The woman question in Aristotle.pdf

8/11/2019 The woman question in Aristotle.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-woman-question-in-aristotlepdf 1/18

ociété québécoise de science politique

Political Rule, Prudence and the "Woman Question" in AristotleAuthor(s): Leah BradshawSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 24,No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 557-573Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229167 .

Accessed: 06/06/2014 05:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Canadian Political Science Association and Société québécoise de science politique are collaborating with

JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne descience politique.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 6 Jun 2014 05:35:55 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cpsa

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sqsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229167?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229167?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sqsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cpsa



Political

Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in

Aristotle*

LEAH

BRADSHAW Brock

University

One of the most enduring and cherished statements of Aristotle is his

precise

definition of

political

rule,

namely,

the

appropriate

kind

of

rule

over

free

and

equal persons

(Pol. 1255b).1

When

one

rules over

those

who are

similar

in

stock and

free,'

one has a

respect

for the

equality

of

citizens,

and the ruler

does

not

see

himself as

endowed

with

any

exclu-

sive

capacity

that

would set

him

permanently

above

the ruled. Aristotle

says

that it has been

correctly

said

that it is not

possible

to

rule

well

without

having

been

ruled

(Pol. 1277b).

A

good

citizen

will know how

to rule

and

how

to be

ruled,

and

will see the

political

association

as an

arrangement among equals.

Political rule for

Aristotle

is not

the

same as

democratic

rule,

though

we often

conflate the

two.

Democratic

rule

presupposes

freedom

of

citizens,

as does

political

rule,

but

it does not

presuppose

the

kind

of

equality

that

Aristotle ascribes to

political

rule. Democratic rule he

defines as

the

majoritarianism

of

the

poor

(Pol.

1290b).

It

does

not

require

a

sharing

of

virtue or

a

general

equality

of

means,

as does

political

rule. Political

rule

requires

moderation

and affection

among

*

I

gratefully

acknowledge

this JOURNAL'S

nonymous

referees'

suggestions.

I

also

thank

my colleague

William Mathie for his

insights

on the relation in Aristotle's

writings

between the

virtue

of

prudence

and

the

practical

experience

of

ruling.

1

All

quotations

from

Aristotle's Politics

are from the

translation

by

Carnes Lord

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1984);

from

Aristotle's

Nicomachean

Ethics,

the

translation

by

Harris

Rackham

(London:

William

Heinemann,

Loeb

Classical

Library,

1926);

from

Aristotle's

Rhetoric,

the

translation

by

Rhys

Roberts

(New

York:

Modern

Library,

1954);

and

from

Aristotle's Generation

ofAnimals,

the

translation

by

A.

L.

Peck

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

Loeb

Classical

Library,

1943).

In

writing

about

Aristotle's

theory

of

political

rule

and the

exercise

of

prudence,

I

have

occasionally

used the

masculine

pronoun.

Since Aristotle did

not include females in the

practice

of either of

these

activities,

it

does not

make

sense

to

employ

gender-neutral

language

in the

discussion.

Leah

Bradshaw,

Department

of

Politics,

Brock

University,

St.

Catharines,

Ontario

L2S 3A1

Canadian

Journal

of

Political

Science

/

Revue

canadienne de

science

politique,

XXIV:3

(September/

septembre

1991).

Printed

in

Canada

/

Imprime

au

Canada








LEAH BRADSHAW

citizens,

and

Aristotlewarnsthat

if a

city

wishes to be

made

up

of

equal

and

similar itizens

to the extent that that

s

possible,

it

will

take

care not

to

produce

great

extremes of

wealth

and

poverty

(Pol. 1295b),

or dis-

paritiesin wealth tend to lead to the dominanceof one faction over

another.

The

political

partnership

hat

depends

on the

middling

sort

of

person

is

the

best,

and such

partnerships

re

likely

to last

longer,

to

avoid

degenerating

nto

tyranny

(Pol.

1296a),

and to

produce

the

best

legislators

(Pol. 1296a).

When Aristotle

says

that

the

political partnership

hat

depends

upon

the

middling

ort is

best,

he meansthat which

is

best

practically.

The

middling

sort of

regime

is not the sort that

one

might

pray

for

(Pol. 1325b).

The

ideal

regime

would be one made

up

of

perfectly

just

and virtuouscitizens, a regimenot subjectto the winds of fortuneand

circumstance.Given

the limits of

practicalpolitics,

however,

Aristotle

seems to

prefer

the

political

association.

If

a

healthy regime

s one of

political

rule,

and if

political

rule is the

appropriate

ind

of

rule

among

equals,

then

we

might

assume that

in

a

truly political

association there is

no

real distinctionbetween ruler

and

ruled.

We

might

think that the

truly


s a

pure

democracy

where no one

really

rules another.

But

this

is

not

what

Aristotlehas

in

mind. He

states

emphatically

hat the virtue

of

the ruler

is not the sameas that of the ruled,even in a politicalpartnershipwhere

all

citizens are

roughlyequal.

For it is

clear

that

a

virtue-[the

virtue]

ofjustice,

for

example-would

not be a

single

thing

for

[a

rulerand

for]

a

ruled

but free

person

who

is

good,

but has differentkinds

in

accordance

with

which one will

rule or be

ruled,

just

as

moderation

and

courage

differ in a man or a

woman

(Pol.

1277b).

More

particularly,

he difference

between

rulerand

ruled,

even

in

a

political

association,

has to do with

prudence

phronesis).

Prudence s

the

only

virtue

peculiar

to the ruler

(Pol.

1277b).

All

other

virtues,

Aristotlesays (meaning he moralvirtuesenumeratednthe Nicomach-

ean

Ethics)

may

be

common

to

both

ruler

and ruled. This can

only

mean

that

while

one

could

expect

a

sharing

n

most virtues

by

all

citizens

in a

political

association,

one could not

expect

to find the

virtue of

prudence

n

the ruled.

Instead,

Aristotle

expects

that one

will

find in

the

ruled true

opinion

(Pol.

1277b).

He

compares

the ruler and

ruled to

the

flute

player

and the

flute

maker,

respectively.

Just

as we

expect

the

quality

of the

instrument o

be

judged

by

the one

who

plays

it,

not

by

the

one

who makes

t,

so

we are

supposed

o inferthat the

quality

of

political

association s bestjudgedbythe one whorulesit, notbythose who make

it.

This

seems

at

first consideration

an odd simile.

Surely,

we

might

think,

a

political

partnership

exists

for

the benefit and

enjoyment

of

those who

partake

n

it,

not

principally

or the

satisfaction

of

the ruler.

