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Mind Association

The Truth of ProtagorasAuthor(s): C. M. GillespieSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 19, No. 76 (Oct., 1910), pp. 470-492Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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II.-THE TRUTH OF PROTAGORAS.

BY C. M. GILLESPIE.

THE dictumofProtagoras," Man is themeasureof all things,"was, according to Mr. Schiller, the first statementof thefundamentalprinciple'of Pragmatism, or as he preferstocall it, Humanism.' No one has ever doubted that Pro-tagoras was a humanist in the older sense of theword: hewas a sophist, nd insisted perhaps more emphatically hanany ofhis colleagues that thetrueaim of education s not th'eacquisition of learningbut the trainingof the citizen. ButMr. Schiller sks us tobelieve thatthegreatnessofProtagoraslay in his epistemology,forhe held one of the positions

which modern Pragmatism regards as peculiarlyits own.Accordingto the current nterpretationfthe homomensura,'Protagorastaught hat the udgment f the individual s final.This, Mr. Schillerargues, s wrong. Protagoras taught thatevery judgment claims o be true,but that tsvalidity eperndson otherconditions, ccordingto thecommonway of think-ing. Where he differedwas in making utility forhumanpurposes, nd not correspondencewithan independent rche-type,the testofvalidity. Truth s essentially value. Pro-

tagoras' theory freality'was not, as is commonly upposed,relativist, ut pragmatist.The existenceof so subtle a theoryat a timewhen epis-

temological nvestigationwas in its infancyexcites doubtasto thecorrectness fthe interpretation. This doubtis inten-sifiedby an examination oftheonlyevidence we have of any-importance, he writings of Plato. The The6ctetuss ofcourseour chiefwitness,but theProtagoras nd the Cratylusafford aluable corroborative vidence.

But is Plato a trustworthy itness His good faith s notchallengedby Mr. Schiller. Mr. Schiller even goes fartherthan manycritics in allowing thattheviews enunciated by-theProtagorasof the Dialogues may be attributedto the'historical rotagoras.2 Here I believe Mr. Schiller to be in

IStudies in Humanism, pp. 32 if.; Plato or Protagoras ? passim.21PlatoorProtagoras pp. 9 if. I donot acceptMr. Schiller's ccount

qof hecircumstances hich ed Plato toepitomise hework. Prof.Burnet



THE TRUTH OF PROTAGORAS. 471

theright. I agreewithhim in regarding he defenceofPro-tagoras in Theaetetus,66 ff., s containingthekey to the in-terpretation f the homomensura: it is not purely maginarynor a statement of the views of a later follower of thesophist,but an exposition of the doctrineof Protagoras asPlato understood t. That Plato had read the work seemsproved by the statementofTheaetetus that it was familiarto him (152A). The same principleof interpretationmayfairly e extended to the professionof his faithas a publicteacherput into the mouth of Protagoras in the dialogue ofthatname: thewriter's ttitude n thatpartof the dialogueis sympathetic ather han critical: and the carefully rawnportraits f various sophists would lose point if Protagoraswere not made to speak in character. But Mr. Schillerquestions Plato's insight. The account given by Plato is atravestyof Protagoras' real meaning, which Plato did notunderstand,but which may be reconstructed ut of the datafurnished by Plato himself. Such a charge is obviouslydifficulto establish n the absence of independentevidence;the centralcountmustbe thatPlato's version exhibits nner

inconsistencies so great that it cannot be accepted as anadequate rendering f the original.

Mr. Schiller, togetherwith most critics,treats the homomnensurras an epistemologicalprincipleof universal validity,and therecan be littledoubtthat Protagoras meant it to beso, especially if the words in which it was stated were theopeningwords of his " Truth". But it is all-important ofind out how he approached the question. Plato's owntheory fknowledgewas profoundlynfluencedbyhismathe-

matical studies. Was Protagoras similarly ed to formulatehis principle throughthe examination of a certain kind ofknowledge, and, if so, what kind? The only way we candetermine his point is to consider heillustrationsftheprin-ciple given by Plato. We cannot be quite sure that Prota-goras had these applicationsin mind in the formulationofhis dictum: but if the Defence ofProtagoras is substantiallyhistoricalwe are entitled omake use ofthem, nd ifwe canshow that they really throw light on the meaning of the

dictum,there s a strongpresumption hat factsof the kindbrought forward n the illustrations weighed largely withProtagoras himself.

Now the examples of the principle,whichPlato treatsas

(MIND, N.S., xviii., 422) denies that the Defence can bedinsubstance agenuine argument of Protagoras', mainly for reasons of date. His criti-cism seems to me valid against Mr. Schiller's account, but not to invali-date the position taken in this paper.



472 C. M. GILLESPIE:

assertingthat &ri-tv is equivalent to 8oKicei 'vat,fall into twowell-marked classes.

The first comprises the secondaryqualities of matteras perceived by the senses, cold, heat,sweet, itter152B, 166E, 171E); thesecondra'7OXvTKa'(172 A), especially ustice, moral and social principles andvirtues. In the absence of othertestimonywe must acceptthese as prominent pplicationsgivenbyProtagoras himselfto his own principle.

This being granted,we must nextinquirewhat appear tobe the relations of theseapplicationsto each other. In 'theDefence there is no doubt whatsoever: the example of thephysician who substitutes a good sensation fora bad in hispatient's experienceis an illustrative nalogy leading up tothe conceptionof the sophistorpublic teacherwho inducesthe community o accept good opinionson Justice nplace ofbad. At an earlier tageof hedialogue, ndeed, hesensation--application appears by itself. In 152 A the assertion ofTheetetus that sensation is knowledgeis said by Socratesto be equivalentto thehomomensura,nd the example ofthe.wind that feelshot and cold to differenteople is adduced iii

illustration. But in what follows Plato is careful o showthat he is not directlycriticisingProtagoras, but-doctrineswhichhe regardsas havingan affinity iththedictum. Theassertion of Thevetetus s correlatedwith (1) the dictumnfProtagoras, 2) Heraclitism (152 C), bywhich Plato simplymeans the assumptions and methods of physical sciencesuch as all philosophers except Parmenides (159 E) haveadopted; 3) a refinedheory f ense-perception156A) attrib-uted o certain co/t6-rTEpot,hediscussion fwhich evelops

systemofpsychologywithouta soul. It is quiteclear that n(2) and (3) Plato has inviewothers hanProtagoras. The pre-liminary ialectical riticisms nProtagoras n161A if. ontainno referenceeither to the Heraclitism or to the detailed*theoryfsense-perception;the tone of theDefence,166Si.,,shows that the writer does not endorse these criticisms,and suggests that Plato is here condemningthe polemicalmethods of other critics of the homomensura. It appears,then, that the application of the homomensura n 152 is'

really a peg on which to hang an accountof contemporarytheories starting rom he same empiricalpointofview, andthat the real importanceof the sensation-application s to beobtainedfrom he Defence,whereit is subsidiary.

