11 Articles COGENCY Vol. 3, N0. 2 (11-32), Summer 2011 ISSN 0718-8285 The Study of Legal Argumentation in Argumentation Theory and Legal Theory: Approaches and Developments El estudio de la argumentación legal en la teoría de la argumentación y la teoría legal: acercamientos y desarrollos Eveline Feteris Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands [email protected]Received: 10-5-2011 Accepted: 20-11-2011 Abstract: This contribution provides an overview of how argumentation theorists, philosophers, legal theorists and legal philosophers approach questions about the standards for the correctness of legal argumentation. Ideas about the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation, developed by influential authors in the field, will be examined. This overview serves as a general introduction and background for the different contributions to this issue of Cogency in which the different questions men- tioned above will be addressed by the various authors. The contribution starts with an overview of objectives and methodological choices in the study of legal argumen- tation. It proceeds with a discussion of three traditions in the study of legal argu- mentation: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialogical approach. The discussion is completed with an extended description of the pragma-dialectical approach to legal argumentation. In this approach rhetorical and dialectical aspects are integrated in a systematic theory for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation from the perspective of a rational critical discussion. Keywords: Legal argumentation, rational reconstruction, discussion rules, logical analysis of legal argumentation, dialectical analysis of legal argumentation. Resumen: Esta contribución provee de un marco general de cómo los teóricos de la argumentación, filósofos, teóricos legales y filósofos legales se acercan a preguntas sobre los estándares de corrección de la argumentación legal. Ideas sobre el análisis y evaluación de la argumentación, desarrolladas por influyentes autores en el campo, serán examinadas. Este marco general sirve como introducción general para las dis-
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Abstract: This contribution provides an overview of how argumentation theorists, philosophers, legal theorists and legal philosophers approach questions about the standards for the correctness of legal argumentation. Ideas about the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation, developed by influential authors in the field, will be examined. This overview serves as a general introduction and background for the different contributions to this issue of Cogency in which the different questions men-tioned above will be addressed by the various authors. The contribution starts with an overview of objectives and methodological choices in the study of legal argumen-tation. It proceeds with a discussion of three traditions in the study of legal argu-mentation: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialogical approach. The discussion is completed with an extended description of the pragma-dialectical approach to legal argumentation. In this approach rhetorical and dialectical aspects are integrated in a systematic theory for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation from the perspective of a rational critical discussion.
Keywords: Legal argumentation, rational reconstruction, discussion rules, logical analysis of legal argumentation, dialectical analysis of legal argumentation.
Resumen: Esta contribución provee de un marco general de cómo los teóricos de la argumentación, filósofos, teóricos legales y filósofos legales se acercan a preguntas sobre los estándares de corrección de la argumentación legal. Ideas sobre el análisis y evaluación de la argumentación, desarrolladas por influyentes autores en el campo, serán examinadas. Este marco general sirve como introducción general para las dis-
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COGENCY Vol. 3, N0. 2, Summer 2011
tintas contribuciones a este número de Cogency en el que los diferentes problemas mencionados serán comentados por los autores. La contribución comienza con un marco general de objetivos y selección metodológica en el estudio de la argumenta-ción legal. Sigue con una discusión de tres tradiciones en el estudio de la argumenta-ción legal: la lógica, la retórica y el acercamiento dialéctico. La discusión se completa con descripción extendida del ángulo pragma-dialéctico de la argumentación legal. En este acercamiento los aspectos retóricos y dialécticos son integrados en una teoría sistemática para el análisis y evaluación de la argumentación legal desde la perspecti-va de la discusión crítica racional.
Palabras clave: Argumentación legal, reconstrucción racional, reglas de discusión, análisis lógico de la argumentación legal, análisis dialéctico de la argumentación legal.
1. Introduction
Argumentation plays an important role in the law. Someone who presents
a legal standpoint and wishes this standpoint to be accepted by others will
have to present justifying arguments. A lawyer who brings a case to court
must justify his or her case with arguments. The judge who takes a deci-
sion is expected to support this decision with arguments. Although there is
agreement that the acceptability of a legal standpoint is dependent on the
Others take the view that deontic logic in which normative expressions
such as ‘must’ and ‘should’ are analysed as separate logical constants, is
more suitable for analysing legal arguments in certain cases.2 Although
most legal arguments can be analysed adequately by using predicate logic,
they prefer deontic logic for legal arguments. Deontic logic forms a further
extension of propositional logic and predicate logic, and can thus be used
for the same forms of argument, but also for other forms.
In a recently developed dialogical logic, various authors extend logi-
cal systems to make them more suitable for legal argumentation. Hage,
Leenes, Lodder, Span and Verhey developed a system of logic for argu-
ments about legal rules.3 Because a legal decision often involves a choice
between rules, a logic is necessary for reconstructing a legal argument in
which these choices can be expressed. Prakken (1993) also develops a logi-
1 See for example Tammelo et al. (1981), Rödig (1971), and Yoshino (1981).2 See for example Alexy (1980b), Kalinowski (1972), Soeteman (1989) and Weinberger
(1970).3 See Hage (1997, 2005), Hage et al. (1992, 1994).
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cal system for analysing and evaluating legal argumentation from a dialogi-
cal perspective. Because existing logical systems can only be used for the
analysis in a monological context, Prakken develops a system to conduct
and compare arguments for opposite standpoints. These recent theories
the Toulmin model, on the basis of an analysis and evaluation of a famous
hard case in Chilean law about the custody of a child by a homosexual moth-
er he shows how this model can be used as a basic reasonableness test.
UnderAristotle’sdefinitionof‘thesis’inTopics, Sebastian McEvoy dis-
cusses the distinction between law and fact premises, a distinction which
arguably prevents the immediate correspondence of a general model of
argumentation and an adequate model of judicial argumentation. Having
shown that this distinction is necessary from the perspective of the Rule of
Law principle and is presupposed to be possible, he describes the different
features that distinguish the two kinds of premises, especially when the law
premise is statutory.
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