Thesis Completed 30 April 2013

ABSTRACT

Humane Authority:

Looking to pre-Qin Philosophy for an Alternative to Chinese Hegemony in the South China Sea

Jared N. Strickland

Director: Xin Wang, Ph.D.

Within the field of international relations, many look to China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and predict a bellicose future. Some say China is destined for revisionist ambitions and hegemonic desires, as all rising powers before it have been. These views, though, tend to stem from a long line of Western thought, dependent on an understanding of human nature and power as seen by classical Western thinkers like Thucydides and Machiavelli. In this thesis, I contend that China could benefit from disregarding certain tenets of Western international relations theory and instead looking to its civilizational roots for advice. I use the writings of Mencius, a Chinese philosopher of the Warring States Period, and Yan Xuetong, a prominent international relations theorist from Tsinghua University, to provide principles of “humane authority” as an alternative framework for China’s rise in the South China Sea.

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: Dr. Xin Wang, Associate Professor of Chinese, BIC & MFL

APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: Dr. Andrew Wisely, Director

DATE:____________________

HUMANE AUTHORITY:

LOOKING TO PRE-QIN PHILOSOPHY FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHINESE HEGEMONY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

Baylor University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Honors Program

By

Jared N. Strickland

Waco, Texas

May 2013

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Table of Contents

List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. iv CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................. 1

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 SCS History ................................................................................................................ 3 Contemporary Conflict ............................................................................................... 7 Realism, the SCS, and Humane Authority ................................................................ 12

CHAPTER TWO .............................................................................................................. 17 Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 17

Western International Relations Theory ................................................................... 17 Mencus and Humane Authority ................................................................................ 25 Chinese Foreign Policy ............................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER THREE .......................................................................................................... 31 Analysis......................................................................................................................... 31

Human Nature, Hegemony, and Realism ................................................................. 31 Three Principles of Humane Authority ..................................................................... 40

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................. 45 Discussions and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 45

Big Nations, Small Nations, and Balancing Rights with Responsibilities ............... 45 “Salami Slicing” and Reversed Double Standards ................................................... 47 Charm Offensive and tianxia .................................................................................... 54

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 57 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 59

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List of Figures Figure 1: SCS by EIA ......................................................................................................... 7

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Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Xin Wang, my thesis advisor, for his help and his

patience throughout this process. I am proud to have come this far, and I could not have

done it without him. Thank you, also, to the professors willing to serve on my defense

panel, Dr. Candi Cann and Dr. Charles McDaniel. I am appreciative of your time in such

a busy period, and I know your feedback will provide me with a more wholesome and

well-rounded understanding of my topic.

I am grateful also to many from the Department of Political Science, among

whom I would especially like to thank Dr. Ivy Hamerly, Professor Rex Carr, and Dr.

David Clinton for the generous way in which they allowed me to use their office hours

over the past year. In some cases, this time was used to discuss ideas found in this thesis.

In others, it was used to simply help me deepen my understanding of international

relations. Both were formative in teaching me the value of spending extra time to fathom

big ideas.

Thank you to many professors from the Baylor Interdisciplinary Core, especially

Dr. Anne-Marie Schultz, Dr. Lydia Bean, and Dr. Charles McDaniel for teaching the

courses that made me think deeply about life, society, and history. Thank you as well to

the professors from the Department of Aerospace Studies, especially Lt Col Carl Wooten,

Major David Lamkin, and Captain Leonard Sobieski for preparing me for what is to

come after college. Finally, my sincere gratitude to Mrs. Elizabeth Vardaman for her

help and mentorship since my junior year. While not always directly connected to the

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content of this research, it has been through contact with these professors and mentors

that has motivated me to stay engaged while at Baylor.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Few geopolitical disputes in the 21st century will shape more of the international

community’s future than the conflict in the South China Sea (SCS). Energy abundance,

vital trade routes, and sovereignty disputes all abound in this area. More scarce, however,

have been effective solutions to dissension among China, Taiwan, and member states of

the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in claiming sovereignty of the

region. Some have even likened the SCS dispute to a game of strategy:

The Paracels and Spratlys are studied the way one would examine the pawns in a game of chess. In themselves they are unimportant, but in certain situations they gain significance, and mediocre players may pay inordinate attention to their protection. There is also the faint possibility that a pawn can be changed into a queen, for instance if oil is discovered. In order to understand the constellations that push simple pawns into the limelight, they must be seen in relation to the general balance of forces on the chessboard, and the strategies of all players.1

The fact that “pawns” may change into “queens” in the conflict is commonly known

among disputants, and it has made resolution all the more difficult, as nations realize they

have something significant to lose if another state gains control of the region. The U.S.

Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that the SCS contains 11 billion

barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proven and probable reserves.

For comparison in both respects, this is approximately the level of proven and probable

reserves of oil and natural gas in all of Europe.2 Furthermore, in 2012, the U.S.

1 Tønnesson, Stein. "The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline." (Cambridge University Press) 2006. pp. 1. The Paracels and Spratly islands referred to are two of the primary islands being fought over in the SCS.

2 U.S. Energy Information Administration. "South China Sea." Analysis Brief, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013. United States Energy Information Administration. South China Sea. February 7, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS (accessed March 3, 2013).

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Geological Survey conducted a study, which concluded that anywhere from 5 to 22

billion barrels of oil as well as 70 to 290 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lay

undiscovered, in addition to the proven and probable reserves, in the SCS.3 If this were

not enough, in 2012 the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) claimed the

SCS holds significantly more undiscovered resources than suggested by Western studies,

estimating 125 billion barrels of oil (which would make it one of the most prolific

sources of oil in the world) and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.4

Making the high levels of hydrocarbons even more enticing, the past two decades

have seen Asia become a voracious energy consumer. Specifically, the EIA wrote in

2012 that Asia has become the largest user of petroleum (a product refined from crude oil)

of any region in the world. China, in addition, notably uses more energy than any other

single nation, and although the majority of its consumption comes from coal, the second

largest source is oil.5 This consumption is expected to continue to grow, as China (along

with Asia) continues to modernize its large population.6 Thus, Asia has both large and

growing energy demands. This, combined with the fact that several of these energy-

starved nations lie geographically next door to the hydrocarbon treasure of the SCS has

been a motivating factor in much of the conflict.

Furthermore, the SCS possesses the world’s highest level of biodiversity. Pelagic

fishing in the SCS is an important source of both food and income in Asia, and the

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 United States Energy Information Administration. China. September 04, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH (accessed April 01, 2013).

6 Kumagai, Takeo. Asia energy demand to double to 9 bil mtoe by 2035 - outlook. April 18, 2011. https://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Oil/8805632 (accessed April 01, 2013).

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fishing industry produces about 5 million tons of catch annually, which is about 10% of

the world’s annual catch.7 Vietnam depends on seafood as one of its biggest exports

(amounting to 7% of its exports in 2010) and China continues to be both the world’s

largest consumer and exporter of fish.8

In addition to energy and fishing stocks, discord in the SCS also stems from the

valuable trade that flows through its waters. The EIA wrote in 2013 that the SCS covers

some highly valuable and strategic trade routes. In fact, greater than half of the entire

world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage must pass through some of the SCS’s choke points

like the Straights of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok in order to reach its destination (which

is often also in the SCS). This annual tonnage also includes nearly a third of the world’s

crude oil and half of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). As a result, many Asian

states value the SCS as a critical maritime territory. They fear that if its sovereignty fell

into the hands of a hegemonic power, it could spell disaster for other nations competing

to extract its energy, fish its waters, or navigate its sea-lanes.

SCS History

As many nations have known about the value of the SCS for some time, interstate

competition for control of this region is nothing new. Based on the works of Stein

Tønnesson, a SCS historian, the dispute can be looked at in three essential historical

components: the pre-modern, the modern, and the contemporary. The pre-modern era

deals mainly with records before the 19th century, where sovereignty claims were based 7 Khemakorn, Pakjuta. Region, Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea. Study, New York: United Nations, 2006. pp. 29-33.

8 Bland, Ben. Vietnam’s fishermen on front line in China clash. June 20, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0b4e8380-9b52-11e0-bbc6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2PE1aWUWp (accessed April 01, 2013).

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primarily on archeological findings. Although China bases most of its claims on this era,

most scholars outside of China do not consider this is a valid method.9 China often cites

ancient Chinese naval documents that reference the SCS islands to indicate it had

discovered the area first. However, several other states, including Vietnam and Malaysia,

also have documents that indicate people in their history discovered SCS islands very

early. None of these writings, however, show evidence of legal disputes, or anything

resembling modern state sovereignty as a concept. Furthermore, the United Nation’s

Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) is the guiding influence in settling

maritime disputes, and it does not recognize historical occupation as a legitimate source

for possession, making these types of claims inadequate.10 If there is to be a fair way of

dealing with legitimacy claims within the SCS, it will not be through archaeology or

evidence dating to the pre-modern era.

The modern era starts near the 19th century. It marks the beginning of the real

dispute as well, due to the idea of sovereignty originating with European colonial

expansion of Asia in the 19th century. When the British and French first came to Asia

with their “fearsome canon-boats,” they established both colonization and the idea of

modern sovereignty.11 Most of the 19th century saw the development of records of the

SCS through the British, who were most active in the shipping and merchant domain.

The British claimed the Spratly islands in 1877. Not many more claims appeared until

about the 1890s, however, when the French colonizers began to erect lighthouses on the

9 Dawley, Evan. "Claims and Incidents in the South China Sea." History Brief, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, D.C., 2013.

10 Ibid.

11 Tønnesson, Stein D. "An International History of the Dispute in the South China Sea." East Asian Institute, March 2001. pp. 4-6.

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Spratlys and Paracels, claiming them in fear of possible Japanese expansion. Around the

1930s, France made its claims formal, and the concept of coastal state sovereignty was

codified in the Hague convention.12 In the 1940s, with the rise of Japan’s imperial power,

France was forced to remove its presence from an island called Itu Abu. In 1942, the

Philippines invaded Itu Abu. Then in 1947 Chiang Kai-shek published the U-shaped map,

famous now for encircling, and giving claiming power to China for the vast majority of

the SCS.13 Japan gained control of the SCS during World War II and held it until 1951,

when it formally relinquished its control as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

The treaty, however, did not designate a transfer of sovereignty to any specific nation,

which has created problems for many Island disputes in East Asia, including those in the

SCS. The primary reason the treaty did not effectively handle the transition from

Japanese sovereignty was because China was not represented at the conference. This is

due to U.S. hesitation to choosing sides between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

and the Republic of China (ROC). Ongoing hostile relations between the latter two made

the U.S. cautious before creating the perception that it had chosen sides. As a result,

there was significant debate about which government to invite to the San Francisco Peace

Conference. In a speech from the conference, John Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State

made clear why China was not in attendance:

China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that the Sino-Japanese war cannot be formally terminated at this occasion. Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments have created a situation such that there is not general international agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace. Some think that one government meets these

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

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tests. Some think another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus the Allies were faced with hard choices.14

Thus, even though the San Francisco Peace Treaty marked the end of Japanese

sovereignty over the SCS islands, it also created a void of legal sovereignty in the process.

