The USAF in Southeast Asia Civic Action

8/7/2019 The USAF in Southeast Asia Civic Action

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R ESEA R C H STU D IES SER IES

T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Ai r F o r c e i n S o u t h e a s t A si a

CIVIC ACTION

By

Betty Barton Christiansen

Air Force History and Museums Program

WASHINGTON, D. C. 1998


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CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

I . T h e G r ow th of a C on ce pt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

II. The Search for Definit ions and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

I I I. N a t i on -B u ild in g Ami d In s t a b il it y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

IV. Reviving Pacification a nd Civic Action Str ategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

V. T h e Te t O ffe n s ive a n d O pe r a t ion R e cove r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 55Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

VI . P r ogr a m R efi n eme n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 83Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

VII. Redefining Seventh Air F orce Civic Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

VIII. Summa ry Assessment a nd Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

A p p e n d i c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

1. Cost of Civic Action Activit ies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2692 . S t a t i st i ca l Br e a k d ow n of P r oje ct s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 703 . U S AF Me dica l Ci vi c Act i on P r o gr a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 714 . Vie t n a me se Con t r i bu t i on s L a bor a n d Ma t e r ie l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 725 . H a m le t E va lu a t ion S ys t em T r en d s, 19 68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 736 . I n fr a s t r u ct u r e Ne u t r a liza t ion , 19 68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 74


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P R EF A C E

This is the first in a series of research st udieshistorical works tha t were not

published for various r easons. Yet, th e ma terial conta ined th erein was deemed to beof enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These works were minimallyedited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find themuseful. We invite readers to provide feedback to th e Air Force H istory a nd MuseumsProgram.

Capt. Bett y L. Bart on Christiansen, a member of the st aff in the Office of AirForce History, r esearched a nd wrote this volume. She begins by establishing aframework of the civic action concept. Chapter II discusses the period correspondingto the Kennedy administration, when both government and military officials grappledwith adjusting to a "new kind of war," the origins of counterinsurgency strategy (ofwhich civic action wa s a part ), and the efforts to apply this str at egy in Vietnam . Thena tion-building period discussed in Ch apt er II I, covers t he per iod from November 1963to J uly 1965, a t ime of great instability in South Vietnam , an d th e myriad effort s bythe USAF to establish unity. Although he had promised to continue the policies ofPresident Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson began to "lean away" from political and othernon-milita ry solutions to t he crisis in Vietna m. This wa s r eflected in t he a ttitu des ofthe various services toward unconventional warfare and civic action. By 1966, whilemili tary solutions occupied center stage, some stabili ty had been established inVietnam. More attention was being paid to winning popular allegiance and USAF'sSeventh Air Force formally organized its civic action activities. However, just as theprogram showed signs of success, th e Tet offensive intervened. Thus, Chapter Vdemonstrates that instead of serving as advisers to the Vietnamese, the USAF civicaction effort was compelled to revert to an earlier phase of its development, when

humanitarian services were emphasized. Still, the program recuperated completely byJ u l y 1 96 8. I n C h a p t er VI , t h e S ou t h Vi et n a me s e g ov er n me n t e mba r k e d on a naccelera ted pacificat ion progra m to extend its contr ol t hroughout the coun try. Civicaction const itut ed one pa rt of this effort . Seventh Air Force sought to improve tr ainin gcivic action personnel, increase the number of civic action officers "in country," andob t a in mor e r e s ou r ce s for t h e p r og r a m. T h es e r e fin e me n t s p r ov id ed a b et t e runderstanding of civic action and showed the benefits of increased South Vietnameseparticipation. By t he end of 1968, pacification had become a major part of a l liedstrategy in Vietnam. The results of the various changes in the civic action programare discussed and assessed.

Jacob Neufeld, General EditorJ a n u a r y 1 99 8


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C HAP TER I

THE GROWTH OF A CONCEPT

T h e n e w g en e r a t ion of mi li t a r y l e a d er s h a s s h ow n a n i n cr e a s in g

awareness that armies cannot only defend their countriesthey canhelp to build them.

J ohn F. Kennedy 1

Military forces exist for the primary purpose of bringing both internal andexternal security to their respective count ries. Of necessity they deal in t he h ar dwareof war: planes, bombs, tanks, and guns. Frontline troops are taught to kill. Soldiersar e often idealized for their bravery a nd insensitivity at the scene of bat tle. With theaid of the mass media a stereotyped, dramatic image of the soldier in combat hasemerged, with few giving h im credit for more t han bloodshed a nd destru ction.

History is replete, h owever, with examples of arm ed forces engaging inconst ru ctive endea vors, cont ribut ing not only to bett er civil-militar y relat ionsh ips butalso to the progress and socioeconomic development of entire nations. These non-military activities, although not known until recently as "military civic action," are asold as wa rfare itself. Nehemiah ordered a ncient Isra elite war riors t o car ry a sword inone hand and their implements to rebuild Jerusalem in the other. As early as 300B.C. Alexan der t he Grea t creat ed th e first militar y engineering un its, rebuilding andmodernizing man y conquer ed Per sian cities. The a ncient Roma n legionn aire, deviatingfrom the comm on practice of pillage, exploitation, an d suppression of conqueredpeoples, built roads, located and secured cities, and dug waterways. By introducingsuperior Roman agricultural methods, legal system, and engineering and miningtechniques, the Roman mili tary served as a civilizing force coincidental with i tsmilita ry conquests.2 In more recent years, the engineering accomplishments of the

B r i t i s h mi l i t a r y w e r e i n s t r u me n t a l i n t r a n s f o r mi n g I n d i a a n d mo v i n g i t i n t o t h emodern era .L ik e wi se n i n et e en t h -ce n t u r y R u s si a n C za r s u s e d mi li t a r y e n gin e er s t o

const ru ct the grea t Tra ns-Siberian r ailroad, an d since 1919 the Soviet Union has oftenemployed the technical skills and manpower reserves of the Red Army to accomplishsuch diverse tasks as harvesting crops and building roads.

Much the same was true in the United States where military civic action hasa long tradition. The important role played by the armed forces in the developmentand expansion of the West is well-known. During the colonial period, a young militiaofficer, Col. George Washington, carried out surveying and mapping assignments forthe civil governm ent. Later, after independence had been gained, t he Americanmilitary engaged in numerous nation-building activities out of necessity for survival

on the frontier, and as a result , encouraged th e sett lement of wilderness areas andstimulated the economic growth of the nation. Despite pessimistic warnings fromsettlers, frontier garrisons successfully intr oduced wheat to th e pr airie sta tes to feedtheir troops. They brought in livestock herds to provide a regular beef ration. TheWestern lumber industry r eceived i ts init ial s t imulus from sawmills erected tocon s t r u ct Ar my for t s . T h e for t s t h e ms elv es b eca me s it e s for ma n y of t h e mor eprosperous Western and Midwestern cities. And military roads formed the basis for


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the web of highways crisscrossing much of the nation today. 3 I n ma n y a r e a s A r mydoctors pr ovided th e only medical a id available to ear ly settlements, a nd troop u nitss t a t ion e d in s pa r s ely p op u la t e d a r e a s oft e n a p pe a r ed a s t h e on ly t a n gib lemanifestation of national authority.

Other civic activit ies on the part of the mili tary resulted from a consciousnation-building effort on the part of the United States government. Prompted by

military necessity and economic considerations, Congress and the Secretary of Warassigned th e a rm ed forces a succession of constr uction and explora tory ta sks. Thesemissions ran ged from the famous expedition of Capt. Meriwether Lewis and Lt.William Clark to the construction of forts and posts to protect settlers from Indianattacks and to guard trails leading into the country's hinterland. In 1810 the WarDepartm ent, even while on t he verge of war with En gland an d Fr an ce, directed Arm yelements to build a "wagon road" from Fort Hawkins on the Georgia frontier throughIndian country into the Mississippi Territory.4 Several years after the War of 1812,Secreta ry of War J ohn C. Calhoun noted th at such civic actions h ad not only proved"highly useful for militar y operations" but also contr ibuted directly t o th e "industr yand political prosperity of th e comm unity.5

In the decade following th e War of 1812, sett lers flocked into ter ritories eastof th e Mississippi. Since the U.S. mili tary academy at West Point produced thena tion's only civil engineers for several decades, t he federa l governm ent relied alm ostexclusively upon mili tary specialists for reconnoitering and survey work6 Th eEngineering Corps cut tr ails thr ough t he forest an d conducted sur veys for the initialaccess roads as successive areas were opened for exploration and settlement. Latergarrison troops made the necessary road improvements, drained swamps, bridgedr i v e r s a n d s t r e a ms , a n d c o n s t r u c t e d c a n a l s t o k e e p p a c e w i t h t h e r a p i d i n t e r n a lgrowth of the nation. This was the case in opening the Washington Territory, NewMexico Territory, Kansas a nd Nebra ska, an d Uta h.7 So grea t wa s th e dema nd for civile n gi n ee r s , P r e si de n t J a me s Mon r oe a s k ed C on g r es s t o i n cr e a s e t h e n u mb er of engineers on a ctive duty, stating t hat "the more extensively these Corps a re en gaged

in the improvement of their country....the happier the effect will be.... By profiting ofth eir science the work s will always be well executed, a nd by giving to t he officers su chemployment our Union will derive all the advantage, in peace as well as in war, fromtheir talents and services." He went on to note an additiona l advant age: "The militarywill be incorporated with the civil , and unfounded and injurious dist inctions andprejudices of every kind be done away." 8

Likewise, President John Quincy Adams envisioned extensive use of the ArmyCorps of Engineers to carry out his am bitious internal improvements program andoversaw th e appointm ent of a Boar d of Engineers for In tern al Impr ovements for tha tpurpose.9

T h r ou g h ou t t h e r e ma in d e r of t h e 1 80 0s a n d in t o t h e t w en t i et h ce n t u r y,American milita ry forces a dded t o th eir list of civil a ccomplishments. Engineers

provided surveys and engineering help for construction of the first transcontinentalrailroad. Military doctors developed a control and cure for yellow fever and typhoid,and Union tr oops r esponsibly adm inistered th e F reedmen's Bur eauthe first "socialwelfar e" effort of the federal governm ent. In the na tion's capital, milita ry en gineersconstructed the Washington Monument, the Pentagon, the Library of Congress, andportions of th e Capitol. Pr obably the Army's great est engineer ing accomplishm ent wasconstruction of the Panama Canal, completed in 1914.