This leaves the onlyseriousapplicationof the principle intheDefence an ethical and social one. Have we anyevidenceto support or oppose the interpretation uggested by theDefence that this was the application which Protagoras




himselfchiefly ad in view? Gomperz denies this on twogrounds Griechische enker, ., 362): (1) the elmphaticuni-versality of statement shows that it was meant as anepistemological principle; (2) there is no evidence thatProtagoras applied it to ethics, though his followersmayhave done so. The second point falls altogether if theDefence is substantiallythe view of Protagoras himself.With regard to the first, he dictum may have been anepistemologicalprincipleofgeneral import, nd at the sametimehave been originallymotivedbyethical interests.

Now there s conclusiveevidence thatthemain interest f

Protagoraswas ethical. In Protagoras,19 D, E, he is depictedas teachingonly the artsof the citizen oIKoVo0,uKr and vroXL-T7tK?7),nd as lookingwithdisfavour n the mathematics, s-tronomy nd music taughtby other sophists. The dialogueas a whole bears out this statement: thesubject is an ethicalone, " Can virtuebe taught " The positivecontribution fProtagoras to the discussion is a strikingdiscourseon theoriginofsociety nd the influence fsocietvonthe ndividual.The Defence ofProtagoras in Theatetus, 66 ff.,begins and

ends withan attack on captious criticism,nwhichwe mustsuppose thatPlato is reallyexpressinghis own views. Thecentral section, in which Protagoras is supposed to supplythe detailedmeaningofhis dictum WJ3e't aae'aTepov ,ataOe

E"ryco,166 E), is quite shorta,nd onsists oftwo partsonly.The first llustrates he principlebythe ease ofthe physicianwho restoreshis patient to normalhealth,wherebythewinewhichbefore astedbitter omes totaste sweet. The secondapplies it to politics: that is rightwhich seems right to the

community; the orator is the physicianwho brings the.community o a better state of health. Can there be anydoubt thatthe former pplicationis an analogy to illustratethe latter? The clearestproof hat it is an analogy is to befound in the fact that the functionof the physician heredescribed is an accidental one: his essential aim is to re-store the patientto health,not to change his perceptionofthewine. The trivialcase of the physician and his patientis treated ust so far as it seems parallel to the important

case of the publicist and the state. Better health in thestate is betteropinionsas to right and wrong,and so betterhealth in the patient is regardedas betterfeelings. TheHeraclitismand elaboratetheoriesofsense-perception ftheearlierpassages are not alluded to. The Defence of Pro-tagoras is substantially a vindication of his position as amoral teacher, nd is in striking greementwith the profes-sion of faith assigned to him in the Protagoras. We have

32




the same personalnote; the teacherexpoundingthe aims ofhis

teaching;the same defence of the sophist's art on the

same grounds; the sophist makes mren etter n the sense ofbeing betterable to transact public and private business;the same disclaimingof special knowledge.

Thus the inner evidence of the passage itself, supportedby the resemblanceto theProtagoras,eads us to seek for hereal meaning of the dictum in the words which must beregarded as the climax of the Defence, but to which Mr.Schiller seems to attach little importance (see Plato orProtagoras pp. 15, 16), viz.: o y' v EKaO-Tfl 'ioXEL 8&ica Kab

caXe ISOKy, Tavra PatELzatavTy,eos az' avwia VOC4Ty167Q.'Now there is no doubt whatever about the meaning of

these words, taken in themselves. hKcata are the legalprinciples, KaXa the wider social and ethical principlescurrent n the community see the Dicaiexeis). The vo'os' ofthe communitydeterminesfor t the standard of right andwrong; and when it is stated that the adviser cannot domore than substitute a good system of right and wrongfora bad one, the primaryreason for this is that the dis-

tinctionofrightand wrongis regardedas dependenton thewill of the community.2 The individual as such is not themeasure of right nd wrong: the communitys. Right andwrong mplyan authority therthan that of the individual.A similar insistenceon the role of the community s foundin theProtagoras. The mythdescribing he originofsocietyrepresentsJusticeas a socialfact (322 D), and society s latertreatedas the greatmoral teacher 325 C ff.).

Thus in morals the homomensuraneans in the firstplace

that the community s the authority, he judge of what isrightand wrong. But when Protagoras insists that man isthe measurehe means manandnot notheruthority ommonlyaccepted. What can this authoritybe? Something supra-human. In the then state of thoughtthis can onlymeanthegods. The dictummust be primarily claim forfree-

1SurelyPlato intends hemainemphasis o fallon thissentence, heonlyone in the detailed defencewhichputswith fullexplicitness hatidentificationf appearance nd realitywhichhe treatsas the essence

of hehomomensura. To me t readsunderlined. Mr. Schiller akesnomorenotice hanthis: " the sage or sophist erforms similar ervicefor ities (Plato orProtagoras ? p. 16); " cities ften o notknow heirown advantage (ibid.,p. 24). His interpretationf the Defence eemsto throw heemphasis n thewrongwords hroughout.

21 havestated his n modern erms. A Greek wouldalways saythejudgment of the communitywhere we say will: you act on your viewof what eems good to you. ThQ ambiguityfthe verbaoKei-appearsand appears good-makes the transition rom he perception f thefeveredpatientto the will of the communityeryeasy.




dom of thought n ethical matters, a claim that has beenconceded in physical matters. You must not, he says ineffect,regard the social reformeras impious because heseeks to probe and perhapstoremove ong-established sageswhich are regarded s having a divinesanction. All humanlaws and customs are made by man, not for man: actutalmorality s v6o1Uqnd not 0bt%et. To this extent, at least,man " makeshis own reality .

