The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War & Peace Kelly M. Kadera Daniel S. Morey.

The Trade-offs of Fighting & Investing: A Model of the Evolution

of War & Peace

Kelly M. Kadera

Daniel S. Morey

Trade Offs

Investment in Economy Spending on Military

Long run, latent power advantage

Immediate war fighting advantage

Risk losing wars Drag on economy

“…states sometimes limit defense spending either because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state’s power in the long run.”  Mearsheimer 2001

Trade Offs, cont’d

Industrial War Counterforce War

Shorter wars Better chances in head-to-head combat

Resource bases suffer Long, cumulatively costly war

Interestingly, models of conflict developed by economists generally do include a resource trade-off but not an explicit decision to fight or attack ... whereas those developed by political scientists typically do include an explicit decision to attack but not a resource trade-off. (Powell 2006, 193, fn 58)

Question• How do states weigh these options and

ultimately choose a strategy for winning a rivalry?

• States compare the over time consequences of:– Peace-time competitions– Traditional wars– Industrial wars

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry• Growth from investment

)( iiii mrr

Nation i’s aggregate resource base

Nation i’s level of military spending

Growth multiplier

Guns vs. growth (Knorr 1970)

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

• Limits to growth

ii

iiiii mK

rmrr 1)(

Nation i’s carrying capacity (Cohen 1995)

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

i

ii

ii

iiiii r

m

mK

rmrr

1)(

Drag on economy from military spending (Kennedy ’91, Morgenthau ’78)

e.g., German armament in width vs. armament in depth

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

• Military spending for security (Waltz ’79, Morgenthau…)

jii mm

Action-reaction (Richardson ‘60)

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

i

ijii r

mmm 1

Military allocations limited by resources (Bellany ’99)

Modeling Peacetime Rivalry

i

ii

ii

iiiii r

m

mK

rmrr

1)(

i

ijii r

mmm 1

j

jj

jj

jjjjj r

m

mK

rmrr

1)(

j

jijj r

mmm 1

Modeling Counterforce War

• Counterforce War = targeting military assets

jiji

ijii mm

r

mmm

1

Interaction produces destruction

“A thousand men fire twice as many rounds as five hundred, but of the thousand, more will be hit than of the five hundred, for it must be assumed that the thousand will be deployed more closely.  Von Clausewitz Book 2 Chapter 12, page 205.

“power to hurt” (Slantchev ’03)

i is j’s ability to “bear costs in return” (Slantchev ’03)

Modeling Industrial War

• Targeting economic resources

jiji

ii

ii

iiiii mr

r

m

mK

rmrr

1)(

Interaction produces destruction

e.g., Allied bombing of Germany during WWII

Parameters

Parameter State i State j

α .2 .1

β .07 .12

ρ .4 .1

.1 .22

K 40 50

Simulation ProcedurePeacetime Rivalry

25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time

5

10

15

20

25

Power

mj

mi

25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time

510

1520

2530Power

rj

ri

Representative SimulationsPeacetime Rivalry

25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time

5

10

15

20

25

Power

mj

mi

25 50 75 100 125 150 175Time

510

1520

2530Power

rj

ri

Counterforce War

10 20 30 40 50 60Time

0.20.4

0.6

0.8

11.2Power

mj

mi

10 20 30 40 50 60Time

10

20

30

40

50Power

rj

ri

Industrial War

-10-7.5-5-2.5 2.5 5Time

0.60.81

1.2

Power

mj

mi

-10 -7.5 -5 -2.5 2.5 5Time

51015

2025

30Power

rj

ri

Information from Simulations

1. When/why state prefer 1 type of contest over another

2. Who wins1. If anyone wins2. How one side wins

3. Duration

Deduction 1: A state only prefers war when it has fewer resources and a weaker military than does its opponent.

Peacetime Rivalry

10 20 30 40Time

1

2

3

4

Military

mj

mi

10 20 30 40Time

5101520253035

Resources

rj

ri

Counterforce War

20 40 60 80 100Time

0.60.81

1.21.41.6

Military

mj

mi

20 40 60 80 100Time

10

20

30

40

50Resources

rj

ri

Industrial War

-3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time

0.20.40.60.81

1.2Military

mj

mi

-3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time

123456

Resources

rj

ri

“painful peaces” (Powell ’06)

Deduction 2: Counterforce wars result in stalemates.

Peacetime Rivalry

25 50 75 100125150175Time

51015202530

Military

mj

mi

50 100 150Time

10

20

30

40

Resources

rj

ri

Counterforce War

5 10 15 20 25 30 35Time

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5Military

mj

mi

5 10 15 20 25 30 35Time

10

20

30

40

50Resources

rj

ri

Industrial War

-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3Time

2

4

6

Military

mj

mi

-4 -2 2Time

500

1000

1500

2000

Resources

rj

ri

Deduction 3: Industrial wars lead to the shortest conflict duration

Peacetime Rivalry

20406080100120Time

5101520

Military

mj

mi

20406080100120Time

5101520

Resources

rj

ri

Counterforce War

10 20 30 40 50Time

0.60.811.21.41.61.82

Military

mj

mi

10 20 30 40 50Time

1020304050

Resources

rj

ri

Industrial War

-2 -1 1 2 3Time

246810

Military

mj

mi

-2 -1 1 2 3Time

102030405060

Resources

rj

ri

Conclusions

• Type of conflict matters– Provides advantage (or a chance) to states under

certain conditions

• Not irrational to enter into a losing war• Looking at where preferences come from

Future Directions

1. Process vs. outcome2. Model modifications

1. Shooting2. Mixed military and industrial3. States using different strategies4. Willingness to suffer (breaking points)

3. Empirics