THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT

CHAPTER IV THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT

Anton Aliabbas

It is now three years since the historic signing of the Peace Agreement between

the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki, Finland, on 15 August 2006. The winds of change are sweeping through Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and through GAM itself. GAM has not only put down its weapons, it has also been compelled to devise new strategies to continue its existence as a political entity. This article attempts to provide some insight into the changes that have affected GAM. Its aim is to describe and analyze the transformation of GAM from an armed movement into a political movement with a strong tendency towards business entrepreneurship.

This article has been divided into four sections. The first section describes the political transformation of GAM – particularly its role in the 2006 provincial elections and the possible inclusion of former GAM members in the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and police (Polri). The second section looks at the internal dynamics of the organization led by its aging founder, Hasan Tiro. Friction between the ‘older generation’ and new recruits is a focus of this section. The third section then considers GAM’s evolving capacities to implement the economic empowerment aspects of the Helsinki Agreement. The final section reviews the main points of the article and closes with an attempt to foresee the challenges facing GAM and, in particular, its response the question ‘Does the desire for independence remain strong in Aceh?’1 Political Transformation

Theoretically speaking, the term ‘transformation’ as intended in this article is a process that brings fundamental changes that improve the status quo.2 Transformation does not only effect policies, institutions and processes, but also values and attitudes that react to and influence changes in the environment.

1 Background information on Acehnese history, the emergence of GAM and the events leading up

to the signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005 are contained in Chapters 1 and 3 of this volume. The current article consequently contains limited information on these issues and focuses on the internal transformation of GAM. The author also recommends the following reference materials for readers interested in the evolution of GAM prior to the Helsinki Agreement: Neta S Pane, Sejarah dan Kekuatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Solusi, Harapan an Impian, (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2001) and Kirsten E Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, Policy Studies 2, (Washington D.C: East-West Center, 2004)

2 Symphorosa Wilibald Rembe, The Politics Of Transformation In South Africa: An Evaluation Of Education Policies And Their Implementation With Particular Reference To The Eastern Cape Province, PhD Dissertation, Rhodes University, 2005, pg. 34.

The Helsinki Agreement not only signaled the end of the armed conflict that assailed Aceh for more than thirty years, it also ‘forced’ the GAM separatist movement to change. One of the most fundamental changes occurred in the political realm.

The first section of this article looks at two aspects of GAM’s political transformation in the two years following the signing of the Helsinki Agreement. The first part of this section considers GAM’s role in Aceh’s first ever direct elections for Governor and Vice Governor as well as district and municipal government heads held on 11 December 2006. GAM’s political clout was evident in the fact that almost half of the elections at the district and municipal levels were won by former GAM leaders and the victorious Governor-Vice Governor team had very strong links to the separatist movement. The second part of this section considers the possibility of ‘absorbing’ former GAM members into TNI and Polri and why the proposal, although it looks good on paper, faces several serious challenges if it is to be implemented in future. Politics of the 2006 Provincial Elections

The elections held in Aceh were the first direct local elections for Governor-Vice Governor and districts heads held in the country. In effect, Aceh was a ‘test case’ in the development of the apparatus of democracy in Indonesia. It is no wonder that tensions ran high at the time.

The contest for the 20 government positions, including for Governor-Vice Governor, held on 11 December 2006 provided a clear illustration of GAM’s participation in political processes following the signing of the Helsinki Agreement. When the votes were tallied, eight district and municipal government heads were former GAM leaders and the Governor-Vice Governor team, with broad powers under Indonesian law to legislate and manage Aceh’s development, were also GAM-affiliated.3 Former GAM negotiator in Helsinki, Bakhtiar Abdullah, said the organization’s whole-hearted participation in the election was due to the fact that, “We wanted to grasp the opportunity to develop a better kind of democracy in Aceh”.4

In preparation for the elections, GAM held trainings for personnel over three weeks in Malaysia, Banda Aceh and Sweden with several international trainers and other kinds of material and technical support.5 Former commanders of GAM’s armed wing

3 On 11 December 2006, 19 of Aceh’s 21 districts and municipalities held simultaneous elections, of which former GAM leaders were victorious in eight. The remaining two districts – Bireuen and South Aceh - did not elect new district heads on that date because the incumbents’ term in office had not yet expired. In 2008, the election in Bireuen was won by a former GAM negotiator. As such, GAM-affiliated candidates won in nine of the 19 district and municipal elections. Although written prior to the Bireuen election, Edward Aspinall’s Guerillas in Power (http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/616/47/, accessed on 29 November 2007) offers a thorough overview of the election process and the implications of GAM’s election to mainstream politics. At the time of writing (mid-2008), the province of NAD has 23 districts and municipalities following the division of several of the larger districts.

4 Didik, “Obsesi Merebut Posisi Eksekutif,” in Majalah Acehkita, Edisi January 2006, pg. 16. 5 The Training of Trainers (ToT) involved the Olof Palme Center, based in Stockholm, Sweden,

which is active in political, security and democratization issues. Damien Kingsbury of Australia’s Deakin University was the coordinator of the GAM cadre election preparation program. Kingsbury was a former

(Tentara Nanggroe Aceh – TNA) and GAM ‘intellectuals’, including high-profile negotiators from the peace process, were groomed to lead the development of democracy in Aceh and were given training in, among other things, leadership, election monitoring and campaign strategy. Bakhtiar Abdullah said the organization was placing particular emphasis on preparing personnel with field experience, especially regional commanders, for the election. The participation of former GAM personnel in the elections was, however, an extremely controversial issue throughout 2005 and into 2006. In collaboration with GAM leaders, the Aceh parliament and existing government prepared a Draft Law on the Governance of Aceh (LOGA) in which independent candidates would be included in the 2006 elections.6 However, the Law had to pass through the national parliament and the Draft did not go down well in Jakarta: Significant portions of the country’s political elite maintained that Indonesian law should be upheld in Aceh and, as such, only candidates affiliated to existing national parties should be allowed to participate in the elections. State Secretary Yusril Ihza Mahendra, among others, asserted that the demand for independent candidates was baseless because the Helsinki Agreement contained no explicit reference to such a controversial concession from the government.7 Accordingly, a new Draft Law on the Governance of Aceh prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Jakarta included no allowances for independent candidates and directed potential candidates to join existing national parties. In short, allowing GAM to field independent candidates was seen as a dangerous precedent: Some argued that, in the worst case scenario, the situation in Aceh could inspire other provinces to demand similar concessions that could ultimately lead to the fragmentation of the Republic.8 The State Intelligence Agency (BIN) was also convinced that independent candidates would open the door for GAM to form a political party and thereby control a national ‘strategic area’ while continuing the fight for independence.9 At around the same time, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono stated publicly that GAM was spreading GAM advisor during the various stages of negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government. More information on GAM’s electoral preparations is available in“Membidik Peluang Menata Demokrasi,” in Majalah Acehkita, January 2006, pp. 8-10.

6 In the Draft LoGA prepared by the provincial parliament and government, independent candidates qualified for inclusion in the elections if they garnered the support of three percent of the voting population, which had to be proven through the submission of photocopies of supporters’ identity cards. Further information on the process – and the rush by hopeful independents to register – is available in the March and May editions of Majalah Acehkita, 2006.

