"The Tradition of Sociopolitical Inquiry" (Chapter)

LIBERALISM AND THE QUEST FOR

ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

by

Kenneth E. Bauzon

Published in Association withDuke University Islamic and Arabian Development Studies

THE ACORN PRESS

Durham, North Carolina

LIBERALISM AND THE QUEST FOR

ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

by

Kenneth E. Bauzon

Published in Association withDuke University Islamic and Arabian Development Studies

THE ACORN PRESS

Durham, North Carolina

Copyright @1991Kenneth E. Bauzon

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any formor by any means, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in articlesand reviews, without prior written permission of the publisher. For infor-mation address: The Acorn Press, P.O.Box4007, Duke Station, Durham,North Carolina277O6.

Copublished and sold exclusively in the Philippines by Ateneo de ManilaUniversity Press, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, P.O. Box 154, 1099Manila.

First published 1991

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bauzon, Kenneth Espaft a.

Liberalism and the quest for Islamic identity in the Philippines/Kenneth E. Bauzon.

P. qn."In association with Duke University, Islamic and Arabian

Development Studies."Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-89386-02&X1. Muslims-Philippines. 2. Nationalism-Philippines.

3. Philippines-Politics and government. 4. Liberalism-Philippines. 5. Islam-Philippines. I. Title.DS666.M8838 1990

95994c20 89-82249CIP

Printed in the United States of America

Dt

TheRn.l

In lovit

Julita

Dedicated to my father,The Rero. Francisco Fernandez Bauzon

and

In loaing memory of my mother,

Julita N una Espafia Y N aaas

ormlcles

for-iln,

nilalo9B

Dedicated to my father,The Ra:. Francisco FnnandezBauzon

and

lnlouingmemory of my mother,

Iulita Nuan Espafia Y N aaas

)A9

IP

I

THE TRADITION OFS O CIOPOLITIC AL INQUIRY

Knowledge about society has been among the main goals ofphilosophers and social scientists, especially since the advent of the En-lightenment. Modern science has its origins during this period" as doesthe tradition of modern sociology formalized by Auguste Comte as thescience of society. Whereas before, the method of leaming was specula-tive and ritualistic based on the assumption that a cosmic and socialorder determined the nature of human destiny, the modem period isrooted in the optimistic belief that human nature is shaped by man him-self. If, therefore, man goes about constructing a society according to hisimage of it and exploits all the t€sources at his comman4 he can controlnafure, regularize his behavio4 and predict the outcome.

Society as the Basic Unit of Analysis

Modern sociology, with society as thebasic unit of analysis, has to a greatextent been influenced by Enlightenment assumptions, notwithstandingrecent movements within the discipline to shift its focus of attention.lThe growing compleity of modern society eventually has led tospecializatiory with various subdisciplines sharpening their tools of re-search on the different aspects of society. Of these, political sociology has

emerged as a kind of amalgam of those who focus on political institu-tions in society, and those who stress nonpolitical variables affectingthese institutions and their activities.2 While the context in which thissubdiscipline emerged has been characterized by a tendency towardcooperation among the social sciences, e.g., economics, sociology, politi-cal science, and history, this context is particularly marked, as impliedabove, by the fusion of two images of a world so that political and social

aspects are no longer as separate and unrelated.The notion of separate realms is traceable to the mode of thought cur-

rent in westem Europe during the nineteenth century. In that view, the

4 / Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity

world is divided between society and the state. It follows that those whowield power are those who occupy public offices and those who are ledare formally sanctioned groups such as political parties.3 The breakdownof the state, particulatly in the non-Westem areas, coupled with theemergence in the twentieth century of powerful informal groups, laidthe above assumptions to rest. Western social scientists now have to findnew ways with which to interpret how societies and states interelate,how they persist and disintegrate, and how individuals and groupsfunction.

A rejuvenated subdiscipline of political sociology for a time appearedto dictate the pace of social research, insisting on the primary ofsociopolitical over economic variables. In the second half of thenineteenth century, Karl Man<'s interpretation of history, based on thedual pillar of economic and sociological theory became persuasive,threatening to dislodge positivist techniques and the liberal atmospherethat sustained them.a Howeveq, the primacy of sociopolitical variableswas upheld and it gained no better advocate than Max Weber himselfwhq in his vast contributions to the field of sociology, underlined the im-portance of noneconomic factors. In his critique of Marx, Weber arguedthat a social stratum couldbebased not only on the economic position ofan individual or a group but also on his (or its) relative status in thesociety as a whole.s While class and status may overlap, Weber ex-plained they are not necessarily identical.

