CHAPTER3THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSIONDURING THE COURSE OF development,
the infant moves from kicking
legsandarmstogetherinoneoverallmovementofthebody,towalking,anasymmetricaltwo-beatmovementofarmsandlegsincounterpoint.Afold,aconstraintinmovement,foldsintoanewfold.Thesymmetricalone-beatmovementoftheinfantcurlsthebodyintoitself,perceptuallyinvolvesthebodywithitselfanditsplace.Walkingbreaksthiscurlintoalinethatadvancesintonewplacesthroughabodythattwistsitshipsandstretcheslegsandarmsintoalinearstrideorthogonaltothebodysfront.Acurlaround
the hips unfolds into a line twisted out from the body, and the
infantbegins moving in a very different way, indeed in a very
different worldtheworld of the toddler. When the infant toddles
into walking, her or his
pres-encespreadsoutintonewplacesthingsmustbeputaway,thestairsbe-comeadangerzone,andsoon.A
fold in movement generates a new wrinkle of sens. But how does
sensemerge in folds of movement? How is there sens in movement for
the
infantherself?Theanswerrequiresastudyofexpression,habit,andlearning,andtakes
us to the concept of a topology of expressiona constraint on
learningspeciedbythespread-outlogicofabodythatmovesbygrowing,growsbymoving,aconstraintthatshapessens.EXPRESSIONAND
SENSSENS
INMOVEMENTOneofMerleau-PontysgreatestdiscoveriesinthePhenomenologyofPercep-tion
isthatofsens
inmovement.[W]hatwehavediscoveredthroughthestudyofmotility[motricit],hewrites,isanewsense[sens]oftheword8182
THESENSEOFSPACEsense [sens]. If the empiricists were wrong to
cobble sens from
fortuitouslyagglomeratedcontents,therationalistsandidealistswerewrongtoconsti-tute
sens through the act of a pure I. Such an act could not account for
thevarietyofourexperience,forthatwhichisnon-sense[non-sens]withinit,for
the contingency of its contents. Rationalism could not account for
whatIhavecalledthelabilityofexperience,orthewaythatsens
crossesintoaworldpriortosens,intoanunreectivefundofexperience.Onthecon-trary,Bodilyexperienceforcesustoacknowledgeanimpositionofsenswhichisnottheworkofauniversalconstitutingconsciousness,asens
thatclingstocertaincontents.Everythingsaidsofarleadstotheconclusionthat
the contents in question arise in movement: sens clings to folds of
body-worldmovement.1Sens
inmovementiscentraltoMerleau-Pontysphilosophyanditsfuture.Aswehaveseen,Merleau-Pontysconceptofsens
playsonmultiplemeaningsoftheFrenchword:sens
isnotameaningabstractedfromtheworld,itismeaningdirectedtowardandtwiththeworld.Ithasthischaracterpreciselybecauseitisinmovement;andsens
couldnothavethelabilitydiscussedintheintroductionifitwerenotinmovement.Itisbe-cause
sens isrstofallinmovement,andthencespeakingandthinkingaselaborating
sens are rstofallinmovement,thatMerleau-Pontycanlaterwrite (in the
Phenomenology) of a tacit cogito, an I think that tacitly
existsbeforeitcomestoexplicitlyreectuponitself,andthusrootthoughtincorporealsoil.AndwhatistheprojectofTheVisibleandtheInvisible
ifnotan effort to trace sens in movement to its ontological depths,
to think of
sensnotasinsinuatedintobeingbyareectiveconsciousnessinterrogatingitfrom
the outside, but as arising in the sinews and folds of a being that
opensitselftoquestioninamovementthatMerleau-Pontyspeaksofaschiasm?2As
Leonard Lawlor (1998) shows, Merleau-Pontys discovery of a new
senseof sens
anticipatesDeleuzesattempttondatranscendencewithinimma-nence,tondsens
asanexpressionthatisnotoutsidethatwhichisex-pressedyetisnonethelessdistinctfromthatwhichisexpressed.Buttheconnection
between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze (and the Bergsonian
back-groundofthisconnection)mustbeputasideforthemoment.We
sawthatbody-worldmovementfoldsintostructure.Butthisjustshowsfromtheoutsidethatitlooksasthoughthebodyisbehavinginameaningful
way. The crucial question is: how does sens cling to folds of
body-world movement? How is structure-in-movement sens in movement?
How, toset the question against our Bergsonian background, is there
something morethanpureperception?EXPRESSION AS SENS
INMOVEMENT3InMerleau-Pontysanalysis,sens
isinseparablefromexpression:ifhisstudyofmotilityleadshimtoanewsens
of sens,toasens
inmovement,itisbecausethemovingbodyisalreadyanexpressivebody.ThecentralclaimsTHETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
83of Merleau-Pontys study of expression are that the word has a
sens and thespokenwordisagenuinegesture,anditcontainsitssens
inthesamewayas the gesture contains its. Sens clings to the folds
of body-world
movementbecauseitarisesinthegesturalmovementofexpression.Todevelopthispoint
about sens and movement, we need to review Merleau-Pontys
conceptofexpression,rstfocusingonthepeculiarrelationbetweentheexpression(the
word or gesture that expresses something) and what is expressed.
Thenweneedtoturntogesture.Merleau-Pontys concept of expression is
critical of traditional
accountsthatclaimthatthespokenwordistheexteriorformofanalreadydetermi-nate
interior idea. We often experience linguistic expression in this
way: wesometimes know what we want to say or think, and give voice
to it throughan already dened vocabulary. But Merleau-Ponty
considers this a secondaryform of speech. Primary speech, in
contrast, is a phenomenon that Merleau-Ponty most of all detects in
children learning a word for the rst time, or
inpoetsorthinkersforgingnewwaysofspeaking.Primaryspeechiscreative:the
way of expressing a new thought is there on the tip of my tongue; I
pacearoundtryingtospititout;inspittingitout,IclarifythevaguesomethingIhavebeenthinkingof,IdiscoverwithnewclaritywhatIwastryingtothink
and say.4(Unless otherwise noted, subsequent discussion of
expressionconcernsprimaryexpression.)Ultimately, I crystallize my
thinking only through nding the words
toexpressit.ForabeingwhodoesnothavewhatKantcallsintellectualintu-ition,whoworksoutthought,expressionisnotlikeconvertinganalreadynished
Word document into WordPerfect format, a mechanical
translationofcompletedmeaningfromoneformattoanother.Ifexpressionistransla-tion,
it is the paradoxical sort noted by Merleau-Ponty, in which the
originaldocumentiswrittenonlybybeingtranslated.5Considertranslatingatextfromonehumanlanguagetoanother:insummingupatextinadifferentlanguage,suchtranslationinevitablyintroducesdifferences,ineffectrecre-ating
the source text in the target language, but also elaborating new
mean-inginbothtextsandlanguages.Wheremechanicaltranslationshiftscompletedguresfromonelocationtoanotherinanalreadydenedplaneof
meaning, and effects no real difference in meaning, primary
expression (ortranslating from one language to another) creates new
differences,
elaboratesaplaneofmeaningfromwithin.Expressivetranslation,orsimplyput(pri-mary)expression,isthustobecontrastedwithmechanicaltranslation.Ex-pressionchangessomethingthatdoesnotyethavea
sensnon-sens
(touseMerleau-Pontysterm)intosomethingthatdoeshavesens,
byelaboratingtheplaneofwhatIcallsens-non-sens fromwithin.A great
deal rides on the difference between mechanical translation
andexpression, both for our project and the philosophy of mind,
since a commit-ment to expression constitutes an attack on
representationalism. To show this,I draw a point from Bergson. In
the conclusion of Matter and Memory
Bergsongivesapeculiarlyinsightfulcriticismofdualism(MM,225228).Dualism84
THESENSEOFSPACEproposes that each state of mind is nothing other
than a material brain
state.Eachmind-stateduplicatesthecontentofabrain-stateyetduplicatesitinadifferent,mentalform.Theproblem,accordingtoBergson,isnotthatmind
and brain are different (the usual focus of criticism), it is that
they arenotdifferentenough:mind-statesduplicate
brain-states,sohowcanmind-states be different from brain-states?