The

flute

player

may

be

the

best

judge

of

the

quality

of an

instrument,

558








Abstract. Aristotle

gives

the

classical definition of

political

rule as

the kind

of rule

appropriate

for free

and

equal

persons.

This

concept

of

political

rule is

complicated,

however,

by

the fact

that,

even in what Aristotle calls a free and

equal

association,

the ruler

is

separated

from the

ruled

by

his

possession

of the virtue of

prudence.

This article

explores

the relation between

political

rule

and

prudence

in

Aristotle's

writings,

and

considers particularly the case of political rule between men and women. Though Aristotle

characterizes

the

proper

relation between men and women

as a free and

equal

one,

he

distinguishes

the

male/female

political

relation from the more

general political

relation

by

saying

that men are

naturally

more fit to rule than women. We are interested

in whether

Aristotle excludes women from

political

rule because

he thinks that

women lack

the

potential

for the

virtue

of

prudence.

Resume. Selon

la definition

classique,

donnee

par

Aristote,

la

regle politique

s'applique

a

tous les

citoyens

consideres comme libres et

egaux.

Ce

concept

de

regle

politique

devient

plus complexe

des

lors

que, malgre

le

pouvoir

de

libre et

egale

association,

le

citoyen

est

separe

du

gouvernant par l'obligation

de

prevoyance que

detient ce dernier.

Cet

article

explore

le lien entre la

regle politique

et la vertu de

prevoyance

dans les ecrits

d'Aristote,

plus particulierement

en

ce

qui

concerne la relation

politique

entre les hommes

et les

femmes. Meme si Aristote considere

que

la relation entre les hommes et les femmes est

egale

et librement

consentie,

il

distingue

la relation

politique

homme-femme de

la

regle

generale

en

affirmant

que

les hommes sont naturellement

plus

aptes

a

gouverner.

La

question,

ici,

est de savoir si Aristote exclut les femmes de

la

regle

politique parce

qu'il

pense

qu'elles

ont

moins

d'aptitudes

a

maitriser

la

vertu

de

prevoyance.

but

is the ruler the best

judge

of a

political

association?

Aristotle

appar-

ently

thinks so.

Just

as

we

might

say

that a

concert

is for the

enjoyment

of

an

audience,

but we would not

expect

to

rely

on the audience for

critical reviews, so one might say that political partnerships are for the

benefit and

enjoyment

of

the

people

who

live

under

political

institutions,

though

the ruled are not

necessarily

the best

judges

of those

institutions.

Also,

even

though

Aristotle claims that ruler and ruled

can share

in

all

virtues

except prudence,

he

obviously

thinks that

the

possession

(or

lack)

of

prudence

colours all other virtues

in

some

way.

We know this

because he

says

that

justice, courage

and

moderation,

though possessed

by

ruler and

ruled,

will

manifest themselves

differently

in

the ruler

(who

has

prudence)

than

in

the ruled

(who

have

only

correct

opinion),

just

as

we would expect that these virtues manifest themselves differently in

men and

women.

If

prudence

is

the

central

thing separating

ruler

from

ruled

in an

otherwise

equal

partnership,

we need

to

know more

about

it,

and we

find a

fairly

extensive

discussion

of

it in the

Nicomachean

Ethics.

Aristotle

calls

prudence

a

true,

or

correct,

conception

of deliberation

with

regard

to

what is

expedient

as

a means to

an end

(N.E.

1

143a).

Good

deliberation

he

describes

as correctness

of

thinking

that involves

conscious

calculation

(N.E.

1142b).

Prudence

is a correct

manner of

thinking that is applied to a particular course of action. A prudent

decision

requires

not

simply

the

right

deliberation

about

something

but

applying

that

thinking

to

choosing

an

appropriate

means

to

an end.

The

connection

between

prudence

and action

is

critical

for

Aristotle. He

says

that

prudence

is a virtue that

does

not

merely

make

judgments,

but








LEAH

BRADSHAW

issues commands

(N.E. 1143a).

The

objective

of

prudence

is to

deter-

mine

what

we

ought

or

ought

not to do.

Specifically,

prudence

is bound

up

with

judgment

about human

beings

acting

and

living together.

Aristo-

tle distinguishes prudence from both science (episteme) and art

(techne).

Science

produces

certain

knowledge

about

invariable

things,

art

produces

objects

in the

world,

but

prudence

deliberates about

vari-

able

things,

especially

political

matters

and household affairs

(N.E.

1140b).

Importantly,

while

Aristotle

emphasizes

prudence's application

to

practical,

variable

human

activity,

and

sees

its

value as

lying particularly

in

the

running

of

political

and

household

affairs,

he

nevertheless

categor-

izes

prudence

as

an

intellectual

virtue,

indeed

as one of

the two

highest

intellectual virtues. The other one is wisdom (sophia), what Aristotle

calls

a

combination of

intelligence

and

scientific

knowledge regarding

invariable

things.

The intellectual virtues

of

wisdom

and

prudence

have

a

complex

interrelation,

according

to

Aristotle.

Wisdom,

the virtue

that

is

oriented toward

the

consideration

of

invariable

things,

is the

most

divine

element

in

human

beings,

and Aristotle

says

that

the best life will

emulate

the divine.

At

the

same

time,

he

warns that

human

beings

are

not

gods,

and that

they

are called

upon

to

exercise

the

specifically

human

virtue of

prudence.

Prudence,

of

course,

is

that virtue

directed

at

variable, human things. Though it appears that Aristotle held wisdom to

be

the

higher

of the two

intellectual

virtues,

it is difficult to see

how

one

could

exercise

prudence

without

wisdom.

On

the other

hand,

it does

seem

possible,

according

to

Aristotle's

descriptions,

to

possess

wisdom

(essentially

a

contemplative

virtue)

and not to

possess

prudence

(N.E.

1178).

Prudence

qualifies

as an

intellectual

virtue,

despite

its

practical

bent,

because

prudence requires

intelligence

as well

as

practical

sensi-

bility.

Choice of

any

kind,

Aristotle

rightly

says,

always

involves an

intellectual, deliberative element, and the ability to make good choices

cannot be

acquired by experience

alone.

Experience may provide

a solid

grounding

for

doing

what is

familiar,

but

it

cannot

be an

adequate

basis

for

making

reasoned

and

difficult choices. Even

though

prudence

is

directed at

practical

activity

and

requires knowledge

of

particular

facts

even

more than

the

knowledge

of

general principles

(N.E. 1141b),

prudence

cannot exist without

some

supreme directing faculty

(N.E.

1141b).