7 The issue of ‘independent’ candidates was not explicitly mentioned in the Helsinki Agreement. Article 1.2.2 states that, ‘Upon the signing of this Agreement, the people of Aceh will have the right to determine the candidates for all public positions subject to election through participating in elections in Aceh in April 2006 and beyond’. In the absence of explicit mention of independent candidates, the Indonesian government argued that the inclusion of independent candidates was not a condition or requirement of the Agreement. In addition to State Secretary Yusril Ihza Mahendra, key leaders of several of the country’s largest political parties also vociferously rejected the inclusion of independent candidates in provincial elections in Aceh or elsewhere. See “Setelah Calon Independen Terjegal,” in Majalah Acehkita, March 2006, pp. 8-10.

8 A more detailed consideration of this line of reasoning is available in ICG Report No. 48, Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, 29 March 2006.

9 Ibid.

‘propaganda’ discrediting the central government.10 Despite resistance from significant quarters, the clause allowing independent candidates was included in the Law on the Governance of Aceh (No.11 2006).11

GAM continued to prepare for the local elections even as the controversies raged through their new political body the Committee for the Transformation of Aceh (KPA). The KPA convened a ‘grand meeting’ in May 2006 and representatives from GAM’s former armed wing, political wing and various domestic and international branches attended.12 The meeting delegates failed to reach a unanimous verdict on who should represent the organization in the gubernatorial elections and a vote was taken. Former GAM negotiator and businessman Teungku Nashiruddin bin Ahmad obtained five more votes than his nearest competitor, Hasbi Abdullah, who was a former high-profile GAM negotiator and brother to Zaini Abdullah, GAM’s foreign minister in exile in Switzerland during the long years of the armed conflict.13 The assembly was not divided to the same extent over who was their preferred Vice Governor candidate: former head of the Center for Information on the Acehnese Referendum (SIRA), Muhammad Nazar, obtained 31 votes compared to his next competitor, Humam Hamid, who obtained 24 votes.14

The results surprised many: Hasbi Abdullah had been touted as the leading gubernatorial candidate prior to the vote but he was defeated by Nashiruddin who did not attend the event at all. The meeting ultimately failed to produce a definite leadership team. Nashiruddin later withdrew from the contest. Hasbi Abdullah later became the Vice Governor candidate to Human Hamid, a noted intellectual who had the backing of the Islamic United Development Party (PPP), which was the national party that had won the most support in previous elections in the province. The KPA to all intents and purposes supported the Human-Hasbi team while professing itself open to the candidature of any other GAM-affiliated teams running in the election. One of the ‘dark horse’ GAM candidates was Irwandi Yusuf who, despite receiving only nine votes at the May 2006 ‘grand meeting’ vote, teamed up with the preferred Vice Governor candidate, Muhammad Nazar. The story of how Irwandi and Nazar wound up at the helm is explained in a later section.

10 See Kompas, 7 March 2006. 11 In order to qualify for official candidature in the elections, hopeful candidates had to prove that

they had the support of three percent of the voting population (roughly 120,000 people) located in more than 50% of the province’s districts and municipalities through the submission of photocopies of supporters’ identity cards (KTP). See Law No. 11/2006 on the Governance of Aceh and provincial Qanun regulation 3/2006.

12 The ‘grand meeting’ was entitled the ‘Duek Pakat Bangsa Aceh Sigom Donja’ and was held at the Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, on 19-22 May 2006. It was heralded as the biggest GAM-sponsored meeting ever convened. The commanders of GAM’s four territories were present, along with GAM representatives formerly and presently based in Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Denmark, Sweden, the USA, Australia and Malaysia. The Governor was also present. See Majalah Acehkita, June 2006.

13 Nashiruddin Ahmad came to public prominence as a businessman – primarily in the coal industry and for his ‘multi-level marketing’ operation – and was also a GAM negotiator before and during the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) period. Hasbi Abdullah, a former lecturer at Universitas Syiah Kuala, was sentenced to 14 years jail under the Soeharto regime but was released by Soeharto’s successor, B.J. Habibie, after serving eight years.

14 The atmosphere and results of the ’grand meeting’ are captured in several articles of Majalah Acehkita, June 2006, pp 8-13.

Polling in the lead up to the vote was widespread and the results were hardly

heartening for the GAM leadership. Two survey institutes15 found that the official GAM gubernatorial team were less popular with voters than other mainstream politicians affiliated to national political parties, such as then Acting Governor Azwar Abubakar of the PAN Party and Malik Raden of the Golkar Party. As the director of the Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) poll explained, ‘What is popular is GAM itself, not its leaders per se. GAM is more popular for its militaristic capabilities than for its political prowess’.16 The LSI survey also revealed that the popularity of key figures in GAM’s political struggle, such as Hasan Tiro and the titular GAM prime minister when in exile in Sweden, Malik Mahmud, was relatively high but these men had no intention of running for office. The poll conducted by IFES pointed in a similar direction: Only 36% of respondents said they would vote for a GAM candidate running as an independent or affiliated to a national political party. However, it should be noted that only 7% said they would definitely not vote for a former GAM leader and the vast majority of respondents (72%) said they had not made a definite decision on their preferred candidates.

The tension and controversy over the GAM candidacy – and the organization’s political future – continued right up to election day. The campaign of the Humam-Hasbi team was comprehensive with its catchy ‘H2O’ slogan (shortened from ‘Human-Hasbi OK!’). Violations and infringements of the electoral laws were noted in several districts17, particularly in the GAM stronghold of Lhokseumawe where the official monitoring body reported that three Jakarta-based political parties had attempted to ‘buy votes’.18

The voter polls conducted in late November 2004 had led most observers to expect a poor showing for GAM candidates at the polls and had indicated that no single team would secure more than 15% of the vote. As is so often the case with pre-election polling, the results were resoundingly overturned when the final tally was announced: Just over 38% of voters chose the Irwandi-Nazar team, compared to 16.6% for their closest rivals, Humam and Hasbi.19 Not only had the majority of voters favored GAM

15 The two surveys were conducted by Jakarta-based Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) and IFES.

A description of the scope of the surveys and respondents, margins of error, and an analysis of the results are found in Majalah Acehkita, June 2006, pp. 14-15, and September 2005. IFES also released a statement on the results of its poll entitled Pandangan dan Informasi Mengenai Pilkada Aceh 2006.

16 Cited in ICG Report No. 57, Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 29 November 2006, Jakarta/Brussel, 2006.

17 See Van Zorge Report on Indonesia Inside Issue VIII/21-22, 12 December 2006, pg. 37. 18 Ibid. The parties that reportedly conducted the ‘cash incentives’ for voters were the two largest

parties in the national parliament, Golkar and PDI-P, as well as the party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Partai Demokrat. The allegations were denied by the parties.