Weber's influence on political sociolog:y, particularlywith his efforts todispassionately separate social inquiry from the realms of values, is evi-dent in the orientations that the subdiscipline subsequently came to ac-quire.6 Among these orientations was the analytical distinction betweenthe civil and political orders, each tending at some point to subsume theother. Another was the disassociation of regularized human behaviorand beliefs from a previous transcendental and moral arrangement. Stillanother was the recognition of the existence of a variety of social ordersand their propensity to change in a temporaT, i.e,, historical, sequence.And, finally, there was the recognition that environmental factors im-pinge ory or determine, the type of social order that exists.T From theseorientations developed more rigorous research techniques for identify-ing the conditions under which a social order may change or persist. Thesignificance of this development maybe gleaned from (1) the manner inwhich the phenomena of social disordel disorganization, and change in-creasingly have become the focus of sociological theory, and (2) the dis-covery and elaboration of some general laws goveming different socialorders.s

Facts anr

By the mid-twentieth centuother social phenomena rhavioral movement and ilSchool" and the functionafiuniversities, not to mentprominent amongwhomuthe social sciences the tedrsciences, the behavioral nteenth and seventeenth cepattern of social behavior,tence on knowledge by evirtouchstone of social inquirwhether derived deductirHence, an explanation wapr€supposed certain generwords/ the correspondencrwas presumed a criterionfollowed further that the qthe prediction of future evexplained by a set of prerevent could, in theory at lrbeen formulated before the

This understanding abobecame dominant in socirviously, the nature of scienlregulal, and cumulative. l

repeatedly in a variety of si

change in this theory coulccommodate new evidence,prehensive theory.13 Each rempirical tests which, if zupansiory or incorporation-'in one stroke the problentheories or paradigms.la

TheAr

The behavioral assumptiorthe 1960s as the "standardsearchers of a distinct vocal

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The Tradition of Sociopolitical Inquiry / 5

Facts and Values in Behavioralism

By the mid-twentieth century, the search for an explanation of these andother social phenomena received a boost with the advent of the be-havioral movement and its localized advocates such as the "ChicagoSchool" and the functionalist group of writers at Harvard and Columbiauniversities, not to mention a distinct gnouP of logical positivists,prominent among whom was Karl Popper.e ln attempting to reptcate inthe social sciences the techniques developed and refined in the naturalsciences, the behavioral movement reaffirmed the assumption of six-tbenth and seventeenth century positivists conceming the regularizedpattern of social behavio4 including its predictiory as well as the insis-lence on knowledge by evidence.l0 Thus, value-free objectivitybecarne atouchstone of social i.q,tury and the formulation of testable hypotheses,whether derived deductively or inductively, was a virtue in itself.llHence, an explanation was accepted as valid only if it was logical andpresupposed certain generalizations and relevant conditions. In otherwords, the correspondence between the generalizations and conditionswas presumed a criterion for the validity of a scientific explanation. Itfollowed further that the explanation of past events had a twin brother inthe prediction of future events. The rationale was that if events can be

explained by a set of premises after an event has occurred, the same

event could, in theory at least, have been predicted had these premisesbeen formulated before the event.12

This understanding about the nature of explanation (and prediction)became dominant in sociopolitical studies until the early 1960s. Pre-

viously, the nature of scientific discovery was presumed to be organized,regula4 and cumulative. For instance, a theory that had been tested

repeatedly in a variety of situations was regarded as highly confirmed; achange in this theory could occur only if (1) it was expanded so as to ac-

commodate new evidence, or (2) it was subsumed under a more com-prehensive theory.13 Each resulting theory, in turn, underwent a series ofempirical tests which, if successful, could serve as a basis for further ex-

pansiory or incorporation. This notion, post-positivists assert, eliminates

in one stroke the problem of commensurability acnf,ss and between

theories or paradigms.la

The Advent of Post-Positivism

The behavioral assumptions--<ollectively regarded at the beginning ofthe L960s as the "standard view" owing to the acceptance by social re-

searchers of a distinct vocabulary for the dissemination of the behavioralfurent social


orientationls--cncountered a stiff challenge upon the publication ofThomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Reoolutions in1962. perhapsthe most important aspect of this work is that it views scientific dis-covery as revolutionary, entailing the "breaking down [of] the icons...of'normal science,' replacing them with new fundamental images or'paradigms."'16 No longer is the grrowth of knowledge regarded asbrder-ly and cumulative but, ratheX, the result of competition :ilnong prac-titioners imbued with their own respective sense of mission that in-tegrates their definition of a problem, their solution to it, and themeaning they attach to reality. In other words, these practitioners respec-tively belong to a unit of consensus, referred to here as a paradigm, thatserves as a scientific community and that ffierentiates them frrcm othercommunities. The relative strength of their argument does not necessari-ly depend on the behavioralist criterion of objectivity; on the contrarytheir argument is infused with values r,einforced by so-called scientificmethods designed only to validate them. In this new light, commen-surability has come to be regarded as a problem in its own right.

