THEORY OF MIND AND THE FRONTAL LOBES

Arq Neuropsiquiatr 2006;64(2-A):202-206
D e p a rtment of Neuro l o g y, Medical School, State University of Campinas SP, Brazil: 1Postgraduate Neurologist; 2Associate Pro f e s s o r. This research was supported by grant from CAPES (Brazil).
Received 15 June 2005, received in final form 30 November 2005. Accepted 6 December 2005.
D r. Benito P. Damasceno - Department of Neurology - Medical School, State University of Campinas - Box 6111 - 13083-970 Campinas SP - Brasil. E-mail: [email protected]
THEORY OF MIND AND THE FRONTAL LOBES
Glauco C. Igliori1, Benito P. Damasceno2
ABSTRACT - Background: Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to other individu- als. Its cerebral organization is not enough established, even though the literature suggests the relevant role of the frontal lobes. Objective: To evaluate frontal lobe patients and controls in ToM tests. M e t h o d : We studied 20 patients with lesions limited to the frontal lobes (as shown by CT or MRI), and 10 norm a l control subjects by means of ToM tests (recognizing himself in mirrors, false belief, first and second order ToM tasks), as well as tests of other cognitive functions (counter- p ro o f s ) . Results: Patients and contro l s performed similarly in ToM tests. There was significant difference between frontal subgroups (left, right, b i f rontal) in the double-bluff task (second order ToM) (p=0.021), without relation to verbal fluency (p=0.302) or delayed recall ability (p=0.159). The only two patients with deficits in ToM tasks had impairment of social b e h a v i o r. Conclusion: F rontal lesions do not necessarily implicate in ToM deficits, which may occur when such lesions are associated to disturbance of social behavior.
KEY WORDS: theory of mind, frontal lesions, cognition, neuropsychological tests.
Teoria da mente e lobos frontais
RESUMO - Contexto: Teoria da mente (TM) é a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais aos outros. Sua org a- nização cerebral não está suficientemente esclarecida, embora a literatura indique que os lobos fro n t a i s desempenham papel re l e v a n t e . Objetivo: Avaliar pacientes com lesões frontais e controles em testes de T M . Método: Foram estudados 20 pacientes com lesões restritas aos lobos frontais (conforme imagens de CT ou RM) e 10 controles normais em testes de TM (reconhecimento da própria imagem no espelho, falsa crença, TM de 1ª ordem e TM de 2ª ordem), usando como contra-provas testes de outras funções cog- n i t i v a s . Resultados: Não houve diferença entre pacientes e controles nos testes de TM. Os subgru p o s f rontais (direito, esquerdo, bilateral) diferiram significativamente no teste de “duplo blefe” (TM 2ª ord e m ) (p=0,021), sem relação com a fluência verbal (p=0,302) ou memória de evocação tardia (p=0,159). As úni- cas duas pacientes com déficits em testes TM tinham alterações do comportamento social. C o n c l u s ã o : Lesões frontais não implicam necessariamente em transtornos da TM, os quais podem ocorrer quando tais lesões estão associadas a alterações do comportamento social.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: teoria da mente, lesões frontais, cognição, testes neuropsicológicos.
The human beings are social animals, which need to interact to each other for survival. Their success in such interactions is highly dependent on the so called “social intelligence”, which gives us the power to i n t e r p ret the behavior of other individuals, attribute mental states to them, make inferences about their intentions, desires and believes, and predict their ac- tions. This ability to conceive the mental state of oth- ers is called “theory of mind”1. Theory of mind (To M ) is a complex function, which seems to have its own cognitive mechanisms, since it may be selectively im- p a i red when other cognitive functions are intact, as seen in autistic childre n2 , 3; or it may be selectively p re- s e rved when other cognitive functions are disturbed, as shown in children with Down´s or Williams´ s y n d ro-
m e s4. Furt h e rm o re, ToM seems to be a general human a b i l i t y, since it is found in all culture s5, and has a se- quential pattern of development in children6,7.