How can a duplicate nonetheless
straddleadifferenceinbeing?Andwhatwouldamind-stateaddifitisaduplicate?Either
the duplicate is useless (the position of eliminativist
materialism)
andwehavefailedtoexplainthephenomenonofexperience;oritisnotquiteaduplicatebutconstitutessomethingmore(thepositionofidealism),inwhich
case we have to ask why experience is bogged down in a
brainy-bodybeyondit.Thehypothesisofaduplicatethatisnonethelessdifferentfromwhatitduplicatesbegsthequestionoftherelationofmindandmatter.Thisdualismofduplicatesisalliedwiththetraditionaldoctrineofrepresentation.Mentalrepresentationsaresupposedtostraddlethediffer-encebetweenmindandworldbyduplicatingtherepresentedworldinanentirelydifferent,mentalform.Butifarepresentationduplicates
therepre-sented,howisitdifferent
fromtherepresented,howdoesitre-presentitratherthanpresentityetagain?Howdowegettosomethingmorethanaduplicate?
The traditional doctrine of representation endlessly begs this
ques-tion, that is, begs the question of how a brain-state becomes
a representation,becomes something different and more than rings of
neurons.6The
questionbeggedhereiscognatetooristhequestionbeggedbytraditionaldual-isms,namelythequestionofconstitutingagenuinedifferenceacrossdiffer-ent
regions of being. In begging these questions, the tradition remains
belowBergsons turn of experience, presuming the difference between
subject
andobject,ratherthanshowinghowitrstarises.Crucially,belowtheturnofexperience
the representational relation between subject and object is one
ofmechanicaltranslation:representationamountstoashiftofcontentfromoneformtoanotherinanalreadyestablishedsystem.Attheturnofexpe-rience
the relation between subject and object would instead involve
expres-sion. By seeing how our sens of the world arises in a
movement of
expression,howsubjectandobjectbecomedifferentbyelaboratingtheplaneofsens-non-sens
from within, through expressive movement, we will recongure
tra-ditional problems of philosophy of mind and approach the turn
of experience.The key point in this regard is that a genuine
expression is not a dupli-cate of what it expresses. An expression
is different from what it expresses,
sincewhatIamtryingtoexpressdoesnotatrsthavethemeaningIdiscoverinexpression.
Yet what I end up expressing is not something other than what I
wasat rst trying to express. This is the paradox: the expression is
not other
thanwhatisexpressed,yetisnonethelessdifferentfromwhatisexpressed.7The
paradox is resolved by realizing that expression is, logically
speak-ing,amovement.Iftheexpressionisnotsomethingotherthanwhatisexpressed,itcannotbeplacedalongsideit,anymorethananadultcanbeTHETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
85placedalongsidethechildsheusedtobe.Thedifferencebetweenthetwocannotbeconceivedintermsofaplaneinwhichthetwowouldbeco-present(asinmechanicaltranslation).Yettheexpressionisdifferentfromwhatisexpressed.Whereinthedifference?Notinco-presence,butinthetimeofmovement.Whatisexpressedbecomes
itsexpression,asthechildbecomestheadult.Bergson helps make precise
the sort of movement in question. Expres-sion is not movement as
conceived within a logic of solids, a shifting
(trans-port)ofathingfromonepointtoanother,reducibletopositionsalonganalreadyconstitutedtrajectoryandplanethatisthesortofmovementwend
in mechanical translation. Expression is what Bergson calls a real
move-ment:nottheshiftingofathing,buttheshiftingofastate,anindivisiblemoving
whole irreducible to a series of positions (MM, chapter 4). To
invokeour origami metaphor, expression isnt like moving a patch of
meaning fromthe middle to the corner of a paper, from inside to
outside in a xed
system.Expressionisanindivisiblemovingwholethatstretchesacrossthepaper,stressingit,wrinklingitfromwithin;expressionislikefoldingthepapersothat
a patch that doesnt yet have express form is folded and pressed
outward,becomingexpressastheedgeofaneworigamigure.8(Anexamplemightbe
Aristotles turning the word hule, originally meaning lumber, into a
wordformatteringeneral;aconceptthatdidnotyethavesens
inGreekisexpressed by stressing Greek from within, folding it into
a new philosophi-cal language.) Expression changes the meaning of
what it moves and
elabo-ratestheplaneofmeaningfromwithin,theonebywayoftheother,thusshiftingnon-sens
intosens,shiftingstatesofmeaning.AsMerleau-Pontywrites,Expressioniseverywherecreative,andwhatisexpressedisalwaysinseparablefromit[fromexpression].9Crucially,sens
and non-sens arenottwodifferentbeings;
theyare,asMerleau-Pontymightputit,inseparable,andIhavearguedthattheyareinseparable
because they are two moments of an indivisible expressive
move-ment.Ifwedonotrepresentbutexpressthesens
oftheworld,perceptionandthinkingcanneitherbecutfromtheirgroundintheworldnorberemandedtothesubject.Sens
andnon-sens arenottwoco-presentpoints,they are related by
expression as a movement that expressively translates senswithin
non-sens such that sens bears within itself the non-sens, the
unreectivefund, it translates. Sens and non-sens are not clear-cut
beings, but momentsthat muddle one another and become different
through this muddling.
Thisisinmarkedcontrasttothedoctrineofrepresentationasacleantransitionacrosstheboundsbetween
non-sens (thematerialworldoutthere)andsens(the realm in which a
part of the same material world, a brain or
processor,ismagicallysaidtoallofasuddenrepresenttherestoftheworld),whichdoctrine
leaves us begging for the magical transition. Traditional problems
ofphilosophy of mind are recongifured when we locate the relation
of sens andnon-sens inthemovementofexpression.86
THESENSEOFSPACESofarIhaveshownthatlogically
expressionismovement:itisthebecoming different of non-sens and
sens. But this remains vague. How,
really,isexpressionmovementandhowdoesitgiveriseto
sens?Toanswer,Iturntogesture,recallingthatforMerleau-Pontythewordisagenuinegestureand
that the word has a gestural meaning immanent within speech. (PP
214/183,208/179)GESTURE ANDEXPRESSIONI am frying some mushrooms. As
I reach over the pan, a cluster of oil
dropsburstsandspattersmyhand;thesharpburningfeelingisinseparablefromamovement
already underway, namely withdrawing my hand, quickly shakingit,
and exclaiming ouch! The shake-ouch! gesture expresses pain, or
ratheritis
mywayofhavingpain,ofhavingtheeventnotmerelyhappenbutexpressthesens
ofthere-being-pain-in-me.Theseasonedchefdoesntsayouch! but keeps
cooking and in doing so does not have this event as
paininthewaythatIdo.Howdoesthegesturecometoexpressthesens
ofpain?Hereisaplausiblestory.Asaninfant,Ididnothavethewordpain
orthegestureouch!;Ididnothavethesens
ofpainasadistinctexperiencewithadistinct meaning. Not that I didnt
have the experience I now call pain, butIdidnotexperiencepain as
pain.ImovedaboutandsometimeswhatIdidhurt,butthehurtplayedoutinanoverallconvulsion,inemotionalmove-mentofmybodyasawhole.ButadultsaroundmewouldreactasIhurtmyself,
clapping hands to mouth, saying ouch!, shaking their hand if I
hadhurt a hand, and so on. My movement followed theirs: shaking the
hand
andsayingouch!iswhatyoudowhenhurtinghappens,justaspointingandsayingcatiswhatyoudowhenthecatwalksby.Ofcourse,priortothis,ifIhadhurtahand,Iwouldespeciallymovemyhand,butthatwouldbepartofmyoverallreaction,undifferentiatedwithinit.AsIbegantomoveinanadultway(andofcourseadultswouldnevermovethiswayifhand-hurtingdidntitselfleadtohandmovement),ashand-hurtingwaslessandlessanoverallconvulsion,andmoreandmoreastylizedshake-ouch!ges-ture,theoverallemotionalcolorthathadpreviouslywrithedthroughmywholebodywascondensedintotheshake-ouch!gesture.10In
condensing an overall bodily movement into a different
movement,themovementofonepartofthebody,thecondensationatoncesumsuptheoverallemotionandturnsitintosomethingnew.Thesummingandnoveltyarisebywayofeachother:thesumguresagainstthegroundofwhat
it sums up by turning the ground into something new, something
thatcanbesummedupinadifferentmovement;andthesumisanewgure,somethingthatstandsoutwithitsownbounds,insofarasitisinherentlyrelated