But this is not all. If we look at the subject empirically,historical'ly,we shall see that they have been made by manin the courseofhis pursuit of,happiness. This is the teach-ing ofthemyth n theProtagoras. If theaccounttheregivenof the originof society s divestedof itsmythicaltrappings,it appears that a distinction s drawn between the originaland the acquired capacities ofmen. Man is born with thecapacities of the other animals, and in addition with theknowledge of the arts, based on the use of fire. But thenroXtTt/C,cq e'xums a later development321 D), promptedbythemiseryofthenaturalstate ofwar. The law is a meansadopted by men who have formedthemselves into com-

munities, a means to the end of happiness. This is thefamiliar onvention-theoryf ociety. Now, saysProtagoras,1 I cannot nderstandhepersistence fthecritics n holding hat he

mythnProtagoras, 20 ff., ontainshepositionhatJustices q/arEt andnot merely Io,u. See, e.g.,Susemihl,Die genetischentwickelung erPlatonischen )ilosophie, i., 46; Horn, Platonstudien,i., 41; Wundt,Geschichteergriechischenthik, i., 266. Theirreasons seem to betwo: (1) reverence nd justiceare givento menby Zeus, whereas heotherhumanfaculties re allotted by Prometheus; 2) Zeus instructsHermesto distributehem mong ll men, notamong sections ike the

special arts. Hence it is said that the myth epresents everence ndjusticeas universal nstinctsSusemihl, .c.). NowPrometheus implyis Nature, nthesense n whichNature s contrastedwithConvention.The naturalman acks he socialvirtues. But he tries o formocieties;i.e., society s man-made, ot Nature-made. And it is made in thecourseoftheefforto avoidunhappiness322B). Thereasonwhymanalone tries oformociety s thathehas special ntelligence,ymbolisedinthe myth y hisparticipationntheDivine nature 322 A). Zeus is ameredeusexmachina; hisappearance n thestorys duetotherequire-ments fthemyth-form,hich epresentsll faculties s gifts o man.Justice nd reverence annot be introduced s givenby Prometheus,

who tands orNature; Zelts ssimply eason. This smadeclearbythewords fZeushimself; eusdoesnotpose as anall-powerfulenefactoroman; he speaks as therationalist nquirerwho sees that these virtuesare indispensable othe existence f the state. The myth mphasises,not theirdivine origin,but theiressentially ocial character.....Thenagainthedistributiono all men 322 D) hasbeenmisinterpreted.Yourcommentatorither ries o read Platonicprinciplesnto hespeechofProtagorasSusemihl, .U.) or,because t is put into the mouth f anopponent f thePlatonicSocrates, s on the ook-out or nconsistencies.Thus, whenProtagoras n 323 D statesthat socialvirtue s notoriginal




you must not regard the moral teacher who propoundsnew ideas as one who is

tryingoupset theestablishedorder.Rightlyregarded,he is onlydoingwhatyou have beendoing

all along, endeavouringto the best of his ability to securehuman happiness. And on the otherhand the teachermustnot lay claim to superior wisdom: his attitude can only bethis: " if you adoptmysuggestions, nd make them aw, asyou have everyrightto do, you will find hat they will leadto your greaterhappiness. But I do not set up as an in-fallibleauthority; youmust udge ultimatelywhat happinessis and whethermyschemes will promoteit. But you mustjudge rationally: not under the influenceof custom andtradition,but in accordance with the carefully hought-outresults of your own experience." Not only actual moralcodes are v6o,uq);heultimate principlesof morals are vou,foundedon men's udgmentsofwhat is fortheiradvantage.

Thus the dictumprovidesan epistemological asis forthecontemporary heory hat society s conventional. It estab-lishes a human foundationformoral and politicalobligation.Plato took t in this sense; in Thecetetus,72 A, B, he points

outthatmanyhold thatJustice sbyconvention ut the Goodby nature, whereas Protagoras teaches that both are byconvention of.Republic, i., 505 A). This view accords wellwith the general standpointfromwhich Protagoras musthave regarded his problems. The theory that the stateoriginated in a social compactand the closely allied accountin themythoftheProtagoras reat society as progressive, n

but acquiredbythe ndividual, e is saidby Horn I.c.) tobe contradict-ingtheearlier tatement hatsocialvirtue s given by the gods to allmen. There is no contradiction.We neednotresort othe device ofsaying hatZeus gavethecapacity orvirtue o all men,but that rainingis also necessary or ts development. It is neverstatedthatHermesgave it to all menwithoutxception; theactualwords fZeus, " andlay down lawthathewhocannot artake freverence nd ustice hallbe slain as a plaguetothe state (322D), contemplatehe existenceofindividuals evoid fthesevirtues. Protagoras s not arguing hatthesocialvirtues reuniversalnstincts he is looking t thewholequestionfromhe sideofthestate,notfromheside ofthe ndividual, nd main-tainsthat hestatecannot tandunless hesocial virtues re widespreadand thereforeapableof acquisition y the normalman. There is no

questionof instincts;t-he irtues retreated hroughouts accomplish-ments. Thus the wholeZeus episode is simply he statement f theposition hat ustice ndobedience resocial virtues. In 323C f. Prota-gorasproceeds oshow hat nactualsocieties hecommunitytself s thehigherpowerthat instilsthesevirtues ntothe individualmind; Zeusreally s thecollectivexperience f therace,practical eason ngaged nsecuringthe generalhappiness. Remove the mythical ress, and theaccount s closely kin toJ. S. Mill'sutilitarian escriptionftheoriginofmorality. Notethatthedoctrinehatpunishments essentially re-ventive324A) ispureutilitarianism.




direct opposition o the poeticalconceptionof a Golden Age.They are substantiallyan application to human society ofthe principles long accepted in the interpretation' f thephysicalhistory f the world-from Anaximander to Anax-agoras-and reflectedn the historicalmethodsof Thucydides.Protagoras s stronglymbued withthe spiritof the physicalscience of the day. The methods of empirical science arepatent alike in the developmentof the homo,mensura nd inthe theory f the origin of society assigned to him in theProtatgoras.That his general starting-pointwas that ofempirical science is implied by the fact that Plato brackets

his dictum with Heraclitism in the Thecetetus. There areindicationsthathe was much influenced y Atomism. Thesubjectivist reatment f sensationhas a closer affinity iththis than with any other of the physical systems. Hissceptical attitude to religion accords with the position ofDemocritus, and is in marked opposition to the effortsofDiogenes of Apollonia and others to reconcile science andreligion:

I do not thinkthat we can regardthedictum as primarily

directed gainstParmenides from he standpointof empiricalscience. The onlydirect evidenceforthis interpretation sa citation from Porphyry n Eusebius (Diels, FVS. 537).Porphyry states that he has come across a work by Pro-tagoras on Being, whichcontainsdetailed arguments gainsttheEleatic position. Was thisworkthe same as the TruthEven ifwe grantthat this workon Being was genuine,weneed not suppose that the main object of Protagoraswasthe refutationof Eleaticism. Plato and Aristotledo not

bring the dictum nto close connexionwith theParmenideanprinciple. The Thecetetus reats it as a corollaryfromtheassumptionsofphysical cience,notas a justification f theseassumptions, and Aristotle follows suit in the Metaphysics(1009'b, 1 if.). As we have seen, the chief application n theThecetetuss to ethics, which we have no reason to believespecially nterested he Eleatics. Moreover, hewordingofthe dictum does not suggest that it was directed againstParmenides; the 'V9pawovos pointless,forParmenides and

Zeno might replythat in their systemhuman reason is themeasure of reality. Protagoraswould have to argue on thelines of the Gorgian paradoxes, that there is no humanfaculty apable ofapprehending he Eleatic Being. We haveno evidenceof his having argued on these lines. Again the-plural rwZv'vmzvuggeststhat Protagoras is assuming,notproving, he plurality fbeing,i.e. the empiricalstandpoint.Moreover,the examples tending oprovethatyoucannotsay




what thewind and the wine are in themselveshave no forceagainst Parmenides, who denies the realityof the wind andthe wine; they follow the same line of thought as thatwhich led Democritus tohis physical doctrineof the second-ary qualities of matter. I ca.nnot, herefore, dmit that thedictum was primarilydirected gainst the Eleatics, thoughProtagoras may have argued against them incidentally r inanother connexion.