In the ontogenesis of ToM, the first step is to be able to recognize himself as being separated fro m the other, to understand that himself and the other a re distinct individuals. On the other hand, the child p e rceives similarities in himself and others, then being able to recognize the other and consequently him- self as intentional beings. Just in this way can the c h i l d engage himself in joint attention activities with oth- ers, probably after nine months age8, or accord i n g to other authors9 , 1 0, after 18 months age. With this a b i l i t y, the child can engage himself in a triadic re l a- tionship with the other individual (adult) and the
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object of their attention, coordinating their interac- tions (the child sees a toy and sees that his mother also sees it). Next stage in the development of To M (after 18 months age) is pretense play, which re q u i re s the ability to uncouple simulation from re a l i t y6. At this age, the child begins to understand the desire of others (“John wants to eat”), before understand- ing the belief of others (“John believes that I ate a candy”).
Later on, between 3 and 4 years age, the child be- comes able to understand that the others can have beliefs or false beliefs7. In false belief tests, the child thinks that the other person may have a false belief. He/she can re p resent the mental state of another p e r- son, making inferences about the belief of this per- son, conceived as diff e rent from his/her own belief in the real state of the world1 1. This ability is called “first order ToM”.
Between 6 and 7 years age, the child begins to understand that the other person can also re p re s e n t the mental state of other persons (beliefs about b e l i e f s )1 2. Thus, the child can make inferences not on- ly on the belief a person has about an event in the world, but also on the belief this person has about the belief of another person concerning this world event. This is the “second order ToM”. First ord e r ToM may be expressed as “A thinks that B did x”; and second order ToM, as “A thinks that B thinks that A did x”.
The cerebral organization of ToM is not enough established. However, such a complex mental func- tion is probably carried out by a neurofunctional net- work engaging various brain regions and mental ope- r a t i o n s1 3. In this re g a rd, the frontal lobes seem to p l a y a crucial role, as revealed by studies of normal sub- jects using functional neuro i m a g i n g1 4, as well as eval- uation of frontal lobe patients on ToM tests1 3 , 1 5 - 1 7. Other brain regions seem to be also engaged, part i- cularly the temporal-parietal junction1 8 , 1 9, and the left amygdala2 0. ToM can also be disrupted by diff u s e brain lesions with dementia21.
As yet, it is not known how and in what degre e a bilateral or unilateral frontal lobe lesion can impair ToM. With the aim to contribute to this knowledge, we have studied frontal lobe patients and norm a l control subjects by means of tests for ToM tests and relevant cognitive functions (counter-proofs).
METHOD Subjects – This study included 20 patients with ages
higher than 18 years, even illiterate ones, attended at our university hospital (Unit for Neuropsychology and Neuro- linguistics, HC-UNICAMP), as well as 10 normal control sub- jects. The inclusion of controls re q u i red them to be matched
to the patients by age, sex, education and handedness, as well as to have normal neurological exam and no pre v i o u s h i s t o ry or current symptoms of neurological or psychiatric diseases (neuroimaging was not re q u i red). All patients had lesions limited to the frontal lobes, in chronic phase (≥4 months after lesion onset), as shown by computerized to- mography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). This study was approved by our Medical School Ethics Committee and all patients and controls signed the informed consent form.
P ro c e d u res – All patients and controls underwent med- ical history, neurological examination, Mini-Mental Status Exam (MMSE)2 2 , 2 3, besides tests for ToM and cognition. The following cognitive functions were examined as counter- proofs for ToM tests: attention (Digit Span, a WAIS-R sub- t e s t )2 4; visual-spatial perception (Luria´s Neuro p s y c h o l o g i c a l B a t t e ry and Ratcliff´s mental rotation tests)2 5 , 2 6; language (Boston Naming Te s t )2 7; executive functions: verbal fluen- cy (category: animals) and Stroop test2 8; and delayed re c a l l of word list (Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Te s t )2 9. ToM tests, whose scores were 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect), included:
1. Mirror test3 0 , 3 1 to evaluate the subject’s ability to re c- ognize himself in the mirror.
2. False belief test2 to verify if the subject is able to infer that another person may have a wrong (false) belief, dif- f e rent from his own. The story of Sally and Anne is played by actors and presented in video-TV. Sally puts an object in a place in the presence of Anne, and goes out from the sta- ge scenery. Anne changes the place of the object while Sally was out. Sally comes back to stage and, then, the examin- er asks the subject “where Sally thinks the object is placed”.