Without either the PRC or ROC in attendance, neither of their interests was represented,

and as a result, much of the modern conflict in the SCS is at least partially a result of this

treaty.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made its first claims to the SCS in 1947 and

maintained the claim after establishing the PRC government in 1949, and it has

maintained this claim since.15 Below you can see the size and key islands of the SCS in a

map published by the EIA.

14 Dulles, John Foster. John Foster Dulles's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Sept 5, 1951. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19510905.S1E.html (accessed April 11, 2013).


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Figure 1: SCS by EIA

Contemporary Conflict I demarcate the “contemporary” era as beginning in 1967 when a military conflict

between Malaysia and Indonesia created the political baseline for the founding of

ASEAN.16 This era also covers the introduction of UNCLOS in 1982, which has been

ratified by most of the countries involved in the conflict and is generally considered the

primary basis for resolving disputes with international maritime law. Furthermore, this

time period narrows down the number of key players in the dispute to China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, and the Philippines, which all make different types of claims today. China, for

example, claims all of the major islands and maritime resources, including the waters

16 Tønnesson, Stein D. "An International History of the Dispute in the South China Sea." East Asian Institute, March 2001. pp. 10-12.

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arching 1,200 miles from China’s Hainan Island to the coasts of Singapore and

Malaysia.17 Taiwan also claims the entirety of the SCS and shares the beliefs of its

mainland counterpart that ancient Chinese documents are a basis for claiming sovereignty.

What Taiwan does not share with China, however, is recognized statehood. As such, it

does not have access to more legitimate means of claiming sovereignty, such as through

UNCLOS.18 The Philippines only claims sections of the SCS and has attempted to

legitimize these claims through UNCLOS, which dictates that waters within 200 nautical

miles of a nation’s continental shelf are considered part of that nation’s Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ). The Philippines is also a unique case because of its treaty-based

alliance with the U.S.19 Vietnam, the last big regional country in the dispute, is perhaps

the most significant state-level actor besides China. It has engaged with China on

multiple accounts through maritime skirmishes and possesses a navy more capable than

other smaller Southeast Asian nations.20 It claims that it has physically occupied critical

islands in the SCS, the Paracels and the Spratlys, since the 17th century, and it also

claims its EEZ extends into the SCS.21 There are other nations that also claim parts of the

SCS, such as Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, but their role has been relatively small

compared to the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. The majority of their influence now

17 Kaplan, Robert. The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict. September 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict (accessed April 01, 2013).


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

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comes from the collective pressure they are able to apply on China through multilateral

organizations like ASEAN.

Although not a direct claimant in the dispute, the U.S. is a factor that also cannot

be left out. Ever since 1995, the U.S. has held that its interests in the SCS are “neutrality

on the validity of the claims, support for peaceful resolution and multilateral solutions, a

willingness to provide necessary assistance to achieve those goals, and a strong concern

with both maintaining open sea lanes, for both commercial and military purposes, and

adherence to international law including the LOSC.”22 While neutral, the U.S. also plans

to be involved. When President Obama addressed the Australian parliament in Canberra

in 2011, he told the world that when it came to the Asia-Pacific, America was “all in.”23

Since then, through multiple approaches such as garrisoning marines in Darwin,

Australia,24 attempting to mediate joint dialogues,25 providing support for smaller Asian

nations,26 and repositioning its global military force towards Asia,27 the U.S. has shown it

will be able to follow through with the “pacific pivot” and be involved in Asia’s future.

The pivot comes at a bad time for China, however. Thus far China has attempted


23 Donilon, Tom. Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisory to the President: "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013". March 11, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a (accessed April 01, 2013).

24 Siegel, Matt. nytimes.com. April 04, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html?_r=0 (accessed April 01, 2013). (Xiaokun 2010)

25 Crook, John. "Secretary of State Urges Multilateral Approach to China’s South China Sea Claims." The American Journal of International Law 104, no. 4 (October 2010): 664-666.

26 Ibid.

27 Bumiller, Elisabeth. Words and Deeds Show Focus of the American Military on Asia. November 10, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/world/asia/us-militarys-new-focus-on-asia-becomes-clearer.html (accessed April 01, 2013).

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to avoid "internationalizing the issue" and resents an attempt of either U.S. or multilateral

intervention.28 Its approach to the SCS has been one of emphasizing bilateral resolution

and intimidating smaller states through economic and military might.29 Furthermore,

China’s ascension to the world spotlight through its rapid economic growth and military

modernization has raised suspicion among Southeast Asia nations, along with the rest of

the world, as to its intentions in the resource-laden seabed. Many think China desires to

achieve Asian hegemony and therefore sees the SCS as a necessary stepping-stone. The

ASEAN states have sought to balance against China due to this suspicion and have

welcomed the shifted U.S. focus from the Middle East to their own backyard.30

More ominously, the contemporary era marks the beginning of repeated naval

standoffs between China and other claimant states. China has significantly clashed three

times with Vietnam vessels in the SCS, once in 1974 near the Spratly Islands, which

resulted in the death of 36 sailors between the two nations, another in 1988 at Johnson

Reef when China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) sank three Vietnamese

vessels, killing 74 of its sailors, and also in 2005 when the PLAN opened fire on Vietnam

fishing vessels, killing nine. There have been more incidents. The list of Chinese

engagements in the SCS runs long.31

28 Xiaokun, Ai Yang and Li. Chinese military told to keep close eye on situation. July 30, 2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/7086388.html (accessed April 01, 2013).

29 Haddick, Robert. Salami Slicing in the South China Sea. 8 3, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/03/salami_slicing_in_the_south_china_sea (accessed 3 28, 2013).

30 People’s Daily. People’s Daily Online. March 03, 2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6908081.html (accessed April 01, 2013).


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Although scuffles between involved countries have occurred all across the SCS,

most of the fighting has taken place at key islands: the Paracels and the Spratlys. Efforts

to claim these islands stem largely from the desire for jurisdictional entitlement of seabed

resources as set out in UNCLOS through EEZs. These battles run the gamut of quick

melees with other naval ships to harassment of fishing and merchant vessels. In nearly

all instances, China has been the common denominator and often the initiator of the

skirmishes.32 China’s participation in many of the conflicts is well documented in the

referenced history brief from the State Department. However, the claim that China is

often the initiator of these quarrels is more controversial. China, for example,

consistently claims that it is only defending its sovereignty,33 suggesting that despite the

high quantity of conflicts it engages in, they are all in self-defense. Admittedly, the issue

is complex and it remains unclear if any one state can be considered completley culpable

of inciting conflict in the SCS. More likely, many states all contribute in some way to

making the dispute resistant to solvency. However, outside of its own borders, China

largely has the reputation of being coercive. Thus, regardless of the complexity of the

situation, most other nations involved in the SCS at least perceive China to be both the

initiator and the aggressor.34 Due to China’s perceived aggression, many littoral Asian

32 Ibid.

33 Murdoch, Lindsay. en Jiabao Adamant on South China Sea Claim. Nov 21, 2012. http://www.smh.com.au/world/wen-jiabao-adamant-on-south-china-sea-claim-20121121-29pd5.html (accessed April 12, 2013).

34See: Johnston, Alastair. "How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?" International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7-48. Also reference: Swaine, Michael. "Perceptions of an Assertive China." China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (Mar 2010). Also see: Nye, Joseph S. "China's Bad Bet Against America." Korean Times, Mar 14, 2010.

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states have begun to fear China. They are afraid it will take control of the SCS and use it

as leverage to fuel its growth and exert its will on Asia.35

Realism, the SCS, and Humane Authority

China’s behavior in the SCS cannot be called irrational, though; it is very much in

line with Western theories of international relations, especially with notions of realism.

China’s aggression suggests that the only variable it considers is power, without which it

believes it cannot be secure.36 While many criticize China for having revisionist

ambitions, it is actually acting in accordance with established Western theories on the rise

of great powers. Western theories, however, also predict China’s bane if it continues on

its current path. This is suggested by the fate of rising powers in relation to established

hegemons.37 In a unipolar system, the hierarchy of a hegemon38 establishes stability,

since the hegemon is able to offer authority and structure. Robert Gilpin coins this

“hegemonic stability theory.” When a rising power begins to converge with the hegemon,

though, the system is threatened and the likelihood of conflict increases significantly.39

Gilpin makes clear that this notion comes straight from the roots of Western society,

35 Economist. The South China Sea: Troubled Waters. August 06, 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/08/south-china-sea (accessed April 01, 2013).

36 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 1st. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2001. Mearsheimer argues that all great powers seek hegemony because it is the only way to ensure security. pp. 31-37.

37 Gilpin, Robert. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 595-596.

38 Hegemony in this context refers to a single major power vastly more capable at exerting its will on the international system than any other one state. This is generally what hegemony means in Western international relations theory. However, as will be seen, hegemony can also take on other meanings depending on cultural context.

39 Gilpin, Robert. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613.

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noting that Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War says the war between

Athens and Sparta is but a model that will be repeated throughout history, as all rising

powers inevitably clash with established powers, create bipolarization in the system, and

eventually cause war and conflict. Thus, China’s aggressive behavior in the SCS should

come as no surprise; it is acting in accord with the established rules of interstate relations.

To judge behavior in the SCS by the criteria of Thucydides, China is simply acting as all

rising hegemons act: forcefully.

Are there other alternatives to China’s approach to the SCS disputes? One

alternative for China is “humane authority,” according to some Chinese scholars in the

field of international relations. Yan Xuetong, a famous Chinese international relations

theorist, argues in his book, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, that pre-

Qin thinkers wrote prolifically on the issue of power and authority among warring states,

which can be applied especially well to China’s situation in the SCS dispute.40 Yan

continues that there are seven main authors when it comes to classical Chinese thought in

the pre-Qin era: Laozi, Confucius, Mozi, Hanfeizi, Guanzi, Xunzi and Mencius, of whom

Mencius wrote the most that is applicable to China’s problems in Southeast Asia.