19 Irwandi-Nazar obtained 38,20% of the almost 2.6 million votes, with the other candidates obtaining: Humam-Hasbi (16.62%), Malik-Sayed (13.97%), Azwar-Nasir (10.61%), Ghazali-Salahudin (7.80%), Iskandar-Saleh (5.54%), Tamlicha-Harmen (3.99%) and Djali-Syauqas 65 (3.26%). See Nur Raihan, Pilkada NAD: Irwandi-Nazar Resmi Jadi Juara. http://www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2006/bulan/12/tgl/29/time/125022/idnews/725227/idkanal/10 accessed on 25 November 2007.

candidates, but Irwandi and Nazar’s victory was sufficient to ensure that the election did not go to a second round of voting.20

The victory received a mixed response from the national government. Influential member of Parliamentary Commission I on Internal Affairs, Permadi, stated publicly that, “This result must be met with a new contingency plan because Aceh will definitely (want to) be independent. Let alone the Governor-elect still considers himself a member of GAM.”21 Nevertheless, the President duly accepted and validated the election results and Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar were sworn in at the provincial parliament on 8 February 2007.22 Irwandi took the opportunity to set the record straight on his political vision for Aceh: “Our old identity we leave behind, namely, the demand for independence. Our identity in its new format is (based on) sovereignty. That is, we were democratically elected by the people,” he said at the time.23 Ex-GAM in the Armed Forces and Police?

The next challenge faced by most GAM members was to find employment, as the end to hostilities had effectively heralded a new era in the struggle to make ends meet. A World Bank study in late 2006 showed that approximately 70% of former combatants were aged 16-35 years old.24 It also found that more than 70% were without full-time employment:

20 Provincial Qanun regulations associated with the LoGA and other local election laws are very detailed in proscribing the conditions for holding a second round of voting. In order to directly assume office and avoid a second round, the winning Governor-Vice Governor team must obtain more than 25% of the vote, while all the other candidate teams obtain less than 25%. Irwandi and Nazar clearly met the criteria and proceeded unchallenged to their new positions of authority. See Forbes Damai, Laporan Dinamika Pilkada Aceh 5-22 December 2006.

21Muhammad Nur Hayid, Kemenangan Tokoh GAM Irwandi Harus Disikapi. http://www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2006/bulan/12/tgl/13/time/131633/idnews/719626/idkanal/10 accessed on 25 November 2007

22 Kompas, “Irwandi-Nazar Dilantik,” 9 February 2007, contains a detailed account of the inauguration ceremony.

23 Ahmad Arif, “Aceh di Tangan Mantan Tokoh Perlawanan,” in Kompas, 9 February 2007. 24 See World Bank, Kajian mengenai Kebutuhan Reintegrasi GAM: Meningkatkan Perdamaian

melalui Program Pembangunan di Tingkat Masyarakat, (Jakarta: Bank Dunia, 2006), pg. 13.

Diagram 1. Employment Status of Returned GAM Combatants25

Bekerja: Working Tidak Bekerja: Not Working

Mencari Kerja: Looking for Work

The World Bank report identified several reasons why former GAM combatants

had not yet reintegrated into the workforce. First and foremost was the fact that combatants wished to spend time with their families and settle into ‘normal’ life. The second reason was an identified lack of access to capital and/or work opportunities. Finally, the study revealed that many former combatants were awaiting final orders from their immediate superiors, as the commando structure in several regions remained a prominent factor in local developments.

Questions were raised about the possibility of incorporating former combatants into the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and National Police (Polri). Formal admission requirements are very clear about minimal levels of education and applicants must have achieved a pass at the Middle School level. The World Bank study, among others, highlighted the fact that former combatants tended to have very low levels of formal education26: More than 50% did not graduate from the Middle School level or above. Only 22% graduated from Middle School level or had any sort of higher education, making it extremely difficult for the authorities to consider incorporating former combatants into the TNI or police force.

25 Ibid., pg. 17. 26 Ibid., pg. 16.

Mencari Kerja,

42.20%

Bekerja 25.4 %

Tidak Bekerja 32.5

%

Diagram 2. Education Levels of Active GAM Members and the General Population27

Former combatants could return to school and obtain their Middle School certificate through the intensive course offered under a national program and the chiefs of both TNI and Polri had never spoken against their incorporation into the forces. However, other kinds of - primarily psychological - obstacles significantly influenced former combatants’ decisions following the establishment of peace. Besides a general aversion to adult schooling, former combatants were concerned that discrimination during the selection process and once inside the institutions of national defense and policing would occur. The forces in 2005-6 were also in a state of readjustment to the new reality and the situation was not an attractive opportunity for former combatants. A. Internal Dynamics of GAM

There was a clear change in GAM’s ‘struggle’ from armed resistance to organized political action as a result of the Helsinki Agreement and this had many significant impacts on the organization itself. In 2005, the GAM leadership established the Committee for the Transformation of Aceh (KPA) and tasked it with, among other things, the monitoring and active application of programs designed to re-integrate former combatants into society. The leadership also established the ‘National Council’ to bring together GAM’s political and economic resources.28

From the very beginning, the position of Malik Mahmud, GAM’s ‘Prime Minister’ in exile during the prolonged armed conflict and its chief political mover, was unclear. He apparently preferred to wait for the conclusion of discussions on the Law on the Governance of Aceh rather than prepare for the candidacy of GAM representatives in the local elections. At various times he suggested different gubernatorial candidates,

27 Ibid., pg. 16. 28 The National Council was established in October 2005 and the KPA in December 2005. In a

closed meeting, Teungku Usman Lampoh Awe was elected as Chairman of the National Council, Muzakkir Manaf was elected as Chief of Security Issues and Zakaria Saman as Chief of Political Issues. See ICG Report No. 57.

including Kamaruzzaman, Hasbi Abdullah, Nashruddin Ahmad, Sofyan Dawood, M Nazar and Irwandi Yusuf.29 Nevertheless, most observers concurred that Hasbi Abdullah had the support of the senior GAM leadership.30 This was most obvious when, at a time when the push to field independent candidates was all but quashed in Jakarta, senior GAM leaders met to discus the pairing of Hasbi with Humam Hamid. Humam had already received the nomination of the national United Development Party (PPP). Delegates from both GAM and PPP, including Malik, met several times at the house of Tengku Usman Lampoh Awe, the head of GAM’s National Council, to discus cooperation between GAM and the province’s most popular existing political party.31

Many voices were raised in protest at the Humam-Hasbi pairing: Some felt it was too early to discus forming a coalition, and others objected to Humam because he had never been a member or public supporter of GAM. Others who backed the meetings maintained that the Humam-Hasbi combination was ideal, as the team combined the GAM intellectual Hasbi with Humam’s existing political base through the Islamic PPP.32

Two broad ‘factions’ were evident at this point and generally coincided with a

generational division within GAM itself. The division, in other words, was not so much linked to the organization’s structure as to differences of opinion between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations.

Diagram 3.

Internal GAM Groupings33

As mentioned earlier, when the GAM meeting held in May 2006 failed to agree on gubernatorial election candidates, the issue went to a secret ballot, with results as listed below:

29 Ibid. 30 Majalah Acehkita, June 2006, pg. 9 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Sourced from various written reports and interviews with GAM leaders and members.