3. Understanding ToM stories: In these tests, the exam- iner reads the story and the subject has to retell it soon af- t e rw a rds. If the subject forgets relevant events, the story is read again to him (her) up to three more attempts. Failure to remember relevant events in the fourth attempt excludes the subject from the test.
3.1. First order ToM story1 6: This tests the subject’s abil- ity to explain the behavior of a character by attributing mental state to him. Story: “A burglar who has just ro b b e d a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a poli- ceman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He does not know the man is a burg l a r, he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burg l a r, ‘Hey, you! Stop!’, the burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.” Questions: (1) Why did the burglar surrender?; (2) Did the policeman know that the man was a burglar?
3.2. Second order ToM stories: To verify if the subject can understand what a character thinks about what anoth- er character thinks about an event.
3.2.1. The examiner reads following story, adapted fro m Stone et al.1 3: “Mary and John are sitting in the kitchen tal- king. John is eating cookies. John gets up and leaves the room. Mary closes up the box of cookies and puts them away in a cabinet . While he is outside of the room, John looks back through the keyhole and sees Mary moving the
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cookies. Mary goes back and sits down. The John opens the d o o r.” Then, the examiner asks the subject: (1) Where does Mary think that John thinks the cookies are? (belief ques- tion); (2) Where are the cookies? (reality question); (3) Whe- re were the cookies in the beginning? (memory question); (4) Where does John think the cookies are?
3.2.2. The other story is a “double bluff” test3: “During the war, the Red army captured a member of the Blue arm y. They want him to tell them where his arm y ’s tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the mountains. They know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save his arm y, and so he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and very clever; he will not let them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when the other side asks him where his tanks are, he says, “They are in the mountains.” Questions: (1) Is it true what the prisoner said?; (2) Where will the other army look for his tanks?; (3) Why did the prisoner say what he said?
Data analysis – Data was analysed by means of statistical s o f t w a re SAS System for Wi n d o w s3 2. Patients and contro l s
w e re compared for age, education, and cognitive tests by means of Mann-Whitney U test and Kru s k a l - Wallis analysis of variance, and for their perf o rmance on ToM tests by using Fisher´s exact proof. Significance level was 5% (two-tailed).
RESULTS The etiology was vascular in 11 patients, traumat-
ic in 7, surgical resection in 1, and tumor in 1 patient. As shown by Tables 1 and 2, there was no significant d i ff e rence between patients and controls concern- ing age (p=0.081), education (p=0.964), MEEM score s (p=0.609), Stroop test (p=0.147), and Boston Naming Test (p=0.118), but they perf o rmed diff e rently in tests of attention (p=0.0016), verbal fluency (p=0.0141), and delayed recall (p=0.0272). Both groups perf o rm e d similarly in ToM tests: false belief (p=0.532), first ord e r ToM (p=0.1), second order ToM (p=1), inclusive “dou- ble bluff” task (p=0.1107). Mirror test was carried out correctly by all patients and controls.
Table 1. Demographic and cognitive data in patients and controls.
