Page 1
THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS; THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PERSPECTIVE.
MWENDA MARTIN*
Abstract
The use of explosive weapons against civilians is not a new phenomenon and the prominence of
civilian casualties in contemporary conflicts is a reflection of the changing nature of conflict.
New trends indicate an increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and new
technologies, the number of hostilities has gone up in urban or densely populated areas, and the
line between civilians and combatants has become blurred. This essay looks at the use of these
explosive weapons in populated areas, the International Humanitarian Law regime governing
their use and whether it is adequate to regulate their use and if not what policy considerations
should be effected to enhance protection of civilians and civilian property that might be affected
by such weapons.
Key words
Contemporary conflicts, densely populated areas, explosive weapons, International Humanitarian
Law, civilians, civilian property, protection, existing legal norms.
1.0 Introduction
Violence, including armed violence, is a „leading worldwide public health problem‟.1 Among the
means of armed violence, use of explosive weapons can be „an important cause of death and
* LLB Moi University. The author can be contacted at [email protected]
1 Prevention of Violence: A Public Health Priority, Resolution WHA49.25 adopted by the Forty-ninth
Page 2
injury‟,2 every year tens of thousands of civilians are killed and injured by these explosive
weapons such as mortars, rockets, artillery shells, air-dropped and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) used by national armed forces and non-State armed groups. Data collected in recent years
by civil society and the United Nations actors paints a stark picture of the humanitarian impact of
the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as civilians are killed, injured and displaced;
housing, schools, healthcare and other vital infrastructure are damaged or destroyed; explosive
remnants of war pose a continuing threat until their removal; and the challenges and costs of
post-conflict reconstruction and development increase enormously.3
In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the humanitarian problems caused by the
use of explosive weapons in populated areas, since 2009, the United Nations Secretary-General
has consistently highlighted the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as a major
challenge to the protection of civilians.4 Other senior officials of the United Nations like the
Emergency Relief Coordinator have acknowledged the serious humanitarian concern posed by
the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, an increasing number of Member States as well
as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)5 have also shared the same sentiments.
World Health Assembly, Geneva, 20–25 May 1996. 2 Cæcilie Buhmann, „The direct and indirect costs of explosive violence‟, (2009) British Medical Journal, Vol.
339,p. 761. 3 This destruction of infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, water pipes and electrical grids has the effect of
prolonging the impact of armed conflict. 4 Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN document
S/2009/277, 29 May 2009, para. 36; United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-
General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,” UN Security Council, S/2012/376, 22 May 2012,<
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4150.pdf > accessed 9 April 2015 5 See recent statements by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross: “the growing
number of military operations conducted in densely populated urban areas, often using heavy or highly explosive
weapons” have “devastating humanitarian consequences for civilian populations”; “Sixty Years of the Geneva
Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future”, address by Jakob Kellenberger, Geneva, 12
August 2009. In the same vein, see “Sixty years of the Geneva Conventions and the Decades Ahead”, statement by
Jakob Kellenberger, Geneva, 9 November 2009.
Page 3
For example during 2013, some 37,809 people were reported killed and injured by explosive
weapons, of which 82 per cent were civilians and when explosive weapons were used in
populated areas, 93 per cent of casualties were reportedly civilians.6 In 2014 alone, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) documented the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, in violation
of international humanitarian law (the laws of war), in at least 12 countries: Syria, Iraq,
Israel/Gaza, Ukraine, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Thailand and
Colombia. Such unlawful attacks were typically indiscriminate (they did not distinguish between
the military target and civilians) and/or disproportionate (the anticipated civilian loss exceeded
the expected military gain).7
However it should be noted that not all uses of explosive weapons in populated areas violate
international humanitarian law.8 What then are explosive weapons? These are bombs, cluster
munitions, grenades, IEDs, mines, missiles, mortars and rockets. Although these weapons differ
in composition, design, and the way they are used, they always share certain fundamental
characteristics; for instance they use force to affect an area around the point of detonation
through the effects of blast and fragmentation9, and though they differ in size, in how they are
delivered to a target and in many other details, all of these weapons use explosives as the primary
means of causing damage.10
6 Action on Armed Violence, An Explosive Situation: Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2013 (April 2014 )
7 Steve Goose and Ole Solvang, „Deadly Cargo: explosive weapons in populated areas‟,
<www.opendemocracy.net/open-security/steve-goose-ole-solvang/deadly-cargo-explosive-weapons-in-populated-
areas> accessed 9 April 2015 8 Ibid para 5
9 International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), INEW Call Commentary (2011),
<http://www.inew.org/about-inew/inew-call-commentary> accessed 9 April 2015 10
Ibid
Page 4
„Populated areas‟ broadly equates to the legal concept of „concentration of civilians,‟ as used in
Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).11
This term should be
interpreted and understood in a common and broad way in order to encompass all those areas
where civilians are at risk of harm, but also to include the indirect harm and danger these
weapons cause, such as destruction of vital infrastructure, resulting in a pattern of wider, long-
term suffering.12
1.1 Legal Framework on Explosive Weapons
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the „law of war‟ or international law of
armed conflict, is one of the two branches that govern use of weapons the other one being
Disarmament Law. It lays down rules intended to minimize suffering in armed conflict by
regulating how hostilities are conducted so as to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering
and civilians from the perils arising from military operations.
