheme, but if one believed the principle of personal good,

compensatory justice would be very hard to defend indeed. The principle of

personal good states that: if one alternative is at least as good as another for

everyone and definitely better for someone, it is better. 37 The second scheme

37 Ibid, p.165.


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is definitely better, not just for one person, but for everyone. Compensatory

justice has no inherent link to personal good it has no inner commitment to

having good effects on people. So while it is not intrinsically incompatible

with the principle of personal good, compensatory justice may not always

score highly on the personal good scale when compared to other systems of

distribution that are more connected to utility.

So valuing equality intrinsically is not prima facie incompatible with

compensatory justice, nor is taking equality to be a personal good. However, a

further commitment to the principle of personal good may make for a less

happy pairing. So far, as with the first branch of egalitarianism, intrinsic

personal beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with

compensatory justice. I have discussed the intrinsic value this view gives to

equality and its treatment of equality as a personal good. Finally I will discuss

the beneficial character this branch confers on equality.

As with the first branch of egalitarianism, the fact that intrinsic personal

beneficial egalitarianism sees equality as a good does not suggest prima facie

incompatibility. There is no innate conflict between the ideal of compensating

for work and believing equality to be beneficial. The view that equality is

beneficial may however potentially make compensatory justice less attractive.

This is because, when equality is seen as a good, the more equality there is,

the better the system of distribution becomes. As I mentioned earlier,


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egalitarians that value equality as beneficial are likely to be moral pluralists,

which will limit the reach of equality. However, equality may easily be valued

highly enough so that compensatory justice becomes inadequate and other

systems of distribution become more attractive. So, while the beneficial

character assigned to equality by intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarians is

not prima facie incompatible with the ideal of compensatory justice, it is not

completely in tune with it either.

IV. Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory

justice

I now move on to my third category of egalitarianism: instrumental

impersonal beneficial egalitarianism. This category sees equality as a means

rather than an end, signalling a key shift away from valuing equality in of

itself to valuing equality for its ability to produce some other ideal. A

significant divergence in underlying principles is reflected in the move from

intrinsic egalitarianism to instrumental egalitarianism. As I have mentioned in

other places, Derek Parfit has made the claim that instrumental egalitarians

are not real egalitarians: For true Egalitarians, equality has intrinsic value. 38

38 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.


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Instrumental egalitarians value equality in so far as it promotes some other

aim. They do not see value in equality itself.

So how does this difference affect this brand of egalitarianisms compatibility

with the ideal of compensatory justice? Instrumental egalitarians, while

valuing equality for different reasons than intrinsic egalitarians, still value

equality as a good. This means that as with intrinsic egalitarians, instrumental

egalitarians are concerned with the presence of equality. Equality is still good

it is just good for a different reason. So because compensatory justice aims

for equality (in the area of labour burden and income, taken together as a

package), instrumental egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with the ideal

of compensatory justice.

There is room for conflict, however. The kind of equality present in a scheme

of compensation for labour burden is a specific type of equality that may or

may not engender the ideal that equality is supposed to be instrumental in

bringing about. Take for example the end goal ideal of political equality.

Someone who wants political equality might be an instrumental egalitarian

because she sees equality of resources as instrumental to achieving political

equality. However, schemes built on the ideal of compensatory justice will not

necessarily have equality of any degree in the area of resources. People who

choose to work hard in unpleasant occupations will receive high incomes

under a compensation scheme, making these people more resource-rich than


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those who enjoy their jobs and work at a comfortable pace. Compensatory

justice is compatible with great inequalities of income, and an instrumental

type of egalitarianism with an end-goal of political equality is likely to be

incompatible with large gaps in income across society. So in order for

instrumental egalitarianism to be compatible with compensatory justice, its

specific breed of equality equality of labour burden must satisfactorily

bring about the particular end-goal ideal that equality is supposed to be

instrumental to. In saying this however, at the primary stage of examination,

there is nothing incompatible about instrumental egalitarianism andcompensatory justice.

Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism is unique in the sense that

the end-goal ideal is an impersonal good. So the ideal in which equality is

supposed to bring about is taken to be good, regardless of how people are

affected. Political equality is such an ideal. So how does this impact

instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory justices

compatibility? The fact that this brand of egalitarianism values equality

because it brings about an impersonal good is prima facie compatible with

compensatory justice. Valuing something as an impersonal good is not

counter to the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is an

impersonal ideal; as such, there is no salient suggestion of incompatibility or

potential for conflict in this area.


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With all the branches of egalitarianism discussed so far, equality has been

seen by instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarians as a good. Therefore,

as with the other two branches, the beneficial facet of instrumental impersonal

beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice.

However, as with these other two branches of egalitarianism, this aspect also

suggests possible tension with compensatory justice due to the potential extent

to which equality may dominate a moral view. If equality is given

significantly more weight than other values, it could find the amount of

equality present in a compensation scheme unsatisfactory.

VI. Instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory

justice

The fourth branch of egalitarianism to examine is instrumental personal

beneficial egalitarianism. This kind of egalitarianism values equality in a very

similar way to the previous kind, in that it values equality as an instrument in

achieving some other good. The two differ only in that one is primarily

concerned with an end-goal ideal that is taken to be an impersonal good, while

the other takes this end-goal ideal to be a personal good. So in terms of prima

facie compatibility instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism does seem


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compatible with compensatory justice on two counts. Instrumental

egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice (although,

as I have discussed, there is potential for conflict on this count) and beneficial

egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice (although

there is also room for tension in this aspect). The third aspect appears

compatible also.

There are no clear irreconcilable principles between the ideal of compensation

for labour burden and valuing equality because it is instrumental to a personal

good. Compensatory justice aims to equalise the income-plus-labour-burden

package and instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism aims for equality.

Unlike the last branch however whose end goal ideal was an impersonal

good this branch suggests a possible area where further tension may arise.

This tension is the same as that which I discussed with reference to intrinsic

personal beneficial egalitarianism. If, in addition to valuing the end-goal ideal

as a personal good, an instrumental personal beneficial egalitarian maintained

the principle of personal good, then compensatory justice may not be

defensible in her eyes since it is an impersonal ideal. But the principle of

personal good that all goods are personal goods is not in any way

inextricably bound to the idea that one good is a personal good. So in total,

instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with

compensatory justice.


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VII. Justice egalitarianism and compensatory justice

The fifth category I defined was justice-based egalitarianism. The first four

categories take equality to be something which makes things good, either for

people, or just good full stop. But this view values equality in the sense that is

required by a theory of justice. Equality is taken as something social

institutions should promote in order to achieve justice in distribution, and not

as a good-producing phenomenon. This kind of egalitarianism does not

attribute a more the better character to equality; instead it sees equality as a

fair distribution given a particular line of argument. So, is this justice-based

kind of egalitarianism compatible with the ideal of compensatory justice?

The abstract exercise of taking equality to be a requirement of justice is

compatible with the ideal of compensatory justice. This is because

compensation for labour burden defends equality on the basis of justice.

Compensatory justice is a theory of justice that views compensation for work

as a requirement of fairness. But a level down from pure abstraction, we find

that a justice-based egalitarian holds a particular theory of justice that has

equality as its aim. In this sense, without knowing the ins and outs of this

particular theory of justice, talk of compatibility is purely speculative (though,

there may well be incompatibilities once this information gap is filled). At the

same time, a theory of justice that recommends equality may well be

compatible with compensatory justice. Compatibility with

Thesis Main Part

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