The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgency State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgency by Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika ISBN: 978-1-932728-79-8 (online version)

Policy Studies 52

The State Strikes Back:India and the Naga Insurgency

Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika

About the East-West CenterThe East-West Center is an education and research organization estab-lished by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and under-standing among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and theUnited States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, andjust Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperativeresearch, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concernto the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Centercomes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided byprivate agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the gov-ernments of the region.

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The State Strikes Back:India and the Naga Insurgency

Policy Studies 52___________

The State Strikes Back:India and the Naga Insurgency___________________________

Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika

Copyright © 2009 by the East-West Center

The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgencyby Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika

ISBN: 978-1-932728-79-8 (online version)ISSN: 1547-1330 (online version)

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ContentsList of Acronyms v

Executive Summary vii

Introduction 1

Precursor and Rationale 8

AFSPA and Its Impact 14

The Reddy Committee’s Report 18

Conclusion 25

Endnotes 29

Bibliography 31

Appendices 33

Project Information: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia 41

• Project Purpose and Outline 43

• Project Participants List 47

• Background of the Conflicts in Northeast India 53

• Map of Northeast India 57

List of Acronyms AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act

ARC Administrative Reforms Commission

DMK Dravida Muthera Kazagham

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

NNC Naga National Council

NPC Naga People’s Convention

ULP Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Executive SummaryIn the first decade after India declared independence in 1947, theIndian state faced numerous challenges to its very existence and legit-imacy. These ranged from a war with Pakistan over the state of Jammuand Kashmir immediately after independence, an issue that continuesto challenge policy makers in both countries, to the first armed upris-ing in the country in Telengana led by Communists in what is todaythe state of Andhra Pradesh.

Strident demands for separation from India rose in the 1960s inthe South with the growing power of the Tamil nationalist DravidaKazagham, later the Dravida Muthera Kazagham (DMK), which cam-paigned against the imposition of Hindi as a national language as oneof its main planks. The DMK, led by a deeply committed leadershipdrawn from Tamil’s underprivileged castes and classes was, however, asmuch a revolt against the privileged and upper castes, particularly theBrahmins, who had controlled the region historically.

The DMK was the first of a number of influential political move-ments that stressed and posited the importance of the “local” againstthe “national” and also advocated separation. Telengana was resolved,and so was the DMK problem, without the use of the armed forces.The central government felt that it had enough powers under existinglaws to deal with these challenges and that the local police were capa-ble of tackling such surges.

Yet when an armed revolt against the very idea of India erupted inthe distant Naga Hills of Assam state in the 1950s, the Indian govern-ment was quick to act by using the full force of the army and, in somecases, the air force, as well as its paramilitary and local police. It enact-ed special parliamentary legislation such as the Armed Forces Special

Powers Act (AFSPA) to give security forces even more powers and toprotect them from criminal prosecution for any “normal” violation ofthe law, since these were regarded as extraordinary conditions requiringextraordinary responses. AFSPA was later used in the states of Punjaband Jammu and Kashmir, with amendments for local conditions.

The scholar Udayon Misra says that the centralized power of theIndian state is repeatedly questioned in the Northeast of the country,where several ethnic groups live in eight states. Also questioned is itsmanagement of the problems of dissent and political identity and espe-cially the question of “one nation,” with an emphasis on homogeneity.The first real armed challenge to the Indian state came from theNortheast, especially its hills. Historically, these areas had been kept at adistance from the “mainland” by the British, through special administra-tive arrangements with the hill tribes, and they were completely unin-volved in the welter of the independence movement led by MahatmaGandhi. “During the post-Independence period, the rise of nationalisticaspirations among different communities has nowhere been as promi-nent as in undivided Assam.” (Misra 2000: 11).

Perceived internal threats, according to Margaret A. Blanchard(1996), often have created far greater repressive reactions than whenthe nation is at war. To a large extent, these internal and externalthreats are universal in nature. The fears that such threats engenderappear similar across borders, as are the responses to them from aroundthe globe. According to the human rights campaigner BablooLoitongbam, common issues that arise during periods of great fearcaused by national security apprehensions include:

• a lack of confidence in the good sense of the nation’s people(whether from the Northeast or other “troubled” regions);

• limited access to information due to excessive government secrecy;• government control of ideas that people can receive;• surveillance of dissidents;• reliance on repressive legislation.

All five are major issues in the Northeast today, which has the “dubi-ous distinction of being home to Asia’s longest running insurgency”(Loitongbam 2008).

This monograph addresses how the Indian government has tacklednationalist aspirations through the use of the Armed Forces SpecialPowers Act, with a focus on Nagaland, and analyzes the approach, itsimpact on Naga society, and the fallout for the Indian state.

viii Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika

The State Strikes Back ix

The first section provides background on Nagaland and the impo-sition of the act, including a timeline; the second section “Precursorand Rationale” looks at the precursors to the act as well as the act itself,its rationale and scope; the next section considers some of the impacts;the fourth section, “The Reddy Committee’s Report,” focuses on thereview of AFSPA by the Justice Reddy Committee; and the final sec-tion provides conclusions and makes recommendations.

The Naga story is proof of the failure of AFSPA and the greatereffectiveness of civil power. The act has pushed people away from gov-ernment and the practice of democracy, and has helped to sustain theinsurgency by violating people’s human rights. Among the lessonsthat have emerged from the phases of the Naga conflict is a realizationby the central government and the Naga groups that dialogue is morefruitful than force or violence. The system must now enact laws tocontrol the situation peacefully and involve communities and civilsociety in increasing the democratic space.

Many armed groups in the region are also gross violators of humanrights and humanitarian laws. As such they have become objects ofboth hate and fear. The state at least can be called to account; theseshadowy groups cannot, and therefore a very strong mobilization ofcivil society is called for, across the spectrum of scholarship, media, andnongovernmental organizations to raise the people’s voices againstpredatory actions, by the state and by nonstate actors.

The State Strikes Back:India and the Naga InsurgencyMany of the ethnic groups in India’s Northeast, which shares borderswith four countries—China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan—areethnically and historically different from the rest of India, althoughthere are strong connections, established over centuries, between thestate of Assam and the “mainland” as well as Tripura. The physical con-nection is slim, a narrow land corridor euphemistically called “thechicken-neck.” Barely 4 percent of the region is contiguous to the restof India; 96 percent of the Northeast borders other countries.1

The Nagas are a group of heterogeneous tribes belonging toMongoloid and Indo-Burman stock. Theirs is a fiercely independenthistory, with each village existing as an independent sovereign republic;virtually all sixteen major tribes in the current state of Nagaland prac-ticed headhunting (the same is true of Naga tribes in other states ofIndia and in neighboring Burma [Myanmar]) until it was banned bythe British. The pronounced differences among the tribes and even vil-lages under the ambit of one tribe were significant, although many ofthem also claimed common ancestry despite having different lan-guages, as well as social and cultural practices.

But there was no truly common ground, despite a shared polit-ical heritage—there was neither a nation-state as defined by contem-porary political understanding with accepted structures of commongovernance, army, foreign policy, and civil rule statutes that define

the role of the state and the citizen. The Nagas, nevertheless, contin-ued to assert their commonality as a people against the Indian-nessthat New Delhi was perceived to promote, and not a little aggressive-

ly. The Nagas have lived in isolation forcenturies, and there are extensive descrip-tions in the Ahom Buranjis and chroniclesof their frequent clashes with the Ahomrulers of medieval Assam, rulers who camefrom Burma’s Shan region in the thirteenthcentury. For the most part, they lived inisolated, hilltop independent village states

that were often hostile to each other and were involved in frequentraids on each other’s territories. (Indeed, some Nagas still speak ofthe “wars” with rival villages in the present context as if these werestill continuing.)

In the nineteenth century, the British extended their administra-tion in the province of Assam to a limited area in the Naga Hills, whichwas inhabited by a large and diverse group of Naga tribes. Following theTreaty of Yandabo (1826), through which Manipur, then a kingdom,and Assam, became part of British India, it became necessary to open aconnecting land route between Assam and Manipur. This was attempt-ed in 1832, from Imphal to Assam, under Captains Jenkins andPemberton through the Naga Hills.

Britain’s expansionism led to decades of Naga resistance to Britishefforts to establish authority in the Nagaareas. The battles with imperial troops andexpeditions ended in 1880 with the battle ofKhonoma, in which the Nagas were besiegedfor about four months and starved out.

The British punitive expeditions wereaimed at stopping Angami Naga depreda-tions into the plains of Assam, and

although there was a military occupation, a loose political administra-tion left most tribes alone. The most significant British interventionafter the securing of the Naga Hills was the spread of education, which

2 Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika

Britain’s expansionism

led to decades of

Naga resistance

b

The Nagas have

lived in isolation

for centuries

b

The State Strikes Back 3

was conducted almost exclusively by the American Baptists, whobrought Christianity and a way of life that often disrupted the tradi-tional village structures, eroded the power of the chiefs, and discour-aged old customs and beliefs, including the great Feasts of Merit, aswell as headhunting. This situation prevailed until 1935, when theGovernment of India Act was issued to bring some control there.Political power rested with the governor-general and was exercised bythe provincial governor, as his representative. The British institutedthe Excluded Areas Act and the Partially Excluded Act to preventinteraction between the plains and hills; these rules also blockednationalist Indian campaigns, such as the independence struggle,from places like the Naga Hills.