The

prudent

individual

may

have

a

well-grounded

practical

sense of

things

and

may

need

a

sensitivity

to

the

particular;

but

he

will

see all of this in light of his supreme directing faculty which Aristotle

calls

intelligence.

To

get

a

better

sense of

how

Aristotle

sees

prudence

as

both an

intellectual

and

a

practical

virtue,

it is

helpful

to

look at

some

of

his

examples.

He

concedes

that

those who

are

ignorant

of

general

principles

560








Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in

Aristotle

are nevertheless sometimes more successful in action than those

who

grasp

general principles

but are

lacking

in

particular knowledge.

For

instance,

if

a

man knows that

light

meat is

easily

digested

and therefore

wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not

be

so

likely

to restore

you

to

health as

a man who

merely

knows

that

chicken is

wholesome;

and

in

other

matters,

men of

experience

are more

successful than theorists

(N.E. 1141b).

Similarly,

he

says

that

the

unproved

assertions and

opinions

of

experienced

and

elderly people

ought

to be

heeded,

since

experience

has

given

them

an

eye

for

things

(N.E. 1143b).

Aristotle's

examples emphasize experience

and

practical

knowhow as

integral

to

prudence,

but he still is

careful

to

point

out

that these things are not sufficient. Prudence is not merely correct

decision,

for it is

possible

to arrive

at the

right

decision

for the

wrong

reasons and no one

would call such decision

prudent

(N.E.

1142b).

Prudence

requires

the

correct

choice

of

action for reasons that

are

themselves correct and conscious. Aristotle

also

says

that we would not

call

someone

prudent

who

arrived

at a correct decision

for

correct

reasons but after a

painfully

slow

process

of deliberation.

Prudence

seems

to demand

quickness

of

mind,

swiftness of decision

and decisive-

ness

of action.

The

combination of

intellectual

quality

and

practical

judgment seems to constitute the core of prudence. Someone who is

prudent

understands

fully why

a

particular

course

of action is

good,

and

so chooses

deliberately

and

knowledgeably.

Virtue

is

not

merely

a

disposition

conforming

to

right

principle,

but

one

cooperating

with

right

principle;

and

prudence

is

right principle

in

matters

of conduct

(N.E.

1144b).

One needs

intelligence,

good

character

and

practical experience

to

be

prudent.

It is

possible

for

a

person

to

possess

some moral

virtues and

not

others,

Aristotle

says.

For

example,

one

may

be

courageous

but not

necessarily just; it is possible to be moderate but not courageous. But it

is not

possible

to be

prudent

without at the same

time

having

all

other

moral virtues

(N.E. 1145a).

Prudence,

the

quintessential ruling

virtue,

cannot

afford

to be a

badjudge

of

anything.

It is the most

complete

virtue

for a human

being

(N.E. 1144b).

We can summarize Aristotle's account

of

prudence by

ascribing

to

it

the

following qualities.

It

has

a

truth-telling,

rational

quality,

which

places

it

squarely

in the

realm

of intellectual

virtue.

Prudence

demon-

strates

good

character,

that

is,

habituation

in

the moral

virtues

such

as

justice, courage and moderation. Finally, prudence requires the oppor-

tunity

to make decisions and issue

commands,

meaning

that it

can be

exercised

only

in

practical

conduct

and from a

position

of

authority.

One

has to

be able to

produce

results,

and

for

this one needs

power

to execute

decision.

561








LEAH BRADSHAW

The last

feature of

prudence-issuing

commands-is

of

particular

interest

to

us

in

light

of

the

considerations

on

political

rule. Aristotle has

said that

prudence

is the virtue

peculiar

to

the

ruler,

even

in

an

otherwise

equal partnership. We know certainly that Aristotle considered the

authority

to

issue

commands as an

integral part

of

prudence.

He

has

even

gone

as

far to

say

that it is

probably

true

that

no

one can obtain the

virtue of

prudence

without

domestic

economy

and

politics

(N.E.

1142a).

In

short,

to

exercise

prudence

one needs a domain to rule. What we want

to

know,

however,

is

whether

prudence

is a virtue that is

acquired only

by ruling

(something

that is learned

by doing)

or whether it is

a

latent

virtue

that

predisposes

some toward fitness to rule over

others?

Aristotle does not

furnish an

easy

answer

to the

question.

On

the

one hand, he says that we cannot be prudent without being good

(N.E.

1144a),

and

by

goodness

he

means an absence

of

vice

(1144a),

or a kind of

moral

judgment

that

goes beyond

cleverness.

Goodness

encompasses

natural

qualities

( a

natural

affinity

for

virtue,

loving

what

is noble and

hating

what

is

base

[N.E.

1179b]);

proper

habituation

( it

is

difficult to obtain

a

right

education

in

virtue from

youth up

without

being brought

up

under

right

laws

[N.E.

1179b]);

and

intelligence

(goodness

will be

secured

if

men's lives are

regulated

by

a certain

intelligence

[N.E.

1180a]).

Obviously,

even to

qualify

for the virtue

of

prudence, one has to have a ratherdemanding assemblage of qualities: a

natural

predisposition

toward

virtue,

good

habits and

education,

and

intelligence.

If

one

is

deficient

in

any

of

them,

it is

difficult

to

see

how

one

could

even

hope

to be

prudent,

according

to Aristotle's

stringent

requirements.

Yet not

having

the occasion or the

opportunity

to exercise

authority

and

issue

commands,

one

conceivably

could have

all the

necessary

qualities

of

goodness

and

still

lack

prudence.

Aristotle discusses

just

this situation.

Individuals can

have

all the

qualities

that

constitute

goodness, and this would mean that they necessarily would have a

proper

understanding

of

things

in

general,

but

it would not mean

neces-

sarily

that

they

have

prudence.

A

person

with

good understanding

(eusunesia),

according

to

Aristotle,

has

a

grasp

of variable

things

con-

cerning

human

happiness

(the

importance

of

community, family,

friend-

ship

for

example),

and

therefore is

concerned

with the same

objects

as a

prudent

person (N.E. 1143a).

But

the

big

difference between the

person

with

understanding

and the

person

with

prudence

is

that

the latter has

authority

and

issues

commands.

Understanding

is not the same

thing

as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands since its end is a statement

of

what we

ought

to do

or

not to

do,

whereas

Understanding merely

makes

judgments

(N.E.

1143a).

Evidently,

the

only thing

that

separates

the

good

man with

prudence

from the

good

man

without

prudence

is

the

authority

vested

in

the

former,

which allows him the

opportunity

to

cultivate the

additional virtue.