The main principles of IHL regarding protection of civilians from attacks, which are reflected in
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and also underpin international customary law,
are “distinction,” “proportionality,” and “precaution”.
The Principle of Distinction according to Article 48 of Additional Protocol I is to the effect that
at all times during conflict combatants must be distinguished from civilians and only the former
11
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Explosive Weapons, Framing the Problem (April
2010), UNIDIR 12
Human Rights Watch & International Human Rights Clinic, Documentation of Use of Explosive Weapons in
Populated Areas (2011) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2011_armsother_EWIPA_0.pdf.>
accessed 9 April 2015
Page 5
can be targeted, furthermore, civilian objects have to be distinguished from military objects, have
to be protected, and are generally unlawful as direct targets.13
The Principle of Proportionality is highlighted in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I which
prohibits attacks violating the principles of proportionality, which means an “attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.14
The Principle of Precaution in IHL requires the one attacking to take precautions in the choice
of means and methods of attack. Article 57 of the Additional Protocol I obliges conflicting
parties to constantly take care to spare civilians as well as to take feasible precautions to if
possible avoid, or minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects, this includes the
requirement to avoid locating military objects near densely populated areas.15
Parties to armed conflict are to direct their operations against military objectives only, the rule of
distinction is supplemented by the rule against indiscriminate attacks, this rule determines that
such attacks are: those which are not directed at a specific military objective; those which
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective;
and those which employ a method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol.16
13
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 14
Ibid Article 51 (5) (b) 15
Ibid Article 57 (2) (b) 16
Ibid Article 51 (4)
Page 6
Despite the three principles many have argued that IHL is insufficient to adequately regulate
explosive weapons use. This is because it provides context against which arguments for
regulation can be made, but in itself fails to “articulate the serious risk of humanitarian harm
associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in a manner that adequately
protects civilians, that is, people who share a legitimate expectation to be protected against the
effects of explosive weapons.”17
The three principles of customary international law
notwithstanding, discussed below are additional protocols and conventions which supplement
these principles as far as use of explosive weapons in populated areas and protection of civilians
is concerned.
1.2 CCW Amended Protocol II
This Protocol was adopted in 1996 by High Contacting Parties to the CCW to deal with
landmines, booby-traps and other devices including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway
crossings or river crossings by limiting their use and requiring that some general measures be
taken to reduce the dangers to civilians for instance by giving warnings of attacks where
feasible.18
It also states that these mines, booby-traps or other devices must not target civilians or
civilian objects or be used indiscriminately, moreover, it prohibits the use of anti-personnel
mines19
and anti-vehicle mines which are designed to explode when mine detection equipment is
passed over them.
It must be noted that this Protocol remains the sole legally-binding instrument which covers
IEDs, these are devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive
17
M. Brehm, „Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons: An Analysis of International Legal and
Policy Standards’ (2012),UNIDIR/2012/8, p. xi 18
Article 3 (10 and 11) Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May 1996) 19
Ibid Article 4
Page 7
material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to
destroy, disfigure, distract or harass.20
1.3 CCW Protocol V
This is the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, The High Contracting Parties adopted this
Protocol in November 2003. Protocol V defines Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) as
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). UXO is an explosive
ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use and used in an armed
conflict and should have exploded but failed to do so21
, they include hand grenades, mortar
shells, explosive submunitions or bombs that have been used but which have not detonated as
intended.