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Today the federal government continues to call upon mili tary engineers todesign navigational improvement projects and to help with flood control.10

Beginning in the 1920s, the United States Air Service, predecessor of th eUnited States Air Force, continued in this nation-building tradition. The advent of theairplane and modern technology added a new dimension of speed and effectiveness tomilitary civic action. Some fifteen years after the Wright brothers made their historic

flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, military pilots were providing airmail serviceand flying experiment al crop dust ing missions against agricultur al pestsoperat ionssoon taken over by commercial firms. In 1919 the Chief of the Forest Service notedthat airmen had demonstra ted that "forest protection is one of the civic uses of airplanes."11

During the 1920s military pilots substantiated this claim by flying hundredsof thousands of miles over national forest reserves in Montana, Idaho, California,Oregon, and Washington to provide early warning fire protection and to tr ain AirService troops.12 This civic work was eventu ally tak en over by comm ercial pilots in1928. Air Service experiments with aerial photography aided Army engineers in theirflood control work; t he Coast Guard with i ts campaign against rum smuggling;farmers with crop surveys, soil experiments, and irrigation projects; and city plannerswith designs for cities, towns, and park s.13

Similarly, the enormous strides made by the nation's commercial airl inesresulted directly from the pioneering cross-count ry flights an d engineering progressmade by the Air Service. Military contracts awarded for advanced war planes not onlyhelped keep the embryonic American aircraft industry alive during the 1920s and intothe 1930s but also stimulated aeronautical advances in cartography, meteorology, andcommunications.14 Indeed, Congress authorized the replacement of military aircraftfor the very purpose of insuring that the aircraft industry would develop into aneconomical civil ent erprise. La ter the Air Service itself organized a civil affairsdivision charged with the "encouragement of commercial aviation and of insuringp r op er lia is on w it h com m e r cia l in d u st r y a n d w it h ot h e r d ep a r t m en t s of t h e

Government using aircraft."

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Perhaps the most significant civic action project the Air Service undertook inthe 1920s was the surveying, marking, and equipping of a comprehensive system ofairways across th e United Sta tes. President War ren G. Harding, recognizing the n eedfor airfield development, added his encoura gement. The Air Service, he advisedCongress, should be "uti lized...in the establishment of national tran scontinentalairways and in cooperation with the states in the establishment of local airdromes andlandin g fields."16 Accomplishments by 1925 led one U.S. senator to comment that "theremarkable success of the Army Air Service in laying out and conducting its modelairwa ys, over which ar my planes h ave flown a bout one m illion m iles without a ny fata laccidents is an insta nce of wha t can be a ccomplished a nd wh at should be continu ed."17

Besides the m an y civic cont ribut ions m ade by militar y aviation, milita ry pilots

have flown mill ions of m iles on hum anitarian missions and in response to civilemergencies. One of the earliest missions was undertaken in California in August1922, when Crissy Field pilots tr ansported the rescue worker s who saved t he lives offort y-eight men entombed in a burn ing mine. After the Air Ser vice was redesigna tedthe Army Air Corps in 1926, military "crash rescue" planes became available to flyemergency missions on a routine basis.18

In Februa ry 1939, the Air Corps ru shed em ergency help to victims of a m ajor


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eart hqua ke in Chile. Loaded with near ly two tons of Red Cross medical su pplies, anexperimental XB15 bomber and two other planes l ifted supplies to Santiago andrema ined ther e for t en days to deliver m edicines and evacuate ea rth quake victims tohospitals. These Army Air Corps mercy flights to an area outside the United Statesmarked a shift of U.S. military civic actions from the purely domestic scene to theworld stage.

Since World War II Air Force pilots have helped fight a cholera plague in Egypt(1947), flown relief missions to succor earthquake victims in Ecuador (1949), Greece(1953), Morocco (1960), Chile (1960), Per u (1960), Ira n (1962), Libya (1963), Ita ly(1976), an d t o aid people fleeing floods in th e Un ited Kingdom (1953), the N eth erla nds(1953), East Pakistan (1954), Mexico (1955), Japan (1957), Brazil (1960), Kenya andSomalia (1961), and Morocco (1963).

Air Force personn el flew food to Ita lian t owns isolated by snowstorms in 1956an d to the r iot-torn Congo in 1961. They tr an sported insecticides and flew aerial spr aymissions to combat locust plagues in North Africa (1957) and in Thailand (1963). In"Opera tion Safe Haven ," th e Air Force evacua ted t housa nds of refugees, man y of themsick or woun ded, who were fleeing comm un ist a tr ocities in H un gar y (1956-1957). Andin 1948 an d 1949 American pilots part icipated in the Berlin airlift, pr eventing WestBerlin from falling to the Soviets. There is scarcely a country in Europe today whichhas not been a beneficiary of the humanitarian and disaster relief missions of theUnited States Air Force.19

Following World War II, American civic action policy changed considerably.While th e governm ent continued to empha size th e usefulness of the mili tary onna tional development pr ojects a nd in inter na tional disaster relief, man y policy maker sbegan to see th e potential for using milita ry civic action as an instru ment of foreignin t e r n a l d efe n se . I n t h e l a t t er i n st a n ce , ci vi c a c t ion s p er for me d b y a for e ig ngovernment under the direction of the American mili tary could be used to helpsuppress domestic unr est caused in par t by government al unr esponsiveness to popularneeds, And in developing nations, which were considered especially vulnerable to

comm un ist su bversion, t he m ilita ry could cont ribut e to economic and political st abilityby injecting i ts skil ls and mana gerial capabilit ies into such areas as education,transportation, construction, and administration, and thus decrease the appeal of comm un ist pr opaganda . Militar y civic action could th us become both a prevent ive anda curative weapon for communist-inspired insurrection and an additional Americantool with which to fight the cold war.

The t ra nsform at ion of civic action from a lar gely volunt ar y, domest ic fun ctionto the political a nd milita ry weapon which it eventua lly becam e in Vietna m was n otan overnight occurrence. It had its origins not only in America's own brief colonialexperience in t he P hilippines but m ore immediat ely in th e post-World War II decisionsof President Harry S. Truman and Congress to help the war-torn countries of theMiddle East, Europe, and Asia. When the fighting in World War II was over and a

mut ual enem y defeated, th e wart ime allian ce between t he Allies of the West an d th eSoviet Union came to an abrupt end. The Soviets established communist regimes inone East European country after the other, and the United States searched for somemeans to stem the growing tide of Soviet power and influence.20 Western Europe wasalso in a shambles, exhausted by the war. Under such conditions, communism wasable to ma ke inroads with a multi tude of promises and appeals to those distressedp eop le s. W h ile ou t s id e S ovi et p r e ss u r e w a s b r ou g h t t o b ea r a g a in s t T u r k ey ,


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communist inspired guerrillas in Greece threatened the immediate overthrow of thelegitimate national government there as well. Britain appealed to the United Statesfor help. It could no longer bear the burden of Greece alone.