Supreme Leader Hasan Tiro

Prime Minister Malik Mahmud

The ‘New’ Generation Irwandi Yusuf Bakhtiar Abdullah Sofyan Dawood Kamaruzzaman Nur Djuli Munawarliza

The ‘Old’ Guard Usman Lampoh Awe Zakaria Saman Ilyas Abid Muzakkir Manaf Yahya Muaz Darwis Jeunib

Table 1. Results of Secret Ballot on Preferred GAM Governor-Vice Governor Candidates

at May 2006 Grand Meeting in Banda Aceh34

Governor Candidate Vice Governor Candidate Candidate No. of Votes Candidate No. of Votes

Nashiruddin Hasbi Abdullah Irwandi Yusuf Humam Hamid M Nazar Iqlil Shadia M Adnan Beuransah

39 34 9 2 2 0 0 0

M Nazar Humam Hamid Iqlil Nashiruddin Shadia M Irwandi Yusuf Hasbi Abdullah Adnan Beuransah

31 24 12 7 4 3 3 1

Nashiruddin’s victory was seen by many as the result of his support among the

‘new’ generation of GAM members who respected his political experience and record at the CoHA negotiations as well as his neutral status within GAM’s internal maneuverings.35 It was his ‘man of the people’ ethos, however, that would see Nashiruddin withdraw from the race. He told the press in June 2006, “Let me live in the village with the widows and families of the victims of the conflict. We want a quiet life.”36

The most popular vice governor candidate at the May meeting, Muhammad Nazar, had no intention of withdrawing but was not prepared to run alongside the meeting’s second choice for governor candidate, Hasbi Abdullah. It was reported that Hasbi’s leadership spirit was being brought into question and that the Hasbi-Nazar pairing was not ‘strategic’, as both men hailed from Pidie district where GAM was originally established in 1976.37

Unable to resolve internal problems and pressed for time, the GAM central

leadership took the middle way: Malik Mahmud announced that GAM as an organization would not be directly involved in determining candidates for the local elections and that members were free run as independent candidates provided they met the stipulations of the new Law on the Governance of Aceh.38 The announcement seemed to intensify the division between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ GAM groupings. The ‘old guard’ was perceived to be out of touch with the situation in Aceh’s villages. Nevertheless, leaders of the National Council, such as Usman Lampoh Awe, Zakaria Saman and Ilyas Abid, forged ahead with their negotiations with Humam Hamid and PPP and later expressed their full support for the team.39

34 Acehkita, June 2006. 35 Interview with a younger generation of GAM leaders in Banda Aceh, 3 November 2007. 36 Majalah Acehkita, June 2006, pg. 10. 37 ICG Report No. 57. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

Meanwhile, Muhammad Nazar was drawing closer to Irwandi Yusuf, who was

then seen as a long shot – primarily due to his limited support from GAM leaders, as evidenced in his poor showing at the May meeting. The pair began to present a united public front after a meeting of the KPA in East Aceh in August 2006. Nazar in particular was tireless in drumming up support at the grass-roots level and met with many local GAM commanders across Aceh.

The situation came to a head at a later KPA meeting in August 2006, this time with Malik Mahmud in attendance.40 After the conclusion of the meeting, KPA chairman Muzakir read a public statement in which GAM support for the Humam-Hasbi team was stated unequivocally. Many reacted negatively to the declaration claiming that the statement had been prepared by Humam-Hasbi supporters. The statement was naturally seen as a snub at the political aspirations of Irwandi and Nazar.

Widespread confusion ensued, especially after two memos signed by Malik Mahmud were leaked in October - one supporting Humam-Hasbi and the other supporting Irwandi-Nazar. Some GAM leaders opted to follow the organization’s official line, while others maintained that only Irwandi and Nazar were ‘true GAM’.

The relationship between the National Council, with its compliment of long-standing GAM notables, and the KPA, which managed more day-to-day engagement with former combatants, was also far from harmonious. The Council issued a statement declaring that support for the Humam-Hasbi team was final. After meeting with KPA leaders from the regions, KPA head Muzakir withdrew his support from the Humam-Hasbi campaign.41 He, like many others, had perceived the sea change: Irwandi and Nazar were – more or less - the people’s choice and won a convincing victory at the election.

Problems between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations were far from over, however.

A whole different can of worms was opened when the central government gave the go-ahead in 2007 for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh. The provision was covered in the Helsinki Agreement: Point 1.2.1 reads, ‘As soon as possible, but no later than one year after the signing of this Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia will formally agree to and facilitate the formation of political parties based in Aceh…’. The point was formalized in Government Regulation No.20/2007 but controversy over the number and nature of GAM-based political parties, the use of its symbols and flag and the political future of the organization was already well underway.

The fact that GAM had the opportunity to channel its energies into the legitimate political realm was nevertheless widely appreciated. The issue had been on the table at negotiations during the tenure of the previous president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, but her attempts to appease the TNI leadership during her presidency effectively ruled out any such concession. With the new political reality in Aceh following the tsunami and

40 Ibid.. 41 Koran Tempo, 28 November 2007.

subsequent Helsinki Peace Agreement, many Acehnese and international observers spoke openly about their hope that GAM would be given the same opportunity opened to Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and the Partie Quebecois in Canada.42 Interestingly, an LSI survey in March 2006 revealed that the majority of the people of Aceh supported or strongly supported the formation of local parties, although there was a notable difference in support between Aceh’s three largest ethnic groups: Some 67% of ethnic Acehnese (who comprise around 77% of the total population) supported or strongly supported the formation of local parties, compared to just 30% of ethnic Gayonese (representing 6% of the population) and 26% of ethnic Javanese (representing 10%).

GAM itself began to prepare for the establishment of a political party as early as 2005. The move was backed at the meeting in Banda Aceh on 20-23 May 2006 attended by GAM leaders based Aceh, other national cities and foreign countries.43 The GAM Party or Partai GAM was formalized one year later at a ceremony at KPA headquarters led by National Council leader Tengku Usman Lampoh Awe. Malik Mahmud and Muzakkir Manaf were installed as party leader and deputy leader, respectively, with Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar filling the post of secretary general.

The new party proudly displayed its colors and the Crescent and Star motif inspired by the long-standing GAM flag and symbols. Concerned parties within GAM as well as within local and national government agencies were quick to voice their criticism, albeit for different reasons: GAM factions that felt alienated from the new party protested that it had ‘taken over’ symbols that belonged to the people of Aceh, while Indonesian nationalist leaders saw the new party and its symbols as an indication that GAM wished to retain their pro-independence political symbols and ethos.

The Banda Aceh Police Chief went to the Partai Aceh head office and wrote to the leadership to express his concerns. To avoid further confrontation, the name board at the office was duly covered.44 Protests continued to issues from Jakarta and the matter was canvassed in a meeting of House of Representatives Commission I on Internal Affairs in October 2007. Coordinating Minster for Politics, Law and Security, Widodo AS, forcefully told the meeting that, “A political party that displays GAM attributes is not in accordance with the spirit of the peace in Aceh.”45 Head of the Commission, Theo L Sambuaga, concurred, saying, “We must be firm (and) not allow the registration of local parties that use GAM symbols because this is not known according to the terms of the Helsinki Agreement.”46

It is worth considering if the appropriation of GAM symbols by the new Partai GAM did indeed violate the word or the spirit of the Agreement or associated laws and regulations. Point 4.2 of the Agreement states that, ‘GAM will demobilize all of its 3,000 military personnel. GAM members will not wear their uniforms or display military

42 See, for example, ICG Report No. 40, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, 15 Agustus 2005, and Koran Acehkita, Edisi 025/TH Ke-3, 08-14 October 2007.

