The Territoriality of Spatial-Economic Governance in Historical Perspective: The Case of The Netherlands

Page 1

1

Draft version of Lagendijk, A and Boekema, F. (2009): The Territoriality of Spatial-

Economic Governance in Historical Perspective: The Case of The Netherlands. In:

Shifts in Governmentality, Territoriality and Governance: An Introduction. In Bas, A,

Lagendijk, A and Houtum, Henk van: The Disoriented State: Shifts in

Governmentality, Territoriality and Governance, Springer, pp. 121-140

Arnoud Lagendijk & Frans Boekema

Spatial economic governance of knowledge and innovation

Introduction

A field in which recent changes in governmentality, territoriality and governance has

been pervasive is that of spatial economic policy. In particular, the impact of

neoliberal perspectives has resulted in three major point of emphasis: namely on (1)

indigenous growth and innovation (supporting ‘competitiveness’), (2) the region as a

key site of economic development, and (3) multi-level and multi-actor forms of

governance (Kaiser and Prange, 2004, Charles et al., 2004, Malerba, 2002??)

Obviously, the degree and specificities of changes manifest strong geographical

variations. Some countries, like the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark have gone

quite far in propagating indigenous development while others, like Germany and

France remain more committed to the ‘welfarist’ objective of spatial equality through

redistributive measures. To understand such specific outcomes, we need to examine

how certain pervasive ideas and practices are performing in a particular context of

national and regional political development and policy-making. As emphasised by

Painter (2002) and Larner and Walter (2002), the analytical use of the concept of

‘governmentality’ and the method of genealogy can serve such a project well.

Territorial formations such as regions can be seen as constituted objects of knowledge

that result from the political scopes and rationalities, technologies, and discourses

created by government, as contained, in particular, in ‘geographical knowledges’ and

images and mappings of ‘spaces of rule’ (Dühr, 2007) Genealogy places the inquiry in

a historical context, by exploring the historical trajectories and mutations occurring in

political rule and rationality, thus exposing time- and space-specific ‘self-evident’

truths..

In this chapter we will focus on one dimension that, in our view, deserves particular

attention, namely territoriality. More specifically, we want to explore how shifts in

governmentality and the rise of new forms of governance, as extensively documented

in the literature, have been accompanied by changing perspectives on territoriality,

and practices of territorialisation (??Jones). We understand such territoriality basically

in two ways. First, the development of economic policies is territorial as a practice.

State and non-state organisations at different spatial levels and in different formations

coalesce in constituting forms and practices of economic governance. Second, it is

territorial as a target. Governance practices target a specific bounded territory, a

region or locality, which is presented as in need of attracting investors, supporting

innovation, developing skills etc. Neo-liberal governmentalities, for instance, with an

emphasis on self-responsibility and self-help, proclaim a neat alignment between

these two dimensions. Regions should basically look after themselves, linking subject

(governance) and object (target), building their own institutional capacity to provide

Page 2

2

locally tailored and supported economic governance and aid, in what is considered a

‘global’ setting of ‘fair play’.

What makes this an intriguing topic is that the issue of territoriality reflects a high

level of ambivalence, and, compared with ‘neo-liberalising’ governmentality and

‘multiplying’ governance, less a sense of direction. On the one hand, territories,

notably regions (from city-regions to sub-state areas or provinces), have been defined

as subjects of national policies involving redistribution or innovation in a rather a-

spatial manner. Territories are then seen as ‘containers’ for state projects. Such a

‘container view’ has been characteristic for most post-war regional policies evolving

at national and supranational (EU) level (cf. the EU NUTS division and its application

in Structural Funds). This view is increasingly challenged, on the other hand, by what

can been described by more spatially oriented approaches, that see spatial economic

development more in terms of specific places and their connections, that is, in terms

of nodes, networks, corridors and gateways. While the regional-economic approach

still reigns supreme at the European level, and in some federal states, many countries,

and the EU itself, manifest a move towards a more spatialised, ‘node and network’

territorial perspective.

One of these countries is the Netherlands, in which economic and innovation policies

have been grafted onto an explicitly neo-liberal governmental perspective, and on an

elaborate division of labour between the central state (notably the Department of

Economic Affairs and its developmental agency Syntens), provinces (notably through

their engagement with European funding and initiatives), and localities (city-regions

and cities). While changes in governmentality and governance are thus in line with

general trends, this comes with clashing views and practices of territoriality. One

illustration of this is the way the notion of ‘urban networks’ is understood and

practised both as a form of spatial connection (gateway) and as a bounded space of

strategically collaborating cities (city-region). In part, this is a reflection of the

broader tension between ‘container’ and spatialised views manifesting at a more

global level. In addition, a specific role is played by the historical process of Dutch

state formation. Both the ‘container’ and spatialised perspectives hark back to

developments in the establishment of the federal republic and the institutionalisation

of spatial planning centred on water defence in the 15th and 16

th centuries respectively.

What this paper seeks to do, therefore, is trace current perspectives on territoriality

within economic development policy in a long-term historical as well as an actualised

setting. The argument will be developed in three steps. After a brief introduction on

the (perceived) significance of the region in innovation and knowledge production,

the development of Dutch regional and spatial approaches towards economic

development will be discussed from an historical point of view. Against this

background, the final part will discuss recent shifts in the governance of territorially

oriented economic policies.

Neo-liberal governmentalities and spatial-economic development policies at the

level of the EU and the Netherlands

Economic development policies have undergone a radical change as a result of the

rise of neo-liberal discourses, with its accompanying shift from egalitarian to

entrepreneurial approaches. For spatially oriented policies, this has meant a change

Comment [LPC1]: Alternative:

section

Page 3

3

from territories considered primarily as statistical units under an overarching aim of

convergence, to economic subjects endowed with agency to nurture their own

(indigenous) economic position and development. Development practices shifted

accordingly from investment support primarily for larger firms to encouraging

innovation and local networking, with a stronger emphasis on SMEs. A clear

manifestation of the entrepreneurial mood in the domain of spatial and economic

policy is the proliferation of strategies and practices oriented towards building

‘regional innovation systems’ or ‘networks’, and ‘Learning Regions’. (Rutten and

Boekema, 2007).