In March 1947 Congress responded with the Greece Turkey emergency aidprogram and soon followed with the European Recovery Program, known popularlyas the Marshall Plan. Its stated aim was to assist those countries in the task of post-

war reconstr uction an d improvement of their economies, As P resident Tr um an notedin his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, the objective was "to help the freepeople of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing,more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.21 H eleft unstated the more important belief of the time that such assistance was vital toAmer ica's own secur ity because it would s erve t o "cont ain" Soviet expa nsionism. Thisbelief had been enunciated earlier as the Truman Doctrine. 22

The lar ge amount s of economic and m ilita ry aid funn eled int o Greece eased t heAmerican m ind somewha t about the immediate pr ospects for a comm unist ta keover.But the feeling still lingered that more long-term measures were needed. Shortly afterCongressional approval of the monetary aid package to Greece in 1947, the StateDepartment called upon United States Army engineers to help rebuild the country'stransportation facilities. By December 3, 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had estab-lished a J oint U nited Sta tes Milita ry Advisory a nd P lanning Group t o Greece, and byJuly the first C-47 had arrived to give support to the American Mission for Aid toGreece. Throughout the next three years the services provided by the United StatesAir F orces in Eu rope proved to be "essent ial to the s upport of the Gr eek Army fightin gthe Communist guerri l la elements.23 An d b y 1 94 9 t h e U n it e d S t a t e s m il it a r y h a de st a b li sh e d t h e p r e ce de n t for a i din g a for e ig n n a t i on r e s t or e i n t er n a l or d e r b ys u p er v is in g t h e r e bu i ld in g of p or t s , r e p a ir i n g d a ma g ed r a i lr oa d s , b u il di n g a n drepairing st ra tegic roads, an d assur ing a supply of th e basic necessities of food fuel,and clothing.24

In 1949 Congress embodied th ese ideas in law with t he pa ssage of the Mut ual

Defense Assistance Act. This "Mutual Security Act" emphasized the role of military,economic, and technical assistance in contributing t o th e "mutu al security andindividual and collective defenses of the free world" and in the development of theresour ces of the free world "in the interest of their security and independence." Thechallenges of the Cold War thus led to a union of the previously separate functions ofthe militar y. The h um an itarian and economic concept of nation-building now beganto be linked for t he first t ime not only to politics but to United St at es na tional securityand foreign policy interests.25

Additional experiments using military civic action as part of our foreign aidprogra m took place in t he ear ly 1950s an d tightened t he linkage between these ideas.During the Korean War, United States armed forces personnel again became involvedin helping the people of a war-ravaged country. U.S. actions in Korea were especially

significan t, h owever, becau se of th e un iqueness of using a comba t force in t he field t orehabili tate the nation i t had fought over. Moreover, the success of the Americanp r ogr a m d emon s t r a t e d t h e p os s ib ili t y of u s in g mi li t a r y r e s ou r ce s t o a s s is t i nsocioeconomic fields without detriment to the military mission.

At first, American aid t o Korea was given on a n inform al, sponta neous basis.R a t ion s w er e s h a r e d w it h t h e h u n g r y, a n d fu n d s a n d clot h i n g w e r e coll ect e d t osupport war refugees. The humanitarian efforts of fighter pilot Dean E. Hess to rescue


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Korean orpha ns and provide them a place of safety a chieved widespread pu blicity.26

But it was only after th e cease-fire t ha t la rge scale civic action pr ojects got un der wa y.During the summer of 1953, after seeing firsthand some of the churches and

schools constructed by U.S. mili tary personnel, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylorthencomma n d e r of t h e E i gh t h Ar my t ook s t ep s t o p r ovi de a d d it i on a l fu n d s a n dcentralized control for the voluntary program. In August, Gen. Taylor wrote to

Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah, who in turn won President DwightD. Eisenhower's enthusiastic support. In November, Congress also approved Taylor'srequest a nd a uth orized the diversion of milita ry supplies an d equipment into a form alrelief and rehabilitation activity officially designated as Armed Forces Assistance toKorea.27

Constr uction work began immediately. Pr ojects were selected which wouldreplace th e war-dama ged facilities tha t h ad ser ved the lar gest num ber of people andbeen of greatest benefit to local residents. Lumber, no longer needed for militaryhospitals, was used to construct school buildings, and cement intended for bunkerswas used in foundations for orphanages. With Taylor's encouragement, military unitsbegan "adopting" entir e comm un ities. Work ing side-by-side with Korea n civilians , th eAmericans contributed from their own salaries millions of dollars for needed suppliesand equipment.28

At first American troops volunteered for the work in their off duty time, withthe transportation corps providing trucks and drivers when they could be spared frommilitary duty. Gen. Taylor was designated Executive Agent for the undertaking andwas responsible for coordinating and supervising Air Force and Navy, as well asArmy, participation. By November 1955, almost 3,000 projects had been completed,with an estimated value to th e Korean economy of more tha n $48 million. Mat erialsand supplies furnished by the United States amounted to $15 million. In 1959 all U.S.units stat ioned in Korea were required t o participate a ctively in t he program, a nd byJ anua ry of that year the number of completed pr ojects had grown to nearly 4,000.These improvements were valued at more than $66 million, while the United States

contribution amounted to only $21 million.

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The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program set a number of importantprecedents which would serve as goals and models for later U.S. civic action projectsin S ou t h e a s t As ia . T h e con s t r u ct i on p h a s e of t h e p r og r a m w a s d es ig n ed t o b eprimarily a self help program. Korean agencies were expected to provide a majorportion of the construction materials and labor involved in completion of a project. 30

As of 1968, for example, American funds could not exceed more than one-third of thetotal cost of the Korean program, and in 1969 an Eighth Army regulation stipulatedthat no single project could utilize more than $1,500 in American materials.31 Projectswere selected only after consultation with civic leaders in Korean communities anddetermination that such projects could be successfully operated after the Americanmilitary contribution had been completed. American armed forces personnel were not

required to do manual labor on projects, but they often voluntarily joined in the workwith contr ibutions of money, gifts, an d services. They normally furnished guidanceand supervision. At the discretion of local commanders, certain military equipmentwas loaned for use on approved projects, provided that such use did not detract froma state of combat readiness. The projects were usually conducted on a small scale,could be completed in one constr uction season, an d were locat ed within the vicinityof the unit sponsoring the projectusually in small urban or rural areas.


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The basic objectives of the Korean civic action program were significant alsoin their applicabili ty to mili tary civic action as i t would be carried out later inVietna m, They were essent ially twofold. First, th e program was designed to contr ibuteto the economic and sociological development of the Republic of Korea by aiding theKorean people at the grass roots level. At the inception of the program a general fearexisted that unless something were done quickly to bolster Korea's economy, the

commu n i s t s w ou l d ga i n s u ch p op u la r s u p por t t h e y cou l d t a k e ov er t h e w h ol epeninsula. Voicing t his fear, one American officer in the United States mili tarygovernment in Korea noted in 1954 that:

the existing r elief economy in Korea provides a fertile field for theCommunist agitator and propagandist. Misery breeds dissatisfactionan d a h ungry m an, worried about his fam ily and with n o norm al outletfor his material desire to work and produce a l ivelihood by his owneffort s, is vastly m ore susceptible to insidious, cleverly pr esented an dwell-disguised Comm unist ant i-western pr opaganda tha n h e was whenhe had a job and his nation had a viable, growing economy. The Koreanwho spurned Communism in 1950 may well be questioning the wisdomof his action today.32

He went on to recommend that "the strongest perimeter defense America canbuild in Asia or a nywhere else is one built on un dersta nding and mu tua l respect, an dit is th e only defense which can not be penetra ted by Comm unism.33 And th is was th esecond objective of the Korean civic action program:

to enhance civil-military community relationships and thereby not onlycreat e a receptive climat e am ong Korea n comm un ities for t he cont inuedp r e se n ce of U .S . mi li t a r y p er s on n e l b u t a l so e n a b le t h e mi lit a r yservices, U.S. as well as South Korean, to win the confidence of the

p op u la t ion , t h u s m a k in g t h e a r e a le ss vu ln e r a ble t o com m u n is tpropaganda.34

The Korean progra m was successful for a num ber of reasons. There was a realneed for Amer ican social an d economic assista nce. Amer ican forces were concent ra tedin the area, and they possessed relatively large stocks of supplies and equipment. Theprogram was well-directed and well-coordinated. Above all, American mili taryinvolvement received wholehearted support not only from Washington but from fieldcommanders as well.

Even a s lessons were being learned and precedents were being set in SouthKorea, additional experiments with civic action were taking place in the Philippines,In the latter instance, however, civic action was used, not as a preventive measure

against a possible futur e insurgency, but actually a s a counterinsurgency m easureitself. American military personnel and advisors, among them, Lt. Col. Edward G.Lansdale (later a major general in the United States Air Force), helped develop thecoun ter -guer illa campa ign which, accordin g to Lan sdale, was "classic in its lessons ofthe str ategy and t actics th at win."35

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, communist-led and inspired dissidents wereable to mak e substa ntial inr oads in the Philippine count ryside, using Mao Tse-tun g's


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guerrilla warfare doctrine an d ta ctics. Known a s t he H ukbalah ap (Huk ) rebellion, th einsurgency failed to yield to conventional military tactics. Much of the-Huk activitytook place in Central Luzonso much so that newspapers began call ing the area"Huklandia."36 The-Huks were active in other parts of the Phil ippines, but CentralLuzon remained the hot spot for several reasons. It was inhabited by an agrarianpopulation which felt, with some justification, that it was not getting a fair deal from

the government. Moreover, the farming areas were interspersed among swamps,mount ains , and jungle area s which m ade ideal bases for guer rillas. Food was plentiful.And, to complete the picture, it had American military bases in the area which weremanned by personnel under strict orders to keep out of the "domestic affairs" of theFilipinos. Their orders specified that they were there to help defend the Philippinesfrom "external aggression."37

The communists were able to field about 15,000 armed Huks in guerrilla units.These were sup ported by a claimed m illion sympa th izers am ong the popula tion, whomthe communists labelled their "mass base." This million represented a large portionof the 17 to 20 million total Filipino population at the time. Opposing the communistarmed force, which often was able to hide in among the civilian population, were thePhilippine Armed Forces of around 50,000.