43 Ibid. 44 Koran Acehkita, Edition 017/TH Ke-3, 18-22 July 2007. 45 Koran Acehkita, Edition 025/TH Ke-3, 08-14 October 2007. 46 Ibid.

emblems or symbols after the signing of this Agreement.’ Follow-up laws aimed at elaborating this stipulation but still left room for interpretation. Article 82 of the Law on the Governance of Aceh (No.11/2006), for example, states that;

(Subsection 1) Local political parties are forbidden from using the name, symbols or signs that are the same as: the flag and symbols of the Republic of Indonesia; symbols of state or government institutions; symbols of the Aceh region; the name, flag or symbols of any other country or international institution/body; the name or picture of any individual, or; any that possess any similarities in part or full with other (national) political parties or local political parties. (Subsection 2) Local political parties are forbidden from engaging in any activities that violate Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, any existing laws and regulations; and from any activities that endanger the cohesion of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Central Government Regulation No.20/2007 on Local Political Parties in Aceh, in

reference to their establishment, merely states that:

(Article 2, subsection 4) The name, symbols and signs as mentioned in subsection (2) point (b) will not possess any similarities in part or full with national symbols, the symbols of national institutions, government or regional government symbols, the name, symbols or signs of political parties or other local political parties.

GAM leaders maintained that the name of the party as well as its symbols and

attributes did not violate the Helsinki Agreement or any subsequent laws or regulations. Senior GAM leader Zakaria Saman told this writer that the GAM symbol used by the party was not a symbol of the organization’s armed wing (TNA).47 He added, “The GAM name (in Partai GAM) is just a name. We are still implementing the MoU and our commitment to the NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia).” When asked if the establishment of the party could function as a vehicle for a future independence struggle, Zakaria said GAM had changed and added that, “If we (wanted) independence, of course we would not have signed the MoU. We could disband the party now but even then there would be no guarantee that Aceh will remain part of the NKRI.”48

The Partai Aceh leadership and GAM National Council leaders did not create a new symbol or plan for a change of name in late 2007. KPA spokesperson Ibrahim bin Syamsuddin told the writer that the ‘fear’ that GAM would return to its old path was primarily the result of national parties feeling threatened by the loss of votes in future elections. “We have done nothing wrong,” he said. “The GAM name has become an emblem of struggle so that now it can become the party close to the hearts of the people of Aceh.”49

47 Interview on 3 November 2007. 48 Ibid. 49 Interview in Banda Aceh on 3 November 2007.

The central government, however, continued to see things differently. In July

2007 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reportedly stated that the party’s name and symbol were not in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement.50 Minister for Law and Human Rights Andi Matalatta said that Partai GAM had already registered with his ministry but that the relevant bureau would not verify the part because it was at odds with existing laws and endangered the cohesion of the NKRI.51

Despite the reaction from Jakarta, Partai GAM was still undaunted in late 2007. Party spokesperson Ibrahim told this writer in November that their preparations for the 2009 general elections were almost finalized, that they had built branches in 75% of the province and that trainings for potential legislative council members continued.52 These activities also involved persons from ‘outside’ GAM. GAM was preparing to leave the fate of the party in the hands of the ordinary people of Aceh. “We hand it all over to the people of Aceh because, for us, the head of the party may not even sit in the legislative.” He also explained in the interview that Partai GAM had not considered forming a coalition with an existing national party. The issue had not been discussed at meetings and, in any case, the party had been formed to address issues in Aceh, not on a national level.53

Despite these statements, the leadership decided to change its tune in regards to the party’s identity. Following a meeting in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in early February 2008 between GAM and government representatives, the GAM acronym was redefined as ‘Gerakan Aceh Madiri’ (Autonomous Aceh Movement) replacing the old ‘Gerakan Aceh Merdeka’ (Free Aceh Movement). The new logo also lacked the tell-tale Cresent and Star motif adapted from the old GAM symbols. Only the black and red lines remained behind the accronym and its new definition.54

This state of affairs did not last long: The ‘Partai Gerakan Aceh Mandiri’ changed its name to simply ‘Partai Aceh’ (Aceh Party) in May 2008.55 A spokesperson, Adnan Beuransah, was reported saying that the change was a means to ‘readjust’ and that the party established by former independence fighters had to follow a philosophy as ‘adaptable as water’.56 “We are adapting to the new political tone. We may take one step

50 The President was cited by State Secretary, Hatta Rajasa. See Koran Acehkita, Edisi 017/TH

Ke-3, 18-22 July 2007. 51 The Minister asserted his ministry’s stance on the issue at a hearing with House of

Representatives Commission III. See Koran Acehkita, Edisi 025/TH Ke-3, 08-14 October 2007. 52 Interview on 3 November 2007. 53 National Government Regulation No. 20/2007 on Local Political Parties in Aceh allowed for

the formation of coalitions between Acehnese parties and national parties. 54 The ‘Round Table II’ meeting involving GAM and government representatives was held 9-10

February 2008. ‘Round Table I’ had been held in Jakarta. See http://news.okezone.com/index.php/ReadStory/2008/02/10/1/82320

55 Serambi Indonesia, “Partai GAM Kembali Ubah Nama dan Lambang,” accessed on 22 May 2008.

56 http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/05/01/21315463/partai.gam.bakal.jadi.partai.aceh accessed on 9 July 2008.

back if we are then able to take several forward,” he said.57 The new party flag was as simple as possible, with the words ‘Aceh’ and ‘Party’ gracing the horizontal margins made by the distinct red and black lines. There could be no doubt, he added, that the party now conformed to the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement and associated laws and regulations. The changes had been necessary to assuage suspicions and as a means to refocus energy on the peace, re-integration and reconciliation processes. In addition, the party’s mission was to transform the people’s attitudes - from the old revolutionary movement to supporting a new party committed to the development of Aceh.