Morc significantly, the post-positivist era is delineated by particularassumptions about science that distinguish it from the prnceding era.r7First, post-positivism denies that observation can be independent oftheory. To the contrary, it asserts that there can be no meaningful obser-vation apart from theory. Second, it rejects the notion that experiments ortests are value-free. Rathe4, the opposite is true: experiments or tests arereplete with interpretations based on values. This assertion places inserious doubt the usefulness of so-called "cmcial experiments" srp-posedly designed to test value-free theories.ls Thir4 post-positivismrejects the notion that empirical testing procedures by themselves canprcvide adequate cause for rejecting a theory. Instead it asserts, theoriesare always in some danger of becoming obsolete due to potential"anomalies." Fourth, it admits the possibility that the meaningp of termsoften change when the terms are placed in a new theoretical setting. Thisis because terms do not edst in isolation; they assume meaningbybeinga part of a theoretical system. Fiftb it poses a broader conception oftheory to encompass " arry sufficiently general point of view concemingmatter [sic] of fact "le including folk myths and religious beliefs. Sixth, itrecognizes the variability of the goals of science and casts doubt on anyclaims of finality by science of any phenomenon. Finally, post-positivismrejects the separation between the context of discovery, i.e., the sources ofscientific ideas, and the context of justificatiory i.e., the logic of explana-tion, for the reason that both actually emanate from the same contextualcontext.

As a consequence of tlxscience has come to be viehow scientific knowledPUnder this new regime, ittain conceptual PersPectilplication of "the way in wvestigation, set [sic] stand:

the collection of evidencqutry."zo In other wordsanschauung fliterallY, woshare commonPrrceduremore, because it is assurhistorical setting consir

knowledge of the historysarily established with anof knowledge.

At the outset, it can hscience and the sociologipositivism. As a subdisciltents of human conduct, I

"the glowth of a techniqmeaningf ullY intelligibleporary counterPart of eigsingled out as having Pusconstruct a world of mez

behavior lend themselvecontinues, the substanctdehumanization and foleverything to a measurileads, in turry to the str

default because of its PrelGiven this critique t

knowledge offers an altr

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The Tradition of Sociopoliti callnqurry / 7

As a consequence of these assumptions, the task of the philosophy of

science has co]me to be viewed as that of providing an understanding of

how scientific knowledge is discovere4 developed" and modified.

under this new regime, it is believed that science originates from a cer-

tain conceptual perspective the comprehension of which requires an aP-

plication of "the *ay in which this perspective leads to problems for in-

vestigation, set [sic] itandards for their solutions, directs observation and

the c-ollection of evidence, and set [sic] goals and expectations for in-

qtt$."2o In other word.s, science operates in the context of a welt-

insrirouung (literally, worldview) within which a glgup-of scientists

shale com-mon procid,tres in the management of complex data. Further-

more, becaut" it i" assumed that the weltan*hauung develops within a

historical setting considerable attention inevitably is given to a

knowledge of the history and sociology of science. Thus, a link is neces-

sarily estiblished with an important branch of sociology-the socioloryof knowledge.

At the oritset, it can be said that the post-positivist philosophers of

science and the sociologists of knowledge are akin in their critique of

positivism. As a subdiscipline devoted to the study of the ideational con-

ients of human conduct,lhe sociology of knowledge has been critical of,,the growth of a technique of thought by means of which all that was

-uu.rllttgfrrtty intelligible was excluded."2l Behavioralism-the contem-

porary Jounierpart of eighteenth and nineteenth century positivism-is'sindea out as havingpulhed to the foreground this tendency, seekingto

con"struct a world oi measurable facts in which the pattems of human

behavior lend themselves to prediction. consequently, as the critique

continues, the substance of social science undergoes a "mechanistic

dehumanization and formalization in which there is a'r'eduction of

everything to a measurable, or inventory-like describability'"'2 This

leadi in iurry to the sterility of inquiry, devoid of any meaning by

default because of its pretensions for objectivity.