During th e first years of the an ti-Huk cam paign, the Ph ilippine m ilitary u sedconventional, small-unit combat techniques. They made excellent use of fire-power,They were well-equipped and well-trained. According to the usual military doctrine,t h e y s h ou l d h a ve w on , b u t t h e y d i d n ot , I n s t ea d t h e commu n i s t H u k s a ct u a l lyincreased t he st ren gth of th eir forces in the field, extended th eir ar eas of influen ce an dcontrol, and greatly increased the numbers of population supporting them.

I n mi d-1 95 0 t h e s it u a t i on s u d de n ly r e ve r s ed it s e lf s h or t l y a ft e r R a monMagsaysay was appointed Secretary of National Defense and given broad powers toput an end to the rebellion. For the first few months the Philippine army continuedt o e mp loy con v en t i on a l t a ct i cs , a n d d e sp it e Ma gs a ys a y's a l le ge d in t e n t ion of "exterminating every Commu nist and Hukbalahap member in t he Phil ippines," the

army continued to lose the battle.

38

Gradually, Magsaysay began to realize that theHuk m ovement involved much more tha n a military thr eat, tha t ther e were importa ntsocial, economic, and psychological reasons for its continued successes. The Huks wererecruit ing most of th eir support from tenant farm ers who were being exploited byla n d lor d s a n d b a n k er s in a n e a r -fe u da l s ys t e m of e con omi c p e on a g e. T h e ma i npropaganda theme of the communists was "land for the landless." The people had alsocome to distrust the Philippine army. Instead of protecting the people, it had offendedma ny by its undisciplined behavior. Filipino soldiers "confiscated" what ever theyneeded and often alienated large segments of the civilian population by either thearrogance of their methods or their capacity.39

T h en , a t t h e s u gge st ion a n d u n d er t h e gu id a n ce of E d wa r d L a n sd a le ,Magsaysa y inst itut ed several significant cha nges. Lansda le had gained th e confidence

of Magsaysay about a year prior to his assignment to the Philippines when Magsaysaywas on Congress iona l business in Washin gton. And du ring a World War II assignm entto the Phil ippines, Lansdale had won the friendship and respect of several high-ranking Philippine officials as well as American military personnel. In September1950 Gen. J ona tha n Anderson, Chief of the J oint U.S. Milita ry Advisory Gr oup, a ndAmerican Ambassador to the Ph ilippines Myron Cowen negotiated Lansdale's retu rnto the P hilippines in an advisory capa city with t he American Militar y Advisory Group.


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Lansdale had the backing of Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff of the AirForce, and of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Gen. Anderson,Ambassador Cowen, and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine armed forces agreed thatLansdale was to advise not only on intelligence matters, which was his speciality, buton the whole problem of the Huk rebellion.40

By this time Lansdale had begun to establish a reputation for the innovative

and unconventiona l, and in th e Ph ilippines he wa s au thorized to experiment with hisnew ideas. At La nsda le's requ est, Ma gsaysay creat ed a psychological war fare divisionwithin his staff called the Civil Affairs Office.41 Lansdale proposed that the new officedirect th e m ilita ry t o perform not only psychological work a s pa rt of its r outine comba tactivities but a lso "impr ove th e at titu de an d beha vior of tr oops towar d civilians thosemasses whose loyalty is the imperative stake in a people's war as waged by theCommunists."42 This was not an idea original with Lansdale. It had been enunciatedsome 2,000 years before by Sun Tzu as one of the success factors governing the art ofguerrilla warfare. Su n Tzu defined it a s t he "mora l law" which "cau ses th e people tobe in complete a ccord with t heir r uler, so th at th ey follow him regar dless of their lives,undismayed by any danger." Mao Tse-tung, realizing also the importance of a gooda r my -p eop le r e la t i on s h ip , r e it e r a t e d it in t h e 1 94 0s w h en h e w r ot e h i s t a ct i ca ldoctrine for the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army. "The people are like thew a t er , " h e e xp la i n ed , "a n d t h e a r my i s li ke t h e fi sh . " T h e F i lip in o commu n i s t srecognized t he value of the principle, and their cam paign was succeeding. "The wayto star t defeating Commun ist guerrilla leaders a nd forces," Lan sdale explained later ,"is to use th e sam e cardinal principleand to use it bett er. Fr ee citizens a lways ha vet h e op p or t u n i t y t o ma k e s t r on g er , mor e d yn a mi c u s e of t h is p r in cip le t h a n t h eComm unists can."43 To th e Ph ilippine a rm y's mission of physically defeat ing the H uks ,then, was added the additional duty of regaining the confidence of the people bydemonstrating that government soldiers could and would protect and help them, Inthe combat battalions, the commander and his civil affairs officer met with villageleaders to work out relationships between troops and civilians, methods of protecting

farmers from guerilla raids during planting and harvest, and village self defense. Thisled to furt her ar my actions, such, for example, as escort ing Depart men t of Agricultur eagent s into combat a rea s to help far mer s an d using tr oop labor to build village schoolsand other public works, and to dig water wells. Noting that tenant farmers weremostly without counsel in cour t cases involving land problems, th e a rm y quicklyarranged for a number of its judge advocate officers to appear in court in civilianclothes to r epresent the farm ers. Special a rra ngements with the telegraph officeallowed poor people to bring complaints to the attention of the proper authorities fora cost of only five cent s, wha tever th e length of the m essage. Civilians wound ed in firefights between the a rmy a nd t he Huk s were treated in arm y hospitals.44 In the 1951election, troops guarded candidates to h elp protect their right of free speech andfreedom of assembly, and then guarded the polls and the ballots to increase the

possibility of an honest, free election.45

As a result of his unusual program, Magsaysay won the people over to the sideof the government and broke the back of the rebellion. Lacking an appropriate termto describe all this military assistance at the village level, Lansdale coined the phrase"military civic action."46 By 1953, when Magsaysay himself was elected president, thepeople, with their own government in power, were even less inclined to help thecommunists overthrow it. And the improved relations with the population yielded an


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abundance of combat intelligence needed for a successful military campaign. 47

While carrying out a vigorous military offensive against the Huks, Magsaysayalso insti tuted m easures t o induce t he guerri l las to surrender. Many of them knewlittle or nothing about communism. They had joined the rebels out of despair withtheir lot. Magsaysay offered free government land to rebels who surr endered. And heesta blished an E conomic Developmen t Corps to help clear t he lan d an d constr uct basic

facilities. As Magsaysay explained, t he ar med forces offered the Huk s the choice ofreceiving either the "hand of al l-out force or al l-out friendship."48 Large-scalesurr enders of ra nk-and-file guerrillas, together with effective military an d policed r ive s a g a in s t t h e h a r d cor e of commu n i s t le a d er s h ip , fi n a lly r e d u ce d t h e H u k movement to a minor t hr eat, easily contr olled by r outine police a ction.49

By the mid-1950s, then, the arm ed forces in t he Philippines and Korea haddeveloped an operational doctrine of assisting the civilian population to bring abouta "brotherhood" between soldiers and civilians. The initial reason was elementary: towin over the people to help the army in finding and fighting an enemy who hid amongt h e p op ula t ion . Th e s ucces s of t h e P h ilip pin e e xp er ien ce a n d la t er t h ea ccomp li sh me n t s of t h e Ar me d F or ce s As s is t a n ce t o K or e a p r ogr a m s p a wn e dconsiderable interest in the use of civic action as a counterinsurgency tool. Observersfrom Malaya, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma visited the Philippines to study this doctrinein the field and took home with them many operational ideas which they furtheradapted and developed to fit their own special local needs.50 I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e splans were laid to stu dy th e possibility of using civic action as a cold war weapon.