Mencius contributed one major finding both unique to China’s history and applicable to

China’s modern ailments: the distinction between hegemony and humane authority. In

the Western context, hegemony refers to no more than the leading state in a unipolar

system; no other nation can oppose that state’s combined military, economic, diplomatic

and soft power. Humane authority as a classical Chinese concept carries with it the same

40 Xuetong, Yan. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Kindle Electronic Edition. Edited by Daniel A. Bell. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Beijing: Princeton University Press, 2011. pp. 203-205.

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criteria for power but additional demands for the behavior of the leading state. It places

emphasis neither on economic nor on military might but on moral fortitude and

establishing trust among neighbors. Instead of forcing submission from other nations,

humane authority builds alliances in the international community through “benevolence,”

which has the principles of leading through example, fairness, and openness. Mencius

famously writes about the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties:

The Three Dynasties won the Empire through benevolence and lost it through cruelty. This is true of the rise and fall, survival and collapse, of states as well. An Emperor cannot keep the Empire within the Four Seas unless he is benevolent; a feudal lord cannot preserve the altars to the gods of earth and grain unless he is benevolent; a Minister of a Counselor cannot preserve his ancestral temple unless he is benevolent; a Gentleman or a Commoner cannot preserve his four limbs unless he is benevolent. To dislike death yet revel in cruelty is no different from drinking beyond capacity despite your dislike of drunkenness.41

As clearly as Thucydides predicted the fate of all future states to fall into a mold casted

by the wars between Athens and Sparta, Mencius argues that states will rise and fall

based on their benevolence, not on their challenge of hegemony.

Just as many contemporary realists draw directly from Thucydides, China could

draw directly from its own heritage to avoid the disaster of hegemonic war predicted by

Western thought. Mencius would be just as valid as Thucydides as an authoritative

writer on interstate relations. As Yan Xuetong points out, Thucydides wrote on the

relations between Greek city-states more than two millennia ago. Mencius also wrote

more than two millennia ago and wrote during the Warring States period, a time

especially cultivating of writings related to interaction between states. As History of the

41 Mencius. Mencius. Revised Edition. Edited by Betty Radice. Translated by D.C. Lau. London: Penguin Books, 2004. See pp. 17 for full reference.

15

Peloponnesian War offers lessons today because of its similarities in content to modern

international relations problems, the appeal of pre-Qin writings is its plethora of

connections to contemporary interstate relations. In the Warring States Period, for

example, politics was anarchical, every state had an independent military, and no one

state had a monopoly on coercive force.42 Issues of trust and alliances were just as much

at the nucleus of ancient Chinese interstate relations as they are for the international

community as whole today. Thus, using pre-Qin writings as a guiding force for

developing modern international relations theory is just as sound for China as it is for

European or American scholars to cite Thucydides when developing thought on Western

schools like realism.

What advantage does Chinese thought have on shaping China’s policy agenda?

The benefit comes from the content, as thinkers from the Warring States period differed

greatly in opinion from their Western equivalents. Using Chinese history as a starting

point allows China to avoid making both the same assumptions and mistakes of Western

international relations theory.

Drawing lessons from pre-Qin authors could be especially beneficial for China in

the SCS. As has been mentioned, China as a nation-state has formally claimed the SCS

since 1949. Its first major military clash in the area was in 1974, and it has followed it up

with multiple military encounters since then. In nearly forty years, though, it is no closer

to actual sovereignty over the SCS. With the advent of the pacific-pivot, China will be

even less successful with aggression, as it will only legitimize suspicion that it seeks


16

hegemony and will push ASEAN states into tighter cohesion with the U.S. At that point,

it will be both farther from achieving its goals and closer to engaging in serious conflict.

China will likely not give up its ambitions in the SCS, but it could change its tactics. In

order to do this, it must begin with its theoretical framework for guiding its increasing

power. Currently, hegemonic stability theory is the primary framework nations have on

which to understand growing powers. Following a model of humane authority could lead

to different outcomes than expected by the West.

This thesis is not an attempt to develop an entirely different school of thought in

international relations theory. Rather, it is an attempt to enrich modern theory by

providing an alternative to realism and hegemonic stability theory with an idea based in

China’s own classical literature. It will broaden understanding of the nature of the

international community, and it will potentially enable scholars to provide China with a

more peaceful approach to resolving dispute in the SCS. As Yan Xuetong attempts to use

the pre-Qin era writings to provide policy advice to China in a broad sense, this thesis

will be attempting to apply his pre-Qin advice specifically on the SCS dispute.

Following this introduction, the second chapter will be a literature review, looking at the

analysis of established scholars to create a greater sense of continuity in an ongoing

discussion on the SCS and international relations theory related to Asia. In the third

chapter, I will offer some of my own analysis, showing where I agree and disagree with

the current scholarship, as well as offer my own synthesis and analysis of ideas. Finally,

in the fourth chapter, I will conclude with predictions of what I believe we will see in the

future of the SCS based on a model of humane authority.

17

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This chapter will examine the literature of the SCS debate in three different

categories: Western international relations theory, Mencius and alternatives to Western

international relations theory, and Chinese foreign policy. Emphasis will be placed on

how these three topics directly relate to the SCS or play into creating alternative

frameworks for resolving the conflict.

Western International Relations Theory

In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, Samuel

Huntington posits that China’s ascension in the international order carries connotations of

inevitable Asian hegemony:

China’s history, culture, traditions, size, economic dynamism, and self-image all impel it to assume a hegemonic position in East Asia. This goal is a natural result of its rapid economic development. Every other major power, Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, has engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental with or immediately following the years in which it went through rapid industrialization and economic growth.1

Huntington characterizes China’s civilizational and regime developments as all tying

together to create a perfect storm of state features leading to hegemony. He is especially

vocal about China’s role in the SCS.2 He claims that one of the most dangerous potential

causes of global war in the twenty-first century will be China’s rise and dominance in 1 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Simon and Schuster hardcover edition August 2011. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011. pp. 229.

2 Ibid. pp. 230-235 and 312-316.

18

Southeast Asia. To expound on this, he concocts a scenario in which China’s military

reaches a certain level of competency that it decides to offensively take full control over

all areas of the sea it has traditionally claimed.3 Vietnam resists, and China not only

retaliates against Vietnam’s navy, but actually invades the entire country. In the scenario,

the U.S. responds with an aircraft carrier task force, and the whole situation devolves

from there. The end result is global, civilizational conflict involving all of the world’s

great powers that leads to two results: a nuclear stand off where world powers must

decide whether or not to escalate the conflict to nuclear war and a universal global shift

of power from North to South. While Huntington admits the scenario is a bit fantastical,

he is serious when he says the start of the war is plausible: intervention by one

civilizational power into the affairs of another. Thus, Huntington regards the rise of

China as a serious threat due to civilizational schisms.

His assertions, however, make several assumptions. First, he assumes that the

Chinese want hegemony. This is based on tenets of Chinese nationalism, such as the

desire to “retake” parts of the SCS, as a motivator in international relation. This stems

from a classical realist description of human nature being fearful, selfish, and ultimately

evil. It also seems to have roots in the neorealist emphasis on anarchy as a cause of

conflict.4 Secondly, he assumes that China will seek hegemony with its increased power

simply because it is what all other states did with increased levels of power. Focusing on

the possibility of China’s belligerent rise, he contends that China is unique in that of all

its oriental peers, it has the key ingredients for regional dominance. In just one respect,

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. pp. 312-216. Huntington writes that the Chinese military had reached a new level of confidence in its ability, i.e., it knew there was nothing to stop it from taking the SCS.

19

for example, China has a long history of seeing itself as the prominent international

power. Huntington continues that China has centuries of history ingrained into its

cultural identity, and the fact that China has become subordinate to other international

actors in the past century may be an impetus in driving national interests to reclaim the

power and status China has notably been without since the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842.5 It

also has a steadily growing economy and a rapidly modernizing military, that combined

with the sense of Chinese nationalism described, make it a likely candidate for seeking

more control in the international community.

In addition, China has already shown signs of desire for regional dominance by its

aggressive behavior in the SCS, specifically its decisions to build a military presence on

the Paracel Islands and Mischief Reef, along with its short naval melee with Vietnam in

1988. In the meantime, the rest of East Asia sits uneasy. While Asia may resent China’s

meteoric ascendancy, it also fears being on the wrong side of history. Thus many states

refuse to place all their bets on China as a replacement hegemon in Asia, yet also resist

siding with the U.S. as the balancer.

Huntington’s predictions symbolize perhaps one of the most popular ideas about

China in international relations today: that it will rise forcefully. Huntington states that

an increase in Chinese power is an increase in the likelihood for Chinese hegemony. His

work, however, stands on several foundational claims that need to be considered in more

detail, such as the nature of human beings, the level of anarchy that exists in the

5 University of Southern California. Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), 1842. June 26, 1843. http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=403&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed April 01, 2013). The Treaty of Nanjing marked China’s defeat at the end of the first Opium War. China was humiliated and forced to agree to terms of subordinacy in the treaty written by the British.

20

international system, and the inevitability of rising powers seeking or achieving

hegemony.

In The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer proposes that

states are inherently power seeking: “Great powers, I argue, are always searching for

opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal…the

system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core.”6

Indeed, as the prominent scholar of offensive neorealism, Mearsheimer believes that the

lack of structure in the international community motivates states to be insecure and

selfish. He bases this on the unification of five critical assumptions: that the international

system is anarchical, that great powers possess military capability, that states’ intentions

are inherently ingrained with uncertainty, that survival is a primary goal, and finally that

all great powers are rational actors. Mearsheimer points out that any one of these

assumptions, taken by itself, does not necessarily conclude that states will act selfishly.

Taken together, however, they lead to fear, self-help, and power maximization.

These desires then lead states to naturally desire hegemony. Citing Immanuel

Kant, Mearsheimer contends that all states want hegemony because it is the only way to

securely establish sustainable peace. If one state ruled the world, then there would be no

anarchical system to lure states into conflict. One state could impose law on all

humankind without fear of retaliation from a rival power.

Mearsheimer does not deal directly with the SCS, but he does deal with China,

and more broadly he does create the theoretical framework for others like Huntington to

make claims about China’s rise to hegemony. For Mearsheimer, China’s rise is likely to

6 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 1st. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2001. pp. 29.