The support for indigenous development policies privileging the region cannot be

traced back to one dominant neo-liberal perspective. In line with Cerny’s (this

volume) observations, this shift should be seen as resulting from a large variety of

discursive practices occurring within, as well across, a large number of policy sites. A

great number of organisations and networks, at the regional, national and international

level, is occupied with the transfer of ideas, instruments and resources between

regions, nations and even continents (Lagendijk, 2005). In Europe, the EU has been

playing a pivotal role in the facilitation and shaping of regional innovation strategies.

At a global level, this role is played by organisations such as the OECD, UN, IMF and

World Bank. There are also dedicated programmes and networks such as IRE

(http://www.innovating-regions.org/) and EURADA (the European Association of

Development Agencies) that specialise in the exchange of ideas and experiences,

undertake comparative study work and serve to disseminate ‘good practices’ and

tools. All these organisations translate and circulate their interpretations of neo-liberal

imperatives and necessities into particular strategies and policies.

As a result, under the surface of ‘global’ policy learning and networking, under the

veil of ‘universal’ lessons and ambitions, differences tend to prevail, notably at the

regional level. Policy documentation tends to highlight the variation in overall

objectives, approaches and results, as for instance indicated by a recent EU evaluation

of RIS/RIS+ projects (DG Regio, 2002).What we can also learn from this overview,

behind the concealing standardised formats through which the cases are presented, is

the profound variation in forms of governance and even more of territoriality. Some

of the programmes (notably from Spain, which is heavily overrepresented) clearly

stem from established regional governance settings. They manifest and aim to develop

alliances with other established regional plans, key actors, sectoral and business

support structures, etc. English projects, in particular, appear to be aligned with

ambitions of region formation, by contributing to the shaping of regional governance

agendas and structures, in some case of a cross-border nature. Others (like in South-

eastern Europe) are anchored more at the national level, reflecting national objectives

of reducing spatial disparities and addressing problems of peripherality. Finally, some

(as in the Netherlands) are overtly linked to the European level of policy making and

funding, by stating that the projects present a follow-up or continuation of previous

EU-funded projects at a regional (sometimes cross-border) level. In the latter case, the

projects contain a bundle of activities located within a region demarcated for that

purpose.

These specific outcomes are not coincidental. They are mediated, as argued in the

[book??] introduction, by the political and institutional context in which the initiatives

have evolved. In particular, it is the national level that plays a critical role here. While

Page 4

4

the EU may act as inspirator, catalyst, sometimes even agitator, nation states are still

in control of processes of regionalisation and the shaping of regional governance and

policy structures, and of setting policy agendas (Jones, 2004). The latter has been

prompted, in particular, by the way Western countries feel the need to respond the

pervasive ‘pressures’ of competition and innovation, and the ‘challenge’ to nurture

appropriate productive and innovative infrastructures, for which the regional level is

seen as particularly suitable. Yet, how this response is framed, voiced and practised

differs markedly from state to state. In the case of England, for instance, Painter

(2002) explains the recent process of regional strategy formation in terms of the

asymmetric relations and tensions between the central level and various forms of

regional/local organisations and voices, fuelled by the ongoing discourses on the

regional shape of England (notably versus Scotland and Wales) and on the ‘persistent’

North-South divide within England. In Eastern Europe, one can also observe the

prominent role of (national) discourses and practices of regionalisation in the shaping

of regional agendas, often closely associated with the need to comply with EU

demands for the implementation of Structural Funds and EU regional policy (Varró,

2008). In Spain and Germany, on the other hand, the established federal structure

provides a fertile basis for subnational initiatives, although, especially in Germany,

regional programmes are often implemented at an often more arbitrarily defined level

below that of the ‘Länder’.

When placed in an historical perspective, the Netherlands presents a rather remarkable

case. Its official ‘plural’ denomination (the Netherlands, Paises Bajos, Pays Bas, die

Niederlande) refers back to a legendary federal past. This past ended at the turn of the

18th century, when, during and after the French occupation, unitary rule was

implemented, in what can be seen as a period of major changes of state

governmentalities, forms of governance and, in line with that, territoriality. Since

then, the native denomination of the country is singular (Nederland), while the official

name “Kingdom of the Netherlands” now refers to what is left of the Dutch colonial

empire (including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba). The historical federal structure still

lives on in the provincial division of the country, with two major changes: the

subdivision of the dominant province of Holland into a Northern and Southern part

(1840), and the addition of the province of Flevoland, encompassing land reclaimed

from the former Zuiderzee (1986). Alongside the spatial division, the democratic and

legislative provincial institutions also continue to exist, albeit in highly modified

forms. What is remarkable, however, is not the transition from a federal to a unitary

structure as such. Rather, what is significant is that this transition has been

accompanied by a serious erosion of territorial governance capacity at the subnational

level. Where, as illustrated above, in many European countries the regional agenda of

the EU and similar tendencies have been embraced to instigate or revamp processes of

regionalisation and even federalisation, this is largely absent in ‘the Netherland/s’.

This absence does not point at something missing, but at a different perspective.

Dutch territorial approaches have basically played a different set of cards. Not those

of regionalisation and regional governance, but rather those of spatial formations

(Dühr and Lagendijk, 2007). The neoliberal wave of the 1980s and 1990s prompted

many countries to shift from a combination of direct forms of business support and

Keynesian policies to supply-side oriented approaches along sectoral and regional

approaches, often with EU support. In the Netherland/s the same shift occurred, but

then more towards spatial approaches. In effect, the last two decades of the 20th

Page 5

5

century produced an intriguing confluence of spatial and economic policy. This

occurred, first, through a pervasive ‘spatialisation of economic policy’ and

‘economisation of spatial policy’ (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000), inducing what Hajer

and Zonneveld describe as new ‘institutional practices’ primarily oriented towards the

facilitation of ‘flow’ through the provision of physical infrastructure. Two core spatial

formations that dominate current practices are ‘mainports’ (an intriguing Dutch

composite metaphor using English terms) and ‘urban networks’. The concept of

‘mainports’ signifies the way in which the port of Rotterdam and the airport of

Amsterdam-Schiphol act as ‘gateways’ between Europe and the world, as well as

national economic hubs. In addition, the Eindhoven area is marked as a ‘Brainport’

(continuing the local play on the English language) reflecting the importance of the

interaction between Philips, the Technical University and high tech business – part of

which is hosted on the prestigious Philips high-tech campus. ‘Urban networks’, on the

other hand, stress the importance for cities located within polycentric urban areas to

join forces to improve economic competitiveness, resource efficiency and combat

sprawl.