562








Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in Aristotle

Now

it

should be clear

why

Aristotle

says

that

prudence

is a

virtue

peculiar

to the ruler in

an otherwise

equal,

political

association.

Even

among

those who are

equal

in

significant ways-having roughly

the

same virtues, the same amounts of wealth, the same habits and

education-the ruler is

unequal

in the

possession

of

prudence

because

he rules.

Only

the ruler has

prudence

because

only

he has

the

authority

to

carry

out his

judgments

in

action. When Aristotle

says

that

the ruled

in

a

political

association have true

opinion

(doxa

alethes),

and

that this

true

opinion

is

their

virtue of

citizenship,

he means that

they

are

capable

of

recognizing

and

deferring

to

prudent leadership

(Pol.

1277b).

Aristo-

tle writes

in

the Nicomachean Ethics that when we

employ

the

faculty

of

Opinion

to

judge

what another

person says

about matters

that are

in

the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand (that is, to judge

rightly,

for

right judgment

is

the

same as

good understanding)

(N.E.

1143a).

A

good

citizen

in

a

political

association would have the

capacity

for

right judgment,

which

would

lead him to form the correct

opinion

about

prudent

leadership.

That same

citizen

may

well

acquire prudence,

indeed

possess

all the

necessary

elements for

it,

but

only

if

he takes

his

place

as ruler in a

rotation of office. The rotation of office

in

political

association is

possible

and

actually

desirable,

Aristotle

says.

Political Rule over Women

Now

I

want to look at a

particular

case of

political

rule: that

which

exists,

according

to

Aristotle,

in

the household between

husband

and

wife.

Aristotle

depicts

the

proper

relation between husband and wife as a

political

one,

which,

as we

already

know

from his

general

reflections

on

the

subject,

is the

appropriate

kind

of

rule

for

equals.

Aristotle

has

acknowledged

that

in most

political

offices,

it

is

true,

there

is

an

alternation

of

ruler and

ruled,

since

they

tend

by

their nature

to be

on an

equal footing and to differ in nothing (Pol. 1259b). He goes on to say,

however,

that

in

the


of husband

and

wife,

there

is to

be no

such alternation.

The husband

permanently

rules his

wife. We

know

immediately

what

the

implications

of this

are

for women.

If,

as

we

have

discovered,

it is

possible

to

acquire

prudence only

by

ruling

(and

we know that

prudence

is one

of the

two

highest

virtues

open

to

human

beings),

then we

can deduce from this one

simple

statement

of Aristo-

tle's that

women are

effectively

barred from

the virtue

of

prudence.

Unlike

citizens in a

political

association,

who share

the

potential

for

prudence and the hope of taking their turn at rule, women in a political

partnership

with men

have no

potential

or

hope

for

prudence.

Aristotle

says clearly

that

the

male,

unless constituted

in

some

respect

contrary

to

nature,

is

by

nature more

adept

at

leading

than

the female

(Pol. 1259a).

563








LEAH

BRADSHAW

It is

not at all

obvious from

reading

Aristotle's Politics

why

he

deems the

appropriate

elationbetween

men and women

in

the

house-

hold as

an

equal, political

one,

yet

at the same time

proclaims

that the

maleby nature s moreexpertat leadingthan the female. All Aristotle

has

to

say

about the natural

rulingexpertise

of men

in

the

Politics is

that

those who

rule

permanently

over

others seek to establish differ-

ences in

external

appearance,

ormsof

addressand

prerogatives....

The

male

always

standsthus in

relation o

the female

(Pol. 12596b).

This is

a remark

about

conventions,

not natural

characteristics,

and seems

to

mean

nothing

morethan

that those

who

are

in

authority

or a

long

period

of time

look and

act the role.

Surely

this

is no

explanation

or

why

the

male

is

more

expert

by

nature than the female at

leading.

In one other passingbut criticalremark n the Politics, Aristotle

says

that women are

to be ruled

by

men in

a

political

manner,

appropri-

ate for

equals,

because

the

female

possesses

the deliberative

aculty,

though

n the

female,

he

adds thatthe

deliberative

aculty

lacks author-

ity

(Pol. 1260a).2

His claim

that the

intellectual

aspect

of women's

judgment

is not

authoritative

or their conduct is the

only

decisive

statementthat

Aristotle makes in

the

Politics

regarding

a fundamental

difference

between men

and women.

Since

we know

from

our

investiga-

tion of

prudence

that there

are three essential conditions for its

exercise-good character, proper habituation and intelligence-we

want to

see

if we

can

locate in

Aristotle's

writings

some account of

natural

defect in women

that led him

to

conjecture

hat the

delibera-

tive element in

females s

without

authority,

and

hence

to claim

that

men

are

by

nature

more

fit to

rule

than women.

We know

that the female is

capable

of

deliberation

because Aristo-

tle

says

so

explicitly

(Pol. 1260a).

We

know,

too,

that

deliberative xcel-

lence,

or

intelligence,

is an

important

lement

of

prudence,

the element

in

fact that ties

prudence

o

intellectualvirtue.

The

reason

why

Aristotle

says thatwomen shouldbe ruled n a mannerappropriateor equalsis

because

they

have

this

faculty,

so this

tells us

something

of

the

impor-

tance that

Aristotle

places

upon

deliberation

reason)

n

the

hierarchy

of

human

activities. Women

are

not

to be

ruled

in

a monarchical ashion

(appropriate

or

children),

or

in a

masterly

fashion

(appropriate

or

slaves),

according

to Aristotle

because,

unlike children and

slaves,

women

are

capable

of

reason.

If

Aristotle thinksthat women shouldbe

ruled

permanentlyby

men,

it

obviously

is

not because

he thinkswomen

are

intellectually

deficient. On the

contrary,

the

deliberative

capacity

appearsto be the very grounduponwhich men and women areequal:

hence

the

appropriateness

f

political

rule between them.

2

The

Greek

term is

akuron,

meaning

without

authority.

Akuros can

pertain

to

persons,

denoting

that

they

have no

power

or

authority;

or it

can

apply

to laws or

sentences,

in

which

case

the term

takes on

the

rather more

pointed

meaning

of no

longer

in

force,

cancelled, annulled,

or

set aside.

564








Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in Aristotle

Turning

to consideration of

the moral

virtues,

we

see that Aristotle

is clear

that men

and women

are both

capable

of

habituation

in

the moral

virtues,

yet

in

every

case

where he

speaks

of

these,

he

is careful

to

point

out that the moral virtues are not exactly the same for men and women.

For

example,

although

both

men

and women have the

capacity

for

courage

and

moderation,

Aristotle

says

that we

apply differing

stand-

ards or

expectations

to

each sex.