AXO means „explosive ordinance that has not been used during an armed conflict, but that has
been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control
of the party that left it behind or dumped it‟.22
Under this Protocol the party in control of the
affected territory is responsible for the clearance, removal or destruction of ERW23
and to take
all feasible precautions to protect civilians from their risks and effects.24
1.4 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
It was adopted on 18 September 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999 with the main aim
being to eliminate the civilian harm caused by anti-personnel mines, this is clear from the onset
20
Ibid Article 2 (5) 21
Article 2 (2) Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 28 November 2003 22
Ibid article 2 (3) 23
Ibid article 3 24
Ibid Article 5
Page 8
as set out by its preamble.25
Towards this end, the Convention adopted comprehensive
prohibitions to prevent new use of anti-personnel mines as well as remedial measures to address
the needs of those who have already suffered from these weapons. For instance it prohibits the
development or production and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, it requires the destruction of
stockpiled anti-personnel mines within four years26
, it also requires the clearance of emplaced
anti-personnel mines within ten years27
and the support for assistance for victims.28
1.5 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
The CCM is the most recent, adopted in May 2008 and entered into force in August 2010 to
restrict the use of cluster munitions and their development, production, transfer and stockpiling.29
It requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years30
, clearance of
cluster munition remnants (unexploded submunitions or abandoned cluster munitions) within ten
years31
and age and gender-sensitive assistance to victims for those injured by explosive
submunitions as well as their families and affected communities.32
Legal analyses have concluded that the legal regulation of explosive weapons within
international law is incoherent and fragmentary.33
Existing regulatory categories and notions are
25
The Preamble states as follows; „States Parties [are] determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties
caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of
refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.‟
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction, 18 September 1997 26
Ibid Article 4 27
Ibid Article 5 28
Ibid Article 6 29
Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 1 (1) 30
Ibid Article 3 (2) 31
Ibid Article 4 (1) (a) 32
Ibid Article 5 33
M. Brehm, Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons An Analysis of International Legal and
Policy Standards (2012), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR/2012/8, p. 147
Page 9
at times vague, ill-defined and overlapping and do not formally recognize the common
functioning of explosive weapons through blast and fragmentation.34
However, no international instruments exist dealing with the problem of explosive weapons in all
their aspects, in particular the problems they pose when used in populated areas but their use is
still a subject of International Humanitarian Law.35
This inadequacy of IHL has on occasions
been challenged not only in terms of its ability to encompass new realities of organized armed
violence within existing classifications, but also in terms of the existence of a sufficient body of
substantive norms and its applicability in a given situation.
1.6 The Humanitarian Impact of Explosive Weapons
It has been argued that collateral damage may now be a more serious humanitarian issue than
war crimes in some conflict zones36
, however it is to be noted that it is not the use of explosive
weapons per se, but rather their tendency to cause indiscriminate destruction which may result in
unacceptable levels of civilian harm that forms the key humanitarian dilemma.37
Therefore, this
relatively indiscriminate effect of explosive weapons is central to their ability to pose a key
humanitarian threat, especially when used in populated areas.38
When explosive weapons detonate, they emit a destructive blast wave which travels faster than
sound. Most of the lethal effects are often caused by flying fragments of casing or shrapnel
34
Ibid 35
J. Borrie & M. Brehm, Enhancing civilian protection from use of explosive weapons in populated areas: building
a policy and research agenda (2011), International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93, number 883 September
2011, p. 819 36
Charli Carpenter, „Collateral Damage Control‟, New York Times (11 August 2010).