With the spread of education, a Naga consciousness spanning tribeloyalties began to grow as education became available to all socialgroups. Internecine conflict among the tribes began to diminish.

The first political organization established by the Nagas in the area,the Naga Club, was formed in 1918. On January 10, 1929, it submit-ted a memorandum to the SimonCommission demanding that the Nagas beunder the control of the British and beexcluded from proposed changes to theIndian constitution.2 Although, accordingto Misra, this was a request for a continua-tion of British rule rather than a demandfor independence (since the memorandumbemoaned the lack of unity among theNagas), many Nagas see it otherwise.3 It is regarded by most Naga his-torians as the first Naga declaration of nationality and their firstdemand for independence.

The Nagas’ desire to be located outside India and not within itappeared clear even at that nascent stage of nationalism. It was prompt-ed also by a determination to protect what they perceived to be a tra-ditional way of life based on customary laws that were not codified.

The next steps in Naga political organization were the formationof Lotha and Ao Councils and the emergence of the Naga Hills District

The first [Naga]

political organization...

was formed in 1918

b

Tribal Council, which gave way to the Naga National Council (NNC)in 1946. The birth of the NNC signaled the foundation of Naga con-sciousness; it reasserted the 1929 Memorandum to the SimonCommission, which spoke of the “Naga way of life” and “home rule”quite distinct from being a part of India, about which one leader said,“our country is connected...in many ways.” The secretary of the NNCalso proclaimed that the organization’s goal was “the unification of allNaga tribes and their freedom.”

This was a significant step forward in political formation andarticulation; Paul Brass describes the graduation of an ethnic commu-nity into a nation and speaks of “an ethnic community politicizedwith recognized group rights in the political system” (quoted in Misra2000: 31).

Six major political steps followed, in quick succession: First, theNagas signed an agreement in June 1947 with the governor of Assam,Sir Akbar Hydari, which gave them special privileges and rights. It is theninth and last clause of this agreement that has caused much resent-ment, interpretation, and reinterpretation on both sides. That clausesaid: “The Governor of Assam, as representative of the Government ofthe Indian Union, shall have a special responsibility for a period of tenyears to observe the due observance of the Agreement. At the end of theperiod, the Naga National Council shall be asked if they require theabove Agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agree-ment regarding the future of the Naga people to be arrived at.” SirAkbar died soon after this agreement, and it was repudiated by both theAssam state government and New Delhi.4 This rejection led to the sec-ond step; second, the Naga National Council declared independenceon August 14, 1947, one day before India; third, the charismaticAngami Zapu Phizo was picked as the head of the NNC in 1949 andthen pushed forward with an aggressive campaign aimed at independ-ence. He was to be the most significant voice in Naga politics until hisdeath in 1990; fourth, the NNC organized a referendum on Naga inde-pendence in May 1951, which it claimed was supported by 99.9 per-cent of the population. What it neglected to say was that the “referen-dum” was conducted in only a few areas of the Naga Hills; fifth, the



NNC organized a successful boycott of India’s first general elections,from the Naga side; and, six, the NNC organized the entire audience towalk out of a meeting addressed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehruand Burma’s U Nu in 1953, citing a slight by local officials who hadrefused to allow Naga elders to meet the prime minister. The Nagas left,slapping their bottoms, one of Nehru’s most humiliating experiences.He never returned to Nagaland, even after it became a state in 1963.

However, the Government of India considered the Naga areas to bepart of India by virtue of the fact that much of these were under theBritish colonial administration and regarded the Naga movement as an“insurgency” and “secessionist.” The claim is based on the BritishParliament’s Indian IndependenceAct, especially the Extra ProvincialJurisdiction Act, “empowering thenew Indian Government to contin-ue its administration in the NagaHills.” Thus, on the basis of its rightas “inheritor” of British colonialpower, the Government of Indiarefused to recognize the Naga case.The government considered itself on stronger legal ground after it hadmade Nagaland a state in 1963, seeing this as an effective counter to theinsurgent campaign for sovereignty. By establishing the state, it thoughtthat it could wean away the public by offering political and financialpower and a role in the Indian Union.

After the successful (though limited) referendum of 1951 and theelection boycott of 1952, the Nagas found themselves dealing increas-ingly with an irredentist state government in Assam, which showedneither sensitivity to their concerns nor appreciation of their history.The state launched a crackdown on the NNC soon after the snub ofNehru, viewing the Naga issue as a law-and-order problem. It promul-gated the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts)Act in 1953 for application in the Naga Hills District; all Naga tribalcouncils and courts were dismissed. It needs to be noted that until thenthe state police had led the campaign against the Nagas; the army was

the Government of India

refused to recognize the Naga

case [for independence]

b

not involved. However, once the Assam Disturbed Areas Act waspassed, it paved the way for the enact-ment of the Armed Forces SpecialPowers Act (AFSPA) for Assam in 1958by Parliament.

AFSPA was the barest, the mostcontroversial, and also the most power-ful of legislation drawn up by lawmakersin Delhi to crush the first armed andpolitical challenge to independent India’sterritorial and political integrity. It alsoauthorized the first use of the army in

India against a major political uprising.When introducing the Armed Forces Special Powers bill (1958) in

the Lok Sabha, Home Minister Shri Govind Ballabh Pant declared that“certain misguided sections of the Nagas” were involved in “arson, mur-der, loot[ing], dacoity [robbery,] etc.” He added, “So it has become nec-essary to adopt effective measures for the protection of the people inthose areas. In order to enable the armed forces to handle the situationeffectively whenever such problem arises hereafter, it has been consid-ered necessary to introduce this bill.” It should be emphasized here thatthe Indian home minister did not speak of the threat to “national secu-rity” or national integrity or sovereignty at the time; he spoke of theproblem as a law-and-order issue that needed to be sorted out “for theprotection of people in those areas.” He did add the caveat that the lawhad been introduced to help the armed forces “handle the situationeffectively whenever such problem arises hereafter,” indicating that evenin the 1950s New Delhi was concerned about a future increase in chal-lenges like that posed by the Nagas. Some members of Parliament, fromManipur and elsewhere, opposed the act; one of them, L. Achaw Singhof Manipur, described the proposal as “unnecessary...an anti-democrat-ic measure...a lawless law” (Government of India 2005).

The government intention, as publicly stated, was to use the pow-ers granted by the act as a temporary measure; but fifty years after itspromulgation, AFSPA continues in the Northeast and has been used in


the Assam Disturbed

Areas Act...paved the way

for the enactment of the

Armed Forces Special

Powers Act...in 1958

b


Jammu and Kashmir and also in Punjab, where the state defends itsuse, citing the need to fight local struggles for self-determinationand/or outright independence, which could harm “national integrity.”

As has been pointed out, the law is one of several in use in theregion that empowers troops to intervene in times of civil disturbanceif the local administration loses controlof the situation. One of the most con-troversial clauses of the act is thatwhich arms even junior members ofthe security forces with the power ofdeath over life. Sanjib Baruah arguesthat AFSPA gives “authoritarian trap-pings” to India’s democratic institu-tions and that this and other laws havetried to provide “a permanent counter-insurgency capacity” since“insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have become part of the fabricof everyday life in Northeast India” (Baruah 2007b: 3).

Why was such sweeping legislation, invoking the army, usedagainst the Nagas and restrained force relying on the police against theCommunist and DK/DMK (Dravida Kazagham/Dravida MutheraKazagham) challenges elsewhere in the country? The debates inParliament show that the central government felt the need for anomnibus law. Misra (2000) has argued that this was as much an out-come of the failure of the nascent Indian state to understand theNagas and what they wanted as it was the result of a lack of compre-hension of a distant area with complex ethnic groups. This lack ofunderstanding was clear in the Indian home minister’s statement toParliament in which he compared the Naga armed groups to banditsand said that “certain misguided sections of the Nagas” were involvedin “arson, murder, loot[ing]...” The justification appears weak, in ourview, since criminal gangs in central India roamed the ChambalValley for decades and were finally persuaded to lay down their armslargely through the persuasive skills of a follower of MahatmaGandhi, Jayaprakash Narayan, although they also faced much pres-sure from state police operations.

[AFSPA]...empowers troops

to intervene in times of

civil disturbance

b

It also appears to us that the police proved inadequate in copingwith the armed uprising because they were not used to dealing withviolent movements. Since the 1930s, much of the opposition to Britishrule had been peaceful, although the violence inflicted on pro-inde-pendence demonstrators in Assam was vastly disproportionate to thescale of the challenge. The size of the police force was also inadequate,and there was just one senior official handling the law and order for amedium-sized state, an inspector general of police. Today, there are nofewer than three director-generals of police for Assam alone.

On the “Naga national question,” Misra has observed that the fun-damental strength of the Naga movement was drawn from the supportit got from the traditional Naga leadership at the village level, “the mostbasic foundation” of Naga nationhood. In order to reduce the Nagaleaders’ authority and influence, the Government of India felt it wasnecessary to shake the very basis of Naga society—the villagerepublics—and to “break up...the economic pattern...of the Nagapeople,” specifically of land relationships (Misra 2000: 44). Even a cur-sory study of the role of the Indian Army in Nagaland would revealthat, under cover of fighting the insurgents, there has been an attemptto disrupt the entire economic pattern of the Naga people.