Further, here s evidencethat Protagoras was specially n-terestedn theological uestions. The list ofworks ttributedtohim by Diogenes Laertius (ix., 55, Diels,FVS. 526) contains

the names of a treatise rep' Oe'v a.nd another ep' 'rZwv EvAWov. The famous passage expressing cepticism bout thegods is quoted by Eusebius (Diels, FVS. 537) as fromthebeginningof the formerwork. There is reason to believethat this treatisewas the second part of the work called oiKaTra/3daXXovpeT,f which the first part was i 'A'Xr9eta.Plato cites the homomensura s from the beginning of theTruth Theoot.,61 C), Sextus Empiricus (adv. math., vii., 60,Diels, FVS. 536) as from he beginning f theKaTra/3iXXovmre9.

Now Euripides' Bacchce, 99-203, contaiins reference o theProtagorean scepticism about the gods, in which occurs thephrase ov'3Ers v'5a /caTa/8aXeZ Xoryoq, hich suggests thatthescepticism was expressed in the KaTaI3XXov-re9..And whythe plural ? Were there three parts of the KaTaRA3Xov7re9,the Truth perhaps withthe aub-title On Being "), Concern-ing the Gods, a.nd Concerning ades? The title of thelast-namedwork s not well attested:1but t would be quite inaccordance with the doctrinesof Protagoras to deny that

there is any retributionor rewardformen in a.n after-life.Was the whole book the tke5'yaqoyos of Anecd.,Par. (Diels,FVS. 537) ?

Prof. Burnet (MIND, N.S., xviii., 423) conjectures thatProtagoras " had merely ntended oattack themathematicaland astronQmical cience of his day" and especiallythe in-finite divisibility of space. The dictum would thus beprimarilyconnected with the sensationist critique of thegeometersalluded to in Aristotle,Metaph., 97 b, 32. This

would explaiin the use of the word " measure ". But in theabsence of direct testimony that the dictum was ever sounderstood n antiquity,Prof.Bur4et's reasons seem insuf-ficient. As far as I can understand the meaning of hisremarks,he classes Protagoras a.ndthe Atomiststogether s

1 It appears only n the list of, iogenes,which ontains ome titlesapparently erived rommisunderstandingsfpassagesn Plato; andDiels,l.c., suggests confusion ith work ttributedo Democritus.




opponents of the new mathematical science of Western

Greece, instancingthe Atomist

viewof the earth as disc-

shaped,as showingthatAtomism standsnearerto immediateexperience than the Pythagorea.n view of the earth asspherical. What has the latter to do with the doctrine ofinfinite divisibility? Does not Atomism itself notoriouslytranscendthe sensationpointofview ? So far as antiquityis concernedthe dictum is interpreted s fatal alike to theatoms of Leucippus and the points of the Pythagoreans.Again, I cannot see how the account of the researches ofTheaetetusnto the theory fsquare roots n the introductorypartofthe Theetetus ouldconvey o a reader ofthedialoguethe originala-pplication f the homomensura, iz.: its attackon incommensurables,fwhichthere s no direct uggestionnthewhole courseofthedialogue. This account is introducedprimafacie s an example of logical method,and there s noobvious reason for connecting it more closely with thediscussionof one definition f knowledge than with that ofanother.

It seemsto me that several difficultiesn connexionwiththe homomensura re easily solved bythis interpretation ,fit as being primarily thical.

First, the connexionof truthand " value ". Mr. Schillerregards the subsumptionof truth ndertheconceptofutilityas the central doctrineof Protagoras, and holds that Platois mistaken n making its essence to be subjectivism. I sub-mit that there s no evidence nthe Defence or elsewhereforMr. Schiller's view; that the onlyreasonable interpretation

is that Protagoras taught thatman alone determineswhat isgood and useful. Mr. Schiller has to admit that inPlato'saccount Protagoras does not say that the better s thetruer:the sophistwho induces in his public a " better" opinion inplace ofa " worse" does not substitute " truer" for " lesstrue": in fact Protagoras is made to assert degreesofvalueand deny degrees oftruth. But Mr. Schiller treats this asmerelya technicaldivergencefrom the pragmatistprinciple(Plato orProtagoras p. 17). I hold, on the contrary,that

Protagoras subsumes the rightjust) under the usefulgood),and that the association of trdthwithutilitys secondary andaccidental. He draws a distinctionbetween the Just, awand custom,andtheGood,humanwelfare. This distinctionis a commonplaceof Greek ethicaldiscussionfrom he outset.Early ethical thoughtassumes thatmen must be just, obeythe commonmoral code oftheirstate, and inquires.what isthe bestkind of, ifesubject to thiscondition. The thinkers



480 a. M. GILLESPIE:

ofthe Enlightenment irst aised the question whetherthiscondition was binding, by analysing the grounds of moraland political obligation. We know from Plato that manyfound the claims of the state (justice) and those of theindividual (happiness) to be irreconcilable. Hence thedoctrinethat might s right nd the glorification f tyranny.But these are not the views of Protagoras. His politicalideal is the freedemocratic tate. His ideal of private ife sthat of the citizen ofsuch a state. He accepts the rightofthe community ocoerce the individual n its own intere?ts.1For the law is a necessarymeans to the good of thewhole.

So faras the Just s concerned, man is themeasure,forthecommunity s the authority. The object of the teacher s toshow that if the communitywill accept new-not truer-conceptionsof ustice, t will tend to their welfare,be betterforthem. But here again the homomensurraomes in, for itis implied 1) that the teacher forms some judgmentof whatis to the public advantage, 2) that the public forms similarjudgment. Thus fromfirst o last, what is right, .e. useful,and what is good, s determined y some human judgment.

If it be objected that the association of truthwithutilityis asserted n the Thecetetuisniversally, and not merely nconnexion with morals, reply: (1) it is not universally as-serted,but only in connexion with the teacher (166 D) andthephysician 167 B); (2) the application to the physicianis not independent,but an analogy to illustrate he applica-tion to the teacher; (3) the Protagoras rovesthatProtagorasopenly professed o teach nothing but theprinciplesofpub-lic and private conduct; the contents of the Defence show

that the immediate subject of discussion is the principlesprofessedby Protagoras as a teacher. If, therefore,we canfinda simple explanation of the association of truth withutility, by assuming that ethical truth is meant, an ex-planation in accordance alike with known tendencies ofethical thought n the fifth entury and with Plato's inter-pretationofthe dictum as asserting the identity fseemingand being, we are justified n accepting t.