Given this critique of behavioral techniques, th9 sociolory _ of

knowledge offers ai altemative mode of social research. Basic to this

mode is ihe recognition of an intimate relationship between an- object

and the perceivin-g subject---a relationship signifying at another level a

"orr=rpot duncebitr,r'ein thought and existence. This does not necessari-

ly mein that whatev"r a perro-n imagines is necessarily accurate, for the

iossibilities of inadequate perception, incorrect knowledge,_and unwill-

irrgr,.r, or inability to convey ideashonestly ute acknowledged. Sociol-

ofr ofknowledge is less interested in debunkingor unraveling socially

pilauced distoriions than it is in a systematic study of the various social

ionditions that give rise to anything that passes for "knowledge" in

ent ofobser-


society. As Peter L. Belger and Thomas Luckmann explairy "the centralproblem [of sociology of knowledge] is the sociology of truth, not thesociologtrr of ettot." 23

The presumption of social conditions as a factor in the rise ofknowledge is based on the view that society not only shapes the ap-pearance but also determines the content of human imagination. Nohuman thought assert Berger and Luckmanry is free from the ideologiz-ing influences of its social origin. In turn, the human imaginationprrcduced creates a social reality characterized by its own justification forefstence. Established intolerance and institutionalized suppression, forexample, delineate what the controlling elements in the society regard asdangerous and subversive, on one hand, and a permissible area of dis-cussiory on the other. In certain cases, the thought process itself can be "acatalytic agent that is capable of unsettling routines, disorganizinghabits, lreaking up customs, undermining faiths, and generating skep-ticism."24

The above realization thus bears out the twofold aspect of the objec-tivity pnrfessed by the sociology of knowledge. On one hand, the objectand subject are acknowledged as autonomous entities; on the otherhand, both are acknowledged to be engaged in an interactive process.Furthermore, the sociology of knowledge does not completely reject thepositivist concem for causality, e.9., a causal relation between thoughtand its existential basis, inasmuch as the former aspect of objectivity (theobject) is concemed with the reliability of data and the validity of con-clusions, while the latter (the subject) is concerned with the interpreta-tion of meaning. While causality is not a major concem for the sociologyof knowledge, it is bnrught up anyway, particularly by Karl Mannheimin his pioneering efforts in the field.s Mannheim, it may be noted treatsthe model of causality only with regard to his critique of positivismwhich, to him, has been entirely incapable of probing the problem of theexistentiality of thought. He perceives that positivism, because it effec-tively excludes meaningfully intelligible phenomena from analysis, con-tains nihilistic elements manifesting reliance on the dogmas of science.To deal, then, with the problem of subjectivity wherein one can accountfor the historical position of the knowing subject, on one hand, and acomprehension of the acting subject, on the othe1, Mannheim seeks toredefine the nature of social inquiry.26 First, he distinguishes betweenGeistesutissenschnften ("moral sciences" or "human sfudies") and Natur-wissenschafien ("natural sciences") and claims that the positivist ideal of aunified science is a "specious" one. Second, he insists that the Geistesutis-senschaften are distinguished by the meaning invested in their subjectmatter and that to deny this meaning as positivism does, is to deny the

prospect of human studietiory at least, is to comphenomena, unlike the icausality which is subsrmplains that once meaningpretation, i.e., that is, thesocial reality, follows.

Thus fax, the discussiqproduct as though knowilcomp osed of individualsnature of that society. Amsociety, particularly contgenerty and a divetgengroups, thus rendering iherently, the lack of a cmlishing uniform criteria c

society possess differenprimarily to their respectithen, has the unavoidabholders of these perspectiprcting an object and a swith meaning. Thus, lv{ar

thinking depends nec€ss

within itself the whole sy:thinker in question and ehind this system of thoug

Is the sociology of lnorheterogeneous conceptbWhile an acknowledg"d I

of the homogeneity of lruto nanow down or evenassumption that these dithose who hold them, Mzin the society itself. This I

of varying perspectives irenough to focus on thesociological nrots as a mand corresponding limitatlimitations is a precondiperspective, thus enabliqeach of the perspective,the perspectives maybe c

3the cenkalpth, not the

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of dis-can be "a

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ivity (theof con-

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pncspect of human studies altogether. Thfu4 the purpose of an investiga-tion, at least, is to comprehend the meaning of concrete historicalphenomena, unlike the interest of the nafural sciences in discoveringcausality which is subsumed under presumed general law. Lastly, he ex-

plains that once meaning has been comprehended, the Problem of inter-pretation, i.e., that is, the problem of accounting for thought in terms ofsocial reality, follows.