Precursor and RationaleThe promulgation of AFSPA, as well as predecessor legislation, isclosely associated with an event in 1953 at Kohima involving whatwas perceived as a slight to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Thesurge of violent activities against the Indian state, as the timeline inthe previous section shows, started soon after, although for a numberof reasons.

Nehru, along with his Burmese counterpart, Thakin Nu or U Nu,visited Kohima on March 30, 1953. It was to be a grand gesture onNehru’s part to the leader of a neighboring nation, an ally of India’spolicy of nonalignment. It was also an opportunity for the Nagas tobridge what they described as the “Indo-Naga” and “India-Burma”divides. Bureaucratic mishandling of the situation resulted in a missed opportunity.



Naga elders wanted an audience with Nehru to discuss a numberof issues. Fearing an embarrassing situation, the deputy commissionerof the Naga Hills District informed the elders that there would be noaudience. The public had been waiting for Nehru and U Nu to cometo the meeting ground, but after learning there would not be an audi-ence, turned their backs on the leaders. What Nehru saw, to his ever-lasting chagrin, was hundreds of Nagas whacking their backsides asthey left. He vowed never to visit the Naga Hills again and never did.

Following that ill-fated visit in March, only two months later (onMay 26) the Assam government promulgated the Assam Maintenanceof Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act, 1953 (Act XVI of 1953).This act received the Assam governor’s approval and was published inthe Assam Gazette on June 3, 1953. It was the first of a series of succes-sive and increasingly draconian legislation that was to govern the NagaHills and then other parts of the Northeast, as groups rose in revolt.Such laws were used in no fewer than five states, including Assam, bythe 1990s.

Over the past several decades, the rise of ethnic tensions amongvarious ethnic communities has escalated into gruesome conflicts, fur-ther complicating the security scenario. Indeed, the range of complica-tions leads planners in New Delhi to view the region as a perpetualnational security challenge.

The 1953 act specifically mentioned that it “shall apply to theNaga Hills District” and come into force “at once.” The act was meantto be an amendment of the AssamMaintenance of Public Order Act of 1947. Theprovisions are sweeping in their scope:Individuals’ movements, associations, andactivities are regulated. An executing officer,not necessarily a magistrate, needs no proofexcept his own personal “opinion” to proceedagainst a suspect. According to another provi-sion, even if a person’s life and activities were“restricted,” the authority needs only to inform the person of the order

An...officer...needs

no proof...to proceed

against a suspect

b

“without disclosing facts which the said authority considers it would beagainst the public interest to disclose.”

A third clause allows “the inhabitants of any area” to be “collective-ly” fined in any manner the “authority” thinks fit. A sub-inspector ofpolice can arrest anyone on suspicion, without warrant. And the actmakes no mention of requiring an arrested person to be produced incourt, although the maximum penalty for not appearing is up to twoyears imprisonment or fine or both. To protect the police, no suit, pros-ecution, or other legal proceedings were allowed against any officer act-ing under the act.

The last clause is crucial because it was to form the core of AFSPA,which came five years later and provides omnibus protection to any sol-dier or officer who may have violated the rights of a citizen by forcefulentry into a home, damage to property, detention without a warrant,or custodial deaths.

The Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act (1953) laid the“foundation” for other extraordinary legislation, which followed inquick succession. These laws have, according to human rights activists,successively denied basic rights to citizens and cloaked judicial proceed-ings. In recent years, with the growth of civil society movements, espe-cially in the human rights sector, the media have begun to function asboth investigators of abuse and disseminators of information aboutsuch violations.

The Assam Disturbed Areas Act (Act XIX of 1955) followed inDecember and became operational on January 1, 1956. The act itselfwas preceded by an ordinance of the same name (Ordinance V of1955). This legislation and the Assam Maintenance of Public OrderAct of 1953, were applicable to the Naga Hills District.

The Disturbed Areas Act went back to 1947 when the Governmentof India, facing communal violence at the time of Partition, enactedfour ordinances to tackle the crisis: the Bengal Disturbed AreasOrdinance (Special Powers of Armed Forces); the Assam DisturbedAreas Ordinance (Special Powers of Armed Forces); the East Punjab andDelhi Disturbed Areas Ordinance (Special Powers of Armed Forces);and the United Provinces Disturbed Areas Ordinance (Special Powers of



Armed Forces). These were designed to confront the Hindu-Muslimriots of the time, when India and Pakistan were born in blood.

The Assam Disturbed Areas Act empowered authorities to:

• declare any area “disturbed”;• empower any magistrate or police officer of sub-inspector rank or

havaldar (equivalent to a sergeant) in the case of a police armedbranch, including the Assam Rifles, to fire upon or use force tothe extent of causing death, if he “thinks” such a step is necessaryto maintain “public order”;

• block processions and legal proceedings against any person actingunder this law except with the previous permission/sanction ofthe state government (executive) that first orders the action.

Less than two years later, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958was enacted, embracing the second and third clauses in the AssamDisturbed Areas Act, which empowered soldiers to shoot to kill andthen protected them against any prosecution, other than that by thecentral government. AFSPA specifically enabled the military to play arole in insurgencies (it was amended in 1972 to enlarge the scope of itsoperation). This was a turning point in policy formulation and fieldaction for it represented the moment when civil power to deal with apolitical challenge was “transferred” to the army and paramilitaryforces. A military response to a political problem became embedded inthe system and in Delhi’s approach.

In 1961, the central government passed the Nagaland SecurityRegulation Act (Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section I, April11, 1962); this and the Disturbed Areas Act are still in place.

Over and above AFSPA, the Nagaland Security Regulations Actput more sweeping powers in the hands of police and civilian authori-ties. These included the rights to:

• use force to the causing of death if an officer suspects a personwas likely to commit an act of “looting” in a riotous situation;

• control the production, sale, and purchase of any commodity—including transport, modification, repair, etc.;

• evict any person from his own property; such property can beconfiscated/ requisitioned;5

• enable the governor to take a range of additional actions, whichincluded the arbitrary relocation of villages.6

In addition, the judiciary could not interfere with the powers orprocesses pursued by government.

AFSPA transformed the government’s approach to the problem,substituting central security forces for the police. This signified a newphase in the conflict—an acceptance that the challenge from the Nagaswas far more serious than previously thought and that armed forcesrequired “special powers” to deal with the situation. Local police andconstabulary were thus viewed as not able to deal with the Nagas who,though not trained in insurgency, had a tradition of fighting againstintruders, rival villages, and tribes in their forested hills.

At the time, the areas covered by the new law were the Naga HillsDistrict in Assam and three subdivisions (Ukhrul, Tamenglong, andMao) in what was then the Union Territory of Manipur.7 What startedas a temporary measure to deal with the Naga movement was invokedin the Lushai Hills District of Assam (currently the state of Mizoram)in the 1960s; in the 1980s, the law was extended to Tripura and thelargest state of the region, Assam, following insurgencies there.

In addition, as originally enacted, the act conferred the authority todeclare an area to be a “disturbed area” only on the state government.This is the enabling provision that legalizes the use of AFSPA; withoutit, the act cannot be used. In 1972, however, the same authority wasgiven to the central government to enable its armed forces to exercisethe special powers.

What are perceived widely as emergency and draconian powers aredressed up as normal procedure. Consequently, there have beeninstances in which the state governments of Tripura and Nagalandwanted to lift the “disturbed area” status and the central governmentwanted to re-impose it. All it requires is for the central government to



propose to Parliament an extension of the use of the act before itexpires in the specific state—even if theconcerned state has not asked for it. Agreat deal of ennui has set in: casualnesson the part of the government, andhelplessness on the part of the states andpeople’s organizations.

As if this was not enough, a wholeslew of all-India legislation was enactedbetween the 1960s and 2004. Theselaws were targeted at problems of internal security, which the policewere viewed as incapable of handling because they constituted anarmed insurrection against the whole state, not just a part of it, andhence justified the use of the army or paramilitary forces. The lawsinclude the Maintenance of Internal Security Act and the UnlawfulActivities (Prevention) Act (ULP) of 1967, which lapsed and was rein-troduced in 2004 and then passed virtually unanimously by Parliamentthat year.

The ULP of 1967 was the first comprehensive legislation passed byNew Delhi that dealt with the problems of secession. At the time, theNaga armed movement and the Mizo insurgency were viewed as majorthreats, and the new law strengthened AFSPA by defining unlawfulorganizations and facilitating bans on them. In addition, it empoweredthe central government to control the use of funds by such groups. Inother words, the central government had created a legal framework totarget the political associations and support systems that sustained theinsurgencies. AFSPA was intended to be just a military tool, althoughit was used extensively against civilian populations. The ULP buttressedthat power by hitting at the basic freedoms that were constitutionallyguaranteed to all Indians but which it sought to deny to those livingunder the pall of AFSPA: the freedoms of expression and association aswell as of movement.

In 2004, the ULP was repealed, following much criticism over itsuse and abuse in the nearly forty years of its existence. However, bow-ing to national security concerns in the wake of an attack on

emergency and draconian

powers are dressed up as

normal procedure

b


Parliament and an India-Pakistan standoff that had lasted almost ayear, a new law, the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, introduced specific clausesto battle “terrorism.” In this new law, enactedpost-9/11, lawmakers took pains to defineterrorism in detail.