21

lead to conflict. As other states see its increase in economic and military capabilities,

they are sure to be skeptical of the international system and always uncertain about

China’s intentions. Furthermore, China will be focused on its own survival and will also

look to others with skepticism. Therefore, its rise will naturally lead not just to increased

influence but an inevitable pursuit of dominance in Asia. According to Mearsheimer, this

would be the only option China has to ensure its safety. Furthermore, from this theory,

we can expect increased levels of aggression on behalf of China up to the point of its

actual hegemony. Mearsheimer writes: “But even if a great power does not have the

wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act

offensively to amass as much power as it can…”7 According to Mearsheimer, even if

China does not yet have the military and economic might to go completely unchallenged

in Asia, it will still behave offensively to establish its legitimacy and consolidate its

power.

In contrast to John Mearsheimer’s emphasis on the anarchy of politics, Hans

Morgenthau, the founder of classical realism suggested that it is human nature that drives

political desire for power. In Politics Among Nations he lays out six essential principles

of political realism, the first one of which states: “Political realism believes that politics,

like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human

nature.”8 The rest of Morgenthau’s principles are that power is universally pursued by all

nations, the pursuit of power holds true through many different environments, national

survival is the primary moral goal of the statesman, states do not have a monopoly on

7 Ibid. pp. 35.

8 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th Edition. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. pp. 4-16.

22

truth, and politics is autonomous.9 In essence, classical realism claims that human nature

drives the pursuit of all states for power and that human nature is evil and fearful.

Therefore states are inherently compelled to pursue power to protect themselves from

each other. Classical realism also disregards the way in which this power is pursued, so

long as it is ultimately attained.

As a framework for the SCS dispute, classical realism predicts that China will

pursue more power due to fear of other states. Realism lays the foundation for states to

pursue hegemony because it aligns with Morgenthau’s assertion that power is the

ultimate goal of the state. While realism predicts the same outcome in the SCS as

neorealism, the Chinese pursuit of hegemony, it does so for different reasons. John

Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism makes the argument based on the anarchy of the

system. It assumes that if China’s power grows to the point where there is nothing to

stop it, Chinese aggression will become more and more likely. Hans Morgenthau’s

classical realism makes the claim that regardless of other states’ relative power, China

will pursue hegemony in the SCS. Furthermore, not just China, but all Southeast Asian

nations will pursue control of the region if it translates into more national power or

influence in the international community. As has been stated, however, classical realism

makes these claims on the basis of human nature, which will need to be analyzed in more

detail.

Niccolò Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1512 as a guide to pragmatic state

leadership. The work is famously known for its emphasis on what is effective versus

what is ethical. Where Mearsheimer sets the theoretical framework for evaluating issues

9 Ibid. pp. 4-16.

23

through the lens of neorealism, Machiavelli lays the philosophical foundation for which

principles of realism are built. In The Prince, Machiavelli writes: “For one can say this

generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of

danger, eager for gain.” Machiavelli asserts here the central tenet of realism: that human

nature is selfish, unreliable, and ultimately evil. This reinforces scholars like Hans

Morgenthau that argue conflict will perpetually arise out of human inability to control

urges to dominate others.

Machiavelli does not just write about human nature, though. He also writes

advice to how “the prince” or states should act in response to the naturally negative

actions of men and women. He writes: “And I shall dare to say this also, that to have

them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful;

to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so

framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to

the opposite.”10 He advocates here for rulers to be two-faced. He writes that the best

way to rule is to appear as necessary to appease the people, but to secretly believe in none

of it, therefore reserving a malleable spirit that can change to adapt with the times. The

implications of this in modern international politics suggest that realist ideology teaches

that all states are not only liars, but that they should be liars. According to Machiavelli,

this is the best way a state could secure support without actually committing itself to

causes that could be detrimental to national interests in the long run.

Robert Gilpin is considered to be prominent authority on hegemony in the

international relations theory community. He argues that hegemony is one of the most

10 Machiavelli, Nicolo. The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. Project Gutenberg. Kindle Edition. Location 1044.

24

central ideas in all of international relation. Gilpin quotes Thucydides as foreshadowing

both Machiavelli and Morgenthau, when he says:

Underlying Thucydides’ view that he had discovered the basic mechanism of a great or hegemonic war was his conception of human nature. He believed that human nature was unchanging and therefore the events recounted in his history would be repeated in the future. Since human beings are driven by three fundamental passions--interest, pride, and, above all else, fear--they always seek to increase their wealth and power until other humans, driven by like passions, try to stop them.11

Gilpin thus claims that the pursuit of hegemony, the fall of hegemons, and the clash of

rising powers and falling powers is an ancient phenomenon, not a new one. Hegemony’s

source mirrors exactly what realism says drives the pursuit of power: human nature.

Gilpin refers to Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War to show that the first

hegemonic conflict was between Athens in Sparta more than two millennia ago. The war

between the two ancient nations has implications for modern international relations.

Gilpin writes: “Over time the power of a subordinate state begins to grow

disproportionately, and that rising state comes into conflict with the dominant or

hegemonic state in the system. The ensuing struggle between these two states and their

respective allies leads to a bipolarization of the system, to an inevitable crisis, and

eventually to a hegemonic war.”12 Ergo, Gilpin claims not only that human nature drives

the pursuit of power, but that the pursuit of power inevitably leads to war as a rising

power attempts to replace the current hegemon. As a framework for the SCS, this

concludes pessimistic endings for the international system as a whole. This theory of

hegemony would look to China’s behavior in the SCS and predict that its clash with the 11 Gilpin, Robert. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613.

12 Ibid.

25

United States to be indubitable, especially in the context of the pacific pivot. This theory,

however, may have alternatives. Gilpin has made assumptions, as many Western

thinkers have, on human nature that acts as a platform for the rest of the theory. If other

perspectives on human nature can be provided, conclusions based on Western notions of

hegemony may not hold true.

Mencus and Humane Authority

Mencius was a Chinese scholar who lived in the 4th century as one of the most

famous Confucian philosophers in history, second only to Confucius himself. Writing

during the Warring States Period (475-221 BC), Mencius is particularly germane to a

discussion of international relations. In the Warring States Period, China had not yet

become a unified political entity, thus, scholarship of the time focused heavily on the

interaction between political allies and enemies. Mencius distinguishes his writings from

others both in his description of human nature and the advice he prescribed to rulers.

Mencius focused on four main ethical attributes important to Chinese society:

benevolence, ritual rites, social propriety, and wisdom.13 The latter three relate to the

social norms of pre-Qin China; the first idea, benevolence, however, is an idea prescribed

to the qualities necessary for a good ruler. When writing about how to rule, Mencius says:

Now if you should practice benevolence in the government of your state, then all those in the Empire who seek office would wish to find a place at your court, all tillers of land to till the land in outlying parts of your realm, all merchants to enjoy the refuge of your market-place, all travellers to go by way of your roads, and all those who hate their rulers to lay their complaints before you. This being so, who can’t stop you from becoming a true King?14

13 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Mencius. 2010. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mencius/ (accessed April 01, 2013).

14 Mencius. Mencius. Revised Edition. Edited by Betty Radice. Translated by D.C. Lau. London: Penguin Books, 2004. pp. 13.

26

Mencius argues, in vibrant contrast to Machiavelli, that the effective way to rule a people

is not through manipulation, but through making them want to live under your rule.

Mencius provides a philosophical alternative to Machiavelli within international relations.

Where Machiavelli argues that humans are evil and that a prince should manipulate his

subjects to the extent necessary to retain control of his domain, Mencius argues that

people are fundamentally good and that a ruler should act with benevolence,

incentivizing the people to support his rule. He writes: “Human nature is good just as

water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not

flow downwards.”15 Thus, Mencius differed from the Western canon in two main ways:

first, he believed that human nature was good, making him fundamentally opposed to

Machiavelli, Thucydides, Hobbes and most of the realist school of thought. In addition,

Mencius believed that humane authority would attract people through benevolence, not

force. Thus he believed the best way to run a state was through something more similar

to soft power than to coercion.

Chinese Foreign Policy

A key scholar to the discussion of Chinese foreign policy is Taylor Fravel. In his

article, Regional Insecurity and International Cooperation Explaining China’s

Compromises in Territorial Disputes,16 Fraylor states that historically China’s

willingness to compromise on territorial disputes has correlated to the level of regime

15 Ibid. pp. 122.

16 Fravel, Taylor M. "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes." International Security (MIT Press) 30, no. 2 (2005): 46-83.

27

insecurity it suffered concurrent to the territorial dispute. In affect, its external

cooperation depended on internal crises. He also predicts that disputes concerning the

Spratlys or Paracels are too periphery to be considered a cause of regime insecurity, thus

China is unless likely to offer up concessions for this reason. He maintains, however,

that China is not a revisionist nation. Although territorial expansion is often associated

with revisionist ambition, Fraylor argues that China’s contemporary territorial disputes

can be attributed to its regime insecurity, and that other disputes, including the SCS, were

established and have been consistent since 1949. Despite steady increases in power since

then, China has remained steadily reserved in its ambition towards the SCS. The state

sees the islands as historically part of the mainland sovereignty, not simply as land worth

annexing for resources, though that seems to be contributing factor. In either case, the

fact that its claim is over sixty years old and has maintained low levels of assertiveness in

spite of high levels of capabilities suggest that China is not revisionist.

Another important element of context to understand China’s foreign policy comes

from Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying: 韬光养晦 (taoguangyanghui, referred to as

TGYH in the remainder of this thesis) —to cover light and nurture in the dark.17 This

term has been China’s guiding ideology in its foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping began

using the term in speeches during the late 1980s and 1990s. Another term used in

junction is决不当头 (juebudangtou)—do not stick your head out. Both terms are

metaphors for avoiding responsibility and focusing instead on development. Professors

Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang of the University of Maccau contend that Chinese

17 Wang, Jianwei and Dingding Chen. "Lying Low No More? Chinese New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy." China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (Sept 2011): pp. 197.

28

scholarship lie at a crossroads regarding the importance of TGYH. Many believe it is an

outdated principle, no longer applicable to modern China. Others see no alternative to

TGYH except Chinese aggression.18 Indeed, the article states:

Their recent efforts to reassure the outside world about their benign intentions and the continuity of their policy seem to suggest that the Chinese leadership is unlikely to abandon TGYH in the foreseeable future because any significant departure from it would create confusion and suspicion among China’s neighbouring countries in Asia, thus driving them into the arms of the US and complicating China’s peripheral environment. What happened in 2010 regarding the South China Sea is a case in point. In early 2010, some Chinese officials and commentators, for the first time, began to refer to the South China Sea as one of China’s core interests, thus creating tensions between China and some Southeast Asian countries and between China and the US.19

Thus, some scholars and official in China think that TGYH will remain a guiding

principle in the SCS because the alternative that has been presented has been aggression

and provocative statements about core national interests.