Another difficultys easily explained on these lines. Did

Protagoras mean man as such or each individual man?Both. In his genergstatement f the dictum he didnotdis-tinguish,because the distinctionwas irrelevantto his pur-pose. If he was arguingforthe right f men to solve theirsocial problems in their own way and in view of their ownhappiness,it was not to the point to draw a distinctionbe-tweenmen in general and individual men. Hermogenes in

I Protagoras, 22D.




the Cratyluts384 C, D) in statingthe case forthe theory hat-namesare vvVOtJcpllows both private and public names:if names are arbitrary,not fixedfor man by Nature, every-manhas a right to give any name he pleases to any thing;fromthis pointof view it is not a matterofprinciple,thoughconvenientforpurposes of communication,that individualsshould use the same names for he same things. In the sameway a naturalisticutilitarianismregards society nd theob-servance of public rules by individuals as means to thehappiness of ndividuals.

AnotherfeatureoftheProtagoreandoctrine s mosteasily

accounted foron the principle that the dictum is primarilyconnected withthe vo61upheoryof society. The Platonictreatment mplies that on Protagorean principlesnot only sthe judgmenttrue forthemaker,but t doesnot laim obetrueexcept orthemaker. The standpoint s empirical nd natural-istic. Man (as in the mythof the Protagoras) s a part ofNature and differs rom he otheranimals mainly n respectof his capacityfor ocial life. What is good and useful forone creature s not necessarily good and useful foranother

-(Protagoras, 34 A,B). Social judgments about rightandwrong are the ways by which man adapts himselfto.theattainmentof his own good. If we considerthe varietyofcustoms and of moral judgments, we shall see that inpassing judgmentsofright and wrong, useful and hurtful,good and bad, men do not really mean to assert their ob-jective validity beyond the limits of their own societyandtheir own conditions of life. Right and wrong, good andbad are always T&V&. If I assertthis is right, mustqualify

vwith for n Athenian,fora Spartan ". And the judgmentis always byan Athenianor a Spartan. Humanity is com-posed ofa number of groups,each of which passes judg-ments claiming validityonlyfor tself, nd havingno higher.authority. Hence their beliefs re true so long as they coni-tinue to hold them. Within the group theremay be in-dividualvariationsof opinion,but society s banded together-tosuppress these. Teachers and reformers here are, buttheir functions confined o changing publicbeliefs.

Again, this interpretation ivespoint tothe retort, Howcan you on your own principles lay claim to wisdom?"For Protagoras was a professedteacherof the principles fpractical conduct. If in his treatiseon the Truth he laidspecial emphasis on the point that all moral judgmentsareequally true, the question at once arose, what were hisclaims to be a teacher? He had an easy answer. In a freecommunity of educated men he laid no claim to superior




wisdom: he only asked them to listen to one who hadthoughton these matters more than most, and to considerfor themselveswhat he had to say. He claimed the atten-tion due to the Op6mlbog,ot the obedience exacted by the0ro0k or expert.' His colleague the physician is not thejudge whether he wine tastes well or ill to his patient; forthis he must rely on the statementof the patient himself;but he is able to make it taste well. So the sophistclaimsthat ifhis hearerswill only listen to him, he can make thenmcome round to his way of thinking. Yes, replies Plato intheRepublic, ut that is just because the sophist reallytakes,

his principlesfromhis public.I should maintain that the Humanism of Protagorashas.

a naturalisticrather than a pragmatist tinge. Moral truthis resolved into beliefs, treated objectively as means ofadaptationto circumstances, ike the protective urand woolof other animals. The superiorityof the teacher is ulti-matelyhis power to change beliefs; as man is assumed tobe always animated by a desire forhis own advantage,thispower shows itself in his ability to convincehis audience

that it will be to their advantage to adopt new measures,new ideas of right and wrong. Progress implies a strugglebetween ideas.

I may be asked: if the examples from sense-perceptionwere in essence illustrations supporting a theory of thermoraludgment,whydidProtagoras choose them? Severalreasons may be given. Whether or no the distinction7e-tween the primary and secondary qualities of matter had

been explicitly drawn by the time Protagoras wrote, thescientific nvestigations nto the conditions of sense-percep-tionmust have called attentionto the variability f certainkindsofsense experience. As the examinationofknowledgeas knowledge began withthe investigation fperception ndtheperceptual udgment,one of the firstdiscrepanciesto benoticed would be that between the judgment of sensation" it feelscold, tastes sweet" and the judgment of perception" it (the wind) is cold, it (the wine) is sweet ". The latterclaims an

objectivevaliditywhichthe formerdoes not. To

a writer nxious to get simple illustrationsfor the principlethat the Just and the Fair are valid onlyforthe communitywhich adopts them and not for other communities,theparallel of the judgmentsof sensationand perception s apt.As a matter of fact,Plato's real ground for rejectingPro-

' Compare the argument hat every man's judgmenthas value inpolitics (Protdtgoras, 23 A, B).




tagoreanism n the Thecetetuss that he regards t as reducingall judgmentsto the level of these judgments of sensation.There is another reason forthe choice: cold, warm,bitter,.sweet are intrinsically ood orbad. Cold and bitter reper eunpleasant,so that the change from itter o sweet sensations.is a change from bad to good experience,of which theindividual s the ole judge. This is the point: the ndividualis sole judge both of the sweetness and of the pleasantness.We must assume that the individual,whetherman or com-munity,desires the good, i.e. what seemsto him good: andthere s no good forman exceptthe seeminggood. If,there--fore,the sophist convinces the public that its customs arebad, we must suppose that it will tryto change them.

The real history f thehomomensutratake to be this. Itwas enunciated by Protagoras not as ain epistemologicalprinciple n the abstractbut as embodyingthe fundamentalassumptions of the new school of ethical thought. Thewords "man" and " all things had a special polemicalreference. That human reason is the ultimate udge oftruthis a principleacted on by the scientific nquirerswho have

been workingout a scheme ofmaterialreality, nd theclaimhas not been seriouslydisputedin respect of iNature. Butpopularthoughthas hithertorefusedto recognisethe claimin regardto human institutions. Vaguely and unreflectively-it has looked on laws and customs as of divine or semi-divineorigin, nd resisted ttemptsat scientificnalysis andrationalreform n this ground. Wrongly. For it mustberecognisedthat in every sphere man is the Altiinate udge.The dictumdeclares the right ffree nquirv nto all problems,

of conduct.Taken in itself he dictummeans man in general. But inthe workingout of his principleProtagoras, underthe in-fluenceof the empirical,historicalmethodsderivedfrom he,

VcTtKwO,gave to itan interpretationhich mplied hateachman (and state) is his own judge. This interpretations partand parcel of the vo,ucotheoryof society. The laws andcustoms of a societydeterminefor hat societywhat is just,and fair. But the law contains the experienced udgment

of a society workingout its own salvation on its own lines.The goodof one society s not necessarily hegood of another.The freecommunity s in the last resortresponsiblefor tsideas of what is best for it. Hence the community s theultimate judge both of the end-its own good-and of themeans-moral rules.