Patients Group Sex Age Educ MMSE Attent VF Stroop BNT DRM
1 L M 63 4 29 4 9 5 56 04 2 L F 73 4 28 5 16 6 57 07 3 L M 30 11 28 4 10 1 54 09 4 L F 22 4 24 5 15 3 50 07 5 L F 48 15 28 6 11 0 59 03 6 L M 21 10 30 7 10 6 48 08 7 L F 53 9 21 5 4 17 27 05 8 L M 69 3 18 6 6 ND 39 00 9 R F 46 11 28 7 20 1 55 09
10 R F 58 0 22 4 13 ND 38 07 11 R M 58 4 21 5 6 ND 50 00 12 R M 70 5 16 3 11 ND ND 03 13 R M 49 6 24 6 7 6 35 01 14 BiF M 50 7 30 6 22 0 58 04 15 BiF F 33 8 26 5 10 1 51 06 16 BiF F 44 0 16 4 10 ND 36 01 17 BiF M 72 3 20 3 4 ND 20 00 18 BiF M 44 8 27 6 17 1 50 05 19 BiF M 51 5 27 6 15 2 39 09 20 BiF M 63 8 29 6 13 12 48 06
Mean±SD 50.8±15.6 6.2±3.8 24.6±4.6 5.1±1.2 11.4±4.9 4.3±4.9 45.1±10.7 4.7±3.1
Controls 1 M 38 4 29 9 11 1 54 11 2 F 20 8 23 9 17 0 53 12 3 M 53 4 24 8 17 1 49 05 4 M 21 5 28 8 22 5 51 13 5 M 57 4 28 7 15 1 53 03 6 F 50 15 26 9 21 0 59 13 7 F 31 7 27 7 15 4 48 10 8 M 42 8 28 6 17 5 56 06 9 F 40 0 22 4 11 ND 39 03
10 F 53 9 27 6 13 0 52 08 Mean±SD 40.5±13.2 6.4±4.1 26.2±2.4 7.3±1.6 15.9±3.7 1.9±2.1 51.4±5.4 8.4±3.9
p 0.0819 0.9646 0.6097 0.0016 0.0141 0.1477 0.1180 0.0272
L, left; R, right; BiF, bifrontal; ND, not done; Educ, education (years); MMSE, mini-mental status exam; VF, verbal fluency; Stroop, stroop test; Attent, attention; BNT, Boston naming test; DRM, delayed recall memory; SD, standard deviation; P, p value (patients versus controls).
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The frontal subgroups (right, left, and bifrontal) w e re similar concerning demographic and cognitive data. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, eight patients were excluded from “double bluff” test, three from 1s t o r- der and two from 2nd order ToM tests, because they did not fulfil criteria for perf o rming these tests. A- mong the ToM tests, the only one in which these sub- g roups perf o rmed diff e rently was on the “double b l u ff” task (p=0.021) (Table 3). Perf o rmance on this test was not influenced by delayed recall (p=0.1597) or verbal fluency (p=0.3022).
DISCUSSION
The ToM tests we employed presented varied d e g ree of diff i c u l t y. The mirror test off e red no pro b- lem to our subjects. Difficulties appeared with sto- ries re p resenting less familiar situations, as happened with the double bluff story (test 3.2.2) about a war, but not with the other second order ToM story (test 3.2.1) portraying the scene on a couple in the kitchen. These diff e rences in familiarity may, at least part l y, explain the difficulties which two of our cases (num-
Table 2. Results of ToM tests in patients and controls.
Patients Group Mirror False 1st order 2nd order Double test belief ToM ToM bluff
1 L 1 1 1 1 0 2 L 1 1 1 1 0 3 L 1 1 1 1 1 4 L 1 1 1 1 0 5 L 1 1 1 1 ND 6 L 1 1 1 1 1 7 L 1 0 0 0 0 8 L 1 0 0 1 ND 9 R 1 1 1 1 1 10 R 1 1 ND 1 ND 11 R 1 ND ND ND ND 12 R 1 1 0 1 ND 13 R 1 1 1 1 ND 14 BiF 1 1 1 1 1 15 BiF 1 1 1 1 1 16 BiF 1 0 0 0 ND 17 BiF 1 1 ND ND ND 18 BiF 1 1 1 1 1 19 BiF 1 1 1 1 1 20 BiF 1 1 1 1 1
Controls 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 ND 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 ND 10 1 1 1 1…