Yet despite all these laws and a large pres-ence of the armed forces, about forty armedgroups—some more active than others—con-

tinue to function in most states of the region, except Sikkim. Most ofthe influential and feared groups operate out of Assam, Manipur, andNagaland, and Tripura also reports irregular activity by two groups.

AFSPA and Its Impact There are just six clauses in AFSPA. One of the crucial clauses states,

“Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned offi-

cer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may,

in a disturbed area, if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for

the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he

may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the

causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention

of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area

prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of

weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-

arms, ammunition or explosive substances.”

It also states that no criminal case can be brought against the soldier ifhe has taken action under the act that has resulted in loss of life or oth-erwise, except by the express sanction of the central government. Such sanction has not been given in a single case since the act wasinstituted in 1958.

Many citizens regard the AFSPA clauses as “lawless,” undemocrat-ic, and unconstitutional laws that have further alienated communitiesand groups that did not anyway feel deeply attached to the idea ofIndia. There is virtually no legal redress in these laws because:

the [ULP] introduced

specific clauses to

battle “terrorism”

b


• No courts of law have any right to take up any case, even againstcivilian personnel, unless express permission is granted by thoseauthorized—in other words, usually by the persons who should be held accountable for the act/s of commission or omission. Itmust also be kept in mind that until 2006 there was no formalattempt to separate the executive and the judiciary in Nagaland,and the district administrations, by virtue of their executiveposts, became magistrates.

• There is no equality before the law because the laws themselveswere made to “legalize” inequality.

• In most laws, an individual is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. Under these laws, a person is guilty unless he canprove beyond doubt that there is no ground for authorities to “suspect” him.

Discussion often arises as to why normal powers under civiliancontrol would not have sufficed to deal with the Naga situation in the1950s and whether it was necessary to have brought in the armedforces, a situation that continues half a cen-tury later. Essentially, AFSPA asserted NewDelhi’s reluctance to deal with armed rebelsthrough a process of dialogue. Efforts toseek mediation and peace were significantbut brief and were not sustained. Today, thisreluctance has changed to an official recog-nition that only dialogue and political set-tlements, not military force, can sort issuesout. Yet this has taken over forty years to beestablished, although there were two sporadic ceasefires in the 1960sand 1970s, the first in 1964 between the two sides and the second afterthe 1975 agreement between the government of India and representa-tives of the Naga underground.8

Although the first ceasefire was followed by several rounds of dis-cussions between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and leaders of theNNC (the political organization that set up the Federal Government of

AFSPA asserted New

Delhi’s reluctance to

deal with armed rebels

through...dialogue

b

Nagaland), the talks fell apart, with the central government accusingthe Nagas of continuing their connections to Pakistan and the People’sRepublic of China, where India alleged the Nagas were sending groupsfor training in arms and guerrilla tactics. Attacks on trains in Assamgave the government a reason to abrogate the ceasefire. Meanwhile theIndian government also was messily involved in dividing the Nagasalong tribal lines in order to weaken the movement, a schism that con-tinues to widen. What is significant is that all these events were takingplace despite the decade-long use of AFSPA, indicating that it was notas effective as Delhi had expected it to be.

India also sought to lessen the damage and the threat through apolitical initiative aimed at reducing the influence of the “under-ground.” This took the form of what is widely known in Nagaland asthe 16-Point Agreement, in 1960, with the Naga People’s Convention(NPC) (comprising those who were opposed to the armed movementand were part of the state, either local officials or politicians from theNPC, most of whom later crossed over to Nehru’s Congress Party).The agreement ensured that Nagaland became a full state three yearslater, with special rights. One was that customary laws would beuntouched even by Parliament and that laws passed by Parliamentwould not apply to the state unless ratified by the local legislature.

There were sixteen points of political discussion, but not all wereagreed to. Those rejected included a demand for the integration ofthe contiguous Naga-inhabited areas, by including districts fromneighboring states of Assam, what was then the North East FrontierAgency (now Arunachal Pradesh), and Manipur. This particularpoint was deferred for discussion at a later date at Nehru’s insistenceand continues to be a sensitive issue in all three states as well asin Nagaland.

No elections were possible in the Naga Hills until 1964, a yearafter the state of Nagaland was carved out of Assam, a move by Delhito meet local aspirations. However, Naga scholars say this failed toassuage basic demands, although it did help build up a middle class, agovernment bureaucracy, and a political class with an interest in closefinancial and political connections to New Delhi.



But the reality was that the central government was unsure, in thefirst decades of Indian independence and despite the growth of theNaga elite, whether representative democracy would work in Nagaland.It knew that it could depend on the army, an all-India organization thatserved the state without asking too many questions. But it was not pre-pared to trust even its own administrative structures in the state, suchas the police and civil administration, and viewed even political organ-izations with suspicion, concerned that these could again fan revolt.Such suspicions are visible in the central government’s approach to pro-Naga nationalist groups, and reflect what Sanjib Baruah describes as apolicy supporting army rule through the back door in the Northeast.“Generals as governors” is a much-quoted phrase of Baruah, whoreferred to the military mind-set of Delhi that continues to appointeither retired generals or former intelligence officials as governors tosensitive states like Nagaland, Assam, and Manipur, and most recentlyto Arunachal Pradesh.9 Baruah sees this approach as reflective of Delhi’smistrust of the region and the need to have a strong representative tointervene on its behalf should a crisis arise. (Baruah 2007a: chap. 3)

In Nagaland, the first pro-NNC government took office in 1974,against the opposition of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Vizol gov-ernment lasted barely two years before it was dismissed by the centralgovernment. Over thirty years later, after Neiphiu Rio, a renegade con-gressman, had formed his own state-level party and led it to a decisivevictory over the Congress Party, the central government did the samething. Barely two months before Rio was to complete his term, it dis-missed him, only to face embarrassmentwhen he captured power again, partly ona sympathy vote.

Even in the Indian army, althoughthere is resistance at high levels to repeal-ing the act, there is an acknowledgementthat things cannot remain as they are andthat AFSPA needs change: the armywants the act to be made “more humane”

the army wants the act to

be made “more humane”

but not scrapped

b

but not scrapped, as civil society and as the Committee to Review theArmed Forces Special Powers Act had recommended.

Repealing AFSPA is part of a larger process of democratizing spacesand reducing the power of the military. Lieutenant-General J. M.(Johnny) Mukherjee, the former head of Eastern Command in Kolkatathat supervises the army structure and operations throughout EasternIndia (including the Northeast), as well as a former chief of army staff,General Shankar Roy-Chowdhury, have spoken publicly of the need forpolitical solutions to issues like the Naga problem, saying that therecannot be a military resolution. Both men have extensive experiencewith the Northeast. What Mukherjee, Roy-Chowdhury, Major-GeneralDipankar Banerjee, and other military officials stress in association withBaruah, Misra, and other scholars is that challenges such as those posedby the Naga conflict need to be fought with ideas, not weapons. Thepower to influence political decisions and the ongoing political process-es must be taken away from the army. One way of doing that is byrepealing AFSPA.

A bid to do so through the Supreme Court failed in 1996 when theapex court overturned a challenge to the law’s constitutional status bythe Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights but issued a list of“Do’s” and “Dont’s” for the armed forces, as recommendations, notbinding edicts. It was left to a committee set up by the government ofIndia nearly a decade later to challenge the need for the act and proposesweeping changes.

The Reddy Committee’s ReportFor years, Indian human rights groups and jurists as well as internation-al organizations have sought judicial review of AFSPA and its annul-ment on the grounds that it was repugnant to the right to equality andthe federal structure of the Constitution. In 1997, however, a five-member Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court unanimouslyupheld AFSPA as constitutionally valid, much to the disappointment ofmany human rights activists.10

There have been strong objections by international organizations toAFSPA and its continued use by a nation that prides itself on democrat-



ic values. Thus the United Nations Human Rights Committee, whichmonitors the compliance of the state parties to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), after discussing theThird Periodic Report of the Government of India, stated in itsConcluding Observation:

Under Article 4, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR Government of India is

under a legal obligation to inform the other State Parties to the

Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the

United Nations, if it wishes to derogate from the human rights obli-

gations it has entered into by becoming a party to the Covenant. By

conferring special powers to its armed forces having a serious bearing

on the right to life, right against torture, right against arbitrary

detention and right to fair trial, the Government of India is in fact

derogating from its obligation under the Covenant without inform-

ing the other State Parties. (ICCPR 2007, para. 12)

The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination, after considering various reports of the Indian gov-ernment under the International Covenant on Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination in February 2007, urged the govern-ment to repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The committeeasked India to inform it of its implementation of the above-stated rec-ommendation within one year of the adoption of the conclusion.Nothing has happened; the law remains on the statute books, despiteinternational condemnation.

On June 25, 2007, the Administrative Reforms Commission(ARC), a statutory body set up by the president of India, also called forrepeal. Indeed, the ARC, headed by a prominent Congress Party leaderfrom the southern state of Karnataka, M. Veerappa Moily, said in the342-page report to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: “Withoutamending the Constitution, we considered that a law should be enact-ed to empower Indian government to deploy its forces and even directsuch forces in case of major public order problems which may lead tothe breakdown of the constitutional machinery” (Administrative

Reforms Commission 2008: 143–79). He said that conditions to usethe law should be strict, and that its enforcement should be temporary.