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/opinion/12iht-edcarpenter.htm > accessed 9 April 2015 37
Roos Boer,et al Protecting Civilians from Explosive Violence: defining the humanitarian problem February 2011 38
UNIDIR, „Background Paper No 2 of the Discourse on Explosive Weapons (DEW) project‟, (UNIDIR Resources,
July 2010) 1. < http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf10-act499.pdf.> accessed 9 April 2015
Page 10
which can have a long reach,39
many of these weapons are also unguided or used without
spotters meaning they cannot be targeted precisely, posing additional civilian risk.40
Upon
detonation these weapons therefore injure and kill people and damage or destroy objects present
in the area around the target, these constitute the immediate or primary effects of explosive
weapons. Destruction of hospitals, markets, schools, power plants and the long-term disruption
of vital socio-economic activities constitute the secondary effects. Added to these long-term
effects are the dangers posed by unexploded ordinances which can maim and kill people many
years after the conflict has ended and which can deny the use of or access to the areas they
contaminate, for instance depriving populations of valuable arable land.41
The primary effects of explosive weapons are: immediate death of persons in the direct vicinity
of the explosion, potentially fatal damage to organs and tissue caused by the blast wave,
propensity to cause a host of potentially fatal injuries by explosively projecting weapon
fragments and other debris into the body, indirect death and injury through the post-detonation
collapse of buildings and destruction of buildings, roads and other infrastructure.42
The secondary (long-term) effects of explosive weapons include: victims suffering permanent
physical disabilities or traumatic brain injury, victims suffering from psychological trauma such
as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD), damage to socio-economic infrastructure such as
houses, schools, power plants, markets, hospitals, roads and railway systems and water supply
39
Supra N.5 40
Ibid 41
Caecilie Buhmann, „The Direct and Indirect Costs of Explosive Violence: Recognition and Documentation Need
to Translate into Policy Action and Political Support‟, (2009) 339 BMJ 761 42
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, „What are cluster munitions?‟.
<http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Problem/Cluster-Munitions/What-are-Cluster-Munitions.> accessed 9 April
2015; Christopher Rogers, „Civilians in Armed Conflict: Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest Pakistan‟,
(Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2010) 33-34.
<http://www.civicworldwide.org/storage/civicdev/documents/civic%20pakistan%202010%20final.pdf.> accessed 9
April 2015
Page 11
and lastly deaths and injuries caused by unexploded ordinances years after hostilities have been
concluded and can deny access to valuable land.43
1.7 What to do to enhance protection of Civilians and Civilian Property
It must be noted that explosive weapons are generally excluded as instruments for domestic
policing and states tend to prohibit private ownership of explosive weapons44
, however states
have over the years lost their monopoly over these weapons as non-state actors have acquired
them and used them in armed conflicts which has posed a serious military challenge for states45
,
as well as posing a major risk to civilians especially when used in populated areas.
A combination of factors determines the degree to which civilians‟ lives and livelihoods in
populated areas are at risk from explosive weapons, including civilians‟ vulnerability and
exposure, and capacity to respond to the threat posed by explosive weapons.46
Analyzing each of
these factors would be vital for purposes of protection programming that aims at reducing risks
to civilians and civilian property.
The risk that explosive weapons pose to civilians can be reduced by mitigating the hazard itself,
that is, by reducing the threat that explosive weapons pose to civilians in populated areas for
43
Robin M. Coupland and Adriaan Korver, „Injuries from antipersonnel mines: experience of the International
Committee of the Red Cross‟ (1991),303 BMJ 1509-1512; Daya J. Somasundaram and Kea Kiri Renol, „The
psychological effects of landmines in Cambodia‟, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 14:3 (1998) 219-236; 44
Landmine Action, Explosive Violence: The Problem of Explosive Weapons, 2009, p. 46 45
IED use by non-state armed actors has become widespread. In addition, some non-state actors have acquired more
sophisticated explosive weapons. The Lebanese Hizbullah, for instance, damaged an Israeli naval vessel with an
anti-ship cruise missile in 2006 and has flown drones over northern Israel several times in recent years. Hizbullah‟s
alleged Scuds raise storm clouds over Lebanon, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 16, Comment 20, 2010; Hezbollah
drone brought down over Galilee held 30kg of explosives, Haaretz, 14 August 2006. 46
Exposure can vary depending on the presence of a military target, infrastructure releasing dangerous forces, or
non-blast proof buildings in the vicinity of civilians. Vulnerability, or susceptibility to losses, depends on a complex
interplay of many factors. Within a civilian population, some groups may be more prone to loss, suffering and
damage than others. Characteristics of these variations include gender, age, and physical and mental constitution.
Civilians‟ capability and resources available to cope with explosive weapons hazards differ in function of, for
instance, their knowledge about explosive weapons and explosive remnants, or their social and socio-economic
situation.
Page 12
instance by advocating the use of less explosive weapons in populated areas. The presumption
that the use of explosive weapons in populated areas will result in unacceptable civilian harm
should also be given more emphasis, and it would entail:47
better collection, analysis and dissemination of data on explosive weapons use and its
impacts on civilians;
recognizing that explosive weapons use in populated areas represents a serious
humanitarian problem and developing a common language of humanitarian concern in
response to unacceptable use of explosive weapons;
more publicity and transparency about policies on explosive weapons use;
increased user accountability and more rigorous scrutiny of claims regarding the
acceptability of explosive weapons use; and
greater recognition of the rights of victims of explosive weapons.