Thus fat the discussion has dealt mainly with knowledge as a soeial

product as though knowledge was homogeneous to society, i.e', a society

composed of individuals and groups possessing a common image of thenature of that society. A more realistic view, however, acknowledges thatsociety, particularly contemporary society, is characterized by hetero-geneity and a divergence of inter,ests among those individuals and

groups, thus rendering incongruous their "common image" of it. In-herently, the lack of a common image precludes the possibility of estab-

lishi.g uniform criteria of relevance and truth. Different sectors of thesociety possess different perspectives, which Mannheim attributesprimarity to their respective cLass positions. "Talking past one anothe1,"

ihen, has the unavoidable consequence of differing perspectives; theholders of these perspectives have a particular way of viewing and inter-preting an object and a set of concepts with which to invest the object

with meaning. Thus, Mannheim writes, "[E]very definition in historicalthinking depends necessarily upon one's perspective, i.e., it contains

within itself the whole system of thought representing the position of thethinker in question and especially the political evaluations which lie be-

hind this system of thought."27Is the sociology ofknowledge oblivious to the fact that there maybe a

heterogeneous conception of society? 04, is heterogeneity assumed?

while an acknowledged task of this enterprise is to establish the "truth"of the homogeneity of knowledge in society, it must also search for waysto nanow down or even reconcile differing perspectives. Based on the

assumption that these differences ale rooted in the social positions ofthose who hold them, Mannheim, for one, believes that the solution lies

in the society itself. This plesumes, howeve4, a previous harmonizationof varying perspectives in the intellectual realm. To achieve this, it is notenough tb focus on the perspective Per se; one also must trace its

sociological roots as a means of discovering its unique characteristics

and corresponding limitations. An awal'eness of these characteristics and

limitationJ is a precondition to the formulation of a more inclusive

perspective, thuJenabling one to determine (1) the extent of validity ofeactr-of the perspectives, and (2) the "common denominator" by whichthe perspectives maybe comPared.

subject:ny the


Implementation of this procedure has one of two possibilities: (1) thecommensurability or (2) the incommensurability of the perspectives con-sidered. Under a condition of commensurability, perspectives (or para-digms) A and B are applicable within the same domain D. Within D, Amay assert P conceming phenomenon Q, in 1€sponse to which B mayeither agree or disagree. In this case, the terms or categories that appearin Paradigm A conceming assertion P are also the same ones found inParadigm B and, hence, can be introduced into the latter. If a term orcategory in A cannot be introduced into B, that term is consequentlytranslated into one that canbe introduced into B. "Insofar as these condi-tions are met " writes James B. Noble, "we can speak of [Paradigms] Aand B as being commensurable with respect to P within domain D....Ifboth assert P, then the [paradigms] are in agreemenf in additiory if either

[or both] is supported by independent teasons, then it supports the other

[paradigm]....On the other hand, if the [paradigms] contradict one anotheq,

there is a prrcblem, and a decisionbetween them maybe necessary."xThere is a problem of incommensurability if the above conditions are

not met. More significantly, if the terms in Paradigm A can neither betranslated nor intncduced into B, both paradigms may be said to beskongly incommensurable. From actual experience, Kuhn has notedthree reasons for the incommensurability of paradigms. First, the prac-titioners of the different paradigms disagree on the list of problems to beresolved. Second, communication across paradigms is hindered by thetransformation of meaning of the terms used. And, third the prac-titioners are wrapped up in their own worlds in the practice of theirrespective trades, with each world shaped according to a particularvision; a shift (or "conversion") from that vision would be at best ashocking experience.2e

The prrccess of discovering whether paradigms are commensurable orincommensurable does not occur in a vacuum. It requires, as Mannheimsuggests, that individuals be capable of transcending their ownparochial perspective and of acquiring a broader one "that is both sensi-tive to the particular perspectives involved in a controversy, and yet rela-tively detached."3o To this task are assigned the "socially unattached in-tellectuals" by virtue of their "openness" and the "common bonds ofeducation" that minimize if not suPPress class and social differencesamong them. It is these qualities that render them more qualified thanothers in formulating or reformulating the various perspectives thatcompete in history.

At this juncture, it is ap1

tion of sociopolitical inqPhilippines. This text dcnationalism, for that hasabound. Nor does it prea study. Rathet, using thrpresent work attemptrsociopolitical inquiry th:pine politics, societ;r, an<

ale traceable to either then4 it shall have serverwhich knowledge develexperience.