Although the ARC differed from the Reddy Committee, whosereport and findings are discussed below, saying the new law shouldapply only to the Northeast and not all of India, it endorsed the ReddyCommittee’s view that armed forces should not be deployed except inshort bursts, “because then the very purpose would be defeated.”

The Moily report was preceded by another government committeethat supported the call for repeal. Mohammad Hamid Ansari, current-ly the vice president of India, headed a committee appointed by theprime minister designated as the “Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures in Jammu and Kashmir.” In the report (issuedbefore he was elected vice president), Ansari’s group, in April 2007, alsocalled for the repeal of AFSPA.

In 2004, under pressure from agitation in Manipur state arisingfrom the detention and death of a young woman in the custody of aunit of the Assam Rifles paramilitary, the Government of Indiaappointed a committee headed by former Supreme Court Judge B. P.Jeevan Reddy to review AFSPA (hereafter, the Reddy Committee) andto decide whether it should remain, be replaced by a more humane law,or be repealed. The prime minister himself said that “more humane”legislation could replace the act.

After extensive public hearings in all the states of the region, exceptSikkim, the Reddy Committee submitted its report in June 2005.Those who shared their views with the committee included civil rightsactivists, lawyers, families of victims, academics, political leaders, offi-cials, and even the army. The army’s view remained unambiguousthroughout. It consistently opposed repeal, saying that it required“adequate authority” to conduct its operations. At one presentation,the army told the committee, “Such authority should cover actionsinvolving entry and search without warrant, seizure of weapons andexplosives, use of force including opening fire when needed, anddestruction of armed camps and military stocks held by insurgentgroups. The army also requires adequate safeguards against spuriousand motivated accusations of excesses leveled and legal proceedings



commenced against its personnel. Such authority and legal safeguardsare provided by AFSPA.”11

The approach of the committee, after some initial criticism fromhuman rights groups, has received support from the United NationsCommittee on ending Racial Discrimination, which called on theIndian government to publish the report and repeal the act. The ReddyCommittee identified three priorities:

• the security of the nation, which is of paramount importance; • the fundamental rights conferred upon the citizens of India and

the deployment of armed forces or paramilitary forces of theUnion to restore public order in any part of India, or to protecta State from internal disturbance is, and ought to be, an excep-tion and not the rule;

• the need for a level legal playing field.

While protecting such forces against civil or criminal proceedings foracts and deeds carried out while performing the duties entrusted tothem, the report said it was also equally necessary to ensure that“where they knowingly abuse or misuse their powers, they must beheld accountable therefore and must be dealt with according to lawapplicable to them.”

The Reddy Committee’s report called for the repeal of the act,describing it as “too sketchy, too bald and quite inadequate.” It tried todevelop a middle position. “The Act, for whatever reason, has becomea symbol of oppression, an objectof hate and an instrument of dis-crimination and highhandedness.It is highly desirable and advisableto repeal this Act altogether, with-out, of course, losing sight of theoverwhelming desire of an over-whelming majority of the region that the Army should remain (thoughthe Act should go). For that purpose, an appropriate legal mechanismhas to be devised.”12

The Reddy Committee’s report

called for the repeal of the act

b

The chief minister and top elected official of Nagaland, NeiphiuRio, says that there was a need to “appreciate the special circumstancesof Nagaland as well as the security concerns of Government of India,”yet, “at the same time, we are against these (extraordinary) laws as todaywe are living in a civilized world. We cannot win over the people withsuch laws.” Rio, who assumed office in 2003 and runs a regional coali-tion called the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland, says that the state gov-ernment had repeatedly declined to extend the Disturbed Areas Act,which empowers AFSPA and the use of the army. But each time, thecentral government would override the local government.13

The governor of Maharashtra, S. C. Jamir, a three-time chief min-ister of Nagaland, said, “These laws have blatantly denied all funda-mental rights to the Nagas and treated them worse than animals, manyinnocent people were killed and/or herded to jails, traditional villageswere uprooted and grouped into well stockaded ‘concentration camps’under the pretext of denying food to underground cadres etc.”14

The committee noted that while the Supreme Court had upheldAFSPA’s constitutional validity in a 1997 ruling that deeply disappoint-ed human rights activists and organizations around the world, it point-ed out that this ruling was not an endorsement of the law. In addition,the committee said that legislative shape should be given to many ofthese riders; its concern here was that security forces should not beallowed to hide behind the cloak of rules that did not empower themto conduct themselves as they wished and in violation of the basic tenetsof justice and the rule of law.

The committee did not merely stop with recommending theremoval of AFSPA. It formulated a structure that aimed at undoing thedraconian aspects of the Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act of 2004by proposing clauses that could curb the sweeping powers of the statesand its functionaries. The proposals were aimed at what committeemembers described as bringing the armed forces under the law insteadof allowing them to remain above it. This has been misunderstood bysome legal pundits in Delhi, and even some human rights activists, asan effort to enforce AFSPA on a national scale. What they may havefailed to understand is that the committee suggestion was aimed at



democratizing the ULP of 2004, for currently it has the same objec-tionable clauses and protections of AFSPA.

What the committee proposed appeared to be based on a realisticunderstanding of the political establishment in India and its concerns:that it would not be possible, given the conditions in Jammu andKashmir and the Northeast, as well as the problems in neighboringPakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, to do away with anti-ter-rorism laws. The AFSPA review committee took the view that “itwould be more appropriate to recommend insertion of appropriateprovisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [asamended in the year 2004]...instead of suggesting a new piece of legis-lation” because it considered the ULP to be a law that was sufficientlybroad yet comprehensive to curb terrorism.

The committee suggested a proposal that could meet many of thebasic grievances laid at the door of thearmed forces by proposing a chain ofGrievance Cells that could be managedby army and police officers and civiladministration. The goal was to dealeffectively with the complaints of peo-ple who had been picked up anddetained, and with the cases of thosewho had disappeared or ended up deador badly injured. There is a need for amechanism that is transparent andquick and that involves authorities fromconcerned agencies as well as civil society groups to provide informa-tion on the whereabouts of missing persons within twenty-four hours.

Although this may be regarded as a proactive approach to prevent-ing the abuse of power by armed forces by insisting on transparency,accountability, and a rigorous time frame in which accountability hasto be delivered, it drew criticism from Amnesty International, whichreluctantly welcomed only one “aspect” of the report, referring to thecommittee’s call for AFSPA’s repeal. Amnesty opposed the committee’ssuggestions to amend the ULP.

The committee [proposed]

a chain of Grievance Cells

that could be managed by

army and police officers

and civil administration

b

It is our view that Amnesty International failed to understand thecommittee’s efforts to resist state power and to enforce greater account-ability on the armed forces and the government. As part of this effort,it suggested that the current method of simply extending the DisturbedAreas Act every six months by a decision of the Ministry of HomeAffairs be done away with. This power is now concurrent; thus the cen-tral government can override the state government, which may notwant the act to be applied.

As noted earlier, AFSPA can become operational only after thepromulgation of the Disturbed Areas Act: an area must be declared“disturbed” by either the state or central government and requiring thedeployment of the army and other central security forces because locallaw enforcement authorities are regarded as inadequate to deal withsecurity conditions. The committee wanted a control on both the timeand the conditions of deployment so that it did not become a perma-nent feature of government and governance, because this, in effect, waswhat AFSPA had enabled the army and paramilitary forces to do.

The committee went so far as to propose its own draft legislationfor a bill that Parliament could enact as Chapter VI A of the 1967Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act “to serve as a guide in drafting thelegislation to be introduced in Parliament.”

Surprisingly, apart from occasional statements and articles oruncoordinated meetings and conferences,there has been no debate worth the nameover the committee’s report (the civilsociety movement in Manipur beganfocusing on other issues after the reportwas submitted to the government), andthe central government has deflectedevery effort to make it public. Although ithas not been made public officially, the

newspaper The Hindu posted the report on its website.But the strong views of civil society toward the government’s inac-

tion on this matter remain unchanged: The Sentinel newspaper of


there has been no debate

worth the name over the

committee’s report

b


Guwahati remarked caustically on the first anniversary of the commit-tee’s report that the government “stubbornly refuses” to place the reportin Parliament.15

The Reddy Committee report tried to break new ground and offera way out of the conundrum in which Nagaland and other parts of theNortheast find themselves. The lack of official response highlights thelack of government interest in taking a broader perspective on issuesand in continuing a business-as-usual approach.

The prime minister has called for amendments that could make theact more “humane,” a view that has the approval of the DefenseMinistry, the army leadership, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Thiswas echoed by Defense Minister A. K. Antony, who categorically statedthat AFSPA would remain in force but could be amended to make it“more humane.” Mr. Antony even went so far as to say that the armywould accept such an amendment, raising serious questions about whocalls the shots in the Indian defense establishment. His statements drewcaustic comments from the public and the media that the country didnot require the army to approve political decisions or to play a role inpolicy making.