1.8 Conclusion
The international stigma against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is growing and
the message is clear that when they are used it is civilians who pay the price. International
customary law principles, the Additional Protocols and conventions discussed above merely
touch on a small part of explosive weapons, apart from this there exists no specific international
instrument which deals with explosive weapons in all their aspects. Efforts should be made to put
such an instrument in place that deals with explosive weapons exclusively.
1.9 Recommendations
47
This section builds on the recommendations put forward in Landmine Action, Explosive Violence, The Problem of
Explosive Weapons, 2009, p. 14.
Page 13
Parties concerned with explosive violence in populated areas should speak out in one language
so as to advocate for a common cause, attract public and media attention, and challenge the
status quo which views the use of explosive weapons in populated areas as a regrettable but
„normal‟ aspect of armed conflicts. By doing this they will be building on the debate on
explosive weapons use in populated areas.
States should also collect data on the human costs of the use of explosive weapons in populated
areas. By doing this and reminding states of their legal obligations to do so, states, policy makers
and advocacy groups can more accurately assess the risks that explosive weapons pose to
civilians, and review states‟ compliance with IHL.
Users of explosive weapons should be challenged to justify when and how they use explosive
weapons in populated areas, by doing this the international community can improve its ability to
hold states accountable for the consequences of explosive violence.
Rules of IHL legally oblige states to provide assistance to the victims of specific explosive
weapons, therefore efforts should be deployed to broaden state responsibility to encompass any
kind of explosive weapon, and to increase states‟ responsibility for assisting with the post-
conflict clearance of unexploded ordnance.
References
Additional Protocol I to The Geneva Convention of 12th August 1949 relating to the Protection
of victims of international armed conflict (API) (Adopted on 8th June 1977)
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as
amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May 1996)
Page 14
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 28 November
2003
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008
Buhmann C, „The direct and indirect costs of explosive violence‟,(2009) BMJ, Vol.339, p. 761.
Steve Goose and Ole Solvang „Deadly Cargo: explosive weapons in populated areas’,
<www.opendemocracy.net/open-security/steve-goose-ole-solvang/deadly-cargo-explosive
weapons-in-populated-areas>
International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), INEW Call Commentary (2011),
<http://www.inew.org/about-inew/inew-call-commentary>
Human Rights Watch & International Human Rights Clinic, Documentation of Use of Explosive
Weapons in Populated Areas (2011)
Brehm M, Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons An Analysis of
International Legal and Policy Standards (2012), United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, UNIDIR/2012/8
J. Borrie & M. Brehm, Enhancing civilian protection from use of explosive weapons in
populated areas: building a policy and research agenda (2011), International Review of the Red
Cross, Volume 93, number 883 September 2011,
Page 15
M. Brehm, Protecting Civilians from the Effects of Explosive Weapons An Analysis of
International Legal and Policy Standards (2012), United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, UNIDIR/2012/8
UNIDIR, „Background Paper No 2 of the Discourse on Explosive Weapons (DEW) project‟,
(UNIDIR Resources, July 2010) 1.< http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf10-act499.pdf.>
Roos Boer et al, Protecting Civilians from Explosive Violence: defining the humanitarian
problem (2011)
Caecilie Buhmann, „The Direct and Indirect Costs of Explosive Violence: Recognition and
Documentation Need to Translate into Policy Action and Political Support‟,
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, „What are cluster munitions?‟
<http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Problem/Cluster-Munitions/What-are-Cluster-Munitions>
Christopher Rogers, „Civilians in Armed Conflict: Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest
Pakistan‟, (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2010) 33-34.
Robin M. Coupland and Adriaan Korver, „Injuries from antipersonnel mines: experience of the
International Committee of the Red Cross‟, BMJ 303 (1991) 1509-1512
Daya J. Somasundaram and Kea Kiri Renol, „The psychological effects of landmines in
Cambodia‟, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 14:3 (1998) 219-236
Landmine Action, Explosive Violence: The Problem of Explosive Weapons, 2009
Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, UN document S/2009/277, 29 May 2009
Page 16
“Sixty Years of the Geneva Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future”,
address by Jakob Kellenberger, Geneva, 12 August 2009