A

man would be

held

a coward

if

he

were as

courageous

as a

courageous

woman,

and a woman

talkative

if

she were as

modest

as

the

good

man

(Pol.

1277b).

Taking

issue

with

Socrates' claim that the moral

virtues are

the same for

everyone, regard-

less of

sex,

Aristotle

says explicitly

that

justice,

courage

and moderation

are

not the same for men and women:

There

is a

ruling

and a

serving

courage, and similarly with the other virtues (Pol. 1260a). And finally,

in

the

Rhetoric,

Aristotle identifies the male excellences

of the

soul as

temperance

and

courage;

the female excellences

of

the

soul

he

desig-

nates as

self-command

(temperance)

and an

industry

that is

not

sordid

(Rhet. 1361a).

Why

should the moral

virtues,

and

by

extension,

habituation,

be

different

for men and women? The

answer

cannot lie

with

differences

in

deliberative

capacity,

or

intelligence,

since we have

already

established

that this is the

ground

upon

which

men

and

women are

equal.

Aristotle

does not think that there are ruling and serving moral virtues

because of

any

fundamental

sexual differences

in

reason

or intellect.

As

Stephen

Salkever

points

out in

his

analysis

of

Aristotle's

treatment

of

the moral

virtues in the

Rhetoric,

sophrosune

[moderation

or

temper-

ance]

is the

common

virtue

between men

and

women,

and the virtue

whose

potential

expression

the

two

sexes share

is of

infinitely

more

importance

and

worth

than the one that divides them. 3

If

there is

any explanation

for Aristotle's distinction

other

than

mere

convention,

then it

must lie

elsewhere,

perhaps

in

what

Aristotle

calls natural character or endowment. Natural character Aristotle

describes

in

the Nicomachean Ethics

as

an endowment

obviously

not

under our

control;

it is bestowed on those who are fortunate

in the true

sense,

by

some divine

dispensation

(N.E. 1179b).

Still,

he

says

that

natural

character has to be tilled

if

it is to flourish.

All

sorts

of

circumstances-bad

habits,

poor

education,

defective

laws-can

stunt

natural

character,

but Aristotle also

discusses

at

length

a constitutional

defect that

may

thwart an otherwise

good

natural character.

The

defect

is

too

much

passion.

He that lives at the dictates

of

passion

will

not hear nor understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him;

but

if

so,

how

can

you change

his

mind

by

argument?

And

generally

speaking, passion

seems not to be amenable to

reason,

but

only

to

3

Stephen

Salkever, Women,

Soldiers,

Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on the

Politics

of

Virility, Polity

19

(1986),

243.

565








LEAH

BRADSHAW

force

(N.E. 1179b).

A

common

interpretation

of Aristotle

claims

that

he

thinks

women

were ruled

by

their

passions

in

just

the

manner

described

above,

but

there is

no

evidence

in

any

of

his

writings

to

support this view. We know that Aristotle thinks women quite capable

of

deliberation and amenable

to reason. He states

clearly

that

women

are not to be

ruled

by

force,

a manner of rule

appropriate

only

for those

incapable

of reason.

Aristotle does not

think

that

women are

purely

emotive

creatures,

with little or no

capability

for rational

thought.

While

a

nature ruled

by

passion

is

a serious obstacle to

the cultivation of moral

virtue,

and a

common

enough

problem

among

human

beings,

Aristotle

does

not

attribute this

condition

universally

to the female sex.

There

is

another constitutional

defect, however,

that interests

us: the state of character wherein one understands and deliberates

correctly

about

things,

but

is

incapable

of

acting

on that

understanding.

Unlike the individual who

lives at the dictates of his

passions,

this

type

of

person

knows what he

ought

to

do,

but

cannot

carry

out his own

imperatives.

He has the voice of

reason,

but does not

obey

it. As

Aristotle

puts

it: The weak

deliberate,

but then are

prevented

by

passion

from

keeping

to their

resolution

(N.E. 1150b).

This is a

condi-

tion of

character that

Aristotle labels incontinence

(akrasia),

and while

it is not

exactly

vice

(incontinence

conflicts

with a correct

decision,

whereas vice entails a wrong decision), nevertheless it is similar to vice

in

the

consequences

it

produces

(N.E.

1151a).

Aristotle

compares

the

incontinent

person

to a state which

passes

all

the

proper

enactments

and has

good

laws,

but

which never

keeps

its

laws

(N.E. 1152a).

Incontinent

people

deliberate

correctly

but are

too

weak to

carry

out

their own

judgments: they

apparently

have no

authority

over

their

own

passions.

Aristotle

points

out

that incontinent

people

are

incapable

of

pru-

dence. The same

person

cannot be

at once

unrestrained and

prudent,

for it has been shown that Prudence is inseparable from Moral Virtue.

Also,

Prudence does not

consist

only

in

knowing

what

is

right,

but also

in

doing

it,

but

the unrestrained man does

not

do the

right

(N.E.

1152a).

We

recall that

in his

description

of

political

rule,

Aristotle

had said

that

the

ruler

has

prudence;

the

ruled have

correct

opinion.

An

inconti-

nent

person,

as

Aristotle has

described

him,

may

well fall

into the

category

of

good

citizen under

political

rule.

He has the

right

under-

standing

of

things,

knows

good

judgment

when he sees

it,

but

requires

some

authority

other than his own

resolve to make

him

obey

reason.

Aristotle says of the incontinent:

There

is

a

person

who

abandonshis

choice,

against right principle,

underthe

influence

of

passion,

who is

mastered

by passion

sufficiently

or him

not

to act in

accordance with

right

principle,

but not so

completely

as to

be of

such

a

characteras to believe

that the reckless

pursuit

of

pleasure

s

right.

This is the

566








Rule,

Prudence

and

the Woman

Question

in

Aristotle

unrestrained

man:

he is

better

han

the

profligate,

and not

absolutely

bad,

for in

him the

highest

part

of

man,

the fundamental

principle,

is

preserved

(N.E.

1151a).

The fundamental

principle

to

which Aristotle refers

is,

of

course,

reason,

and it is the

preservation

of this

principle

in

the

incontinent

person

that

makes

it

possible

for

him

to be ruled

in

a

political

manner,

despite

the fact that his flawed character makes

it

impossible

for him

ever to

acquire prudence.

Aristotle's

depiction

of

the

incontinent,

or

unrestrained,

man

is

particularly

interesting

to

us,

because it seems

to hold

out

an

explanation

of

the

peculiar

condition

of

women,

who are

supposedly equal

to men

in

some

way,

yet

destined to be ruled

permanently by

them.