to something different that it sums up. The sum, then, isnt
math-ematical,sincethesumissomethingnew,irreducibletowhatitsumsup.THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
87Asimilarsummationoccurswhenbodilymovementcondensesinamorecomplexpattern,forexample,ashockturnsintoastartledlookandretreat,
or a thought, memory, or writing process condenses around a word,
asin Archimedes Eureka!, Citizen Kanes rosebud, or, perhaps,
Merleau-Pontyssens.Ifemotion,forSartre,isconsciousnessswayofeeingsituationsbytransformingthem,expressionisabodilysummationbydifferencethatletsushandlemovementbyturningitintosomethingdifferent.(Sartre1993)I
call this summation by difference articulation. Rendering a sum
thatis incommensurate with yet related to what turns out to be its
ground
articu-latesbothgureandgroundatonce,asafoldinpaperformsanewgureandgroundatonce.This
leads to a crisper account of the interrelation of sens and
non-sens.To
saythatthegesturecomestomeanpainisnottosaythatitcomestomeanapainthathadpreviouslybeenthere.Rather,thegesturerstofallarticulatespainas
painbygivingmeahandleonit.Previouslytherehadonlybeenashockofmovementthatoverranme.Nowthereisawayofhandling
it, namely, running it into a shake of the hand and a vocal
ouch!What had been non-sens runs to ground in a sens, is
articulated into sens
andnon-sens.Shockisarticulatedintopaingroundedinshock.Butthepainisnotsomethingotherthantheshock,itistheshockarticulated,becomedifferent.Insteadofconvulsingorthrashingattheworld,Ishakemyhandand
say ouch!, letting my pain be manifest to others and myself; or, if
I ama chef, I express indifference in sticking with my work. The
gestural
expres-sionofpainarticulatesshockintoamovementpropertoourworld,espe-ciallytooursocialworld.Expressionismutedwherewecannotfoldmovementintomovementpropertoourworld,wherethereisshockwithoutpain,happeningwithoutahandle,
non-sens that has not yet run aground in sens. Perhaps we could
speakhere of the interval between death and mourning, between shock
and
expres-sion.Tobeinthatintervalistobedislocated,tobemovedwithoutyetknowing
how to move, to be emotive without yet having the proper emotion,to
be gesticulating without yet gesturing, to be immersed in a
non-sens that isnonethelessnotyetdevoidof
sens,whichiswhythatintervalissoshocking.To cross that interval, to
handle movement across it, is expression.
Expressionisatranslationthatcreates,byarticulation,thetextbeingtranslated;thefailureofexpressionisthefailuretoevencreateatexttobetranslated.11Butthiswouldmean,andnowwecanreturntothepointmorecon-cretely,thatsens
containswithinitthenon-sens ittranslates,andnon-senscontainsthesens
translatedwithinit:paincontainsshock,andshockcon-tains pain. This
deepens the point that expression is not a mechanical
trans-lationbetweenpointsonaplane.Itismorelikeanarticulatoryconvulsionin
which points already muddled and implied within one another have
theirdifferences become express in a new way. Expression is not a
movement frompure non-sens to pure sens, but a movement within what
I call sens-non-sens.88 THESENSEOFSPACEHere we should recall our
Bergsonian background, in which perceptualrecognition is not a
matter of adding meaning to matter (a magical
additionbeggedbyrepresentationalism)butofremovingmovementfromthebody-world
circuit, that is, folding and constraining. Sens is not a
ready-made, self-subsistentingredientadded
tothebody,itisamovementofsens-non-sensarticulatedintosens
byfoldingmovementfromwithin.Body-worldmove-mentisthusthenativetongueof
sens;thewebofsens
followsthearticula-tionsandcondensationsofbody-worldmovement.ReworkingaBergsonianword,
I shall say that sens is contracted out of body-world movement, and
thuscontractsatasteofitsmovingnativetongue.Thewordouch!
contractsshock: there are not two things, shock turned into pain
and then ouch!
asawordforpain,anabstractsignaddedfromthinair;gesturalexpressionisthe
having of the pain. The word is the shock contracted into sensible
form,andsoitretainssomethingofthemovementfromwhichitiscontracted,giving
a taste of shock in verbal form, as the origami gure retains
somethingoftheproportionofthepaperfromwhichitiscontracted,givingavisualtasteofplanargeometryinguralform.Indeed,theexclamationpointisalmostpartofthespellingofouch!,andgivesalittletasteofshock;theonewhouttersouchinattonesistheironistorcomic,nottheoneinpain.AsSheets-JohnstoneandLakoffandJohnsonshowinmuchmoredetail,ourlanguageingeneralbearsmanytracesofitsorigininmovement(LakoffandJohnson1999,Johnson1987,Sheets-Johnstone1999a).But
expressive articulation generates meaning more on the side of
thebodythanonthesideoftheworld.IfitislikeBergsonianperceptualrec-ognition,itisaffective.12InBergsonsaccountofperceptualrecognition,incomingmovementrepeatedlytranslatesbackandforthacrossdifferentzones
of the body and goes back to the world in different form. For
example,in listening, movements of hearing and speaking cross over,
scanning hear-ing with speaking. By repeated translation through my
body, the movementof sound becomes the very different movement of a
body listening for
wordsasdiscreteunits.ThetranslationsherearenotexpressivebutwhatIcallbodily
translations. Bodily translation is like routine (nonpoetic)
translationfrom one language to another, in that it involves shifts
from one
establishedregionofmeaningtoanother,butthelanguageinquestionisthatofthemovingbody.Themotorlanguageofhearingtranslates,acrossthebody,intoamotorlanguageofspeaking;intranslatingbetweentwodifferent,already
established languages, the one cuts up the other; hearing is
scannedbyitsdifferenceswithspeaking,inthewaythatFrenchisscannedbyitsdifferences
with English when we translate computer manuals back and
forth.Throughrepeatedbodilytranslation,perceptualrecognitionturnssonicmovementbackintoadifferentperceptualmovementtowardtheworld.Incontrast,expressivearticulationtranslatesmovementsofthebodyintodif-ferent
movements within the body: the shock of the oil is scanned and
articu-lated by the gesture of my hand; the movement of a shocked
body translates,THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION 89through the body itself,
into the very different movement of a body
tenderlymovingpainedparts.Perceptualrecognitionandarticulationdependonbodilytranslation,andbodilytranslationisduetofoldsthatconstrainbody-worldmovement,foldsthatgeneratedifferenceswhenmovementcrossesabody.Theshake-ouch!
gesture begins in a shock of movement and folds this shock into
newmovement,articulatingshockassomethingdifferent.Butinthecaseofprimaryexpressionthegesturedoesnotjustrunthroughexistingfolds,themovementofshockcreatesnewfoldsinthebody.Soexpressioninvolvestwoentwinedtemporalorders:theorderofagesture(theshockoftheoilfoldingintotheshake-ouch!movement);andtheorderoflearningtogesture
(shock gradually folding into constrained movement that turns
shockintogesture).Thetwoordersintertwine:movementonthetemporalorderof
learning generates the fold at play in instances of gestural
movement, andinstances of partial gestures generate the learning
process. In both orders theoverall movement is expressive: within a
gesture we nd a beginning in non-sens
andanendinginsens,buttheoverallarcoflearningalsobeginswithnon-sens
andendsinsens.Itisinlearning,specicallylearninghabits,thatwewillndalinkbetweenexpression,sens,
andperception.The account of gesture puts esh on our bare-bones
account of expres-sion. I continue to speak of the shock of
movement, playing on two differentsenses of shock: as a sheaf or
tangle, as in a shock of hair, and as a distur-bance. A shock of
movement is an as yet inarticulate tangle of
movements,amovingdisturbance,
non-sens.Yetasadisturbancethattranslatesthrougha limited
body,throughabodythatisntjustmovedbutmovesitselfinself-limiting
ways, shock is already moving to sens. Expression is the movement
inwhich non-sens folds into sens, in which shock is articulated in
a summationby difference that turns what it sums up into something
new. Expression isthusamovementthatarticulatessens within non-sens.