Such a ‘spatial’ emphasis and rationality is also reflected in the way the notion of

‘regional innovation’ has been embraced. While provinces and regions have taken the

project and funding possibilities offered by the EU, this remained largely confined to

self-contained activities geared to nurturing local collaboration, clustering and

resource development. Where initiatives are embedded within broader regional

agendas, this is often linked to the conceptualisation of specific spatial formation,

such as the ‘Research Triangle’ between Nijmegen, Wageningen and Enschede. The

only province that has developed a regional innovation strategy that serves

substantively as a basis for other local initiatives in is Limburg (Van Gils, 2000). In

parallel, there have been several national attempts to instigate a regionalised structure

of innovation support, but these remain strongly subjected to central forms of control

and finance, as will be discussed below.

Let us now trace these developments back to the period in which the Dutch state was

founded. The next sections will relate how, since the ‘Golden Age’, major

transformations have taken place in state governmentalities and governance

structures, and how this bears on the territorial perspectives and practices with

economic development policy. In brief, the historical trajectory runs from

mercantilism, via developmentalism to entrepreneurialism. The latter shift will be

examined, more specifically, by zooming in onto the performance of spatial

development concepts that have emerged in the post-war period. As illustrated by the

work of Van Duinen (2004), and Zonneveld and Verwest (2005), in recent times

spatial development concepts have served to reconcile the more 'abstract' political and

policy debates on spatial planning and the 'concrete' level of control and development

(Van Duinen, 2004). Consequently, delving into the genealogy of such concepts

provides important clues to the broader connections between shifts in

governmentality, governance and territoriality. An interesting issue highlighted by

these authors is the way these concepts are, on the one hand, a major source of lock-

in, through the way they reinforce established discursive and institutional practices,

while they, on the other hand, can also embody major transformative capacities.

Page 6

6

Territoriality and practices of territorialisation in the Netherland/s: from

‘mercantilism’ to ‘developmentalism’

The wealth of the Dutch Republic in the 17th century was primarily based on its

central position in the circulation of goods, accompanied by rapid expansion of

services in communication, contracting, financing and insurance. In terms of political

rule, this position was sustained by a close coalition between a mercantilist state and

ruling elites, structured along territorial (urban and provincial) and religious lines.

While protecting land against water (sea and river) had always been a major concern,

as well as a major drain on resources, the combination of wealth and the dispersed

territorial governance structure triggered a wave of more ambitious projects of land

reclamation and cultivation. This, in turn, produced some significant outcomes which

still pervade spatial developments and perspectives in the Netherlands: the rapid

expansion of agriculture and a clear divide between urban nodes and ‘open space’.

Dutch landscape painters in 17th century would typically depict rural, idyllic pictures

of grazing cattle and horticulture with the silhouette of a (trading) city visible in the

distance. Such pictures are still relished in the context of the current debate on spatial

planning, notably on the containment of ‘urban sprawl’.

This ‘Golden Age’ was followed by a long period of slow but lasting decline. Not

only did the Republic face a relative decline in its trading position, it was also unable

to upkeep, let alone develop, basic infrastructure, except for the most necessary

structures of water defence. The country’s federal structure, moreover, once a source

of a certain strength, resilience, and pride, increasingly became a liability and factor

of stagnation. In terms of political rationality and rule, times were changing across

Europe. Neighbouring countries like Great Britain and France were moving to more

‘modern’, growth-oriented modes of economic management, partly driven by a

subordination of the economy to social and political (including military) goals framed

at the level of the nation state. The result was a fundamental turn from mercantilism to

'developmentalist' political rationalities and government actions (Larner and Walters,

2002). Until the end of its existence, however, the Republic lacked the (super)vision

and resources to follow suit. The end came when, in 1795, France occupied the

impoverished territory of the ‘Low Countries’. The 'French Age', as the period is

called, ushered in a series of fundamental transformations, most of which endured

after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The Netherlands was turning into Nederland,

developing a structure and rule of governance markedly different from times gone by.

Transformations in territorial governance under 'developmentalism’

Under Napoleonistic rule, the Republic was dismantled and replaced by unitary state

rule. In the third year of the occupation (1798), the Provinces were stripped of

virtually all their powers and competencies. This centralisation was further

consolidated in the post-French period 1815-1848. Across Europe, the traumatic years

of the early 19th century triggered a restoration of conservative forces and ideas. The

Netherlands, the former Republic, turned into a monarchy under the autocratic rule of

William I. A major change carried out by William I was the almost complete

subordination of the lower levels of government to a centralised system of finance and

directives. The provinces only held on to certain devolved responsibilities in the field

of physical infrastructure, notably water defence (Van der Woud, 2004). In time,

provinces and municipalities have acquired more competencies and responsibilities,

Page 7

7

but always subject to what have come to be known as the ‘golden strings’ of

centralised finance and various forms of direct control (such as through the still

prevalent, although seriously contested, system of state-appointed mayors) (Faludi,

1994). This fate even struck the hallmark of Dutch territorial governance, the

territorial ‘Water Boards’. Emerging in medieval times as independent, societal

bodies to arrange for common water protection, the Water Boards were now the first

to be subordinated to provincial rule and then converted into ‘normal’ state

organisations (1848).

The most fundamental devolution of power to the lower levels of government took

place in the late 1840s. Induced by the wave of liberal revolutionary movements that

swept across Europe, William II ordered the politician Johan Rudolf Thorbecke to

draft a new Constitution that would substitute liberal for political rule. Besides

founding a two-chamber system of representative democracy, the Constitution

established the principle of co-government between the central state, provinces and

municipalities. Co-government requires the different layers of government to seek

consensus on virtually all core domains of policy-making: housing, infrastructure,

economic development, social and environmental policy, etc. In time, the provincial

level acquired a key role in planning and coordination for housing (Housing Law

1901), regional spatial and structural planning (optional from 1931 onwards,

obligatory after 1964), environmental issues and transport development. Yet, despite

what Toonen (1993) characterised as ‘silent accumulation’ of strategic tasks,

provinces have evolved as primarily procedural and formal bodies that in general tend

to avoid conflict (Faludi, 1994). Provinces thus provide vital channels for the central

state to rule ‘at a distance’ in what is characterised as a decentralised unitary state

structure. Rather than through a top-down system of ‘command and control’

characteristic for centralised unitary states, hierarchy is enacted through a subtle

combination of discursive practices and the ‘golden strings’ of financial control and

overall supervision.