I n J u n e a n d J u l y 1 9 5 3 d u r i n g t h e f i n a l p h a s e o f t h e a n t i - H u k c a mp a i g n ,Lansdale accepted the invitation of Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel and joined a smalladvisory group to the French in Indochina. By that time the first Indochina war wasdrawing to a close, and French General Henri Navarre, who had just assumed theFrench command, was avidly seeking solutions to his dismal problems. AlthoughNa varr e's staff officers r emem bered Lan sdale's exploits in t he P hilippines and viewedhim as a dangerous revolutionary who sought to "st ir up the natives against the

French," General Navarre himself welcomed his visit. Both the French General andO'Dan iel sought out his ideas on such t actics as psychological wa rfar e, unconventiona ltechniques, combat intell igence collection, pacification, and counter-guerri llaoperations.51 Even at this time F rench militar y ana lysts in P ar is had begun to developtheir own t heories about comm unist revolutiona ry war far e, and ma ny were becomingconvinced that such a war could not be won by the West unless it adopted the sameunconventional social, economic, and political tactics used so effectively by communistguerrillas.52 To be sur e, Fr ench forces in th e field ha d alr eady conceived of wha t wouldlater be called the "pacification program" by the United States and had sent outrudimentary civicaction teams, called Groupes Ad m inistratifs Mobiles to ru ra l villagesin a n attempt to extend French control to Viet Minh-dominated a reas. But in 1953French civic action concepts were still in the formative stage, and none of the French

efforts to bring security and economic development to the countryside had been fullys u cce ss fu l, t h ou gh s om e h a d r e a lize d t e m por a r y ga in s . E ve n t h e GroupesAdm inistratifs Mobiles were viewed as m erely experimen ta l organ izat ions.53 Moreover,a truly unconventional campaign would have required additional troops to counter theenemy's increasing str ength tha n the Fr ench were willing to field, while most F renchofficers were not prepared to fight even a guerri l la war by any means other thanconventional methods. Time had to await the Algerian uprising for the French to


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employ th eir n ew ideas on coun terinsur gency a nd special opera tions.54

Meanwhile, a disheartened Lansdale left Saigon temporarily, while Ho ChiMinh completed his defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. At the Geneva conferencewhich began on May 8, 1954, France, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union eventuallyagreed to a cease-fire in Indochina, recognized Laos and Cambodia as independentnations, and divided the Vietnamese portion of Indochina at the 17th parallel. The

s ign a t or ie s a gr e ed t o h old a n e le ct ion in 1 95 6 u n d er t h e s u pe r vis ion of a ninterna tiona l contr ol comm ission to decide the question of un ificat ion of th e twoparts.55 That the future did not bode well for a united Vietnam was evinced by twodevelopments: a frankly communist government headed by Ho Chi Minh himself assum ed contr ol in Ha noi as th e French withdrew; an d the United Sta tes an d the non-communist government in South Vietnam did not sign the Geneva accords.

Even before th e Geneva agreemen ts ha d been reached and the F rench had beenousted from Vietnam, the United States was formulating an idea which would becomea cornerstone of U.S. policy in Vietna m. President Eisenhower gave i t officialexpression when he observed a t a press conference on April 7, 1954, tha t the loss ofIndochina , like a "falling domino," would lead "very qu ickly" to the loss of oth er ar easas well.56 At first i t was hoped that under the Geneva agreements South Vietnamwould have a chance to establish a democratic government, but by the fall of that yearit had become apparent that the nation faced staggering problems. It had to resettlenearly one million refugees who departed North Vietnam in 1954 after the Frenchw it h d r e w. T h e g ove r n me n t i t se lf, n e a r ly p a r a l yz ed b y e igh t y ea r s of w a r , w a sunderman ned and untr ained in effective self government . F rom t he outset i t facedsevere economic shortages. Moreover, the North had emerged from the war with largemilitary forces which posed a considerable threat to the Southern regime.57

Pr esident E isenhower, concern ed about t he possible loss of all Vietna m a nd t he"Comm unist enslavement of millions," decided to recognize South Vietnam as anindependent state. In September the President undertook to form a Southeast AsiaTreaty Or ganization (SEATO) to prevent fur ther "Comm unist aggression" in th e a rea

a n d p le dg ed , a l on g w it h t h e ot h e r p a r t i es t o t h e t r e a t y, t o r e s is t "b y me a n s of continuous and effective self help and mutu al a id arm ed att ack and to prevent andcounter subversive activities directed from without."58 And on October 23, 1954, in aletter to Ngo Dinh Diem, who had emerged as head of the government in Saigon,Eisenhower offered American help to the new government to insure its survival, "Thepurpose of this offer," the President wrote, "is to assist the Government of Vietnamin developing an d ma intaining a strong, viable sta te, capable of resisting su bversionor aggression through military means."59

Thus, a commitment was made to maintain the independence and security ofSoutheast Asia. It would guide U.S. policy for almost two decades. No specific militarymeans of upholding the agreements were mentioned, but the October letter to Diemdid signal t hat the United States was preparing to use at least some of the militar y

weapons at its disposal.During the hea t of the Geneva debates, Edward Lansda le retu rned t o Vietnam ,

this time as the top American expert on guerrilla war. 60 Ambassador Donald Heathin Saigon and Gen. John O'Daniel , who by this t ime was commander of the U.S.Military Assistance Advisory Group t o Indochina, ha d requested his services. Underorders from the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,with secret instructions from President Eisenhower and Secretary of Stat e J ohn


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Foster Dulles, and with close Central Intelligence Agency connections, Lansdale wasdesignated a ir at ta ch t o the U.S. legation. His initial task was a dvising John F osterDulles and Ambassador Heath. Later he became a member of the small Mili taryAssistance Advisory Group that took over the training role from the French. Hisorders directed him to a ssist the Vietna mese on self help and counter-guerri llameasures, but very quickly he became Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's personal advisor. 61

His instructions did not specify the exact measures to be used but implied that he wasto help the Vietnamese much as he had helped the Filipinos. He arrived in Vietnamonly to find th e Fr ench st ill in contr ol of almost a ll aspects of Vietn am ese society an dhis reputation still as "villainous" in French eyes as before.62 Dr. Phan Nuy Quat, thed efe n se mi n is t e r , fin a l ly fou n d h i m a n a d vi sor y s lot i n t h e Vi et n a me s e a r my 'spropaganda and information organization, for which the French had little concern.From that position Lansdale was able to counsel the Vietnamese on psychologicaloperations and civic action.

A short while into his new assignment, Lan sdale noted with alar m t ha t villagepeople were becoming increasingly a lienated not only from the capital but fromprovincial centers as well pr ovincial administra tors were grossly corru pt, andadministrative services lagged in areas being vacated by the Viet Minh under theGeneva accords. As in the Philippines before Magsaysay, soldiers stole what theyneeded from th e people and in some instan ces were actually more bru ta l tha n t he VietMinh had been. One correspondent wrote that "far from giving security, there is everyreason to suppose that the army, buttressed by the Civil Guard...is regarded by-theSouthern peasant as a symbol of insecurity a nd repression."63 Lansdale feared theou t com e of t h e 1 95 6 p le bis cit e . I n a m in or m ove t o cou n t er t h is e r os ion of government al support, h e opened a school for psychological warfare tr aining a ndimplemented a curriculum which taught Vietnamese troops, among other things, goodbehavior patterns toward civilians. He met with only limited success, however, sincethe Fr ench, who were still in contr ol of the ar my, continu ed to view Lansdale's ideasas al ien and unorthodox; and Diem, intent on consolidating his power in Saigon,

wasted little time worrying about the allegiance, much less the treatment or livingconditions of the rural population. Early in 1955, however, Diem began to turn hisattention t o the rur al ar eas. The impetus for this about face came in J anua ry whena Vietnamese official named Kieu Cong Cung presented Lansdale a plan for a crashp r ogr a m t o t r a i n Vi et n a me s e b u r e a u cr a t s a s t r u e ci vil s er v a n t s . " Cu n g 's id ea , "Lansdale explained, "was to place civil service personnel out among the people, insimple dress, wh ere t hey would help initially by work ing alongside the people, gettin gtheir h ands dirty when n ecessary."64 After they had served satisfactorily in thiscapacity for awhile, they would assume the role of enlightened public administrators.Lansdale l iked the idea. "It would-bring a useful governm ent presence into thecount ryside quickly and produce civil servan ts, with some under stan ding of the realneeds of the people."65

By this t ime the advisory staff of the United States economic mission hadplanned esta blishmen t of a N ational Institu te for Administrat ion in Sa igon a nd let acontr act to Michigan Sta te Un iversity to train a nd qua lify rur al adm inistrat ors.66 Bu tLan sda le wan ted t he quicker resu lts he believed the Cu ng plan would provide. He soldthe idea to Diem, who saw t he plan as a way to further consolidate his power, andDiem a ppointed Cun g to star t work imm ediately on t he pr ogram . Cung would reportto Diem directly and would work u nder th e direction an d sponsorsh ip of Army Genera l


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and Defense Minister Nguyen Van Minh. Diem picked the name "civic action" for theprogram, borrowing th e label from Lansdale's reports to h im on the Phil ippineexperimenteven though Diem did not envision the use of military personnel.67

On May 7, 1955, Cung took office as Commissioner General for Civic Action.Wi t h in s eve r a l mon t h s a p il ot p r og r a m h a d b ee n i n it i a t ed a n d a C ivi c Act i oncommissariat established. Vietnamese functionaries believed the program would not

work and did everything possible to squelch the plan. But Diem's mind ha d been set.Cung's training center was established in Saigon, and when no civil service personnelvolunt eered for field assignm ent s, some 1,400 to 1,800 cadr e were selected from am ongcar efully screened and un iversity-educated refugees fleeing North Vietnam . Dur ingtheir tr aining students were required to dress in t he calico noir of Southern farmersand laborers, which became their "uniform" later in the villages. By this time fieldagents clad in black peasant garb had become well-known political figures in theVietnam ese conflict. The Viet Minh h ad u sed them extensively an d ha d ta ught themthe "three widths"to eat , s leep, and work with the people. Later the same blackgarment would be worn by workers for the National Liberation Front and in theRepublic of Vietna m by th e government 's r evolutiona ry development cadr e.68