Now this doctrine mplieda restriction f the validity ofthe moral judgment. The moral judgment does not claim.




to be valid beyond the sphere of the social group whichforms t; popular thought is merelymistaken n supposingthat it does. In the next generation,when epistemologicalquestions came to be discussed more on their own merits,and niotmerely s subsidiary to otherproblems, he workofProtagoras was found to contain the principle that everyjudgment is relative. Protagoras himself had had themoral judgrnent hieflyn mind, but had also illustratedhisprinciple rom he regionof sense-perception.So the principlethat to be is to seem to be became associated with his name.Plato's objection o the principle eally s this, hat Protagoras

did not understand the nature of a judgment. When he-treatshomomensura s equivalent to the identificationofknowledgewithsensation, nd couples twithHeraclitism,heis in effect ayingthat if you approach the subject ofknow-ledge fromwhat is virtually he standpointof physiologicalpsychologyand regard the arousingof a passing sensationbya physical stimulus as the typicalfact of knowledge,youcannot butmisunderstand he whole question. This is whatProtagoras has done: instead of examining the judgment

fromthe inside,he has merely ransferredo it the charactersof sensation: hence his failure to see that the judgmentclaims a universalvalidity. And so Plato dismissesProta-goras and the Heracliteans, i.e. the physical inquirers, ndpasses on to the consideration f the judgment Theaet.,84 Bff.). That Protagoras had not specially examined the judg-ment and probably nistook ts nature seems in accordancewith what is known of thehistory f psychology nd logic:(1) theearly nquirers eem to have confined heirpsychological

investigations o the physical conditionsof ensation; (2) theexamination of the judgment itselffollowedthe growthofdialectic, chiefly n the Socratic schools,and the numerous7roptat to which it gave rise show that the analysis of thejudgment presentedgreat difficulties:ndeed, t would seemthat only the Academy succeeded in formulating ny satis-factory ccountof t.

Let us now turn to the question whetherthe Thecitetus

contains any refutationof Protagoras, and whetherthereare any important iscrepanciesbetweenthe Defence and therejoinder of Socrates. I do not attachthe same importanceas Mr. Schiller does to the rejoinder itself,because, as Ihave said, Plato's chief objections are to be found in theform of the dialogue as a whole. But a word of protestmustbe entered gainstMr.-Schiller'smethods. An essentialpart ofhis case is this: the rejoinder shows that Plato has




misunderstoodhis opponent; he has treated the dictum as

meaning the relativityof truthto the individual,whereasit reallymeant that utilityvalidates the claim ofthe judg-mentto be true. What is theevidence Mr. Schiller's inter-pretation is based entirely upon the short statement inthe Defence, statementmadebyPlato himself. There is nota word of independentevidence for it. The rejoinderofSocrates is directed entirely gainst the relativism of thedictum. But Mr. Schiller does not use the rejoinder toconfirmhis interpretation;he simply argues that the re-joinder is all wrong and irrelevant,because it does notagree with his interpretation,nd then uses this supposedirrelevance o confirm is interpretation. But Mr. Schilleris not entitled o use a supposed discrepancy s independentconfirmatoryvidence,because there is no real discrepancyunless his interpretationf the Defence is correct. He mustresthis case entirely n theDefence.'

Now (1) he has no right to use the Defence as evidenceentirely ndependentof the rejoinder,because even thoughwe assume that it substantially reproduces the views of

Protagoras,these are obviously tatedin Plato's own words.Hence such criticisms s thoseon page 23 ofhisPlatoorPro-tagoras? that Socrates llegitimatelyubstitutes '7yteLtando-vfJe'povlraorXpqora are merely aptious. Mr. Schiller isdrivenby the exigenciesofpolemicto treatthe Defence as ifit containedthe ipsissimaverba fProtagoras. The rejoindermust be used to confirm he reading of the Defence, andsmall variationsof anguage cannotbe pressed.

(2) Mr. Schiller's reading of the Defence emphasises the

elementofutility nd makes the relativism uite secondary;hence the accusation of irrelevancyn the rejoinder. Butanother,and, I believe, a more correctreading makes therelativismprimary. If Plato in his defence of Protagorastreatedthe elementofutility s beingsecondary nd ignoredit in his reply,we have no right, n the absence of inde-pendentevidence,to regard t as primary.

(3) Mr. Schilleradmits ibid., p. 17) that there s a differ-ence between the views of Protagoras expounded in the

Defenceand modernPragmatism,but treats it as merely atechnicaldifference.Pragmatismteaches thateverybelief sas such true to thebeliever: this "formal claim" to truth sdistinguished rom he validityof the belief; validity s what

1Mr. Schiller eally inds dualpersonalityn Plato: thewriter ftheDefence s intelligentnough ounderstandrotagoras,hewriter ftherejoinder fSocrates s unableto.doso. See his remarkst the footofpage23 ofhis Plato orProtagoras




ordinary eople call truth; for'the pragmatist a valid beliefis simplya beliefthat ought to be held: and the only ustifi-cation for holding it is that it has value, in other words is-useful. Hence " value " is a bridgeconnecting" truth," .e.belief, and "validity," i.e. truth n the common,useof theword. Now Protagoras draws a distinction etween a beliefand itsvalue: so do we all: this is no discovery fthe prag-matist. Does the Protagoras of the Defence state that itsvalue givesto it another sort of truth, or validity? Not atall: he seems to distinguish ruth nd utility as conceptionswith no point of mutual contact. He recognisesno suchdistinction s thatbetween the claim and the validity Qf abelief. The patient believes and ought to believe that hehas feelingsof bitterand unpleasant, they are guaranteedby his immediate xperience. The other xperience fsweet-ness is betterbut not in any sense truer: I am the sole udgeofboth. So in the exampleofthe stateand its moral beliefs.What is believedright ndwhatoughttobe believed ight reidentical. The defacto law is the law. Claim and validityare identified. If it is desirable to change our beliefs, t is

because we form nother belief-of which again we are thesole judges-concerning utility. If Mr. Schiller can regardthis as merely technical deviation fromPragmatism, t isbecause Pragmatism is content to claim Relativism as abrother. Mr. Schiller's own account of the formation fthetemple of truth I.c., p. 17) is thepurest relativism. I forma belief claim): I see itsvalue: therefore holdthatitoughtto be believed (validity): I persuade others of its superioradvantages: they adopt it and hold that it ought to be be-

lieved (objectivevalidity): hence " the validityofa claim totruth is neither ogicallynor etymologically ther than itsstrength . Put in therelationto the ndividual ntvt)whichthe ancients always supposed Protagoras to insist upon asqualifyingboth "claim" and "'validity," nd theRelativismis absolute.