The twentieth century witnessed another sequence of sea changes in the political

rationality and forms of governance. As a result of a growing emphasis on ‘welfare’,

notably in the post-war period, the state moved from governing through the

‘individual’, calling on his (and more recently also her) moral normativity, to

governing through society (Rose, 1996). The Dutch state, in particular, developed

quite astute mechanisms to involve a great variety of societal organisations in

processes of policy design and implementation, often making them co-responsible for

key domains of state regulation (such as health, labour laws, education, etc). This

pervasive co-optation ranged from corporatist forms of political-economic decision

making at the macro-level to all kinds and shapes of ‘joined-up’ policy-making.

Accordingly, the principle of co-governance was not only applied to different levels

of the state, but also to the spectrum of state-society. And once more, it is not

‘command and control’ that rules, but a subtle mix of inducement and dialogue

primarily based on discursive practices, alongside a sophisticated system of financial

support and control. One of the remarkable manifestations of such a far-reaching

system of co-optation is the way the state has not only condoned but even subsidised

certain radical opponents (such as the squatter and green movements).

The way the Dutch have perfected what can be called a governmentality of the

‘Consensus State’ (cf. Toonen, 1993) has incurred considerable praise as well as

Page 8

8

critique. It is a system that allows many voices to be heard, including more marginal

ones. Yet it is also a system that is extremely complex and ambiguous, in terms of

institutional arrangements, processes and outcomes. This raises critical questions such

as: Who is invited to speak, and when? Whose voices are actually heard, and how? In

time, the Dutch approach to consensus has become highly procedural, increasingly

relying on input from experts, notably in process management and communication,

operating at a distance from the issuing state bodies. Moreover, especially in an area

such as spatial planning it is also deemed rather selective (Hajer and Zonneveld,

2000), that is, used after core (‘frame’) decisions and choices have been made at a

state level. Hajer and Zonneveld’s critical account of Dutch spatial planning points to

the contrast between, on the one hand, the urge to ‘reach out’ and engage in inclusive

methods, and, on the other hand, the persistence of a centralist ‘survey, analysis, and

plan’ approach. The latter harbours the technocratic tradition in physical planning that

has characterised the country since the mid 19th century. Key discursive practices

remain rooted in a strong belief in predictability and stability, and the urge for order

and control. Let us, with this tension in mind, explore what in Foucauldian terms are

called the ‘technologies’ of government.

Technologies of government in spatial and regional planning.

Alongside the ruling political rationality, the technologies of government also

changed. In the 19th century, this was driven by a core characteristic of the new,

‘developmentalist’ mode of governmentality introduced by the French.

Developmentalism entailed a discursive and functional separation between the

‘political’ and its object of governance, like the ‘economy’, 'population', and

‘territory’. Key to this process is the definition, classification and subjecting of

entities like ‘enterprises’, ‘citizens’, and spatial ‘plots/ structures’, accompanied by

‘modern’ forms of accounting, population and business registration (e.g. census),

spatial demarcation (e.g. cadastre) and classification. It was the introduction and, in

the following decades, fine-tuning of such technologies that rendered the core

‘developmentalist’ ambitions feasible and increasingly effectuated. In doing so, a

modern state apparatus and bureaucracy emerged that has been expanding ever since,

developing ever-finer divisions of labour and more and more complex forms of

governance (Rose, 1996).

Government practices bearing on spatial development did not involve only the

demarcation and subjecting of spatial plots - measures which were initially

implemented largely to modernise the system of tax collection. Right after 1795, a

‘modern’ nation state emerged that saw as one of its key aims to engage in "steering

the spatial development of an area in order to promote the evolution of a system that

serves the community best" (Van der Woud, 2004). The result was a major shift from

particularistic forms of regional planning to nationally rooted forms of planning,

which manifested itself in two ways. First, induced by the French centralist and

determined approach to public works, a national planning of infrastructural

investments emerged, oriented to waterways, roads and, from the 1840s onwards,

railroads. The French and Dutch rulers of the 19th century were confronted with a

communication infrastructure which, due to the economic downturn in the 18th

century and lack of planning, was literally falling apart. Few roads were paved, many

rivers and ports had become inaccessible for most of the ‘dry’ seasons, while the need

Page 9

9

for water defence absorbed most of the resources available. To counter this, a process

was started involving primarily piecemeal improvements, notably through the

dredging and improving of waterways, and the development of an integrated toll-free

‘state’ road network (‘Rijkswegennet’), punctuated by major investments in canals

and railroads.

The second shift from particularistic-regional to state-based and national planning

struck the heart of the country’s investments in its physical environment, namely land

reclaiming. A milestone in this development was the successful transformation of a

major lake Southwest of Amsterdam, the Haarlemmermeer, into a polder (now the site

of one of the country’s ‘mainports’, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol). In the words of

Van der Woud: “Perhaps it is this technical triumph, the domestication of the century-

old water wolf at the heart of the Country, that present the decisive condition for the

expansion of the concept of land reclaiming. The Netherlands discovered in this

decade [1839-1853] that space, even when embodying large dimensions and a tough

character, could be engineered in the interest of society” (Van der Woud, 2004, 280,

our translation).

In addition to providing a link to a cherished past, national planning and

implementation of land reclaiming could also build on extensive stock of expert

knowledge accumulated over centuries. In contrast, the fields of infrastructure

investments and other domains of spatial and regional planning only matured in the

19th and 20

th centuries. Typically, however, the way these new fields developed

echoes to a large extent the ‘engineering’ mores of land reclaiming practices. All are

in line with what has been described before as a following a ‘survey, analysis, and

plan’ rationality. While in the 19th century planning expertise was largely an offshoot

of core technical disciplines (such as physical engineering), the 20th century witnessed

the rise of a separate, self-defined policy and knowledge domain of spatial planning.

Especially in the post-war period, and partly impelled by the German occupation, a

massive apparatus emerged dealing with the design and implementation of spatial

planning at the national, provincial and local levels. As a result, Dutch spatial

planning is performed by a nested system of drawing, and putting into practice, land

use maps. These maps range from national and regional 'sketches' providing images of

major flows and structures, to local, legally binding, land use maps

(bestemmingsplannen) that demarcate the physical limits of housing estates, business

parks, etc. What, in a broad perspective, characterises Dutch spatial planning, is this

persistent orientation of spatial planning towards the definition and control of land

use, which also bears upon perspectives on, and practices of (regional) economic

development.