Diem's program, borrowing the idea from t he Viet Minh, required its worker salso to live among a nd a ssociate freely with t he comm on villagers. Init ially thirt y-onecivic action teams began operations in eleven provinces where communist influencedominat ed. Each t eam was composed of from four to ten men an d ha d r esponsibilityfor a number of villages. "Provincial authorities originally refused to recognize CivicAction personnel as governm ent officials, due to the plebeian dress," Lansdalereported; however, "Cung, dressed in the same manner, and as a high functionaryclos e t o t h e P r e s id en t , ma d e a r a p id t ou r of t h e p r ov in ce s a n d ga i n ed gr u d gin gacceptan ce of th is n ew style of government employee." The civic action team s builtvillage ha lls, primar y schools, dispensar ies, and oth er facilities, provided first aid, an dhelped with the building of roads, pit latrines, and other community projects. Theirprimary objective was similar to that of the Viet Minh on whom the teams model their

tactics an d organizationsto win the confidence of the villagers, t o intr oduce basicconsider ed a th rea t by the Viet Minh. Comm un ist agent s began political at ta cks to stirup t he people against t hem and finally tur ned to mur der.69

S oon t h e D ie m gove r n me n t , h ow ev er , ca u g h t u p in it s a n t i -commu n i s tcam paign an d drive for power consolidation, lost sight of th e origina l social a ndeconomic goals it had established for the teams. As the teams proved themselves inthe villages, Diem ordered them to start working with the Army in its pacificationprogram . They were sen t out as civil governm ent "tr oops," eventu ally serving in everyprovince in South Vietnam, including combat zones.70

T h es e a ct i vit i es h e lp ed con v er t t h e ca d r e s a w a y fr om ci vi c a ct i on i n t oexclusively propaganda and political instruments. Diem directed them to dissolve thelocal governments and take complete command of the hamlets. The teams were still

composed largely of repatriated Northerners who were not only outsiders but alsoCat holics. Thu s, in addition to eliminat ing local represen ta tive govern men t, Diem alsoimposed an out side, non-Buddhist h ierar chy on a rur al popula tion which between m id-1954 and late 1955 had indicated a will ingness to support a central government.I n s t ea d of w in n i n g a l le gi a n ce fr om t h e p eop le , con d it i on s w er e cr e a t e d t h a tencour aged th e rise of a Viet Cong insu rgency. In late 1956, Diem dr ast ically cut backon civic action and turn ed t o terrorist tactics, further al ienating t he people and


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thr owing even m ore popular support t o the comm unists. E xcept for a brief period in1954 and 1955, then, when the peasants responded to the honest compassion of theearly cadr es, a situat ion developed exactly opposite to the origina l objectives of t hecivic action plan. Military forces and civic action teams alike resembled conquerorsmore than protectors of the people. Graft and corruption flourished. Even an effort bythe United States economic mission to salvage the civic action idea by circumventing

the Saigon dominat ed progra m an d a pplying economic resources directly at the grassroots level, ended in failure when a desperate Diem scuttled the attempt.71

All the while Edward Lansdale had watched the deterioration of the civicaction program and United States attempts to prop it up with money and equipmentdespite its conten t and defects. His protests to t he E isenhower a dministra tion failedto produce a policy change. At the end of 1956 he was recalled from Vietnam, andDiem's totalitarian practices continued without restraint. In 1957 the death of KieuCong Cun g ended a ny h ope for br inging about social an d economic reform at th is pointin th e Diem r egime. Diem's brother-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nh u, a bsorbed th e rem nan ts ofthe civic a ction directorat e into his polit ical and intell igence organization. Thepeasants now began associating civic action personnel with Nhu's secret police. 72

W h ile t h e s e a ct i vit i es w er e t a k i n g p la ce i n t h e P h i li pp in e s, K or e a , a n dVietnam, at least some of the lessons were not lost on America. In 1958 William J.Lederer and Eugene Burdick published a novel entitled, The Ugly American , in whichthey forecast t hat America would either win or lose against comm unist insurgents inSoutheast Asia, depending on how successfully it stood up to the guerrillas in thebatt le for popular support .73 Lansdale himself was portrayed in the book as Col.Hillandale, an American who cared enough to change anonymous, bureaucraticprograms into personal responses to the needs of real people. The book received aw a r m r e s p o n s e a n d c a me a t a t i me w h e n W a s h i n g t o n , t o o , w a s r e f l e c t i n g o n a nappropriate counter to insurgency warfare. President Eisenhower in particular wasreceptive to an y new idea which might be useful a s a cold war weapon. Yet at thesame time he feared the dangers inherent in large defense organizations and the rise

of a "military-industrial complex"a fear he gave voice to in 1961.

74

Was t he civic useof militar y forces an appropriate solution to both the problem of insur gency war far eand the expense and danger of a large, idle standing arm? Many astute observersbelieved i t had worked in the Phil ippines. And for this reason Eisenhower hadsupported the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program as well as President Diem'sefforts in Vietnam.

In the mid-1950s while State Department experts under the leadership of Her bert Hoover, J r. pr obed th e issue of th e constr uctive use of militar y forces, the U .S.Army's Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs was investigating the same matter. 75 InDecember 1954, under the direction of Gen. Taylor, an outline plan was drawn up forthe application of a Korean-type program to underdeveloped countries outside Korea.The plan envisioned m edical an d const ru ction pr ogra ms, r elying on indigenous sources

of labor and materials and emphasizing "short-term, impact-producing projects."76

Nothing came of the plan unt il early in 1956 when Lt. Col. L. J . Legere of the WhiteHouse St aff wrote inform ally to the Army Chief of Sta ff emph asizing th e effectivenessof civic action in Korea and mentioning that the State Department was planning tore-evaluate the entire foreign mili tary and economic aid programs in l ight of thesuccessful assistance program in Korea. On May 28, 1956, in a letter to AssistantSecretary of Stat e for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, the Army Chief of


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Sta ff suggested consider ing th e possibility of plan ning Korea n-type pr ogra ms for otherunderdeveloped countr ies which the United States was desirous of h elping. Hes u gg es t e d f u r t h er t h a t in t h os e c ou n t r i es w h er e t h e U n it e d S t a t e s a l r e a d y h a dmilita ry missions, th is civic cont ribu tion could come from Milita ry Assist an ce AdvisoryGroup personnel, t ra ined and reinforced for that purpose. On J une 7, Robertsonagreed to give the idea further consideration and designated a representative on his

staff to work with the Army for that purpose. 77

Late in J une the Army completed i ts stu dy and sent i ts recommendations t othe Secretary of Defense. The study concluded that "an aid program based on theAFAK [Arm ed F orces Assistan ce to Korea ] principle of helping t he indigenous peoplehelp th emselves can m ost a ppropriately be applied in other u nderdeveloped ar eas ofthe free world, as well as Korea." Such a progra m would be directed by the count ry'ssenior U.S. milita ry comm an ders a nd would fall within the effort of the total Un itedSta tes aid pr ogra m. Militar y as well as overall U.S. foreign policy objectives would be"materially strengthened through this aid approach,"and a "tremendous psychologicalimpact" would result , increasing t he morale of American mili tary personnel and"reducing some of the social an d economic pressures which cause unr est and subjectthe country to political exploitation."78

I n N ov emb er , a ct i n g on t h e Ar my 's r e comme n d a t ion s , t h e O pe r a t ion sCoordinating Board of the Defense and State Departments directed that appropriateaction be ta ken to extend t he Korean appr oach t o civic action to other count ries on a"moderate scale." It added that to be effective such operations should be "conductedon a p er s on a l iz ed b a s is t o a ffor d U n i t ed S t a t e s mi li t a r y p er s on n e l ma x imu mopportun ity for participation," and that "maximum indigenous participation...beobtained for greatest psychological and economic return."79

By 1958 the whole question of military assistance had made its way into theU.S. Congress, occasioning considerable discussion and debate. As a result, in theclos in g ye a r s of h i s a d min i st r a t i on , Mr . E i se n h ow er a p p oi n t ed t h e P r e s id en t ' sC ommi t t ee t o S t u d y t h e U n it e d S t a t e s Mil it a r y As s is t a n ce P r og r a m u n d e r t h e

direction of William H. Dra per, J r., former U nder Secreta ry of th e Arm y. He as ked th ecom m it t ee t o focu s on t h e r e la t ion s h ip b et w ee n m ilit a r y a s sis t a n ce a n d t h efurtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, ways of respondingto the "new Communist techniques in waging the cold war," and the "impact of ourmilitary assistance programs on those related portions and objectives of the mutualsecurity effort which are directed primarily at the economic betterment and growthof the free world."80

The Draper Committee responded a year later with a detailed report showinga clos e r e la t i on s h ip b et w ee n for e ign e con omi c d ev el op me n t a n d commu n i s texpansionism.81 In addition, comm ittee mem bers a greed on the benefits to be gainedby using indigenous mili tary forces in the socioeconomic development of theircountries. "The United States should, as a matter of policy," the committee suggested,