A work such as this a

out various interpretatperspectives. More thanbut reflections of diverlpresumed solutions to iquestion or situation thatiory and justification. Tltual discourse, the proctthe practical problem of

The phenomenon ofPhilippines, whether inbeen variously describerdanao Crisis," and the'Moreoveq, the "pnrblem'causes rcquiring correspgests that the prcblemimage is the product oftolerance, acceptance, tcompassion."3l The sc

psychological ba:riers bhow to accept one anothabout one another. A polmittee of the PhilippineMuslim society into theingly, the problem is thalpopulation of the countthey [i.e., the Muslims] a

ilities: (1) thepectives con-res (or para-Within D, Avhich B mayI that appearnes found inIf a term ornnsequentlyithese condi-tradigmsl Ahain D....Ifliory if eithernts the otherlone anotheq,Fflry."%nditions aren neither bee said to ben has notedst, the prac-Slems to belered by thed, the prac-iice of theira particularbe at best a

msurable orsMannheimtheir own

sboth sensi-and yet rela-nttached in-on bonds ofI differencesnlified thanrctives that


Overview

At this juncture, it is appropriate to examine the relevance of the tradi-

tion of sociopolitical i"q"ury to the study of Islamic nationalism in the

Philippines. ^This

text does not pretend to pioneer the study of Filipino

nation'alism, for that has been done already; indee4 works on the subject

abound. Nor d,oes it presume to advocate a particular approach to such

a study. Rathet using the insights gained from the above discussion, the

pr"r"rrt work atteripts to 6reak new ground in the tradition of^sociopolitical inquiry through a synthesis of available studies of Philip-

pine politics, sociery and culture-studies whose basic presuppositions

are traceaUte to eitlier the Islamic or liberal intellectual tradition. In the

en4 it shall have sewed its purpose by demonstrating the process by

which knowledge develops within each of these areas in the Philippine

experience.A work such as this assumes significance in light of the need to sort

out various interpretations and to put them in PIoPeI intellectual

perspectives. Morethan likely, one will find that these interpretations are

Lut LflecUons of divergent definitions of a problem accompanied by

presumed solutions to ii' As used here, the term "'rollery" refers to a

question or situation that requires understanding clarification, explana-

tion, and justification. Thus, it belongs primarily to the realm of intellec-

tualdiscourse, the prccess or outcome of which may bear ultimately on

the practical problem of constituting a political and social order.

The phenomenon of nationalism exhibited by the Muslims in the

Philippines, whether in the distant past or in contemporary times, has

beenvariously described by scholars as the "Moro Problem," the "Min-

danao Cdsis,; and the "Crisis in the Philippine South," among others'

Moreover, the "prrcblem" has been perceived as emanating from various

cluses requiring corresponding solutions. One scholaX, for instance, sug-

gests thaf the lrrcblem lies in the realm of psychologl: "[T]he Moro

iltug" is the product of nearly four-hundred years of human failure in

toleiance, acieptance, understanding communication, patience' and

compassi,on."sl^ 1fts solution, thus, lies in breaking down these

psyJhobgical ba:riers by teaching the Muslims and non-Muslims alike

io.." to aJcept on" attother an4 in the process, develop a positive image

about one another. A political intelpretation, advanced by a special com-

mittee of the Philippine congress, emphasizes the task of drawing the

Muslim society irito ttr" Philippine constitutional framework. Accord-

ingly, the probiemis that of "intigratinginto thebody politic the Muslim

poiiifuUo" of the country, and 1ttratl of inculcating into their minds that

lir"y 1i.u., the Muslimsl #e fifipinos and that they-are a part of it'"32 Still


another viewpoint, which reflects the policies of the former colonial offi-cials in the country, stresses the eventual capitulatiory in a military andreligious sense, of the Muslims to constant colonial pressure. (Accordingto Spanish, Americary and briefly, Japanese colonial administrators, a

solution to the problem was "simply [that] of creating effective strategicand tactical problems that would ensure the ultimate subjugation andconversion of the Muslims."33) A fourth point of view holds that theproblem in the southem Philippines is "primarily of economic and socialorigin; religion is only a secondary concern."34