Besides politicians and bureaucrats, this apparatus also draws on an unprecedented

number and variety of experts, ranging from specialist policymakers to 'external'

consultants and academics. Such experts are the source of a vast output of spatial

statistics, surveys and reports. Also, because of the need to 'align' the dynamics of

knowledge production and policy making internally as well as with other departments

and organisations (e.g. in economic development, agriculture, transport), a myriad of

inter-departmental committees and advisory committees has come into being (Faludi,

1994) A recent milestone in this proliferation of knowledge production has been the

launching of the 'Spatial Planning Bureau' (RPB, launched 2001, recently merged

Page 10

10

with the Environmental Planning Office), where fifty academic experts churn out

research reports at a rate of 2-3 per month.

While, accordingly, 'survey, analysis, and plan’ looms large in Dutch spatial planning,

this has to fit in a broader 'joined-up' and consensus-based political rationality. So

how is this fit achieved? A central role is played by the contrivance and, more

significantly, frantic circulation of concepts of spatial development. Such concepts

can be of a more substantive nature, such as the notions of the 'Green Heart' in the

middle of the 'Randstad', or the 'mainports' of Rotterdam Port or Amsterdam-Schiphol

Airport as economic hubs, or more of a more procedural or principal nature, such as

'spatial quality' or 'mixed land use' as general ambitions, or 'participatory design' to

guide planning processes (Zonneveld and Verwest, 2005). From a governmentality

perspective, what is crucial is that these concepts, at a practical level, provide a nexus

between political rule and technologies, including practices of territorialisation. On

the one hand, these concepts act as the focal points and outcomes of collective

discussions on spatial planning, and hence of the consensus-making process; on the

other hand, they provide the starting points and frames of the 'survey, analysis, and

plan’ circuits.

The shift to entrepreneurialism: the rise of spatial-economic imageries

As argued in the introduction, spatial development practices across Europe (and

beyond) have been subjected to a hegemonic, neo-liberal discourse on economic

development. In a nutshell, this discourse trumpets the capacities of territories -

especially regions - to shape innovative capacities as well as 'balance' economic needs

with other, notably social and environmental, ambitions. Its emergence can be

associated with a broad shift in political rule taking place in the 1980s and 1990s from

'developmentalism' to 'entrepreneurialism' (Larner and Walters, 2002). During

‘developmentalism’, the 'economic' was framed as one of the goals alongside, and

serving, other political and social goals (e.g. population growth, democracy and

equality). Entrepreneurialism, in contrast, promotes economic performance as a goal

in its own right. A discourse that was once limited largely to the domain of business

development, featuring 'competitiveness', 'benchmarking', 'innovation', etc., now

pervaded the realms of other policy domains including that of spatial and regional

development. Moreover, not only the aim of policy-making but also its methods, have

been infiltrated by neo-liberal thinking. Many policy ambitions are pursued, for

instance, through competitive programmes, in which the ‘best’ ideas and projects get

rewarded. Entrepreneurialism, accordingly, does not only define the target, but also

the gist of policy-making.

After the belated, but vigorous embracement of ‘developmentalism’, the Dutch did

certainly not miss out on the shift towards ‘entrepreneurialism’. Hit by a quite a

severe and persistent economic recession in the late 1970s, the country was

confronted acutely with the limits of its developmentalist model. The results were

twofold. First, a dismantling of the regional policy approach focused on inter-regional

redistribution, paving the way for a more selective and strategic perspective with a

stronger spatial orientation. Second, a closer alliance was formed between regional-

spatial development concepts and national accounts on economic growth and

Page 11

11

innovation. These two developments correspond to the notions of ‘spatialisation of

economic policy’ and ‘economisation of spatial policy’ mentioned above, in

discursive as well as institutional practices.

Both these shifts will now be discussed in more detail. To support the discussion, an

overview is provided in Figure 1. The figure provides a genealogy of core concepts

and 'technologies' of regional policy (bottom half) and spatial planning (upper half) in

the Netherlands after 1945.

(1) From regional innovation to spatialised economic policy

From 1952 onwards, the Netherlands had adopted a distributional regional policy

similar to what happened in other West-European counties. Specific support measures

were targeting the northern and southern parts of the country. In line with a

developmentalist perspective, this policy had been destined to divert some economic

growth from the country's core to the more peripheral areas in the North and South

through a system of territorially bounded incentives and, for a shorter period, even

disincentives. While some incentives have managed to survive until today, the

entrepreneurial turn has prompted a shift from a (re)distributional practice to one

stressing 'regions on their own strength' (Zonneveld and Verwest, 2005). Instead of

top-down allocation, regions (provinces) were now compelled to competitively bid for

project grants from the so-called 'Provincial Fund'. In line with this, initiatives were

taken to nurture innovation networks and strategies at the regional level, promoted by

the Department of Economic Affairs.

Economic and innovation support at the regional (provincial) level started with the

establishment of seven regional development agencies (Regionale

Ontwikkelingsmaatschappijen or ROMs). Seven ROMs were founded, formally as

private companies, between 1975 and 1982, in line with the neo-liberal emphasis on

private initiative. Yet, through mergers, there are currently four agencies left: one in

the north (the NOM), one in the east (Oost NV) and two in the south (the BOM in

Brabant and LIOF in Limburg). Accordingly, there is no one-to-one correspondence

with the provinces. Some of the agencies cover two or even three provinces, while the

provinces in the West only have agencies at the urban levels. Seen in an international

context, the remit of the agencies is quite limited. Their key instrument of support is

the provision of financial support, ranging from consultancy to venture capital,

notably to high-tech companies. Strategic planning and action remains in the hands of

state bodies at the national, provincial and local levels.

Two other sets of organisations emerged which were geared to the design and

implementation of innovation policies and support practices at the regional level. In

1988, 15 so-called Regional Innovation Centres (Regionale Innovatiecentra) were

established in an attempt to emulate the Danish model of regional innovation support.

Alongside, so-called Institutes for SMES (Instituten voor het MKB or IMK’s)

emerged, providing organisational and marketing support. In the mid-1990s,

evaluations of these two networks showed rather mixed results. While some centres

were performing well, mainly due to effective and proactive leadership, others failed

to build up competencies and produce effective results. Moreover, the overall

structure of business support was seen as lacking in transparency, coordination and

capacity to respond to business needs (Schulte, 2002). In 1996, the Department of

Page 12

12

Economic Affairs thus decided to merge the Regional Innovation Centres and the

IMK advisory departments into one national network, called the Syntens Innovation

Network. Although before 1996, innovation support was subject to centralised control

by the Ministry, the development of Syntens as a national organisation with regional

affiliates sustained a more effective form of central control and resource allocation.