These changes were also partly the result of the ‘gap’ between the old guard and new generation of GAM members and supporters mentioned earlier. Throughout 2007 and early 2008, the latter continued to criticize the fact that a team hand-picked by Malik Mahmud had established the party. The lack of effective representation in decision making and of feedback mechanisms was keenly felt by lower-level members. In late 2007, one young GAM leader somewhat ironically pointed out to the author that better consultation could have solved the problems of adapting to the new democratic environment.58 One young regional commander, when asked about the change of name and party symbols in May 2008, was reported saying, “What’s really needed is internal democracy: During the war, at least we still had our consultative forums (musyawarah).”59

Debate over who should lead the new Partai Aceh was a particularly thorny issue: The ‘old guard’ had made it clear that Malik Mahmud would lead them, while many of the ‘young guns’ concerned with the party’s development pushed for Governor Irwandi Yusuf to become party chief. Others felt that both these figures were better suited to a role as ‘overseers’ of the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement and as independent political observers or party advisors on political developments in the province and in relations with the Jakarta government.60

Although senior GAM leader Teungku Usman Lampoh Awe had stated at the

inauguration of Partai Aceh that any member who did not support the party was a ‘deserter’61, many younger GAM members had other ideas. The new political party laws - combined with member dissatisfaction at the undemocratic culture of Partai Aceh - had opened the flood gates to the creation of new political parties in the province. At a meeting in October 2007, various GAM leaders from 14 regions supported the establishment of an alternative GAM-based party.62 The ‘new generation’ said the decision was testament to the new spirit of democracy in Aceh, while the ‘old guard’ had

57 Ibid. 58 Interview on 5 November 2007. 59 Ibid. 60 Interview on 5 November 2007. 61 Zakaria cited Usman in an interview on 3 November 2007 62 Interview with younger generation GAM leaders on 5 November 2007. The GAM leaders came

from the following 14 districts and municipalities: Sabang, Aceh Besar, Blang Pidie, Simelue and Sinabang, Aceh Tengah, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Singkil, Pasee, Peureulak, Tapak Tuan, Meulaboh, Gayo Lues, Gayo Alas and Bireun. Meeting held in late October 2007. Interview with younger generation GAM leaders on 5 November 2007.

no pointed objections. The older generation, in fact, looked on the proposed new party as a quixotic gesture and felt it would not threaten Partai Aceh. GAM leader Zakaria told the writer that, “They have no followers, just ask the people.”63

The new generation’s attitude to GAM’s official party changed as the older generation of leaders responded to criticisms and ultimately changed the party’s name and symbols. As one young GAM leader told the writer, “We don’t want to say that (the changes) were the result of pressure, but there has been a change towards democracy (in the newly-named Aceh Party). Our principle is to ensure that democracy really exists and not just at the level of discourse.”64

Despite apparently conciliatory measures, both generations continued to perceive this gap between them throughout 2007 and 2008. The young camp, at least, did not generally see the split as a bad thing. As one of their number explained, “Different opinions are natural as long as those in competition open the space needed for the growth of democracy.”65

We know now that more than one of the local parties cleared to participate in the 2009 national elections has links to GAM. In the final round of reviews in July 2008, the national General Elections Commission (KPU) announced that six of the applicant parties had passed the final stage of the validation process and were now legal entities. These parties were: Partai Aceh, Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (The Safe Prosperous Aceh Party), Partai Bersatu Atjeh (Aceh Unity Party), Partai Daulat Atjeh (Aceh Sovereign Party), Partai Rakyat Atjeh (Aceh People’s Party) and Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh (Aceh People’s Independent Voice Party - PSIRA).66 In addition to Partai Aceh, the two parties with clear links to GAM are PSIRA and the Aceh People’s Party (PRA).

As the name suggests, PSIRA is the outgrowth of the old Aceh Referendum

Information Center (Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh - SIRA), which was led by Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar during the armed conflict and was generally considered a ‘non-military’ appendage of GAM. SIRA is best known for the demonstration it staged in 1999 in support of a referendum on the future of the province that attracted several hundreds of thousands of people sparking a crackdown from the central government and TNI. It made headlines again in 2006 for a smaller demonstration that nevertheless applied significant pressure on the government to allow independent candidates in the local elections and to honor controversial aspects of the Helsinki Agreement. The Aceh People’s Party, on the other hand, was formed by primarily young political activists who agreed with GAM’s aims during the conflict, if not their means, and worked to raise political awareness among local people and to lobby international actors.

63 Interview on 3 November 2007. 64 Telephone interview with young GAM leaders on 29 February 2008. 65 Interview with young GAM leader in Banda Aceh, 5 November 2007. 66 Four parties that had made it through the earlier stages of the verification and formalization

process did not make it through the final stage: Partai Aliansi Rakyat Aceh Peduli Perempuan (PARA), Partai Geuneurasi Atjeh Beusaboh Tha‘at dan Taqwa (Gabthat), Partai Darussalam (PD) and Partai Lokal Aceh (PLA). See Kompas, “34 Parpol di Pemilu 2009,” 8 July 2008.

B. GAM’s Role in Economic Transformation

In addition to adapting to the new political reality, GAM has also faced significant challenges in terms of participating in the economic transformation of the province in peacetime. This is particularly evident when we consider that the organization has played a leading role in the disarmament/decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration (known as ‘DDR’) of former armed combatants as stipulated in the Helsinki Agreement. The definition of ‘reintegration’ in this chapter refers to a process whereby former combatants are assisted in their reinstatement to full citizenship in political, social and economic terms. Key aspects of this process are ensuring that former combatants are able to return to their communities and begin fulfilling their basic needs.67

The first stage of a reintegration program is normally the granting of political amnesty to former combatants and political prisoners. When the central government fulfilled this obligation, GAM began handing over its weapons and ‘deactivating’ its armed wing. The TNI and police also began withdrawing personnel as stipulated in the Helsinki Agreement. The central government also formalized its commitment to providing economic and other kinds of support to the reintegration of former combatants into mainstream society. Reintegration policies in Aceh covered three broad phases of an overall programmatic approach: Short term (conducted between February and May 2006); Medium term (covering May – December 2006), and; Longer term (January – December 2007).68 Several measures were agreed as part and parcel of the reintegration process69: First, provide assistance to former GAM combatants to fulfill their daily needs during the transition period and obtain work; Second, provide economic empowerment assistance and capital to former GAM combatants so they may support themselves sustainably in their communities; Third, provide assistance to enable former GAM combatants to improve their dwellings to an acceptable standard, which may be conducted with assistance from the local community; Fourth, provide assistance to nationalist (anti-separatist –ed.) supporters and other community members in the form of working capital and home improvements in order to avoid social jealousy and improve trust and tolerance in communities, and; Five, provide assistance to other victims of the conflict as deemed eligible. Under Presidential Instruction No.15/2005 on the Implementation of the Agreement between GAM and RI, the Governor was tasked with ensuring the success of government reintegration initiatives. In May 2006, the Acting Governor formally established the Aceh Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh - BRA). BRA received technical support from various international UN agencies and donor organizations and its basic tasks were to reunite the various elements of Acehnese society

67 Andi Syaiful Haq, Dinamika Konflik dan Perdamaian di Aceh, Bandung: Program Magister

Studi Pertahanan InstitutTeknologi Bandung, (unpublished thesis), 2007), pg. 13. 68 Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (Aceh Reintegration Board), Rencana Strategis Badan Rekonstruksi-

Damai Aceh (Draf Naskah), Banda Aceh, October 2007, pg. 23. 69 Translated verbatim from Ibid., pg. 4.

split asunder during the conflict through religious, social, educational, political, and cultural approaches, and to put a stop to the cycle of local conflict through economic approaches.70 In order to avoid local jealousy and improve trust between the various elements of local communities, the government planned to make assistance available not only to former GAM combatants. However, there were many problems at BRA, although the Board achieved considerable success in ensuring political amnesty for 7,140 former combatants and, at the time of writing, had assisted communities with a population of 67,600 people. One of the first problems to come up upon its establishment was identifying appropriate target groups and recipients of assistance. The line had to be drawn somewhere because, in one way or another, the entire population were ‘conflict affected’ but not all could receive direct assistance from the government. BRA created the following categories of aid recipients in 2006: Economic Empowerment Program:

1. Formed armed combatants of the TNA 2. Former political prisoners 3. Civilian victims of the conflict 4. Others:

a. Non-TNA GAM members b. GAM members who surrendered prior to MOU c. Members of PETA (Pembela Tanah Air – Defenders of the

Homeland – an umbrella organization for anti-GAM groups)

Assistance was also to be extended under so-called ‘social-cultural’ initiatives to people who had suffered the following during the conflict or who qualified for the following kinds of assistance: Social-cultural Programs:

5. Diyat 6. Home damaged/destroyed 7. Physical disabilities 8. Medical services 9. Scholarships for orphans

The table below outlines the government’s financial commitment to the BRA reintegration programs for former combatants drawn from the national budget over the 2005-2007 period:

70 Ibid.

Table 2. BRA Economic Empowerment Program for Former GAM Combatants

No. Category Number Timetable Assistance

(IDR)

2005 2006 2007 Total Per person Total

1 Former TNA 3000 1000 2000 0 3000 25,000,000 75,000.000,000

2 Non-TNA GAM members 6200 1200 5000 0 6200 10,000,000 62,000,000,000

3 GAM members surrendered pre-MOU

3204 500 2704 0 3204 10,000,000 32,040,000,000

169,040,000,000

(USD 18.4 million)71

Source: BRA

The funds were not paid ‘out of hand’ directly to recipients. The former combatants had to fulfill certain prerequisites, such as forming themselves into groups and establishing a working relationship or ‘business unit’. The group then had to develop and submit a proposal to their local KPA branch. If the proposal was deemed of an acceptable standard, it would be passed on to BRA.

These measures were put in place to ensure that the funds were used as working capital as intended, but the situation on the ground did not follow BRA guidelines. The KPA central board had handed over decision-making authority on the use of the funds to the district branches. Preparing proposals through the KPA was often viewed as merely a means to secure BRA funds that could be used for other purposes.72 Aceh Besar district, for example, received Rp8,025,000,000 but allocated Rp25 million for each of the 321 registered recipients was not dispersed to the applicant groups or cooperative units as intended. As many as 2,000 GAM members in two categories apparently received funds (both former armed combatants and non-armed supporters, such as logistics and local intelligence sources). The decision was taken because former GAM personnel were in need of cash to meet their basic needs.73

These sorts of practices were known to the GAM leadership. Indeed, many agreed that assistance was not reaching former combatants, families of deceased members and 71 USD 1 : IDR 9,200

72 Interview with KPA spokesperson Ibrahim Syamsuddin on 3 November 2007. 73 Interview with Muharram, former commander of GAM’s Aceh Besar district, in Banda Aceh,

on 5 November 2007. Former active combatants received up to Rp6 million in cash and non-active combatants Rp3 million. However, these amounts could change depending on conditions at the sub-district and village level.

other victims of the conflict fast enough. Zakaria Saman claimed that, by straying from BRA regulations and redistributing the funds, BRA’s economic empowerment program was not only assisting the 3,000 former armed combatants but was reaching as many as 20,000 people. In addition, the payment of cash to eligible parties was the best solution because it was part of GAM’s responsibility as the main local actor in the 30-year conflict and the money was insufficient to cover the establishment of functioning businesses for all.74

The situation in Aceh Besar was not repeated across the province. In Bireuen

district, for example, ‘Type C’75 businesses were established among former combatants in the fields of livestock, fisheries, small plantation agriculture, traditional herbal remedies (jamu) and tourism. These businesses were able to employ 20 people and provide a daily wage of around Rp50,000 as well offer a monthly ‘bonus’ of 15kgs of rice and Rp50,000.76

Clearly, not all businesses affiliated to GAM at this time were owned or run by grass-roots members under the BRA program. The Acehnese elite and GAM leadership came from a long history of entrepreneurship and wealth accumulation. One notable case was the Pulo Gading enterprise established and run by the family of former TNA commander and current KPA chief Muzakir Manaf. The company began by importing secondhand cars from Singapore and exporting pinang fruit to Malaysia but was soon looking to expand into a steel works, a livestock complex and a plastics factory. The company owned stakes in several other local businesses in a variety of entrepreneurial fields.77

The company could not help but attract notice and criticism from many quarters by 2007. In an interview with the writer, Zakaria Saman defended company director Muzakir and said the company possessed all official documents. Many criticized the fact that the company employed few former combatants and resentment of the GAM leadership grew.78 As scrutiny and pressure increased, Malik Mahmud himself gave the company until the beginning of 2008 to provide complete financial reports and audit results, which had not been released or conducted in previous years. If any discrepancies were found, he said, GAM would welcome the submission of the case to the legal authorities.79

74 Interview with Zakaria on 3 November 2007. 75 ‘Type C’ businesses normally possess one large asset, such as a truck or excavator, and rent one

more asset. 76 Buletin Perdamaian, edisi 01/TH Ke-1/Agustus 2007, pg. 7. 77 Aryos Nivada, “Kerajaan Bisnis TNI dan Bisnis (Sayap) Militer GAM di Provinsi NAD,” in

Muradi et al, Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer, Sebaran Bisnis TNI Pasca UU TNI Diterbitkan, Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, 2007, pg. 47. Other companies under Pulo Gadeng are PT Bank Perkereditan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS) Samudra Niaga; PT Matangkuli Perdana; PT Krueng Kureutou; PT Pandu Buana Nusantara; CV Aneuk Piranha, and CV Mawar Sejati. Other companies that involve other high-ranking GAM personnel are Aceh World Trade Center (AWTC) Dagang Holding, PT Aneuk Nanggroe Expedition Bireuen, PT Megah Mulia, and PT Halimun Meugah Raya.

78 Interview with Zakaria on 3 November 2007. 79 Ibid.

In what was seen by many as an attempt to improve public perceptions of GAM’s role in developing grass-roots businesses, the KPA instructed its regional branches to establish local cooperatives. The instruction also coincided with government plans to make more working capital and support available to cooperatives in Aceh. The table below shows a breakdown of the cooperatives registered as of November 2007:

Table 3. KPA-affiliated Cooperatives

No District Total 1. Aceh Tamiang 1 2. Aceh Timur 8 3. Aceh Utara dan Lhokseumawe 7 4. Bireun 7 5. Simeulue 1 6. Pidie 6 7. Sabang 1 8. Aceh Tengah/Bener Meriah 2 9. Aceh Tenggara 2 10. Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh 7 11. Aceh Jaya 4 12. Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya 4 13. Blang Pidie/Aceh Barat Daya 4 14. Tapak Tuan, Aceh Selatan 4 15. Aceh Singkil 1 16. Gayo Lues 1 17. Lain-lain (masyarakat, KPA Pusat) 2

Total 62 Source: Central KPA data as of 3 November 2007

Most of these cooperatives exist only on paper due to a lack of government-sourced or other capital, although handfuls have begun operations. The cooperative on the island of Pulau Weh/Sabang off the coast of Banda Aceh, for example, is importing used cars from Singapore and has started work in the fisheries and sugar sectors. B. The Long Road to Change

GAM’s transformation in the political realm will require time to come to fruition. The long road from armed struggle to fully-fledged political actor requires preparation – both within the organization and the environment in which it operates, including the policies and laws that govern society.