(4) There is much resemblance between Relativism andPragmatismforthevery good reasonthatthe latter s a de-velopmentof the former,necessary, perhaps, to save Re-

lativismfrommerescepticism. An attackon the relativistbasis ofPragmatism wouldbe relevant,as against Pragma-tism. And if the " pragmatism" of Protagoras was onlyan incident in his doctrineof relativity, hen Plato's re-joinderwould be very much to the point. Suppose thatProtagoras arguedfortherelativity ftruth, .e.,what is be-lieved is true,and denied any outside authority. Supposethatin answer to the question, " Do you draw any distinc-






usage,the manyhave a right o call the Protagoreanprinciplefalse,as conflictingwith thefirst 'vSo4ov. Now Protagoras

may do one oftwothings. He may eitherdenyor allow theclaim of one man to call another's judgment false: if hedenies it,he identifies claim" and " validity," if he allowsit, he draws a distinctionbetween them. In any case, hecannot consistently llow any other test of truththan thejudgmentof someman or men. But ifhe deniesthe claim,thenhemustadmitthatfor he mnajorityheir wn ropositionis truethatman is not the measureofall things; if he grantsit, thenhe admits that his proposition hatmanis themeasure

ofall thinigss falseforthe majority. But if no one believesit except himself, hen,on the assumption that beliefdeter-mines truth,it follows that the contradictory s true for(v-irtually) verybody. The argument is clearly directedagainst a doctrinewhich seemed to treat the claim of ajudgmentto truthand its actual truthor validity as equiva-lent. Mr. Schiller's Protagoras can escape by saying thathis dictum s trueeven thoughhe alone believes t, because ajudgment is not validated merely by being believed: but

Plato's Protagoras cannot escape thus, because belief andvalidity are the same, according to Plato's account of thedictum. Hence the relevanceof theproof depends on ourirfterpretationf the dictum. I thinkthat Protagorashim-selfcould have replied,not thathis doctrine s misrepresentedin the way Mr. Schiller makes out, but that he never heldthe doctrine frelativity n the extremeformwhich it hereassumes. I suspect, indeed, that this extremeform f theprinciple, ike the propositions f Jansenius condemnedby

the authorities,did'not appear in the actual writingsof theauthorto whomit was currentlyttributed. It is not to befoundnthestatement f the dictum tself. Generalisedfromsome more qualifiedstatement t probablybecame a catch-wordofdiscussion. And Plato's ownlanguage seemsto showthat he was quite aware of this: the wordsof Socrates in169 E show Plato's good faith: he has made Protagoras nhis defence protestagainst captious dialectical criticismofan abstractprinciple: in 169 E he is merely aying that this

is a dialectical argumentdirectedagainst the abstractprin-

ciple and requiringto be supplementedby an argumentdealing with the matter of Protagoras' doctrine; this isdone in the secondpartof therejoinder. In 171 C the proofis said to be provisional, nd it is stated that ifProtagorascame to lifehe mightdeclare tto be folly: in179 B thisproofis givena secondaryposition.

The second argument,then, is the one on which Platorelies (171 C-172 B, resumed 177 C-179C). It examines the




material account of the dictum given in the Defence, andespeciallythe relationbetween the true and the good there

expounded, Mr. Schiller's accusation that Plato has ignoredthe matteroftheDefence inhisreplyhas nottheleast found-ation in fact Plato or Protagoras? p. 19). Like the first roofit is dialectical.' It starts fromthe popular 'v8o4ov thatthere s a differenceetweenthewise and the gnorant, n as-sumptionwhich s universaland accepted by Protagoras him-self. But this immediately asses intothe 'v3otov ofcertaincoo4o other hanProtagoras,butwhose general ttitude s thatofProtagorashimself. The method is that of settingthe

'voIov ofone aofoos againstthe 06heovfanother. The o-o4ooto whom appeal is made are those who explain theworldonthe principles fempirical cience Heraclitism :n he sense of152 E, described s Tovls r?7vEpo/EvqV ovitfav X6yovraq, 177 C)>and applytheseprinciples o theexplanationofhumansociety,Their 'VWota are set against that of Protagoras, with the,object ofshowingthat thehomomensura cannot be assertedin the unqualifiedmannerin whichitwas advanced by Pro-tagoras, because those inquirers who work out a theoryof

human societyon this ine do not really ccept tuncondition-ally. A fortiori, t cannotbe accepted by those who denyhispremisses.

If we examine the views of these o-ooot we findthat theyaccept partofthe Protagorean doctrine, but reject anotherpart. They agree that the patient is the sole judge for,henatureof his feelings, he state the sole authority orthelaw.Here theyare followed by many whose philosophic stand-point s quitedifferent172 B). But theydo notreallvaccept

theProtagorean position that the superiority f the aofob6'lies only n hispowerto change the opinionsof the individualor the state. They admit an intrinsicdifference etweengreater nd less knowledge.

After tatingthispoint Socrates goes off nto the digres-sion on the 'comparativevalues of the philosophic and thepractical life, nd on resuming (177 B) proceeds to carryoutthe implicationsof the ev'olov. Protagoras had reducedthesuperiority f the wise to superiority n power. Socrates

shows that this power rests on superiority n knowledge:and thisdifferencen knowledge mplies a differenceetweenappearance and reality. The wise teacher s neverregardedmerely s one who can make hishearers dopt new opinions,but as one who can show them theirreal advantage. Here

1 a lV avayKr), othat, XpT)09at ?7LV aVrOlS, 0wo7ol trVEvE'O,.EV, Kat raFoKoVvra aEt ravra XE'yeLv,171D. These wordsseemto imply hat heviews tated ntheargumentre those ofcontemporarvcience.