The Chambers of Commerce, which over time had lost much ground to other

agencies, were reorganised and assigned a role as one-stop ‘front offices’ for starters.

Besides the provision of information and basic coaching, the Chambers were to act as

gatekeepers with the remit to refer SMEs to the specialist services of Syntens and

other organisations. Compared with, for instance, Germany or Belgium, support to

SMEs remains a rather weakly developed (and researched) activity.

One of the outcomes of the reorganisation and centralisation has been a stronger

similarity in the overall approach of, and attitudes towards SMEs. In the view of

Clarysse and Duchêne (1999), Syntens sees itself as a ‘missionary’ in the field of

innovation, oriented to the more knowledge-intensive types of business. This is based

on a view that, by and large, SMEs do not systematically explore the possibilities for

knowledge absorption, and that they often lack competencies to use new knowledge

effectively. The Syntens consultants help SMEs to improve their absorptive capacity

and sensitivities for using knowledge. For the Department of Economic Affairs,

moreover, Syntens provides an important vehicle to liaise with other agencies, and to

pursue particular strategies, across the country. Syntens has now partitioned the

country into just three regions (the North/East, served by six offices; the West, with

five offices; and the South, with four offices). Collaborative activities are mostly

developed at a more local level, together with the Regional Development Agencies,

the Chambers of Commerce, local authorities, etc., in a large variety of regional

settings. In doing so, Syntens has evolved as an organisation that effectively bridges

the national and regional levels, with the capacity to initiate and support local

activities pursuing a national agenda of innovation support.

After the consolidation of the regional innovation systems, the alignment with

established regional territories – the provinces – was further weakened by the

launching of a new policy, ‘Peaks in the Delta’ (Pieken in de Delta, MINEZ, 2004).

This pinnacle of spatially oriented nation-state entrepreneurialism sets out to identify

the regional innovative ‘hot spots’ across the Dutch economic landscape. To quote the

secretary of state: “The Netherlands enjoys a richly variegated economic landscape, and every region has

its own strengths and opportunities. From an economic perspective, we are far from a ‘low country’ – we can see these peaks arising throughout the delta (…) the cabinet

wants to exploit all these regional strengths, because in a competitive world economy,

only entrepreneurial regions can lead the Netherlands to the top of the national

economic league table” (Van Gennip, in introduction to Pieken [MINEZ, 2004, p. 9],

quoted in Benneworth, 2005 p. 40).

Promoting ‘regions on their own strengths’, accordingly, seems to boil down to a state

practice of ‘picking the winners’, pushing for a new territorialisation of economic

development support. More specifically, Peaks in the Delta carves up the national

space into six major areas (the North, the East, North-Randstad, South-Randstad, the

Southwest and the Southeast) each with their own perspectives and targets. While this

continues to respond, to some degree, to the ‘egalitarian’ wish to cater for the entire

national space, it spatiality tends to be much more strategically selective.

Page 13

13

(2) Claiming economic space

Peaks in the Delta and other state initiatives, notably by the Ministry of Economic

Affairs, have resulted in a marked spatialisation of regional-economic policy, bringing

it in line with strategic forms of spatial planning. The latter, as explained above, was

traditionally grafted onto the mission to combat sprawl by urban containment and the

protection of large open spaces, such as the ‘Green Heart’ of the Randstad. From the

late 1980s onwards, comparable to the change of (re)distributional discursive practice

of regional policy, entrepreneurialism started to invade the hegemonic discursive

practices of spatial planning by challenging its dominant concepts. In concrete terms,

the Department of Economic Affairs sought to promote a more economic orientation

of spatial policies and planning by articulating and broadcasting a variety of lead

images of spatial-economic development (Fig. 1). Backed by a series of reports and

studies (Licher, 1998), this started with the above-mentioned concept of ‘mainports’

to denote core ‘nodes’, complemented by the concepts of ‘corridors’ (spatial-

economic gateways between Amsterdam-Utrecht-Eindhoven-Aachen, along the A2

highway; Rotterdam – Utrecht- Arnhem/Venlo-Ruhr (A12); Amsterdam-Rotterdam-

Brussels-Paris (A4), also denoted as the Triple-A connections). Through these

concepts, the Ministry sought to provoke a break with the existing anti-sprawl practice

by designating ‘greenfield’ zones suitable for the expansion of industrial estates.

However, while ‘mainports’ were easily absorbed in the mainstream of spatial

planning, the concepts of ‘corridors’ met with overwhelming resistance. In the end,

despite very intensive lobbying, the Dept. of Economic Affairs (1997) and its allies

could not counter the negative images of untrammelled industrial expansion evoked

by the notion of ‘corridors’. In the national planning document that came out in the

early 2000s (Priemus, 2001), the concept was replaced by the notion of ‘urban

networks’.

Despite the resistance against notions such as corridors, the third and fourth national

spatial plan published in 1988, its addendum from 1992, and the Report ‘Space’ (Nota

Ruimte) from 2001, all adopted a strongly entrepreneurial vocabulary in setting out

their overall ambitions, thus rhetorically underscoring an 'economisation of spatial

policy'. In terms of the broader spatial vision, as argued by Benneworth (2005), the

Nota Ruimte dovetails well with Pieken in the Delta. In the Nota Ruimte, the regional

hotspots are embedded in a broader perspective on territorial development

encompassing infrastructure, housing, business estates, nature areas, etc. One of the

core ambitions behind this embedding has been to accommodate the wish for more

proactive and entrepreneurial forms of planning within a planning context that is

largely focused on land use restrictions. However, at the level of more concrete spatial

concepts, the Nota Ruimte tends to reproduce the traditional orientation towards urban

containment (anti-sprawl, see Fig. 1, second box). This is manifested, in particular, by

the development of the concept of ‘urban network’ as a substitute for corridors. Like

‘corridors’, 'urban networks' were introduced as a new core planning concept meeting

the new demands of the mobile ‘network society’. In practice, however, the concept

entailed more of an up-scaling of urban containment practices from the (single) urban

level to the regional (inter-urban) level than a reference to economic gateways,

contrary to the original intentions of the Department of Economic Affairs. Unlike the

broad-brush nature of corridors, ‘urban networks’ came to refer to bounded urban

spaces, much in line with the notion of ‘city-regions’ or ‘agglomerations’, and hence

Page 14

14

with the dominant anti-sprawl stance. So, in the end, despite its extensive lobby and

its preparedness to embrace a 'land use' perspective on spatial-economic development,

the Department of Economic Affairs did not manage to provoke a genuine change in

prevailing discursive practices (Van Duinen, 2004).