The Review Committee’s recommendations and report have beenstalled by the inability of the United Progressive Alliance Governmentto get a consensus within the Cabinet on the issue, as well as by strongopposition from the army and the Ministry of Defense. The nonimple-mentation of the report indicates the power of the latter institutions todictate government policy in the name of “national security.”

ConclusionAgitations against AFSPA such as those in the neighboring state of Manipur in 2004 are the symptoms of a malaise that goes muchdeeper. The recurring unrest over various issues and the fact that pub-lic sentiment can be roused so easily and frequently to unleash con-frontation and violence, also point to deep-rooted causes that are oftennot addressed.

India is a country no longer in the stage of nation building, as itwas in the post-independence era after 1947 and into the 1970s, when

the Naga movement and others erupted. India has managed to containsuch movements and has even battled them physically; dialogue hasoften reached a virtual stalemate. The leadership of these movementshas also now understood the altered political and economic changessweeping across India and the world.

But problems remain, including the refusal or reluctance of armedfighting groups in the region to recognize that their popular supporthas declined and their goals of independence are regarded as unrealis-tic, that in a changing environment in the neighborhood, with somuch at risk economically, there is much more interest in movingahead with connectivity and change, which can only grow out of peaceand stability.

Indeed, even in the case of Nagaland it can be asserted that the bilat-eralism that defined relations between New Delhi and the Nagas, espe-

cially their political groups, is more or lessgone. Even prominent Naga leaders are nowsaying that in this day and age no nation canbe “truly” sovereign.

The internal conflicts fueled by old divi-sions and hates among factions and tribeshave also caused deep distress at all levels ofsociety, especially in Nagaland. This statelives in a strange situation: the armed groupsare at peace with the Indian army and the

Indian government, but they are fighting each other bitterly in differ-ent parts of the state, each trying to undermine the other’s support base.In the process, the innocent continue to suffer, victims of both hatredand extortion.

India must take all available opportunities to find ways to end theconfrontation and stalemates in Nagaland and elsewhere in theNortheast. As long as government and the state are seen to be unbend-ing on issues as sensitive as AFSPA, despite promises by prime minis-ters and others, hopes will turn to despair, which will mobilize furtherpublic expressions of anger.


Naga leaders are now

saying that in this day

and age no nation can

be “truly” sovereign

a


What has emerged from the phases of the Naga conflict is a realiza-tion that the use of force is fruitless in light of the acceptance by thecentral government and the Naga groups of the process of dialogue.The Naga story is proof of the failureof AFSPA and the greater effective-ness of civil power, which includesformal and informal dialogues as wellas a growing role for nongovernmen-tal civil society groups. The act haspushed people away from govern-ment and the practice of democracy,and instead of reducing insurgencyhas helped to sustain it by violating people’s human rights. It remainsan anachronism, for as the Reddy Committee’s report has shown, thereis enough space within the system to enact laws to control the situationwithout recourse to state violence and to involve communities and civilsociety in increasing the democratic space.

Many armed groups in the region are also gross violators of humanrights and humanitarian laws, defying logic and public concerns, func-tioning in a predatory manner, and descending, despite high-soundingideals and rhetoric, into a criminalized oligarchy. As such they havebecome objects of both hate and fear.

The state at least can be called to account; these shadowy groupscannot, and therefore a very strong mobilization of civil society is calledfor, across the spectrum of scholarship, media, and nongovernmentalorganizations to raise the people’s voices against predatory actions, bythe state and by nonstate actors. National security comes from ensuringhuman security.

The act has pushed people

away from government and

the practice of democracy

b

Endnotes1. This monograph draws from a number of extensive interviews and discussions with

the following people: Niketu Iralu, Shillong and Kohima, between 1990 and 1999;L. P. Singh, former governor of Assam and former Indian home secretary, 1993;Chaman Lal, former director-general, Nagaland Police, February 2001; N. Duolo,Kohima, January 2006; Mr. Koutso, Kohima, December 2006; senior officials ofthe Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Home Affairs, November 2007, January,February, March, and May 2008; K. S. Dhillon, IPS (Retd.), New Delhi, October2007; army officers in Assam, February 2008; senior army officers, New Delhi,March 2008; Babloo Loitongbam, Human Rights Alert, Manipur, New Delhi,April 5, 2008; and Dr. Udayon Misra, Dibrugarh, April 12, 2008.

2. This panel was formally known as the Indian Statutory Commission, a group ofseven British Members of Parliament that had been dispatched to India in 1927 tostudy constitutional reform in the then colony. It was commonly referred to as theSimon Commission after its chairman, Sir John Simon. Ironically, one of its mem-bers was Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister who would oversee the granti-ng of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947.

3. Dr. Udayon Misra, interview with Sanjoy Hazarika, Dibrugarh, April 12, 2008. TheSimon Commission (for its chairman, Sir John Simon) was formally known as theIndian Statutory Commission, a group of seven British Members of Parliament whohad been dispatched to India in 1927 to study constitutional reform in the colony.Ironically, one of its members was Clement Attlee, the British prime minister whowould oversee the granting of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947.

4. From the Naga perspective, the Nine-Point Agreement was a missed opportunity;it showed a willingness to be flexible and to experiment with co-existence withIndia, even with a status less than a state. But this was not appreciated and theagreement failed; yet today it reflects what the major Naga groups are seeking tonegotiate with India.

5. The right to private property was thus neither absolute nor assured, with the stateassuming powers to seize or possess at any time it wished.

6. Under the act, villages were relocated and grouped together (this was extensivelycarried out in the Mizo Hills in conditions of conflict a decade later), with ruralpopulations located in specific, regulated camps; the original villages were burned.

7. Responding to demands from some Naga groups, a process of statehood had beenput in motion. However, there was no “Nagaland” at that time; it came into beingonly on December 1, 1963.

8. In the 1960s, the Peace Mission comprising Chief Minister Bimala Prasad Chalihaof Assam, the Gandhian Jayaprakash Narayan, and Reverend Michael Scottformed one such effort.

9. The former chief of army staff, General J. J. Singh, was appointed governor of theArunachal Pradesh in March 2008, soon after China renewed its position on thestate’s status as “disputed territory,” leading to rebuttals by New Delhi; apparentlythe general’s appointment was to reinforce India’s stake in Arunachal Pradesh.

10. The Supreme Court of India had reacted in a separate case involving the disap-pearance of two Nagas of Manipur, Daniel and Paul, which came before it in1984. The two men were taken away by army personnel on March 10, 1982. TheSupreme Court ruled that the widows of the two men should receive compensa-tion for their disappearance.

11. Because of the reluctance of government to make it public, especially theMinistries of Defense and Home Affairs and in particular the leadership of thearmed forces, the Reddy Committee’s report has remained a “secret” document. Ithas neither been tabled in Parliament nor released for debate by the governmentof India, despite pressure from civil society groups and the opposition. A Hindunewspaper later procured a copy of the report and posted it on its website.

12. The Reddy Committee’s report stressed that “there are two enactments for fight-ing militants/insurgents/terrorist organizations, groups.... In the North-easternstates viz. the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act whose application is limited tothe North-eastern states alone and ULP Act which extended to the whole of Indiaincluding the North-eastern States.”

13. Neiphiu Rio, interview with Charles Chasie in Kohima, February 20, 2007.

14. S. C. Jamir, interview with Charles Chasie in Kohima and Goa (via e-mail),February 25, 2007.

15. The committee’s report includes a note by Hazarika, who says that the repeal ofAFSPA could create political space for negotiations, dialogue, and peace in the Northeast.


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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 2007. UN DocumentCERD/C/IND/CO/19 (March).

Loitongbam, Babloo. 2008. “National Security: A People’s Perspective from theNorth-east.” Unpublished paper, March.

Luingan, Luithui, and Nandita Haksar. 1984. “Nagaland File: A Question of HumanRights.” New Delhi. www.nagarealm.com.

Misra, Udayon. 2000. The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the Nation-State inAssam and Nagaland. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies.

National Commission for Women. 2005. Impact of Conflict on Women in Nagalandand Tripura. New Delhi, 2005.

Samantaray, Maitreya Buddha. 2008. “Northeast India: Identity Assertion and EthnicTension.” Society for the Studies of Peace and Conflict, January 18, 2008.www.sspconline.org [accessed Aug. 17, 2008].

Supreme Court Judgment on Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights vs. Union ofIndia (1997), 2 SCC 109.

Yonuo, Asoso. 1974. The Rising Nagas. New Delhi: Vivek Publishing House.


Appendices


I. Excerpts from the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958

Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officeror any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a dis-turbed area,

(a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenanceof public order, after giving such due warning as he may considernecessary fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing ofdeath, against any person who is acting in contravention of any lawor order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibit-ing the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weaponsor of things capable of being used as weapons or of firearms, ammu-nition or explosive substances;

(b) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any armsdump, prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armedattacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to bemade, or any structure used as training camp for armed volunteersor utilised as a hideout by armed gangs or absconders wanted forany offence;

(c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizableoffence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he hascommitted or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may usesuch force as may be necessary to effect the arrest;

(d) enter and search without warrant any premises to make any sucharrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongful-ly restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to bestolen property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substancesbelieved to be unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for thatpurpose use such force as may be necessary.

(e) Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act shall bemade over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station withthe least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstancesoccasioning the arrest.

(f ) No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted,except with the previous sanction of the Central Government,against any persons in respect of anything done or purported to havebeen done in exercise of the powers conferred by this act.