Like the

incontinent,

the female has the

capacity

for

reason

and

deliberation;

also

like

the

incontinent,

the female nevertheless

needs to be

ruled

by

others

since she

apparently

has no

authority

over her

passions.

As one

com-

mentator has

put

it: The deliberative

faculty

of women

is

ineffective

[akuron;

Pol.

1260al3]...

This means

not

that

women are less

intelli-

gent

than

men,

but

primarily

that

they

are less able

to

impose

their

judgments

on their emotions. It

is

not that

they

do

not value self-control

as men

do,

but that

they

have less

capacity

to exercise it

effectively. 4

Did Aristotle

think that women on the

whole were incontinent and

unrestrained? Is this

why they

have to be ruled

by

men? Is this

why they

can never

rule,

and never

acquire

the virtue of

prudence?

Aristotle does seem

to

identify

a kind of

incontinence

that is

pecul-

iar

to women.

He admires self-restraint and

says

that self-restraint

(of

passion,

or

showing pain)

is

a much more admirable

thing

than endur-

ance of a

passion

or a

pain.

Self-restraint entails

mastery

of

oneself,

whereas endurance

is

only

successful resistance

(N.E.

1150b).

Evi-

dently,

for

Aristotle,

self-restraint is

very

much a masculine

attribute,

whereas endurance

is characteristic

of

females.

He

has this

to

say

about

masculine

responses

to

fatigue:

One who is deficient in resistance to

pains

that most men

endure with success is soft or luxurious

(for

Luxury

is

a kind of

softness):

such a

man

lets

his

cloak

trail

on the

ground

to

escape

the

fatigue

and trouble of

lifting

it,

or

feigns

sickness,

not

seeing

that to

counterfeit

misery

is to be

miserable

(N.E.

1150b).

We are sur-

prised,

he

continues,

when a

man is overcome

by pains

or

pleasures

that

most men can

withstand,

unless his failure to master

his

inclinations

is

owing

to

some

innate

tendency

or

disease. Instances

of

such

innate

tendency

or

disease Aristotle

gives

are the

hereditary

effeminacy

of the

royal

family

of

Scythia,

and the inferior endurance of the female

sex

as

compared

with the male

(N.E. 1150b).

In

identifying

the inferior

endurance of the

female as an

innate

quality,

Aristotle

implies

that the

4

John

M.

Rist,

The

Mind

of

Aristotle:

A

Study

in

Philosophical

Growth

(Toronto:

University

of

Toronto

Press, 1989),

152-53.

567








LEAH BRADSHAW

female sex as a whole suffers

from some

physiological

weakness,

not

necessarily

a character

flaw,

but

a

biological, gender-based

disposi-

tion.

If

there were a

physiological

basis for female

weakness,

this

would

ascribe to women a kind of natural incontinence that would affect

their

participation

in moral

virtue and

preclude

them

from

acquiring

prudence.

Physiology

and

Gender

Difference

Is

there

any

basis

in

Aristotle's

corpus

for

defending

such a

biological

view

of

female

incontinence? Aristotle

furnishes no

clue whatsoever in

the Politics

or

the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

but

he examines in some

detail

the

physiological differences between the sexes in the Generation of

Animals.

In an

infamous

passage

from this

work,

Aristotle

says

that

the

female is as it

were a

deformed

male

(G.A.

737a).

This statement

actually

is

made in

the

context

of

a

discussion of the

respective

male and

female

roles

in

reproduction.

In

the

act of

reproduction,

according

to

Aristotle,

the male

produces

the

principle

of

soul,

that

which fashions

the

material into

shape,

whereas

the

female furnishes the

material

(G.A.

737a). This,

in

our

view,

he

states,

is

the

specific

character of each

of

the

sexes:

that

is,

what

it means

to

be male

or

female

(G.A. 738b).

Aristotle

has

grounded

maleness and

femaleness in physiological differ-

ences,

and

it

seems that

he has

afforded the

male

the

formative role in

reproduction.

The

physical part,

the

body,

comes

from

the

female,

and

the Soul

from

the

male,

since the

Soul is

the essence of a

particular

body (G.E. 738b).

The

respective

roles of

male

and

female in

reproduc-

tion are

described

as

active

(causing

movement)

and

passive

(being

set

in

movement)

(G.E.

729b).

In

characterizing

the

female as a

deformed

male,

Aristotle

is

doing

so within

the

narrow

parameters

of

physiologi-

cal

reproduction.

He

thought

that the

female was

deformed insofar

as

she did

not

produce

the

principle

of

soul

(sperm)

but

only

the

material

required

for

reproduction.

Aristotle's

assertions

in

the

Generation

of

Animals

have led to

much

speculation

concerning

his

alleged

depiction

of

the

inferiority

of

women,

but

we have

to

be careful

to remind

ourselves that the Genera-

tion

of

Animals

is an

empirical

study

of

biology

and

physiology,

not

a

speculative

tract on

the

moral

or

spiritual

qualities

of

animals. Within the

text

itself,

Aristotle

makes

statements that

should detain

us

from

infer-

ring

from

his

comments

about

biology

that women

are deformed men

either

spiritually

or

morally.

For

example,

Aristotle

says

that in the act

of

reproduction,

when

the semen

has

entered the

uterus it 'sets' the

residue

produced

by

the

female and

imparts

to it the

same movement

with

which it is

endowed

(G.E. 737a).

Whatever we

may

now think

about

cause

and

effect

in the act

of

reproduction,

and however far-

fetched

this

description

of

conception

may appear

to

moderns,

we

568








Rule,

Prudence

and the

Woman

Question

in Aristotle

nevertheless can see

from

this

passage

that Aristotle

thought

that

when

the male

principle

of

soul was matched

with

the female

physical

matter,

what resulted was

a human

being

with both

soul

and

body.

And

this is true whether the offspring is female or male. The fully formed

female

is not without

soul,

according

to

Aristotle,

and therefore

is

not

deformed.

Another

example

warns us

further

against

making

too much of

the

male/female

distinction in

the

Generation

of

Animals.

Aristotle

says

that in

those

creatures

in

which

logos

and

body

are

distinct

features-

and

this

includes

all the

higher

animals as

well as

human

beings- the

body-that

is

to

say

the

physical

matter-of

the

active

partner

and the

passive

partner

must be

different

(G.E.

729a).

In

separating logos

from

body in higher animals, Aristotle clearly is distinguishing that which the

different

sexes

share-logos-from

that in

which

they

differ-the

body.