This failure partly demonstrates the resilience of the hegemonic discourse starring

urban containment. Like in most Western countries, environmental concerns and the

public demand for open 'breathing' space near urban areas continue to exert

considerable influence on debates in spatial planning. In addition, the economic

conditions in the1990s, in which a recession was succeeded by an almost

unprecedented boom, stemming the perception of a need for fundamental change. In

effect, two opposing trends emerged. While, on the one hand, economic growth

provided a new impetus to the ‘space for the economy’ discourse and the increase in

wealth; on the other hand, it thwarted the political mobilisation required for a

‘paradigmatic shift’ at the national level. The hegemony of anti-sprawl managed to

persist. What was to stay, however, was a much more economically oriented

perspective on spatial planning, as well as a regional policy firmly rooted in a spatial-

entrepreneurial perspective. More than by ‘regions on their own strength’, spatial-

economic and innovation policies are shaped by, on the one hand, national networks

and frameworks of local business support and, on the other, a spate of spatial

imaginaries seeking to accommodate pervasive entrepreneurialism tendencies within a

prevalent anti-sprawl, integral stance on spatial planning.

Conclusion

??Faludi, when explaining the enduring character of the Randstad / Green Heart

concept, argues that because of the pervasive role of spatial planning concepts: “In a

way, the planners are thus the prisoners of their own brainchild” (Faludi, 1994).

(par to add)

At first sight, the Dutch situation seems to have come full circle. Once a federal

republic, with each province having its own set of economic regulations and policies,

it went through a phase of unitary, national developmentalism to return to an image of

regions “on their own strength”. The latter appears to hark back to a cherished past of

more locally embedded initiatives, with less top-down control and less reliance on the

national state. This return to the region, however, is only partial. It primarily concerns

the target of spatial economic policies and not the governance structures in which

policies and practices are brought about. This chapter has shed light on the historical

development, as well as recent strategic moves that have enabled this result. One

historical development has been the imposed transformation of provinces as proactive,

semi-autonomous substates to regionalised policy arms of the central state. Together

with the rise of a myriad of territorial divisions (such as Chamber of Commerce

regions, Syntens regions, Education regions etc) that do not match provincial

boundaries, this has dramatically weakened the regional capacity to constitute a

subject of economic governance.

Moreover, an important trend over the last century has been the rise of a strongly

spatially oriented perspective on economic development. The Dutch have a long-

standing tradition in effective spatial planning, pushed by the need to defend the

country against the sea and rivers. In Republican times, this state activity was not

linked (at least not conceptually) with the pursuit of regional (provincial) economic

Page 15

15

ambitions. Subsequently, the loss of provincial autonomy and the build-up of the

‘decentralised unitary’ state provoked a stronger link between economic and spatial

policy. The post-war period first witnessed the development of a top-down,

distributional form of regional development policy, focusing on improving the

economic conditions in more peripheral areas. A full fledged spatial orientation

emerged in more recent years, in which, under the influence of neo-liberal thinking,

the Department of Economic Affairs promoted a regional-spatial agenda in order to

expand the ‘room’ for economic development. Given the dominance of spatial

conceptualisations and planning, these agents had little choice other than to frame

their agendas in the prevalent spatial policy language and plan-making cycles, in an

attempt to steer developments in a more entrepreneurial way. It is this discursive-

institutional setting that explains why ‘global’ accounts on regional innovation and

competitiveness are translated in such a particular way in the Netherlands. It also

explains why economic policy-making has taken on such a highly complex and, in

parts, messy spatial and scalar ‘gestalt’, which is actually far removed from the neo-

liberal idea of ‘regions on their own strength’

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Stefanie Dühr and Barrie Needham for their thorough

comments on an earlier version, and the suggestions that have helped us to improve

the line of argumentation.

References

Benneworth, P. (2005) Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred

entrepreneurial networks in peripheral regions

Boekema, F. ,R. Rutten (2007) Regional Innovation Clusters: evaluation of the South-

East Brabant cluster scheme.In Creative Regions (Eds. Ph. Cooke, D.

Schwartz. Routledge, London, pp.105-127

Case Study Report 2: Twente, the Netherlands., University of Newcastle, Newcastle

upon Tyne.

Charles, D., Perry, B. and Benneworth, P. (2004) Towards a Multi-Level Science

Policy: Regional Science Policy in a European Context, Regional Studies

Association, Seaford.

Clarysse, B. and Duchêne, V. (1999) Geïntegreerd innovatiebeleid naar KMO's. toe.

Case studie : Nederland, IWT-Vlaanderen, Brussel.

DG Regio (2002) Regional Innovation Strategies under the European Regional

Development Fund Innovative Actions 2000-2002, European Commission,

Brussels.

Dühr, S. and Lagendijk, A. (2007) The application of spatial concepts and visuals in

regional-level planning policy text and maps in the Netherlands, Paper

presented at the Regional Studies Association International Conference:

Regions in Focus? Lisbon, 2-5 April 2007, Radboud University, Nijmegen.

Van Duinen, L. (2004) Planning Imagery: the emergence and political acceptance of

planning concepts in Dutch national planning, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen, Amsterdam.

Dühr, S. (2007). The visual language of spatial planning: exploring cartographic

representations for spatial planning in Europe. RTPI library series, Routledge.

Faludi, A. (1994) Coalition Building and Planning for Dutch Growth Management -

the Role of the Randstad Concept, Urban Studies, 31, 485-507.

Page 16

16

Van Gils, L. (2000) Pilot project RIN (Regional Innovation Network), Stoas.

Hajer, M. and Zonneveld, W. (2000) Spatial planning in the network society -

Rethinking the principles of planning in the Netherlands, European Planning

Studies, 8, 337-356.

Jones, M. (2008) Phase Space: Geography, Relational Thinking, and Beyond.