The debate regarding TGYH, however, does not take humane authority into

consideration as a factor. It is possible for China to stick its head out without being

aggressive. It is also true, as the quotation mentioned, that the facts regarding China

twenty or thirty years ago when TGYH was first mentioned are no longer the facts about

China today. If nothing else, China is economically too large to simply lay low and

uninvolved. At the same, the quote demonstrates the blowback China has already

received by rising too quickly and in a manner too similar to a hegemon. Instead, it

should rise humanely and specifically stick its head out to take on more international

responsibility. This goes against the essence of TGYH, but it also takes into

consideration that all of Southeast Asia regards China’s growth with suspicion and that

18 Ibid. pp. 199.

19 Ibid. pp. 213.

29

any ambition on behalf of China will be resisted if China’s intent and interests are not

clear. Thus, China would best serve itself by taking steps to refute perceptions regarding

it as an international bully.

A more Western perspective of Chinese leadership comes from David Shambaugh,

a famous Chinese scholar and the director of the China Policy Program at George

Washington University, who argues that those who look to China’s future and predict

hegemony must be more specific in their contentions. He writes that philosophically,

historically and semantically the West understands “hegemony” differently than China,

distinguishing between the Chinese words 霸权主义 (meaning hegemony and referring

historically to feudal lords who maintained order through force; associated with a lack of

legitimacy) and 王 (meaning a rightful ruler). Furthermore, he writes that China has

historically held a negative view of hegemony due to its to association of the idea to its

past subjugation to the West. He states that if China were to become a hegemon, it would

be one of, or a combination of, four different types of hegemony: the isolationist

hegemon, hierarchical hegemon, cooperative hegemon, and coercive hegemon. The

isolationist hegemon essentially uses its economic and military power to buy

independence from the world, similar to North Korea’s current condition. Considered

extremely unlikely due to China’s economic integration in the world system, Shambaugh

writes that there is still enough national sentiment and xenophobia for this to be a

consideration. Hierarchical hegemony would be a twenty-first century version of China’s

historical tribute system, where China acts as a benign protector within Asia in exchange

for deference from other Asian nations. This, however, assumes two key facts: that

China will be able to replace the U.S. as a security guarantor and that other Asian nations

30

will accept China’s role as a benefactor. While the former is possible, Shambaugh notes

that the latter is extremely unlikely for matters of both nationalism and national interest.

The cooperative hegemonic model predicts China will gain substantial power in the

future, but not enough to become a singular hegemon. Instead, it will work with other

regional actors to develop a concert-of-power system. This would require it to no longer

use its military or economy as a bargaining chip against its neighbors and would depend

on its interdependence with allies. As has been seen simply through interactions between

China and ASEAN, however, China has no proclivity towards multilateral organizations,

as it believes they generally work against it. Thus, this form of hegemony is also unlikely.

Finally, the last possibility is coercive hegemony, which is the traditional, full-fledged

idea of hegemony as it is seen in the West. This involves a China that punishes “wrong-

doers” in East Asia as well as one that engages in territorial conflicts through claims of

sovereignty. Shambaugh thinks this type of China is unlikely as well, however. While

China has shown territorial ambition in the SCS, it has not shown interest in being the

“regional policeman.” Furthermore, China does not lay claim to some form of Eastern

“manifest destiny” that allows it to annex its neighbors. Even if it did, the result would

simply be significant balancing by regional actors and opposition by the international

community as a whole. Thus, Shambaugh concludes, Chinese hegemony is not likely in

any form. This is an especially interesting perspective for the SCS, as it demonstrates

that even though Western international relations theory assumes the fate of all rising

powers is hegemony, any given form of potential Chinese hegemony has variables that

ultimately make its manifestation unlikely.

31

CHAPTER THREE

Analysis In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau states in his first principle of

political realism that: "Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has

not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to

discover these laws."1 This chapter will look more in depth at human nature, how it

influences the pursuit of power, as well as how it makes humane authority distinct from

hegemony. Finally, it will discuss the three principles of humane authority based on the

writings of Yan Xuetong.

Human Nature, Hegemony, and Realism

Chapter one showed that the SCS is an incredibly valuable, strategic maritime

body that many states seek control of, in part, if not in its entirety. Resources and

geographic assets of the SCS will continue to incite antagonism in East Asia. Many will

proceed to view China’s actions in the region with suspicion. Furthermore, as presented

in the introduction, many Southeast Asian states are wary of China’s rise in Asia for two

reasons: first, because of China’s reputation and perception of being aggressive in the

SCS, and secondly because much of modern international relations theory affirms

China’s hegemonic and violent ascension. Both realism and neorealism predict that

China as a rising power will pursue hegemony. This bodes well neither for China, nor for

1 Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th Edition. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. pp. 4.

32

the international system, as both Huntington2 and Gilpin argue that hegemonic war

results in a complete overhaul of the structure of the international system.3

Thus, to avoid more conflict, China should pursue policies that provide for

alternatives to hegemony. To provide models for such policies in the SCS, this chapter

will first examine a central component of many international relations theories: human

nature. Understanding human nature is essential for state behavior because it determines

both the actions of state leaders as well as the communities that make up nations.

However, as Samuel Huntington noted in the Clash of Civilizations, outlooks on human

nature are influenced significantly by civilizational norms. Thus, views on human nature

are themselves influenced by differences between cultures, such as those between East

and West. Thinkers in both the Chinese and Western traditions demonstrate that Eastern

and Western worldviews take different approaches on human nature and interstate

relations. For example, many look to Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian

War as a starting point for Western theory on international relations.4 This is for good

reason: Thucydides’ writing is rich with examples of interstate relations between ancient

city-states. Though some factors have changed, such as technology, political values and

views on human rights, much has also remained the same. Relations among ancient

2 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Simon and Schuster hardcover edition August 2011. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011. pp. 312-318. Huntington actually does not use the term “hegemonic war” but discusses in depth the consequences of a civilizational conflict as ending in a restructuring of the world order, which in the case of China, thus civilizational war (with the U.S.) and hegemonic war (also with the U.S.) would essentially be the same thing.

3 Gilpin, Robert. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613 Gilpin writes that hegemonic war by its nature will result in a new international system.

4 Xuetong, Yan. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Kindle Electronic Edition. Edited by Daniel A. Bell. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Beijing: Princeton University Press, 2011. pp. 202. Yan Xuetong notes that Thucydides has become the most quoted author in all of modern international relations.

33

Greek city-states revolved around trust, assumptions of rationality, and ultimately power,

just as modern relations do today. However, this one civilizational view on human nature

does not represent the full spectrum of possibilities, as the West holds an established line

of thought proposing that humankind naturally participates in wrongdoing. Thucydides,

Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes all affirm this. Thucydides makes the initial claim of

these authors, stating in History of the Peloponnesian War that: “In the confusion into

which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law

and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice,

and the enemy of all superiority…”5 Although written more than two millennia ago, this

account from Thucydides is a cornerstone of Western thought, specifically realism.

Thucydides’ emphasis is not that human nature actively seeks out evil, but that humans

are slaves to their passion and are therefore unpredictable and untrustworthy. It is echoed

by Machiavelli in The Prince when he says: “Because this is to be asserted in general of

men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you

succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and

children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn

against you.”6 Thus Machiavelli emphasized the mercurial and amoral nature of humans.

5 Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley. MBS Library. (Hobbes 1651). pp. 182.

6 Machiavelli, Nicolo. The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. Project Gutenberg. Kindle Edition: Location 988.

34

The notion is continued by Hobbes’s famous “war of all against all” when he says in the

Leviathan that:

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal... and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.7

Hobbes’s point is similar to the others. He describes the characteristics of humans that

make the “war of all against all” possible due to violence and fear. Thucydides,

Machiavelli, and Hobbes are all classical thinkers in the Western tradition and their

writings reinforce certain Western ideas. As these quotations demonstrate, such a

Western idea is that of human nature’s inherent wickedness.

In contrast to the Western tradition, Mencius wrote that humans are naturally

good: “‘It is certainly the case,’ said Mencius, ‘that water does not show any preference

for either east or west, but does it show the same indifference to high and low? Human

nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is

no water that does not flow downwards.”8 Mencius clearly contrasts the concept of evil

nature supported by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. This contrast demonstrates

that civilizational variance can provide lessons on politics unique to a specific country. If

assumptions on human nature vary between cultures, then so can views on international

relations and on resolving conflict. If humans are not as evil as made out to be by

7 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Amazon Digital Services. n.a., 1651. Kindle Edition. pp. 56-57.

8 Mencius. Mencius. Revised Edition. Edited by Betty Radice. Translated by D.C. Lau. London: Penguin Books, 2004. pp. 122.

35

Western thinkers, then there are alternatives to the theories based on this assumption,

such as realism and hegemony.

Furthermore, even when civilizations agree in general, they may disagree on the

details, simply by having different vantage points. For example, not all thinkers in the

history of ancient and classical European thought believed humans to be wicked creatures.

John Locke, for example, believed that humans in the state of nature were naturally good,

only becoming selfish, deceitful and overall evil after receiving influence from society.

Locke added that humanity’s naturally benign identity combined with rationality allowed

for peace and stability. This is the origin of modern liberalism. However, this is still

fundamentally different from what Mencius says about human nature and thus the content

of Mencius’s ideas and those of liberalism fundamentally vary. While John Locke and

Mencius might agree that humans are good creatures, Locke’s emphasis is on human

reason while Mencius focuses on morality and humaneness. Both could accurately be

said to consider humans to be good innately. Neither conforms to the other, however,

when it comes to finer points about what human goodness looks like.

Outlooks on human nature can shape political theory and distinguish a nation and

civilization from others in regards to political ideology. Both realism and liberalism

differ majorly on their assumptions about human nature and their prescription to the

individual to trust or distrust others. Furthermore, these differences suggest that there are

potential blind spots in modern international relations theory when it comes to creating

frameworks for the states of other civilizational contexts, i.e., China. They also provide

an opportunity for China to avoid the mistakes of its Western predecessors in its rise. By

capitalizing on its civilizational differences instead of resisting them, China can augment

36

its own international relations theory framework and attempt new approaches to solving

interstate problems.