33




is implieda realism inconsistentwith the unqualified rela-tivismof the dictum. An enlightenedcommonsense,which

has reflected n the investigations fscience,will -allow thatman is theultimate udge ofreality 1) in the case of sensa-tion, where the individual is the sole judge of his own im-mediate experience; (2) in case of moral laws, where thecommunitys the measure,because it is the author, of thelaws. But it will denythat man is themeasure of thegood,whetherofthebodyor of the community, ecause common-sense is realist,and recoanises theexistence of independentconditions, ver which man has not complete control. In

thewordsof he Cratylus,menbelievethat" thingshave somepermanent nature of their own; that they do not existmerelyin relation to us, twisted hither and thither by usand our ideas, but independentlymaintaining the pro-perrelation to theirown nature . . Or, as theRepublicputsit (505 D), " Do we not see that manyare willing to do orto have or to seem to be what is just and honourable with-out the reality; but no one is satisfiedwith the appearance,ofgood-the realityis what they seek; in the case of the

-good, ppearance is despised by everyone ". Hence Plato'sanswertoProtagorasmaybe expressed s follows: " first oudeny any distinctionbetween appearance and reality; thenyou resolve the difference etween the wise man and theignoramus into one of better nd worse; but experience, sexpressed n commonsense, howsthatthedistinction etweenthe better nd theworse impliesa differenceetween appear-.ance and reality; thereforen assumingthat you can teach,you are assumingthe fundamental rinciple hatyou deny .

On this, rgumentwe mayremark 1) that it confirms hereading ofthe dictum as beingprimarily thical in its scope;what Plato is speciallyattacking s the identification f the.good and the apparent good. (2) There is no indicationthat Plato felt any difficultyn replyingto Protagoras; thereply s clear and confident: " if you are going to substitute-utility or truthas the goal of human effort, our successmust depend on the degreeofmasteryyouhave overreality;once allow that realityis not entirely n your power, andutility s dependenton the degreeofyourknowledge". (3).It is quite clear that for Plato subjectivismwas the essence,of heProtagorean doctrine, nd was tobe metbysomeformof realism. His argument s directedthroughoutagainst aview whichseems to him to make man thecomplete magisternature. As against the doctrinethat man has no interpresnaturoe xcept himself, he argumenthas, ofcourse,no force.'

ISo far I agree with Mr. Schiller and Prof. Burnet that Plato hasnot answered Protagoras.




'Whatevermay be said of the cogencyofthe reasoning, it isintelligible,relevant,and shows no discrepancieswith the

accountof the homomensuran the Defence. Mr. Schiller'scriticisms are vitiated by his inability to recognise thedialectical characterof the argument. Thus he objects toSocratesmaking a distinction fwhichnothingwas said inthe Defence: " a division of territorvwhereby he sphereofperceptionwould be leftto the dictum,while that of goodand evil, and of health and disease would be assigned to thecontrolofauthority" (p. 22). Socrates establisheshis pointagainst rotagorasdialectically; Plato understands rotagoras

to deny any difference f authorityfor the sensation andthe good. I cannot understandthe remarks on page 23.Socrates says nothing about " allowing states to judge astheyplease about the just and themoral". What he doessay is that educated opiniongoes withProtagoras in regard-ing the ust (the many justs ") and themoral as beingdeter-mined by the vo4kot f the state. Actualmorality s widelytreatedas vo'61 bypeoplewho insist that thegood is cfvn%et.

We must bear in mind, n this connexion,the prominence

oftheconceptionof causation in all the ethical thought ofthe Greeks. All action is regarded as means to the realisa-tion ofsome end or ends which have value in themselves.Conduct so far as rational involves two distinct udgments,(1) that a certainpossible endhas value, (2) that thisact willcause therealisation of the end. Hence it is assumed thatin acting you do what appears to you likelyto promote youradvantage. But error s possible; what seems to you ad-vantageousmaynot be advantageous. If you act upon your

judgment of what seems likelyto be profitable,your judg-maents infallible nly on the impossible condition hat youare the cause notonlyofyourown act but ofall its circum-stances as well. And this is just what Plato seems to becontendingfor. He shows that if you allow the commonview that there is an independentrealityconditioning, u-man activity,man cannot be regardedas the sole arbiterofhis destiny. So far as the Protagorean principle hat manis themeasuremeant that in dealing with the problemsof

lifewe must ultimately rely on our judgments concerningthings, his is obviouslyno answer. But if t is interpretedin an anti-scientificense; if t is brought nto oppositiontothefeelingwhichinspiresthe scientificnvestigator, he feel-ing that realitycontainsa vast unexploredregion,then oneofthe chief motives to research will be removed, and theprinciple becomes thoroughly pernicious. Men can onlybecomemastersofNature by recognising hat the masteryimplies a process requiringeveryeffort f which they are



492 0. M. GILLESPIE: THE TRUTH OF PROTAGORAS.

capable. If, again, it is interpretedn an anti-moral ense; ifit comes to mean that man may do what he pleases, that hiswelfaredepends on the satisfaction fthedesires he himselfforms nd not also on the human naturewhich he inherits,itAmay asilylead to Calliclean developments. It is againstsuch applicationsofthe dictum thatPlato is arguinghere.

To sumup. The leadingidea ofProtagoraswas relativity,subjectivity,as it was always supposed to be in antiquity.The homomensurcaas first nunciatedwith a specific thicalpurpose. In its generalstatement t meantman in general,

but in the working out, owing to Protagoras' empirical,developmental reatment f the social question, t came alsoto mean the individual,community n one context,man inanaother. In this workingout Protagoras taught that themoral udgmentis valid onlyfor the community nterested,and claimsno further alidity, llustrating is pointfromthephenomenaof sensation. From thiswas extracted a catch-phrase like the Universal Flux, " appearance is reality,"whichwas treated as the essenceof theProtagoreandoctrine.

This abstract principlewas made game of by some amongthe dialecticians,whomPlato cites in Thea3tetus,61 C ff., ndrebukes n the Defence in the person of Protagoras,addingwhat he regards as the real meaning of the dictum. Hehimself uppliesthreeanswers. (1) In the firstpart of therejoinder he gives a dialectical refutation of the abstractprinciple that every judgment is true (validity) because itis true (claim) to the maker. (2) In the second part heattacks the moralapplication: granting (provisionally) the

arbitrarynature of actual moral codes he denies that theGood is arbitrary on the ground that welfare dependson objectiveconditions. (3) But his mainobjection is to befound in his treatmentof the homomensurcas a doctrinewhichmakesknowledge nd sensationequivalentterms: thepsychologyf Protagoras is at fault: he has failed to see thefundamentaldifferenceetween the claims of the sensationand thejudgmentto objective validity: if he had seen thedifferencee couldnothave drawnso close a parallel between

sensationand themoral udgment.I conclude that there is no justificationwhateverfortheview thatProtagoras taught that truth s a " value " or anysimilarPragmatist doctrine, nd thatwe must notread anyepistemologicalmeaning nto the idea ofability as it appearsin Plato's accountof the dictum, ts presence being due tothepredominanceof the ethical and social interests in thetheoryof Protagoras.

the truth of protagoras.pdf

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