Progress in Human Geography, 32, forthcoming

Jones, M. (2004) The regional state and economic regulation: Regional regeneration

or political mobilisation?, In Local and Regional Economies: Institutions,

Politics and Economic Development (Eds, Valler, D. and Wood, A.)

Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 177-200.

Kaiser, R. and Prange, H. (2004) Managing diversity in a system of multi-level

governance: the open method of co-ordination in innovation policy, Journal of

European public policy, 11, 249-266.

Lagendijk, A. (2005) Regionalisation in Europe. Stories, institutions and boundaries,

In Bordering Space (Eds, Van Houtum, H., Kramsch, O. and Zierhofer, W.)

Routledge, London, pp. 77-92.

Larner, W. and Walters, W. (2002) The political rationality of "new regionalism":

Toward a genealogy of the region, Theory and Society, 31, 391-432.

Licher, H. J. (1998) De ruimte tussen analyse en beleid: EZ-discussienotitie 'Ruimte

voor Economische Dynamiek', Stedebouw & Ruimtelijke Ordening, 79, 35-79.

Malerba, F. (2002) Sectoral systems of innovation and production, Research Policy,

31, 247-264.

MINEZ (2004) Pieken in de Delta, Department of Economic Affairs, Den Haag.

Painter, J. (2002) Governmentality and regional economic strategies, In Habitus: a

sense of place (Eds, Hillier, J. and Rooksby, E.) Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 115-

139.

Priemus, H. (2001) Corridors in the netherlands: Apple of discord in spatial planning

TESG 92(1), pp. 100-07.

Rose, N. (1996) Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies, In Foucault and political

reason (Eds, Barry, A., Osbourne, T. and Rose, N.) UCL Press, London, pp.

37–64.

Rutten, R. and Boekema, F. (Eds.) (2007) The Learning Region, Foundations, State of

the Art, Future, Edward Elgar, London.

Schulte, F. (2002) Die Förderung von Unternehmensgründungen in Deutschland und

in den Niederlanden – Eine vergleichende Analyse mit Fokus auf regionale

Gründungsnetzwerke, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Fakultät für

Sozialwissenschaft, Bochum.

Toonen, T. A. J. (1993) Dutch provinces and the struggle for the meso, In The Rise of

Meso Government in Europe (Ed, Sharpe, L. J.) Sage, London, pp. 132-133.

Van der Woud, A. (2004) Het lege land: de ruimtelijke orde van Nederland 1798-

1848, Olympus, Amsterdam.

Varró, K. (2008) ‘Changing narratives on EU multi-level space in a globalizing era:

how Hungary as a national space became part of the story’ European Planning

Studies 16(7), pp. 959-973.

Zonneveld, W. and Verwest, F. (2005) Tussen droom en retoriek. De

conceptualisering van ruimte in de Nederlandse planning., NAi Uitgevers,

Rotterdam.

Page 17

17

EC

ON

OM

IC S

PA

CE

nodes

‘g

ate

ways

: ’C

orr

idors

’(†/

net

work

s

CO

MP

ET

ITIV

EN

ES

S "R

egio

ns

on thei

r ow

n s

tren

gth

s”

‘97 ‘Spac

e fo

r Econom

ic D

ynam

ics’

: fr

om

regio

nal to

spati

al ec

onom

ic p

oli

cy

(Strategic) spatial planning

‘50 ‘60 ‘70 ‘80 ‘90 ‘00

RECO

NSTR

UC

TIO

N R

APID

UR

BA

NIS

ATIO

N (

HO

USIN

G E

XPA

NSIO

N)

EC

ON

OM

IC C

RIS

IS/E

URO

PEA

NIS

ATIO

N G

RO

WTH/S

PRA

WL

‘SPA

TIA

L Q

UA

LIT

Y’

EN

VIR

ON

ME

NT

AL

SP

AC

E E

colo

gic

al N

etw

ork

s (E

HS)/

sust

ain

abil

ity

‘sp

ati

al quali

ty’

UR

BA

N S

PA

CE

G

reen

Hea

rt/ R

andst

ad

(AN

TI

SP

RA

WL

) ‘

New

(gro

wth

) to

wns’

poli

cy c

ity-

regio

ns/

com

pact

city/

tra

nsi

t fo

cus

p

oly

centr

ic u

rban r

egio

ns/

urb

an n

etw

ork

s

SP

AT

IAL

CO

HE

SIO

N A

ND

RE

DIS

TR

IBU

TIO

N

faci

lita

ting p

olicy

(im

pro

vin

g b

usi

nes

s

envir

onm

ent)

Reg

ional

(pro

vin

cial

)

pla

ns

‘60 First National Report

on S

pat

ial Pla

nnin

g

‘66 Second Report:

rational

isat

ion o

f ru

ral

are

as

hig

hw

ay p

lannin

g

urb

an z

ones vs. c

entral

‘74-8

5 Third

Report

new

tow

n p

olicy

rura

l ar

ea p

olicy

urb

an ren

ewal

‘88 Fourth Report

‘urb

an n

odes

’†

Spat

ial develo

pm

ent

per

spec

tive

(‘mainports’)

‘92 4th Report ‘Extra’

‘strat

egic

core

pro

ject

s’

busi

nes

s lo

cation p

olicy†

(‘A

BC’)

Ecolo

gic

al N

etw

ork

s EH

S

‘01 Report ‘Space’

policy

dece

ntral

isat

ion

urb

an n

etw

ork

s

inte

nsifica

tion

(mix

ed lan

d u

se)

layer

ing a

ppro

ach

Regional- economic

policy Context

‘52 d

evel

opm

ent

area

s/

indust

rial

isat

ion

nodes

‘58 p

roble

m a

rea

policy/

dev

elo

pm

ent nodes

Reg

ional

pro

ject

s gra

nte

d v

ia c

entral

‘Pro

vin

cia

l Fund’

‘72 Inte

gra

l Reg

ional

Pla

n for th

e N

orth (IS

P)

‘72 R

egio

nal

Dev

elopm

ent Pers

pec

tive

for Zuid

-Lim

burg

(PN

L)

‘76 IPR (In

ves

tmen

t pre

miu

m sch

eme)

‘75-8

3 S

IR (Sel

ect

ive

inves

tmen

t direc

tive)

AL M

ar 2

006 † discontinued concepts/ideas

Post-war territorial approaches in the Netherlands: core threads in d

iscurs

ive c

on

cepts and policy

‘Peaks

in

the D

elt

a’