While Thucydides and other Western thinkers captured a significant amount of

ancient state interaction that can be applicable to international relations theory today, it

would be hubristic to assume they were able to demonstrate the entirety of the human

experience. It is also consequently unwise to assume that starting with Thucydides will

always provide the best model for modern state interaction. Thus, by looking to pre-Qin

Chinese philosophers, Yan Xuetong supplements the Western canon. Yan Xuetong does

this by examining seven great philosophers of the pre-Qin era and applying principles of

their writing to modern international relations. One particular theme Yan Xuetong

develops is the idea of “humane authority”9 as a guiding principle for Chinese foreign

policy. This is developed among the types of distinctions made by pre-Qin authors

between hegemony and humane authority. Following Yan Xuetong’s example, particular

focus will be on Mencius among the pre-Qin authors.

Mencius distinguishes between 王道（way of the king）and 霸道 (way of the

hegemon). This is an especially pertinent distinction in a dialogue on the rise of China in

a volatile situation like the SCS. Does an increase in China’s power inevitably mean

China will become an Asian hegemon, bringing with it all the characteristics hegemony

has meant in the last century? Not necessarily. In English, the word hegemon has no

negative connotations. It refers to a state that has much more power than other states.10

9 The word “humane authority” is based on is 仁, which means benevolence. It is also a character in many other related terms like 仁德（magnamity) and 仁义 (justice and humanity). Oxford University Press. Oxford Chinese Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.


37

This is not so in Chinese, however. The term hegemon in Chinese carries with it inherent

qualities that suggest the hegemonic actor is tyrannical and oppressive. It is a word often

coupled and distinguished from the “sage king,” a ruler who is fair, just and humane.

The cultural differences regarding these terms goes beyond just dictionary definitions,

though. The purpose of looking semantically at these ideas is to show that Western

thought does not distinguish between a hegemon and a “sage king.” It simply looks at

power. In Chinese thought, however, these are very different concepts as well. Yan

Xuetong emphasizes this when he says:

… I think it is not simply a semantic issue. It is much more influenced by their different international statuses. Since the end of World War II in 1945, the United States has always enjoyed hegemony, whereas since 1840, China has repeatedly suffered from invasions by Western powers. China looks at hegemony from the point of view of the political justness of the international order, whereas the United States looks at hegemony from the point of view of the stability of the international order.11

This shows that hegemony has negative connotations for China not only in its definition,

but also in its literal application. China looks at the international system and resents its

own history in it, as it has suffered repeatedly from hegemonic rule. It would be in

China’s own self-interest to not simply imitate U.S. or Soviet hegemony from the

twentieth century, but rather to find its own way. This would be in line both with its own

national philosophy and history.

Humane authority contrasts both hegemony and realism. As has already been

noted, classical realism’s entire foundation rests on the idea that human nature is evil. It

is the singular factor that drives the pursuit of power and the distrust of other people.

This assumption is undermined, however, by propositions from Mencius that humans are

11 Ibid.

38

not evil, and that people need not distrust neighbors but rather treat them with

benevolence. Furthermore, in his book, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese

Power, Yan Xuetong refutes the basic tenet of neorealism, anarchy, when he argues that

relationships in the international community are far from being equal.12 He begins by

claiming that firstly, some states are simply more economically or militarily developed.

He also claims that while multinational institutions may assert “equality” as a core tenant,

there are still distinctions made between states in regards to military, economy or

responsibility. The Security Council of the United Nations, for example, has permanent

members on the Security Council, which are entitled to exert more influence on

international security issues than non-member states. The World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund, as well, have systems in place where voting power is

commensurate with contributions. States that can contribute the most tend to be those

most economically powerful. Thus, Yan Xuetong argues, looking at the actual power

dynamics within international institutions is enough to dispel the formal theory that

power is anarchical internationally and instead replace it with the idea that power is

loosely hierarchical within the international system.13 If the international order is

actually more hierarchical than traditionally acknowledged, it opens the door for more

international responsibility, a central theme of humane authority. Where neorealists

believe that the anarchy itself becomes a causal mechanism for incentivizing conflict

12 Anarchy in international relations has the following qualities: “There is no central government, and the peculiar character of the units operating within the international system is that they are sovereign and autonomous states, responsible for their own fate even though they may not control it.” Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan and Steven C. Roach. International Relations: The Key Concepts. 2nd Edition. New York, New York: Routledge, 2002.


39

because there is no world government, the advent of international institutions and the

hierarchy of state relationships reflected in their structures suggests that anarchy-driven

conflict is not an inevitability. Rather, some states have more influence and power than

other states. These states can become incentivized to become international leaders. For

example, one benefit from the U.S. as the leading power in the world has been security

alliances that resulted in reduced nuclear proliferation.14 For more powerful states to take

on more security responsibility has lead to safer communities in the past. This is a path

China could follow instead of hegemony. Yan Xuetong also refutes hegemonic stability

theory’s association of rising power with conflict. He states that hegemonic stability

theory assumes power translates directly with desire for hegemony, but that is not

necessarily so in the case of China. It is also important to note that in the post-Cold War

era, no major conflicts have occurred between nuclear powers and that this is a basis to

say it is more likely this will continue than it is to assume nuclear powers will voluntarily

engage in mutually assured destruction.15 Thus, China’s incentive to pursue hegemonic

power should be even less in the nuclear age.

Lastly, Yan Xuetong points out that neorealist emphasis on security and mistrust

of the international system poorly describes the complexity of state interests. All states

are concerned with security, but to claim they will pursue it at all costs and at every level

is not theoretically sound. This is to say that if all states really pursued security endlessly,

14 "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan." January 19, 1960. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf (accessed April 01, 2013).

15 Yan Xuetong supports this idea at Theory Talk #51: Yan Xuetong. Nov 28, 2012. http://www.theory-talks.org/2012/11/theory-talk-51.html (accessed April 11, 2013).

Kenneth Waltz’s does as well at The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better. 1981. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm (accessed April 11, 2013).

40

the international system would be stuck in a maelstrom of Hobbesian war of all against

all, which we do not see currently. Furthermore, Mencius would suggest that taking on

responsibility and acting as a benevolent leader in the international system would lead to

a safer international dynamic than hegemony. Especially with the commonly understood

notion that soft power has often been more effective at reaching objectives than hard

power in the nuclear age,16 the notion of humane authority is an appealing alternative to

hegemony. Thus, hegemonic stability theory provides insufficient context to understand

China’s future. It does little to predict potential interaction between a state claiming

hegemony and a state claiming humane authority. Just as the West has looked to

Thucydides for developing models of interstate action, Yan suggests that China should

look to Mencius for developing a model that avoids the Western prototype of hegemony.

Three Principles of Humane Authority

Yan’s argument and reflections on Mencius’s political philosophy shows that

there is an alternative to hegemony. The critical question for China is how the model

based on humane authority differs from that of hegemonic authority practically. Yan

Xuetong prescribes three main ways, based on Mencius, in which China’s humane

authority could distinguish itself from other forms of governance. These principles are

discussed on a national scale, with no particular situation like the SCS in mind. The first

principle is that of “balancing responsibilities with rights.”17 Yan argues that China

should apply humane authority by balancing its responsibilities and rights specifically in

16 Kenneth Waltz’s does as well at The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better. 1981. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm (accessed April 11, 2013).

17 Xuetong, Yan. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Edited by Daniel A. Bell. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Beijing: Princeton University Press, 2011. pp. 219

41

its international role. This is opposed to hegemonic hypocrisy, where a state formally

advocates for rights but in practice implements tactics to aggregate more power. Second

is the principle of “reversed double standards,” which argues that more developed and

more powerful nations should be held to higher standards than less developed nations.

This applies to virtually all domains: environmental, health, economic, humanitarian etc.

The idea, once again, is to replace interstate hypocrisy with leadership by example. Any

policy pushed on smaller, less powerful states must first be followed by the more

powerful states in a stricter way. The international make-up is not a cookie-cutter ordeal:

for example, in an environmental context, to apply the same CO2 emission standards on a

developing country like Brazil might stymie its growth in a way it will not inhibit a

developed country like the U.K. This can create resentment and distrust within

international relationships. Thus, a country with humane authority would focus on

reversing double standards in the international system to add legitimacy to its rule. The

third principle Yan Xuetong mentions is the principle of tianxia (天下) or “all under

heaven.”18 Xuetong states that this principle would embrace the concept of making

China more open to other states. This includes measures from loosening the strictures on

border policies to making mainland China a more appealing place to live in, work in, or

travel in. By aiming for openness, China would increase trust between itself and other

nations. This concept would require China to be more transparent about its current

domestic conditions and would focus on making China more appealing as an imitable

model, not simply an intimidating force.19 With these three principles of humane

18 Ibid. pp. 220.

19 Ibid.

42

authority, China has a general outline of how it could take fundamentally different

approaches to how it manages increasing power.

Although Yan Xuetong provides an interesting alternative to hegemony on a

grand national scale, he does not discuss its specific application to the SCS. Thus, by

examining the principles of humane authority through the perspective of the SCS dispute,

we may be able to generate more specific ideas on how Chinese maritime interstate

relations could be handled “humanely.”

First is the principle of balancing rights with responsibilities in the SCS. If China

desires more control over the SCS, regardless of historical sovereignty, it must develop

legitimacy among other Asian nations in its ability to be fair and responsible. If China

continues to make claims consisting of historical records and militant rhetoric, it will only

continue to end each bout in a stalemate. No member of ASEAN will choose to allow

China to take a leadership role in South East Asia so long as China holds a “small nations

versus big nations” mentality. What’s more, China will continue to encounter difficulty

in influencing ASEAN so long as the United States offers it support to counter China’s

rise. If China wants to effectively gain footing in the dispute, it must alter its identity

from a bully nation to a humane authority. If it can apply the advice of Yan Xuetong and

Mencius, it can replace the U.S. as the major governing force in Asia and incentivize

ASEAN states to willfully cooperate with China on sovereignty issues. For this to be

done, however, China must take on significantly more responsibility and pay much more

attention to the needs of its Southeast Asian neighbors.

Secondly is the principle of upholding reversed double standards. In order to

apply this principle, China should seek out the international, multilateral or joint,

43

standards and uphold them stricter for itself than on other states. It should do this in any

domain possible, even if the standard seems unrelated to a specific objective of its

government. The point is for China to show initiative at upholding stricter standards on

itself, which will generate trust more easily among its neighbors than by enforcement of

standards on others simply because of its power. More detail will be given on how this

can be applied in the SCS in chapter four.