"encourage the use of t he arm ed forces of u nderdeveloped countr ies as a major"tr an smission belt" of socioeconomic r eform an d developmen t."82 "In fact," the reportcontinu ed, "the role of military establishm ents in promoting social a nd economicprogress may, in some cases, be as important as their contribution to the deterrenceof d ir e ct mi li t a r y a g gr e s si on . ... I t i s n ot e n ou g h t o ch a r g e a r me d for ce s w it hresponsibility for the military aspects of deterrence. The opportunities for them tocont ribut e t o nat iona l objectives, short of conflict, ar e a lso grea t in t he less developed


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societies where the mili tary occupy a pivotal posit ion between government andpopulace."83

The committee specifically recommended that the idea of military civic actionbe defined in mutual security legislation; that the Military Assistance Program beadapted more to the basic social and economic needs of each recipient country; andthat "defense support," in addition to its stated objective of enabling the economy of

a countr y to m eet defense requirements, be uti l ized to foster general economicdevelopment such a s th e provision of roads, r ailroads, a irfields, port s, commu nicationssystems, and power, and sanitation projects.84

The fact that the Draper Committee was cognizant of the 1956 Army study andt h a t a r e p r es en t a t i ve of t h e C h ie f of C iv il Affa i r s s er v ed on t h e commi t t ee le dmembers to suggest also that the U.S. mili tary could play a valuable role in thedevelopment and training of such civic action units. 85 With considerable accuracy thecomm ittee also predicted t ha t militar y civic action could be u seful in conn ection withthe "pacification" of newly liberated areas in Laos and Vietnam. The military, thereport concluded, will be the "principal tool" on which Southeast Asian governmentsdepend "not only for establishment of law and order but for civic leadership, localimprovements, an d development of virgin a reas for settlement."86

Draper committee analysts, however, placed several constra ints on theirrecommendations for an otherwise vigorous implementation of a formal civic actionprogra m. F irst, th ey suggested t ha t civic action should not "unduly detra ct" from t heability of milita ry forces to car ry out essent ial security m issions. Second, it should n otinhibit the long-term development of private enterprise and a sound civil economy.Third, the program should be clearly in the public interest rather than the specialinterest of private individuals or select groups. Fourth economic activities should notbe used as an excuse for ma intaining m ilitary forces not justified by purely militar yreasons. Fifth, th e local society and economy mu st demonstr at e its ability to a bsorbthe programs and techniques taught by the mili tary. And finally, such a programcould be expected to produce the most visible results when used during conditions of

acute civilian labor shortage, a deterioration of social discipline, and/or hazardous orunsatisfactory working conditions.87

As far as developing and implementing a sound United States miliary civicaction program, the final committee report indicated that the Defense Department,in coordination with the Departm ent of Stat e and the Internat ional CooperationAdmin istra tion (predecessor of th e Agency for Int ern at iona l Developmen t) bore m ajorresponsibility.88

The suggestions of the Draper group were embodied in law with the passageof the Mutu al Security Act of 1959. Passa ge of the bill demonstr at ed once a gain t hatboth the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government were beginning toenvisage a plan for using the military's civil capabilities to augment U.S. programsfor overseas economic development and mu tua l security. It appear ed th ere would be

increased efforts in the future to implement the proposal.E n a c t me n t o f t h e Mu t u a l S e c u r i t y b i l l h a d a s i mi l a r i mp a c t o n t h e a r me d

s er v ice s. W h en t h e le gi sl a t ion w a s p a s se d, t h e Ar my h a d s t ill n ot in s t it u t e d a noperat iona l civic action progra m, despite the earlier enth usiasm of th e Civil AffairsOffice an d th e encour agement of the St at e Depart ment . The recomm endat ions of theO pe r a t ion s C oor d in a t i n g B oa r d h a d ca l le d for con s id er a b le s t u d y, a n d mor eimporta ntly t he whole plan had met opposit ion from several high-ranking Army


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comma n d e r s w h o r e je ct e d t h e w h ole id ea of a s s ign i n g a n y s ig n ifica n ce t o anonconvent iona l, semi-political pr ogra m. E ven Lan sda le, who by now was ba ck in hisPent agon office a nd still working on unconventional warfare doctrine with his sm allgroup of Special Forces, Air Force, and Navy supporters, tried unsuccessfully to getthe Arm y at this t ime to approve a n ew Special Forces mission. And th e Air F orce atthis point was too concerned with recent cut-backs in its personnel to give serious

consideration to any additional responsibilities calling for more manpower, althoughit was giving some attention to redefining i ts cold war responsibili t ies.89 Th eau th orizat ion pr ovided by th e 1959 legislat ion, however, stirr ed th e services from t heirlethargy. In the Department of Defense's Journal of Mutual Security the Air Forcemade favorable m ention of t he provision in the Mutual Security Act encouragingmilitary participation in constructive peacetime activities:

While the Military Assistance Program must be conceived primarily asa military effort, other factors must also be considered, for it cannot besuccessful in the long run unless the less developed recipient countriesun dergo significan t chan gesorganizat iona l, sociological, economic an ds ome t ime s p oli t ica l .. .. I t mu s t b e e mp h a si ze d t h a t ma n y mi li t a r yactivities and training programs contribute a dual capability; that is, byaccomplishing a mili tary mission the indigenous arm ed forces alsoenhance the socioeconomic condition of their respective countries.90

Army officials went even further and recommended again to the Secretary ofDefense t ha t a definite pr ogra m sh ould be developed to encour age indigenous militar yforces t o un derta ke civic action progra ms.91 With the legal basis for such a programnow on the statute books, the recommendation was approved on May 9, 1960, formingthe basis for not only the Army's but also the Air Force's civic action program.92 Ajoint Defense an d Sta te Depart ment message comm unicated th e aut horization to thefield.93

The Defense Department directive a uthorized the Army to set up and makeavailable for assistan ce t o U.S. foreign missions a ma ximum of six sma ll, m obiletea ms to encour age local m ilita ry forces in const ru ctive pea cetime activities. To reflectthe constructive nature of the activities to be undertaken, the Assistant Secretary ofDefense suggested the teams be designated "mili tary civic action teams." He alsoesta blished some br oad opera tional guidelines. A tea m would be dispat ched only uponthe specific invitation of the Advisory Group, after approval by the AmericanAmbassador and the Unified Commander concerned, and with the concurrence of appropriate officials of the host government. During an assignment, a civic actiontea m would be consider ed a t empora ry par t of th e Militar y Assista nce Advisory Groupan d subject to its super vision a nd dir ection. While its m ajor pur pose would be to assistthe Advisory Group, i t was also specifically auth orized to devise, develop, and

implement civic action progra ms and provide guidance, leadership, an d a ssistance tohost count ry militar y forces engaged in civic action progra ms. Team personnel wereto be selected from among persons qualified in a variety of activit ies includingeconomic, social, a nd psychological fields. They could include members from allbra nches of th e ar med ser vices as well as qua lified civilians. The directive stressed th epoint that primary responsibility for a military civic program rested with the hostgovernment. "U.S. assistance, if required and desirable, should supplement country


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efforts." Funding for the teams would come through the same channels as funds forMilitary Assistan ce Program t ra ining teams u ntil other ar ra ngements could be made.T h e fu n d in g of s p eci fi c p r o je ct s w a s t o r e ma in t h e r e s pon s ib ili t y of t h e h os tgovernment . In other words, th e dispatch of a mobile team would n ot consti tute acomm itm ent to provide a ssista nce for subsequ ent civic action projects.94 On the list ofcountries in which the Departments of Defense and State contemplated program

action were Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.Throughout the init ial Depart ment of Defense directive which auth orized

implementation of the civic action idea and the Army guideline which followedestablishing st anda rd operat ing procedures, t he civic action progra m's u sefulness infurthering U.S. national interests was emphasized:

It is a concept and technique which has proved effective in reducing thethreat of commu nist subversion, which often originates an d gathersmomentu m in rur al area s thr ough exploitation ofgrievances against th egovernm ent. A posit ive Civic Action program can help win for thelegally constituted government and its security forces the confidencean d coopera tion of th e popula tion. Promotion a nd en cour agemen t by theU.S. of such a program will help create a positive and friendly image oft h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d h e l p g a i n s u p p o r t f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d t h emu tua l objectives we wish to pr omote a nd establish.95

And again:

Military a ssistance is furnished t o friendly nat ions in order to promotethe foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the U.S. and tofacilita te t he effective par ticipat ion of such n at ions in a rr an gement s forindividua l a nd collective s elf defense.96

Thus by the fall of 1960, civic action training teams had been organized andwere made available to military assistance personnel abroad. Later in 1960 the firstsuch team was dispatched to Guatemala. Others soon followed to other countries, anda civic action survey team to South Vietnam determined that the government alsocould benefit greatly from a well-run program.97 In 1961 Congress passed the ForeignAssistance Act, one section of which confirmed and expanded the authority alreadyestablished in the 1959 Mutua l Security Act. The stat ute specifically auth orized thedetailing of "members of the Armed F orces of the Un ited Sta tes a nd other personnelof the Departm ent of Defense (to less developed countr ies] solely to assist in anadvisory capacity or t o perform other du ties of a n oncomba ta nt na tu re, including th oserelated t o tr aining or advice related t o tr aining or advice.. .and to encoura ge th osemilitary forces "in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to

economic development."98

The Mu tu al Securit y Act of 1959 an d th e Foreign Assistan ce Act of 1961, then ,form ed th e legal basis for t he civic par ticipat ion of th e U.S. militar y in foreign int ern aldefense and specifically in foreign national development and, in addition, establishedguidelines for later Air Force involvement in civic activities an d pacificat ion inS ou t h e a s t As ia . I t w a s P r e s id en t i a l con ce r n for w or l d d eve lop me n t s a n d a nintensification of the Cold War, however, which played a major role in forging the civic