Sens thuscontractssomethingofthenon-sens
fromwhichitisarticulated.Notonlydoessensclingtothefoldsofmovement,thefoldsofmovementclingtosens.Twoquestionsremain.First,theabovedoesnotclaimthatcertainkindsofmovementcause
sense,butthatdescriptivelysens
isfoundinthearticulatorymovementofexpression.Articulatorymovementisourwayofmakingsenseofourmovingbeingintheworldinthewaythatemotionalmovement,forSartre(1993),isourwayofchangingourrelationtotheworld.
But how, in detail, does a particular folding accrue sens and
accrue theparticular sens
thatitdoes?Thiswillrequireanaccountoflearningascon-tracting sens
from other bodies in the social world and ones own body in
thenatural world, and will point us back to nature as a movement in
which
sensalwaysalreadyinheres.Second,inthecaseofgesturesorwords,expressiongoesfromtheinside
to the outside. But our target is perception, in which expression
goesfrom the outside to the inside, in which what is expressed is
the world, not90
THESENSEOFSPACEourselves.Itshouldalreadybeclearthatperceptionandexpressiontto-gether,thatwieldingthetennisracketexpressesoursens
ofitsfeltlength,thatwigglingthecorkexpressesoursens
ofitsspringyunity.13Thisfollowsfromtheturntoperceptionasinseparablefrommovement:ifperceptionisnotcutofffrommovement,thenperceptioncannotbebasedonrepresen-tations
cut off from the world; if perception is not a mechanical
duplicationof outside non-sens in inside representations that
magically acquire sens; if
itisamovementthatcrossesbodyandworld;thenthismovementasgivingrise
to sens is the movement of expression. I do not represent the
world, butexpressitssens.
Perception,though,isnotquitethegesturestudiedabove.Howdoesperceptioninvolveexpression?To
answerIturntoastudyofhabit,drawingontheconnectiontolearningremarkedabove,butalsorecallingthatthemovingschemaofper-ceptionasanensembleofstylesishabitual:thefoldsthatconstrainbody-worldmovementarehabitual.HABIT
ANDEXPRESSIONIf gesture is a creative, expressive movement that
generates sens from
shock,habitisawayoffreezingbody-worldmovement,stereotypingit,soastopreemptivelyarticulateshocksashavingsensevenifinappropriate.Thereisthestopsign,Ihavehitthebrakes.Hittingthebrakessumsupthestopsign
but the summary gure is quite different from the ground that the
suminherently points to.14It is in this sense that habit
articulatessens. But howdoeshabitaccruesens,andhowdoes sens
gureinperceptualactsbasedonhabit? The answer hinges on the point
that habits are never entirely
frozen;theyareonthevergeofthawandchange,andthusexpressthesens
ofarelationtotheworld.AwhileafterImovedfrommyparentshome,theyredidthefrontwalk,raisingtheagstonesatthebottomstepoftheporch,tokeepwaterfrom
puddling and freezing in the winter. For a long time, on leaving
theirhouseafteravisit,Iwrenchedmybackonthebottomstep.Iwasnotdescendingmaterialstairsinthepresent,butthehabitstairsofmyyouth,takingtoodeepastepatthebottom.Likeanextrastepatthetopofthestairsinthemiddleofthenight,theshallowbottomstepwasashock.Whenstair-steppinghabitsareappropriatetoactualsteps,habitremovessuchshocks:youdontdealwiththeshockofeachstep,aseriesofstep-shocks
freezes into a habitual movement in which you bounce up or
downthestepsinarhythmedlope.Yettheverysamehabit,becauseitfreezesover
individual steps, makes possible a new kind of shock, namely
overstep-pingthebottominajolttotheback,oroversteppingthetopinajolttoa
gullet falling through a phantom step. New shocks are the basis of
changesofhabit.Habitasfreezingoutshockcontainstheseedsofnewshockthatleadtothawandreform.THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
91Therelationbetweenhabitandshockindicatesalinktoperception.I
couldnt tell you the height of the steps at my parents house, but
evidentlyI perceive, in some sense, their rise. Habit is a kind of
frozen perception.
Yetthisfreezingpreciselyenablesnewperceptualsensitivities.IfIweresensi-tivetoalldetailsofeachstep,Iwouldnevergetanywhereandwouldbeincapableofperceivingstairsasgeneralclimbingsurfaces.Habitisambigu-ous:
it renders us insensitive to actual situations, but is thus the
basis of
ourpowerofperceptualgeneralization,ofskippingoverdetail,oftreatingsitu-ationsthesamewayeveniftheyaredifferent;and,asadeterminateinsen-sitivity,
habit is the basis of further sensitivity. Habit is a kind of
frozen armorthatatoncedullsandcrystallizessensitivities.Habit as
insensitivity-sensitivity is thus a counterpart to gesture.
Ges-tureisapresentfoldingofmovementthatexpressesmyrelationtotheworldrightnow;gesturearticulatesasens
propertothemoment.Habitisafrozenfoldingofmovementthatexpressesageneralsensitivitytotheworld,asens
notquitesensitivetothemoment.Ifgesturearticulatessensacrossthearcofagesture,habitarticulatessens
acrossthearcofhabitacquisition,beginningwiththenon-sens
ofshock,andendingwiththeacquisitionofhabitualarmor.But so far we
remain in an outside perspective. The moving schema
ofperceptionishabitualarmor.ToreturntoBergson,themovingschemaisakin
to an optical medium that limits the movement of light. When
placedat a sufcient angle to incident light, light does not pass
the medium at all,itreects,andasBergsonwrites,thevirtualimagethat
we seesymbolizesthe mediums activity of limiting optical movement
across the medium-worldinterface (MM, 37). Similarly with the body:
for us looking on, the
habitual,schematiccharacterofbodilymovementsymbolizesthebodysactivityofindeterminatelylimitingbody-worldmovement,andthussymbolizesper-ception.
But for Bergson this is just a symbol of pure perception,
perceptionthathasitslocusintheobjectreactedto,thatisnotyetalocusofexperi-ence
in a subject. We see a schema that symbolizes perception, that for
usexpresses a meaningful relation between the body and the world,
but that isnot enough to show that perceptionsomething with sensis
happening forthebeingmanifestingthisschema.To
solvetheproblemofhowthereissomethingmorethanpureper-ception,Bergsonappealstopurememory.Perceptionproperarisesintheintersectionofpurememory,thatis,dure,time;andpureperception,thatis,
material movement. The point of intersection is the body: the body
is
thepointatthetipofthefamousconeofmemory,wherememorystabstheplaneofmovingmatter.Pureperceptionandpurememory,bodyandmind,matteranddure
areentirelydifferentinkind,buttobesurethereisanafnityofdure
andmatter,asBergsonshowsinchapterfourof MatterandMemory.15Dure
contracts the rhythm of matter. For me to experience
eachelectromagnetic oscillation in a burst of red light, my moving
encounter with92 THESENSEOFSPACEred light would have to be slowed
down tremendously; but it would take mehundreds of thousands of
years to experience each oscillation in the burst asa distinct
event, for me to distinguish red light from other light on the
basisof the quantity of oscillations per unit time. The perceptual
experience of
redcontractsalltheseoscillationswiththeirdistinctiverhythmintoaquality.Dure
isthusincontactwiththerhythmandtimeoftheworld,orratheritcontractsthatrhythmintosomethingdifferent,contractsquantityintoquality.Itisthiscontractionthatgivesperceptionsens
fromwithin,thatturnspureperceptionintoperception.
Bergsonsentiresolutiontodualismturns around the point that dure
contracts quantitative rhythm into some-thing qualitative. Yet he
insists that dure is different in kind from
rhythmic,movingmatternodoubtinanefforttofreethinkingofmatter.Habit,
in Merleau-Pontys sense, poses a challenge to Bergsons divisionof
dure and matter. For Bergson, habit is a simple mechanical process
that,by repetition of movements, contracts complex movements into
simple ones,without retaining any of the past, and for Bergson in
general the body
itselfhasnotemporaldepth,itisjustmatterinthepresent.Habitonitsowncouldnotgenerateanythingdifferentinkindfrommechanicalmovement,and
this is why the movement of the body acquires sens only when the
bodyisstabbedwithpurememory.If one of Merleau-Pontys great
discoveries in the Phenomenology is
sensinmovement,anotheranditisreallyjustanothersideofsens
inmove-mentis the temporal depth of the body, especially as
manifest in habit.