Lastly, in all of these measures, China must aim to apply the principle of tianxia

(天下)27 in its conduct. Only through being open and consistent with its claims and

methods can China take on more responsibility while avoiding suspicion of underhanded

and surreptitious objectives. Hegemony depends on deceitful diplomacy to meet national

objectives, but humane authority establishes trust among other nations. Where the

hegemon would marginalize hypocrisy, the humane authority would reverse hypocrisy,

enforcing higher standards on itself rather than on others. The humane authority

ultimately seeks to develop a state whose main source of power comes from its ability to

appeal to other states. It is an exaggerated focus on soft, rather than hard, power.

Ultimately, the notion of humane authority offers China an alternative theoretical

framework for evaluating state relations. This is not a new school of thought, but

27 The term tianxia (天下）literally means “all under heaven,” and the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “the world.” Oxford University Press. Oxford Chinese Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 732. Yan Xuetong applies 天下 as “…China should be open to the world and all the countries in the world should be open to China.” The openness he refers to is societal and cultural. See Xuetong, Yan. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Kindle Electronic Edition. Edited by Daniel A. Bell. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Beijing: Princeton University Press, 2011. pp. 220. I take the openness notion and apply it in terms of behavior. 天下 in the SCS conflict, for the purpose of this thesis, means that China’s behavior should be open and transparent to all the world, and all the world’s actions should open and transparent to China. While the latter is not in the realm of control for China, the former is, and it is essential to establishing humane authority in the SCS.

44

humane authority does offers a specific alternative to the idea of the hegemon.

Furthermore, taking Yan Xuetong’s three principles of humane authority and applying it

to the SCS empowers China with a new approach to meeting national objectives in a

more effective, peaceful way both for itself and for the international community. The

next chapter will look more extensively at the three principles applied to the SCS and will

provide examples of how these principles could manifest themselves in Chinese policy.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Discussions and Conclusion This chapter will look at possible outcomes of China pursuing humane authority

in the SCS as an alternative to hegemony. As shown in chapter three, China must look

for opportunities to show international leadership and responsibility. This chapter will

attempt to look at three major perceptions China has created for itself in the SCS: that

China is a bigger, more important, nation than Southeast Asian states, that China will

only show benevolence in a Machiavellian attempt to manipulate other nations, and that

China is willing to bide its time and take control of the SCS one island at a time. Once

it is shown that these three qualities harm China’s ability to influence other nations, the

remainder of this chapter will provide alternatives on how humane authority could

reverse regard for China as an aggressive rising power. Specifically, it will be shown

that China cannot resort to a “charm offensive”3 or “salami slicing”4 techniques that

provide short-term gains at the cost of permanently alienating Asian neighbors.

Big Nations, Small Nations, and Balancing Rights with Responsibilities In 2010, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, attended the 17th ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss matters of importance to Sino-ASEAN relations.

Explicitly due to pressure from the Chinese, the SCS was left off of the agenda of formal

3 Nye, Joseph. China’s repression undoes its charm offensive. March 25, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-repression-undoes-its-charm-offensive/2011/03/24/AFdlxRYB_story.html (accessed March 28, 2013).

4 Haddick, Robert. Salami Slicing in the South China Sea. August 3, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/03/salami_slicing_in_the_south_china_sea (accessed March 28, 2013).

46

discussion. However, starting with Vietnam, twelve countries broached the forbidden

topic of the SCS and emphasized the need for freedom of navigation and for claims to

sovereignty to be based on legal, legitimate claims to land features, which China does

not have. The Chinese foreign minister is reported as exploding back in a long tirade

that at its apex produced the following: “China is a big country and other countries are

small countries, and that’s just a fact.”5 Some of the delegates congratulated Mr. Yang

after his speech, but many in the meeting were more supportive of the U.S. view.6

Despite what Yang Jiechi was hoping to achieve with an assertion seeming to

imply other Asian nations are subordinate to China, his comments certainly sounded

reminiscent of hegemony. This is the opposite of what China needs to engender trust

and cooperation. China’s aggression has been well established by all of Asia, often

directly through encounters with the PLAN, and much of international relations theory

already predicts that a growing state with China’s composition is all but certain to seek

hegemony.7 Southeast Asian nations are able to connect these dots and realize that they

will be the first countries to experience Chinese pugnacity. Thus, China cannot continue

to promote an “us” versus “them” philosophy amongst its neighbors, regardless of its

size relative to other countries.

5 Pomfret, John. U.S. Takes Tougher Tone With China. July 30, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html (accessed April 01, 2013).

6 Ibid.

7 Refer to footnote two and three of chapter three.

47

This situation relates to what humane authority says about enforcing reversed

double standards. Mencius writes:

King Hsüan of Ch’i asked, ‘Is there a way of promoting good relations with neighboring states?’ ‘There is,’ answered Mencius. ‘Only a benevolent man can submit to a state smaller than his own. This accounts for the submission of T’ang to Ke and King Wen to the K’un tribes. Only a wise man can submit to a state bigger than his own. This accounts for the submission of T’ai Wang to the Hsün Yü and Kou Chien to Wu.’

A humane authority is able to establish healthy interstate relations with its neighbors by

restraining the use of its power. By acting humanely, a more powerful state can “submit”

to a weaker state and the two are able to coexist. The concept has even more

applicability in the SCS because of the potential for balancing. If China does not show

restraint in its use of force, the SCS situation could devolve to the point where Southeast

Asia presents a unified front against China. Such a scenario is unlikely due to economic

factors, but China’s attitude that it is more powerful than other nations and thus does not

have to treat them as equals only makes unification against it that much easier. Applying

“reversed double standards” could take the form of China being more cooperative in

multilateral discussions. Regardless of whether China is willing to make concessions, the

mere fact that it had privately spoken to ASEAN states to strike the SCS topic from the

2010 ARF agenda presents an image of China that disregards the priorities of others.

“Salami Slicing” and Reversed Double Standards

Secondly, the principle of reversed double standards could be applied by China

through upholding higher standards for itself in the ASEAN-drafted “Declaration on the

Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC). Written in 2002, the DOC contains

ten articles for guiding state behavior peacefully in the SCS and contains specific

48

measures states could undertake to mitigate the dispute.8 For example, article four states

that:

The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;9

This article affirms that all involved parties in the SCS should resolve disagreement

peacefully. As has already been discussed, China has created a reputation for itself of

aggression and belligerence in the dispute. Even though China will likely continue to

believe that its claim to sovereignty justifies militant responses in the SCS on grounds of

self-defense, this method will continue to generate more resistance to China’s actions.

Instead, China should strive to show its adherence to article four of the DOC. By ceasing

its long running record of engaging in naval skirmishes, regardless of harassment of other

nations, China could show it will not only hold itself to an established international

standard, but that it will hold itself to it to a degree higher than it would other nations.

This is an application of reversed double standards.

Article six of the DOC also provides a way for China to uphold reversed double

standards. Article six states that, pending settlement of disputes, signing states may

engage in cooperative activities such as marine environmental protection, marine

scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue

8 Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Nov 4, 2002. http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea (accessed April 11, 2013).

9 Ibid.

49

operations, and combatting transnational crimes, such as piracy or drug trafficking.10

Article six is primarily concerned with the “global commons,” that is, an area or resource

not belonging to any single governmental power. In The Tragedy of the Commons,

Garrett Hardin explains that a key characteristic about a commons is that it is difficult to

protect because there is little rational incentive for one state to singularly look after the

interests of all states.11 This applies to the SCS in terms of its sea-lanes and resources.

For example, if the sea-lanes are not protected or managed, piracy and illegal trafficking

may flourish, which will affect all nations.12 However, the rational choice for any

individual state is to look after its own interests, and not to expend its resources to protect

all of the sea. The consequence of this, however, is collective irresponsibility where no

state takes leadership in solving the problem. China could take initiative to show

responsibility for the commons, especially the sea-lanes of the SCS. Outside of the

sovereignty conflict, many of the problems in the SCS are still quite significant.

Research has shown that nearly half of the world’s piracy occurs in the SCS.13 Thus for

China to responsibly attempt to solve issues like piracy is an opportunity for China to

take initiative to improve a realm that affects all members of the international community,

10 Ibid.

11 Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, Dec 1968: 1243-1248. Hardin uses an example of sheep in a pasture, stating that most shepherds will look to a green pasture and assume that there is plenty of grass for not only his flock, but for other shepherds’ flocks as well. As time goes on, however, lack of cooperation and management will lead to overuse of certain areas of the pasture and the death of the grass. Eventually this will lead to the desolation of the pasture altogether, and the end of the common resource. Thus, the point is that any “commons,” whether airspace, sea-lanes, or simple grass in a pasture can be destroyed through overuse, misuse, or both.

12 The Economic Times. Asia Piracy Costs $25 bn a Year. Dec 10, 2002. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/asia-piracy-costs-25-bn-a-year/articleshow/30860501.cms (accessed April 11, 2013). This article states that Piracy in Asia costs the world economy $25 billion every year.

13 Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." Naval War College Review, 2009: pp. 1-16.

50

which would be an essential step in establishing a reputation for humane authority. This

would not only show commitment to affirming article six of the DOC, but it would also

be a sign of responsible rising power. Furthermore, if China could begin to keep sea-

lanes in general safe and free, it would be providing a public good that traditionally the

United Stated has solely been capable of achieving. Another domain for China to take

action in is the environment. China should lead projects to set higher environmental

standards for maritime conduct, including a range of things like fishing, trade, and

drilling regulations. Protecting the environment is another public good that all states

benefit from if one state leads an initiative. An additional area would be to find ways to

fairly solve energy and drilling disputes in the SCS. China could lead the way in setting

precedents for more multilateral measures, as well as even bilateral measures so long as

they do not estrange partner states, to fairly capitalize on the resources of the sea. Taking

on all these measures first, China would be in a much better position to engage in the

final issue: sovereignty. If China could establish its commitment to public goods in the

international community, it would go a long way to shifting its image from “hegemon-in-

training” to “humane sovereign.” Through taking on these responsibilities, China would

be much more effective at negotiating compromise and avoiding military and diplomatic

stalemates with other claimant states. Its claims would be more efficacious and the

global commons would be safer. This could go farther in establishing trust and adhering

to a humane authority framework than citing historical sovereignty and responding in

force to any challenges from smaller nations. Furthermore, China would benefit from

being the first state to adhere to the principles of the DOC, as there has been little

progress since 2002 in terms of inducing a high level of cooperation among signatory

51

states.14 If China were to strictly adhere to the code, it could set forward the momentum

necessary for the declaration to gain traction. It is the only agreed-upon international

guidance in the conflict, and for China to enforce higher standards on itself instead of

pushing the declaration on others could go a long way as a confidence building measure.