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action concept into an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the late 1950s and theearly 1960s the United States was confronted with a succession of major crises, eachr e p r es en t i n g a n a t t e mp t b y commu n i s t s t o e xp loi t t h e e con omi c a n d p ol it i ca linsta bility of un derdeveloped regions. Commu nism 's success in fomen ting th ese crisesappeared t o be due to a new a nd aggressive insurgency a nd revolutionar y warfareprogram aimed at eventual world domination.99

On J an uar y 6, 1961, Nikita Khru shchev gave substa nce to these speculationsby proclaiming the Soviet Union's commitment to support and encourage "wars ofnat iona l liberat ion." Sta ting that such wars were "popular u prisings," he declared tha t"the Commu nists fully support just war s an d ma rch in th e front ra nk with t he peoplesw a gin g lib er a t ion s t r u ggle s." H e r e w a s t h e p r on ou n ce m en t t h a t com m u n is tleadersdeter red from more dra stic mean s of expansion by a highly developed Unit edS t a t e s n u cl ea r r e s pon s e ca p a b ili t yw ou l d p u r s u e t h e ir g oa l s b y s u bv er s iv einsurgency.10 0 Though insurgency war fare i tself was n ot a new phenomenon, i tsth rea ten ed use a s a vehicle for even fur th er expan sion of th e commu nist ideology was.T h u s, fr om t h e b eg in n i n g o f h i s a d min i st r a t i on P r e s id en t J oh n F . K en n e d y w a sconvinced that the techniques of "revolutionar y warfare" r epresented a new andominous k ind of challenge t o American interests.10 1 In March, Kennedy pointed outthat the whole southern half of the worldLatin America, Africa, the Middle East,and Asiawas either under direct comm unist pressure or facing inten se "subversiveactivity designed to break down and supersede" the frail governmental institutionsthere.10 2 On May 25, 1961, he broke with t ra dition a nd a ppeared in person to presenta "S p ecia l Mes s a ge t o t h e C on g r es s on U r g en t N a t i on a l N e ed s ." T h e me s sa g eexpressed his concern with the covert, indirect aggression of communist guerrillawarfare:

They have fired no missiles; and their troops are seldom seen. Theysend ar ms, agitat ors, aid, technicians a nd pr opaganda to every tr oubledarea. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by othersby

guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone...by subversivesan d saboteurs a nd insur rectionists. They prey on u nsta ble or unpopularg ov er n me n t s , u n s e a le d, or u n k n ow n b ou n d a r i es , u n fil le d h op es ,convulsive cha nge, mas sive povert y, illitera cy, unr est a nd fru str at ion.10 3

The new President was particularly concerned not only that insurgents wereable to get under the nuclear guard created by Eisenhower but also that "nationall iberat ion movements" and "popular revolts" could not be clearly identified astra ditiona l acts of war, warr ant ing conventiona l responses. What the U.S. needed wasnew doctrines and new tactics to fight unconventional wars. He reemphasized thispoint when he told West Point graduates:

T h is is a n ot h e r t yp e of w a r , n e w in it s in t e ns it y, a n cie n t in it soriginwar by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war byambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression,s ee k in g vi ct or y b y e r od in g a n d e xh a u s t i n g t h e e n emy in s t e a d of engaging him.... It r equires in those situat ions wher e we mu st count erit... a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, andther efore a new a nd wholly different kind of military tr aining.10 4


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Thus, th e sear ch began for new met hods of fighting insur gencies and new t echniquesof training counterinsurgency forces.

Neither t he Army nor th e na val service was totally prepared for t he emph asisand priority the President would place on counter-guerrilla warfare. The Army hadth ree ill-equipped an d un dert ra ined Special Forces groups, a few psychological war fareunits, and one fully trained civic action team with field experience. Neither the Navy

nor t he Marines possessed un its capable of conducting such operat ions.T h e Ai r F or ce w a s e qu a l ly u n p r e pa r e d . I t h a d n o s p ecia l d oct r i n es for

coun ter insur gency support an d no active-dut y un its with coun ter insur gency opera tionsa s a p r im a r y m is sion . T he t h r ee Air F or ce w in gs w h ich h a d b ee n t r a in e d inpsychological and unconventional warfare for use in Korea were de-activated in 1957becau se "no requirement existed" for such operations. More stress was placed onunconventional warfare capability beginning in 1959, but by 1961 the Air Force stillpossessed only limited ability in that area.10 5 It had done nothing to develop civicaction teams.

In the count erinsur gency progra m which would be developed by t he Kennedyadm inistr at ion for u se in South east Asia, a pr ima ry militar y objective of th e Air Forcewould be esta blishing an d m ainta ining the int erna l security of that ar ea. Civic action,with its capability of contributing toward political and socioeconomic reform, wouldbe an integral part of that military counterinsurgency effort.


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NOTES

C h a p t e r I : T h e G r o w t h o f a C o n c e p t

1 . A dd r e ss a t a W h it e H ou s e R ece pt i on for Memb er s of C on g r es s a n d for t h eDiplomat ic Corps of th e Lat in American Republics, Mar 13, 1961, in Public Papers of

the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Office of the FederalRegister, National Archives and Records Service, 1962), p. 174.2. Leona rd Cottr ell, Th e Great Invasion (New York: Coward McCann, Inc. 1962), p.63; Flavius R. Vegetius, Military Institutions of the Romans (Har risburg, Pa .: Militar yService Publishing Co. 1944), p. 49.3. Fairfax Downey, "Frontier Army," A r m y, Feb 63, p. 49.4. Ltr, William Eu stis, Secreta ry of War, t o Benjam in Ha wkins, Dec 9, 1811, in LettersS ecretary of War, 1809-1816, Vol 3, p. 105; l tr , Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, toThoma s H . Benton, Cha irman Comm ittee on Militar y Affairs, F eb 19, 1936, in U .S.,Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Protect Western Frontier H. Doc.401, 24th Cong, 1st sess, Ma r 3, 1836.5. John C. Calhoun, Report on Roads an d Can als, Ja n 14, 1819, in Richar d K. Cralle,ed , The Works of John C. Calhoun (New York: 1883), Vol 5, pp. 41, 50.6 . At t h e t im e We st P oin t w a s e st a b lis h ed , in 1 80 2, t h e r e w er e n o civilia ntechnological institutions. To fill this void, the academy curriculum placed heavyemphasis on theoretical and practical engineering. In the 1830s, when civilianinstitutions began to emerge, West Point graduates were often selected as professors.As H e n r y A da ms w r ot e in h i s Hi s t or y of t h e Un i t ed S t a t es, American scientificengineerin g "owed its efficiency and alm ost its existence to th e m ilita ry school at WestPoint."7. In 1824 Congress passed the General Survey Act, which specifically authorized theuse of the Corps of Engineers in constr ucting roads an d canals with government aid.U.S., Congres s, House, Comm ittee on Militar y Affairs , Roads Const ru cted by the Arm y

H . D o c . 4 8 , 2 1 s t C o n g , 2 n d s e s s , J a n 1 3 , 1 8 3 1 ; F r a n c i s P . P r u c h a , Br o a d a x a n d Bayonet: Th e Role of the United S tates Army in the Departm ent of the N orthw est, 1815-1860 (Stat e Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953), p p. 131-34.8. James Monroe, Message from the President of the United States, to both Housesof Congress , at t he Commen cement of th e Second Session of th e Eighteen th Congress ,D ec 7 , 1 82 4, in R ep or t of t h e S e cr e t a r y of W a r D ep a r t me n t D ocu me n t s , 1 82 4(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1824), p. 11.9. J ohn Quincy Adams, 1st Annua l Message to Congress, Dec 6, 1925; Bennett C.Clark, Jo h n Qu i n cy Ad a ms (Boston: Litt le, Brown an d Co, 1932), pp. 235-36.10. The A r m y A l m a n a c (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co. 1959, p. 240; William E.Daugherty and Marshall Andrews, A Review of U.S . Historical E xperience with CivilAffairs, 1776-1954 (Beth esda, Md.: John s H opkins Universit y, 1961), pp. 42, 120; John

B. Corr, et , al , Two Centuries of Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, 1974).11. H. S. Graves, Testimony before House Subcommittee on Agriculture, Jan 7, 1919,cited in E ldon W. Downs, "Cont ribut ions of U.S. Arm y Aviation to Uses a nd Opera tionof Aircra ft," (Ph . D. Thesis, U niversity of Wisconsin, 1959). p. 98.12 . R eport of th e Director of the Air S ervice to the S ecretary of War, 1920 (Was

The USAF in Southeast Asia Civic Action

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