All of these interpretations reflect certain fundamental presupposi-tions that offer a comprehensive view of the world and seek to explainsocietal processes and interrelationships between events in a certainlight. For lack of a mol€ adequate label, these presuppositions may bereferred to collectively as "paradigms of explanation," to use Kuhn'sphrase. It is assumed here that the paradigms under consideration-Is-lamic and Liberal-form part of intellectual traditions that interact withand are, in turn, sustained or repressed by the prevailing social, politicafeconomic, and cultural conditions of the societies in which they findthemselves. They serve in their respective ways as the embodiment ofestablished knowledge from which practitioners, i.e., the scholars whoadhere to, support, and elaborate the fundamental presuppositions of aparadigm, seek to validate diverse and competing interpretationsthrough their established norms of research. In so doing these prac-titioners inevitably become active participants in the processes of thesociety in which they operate. Consequently, the knowledge that theyproduce is not like a disembodied head that hovers over the body; rathel,it is a definite part of social processes if only for the function it performsin either undermining or legitimizing these processes. It is the task of thepresent work to examine this interaction between knowledge andsociety and to identify the actors to whom this interaction has beenmeaningful. It is assumed that the practitioners' notion of "objectivity'' isconfined within the limits of their presuppositions. In this context theyprefer certain questions over others, and they view certain modes of re-search as appropriate and others as inappropriate. If a researcher goesbeyond these limits and treads on "forbidden ground," he or she may be

labeled "hel€ticalr" "subversiver" or "deviant" by his fellow prac-titioners.

To discem more fully the meaning of the above-cited interpretations,the fundamental postulates of the Islamic and liberal paradigms of ex-

planations will be elaborated, emphasizing their respective views on aparticular problem-the formation of human collectivity. In Islam, thiscollectivity is known as the Ummah, while in liberal thought, the term

" nation"-oft en equated wieither case, these conceptiufactors for collective actiorLlmmah and the nation willlof the Islamic and the libercomponents of. the Ummahthe rationalization of rel,ati

hand" andbetween them arother. In the process, this wfor pursuing knowledge, p

human organization, bearinconfined their research as

violators of such limits.Following the explicatio

their respective practitiut,phenomenon under study, i

pines. In accounting for thisto encounter a set of basic <

the Philippines solely a nWhat domestic, social concence? Is conflict inherent inculture a significant variabmay ask of the practitionertion involving modificatiotion in the light of new evic

the observation that paradcompeting paradigms bulthemselves.

Admittedly, this ap proacby Kuhn's concept of a parrecognized scientific [addproblems and solutions tc

words, it is a body of knowlthe world and held to be tnpractitioners are guided in I

problem and its Prcscribedpractitioners of a particulathat paradigm may be diqmore competently accountevent constifutes a "crisis'count of this paradigm's faiges to take its Place' It is in

colonial offi-a military and

. (According

ective strategicand

holds that theand social

presupposi-seek to explain:ts in a certain

may beto use Kuhn's

tion-Is-interact with

social, politicafthey find

errbodiment ofrholars who

ppositions of ainterpretations

these prac-of the

that theybody; rathet

ion it performsis the task of the

andhas been

"objectivity''isis context, they

modes of re-researcher goes

orshe maybefellow prac-

interpretations,of ex-

vlews on a

In Islam, thisght, the term


'nation"<ften equated with the secular /'sfnfs"-is commonly used. Ineither case, these conceptions have been observed to become motivatingfactors for collective action neferred to loosely as "nationalism'" The

Llmmnh and the nation will be teconstructed as they existed in the mindsof the Islamic and the liberal practitioners. In particula4 the respective

components of. the Llmmah and the nation will be identified along withthe rationalization of relationships among these components, on one

han4 and between them and other collectivities or communities, on the

other. In the process, this work will examine the practitioners' methods

for pursuing knowledge, particularly with respect to these notions ofhuman oqganization, bearing in mind the boundaries within which theyconfined iheir research as well as the sanctions they imposed on the

viol,ators of such limits.Following the explication of the paradigms' respective postulates,

their respective pracdtioners will then be made to account for the

phenomenon under study, i.e., the formation of nationality in the Philip-pina. In accounting for this phenomenon, the practitioners ere expected[o encounter a set of basic questions such as: Is "Islamic nationalism" inthe Philippines solely a religious phenomenory as the term implies?What domestic, social conditions contributed to its growth and persist-

ence? Is conflict inherent in its existence and, if sq how is it justified? Isctrlture a significant variable in explaining this phenomenon? And" wemay ask of the practitioners themselves: how do they deal with a situa-

tion involving modification or rejection of any aspect of their explana-

tion in the [ght of new evidence? This question arises mainly in view ofthe observation that paradigms are subject to challenge not only frrcm

competing paradigms but also from "insurgent" paradigms withinthemselves.