Insteppingdownstairsthatnolongerexist,ingoingthroughastopsign,inhaving
a phantom limb, my bodily movement insists on retention of the
pastandprotentionofafuture;mymovementisnotjustadisplacementofmatter,butabeingintimethathasasens.We
detected this temporal depth of the body in habit as
insensitivity-sensitivity.Describedfromtheoutside,themovementofhabitacquisitionbegins
with non-sens and ends in sens. But that articulation of sens,
expressedin the arc of habit acquisition, does not vanish into
present routines, it is
notjustapparentfromtheoutside.Wearefacedwithitinthevolatilebalanceof
insensitivity-sensitivity intrinsic to having a habit; the
articulation of sensand non-sens
achievedoverthearcofhabitacquisitioniscontractedintoahabit that
threatens to return to insensitivity or to turn into new
sensitivity.My habit is not entirely in the present, but teeters
between past and present,thusconfrontingmewiththesens
expressedinthearcofhabitacquisition(in the way that the arc of my
gesturing confronts me with the sens
expressedinthegesture).Inactingfromsolidiedhabitinthepresent,myperceptionindeedalmostoccursintheobjecttowhichIamresponding,inthemannerofBergsonspureperception.IhardlynoticethestopsignthatIamstoppingfor;
further, I almost dont notice that I have noticed the stop sign, I
am onautopilot, riding a habit to work (see Russon 1994); my
perceptual responseTHETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION 93goes back to the thing
upon which it reacts, leaving no trace in me,
leavingmepureofhavingperceived.ButintheshockofrealizingIhavegonethroughastopsign,thecommitmenttotheworldfrozeninmyhabitasbalanceofinsensitivity-sensitivityiscracked,thawed,andthrownbackatme:
the commitment is expressed not just for the outside viewer, but
for
me.Iamnotamirror,noramIatelegraphicexchange(Bergsonsmetaphor)routingmovementsinthepresent;Iamahabitualbeing,andahabitualbeing
at once freezes over and forges meaningful commitments to the
world,theonebywayoftheother.Theforgingofmeaningisnotreducedtothepresent,butretainsitspast,retainsitsmomentumtowardthefuture,andcomesaliveinthepresentwhenhabitsthawandreform.Inshort,havingamovingschemabasedinhabitexpressesinandforthebodyarelationshiptotheworld,arelationthathasasens.Habitsarenotdroppedintoourlaps,theyareanachievement.Thesens
achievedinacquiring a habit is contracted into present habits,
ready to be thrown
backinexpressformwhenhabitscrackandthaw.Amirroringmediumdoesnotexperienceitsrelationtoapointoutside,itjustreectslightback,andthevirtualimageleftbehindbythatreectionsymbolizesthislimittotheoutside
observer. But a cracked mirror does not insist that it reects a
virtualimage.Wedo.Myarmisnotameremotormechanism.Asahabitualwayof
relating to the world, fringed with the balance of
insensitivity-sensitivity,myarmsymbolizesacertainwayofbeingintheworld,andifitshouldcrack
I may still insist on that way of being in the worldhence,
accordingtoMerleau-Ponty,phenomenasuchasthephantomlimb.Bergsonreduceshabit
to a mechanism in the present, and so for Bergson, sens can arise
onlyifthebodyisstabbedwiththeconeofmemory;butMerleau-Pontyndsatemporaldimensionwithinthehabitualbodythebodystabsitselfwithmemory.Sothebodycanmanifestsens
withinitself.Thissens
isalwaysimpliedinhabits,andbecomesexpresswhenhabitscrack.Indetectingmeaninginthetemporalityofthebody,Merleau-Pontycommits
meaning and thinking to roots in moving nature. This, as
suggestedbelow,canworkonlyifnatureisnolongeraninertsphereofmatterbutanaturethatmovesandarticulatesitself.Weshallbeledtothispointaboutnatureifwereturntoaquestionposedabove:Itisonethingtoshowthatingeneralagestureorhabitexpresses
sens.Buthowdoesagestureorhabitacquiretheparticularsens
thatitexpresses?ToanswerItakethetimeofhabitbackintothetimeofhabitformation,oflearning.LEARNINGAND
SENSHABIT AS ASCALE OFFOLDS,
ANDLEARNINGInwhatfollowsIexpandtheconceptofhabittocoverascaleoflearnedmovement
patterns. Just below the lower fringe of the scale, not really
belonging94
THESENSEOFSPACEtoit,arethosefoldsofmovementwithwhichoneisbornnaturalcon-straintsofthemovingbody.Abovethatarethebasic,learnedmovementsof
the body, for example, walking, grasping, reaching, sitting, and
the
slightlymoreidiosyncraticinectionsofthesemovingpatternscontractedinlearn-ing
them in specic situations, for example, ones unique style of
walking, ofgoing up and down specic stairs, and so on. Habit in the
usual senseI callit habit properfalls somewhere in this range.
Above this range are skillsmore complex and specic movement
repertoires that not everybody learns,such as driving and ballet.
Above that I include habitual forms of secondaryexpression acquired
through the cultural milieu in which we learn
language,dialect,lingo,usage,andsoon;andtheevenmoreidiosyncraticquirksofrhythmandgesturethattestifytoourownindividualpathsoflearning.Abovethehigherfringeofthescale,notreallybelongingtoit,aremove-mentsofprimaryexpressionthatarenotstereotypedbutcreative.It
should be clear that there is an ambiguity in locating a given
learnedmovement pattern on this scale: isnt a given persons ability
to do ballet,
forexample,bothaskill,astylizedexpressiverepertoire,andasiteofidiosyn-cratic
quirks of balletic expression? Yes, and a full analysis, if
possible,
woulddependontheindividualcaseandrequiremanysubtledistinctions.Thepoint
of conceiving habit as a scale is not to establish a quantitative
rankingbuttodrawbasiclearnedmovements,habitsproper,skills,styles,andidio-syncratic
quirks into a continuum of learned bodily movement, whilst
punc-tuatingthecontinuumwithadifferentiatingprinciplethatremindsusthatnotallinstancesoflearnedbodilymovementarethesame.Thereareatleastthreeinterrelateddifferentiatingprinciplesatworkinthescale.First,complexity.Foldshigheronthescalearefoldedoutoffoldsloweronthescale,andareinthatsensedifferentiatedasmorecom-plex.Butwemustrecallthatinthecaseoffolding,complexityisnotamatterofaccretion,ofstackingindependentunitsonlowerunits,butoffoldingthelowerinanewway.Soagainincomplexitybothupwardlycontracts
lower folds into a higher complex, and downwardly modies
lowerfolds. Learning ballet contracts something of the way you walk
and stand
andthenceyourquirkystyleofwalking,andatthesametimeitdownwardlymodies
your walk and stance; a similar relation holds between the quirks
ofyourballeticexpressionandyourinitialpaletteofballetmovements.Thisupwardanddownwardoverlappingaccountsfortheambiguitynotedabove.Thepointsonthescalearentindependentofeachother,ranked
according to an outside measure of degree. Points on the scale
differ-entiatebyoverlapping,andthismovementofdifferentiationgeneratesascalesusceptibleofcoordinateorderingbybothdegreeandkind,inwhichdifferences
in kind are nonetheless irreducible to differences of degree.