II. Stories of VictimsBy Charles Chasie

• A Chakhesang tribe elder, in Phek district, said his village wasburnt fourteen times by the Indian army. “Many children bornduring the second half of 1950s and early 1960s suffered fromphysical deformities of one kind or the other.” He suspected thesewere due to malnutrition, unavailability of salt, and eatinguncooked food in the jungle for fear of making fire, which wouldattract the Indian army.

• The following incident occurred in 1974: A woman of about 70,from a village now in Dimapur District, had gone to visit a rela-tive in a neighboring village. As she was passing through forestland, she came upon an Indian army patrol, which at the timemaintained a post in the area. Eyewitnesses say they saw her bodybeing brought into the post on horseback, “not properly cov-ered.” The villagers said they had earlier heard the sound of agunshot in the forest above the village, and the dying cry of awoman, and had stayed alert. When villagers demanded that thebody of the woman to be handed over to them, the soldiersrefused. When it became clear that the army personnel intendedto take the body away by vehicle, the women of the village rushedthe camp with sticks and stones. A scuffle followed and manywomen sustained injuries, including broken arms, from gun



butts. The soldiers also resorted to firing in the air. But thewomen of the village managed to wrest away the body of thewoman. Soon the police from the nearest police station, three tofour kilometers away, arrived on the scene, accompanied by amedical doctor. They had been informed of the trouble by village“runners,” who had dashed all the way to the police station afterbeing instructed to call the police. The medical examination stat-ed the woman was shot through the mouth at point-blank range.Semen was found over her lower abdomen and on her clothes.The doctor concluded that gang-rape had taken place.

• On December 27, 1994, there was a major firing incident inMokokchung town, the headquarters of a district with the samename. It was reported that a paramilitary Assam Rifles patrol wasfirst fired upon by “underground” elements. One soldier waskilled. The army retaliated, killing two members of the under-ground. But in the ensuing battle, the commandant of the battal-ion, Lieutenant-Colonel K. B. Poonnacha, was also killed.Thereafter, it appeared the army went “berserk,” according to acommission of inquiry. Altogether twelve people died—two fromthe army, two militants, and eight civilians, including severalnon-Naga businessmen from the Indian “mainland.” There alsowere several alleged cases of arson and rape.

• The Mokokchung incident of December 27, 1994, along withtwo others, at Akuluto on January 23, 1995, and at Kohima onMarch 5, 1995, are the only cases for which a retired Justice of aHigh Court was appointed to inquire into human rights abuses inNagaland. There was extraordinary official insensitivity to publicconcerns and basic rights. In the last event, seven persons werekilled when a convoy of the paramilitary Rashtriya Rifles, mistak-ing a tire burst for a guerrilla ambush, opened indiscriminate fireand even shot off mortars into the heart of the state capital.

III. Impacts of Conflict

What are the consequences of conflict on the civilian population, espe-cially women and children?

A survey in 2002, “Children Affected by Armed Conflict inNagaland,” found that 50 percent of those surveyed believed that psy-cho-social trauma is the biggest consequence of conflict/violence; 40percent had witnessed the exchange of fire, and 43 percent had wit-nessed torture and physical assaults. Approximately 51 percent saidthey lived in fear and insecurity; 60 percent said that classes were notheld regularly, and 71 percent could not concentrate on their studiesbecause of the conflict. Nearly half of those surveyed said that theirexams were often disrupted and two-thirds had no role model.

IV: Excerpts from Sanjoy Hazarika’s note in the Reddy Committee’s Report

At the end of a long night, there is a dawn...When introducing the Armed Forces Special Powers bill (1958) in

the Lok Sabha, the then Home Minister Shri Govind Ballabh Pantdeclared that “certain misguided sections” of the Nagas were involvedin “arson, murder, loot[ing], dacoity, etc.” He added, “So it has becomenecessary to adopt effective measures for the protection of the people inthose areas. In order to enable the armed forces to handle the situationeffectively whenever such problem arises hereafter, it has been consid-ered necessary to introduce this bill.

Some members of Parliament, especially from Manipur, and else-where, opposed the Act; one of them, L. Achaw Singh of Manipur,described the proposal as “unnecessary...an anti-democratic measure...alawless law.”

AFSPA in the North-East has continued for 47 years. TheCommittee’s essential recommendation, as laid out in both its conclu-sions and the proposed changes to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)Act, 1967 (as amended in 2004), is that AFSPA must be repealed forth-with; the gains of the law are extremely moot, its negative impacts havebeen overwhelming.



Many of the security problems of the region can be tackled by localpolice and commando forces, with the assistance of the armed forceswhere essential. But the dependence of the states on the army must bereduced to the minimum and armed forces should be deployed only asa last resort.

Numerous representations from the public as well as from thearmy, paramilitary and police have informed the Committee that polit-ical problems must be addressed politically and not militarily.

This is a long and difficult task and the pressures are enormous. TheCommittee does not underestimate the scale of the challenges. But thereis no option for the Indian State or the states of the Union. Faltering andeven failing, at times, the states of the Union, and especially the North-east, must strengthen their own systems of governance, restoring theconfidence of the people and providing the basics of governance.

It is my view that the army must be deployed in the rarest of rarecases—not as a knee-jerk reaction of governments at the Central andstate levels. The army and security forces have, despite obvious short-comings as are documented and well-known, tried to do their best anduphold their country’s honour and integrity.

We have been encouraged by the openness with which peopleapproached the committee and spoke their views without fear or favour,despite many pressures. We also are encouraged by the fact that manyof the armed groups in the North-east are in the process of negotiationor seeking conversations which can bring armed confrontations to anend and restore dignity to civil society and the rule of justice and law.

We hope that the report of the Committee will help in the process ofreconciliation and democratization in the North-east, create a space fordialogue and discussion, reducing conflicts and helping the region write anew chapter of peace, change and happiness in its troubled history...

At the end of every dark night, there is a dawn, however delayed.And for every day, there is a dawn, whether we see it or not.

Sanjoy HazarikaNew DelhiMay 30, 2005

Internal Conflicts and State-BuildingChallenges in Asia

Project Information

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Project Rationale, Purpose, and Outline

Project Director: Muthiah AlagappaPrincipal Researchers: Morten Pedersen (Burma/Myanmar)

Saroja Dorairajoo (southern Thailand)Mahendra Lawoti (Nepal)Samir Kumar Das (northeast India)Neil DeVotta (Sri Lanka)

RationaleInternal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia is part of a larg-er East-West Center project on state building and governance in Asiathat investigates political legitimacy of governments, the relationshipof the military to the state, the development of political and civil soci-eties and their roles in democratic development, the role of militaryforce in state formation, and the dynamics and management of inter-nal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes. An ear-lier project investigating internal conflicts arising from nation- andstate-building processes focused on conflicts arising from the politicalconsciousness of minority communities in China (Tibet andXinjiang), Indonesia (Aceh and Papua), and southern Philippines (theMoro Muslims). Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York,that highly successful project was completed in March 2005. Thepresent project, which began in July 2005, investigates the causes andconsequences of internal conflicts arising from state- and nation-building processes in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, Nepal,northeast India, and Sri Lanka, and explores strategies and solutionsfor their peaceful management and eventual settlement.

Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian polit-ical landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars,armed insurgencies, coups d’état, regional rebellions, and revolutions.Many have been protracted; several have far-reaching domestic andinternational consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the breakup of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the politicaland territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, thePhilippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand(1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan(1991) Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramaticpolitical change in those countries. Although the political uprisings inBurma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems

44

in those countries, as well as in Vietnam, continue to confront prob-lems of legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam posesserious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.The Thai military ousted the democratically-elected government ofThaksin Shinawatra in 2006. In all, millions of people have been killedin the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced.Moreover, the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner(especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had nega-tive consequences for domestic and regional security.

Internal conflicts in Asia can be traced to contestations over polit-ical legitimacy (the title to rule), national identity, state building, anddistributive justice––that are often interconnected. With the bank-ruptcy of the socialist model and transitions to democracy in severalcountries, the number of internal conflicts over political legitimacyhas declined in Asia. However, the legitimacy of certain governmentscontinues to be contested from time to time, and the remaining com-munist and authoritarian systems are likely to confront challenges totheir legitimacy in due course. Internal conflicts also arise from theprocess of constructing modern nation-states, and the unequal distri-bution of material and status benefits. Although many Asian stateshave made considerable progress in constructing national communi-ties and viable states, several countries, including some major ones,still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent con-flict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state aswell as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of indi-viduals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affectdomestic and international stability.

PurposeInternal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia examines inter-nal conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority com-munities in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, northeast India,Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Except for Nepal, these states are not in dangerof collapse. However, they do face serious challenges at the regional andlocal levels which, if not addressed, can negatively affect the vitality ofthe national state in these countries. Specifically, the project has a three-fold purpose: (1) to develop an in-depth understanding of the domes-tic, transnational, and international dynamics of internal conflicts inthese countries in the context of nation- and state-building strategies;(2) to examine how such conflicts have affected the vitality of the state;

45

and (3) to explore strategies and solutions for the peaceful managementand eventual settlement of these conflicts.