The

active and

passive

designations

attributed

to

male and

female

per-

tain

to

their

sexual

and

reproductive functions,

not

necessarily

to their

moral or

intellectual

ones.

Of

course,

there is

an

erotic

element

to

sexual

relations and

repro-

duction that

Aristotle

never

mentions.

Even

though

body

and

logos

are

distinct

features,

as

Aristotle

says,

one

wonders how

much

logos

is in

fact

affected

by

bodily

differences.

In

particular,

one

wonders

whether

the weakness that Aristotle attributes to women-their inferior endur-

ance

and

their

female

incontinence-can be

traced

to

the

physiological

differences

between men

and

women

that are

described in

the

Genera-

tion

of

Animals.

Here

again,

though,

we

are left

only

with

speculation

since

Aristotle

himself

nowhere

makes

these

inferences. If

anything,

his

discussion

seems

to lead

us

away

from

this

kind of

conjecture.

In

discussing

gestation

for

instance,

Aristotle

comments

upon

the

pain

that

females

experience

giving

birth.

Human

females,

he

says,

suffer

more

than

other animals

in

this,

yet

the

cause

of

this is

to some

extent

attributable to their manner of life, which is sedentary, and this means

that

they

are full

of

residue.

Looking

at

tribes where

the

women

do

hard

physical

labour,

Aristotle

observes

that

the

women

find

delivery

an

easy

business.

And

so do

women

everywhere

who

are used to

hard

work

(G.A.

775a).

Since

Aristotle had

linked

female

weakness

specifi-

cally

to

the

incapacity

to master

pain

and

fatigue,

this

remark is

interest-

ing.

Aristotle

apparently thought

that

Greek

women led

sedentary

lives,

characterized

by

difficult

pregnancies

and

painful

births,

and

this

may

well

have

influenced his

thoughts

on

how

Greek

men and

women dif-

fered in their practice of moral virtue. If women are overcome for much

of

their

adult

life

by

the

pain

of

bearing

children,

then this

might

be

good

reason

why

women

could

not,

in

Aristotle's

view,

master

their bodies

and

passions

with

reason.

At the

same

time

though,

by

comparing

Greek

women

to

tribal

women,

Aristotle

indicates

that

the

painful

condition of

569








LEAH

BRADSHAW

womanhood

may

be more a cultural

phenomenon

than

a

natural state

of

affairs.

The

Generation

of

Animals is a

fascinating

but

ultimately

inconclu-

sive foray into the complex differences between men and women. We

know

from

it

that Aristotle had

strong opinions

about

reproduction,

and

the

soul-forming

role of

the

male

in

the act of

conception.

We know that

in

describing

the

physical

act of

conception,

he

designates

the male and

female roles as

active

and

passive, respectively.

But

Aristotle does not

himself adduce

any

conclusions from these observations

about essential

moral,

spiritual

or

intellectual differences between men and women.

He

seemed

to think that women

had to endure a lot

of

pain

as a

consequence

of

their role in

reproduction,

but in

the end he

questions

whether

this

is

a

universal, natural kind of suffering. In short, it is difficult to find in

the Generation

of

Animals

any

conclusive

evidence

that

Aristotle

thought

there was

a

natural,

physiological

basis for the inherent weak-

ness

of

women.

Conclusion

To

summarize Aristotle's

thoughts

on the

political relationship

between

men

and

women,

we

can

say

the

following.

Male and female

belong

in

an

equal partnership because they share the highest human capacity: that of

reason,

or

deliberation.

Despite

the

equality,

however,

Aristotle

says

that the male is more

fit

to

rule than the female because:

(1)

the

male has

adapted

manners

of dress

and

style

that are

appropriate

for

rulers;

and

(2)

the

female lacks the

authority

to

carry

out her own deliberations.

According

to Aristotle's own

definition of

prudence,

which is

the virtue

specific

to

rulers,

women

are

necessarily

excluded from

acquiring

this

virtue since

they

are

excluded

from

ruling.

We wanted to know

if

Aristotle

furnished

any grounds,

other than

merely

conventional

ones,

for why women should be the equals of men, yet naturally incapable

of

authority.

We

found some

indication

in

Aristotle's

writings

that there

might

be such a

ground.

He

apparently

identified a weakness

specific

to

women

that

resembles the more

general

condition

of

incontinence,

as

that

condition is described

in

the Nicomachean Ethics. The inconti-

nence

of

women

seemed to Aristotle to

consist

in

the female's inferior

endurance

of

either

pain

or

passion.

When we turned to

the Generation

of

Animals to

locate

further

evidence

of the natural

incontinence

of

women,

we

did

not

find

much

proof. Though graphically portraying different roles for the sexes in the

physical

act of

reproduction,

Aristotle

does not

suggest

that these roles

are,

or should

be,

paradigmatic

for the

moral and

spiritual

development

of men and

women.

Furthermore,

he

suggests

that

the

weakness

of

women

may

be more

culturally patterned

than natural.

In the

end,

we

are

left

wondering

just

how much of women's

incontinence

and lack

of

570








Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in Aristotle

authority

is

owing

to

their

habituation

in

dependency,

and how

much is

owing

to natural causes.

Aristotle

may

not have been

bothered

nearly

as

much as

we moderns

are

by

this

nature/nurture

dilemma,

for he

writes:

Incontinents through habituation are more easily cured than natural

incontinents,

for

habit

is

easier

than

nature

to

change.

Indeed,

the

reason

why

habit is also difficult to

change

is

that

it is like nature

as

Evenus

says.

'Habit,

I

say,

is

longtime training,

my

friend,

and in the

end,

training

is

nature for human

beings'

(N.E.

1152).

It

is

perhaps appropriate

at the close of this

investigation

of

political

rule,

prudence

and the woman

question

in

Aristotle

to

say

something

of

why

the

project

should

be

of

interest

to us

in

the

present.

Aristotle's

general

reflections

on

political

rule are valuable for democrats.

Even

in

the kind of political arrangement that is appropriate for equal citizens, he

writes that

there

is

a difference between the virtues

of

ruler

and

ruled.

Only

the

ruler

possesses prudence,

a

virtue that is

acquired

in

the

practice

of

leadership.

Prudence for

Aristotle

is

one of the two

highest

intellectual virtues

practised by

human

beings,

and

it

is

a virtue

that

is

tied

intrinsically

to

political

life. In

a

political

association

composed

of

equals, everyone

is

potentially

capable

of

prudence.

This

connection

between

prudence

and rule

may help

us to see

how,

even

in a democratic

community, good

leadership requires

a virtue that

is

specific

to

those

who rule, but does not necessarily thwart democratic, participatory

politics.