ThisiswhatCollingwood(1933)wouldcallascaleofforms.ButIcallthisparticularscaleascaleoffolds,sincehabitsarefolds,andthemetaphoroffolds
(unlike forms) directly captures the overlapping that yields the
peculiarTHETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
95confusionofdegreeandkindbelongingtothescale.(Thedifferencebe-tween
intensive and extensive magnitudes, noted by Kant and developed
byDeleuze,wouldalsobehelpfulhere,andsotooisHegelsdiscussionofthelogicofmagnitudesandmeasures.)16The
second differentiating principle, related to the rst, is of
individu-alityandidiosyncrasy.Atthelowendarefoldssharedbyallbodies;higherin
the scale are more individualized folds. All sheets of paper are
roughly
thesame,butinfoldingtheybecomemoreindividualized,turningintodragonsversus
roses, with individual roses looking different because of quirks in
fold-ing.Developingcomplexfoldsofmovementisnotamatterofunrollingarolled-up
program, of jumping to a new point on an established scale, but ofa
process of successive folding that contracts the movement of
learning,
withallitsquirksanddetours,intopresentmovement.Somorecomplexfoldswillalsobemoreindividual,idiosyncratic.Thethirdprinciple,relatedtothesecond,isofindependence.Atthelowendthefoldswehavearedependentonnature,onournaturalbodies.Above
that, the folds we learn depend on our social sphere, since we
dependonothersinacquiringkineticabilities.Butaswemovefrombasichabitstocomplexskills,webecomemoreindependentofaxednatureandasocialsphere,
more inclined to choose who we are going to learn from, and
eventu-ally begin to teach ourselves to move, and to learn things
independent of
otherindividuals.Individualityofhabitcoupleswithindependenceoflearning.Twonotes:First,acquiringmorecomplexhabitsisnotamatteroftranscending
the body, of approximating to a disembodied agent.
(Feministcritics, for example, argue that Merleau-Ponty has this
view of our relationto the moving body.)17Learning is rather a
matter of developing ones
ownbodyinonesownway,ofsinkingintotoitasonesown,whichwouldincludesinkingintoitasabeingwithherorhisownmovementsandimperatives.Second,Iillustratedthescalewithexamplesthatcouldbeconstruedasstagesinalineardevelopmentfrominfancytoadulthood.Butthisisforthesakeofexposition.Itismisleadingtothinkthatdevel-opmentmeanslinearmovementupthescale,orthatmovementupthescale
can be achieved only through linear developmentthat would
repeattheerrorofstages.Isntitthecasethatthechildbeginsbytryingtoexpress
her own individual moving, desiring relation to the world, but
thatrequiresabilitiessuchaswalkingthatimposecertainsimplicationsandgeneralities?
In this case learning isnt a linear progression up the scale,
butaleapupit,wheretheleapbecomesstableonlywhennovelmovementbecomes
stereotyped and general, that is, by dropping back down the
scale.And doesnt the development of complex artistic expression
begin by
break-ingupstereotypedcomplexes?Inascaleoffoldswheredifferencesup-wardlyanddownwardlyoverlapandmodifyoneanother,theconceptoflinearprogressupthescaleiscomplicatedbythepeculiarupwardanddownwarddynamicsofactuallearning.96
THESENSEOFSPACEThe important point is that learning involves
movement on the scale,even if the movement is not linear or
progressive. Learning is something likea diachronic version of
Bergsons motor schema. The motor schema is
move-mentthatrecognizesthingsbyplayingacrossdifferentzonesofthebody,synchronically.Learningisamovementthatplaysacrossdifferencesinsuc-cessivefoldingsandunfoldingsofhabit,diachronically,generatingsens,aswewillsee,bycontractingsens
upanddownthescale,eitherfromotherbodies,orfromonesownbody.SKILLS
ANDDELIBERATELEARNING:CONTRACTING SENS FROM THESOCIALBODYMoving and
perceiving are two sides of the same coin. We arrived at this
pointby analysis of perception and its moving schema. But the point
is already
cleartothosewhoteachorlearncomplexskills.Drivinginstructorsdonotjustteach
learners how to move the wheel and accelerator, but how to perceive
thetrafcworld,theonebywayoftheother.AsnovelistDavidFosterWallacevividly
shows, tennis isnt just a matter of swinging a racket but of
perceivingagameygeometryofthecourt,oflearningtheangles,vectorsandwaysofseeing
that give advantage in tennis as a moving game of chess (Wallace
1996,1997). Learning to play tennis is learning the sens of the
tennis world. But howdo I learn this sens if I do not already have
it, if I would already need that
senstomoveandperceiveinsuchawayastobeexposedtothatsens
intherstplace?Wouldntlearningsuchasens,asensiblestructuringofthemovingworld,
be a bit like learning the basic structure of space, which, as Kant
shows,isimpossibleunlessyoupossessthatstructureapriori?BergsongivesawonderfullyinsightfulaccountoflearningaskillinMatter
and Memory. Herewith a version of it, drawing on the key insight
thatlearning a skill is a process in which movements are recomposed
by
repeatingtheirdecomposition,whatIcallasynthesisthatproceedsbyrepeatingananalysis.18Idonotseethetennisinstructordoingabackhandandthenimmediatelyreproducethemovementasawhole.Todothat,Iwouldal-ready
need to be able to do the backhand. But that is precisely what I
cannotdo,whatIamtryingtolearn.Sotheinstructorbreaksthebackhandintofragments,
and I learn how to perform the fragments, by deploying or
modi-fying habits, folds, that I already have. Still, I have not
learned the
backhandifIperformitasaseriesofmovementfragments.Thatsortoffragmentary,choppymovementischaracteristicofthelearner,orofthecomicIamthinkingofJacquesTatiasM.Hulotwhodrawsouthumorinhumanmovementbyunhingingitfromwithin.ItisnotuntilfragmentsslideintoasmoothwholethatIhavelearnedthebackhand.HowdoIachievethesmoothwhole?Preciselybydoggedlyrepeatingthechoppyfragmentsinasequence
that follows the smooth whole modeled by the instructor, until
thefragmentsstartowingintooneanotherinmyownmovements.THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
97I am a being who gets to play tennis only by learning how to. I
cannotdirectly or instantaneously copy the moving gure manifest in
the instructorsmoving body. That gure must be unfolded into a
network of folds, analyzed,either by the instructor, or by me
trying to break things down. But the foldsrevealed by analysis are
fragments of a whole, folds implicated in one
anotherintheinstructorsbody.Thefoldsretainsomethingoftheirco-implication.AsIrepeatfragmentaryfoldsinmybody,theseimplicationsareactivated,andthefoldsgraduallyfoldbackintoawhole,aresynthesized,inthewaythatsomeoneplayingwithanunfoldedpieceoforigami,byfollowingfoldshinged
into one another in the paper, may fold it back up (although it
wontcome out exactly the same). Learning a skill is not a direct
transfer of
movingwholesfrominstructortolearner,butasynthesisbyanalysis:itisonlybyrepeating,overandover,analyzedmovementinmybodythatIsynthesizethecomplexmovementoftheinstructorsbody.Crucially,thesynthesisbyanalysisisconductedwithinthemovementofbodies.(Beingabletolearnorre-jigmovementsjustbywatchingortalkingischaracteristicofexpertswellpastthesimplestageofacquiringskills.)Skillacquisitiondependsonsynthesisbyanalysisandontheinterrelationofthebodiesinwhichalonethissynthesisbyanalysisoccurs.What
is transferred in skill acquisition is not just a way of moving,
buta sens
oftheworld.Inlearningthebackhand,Ilearnhowtoapproachtheball, court,
and world, I learn a whole attitude and orientation to the
world,asens thatIdidnotyethave.Idonotgainthatnewsens
directly,asifhanded it ready-made and entire. When I rst step onto
the court, I glimpsea sens
intheinstructorswayofmoving,butIdonotyethaveit.(Howdidtheinstructorseewhatwasgoingtohappen?Itseemsalmostmagical!)Butinlearning,anaspectoftheinstructorsmovingschemaofperceptionisunfoldedalongthelinesofmovingbodies,analyzed;andwhenIplayandreplay
that analyzed movement in my moving body, I refold it, synthesize
it,andbegintoacquireanewsens.Idonotalreadyneedtohavethesens tolearn
it, because I never seize sens entire from the instructor. In some
sense,I learn the sens from myself, from moving in a certain choppy
way and havingit fall together in my own movement. I cannot
directly seize the sens of
beingCary-Grant-like,thatseemsvagueandmysterious,ifdistinctive;butifIcatch
and repeat fragments of Grants expressions, the minimal mouth
move-mentthatseemsascrucialtohismannerastautnesstoadrum-roll,IstartfeelingGrant-ish,andothergesturessnapalong,sharpeningarhythmofscrewballrepartee.Returning
to the discussion of Merleau-Ponty, Collingwood, and PlatosMeno
attheendofthepreviouschapter,skillacquisitionisnotamatteroftransferring
something from the class of the things without sens to those
withsens, but of having sens in a different and better way. Vague
sens analyzed
andplayedoutinmybodybecomesclearthroughasynthesisconductedinmyownbody.98
THESENSEOFSPACEThemovementfromvaguenesstoclarityisasynthesisbyanalysis,whichhasanontologicalstructurecognatetosummationbydifference,towhatIcalledarticulation,andtobodilytranslation.(Herewearealreadybeginning
to see an underlying ontology.) But articulation involves more
orless spontaneous folding of body-world movement. In contrast,
skill acquisi-tiondependsonandisconstrainedbyasens
vaguelyoutlinedinanothersbody,andbythecommonalitiesofmovingbodiesinwhichsynthesisbyanalysistakesplace.Thisprovidesapartialrstanswertothequestion:howdoesahabitacquire
the particular sens that it expresses? In the case of a skill, I