The result might help diminish impressions of Chinese desire for total control of the

region. If China can show it is willing to act more multilaterally either through ASEAN,

the DOC, or simply through more reserved behavior in the dispute, it could slowly start

to reduce the level of distrust it has created

In addition to upholding reversed double standards, China must also balance

responsibility with rights. As Yang Jiechi said, China is a big country, and with this size

and influence must come the international responsibility to balance the rights granted by

power. China cannot develop a reputation of responsibility, though, if it is being accused

of “salami slicing,” what Robert Haddick from Foreign Policy defined as: “the slow

accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time

to a major strategic change.“15 The purpose of salami slicing is to establish de facto

sovereignty by simply gaining footing in the SCS one step at a time. This is seen in

China’s frequent naval skirmishes as well as through its establishment of military

garrisons within island chains, such as has been done with “Sansha City” in the

14 Bateman, Sam. The Regime of the South China Sea – The Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. http://blog.canpan.info/oprf/img/858/dr.bateman_presentation.pdf (accessed April 01, 2013). pp. 5-7.

15 Haddick, Robert. Salami Slicing in the South China Sea. August 3, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/03/salami_slicing_in_the_south_china_sea (accessed March 28, 2013).

52

Paracels.16 While “salami slicing” might be effective in avoiding staying one step shy of

crossing the line, it is ineffective at creating a trustworthy image. The U.S. and ASEAN

will have difficulty without a binding code of conduct or other international legal

mechanism to define the specific rules of the SCS necessary to prevent “salami slicing,”

but China will still face adversarial balancing if it cannot convince the world that that it is

developing as a responsible nation. “Salami slicing” may pay short-term dividends, but it

will also burn bridges. China should avoid accusations that it is trying to cheat the

system and instead work on showing initiative in leading the system. Even if China

cannot agree on some multilateral decisions to be made on sovereignty, it could perhaps

still lead solutions of a variety of other problems plaguing the SCS, such as piracy and

environmental standards. If China could replace its reputation of salami slicer with

responsible leader, it might increase the likelihood of cooperation in resolving

sovereignty.

One way it could do this is by following the example of Svalbard, an island

between the coasts of Norway and Greenland. After World War I, several nations

became concerned about a resource-rich island with undefined sovereignty, named

Svalbard. In order to resolve the issue, the Treaty of Spitsbergen was created in 1920.

The treaty gave primary sovereignty to Norway, but with the limitation that Norway

recognize all other signatories’ right to maritime resources, including fishing and mining.

The treaty has been considered a success, and it has been suggested as a model for

16 Xinhua. China Establishes Sansha City. July 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/24/c_131734893.htm (accessed April 12, 2013).

53

resolving sovereignty disagreements over islands in Asia.17 This would not solve all of

the problems in the SCS, but it would provide steps forward for nations to cooperate in

oil and gas operations. This could eventually become a platform that alleviates tensions

in the SCS altogether. There is the caveat, however, that other nations are unlikely to

sign a treaty making China the primary sovereign of the SCS, even if the treaty had

binding force to limits China’s power and ensure equal access among all signatories.

This stems from mistrust of China’s behavior in recent years, and it is only exacerbated

by “salami slicing” methods that show China would prefer to shirk responsibility and

bide its time than to seek a multilateral solution with itself at the helm. China could

begin to reverse this conception, however, if it took more interest in pursuing Svalbard as

a potential model for “joint sovereignty” in the SCS.

This would also be a perfect opportunity for China to show its ability to

balance rights with responsibilities. If China were to emulate the role Norway

played in the Treaty of Spitsbergen, it could satisfy both nationalist feelings to

retake islands in the SCS that general Chinese sentiment suggests has always been

part of China, but it could also satisfy demands from Southeast Asian nations to

resolve the dispute from a multilateral platform. Two researchers from the

Singapore Institute for International Affairs suggested making signatories of a

hypothetical “SCS Sovereignty Treaty” part of a joint-‐venture company to help

create checks and balances when extracting the resources of the islands.18 The

17 Petter Dutton, from the Naval War College first suggested this idea in: "Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea." Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 60-62. 18 Khanna, Parag and John Gilman. Does Norway hold key to solving South China Sea dispute? Nov 13, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/13/opinion/khanna-south-china-sea-dispute (accessed April 12, 2013).

54

company would be listed on a major international exchange and it would have both

commercial and state-‐level authorities involved in its oversight.19 Member states of

this company would also have exclusive access to resources, so states would be

incentivized to join if allowed. Hydrocarbons extracted without permission from

this multi-‐national company would be banned from selling in the commercial

market, just as blood diamonds from Africa are among major resellers.20 This

jointly-‐led approach based in a multilateral, binding treaty that grants primary

sovereignty to China would be a better way for China to rise in the SCS than through

the continuation of its show of force.

Charm Offensive versus tianxia

Lastly, China must observe tianxia, or as it may be applied to the SCS conflict,

openness. The whole purpose of an alternative theoretical framework for the rise of

China is to provide a context in which China can dissuade the world that either its rise

will be violent or its leadership will be oppressive. In order to do this, as I have

suggested, it should follow the model of humane authority, which Yan Xuetong shows

begins with reversed double standards and balancing rights with responsibilities. No

action China can take, however, will make any difference if the outside world suspects

China is acting solely to prop up a fake image of itself to hide true intentions.

Unfortunately, China already has this reputation in many respects. In a Washington Post

article, Joseph Nye wrote:

Over the past decade, China’s economic and military might have grown impressively. But that has frightened its neighbors into looking for allies to

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

55

balance rising Chinese hard power. The key is that if a country can also increase its power of attraction, its neighbors feel less need to balance its power. Canada and Mexico, for example, do not seek alliances with China to balance American power the way Asian countries seek an American presence to balance China. The result of this regional wariness is that China is spending billions on a charm offensive to increase its soft power.21

This “charm offensive” is the opposite of what tianxia hopes to accomplish through

openness. With a reputation suggesting that acts of responsibility or generosity are

considered part of deceit, China will only take two steps back for every step it takes

forward diplomatically. Thus, as the last of the three principles of humane authority,

tianxia dictates that it is imperative for China to find opportunities to lead and take on

more international responsibility while doing so consistently with its actions, words and

image. Ideally, China might improve a wide range of domestic factors that could

increase its soft power in context of what Yan Xuetong says about humane authority. In

the short term in the SCS, however, China should at least avoid the mistakes it has made

in other international situations. If China chooses humane authority as an alternate path

to hegemony, it must do so transparently and free from suspicion.

If Yan Xuetong is right, we should see moral leadership in China’s foreign policy

as an alternative to its current ascension to hegemony. Perhaps it will begin slowly with

environmental initiatives or with piracy control, but eventually it would influence all of

China’s actions in the SCS. Perhaps China will find an entirely new way to resolve

conflict, but the end result must be that China takes initiative to lead humanely in finding

a solution. Currently, we do not see that. Most western authors write that China’s

21 Nye, Joseph. China’s repression undoes its charm offensive. March 25, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-repression-undoes-its-charm-offensive/2011/03/24/AFdlxRYB_story.html (accessed March 28, 2013).

56

methods in the SCS revolve around “salami slicing” tactics that chop the sovereignty

issue into smaller, step-by-step disputes that allow China to gain control slowly. Others

claim China only cooperates when it hopes to charm or simply deceive other states. Both

of these tactics, however, will lead to disadvantages for China in the long run. As nations

trust China less and less due to realist tactics and its close association with hegemony,

nations will strive harder to balance against China. This dearth of allies and possible

alienation from the system will make China less capable of achieving national objectives.

Either that, or it will find itself following in the steps of its Ancient Western predecessor,

Athens, and potentially face the unfortunate consequences of hegemonic, civilizational,

and global conflict.22 It does not have to choose this path, however. China’s unique

history provides it with a theoretical framework that no other civilization has. By

attempting to follow a model of humane authority in the SCS, China could provide

benefits both to itself and the international community.

22 This was the central idea Robert Gilpin proposed, that Athens’s hegemonic rise and war with Sparta was a model that Thucydides theorized would be copied until the end of time by rising powers. Gilpin wrote this in: "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613.

57

Conclusion

The SCS will be the most defining region in the world in the twenty-first century.

It certainly has the resources and critical location to be valuable that long. With the high

frequency of conflict in the region, though, much of international relations theory holds

that conflict will also become more serious as China grows and comes into competition

with the U.S. for more Asian influence. The key variables inciting discord in the SCS all

remain: material resources continue to be fought over and historical enmity still remains

between many of the involved states. How China interacts with states in the SCS

cooperate will be significant not just for the region, though, but for the world.

Simply based on its economic growth rates, ceteris paribus, China will rise to be

very powerful in upcoming decades. Western theory, primarily realism and neorealism,

predict that China’s rise will lead to hegemony, either through its nature or the lack of

obstacles in the international system. With aggressive Chinese behavior in the SCS over

the past three decades, they will probably be right, unless China finds a different method

to guide its relations with other states.

China has such a way. By applying pre-Qin era thought, China can substitute

assumptions regarding power relations in politics made by Thucydides, Machiavelli,

Hobbes and other authors of realism with Mencius, who believed that humans are

naturally good and that states should engender cooperation through humane governance.

For China to use humane authority to replace hegemony in the SCS brings

benefits to its own national goals. It will be able to avoid the challenges of the balance of

power as well as be able to cooperate more effectively with neighbors. If it stays its path,

though, China will likely pursue hegemony, which could lead to war on a very large scale.

58

China’s aggression may buy it authority for the short term, but “salami slicing”

techniques and “charm offensive” merely induces paranoia in the international

community and solidifies resistance among potential allies.

Yan Xuetong applied the model of humane authority to China on the national

scale, and I have applied it specifically to the SCS. Through the principles of reversed

double standards, responsibility balanced with rights, and tianxia, China can replace its

reputation as a rising hegemon with one of a cooperative humane authority. Doing so is

in China’s own interest, and it will also benefit the international community. It will make

China more effective at reaching its goals as well as at avoiding the perpetuation of

conflict.

59

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Thesis Completed 30 April 2013

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