We were interested also in Aristotle's

depiction

of

a

particular

kind

of

political

association,

that

which exists between male and

female

in the

household,

for

in

this instance Aristotle deviates

from his

general

rule

governing political

association. There is to

be no

alternation

of ruler and

ruled

in

the

household. Women are

properly

ruled

by

men and hence

are

permanently

excluded from

acquiring

the

virtue of

prudence.

We know that Aristotle

thought

that the

lack of

authority

in

women,

and over women, was pervasive among the Greeks, and that he thought

this

a bad

thing.

He did not think that women

belonged

in

political

decision-making.

Aristotle

speaks critically

of those

regimes

that

allow

the

political participation

of

women.

He

says

that

tyrannical

institutions

are

characteristic

of

popular

rule,

and

among

such institutions

he lists

lack of rule over

women,

children

and

slaves,

and

general permis-

siveness

(Pol.

1319b).

Democracies and

tyrannies

come

under attack

for

permitting

dominance of women

in

the

household so that

they may

report

on

their husbands

(Pol.

1313b).

And in

his

analysis

of the

decay

of Sparta, Aristotle places a large part of the blame for Sparta's

demise

on the women:

they

created more

uproar

than the

enemy

(Pol. 1269b).

While

Aristotle

obviously thought

that

women

exhibited certain

patterns

of behaviour

that made

them unsuitable candidates

for

political

office,

and while

he

elaborated

upon

the

physical

differences

between

571








LEAH

BRADSHAW

men and women in

their sexual and

reproductive

activities,

he

did not

in

fact

provide

any

definitive reason for

why bodily

differences

should

determine

political

or

intellectual

capabilities.

We know that Aristotle

reactedstrongly againstSocrates'suggestion n the Republicthatmen

and

women are

potentially

capable

of

the

same

ruling

virtue. He

tried

to

refute

Socrates' claim

that the moral virtues

are the

same

for

men and

women,

and

he

certainly

seems to be one of

the

early

proponents

of the

masculine male

andthe

feminine

emale.

Aristotle

n

fact

says

that

male and

female

have

differing

unctions

n

the

household

from

the

time

of

birth,

and

that these

functions,

though

grounded

n

mutual

need,

also

produce

pleasure

for

one

another

(N.E.

1162a).

A household

of active

males and

passive

females,

all of whom extend their sexual roles

into

every sphereof humanactivity, may providea certainkindof pleasure

and

utility,

but

even

Aristotle does not

suggest

that

such

a household

yields

virtue. What

he does

say

is

that true

friendship

s

possible

only

between those who

are

equal

in

virtue,

and these

kinds of

friendships

will

be

rare

(N.E. 1156b).

There are those who

argue

that Aristotle did

not

defend the

equality

of men

and

women because

of his

concern

that

such

equality

would

destroy

the

natural

harmony

and

hierarchy

of

family

and

community.5

Aristotle

may

well

have had

good

reason for

anticipating

that the

encouragement

of

similar virtues

in

males and

females wouldupset traditionalamilialandpoliticalstructures,butour

concern

here has been to

investigate

whether

Aristotle had

any

natural

or

essential reasons

for

why

women

lack

authority,

why

they

shouldbe

excluded from

the

activity

of rule and

the virtue

of

prudence.

The conclusion s that

Aristotledoes not

give

a

persuasive

natural r

essential

explanation

or

the exclusion of

women

from

rule. The

only

substantial

weakness that he

attributes o women is a

physical

one

(not

an

intellectualor moral

one),

and even

here

Aristotle s reluctant o

give

this

weakness universal status for all women in

all cultures.

Even

if

womenaregenerallyweaker thanmen, we mustwith Socratesask the

question

whether his

has a

meaningful

mpact

upon

the

capacity

to

rule

(Rep.

456).

Aristotle

certainly

knew

that

by

advisingagainst

women

ever

having

political

authority,

over

either

themselves or

others,

he

was

excluding

them from one of

the

highest

virtues attainable

by

human

beings.

If,

indeed,

as

Aristotle

says,

in

the end

training

s naturefor

human

beings,

then we

can

expect

that

it is

only

in

the

training

or self

and

political

rule

that

authority

becomes natural for both men and

women.

What hat

training

does to familialand

community

relations,

f

it

is extended equally to males and females, and whether the changeis

desirable,

s

certainly

an

important

matterfor

consideration,

but

it

has

not

been our

concern here. Our

concern has

been

to

investigate

whether

5

Arlene

Saxonhouse,

Family, Polity

and

Unity:

Aristotle

on Socrates'

Community

of

Wives,

Polity

15

(1982),

202-19.

572








Rule,

Prudence and the

Woman

Question

in

Aristotle

Aristotle

supplies any

natural or essential

grounds

why

women should

be excluded from

political

rule,

and we have found that he does not.6

6 There is a substantial

body

of literature written on

Aristotle from feminist

perspectives.

Some of

the most acute criticisms

of Aristotle's views on

women are Susan

Moller

Okin,

Women

in Western Political

Thought

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1979);

Jean

Elshtain,

Public

Man,

Private

Woman

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1981);

Kathy Pauly Morgan,

Woman

and Moral

Madness,

in

Lorraine

Code et

al.,

Feminist

Perspectives: Philosophical Essays

on Methods and

Morals

(Toronto:

University

of Toronto

Press,

1988);

Dianah

Coole,

Women

in Political

Theory

(Brighton,

Sussex:

Wheatsheaf

Books,

1988);

and Caroline

Whitbeck,

A Different

Reality:

Feminist

Ontology,

in Ann

Garry

and

Marilyn

Pearsall, eds.,

Women,

Knowledge

and

Reality

(Boston:

Unwin

Hyman,

1989).

Okin

finds that Aristotle

relegated

women

to an

altogether

subhuman

position

(87),

Elshtain claims

Aristotle

thought of woman as a household animal (49), and Coole identifies in Aristotle an

absolute

(ontological)

distinction between

male and female

(47).

The

findings

of this

article do

not accord with

any

of these

interpretations.

While

I

do

not

deny

that

Aristotle

barred free

Athenian women from

equal

social

and

political

status

with their

male

counterparts,

I

argue

that the differences

in

political

status

between men

and

women are

grounded

in

Aristotle's

understanding

of

differing physical

(especially

sexual)

constitutions,

and

prudence.

There is

no

evidence

that

Aristotle

thought

women

defective

in

their

power

of

intellect or

reason,

that he

thought

women less

than

human,

or that he

thought

men and

women to be so different

that

they

did not share

the

same

ontological

status.

573

The woman question in Aristotle.pdf

Documents