contractsens from another body into my own. A particular sens
clings to the folds ofmy movement because I acquire my skilled way
of moving by unfolding
andrefoldingfoldsofanothermovingbody.Butthatdefersthequestion.Howdoesabodyhaveaparticularsensintherstplace?HABITS
ANDNATURALLEARNING:CONTRACTING SENS
FROMONESOWNBODYInlearningaskillfromanotherIbeginwithavaguesens
inanotherbodyandendupwiththatsens
sharpenedinmyownbody.InmorebasiccasesoflearningwhatIwillcallnaturallearningourownbodiesofferthevague
sens that prompts an analysis in movement. Such an analysis
amountstoabreakdownofourmovingrelationtotheworld.Ingettingpastitbyanewsynthesis,wesharpenandcontractasens
fromourownbodies.It is a fact about us that, unless and until we
become incredibly
skilledandversatile,weneedtolearnskillsbyrepeatingandfollowingothers.Related
to this is the fact that we need to learn how to move about. We
havetolearnhowtorollover,situp,crawl,stand,walk,ascendanddescendstairs.Nobodyoffersusanalyticalinstructioninlearningthesemovements,nobody
provides a template of delineated movement fragments (in the
man-nerofatennisinstructor),evenifothershelpoutincrucialways.Rather,theworldandothersdrawusintonewengagementsthatprovokeabreak-downofmovement,ananalysisthatrevealsanew,vaguesens,andtheconsequentrepetitionamountstoasynthesisthatsharpensanewsens.The
infant reaches out for a toy or an others hand, drawing on the
sensofherreaching,extendingbody,fallsover,triesagain,fallsover,andagain.Astablefoldofmovementthatletstheinfantreachalittlewaysfromthebodyintersectswiththeworldinencouragingabroaderreach,butfallsapart,exposinganewvaguesens.Fragmentsofmovementformerlyfoldedinto
an inseparable whole fall apart, a leg and hand that had formerly
alwaysextended in sync with one another begin to move separately,
the leg provid-ingstability,thehandstretchingout.Anexistingsens
ofthebodycrossesintotheworldsoastoprovokeananalysis.Inrepeatingtheanalysis,newTHETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
99movement fragments fall together in a new way, and the infant
acquires notonly a new way of moving, but a new sens. In learning a
skill, an others bodyprovidesavaguesens
togetherwithitsanalysis;whenrepeatedinmybody,theanalysisletsmesharpenanewsens.Innaturallearning,theworldthatcrossesintothebodyprovokesthisvague
sens
anditsanalysis;repetitioninthebodyonceagainsynthesizesthenewsens.This
helps answer the question how a body comes to have a particularsens
in the rst place: sens is contracted out of the body itself in
learning
tomoveinaprovocativenaturalandsocialworld.Thequestionastowhythebodyitselfhasavaguesens
thatcanbeprovoked into sharpening would take us into questions
about the very natureof the body and of nature itself. Such
questions cannot be pursued here, andare no doubt the sorts of
questions that Merleau-Ponty was trying to pursuein
TheVisibleandtheInvisible,
whichisnotjustaturntothephilosophyofbeingofHeidegger,buttothephilosophyofnatureofSchelling,orthatBergsonwastryingtopursueinCreativeEvolution.Onecannotdevelopaphilosophyofperceptionthatovercomestraditionaldualismswithoutalsorethinkinglifeandnature.Theconceptofnaturedemandedbyeverythingsaidsofarisoneinwhich
nature is no longer a ready-made whole with crisply specied laws,
butisitselfamovementfromvagueorganizationtoclearorganization.Natureitself
would not be the unfolding of an already achieved synthesis, would
notberightlyanalyzedonsolidlines.Natureitselfwouldbeasynthesisbyanalysis,
a uid, moving whole, the very movement of which breaks up
intopartialmovementsthatretainatraceofthemovementfromwhichtheyunfold
and thus in the very movement of breaking up fold back together
soastogeneratenewmovements.Afeatureofsuchanaturewouldbethatpartsofitalreadyoverlaponeanotherandreectoneanotherindifferentforms,
that is, the relations of synthesis by analysis, summation by
difference,andbodilytranslationwouldreecttheontologyofnature.Merleau-PontyissearchingforsuchanontologyinTheVisibleandtheInvisible,withhispursuit
of resonances, a narcissism of the other, and in this pursuit he is
goingbacktoSchellingswildbeing,totheidentityphilosophywhichseeksthe
difference of subject and object as unfolding from their
identity.19But
weshouldnotforgetHegel.Inhisearliestbook,TheStructureofBehaviour,Merleau-Pontywritesthatthephenomenonoflifeappearsatthemomentwhenapieceofextension,bythedispositionofitsmovementsandbytheallusion
that each movement makes to all the others, folded back upon
itself[serepliait]andbegantoexpresssomething,tomanifestaninteriorbeingexternally(SdC
175/162).HereMerleau-PontyisconceivingexpressionthroughHegelsphilosophyofnature,viaHyppolite,who,itisworthre-marking,
is one of Deleuzes inspirations.20My analysis shows that
expressionis something like the folding mentioned in The Structure
of Behaviour, but itis not extension that folds, rather movement
itself folds from within. A shock100
THESENSEOFSPACEofmovementwashesthroughbeing,overrunsabodythatlimitsmovement,breaks
up in translating across a body, and by the allusion that each
movementintheshockmakestoalltheothers,theshockfolds,effectingasummationbydifference,anarticulation.SoperhapsinhisearliestphilosophyMerleau-Pontyisalreadythinkingofnatureasamovementthatdifferentiatesbywayof
folding itself into a different sum, which is perhaps also what
Renaud Barbarasmeans by desire (Barbaras 1999, 2000). Realize,
though, what such a
summa-tionbydifferenceinthefoldingofmovementamountsto:aninsideisex-pressed
in an outside, pain is expressed in the gesture; but the outside is
equallyexpressedintheinside:thepainfulgestureexpressestheshockoftheworld,asthepainting(todrawonMerleau-PontysEyeandMindandCezannesDoubt)expressesthelookofthemountain.Thisreversingofinsideandoutsideinexpressionis,Ithink,whatismeantbychiasm.21In
any case, if we wish to nd a sens in movement, without falling
intoalogicofsolids,andifwewishtoanswerthequestionwhythereissens
inthe rst place, then at the level of the living body, I think we
shall have tosay that sens belongs to a moving body that needs to
learn how to move,
thatlearnsfromothers,andthatcanlearntomovedifferently,thatcanteachitselftomovedifferently,thatitselfstumblesuponandencountersdiffer-encesinwaysofmoving.Mostofall,abodyofthissortwillhavetobeconceivedasdesiring,elseitwouldneverlearn.Abeingthatdidnotneedto
learn how to move, that could move in only one way, that never
stumbled,thatdidnotdesire,wouldnothavethesortoflabilesens
thatwedetectedinperception,butacrystallinemeaningthatwouldtranscendmovement,the
sort of meaning urged by representationalism or to be found in the
mindof God. On the other hand, the movement in question here is a
movementoflearning,amovementthatimplicatesitselfinwhatwemightcallthesocial
and the symbolic: it would be wrong to say that certain movements
ofbodiesontheirowncausesens; rather sens
iscontractedinmovingbodiesthatarepartoflargermovements,socialmovements,symbolicmovements.And
so perhaps we return to Hegel here, detecting a eshy matrix
forHegels logic of recognition: a body that needs to learn to move
from othersis a body that is operating as a bodily I that is We,
and a body of this
sortdependsonabodilyWethatisI,asocialbodythathelpsandthusalsopossiblyhindersanddoesviolencetothemovementandgrowthofindividualbodies.The
sens of space is shaped by this eshy matrix from which we
contractsens. If there is a specic sens in movement, a sens that is
not plucked from thinair but is worked out, expressed, in movement
itself, it is because a body thatneeds to learn to move in relation
to the world and to other bodies already
has,initsrelationtotheworldandothers,avaguesens
thatconstrainsthecon-tractionandsharpeningofsens,avaguesens
thatalwaystracesbackintomovement that can never be fully solidied
or completed as a point of
origin,butthattrailsbackbehindusinmovementthatexceedsus.THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
101THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSIONThe eshy matrix from which we contract
the sens of space is constrained bya specic logic of interrelated
parts and movements that spreads out over theplace of the body into
the social and natural world. I shall call this
constrain-inglogicthetopologyofexpression.Tobegin,acoupleofgeneralpointsaboutmyconceptoftopology.In
The Roots of Thinking Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has many
insightfuldiscussionsofthetopologyofthebody.Thesediscussionsaregearedtothinking
about the way that topological properties of the living body
becomeaphenomenologicaltemplateforbehaviorsandconcepts,forexample,themouth
as opening becomes a template for concepts of inside and outside,
themovement of teeth and different topological properties of craggy
molars
andbladelikeincisorsbecomeatemplateforgrindingandchoppingtools,therhythm
of bipedal motion becomes a template for counting. Her focus is
ontopologyintermsofshapecharacteristicsofbodyparts,andrelationsthatremain
invariant through bodily motion; her (very critically qualied)
modelis topology as a science that studies shape characteristics
that remain invari-antthroughcertainstretchingoperations.My
interest is not so much in shape characteristics of body parts as
inthe logic of relations between parts of the body as a spread-out
place that
isnonethelessauniedwhole,theoriginalherediscussedintheintroduc-tion.