Admiftedly, this approach adopted here is influenced in large measure

by Kuhn's concept ofa paradigm. To him, a paradigm is a funiversallyrecognized scientific [a-hievement] that for a time prcvidejsl model

probiems and solutions to a community of practitionuo."T In other*ords, it is a body of knowledge consisting of a set of assumptions about

the world and held to be true and binding for all times and all places. Its

pnctitioners are guided in their intellectual pursuits by its definition of a

problem and its prescribed solution to it. In view of new evidence that

practitioners of a particular paradigm can neither accept nor account fotihat paradigm mly be displaced or rendered obsolete by one that can

mot" "o-p6tently

accounifor the new evidence. The occunence of this

event conititutes a "crisis" in the life of that paradigm in which, on ac-

count of this paradigm's failure to transform and adapt, a n€w one emer-

ges to take its place. It is in this context that we view the relationship be-


tween the Islamic and the liberal paradigms. By examining their respec-tive postulates/ we can gain insights with which to understand specificevents; but this understanding can be achieved only by examining theworks of their respective practitioners, e.g., Islamic publicists and liberaladvocates, who all contribute to the codification and elaboration of whatfor them passes as knowledge.

The influence of Kuhn on contemporary scholars, particularly those inthe subdisciplines of philosophy of science, political sociology, andsociologr of knowledge, may be considered revolutionary in light of thepnrfound ramifications of his views on conventional wisdom regardingthe nature and concept of intellecfual development.s Therefore, to dis-cuss his influence and that of his fellow post-positivists without describ-ing their intellecfual antecedents could lead to a serious misunderstand-ing of the context in which the post-positivist era emerged. Such adiscussion is made even mol€ compellingby the need to clarify some ofthe fundamental historical and methodological issues that have accom-panied the growth of knowledge in the social scientific world.37

Also having a direct impact on the purpose and analytical mode of thepresent work is Edward W. Said's thoughtful and provocative book,Orientalism.x Said identifies as "orientalists" those who, thrrcugh theirtextbooks, lectures, poems/ artistic creations, caricatures, and otherworks, have collectively and cumulatively created and purveyed animage that approximates what they see as the "Orient." Said contendsthat this image, which is especially pr,evalent among European andNorth American observers as well as among people indigenous to theOrient, has been as much responsible for the creation of myths and theperpetuation of misunderstanding about the Orient, in general, andIslam, in particula4 as have been the intrusive force of the colonialpowers in disrupting the settled ways of life among the Muslims andother inhabitants of the region. The orientalists, like Kuhn's prac-titioners, share common pr€suppositions about their subject. Suchpresuppositions have led them to adopt certain norrns for research andanalysis that result in a knowledge that porhays the Orient as an aes-thetic curiositybut otherwise inferior to the Occident.

Just as Saids intention is to present the Orient in a new light by expos-ing fundamental assumptions of the purveyors of orientalist thought, sodoes the present work seek to present a mode of understanding that willhelp unravel the mystery behind the "Moro floblem," the solution towhich continues to elude---as it has over the past four centuries-prac-titioners and political reformers alike. By comprehending the assump-tions that underlie the actions and pronouncements of Islamic scholarsand their liberal counterparts, i.e., those commonly regarded as

mainstream social scientists iunderstand the origins of thsolution to the problem. Butcannot be derived from the s

and justified the hegemonic:into the domain of the Unrnexistence of two nationalitiespast and aspirations for the I

iI

I

I

I

lg their respec-

Ftand specificpamining the

Fts and liberallation of whatt

fularly those in$iology, and

f in light of the

fom regarding

lefore, to dis-prout describ-

Fzunderstand-pg€d. Such aprify some ofI have accom-tsd'szrlmode of theocative book,through theirls, and otherpurveyed anlaid contendsirropean and

Eenous to thenyths and thegeneraf andI the colonialMuslims andKuhn's prac-rrbject. Suchresearch andnt as an aes-

glt by expos-ilthought, solingthatwille solution toturies-prac-the assump-mic scholarsrcgarded as


mainstream social scientists in the PhilipPines, we hopefully can begin tounderstand the origins of the myths and images that shroud a tangiblesolution to the problem. But it must be understood that such a solutioncannot be derived from the same outrnoded ideas that 1tun" tuli6nalizedand justified the hegemonic intrusion of the modem nation-state systeminto the domain of. thie l-lmmah Rathe+ a solution lies in recognizing theexistence of two nationalities, each sustained by distinct memories of thepast and aspirations for the future.

"The Tradition of Sociopolitical Inquiry" (Chapter)

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