The existence of the GAM party is a big step in the right direction because the party is a vehicle through which GAM can pursue its interests in the political realm. After the 2009 elections, we could see GAM party representatives in the national parliament.

It is through political parties also that ordinary people have the opportunity to

consolidate their networks and have a greater influence on determining actions and outcomes. The playing field is wide open. The political party is a also a means for the party itself to educate society - former GAM members as well as others - about the political issues that will effect the future of their homeland.

If the establishment of the GAM party is significant, the validation of six local parties and their involvement in the 2009 elections is even more so. It is the manifestation of the will of government and society to compete according to set rules. Enthusiasm is running high. If the local political parties were excluded from this competition, it would have a grave effect on the ongoing peace process.

Nevertheless, the political parties may also be used to upset the peace process through stirring up problems within communities and in relations between the central government and elements of the erstwhile rebellion in Aceh. In terms of relations with Jakarta there is cause for concern, as national elections are governed by Law No.10/2008 and ‘local’ elections in Aceh under the Law on the Governance of Aceh, which is not covered in any detail in the national Law. As such, great importance is attached to the government and General Election Commission’s ability and timeliness in covering the gap and ensuring that there is a strong legal basis for the implementation and execution of the national elections in 2009 and beyond.

Can the GAM party take control of the Aceh parliament as envisioned by its senior leaders and supporters? This is a difficult question to answer. There are a number of reasons why predicting the outcomes of the election is difficult. First, GAM faces several fundamental challenges in consolidating its party’s internal operations. The rejection of Partai GAM by the ‘new generation’ at its founding was just the first stage in an ongoing debate about the party’s culture and representative credentials. Second, support for GAM has been fragmented to an unknown degree by the establishment of other parties with links to the independence movement, such as PSIRA and the PRA, which were very high-profile and active in drumming up support for the cause within Aceh and abroad.

Besides dividing loyalties among voters, the new local parties’ very existence also means that key people that once supported GAM have become competitors in the political realm. Add to this the presence of the established national parties and the picture becomes even more challenging for the GAM leadership.

Many have questioned the ability of the KPA and Partai Aceh to respond to and channel the aspirations of its followers. Many also note that the GAM leadership’s attitude in 2006 - to adopt a neutral position in the gubernatorial elections - may not be the best stance coming into 2009. One of the reasons the Irwandi-Nazar team won the election was due to the hard work and dedication of Nazar, SIRA and other supporters at grass-roots level. Whether GAM is able to truly represent supporters and effectively mobilize them to draw in more votes remains a question in the minds of many observers.

The change of name from ‘Partai GAM’ to ‘Partai Aceh’ was, nevertheless,

widely viewed as a smart political move. It not only showed that the leadership was willing to change but the fact that they also replaced ‘GAM’ with ‘Aceh’ indicated that the party’s interests are broadening beyond the limitations of the organization. Many chose to see the change as a signal of GAM’s desire to leave behind the confrontational mindset of the past. The people of Aceh are waiting to see if the party can work on these issues effectively and their perceptions will influence their choices when GAM competes at the elections with other local and national parties.

One key issue to work on is the selection of candidates to represent the party at the 2009 national elections. Further tension and division is likely to arise if the leadership does not respond effectively to the aspirations ‘from below’. It is important for Partai Aceh to accommodate the aspirations of junior members and supporters while at the same time reducing the influence of young leaders who have rejected the party and will work against its electoral success. The preparation of GAM party candidates and improving their credentials as professionals will be crucial, as GAM representatives in office will interact with experienced parliamentarians from the established parties.

We must not forget that the internal and external political dynamics unfolding in Aceh are part of the grand process named democratization. GAM itself is transforming from a centralized, ‘commando’ mentality and approach to a democratic organization. One of the key reasons why tensions have arisen is due to the fact that the old ways were ineffective and the organization was unprepared to meet the challenges presented by the new political environment in Aceh.

In simple terms, GAM’s participation in the economic sector is a significant

advancement on the situation prior to the Helsinki Agreement. GAM members are free to establish businesses without the oppressive presence of TNI and Polri as was the case during the conflict. However, not all GAM personnel are benefiting equally from this new lease of economic life. Developing approaches to the economic empowerment of members will be an important issue to address. The lack of transparency and consequent suspicions in the case of Pulau Gading must be avoided if GAM members are to develop their economic credentials. Addressing problems associated with the culture of patriarchy and dependence between senior and junior personnel will also be important in this sense.80

As such, developing clear policies and a healthy enterprise culture will be important for the development of the organization in broad terms. Clear policies and effective action will show members and supporters that the leadership is concerned with their needs. At the very least, it could ensure that the benefits of development are shared more equitably. The development of the cooperatives by the GAM branches could be an important part of this endeavor. In addition to improving access to banking facilities and

80 On the patriarchal and patrimonial culture of GAM see World Bank, “Kajian Mengenai …,” pg.

18

loans, the cooperatives could allow the leadership to track and analyze developments within the membership and devise appropriate, sustainable solutions.81

Indeed, if the GAM leadership is unable to effectively address problems of economic development and inequity between members, there will be dire consequences for the peace process as a whole. The GAM leadership maintains that the desire for independence is no longer strong,82 but conditions within the broader society must be monitored and anticipated. As one district commander told the writer, “If the economic gap and unjust practices continue, the desire for independence will grow because living as a rebel has become a philosophy of life here.”83 The reintegration agency, BRA, is also concerned about this due to the involvement of large numbers of former GAM personnel. The perceived failure of the BRA program will add fuel to the fire of discontent.84

Finally, the evolution of the leadership of GAM will have a profound effect on the future of the organization and Aceh as a whole. Discussions on who will ‘replace’ the aging founder of the organization, Hasan Tiro, have begun but no resolution is in sight. Finding a suitable leader from among the ‘old generation’ leaders, such as Malik Mahmud, Teungku Usman Lampoh Awe and Zaini Abdullah, will be just as problematic as accommodating the newer generation of potential leaders such Muzakkir Manaf, Kamaruzzaman and Bakhtiar Abdullah.

81 The BRA reintegration program in 2008 provided a budget of over Rp212 million and placed

particular emphasis on assistance to GAM personnel who surrendered prior to the Helsinki Agreement and the provision of farming land. The government and BRA considered channeling assistance through cooperatives. See Paparan BRA dalam Rakor Program BRA dengan Dinas Provinsi NAD, Banda Aceh 30 Oktober 2007.

82 Interview with Zakaria on 3 November 2007. 83 Ketua Badan Pelaksana BRA Dawan Gayo mengatakan bila tidak ditanggapi dengan cermat

maka ancaman disintegrasi akan menjadi nyata sebagai respon dari kegagalan program reintegrasi. Wawancara tanggal 2 November 2007.

84 Interview on 2 November 2007.