This interest stems from a small remark by Merleau-Ponty
immediatelyprecedinghisdiscussionoftheillusionofthedoublemarbleandhispointthat
the theory of the body schema is already, implicitly, a theory of
percep-tion(PP
239/206).Merleau-PontywritesthatThething,andtheworld,are given to
me along with the parts of my body, not by any natural
geom-etry,butinalivingconnectioncomparable,orratheridenticalwiththatexisting
between parts of my body itself (PP 237/205). This is clearly
coupledwithanearlierremarkthatifwedescribethespatialityofthebodywendthat
parts are not spread out side by side, but [are] enveloped in each
other(PP 114/ 98). That is, the geometry of the world, the
structure of lived
space,isnotreectiveofamathematicalgeometry,butofaliving,phenomenalgeometry
of the body. The lived body, we could say, stands to lived space
inanarticulatoryrelation:thelivedbodysumsupspaceinaformthatisdifferent
from but not other than space, since the two cross one another.
Thelivedbodysumsupspaceaslivedspace.AgainweareconfrontedbytheontologyInotedabove,andtheconceptofbodilytranslation:inthebody,zonesandmovementsenveloponeanother,translateoneanotherinverydifferent
forms, and when movement repeatedly translates through the
body,thebodytranslatestheworld.Butthephenomenalgeometryofsuchatranslatingorarticulatingbodyisnotthatofclassicaltopologicaldescrip-tions
of the body. It is not even dened by the sorts of meanings that
Sheets-Johnstone discovers inherent in shapes of body parts as
guring in movements102 THESENSEOFSPACElike putting food in ones
mouth, chewing food, and walking.
Merleau-Pontypointsustoamorefundamentalgeometry,oneinwhichthemostbasicunity
of the body is at stake: the body is not presented to us in virtue
of
thelawofitsconstitution,asthecircleistothegeometer,itisanexpressiveunity
which we can learn to know only by taking it up, that is, by living
thebody. What counts in this expressive geometry of the body is the
way that
lifetakesuppartsspreadoutalongsideoneanotherandenvelopstheminoneanotherthroughmovementasauniedwholethatexpressesanattitudeto-ward
the world. So the geometry in question has to do with fundamental
factsaboutthewaypartsworktogetherinthemovementofanexpressivebody.In
other words, the living body is a special sort of place, with a
specialtopology. As noted in the introduction, all the parts of the
body are absorbedinto one original and unied here. The logic of
parts and wholes that
wouldapplytoanyotherplace(topos)doesnotquiteapplyintheplaceofbody.The
body has a different topo-logic (place-logic), a living, phenomenal
topo-logic, in which parts are not beside one another, but envelop
one another inmovement. More, the topo-logic of the body extends
into a larger place.
AsEdwardS.CaseyshowsinGettingBackintoPlace,thebodyis,inCaseysterm,inherentlyimplaced:tobeistobeinplace.Caseyshowsthatoursenseofplaceinherentlyhastodowithacouplingofbodyandplace;forexample,left-rightandahead-behindstemfromthemovinginteractionofthe
body and place. That is, the topo-logic of the body would stem not
onlyfromthepeculiarlogicofpartsandwholesinthelivedbody,butfromthebodysrelationtoplace.Iagree.Thephenomenaltopo-logicofthebody,as
shown in the next chapter, runs between the body as a special place
andthelargerplaceinwhichthebodylives.Wehavealreadyseenthatthesocial
place of the body is vital to learning, and subsequent chapters
showthatmorefundamentalrelationstoplace,forexample,totheearthasaplace
of residing, already gure in the relation between parts and wholes
ofthebody.Butifwearenottoturnthelivinggeometryofthebodyintoapossession
of the subject, and thus close the subject to the world,
violatingthe method outlined above, place must already anticipate
the sort of
geom-etryofenvelopmentorbodilytranslationthatwedetectinthebody.Weshallseethisbelow.Thetopologyofexpressionisthetopo-logicofabodycrossedoverwithplace,conceivedasaconstraintonthedevelopmentalandexpressiveprocessofthebody,aconstraintthatshapesthesens
thatwecontractfromour body moving and growing in place. If learning
to move expresses sens inour bodies, that learning is constrained
by the spread and implacement of
ourmovingbodies.Thetopologyofexpressionthusdesignatesthelivinginter-sectionofspatialandtemporal,eshy-placialanddevelopmental-habitual,aspectsoftheliving,movingbody.Itisaconceptforthinkingofsens
asarisinginamoving,growingbodyinplace.Theconceptiseshedoutinsubsequentchapters.THETOPOLOGYOFEXPRESSION
103CONCLUSIONBergsonsaccountofperception,ofhowthereissomethingmorethanpureperception,ofhowthereissens,dependsonthelightningofpurememorystrikingtheplaneofpurematterinthesingularpointofthebody.Sensdepends
on a leap across differences in kind that nonetheless have an
afnity.Our pursuit of sens in movement took us in another
direction, into the timeof expression, of gesture, habit
acquisition and learning, and thence
directedustothetopo-logicoftheimplacedbody,atopologythatconstrainstheexpressive
movement of learning. In the topology of expression, what
Bergsonwouldcallmatterandmemoryintersectinamutualconstraint.Inabodythatmovesbygrowing,growsbymoving,andisspreadoutinplace,sens
iscontracted from the mutual constraint and co-implication of
movement spreadin place and developmental movement stretched in
time. In effect, the con-cept of the topology of expression plunges
us inside that turning point
where,inBergsonsaccount,theconeofmemorystabstheplaneofmatter.Butinsteadofafeaturelesspoint,thebodyisanopenwrinkleofplaceandtemporalityoverlappingoneanother,waitingtounfoldandrefoldinamovementthatsharpensnew
sens bycontractingitfromvague sens. Sens isnot to be traced back to
an already constituted origin outside of sens, it is notcaused to
come into being by such an origin; rather sens arises in a
continualmovementofbecoming,andtheconceptsofarticulationandthetopologyof
expression help us gain insight into this movement by tracing
constraintsonthismovementfromwithin.The chapters of part two
explore this topology of expression, or
ratheraspectsofitthatIcalltopologies,showinghowoursens
ofspaceiscon-tractedoutofitandhowspatialsens
dependsonthesocial.