DesignA study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investi-gated in the study. With a principal researcher for each, the studygroups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asiancountries, including the region or province that is the focus of the con-flict, as well as from Australia, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, and theUnited States. The participants list that follows shows the compositionof the study groups.

All five study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington,D.C., on October 30–November 3, 2005. Over a period of five days,participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issuespertaining to the conflicts investigated in the project. In addition toidentifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facili-tated the development of cross-country perspectives and interactionamong scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on dis-cussion at the meeting, twenty-five policy papers were commissioned.

The study groups met separately in the summer of 2006 for thesecond set of meetings, which were organized in collaboration withrespected policy-oriented think tanks in each host country. The Burmaand southern Thailand study group meetings were held in Bangkok,July 10–11 and July 12–13, respectively. These meetings were cospon-sored by The Institute of Security and International Studies,Chulalongkorn University. The Nepal study group was held inKathmandu, Nepal, July 17–19, and was cosponsored by the SocialScience Baha. The northeast India study group met in New Delhi,India, August 9–10. This meeting was cosponsored by the Centre forPolicy Research. The Sri Lanka meeting was held in Colombo, SriLanka, August 14–16, and was cosponsored by the Centre for PolicyAlternatives. In each of these meetings, scholars, and practitionersreviewed and critiqued papers produced for the meetings and madesuggestions for revision.

Publications This project will result in twenty to twenty-five policy papers provid-ing a detailed examination of particular aspects of each conflict.Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 18,000- to 24,000-wordessays will be published in the East-West Center Washington Policy

46

Studies series, and will be circulated widely to key personnel and insti-tutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media inthe respective Asian countries, the United States, and other relevantcountries. Some studies will be published in the East-West CenterWashington Working Papers series.

Public ForumsTo engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of theproject to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in con-junction with study group meetings.

Five public forums were organized in Washington, D.C., in con-junction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cospon-sored by The Johns Hopkins University’s School of AdvancedInternational Studies, discussed the conflict in southern Thailand. Thesecond, cosponsored by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The George Washington University, discussed the conflict inBurma. The conflicts in Nepal were the focus of the third forum,which was cosponsored by the Asia Program at The Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars. The fourth public meeting, cospon-sored by the Foreign Policy Studies program at The BrookingsInstitution, discussed the conflicts in northeast India. The fifth forum,cosponsored by the South Asia Program of the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, focused on the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Funding SupportThe Carnegie Corporation of New York is once again providing gener-ous funding support for the project.

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Morten Pedersen United Nations UniversityPrincipal Researcher

Mary P. Callahan University of Washington

Christina Fink Chiang Mai University

Saboi Jum Shalom Foundation, Yangon

Kyi May KaungFreelance Writer/Analyst, Washington, D.C.

Tom KramerTransnational Institute, Amsterdam

Curtis Lambrecht Yale University

David Scott MathiesonAustralian National University

Win MinChiang Mai University

Zaw Oo American University

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London

David I. SteinbergGeorgetown University

David Tegenfeldt Hope International DevelopmentAgency, Yangon

Mya ThanChulalongkorn University

Tin Maung Maung ThanInstitute for Southeast Asian Studies,Singapore

Ardeth Thawnghmung University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Meredith WeissEast-West Center Washington

Khin Zaw WinIndependent Researcher, Yangon

Harn Yawnghwe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

Project Participants

Project DirectorMuthiah AlagappaDirector, East-West Center Washington (from February 2001 to January 2007)Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center (from February 1, 2007)

Burma/Myanmar Study Group

Mahendra LawotiWestern Michigan UniversityPrincipal Researcher

Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Meena AcharyaTanka Prasad Acharya MemorialFoundation, Kathmandu

Lok Raj BaralNepal Center for ContemporaryStudies, Kathmandu

Surendra Raj BhandariLaw Associates Nepal, Kathmandu

Chandra Dev BhattaLondon School of Economics

Krishna BhattachanTribhuvan University

Saroja DorairajooNational University of SingaporePrincipal Researcher

Thanet AphornsuvanThammasat University

Marc AskewVictoria University, Melbourne

Suchit BunbongkarnChulalongkorn University

Kavi Chongkittavorn Nation Multimedia Group, Bangkok

Neil John Funston Australian National University

Surat HorachaikulChulalongkorn University

Srisompob Jitpiromsri Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus

Joseph Chinyong LiowNanyang Technological University,Singapore

Chandra-nuj MahakanjanaNational Institute of DevelopmentAdministration, Bangkok

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Celakhan (Don) Pathan The Nation Newspaper, Bangkok

Surin Pitsuwan MP, Thai House of Representatives

Thitinan PongsudhirakChulalongkorn University

Chaiwat Satha-Anand Thammasat University

Vaipot SrinualSupreme Command Headquarters,Thailand

Wattana SugunnasilPrince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus

Panitan Wattanayagorn Chulalongkorn University

Imtiyaz YusufAssumption University, Bangkok

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Southern Thailand Study Group

Nepal Study Group

49

Sumitra Manandhar-GurungLumanthi and National CoalitionAgainst Racial Discrimination,Kathmandu

Harka Gurung (deceased)Transparency International, Nepal

Dipak GyawaliRoyal Nepal Academy of Science andTechnology, Kathmandu

Krishna Hacchethu Tribhuvan University

Susan HangenRamapo College, New Jersey

Lauren LeveUniversity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Prakash Chandra LohaniFormer Finance Minister, Nepal

Pancha Narayan MaharjanTribhuvan University, Kirtipur

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Anup Pahari Foreign Service Institute, Arlington

Rajendra PradhanSocial Science Baha, Kathmandu

Shree Govind ShahEnvironmental Resources Planningand Monitoring/Academy of SocialJustice & Human Rights, Kathmandu

Saubhagya Shah Tribhuvan University

Hari SharmaSocial Science Baha, Kathmandu

Sudhindra SharmaInterdisciplinary Analyst (IDA),Kathmandu

Dhruba Kumar Shrestha Tribhuvan University

Seira TamangCentre for Social Research andDevelopment, Kathmandu

Bishnu Raj UpretiNational Centre of Competence inResearch, Kathmandu

Samir Kumar DasUniversity of CalcuttaPrincipal Researcher

Dipankar Banerjee Institute of Peace and ConflictStudies, New Delhi

Sanjay BarboraNorth Eastern Social ResearchCentre, Assam

Kalyan BarooahAssam Tribune

Sanjib Baruah Center for Policy Research, New Delhi Bard College, New York

M.P. BezbaruahUN – WTO (World TourismOrganization), New Delhi

Pinaki Bhattacharya The Mathrubhumi, Kerala

Subir BhaumikBritish Broadcasting Corporation,Kolkata

Northeast India Study Group

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Bejoy Das GuptaInstitute of International Finance,Inc., Washington, D.C.

Partha S. GhoshJawaharlal Nehru University

Uddipana Goswami Center for Studies in Social Science,Kolkata

Sanjoy Hazarika Centre for North East Studies andPolicy Research, New Delhi

Anil KambojInstitute for Defence Studies andAnalyses, New Delhi

Bengt KarlssonUppsala University, Sweden

Dolly KikonStanford University

Ved MarwahCentre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Pratap Bhanu MehtaCentre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Sukh Deo MuniObserver Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bhagat OinamJawaharlal Nehru University

Pradip PhanjoubamImphal Free Press, Manipur

V.R. RaghavanDelhi Policy Group

Rajesh RajagopalanJawaharlal Nehru University

Swarna RajagopalanChaitanya––The Policy Consultancy,Chennai

E.N. RammohanNational Security Council, New Delhi

Bibhu Prasad RoutrayInstitute for Conflict Management,New Delhi

Ronojoy SenThe Times of India, New Delhi

Prakash SinghBorder Security Force (Ret’d.)

George Verghese Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Neil DeVottaHartwick CollegePrincipal Researcher

Ravinatha P. AryasinhaAmerican University

Sunanda DeshapriyaCentre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Rohan Edrisinha Centre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Sri Lanka Study Group

51

Nimalka FernandoInternational Movement Against AllForms of Discrimination & Racism,Colombo

Bhavani FonsekaCentre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Mario GomezBerghof Foundation for ConflictStudies, Colombo

Air Vice Marshall Harry GoonetilekeColombo

Anberiya HanifaMuslim Women’s Research andAction Forum, Colombo

Dayan JayatillekaUniversity of Colombo

N. KandasamyCenter for Human Rights andDevelopment in Colombo

S.I. KeethaponcalanUniversity of Colombo

N. ManoharanInstitute of Peace and ConflictStudies, New Delhi

Dennis McGilvray University of Colorado at Boulder

Jehan Perera National Peace Council of Sri Lanka,Colombo

Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam MP, Sri Lanka

Mirak Raheem Centre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Darini RajasinghamCentre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo

John Richardson, Jr.American University

Norbert RopersBerghof Foundation for ConflictStudies, Colombo

Kanchana N. RuwanpuraHobart and William Smith Colleges,New York

P. SahadevanJawaharlal Nehru University

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Centre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Muttukrishna SarvananthanPoint Pedro Institute ofDevelopment, Sri Lanka

Peter SchalkUppsala University, Sweden

Asanga TilakaratneUniversity of Kelaniya

Jayadeva UyangodaUniversity of Colombo

Asanga WelikalaCentre for Policy Alternatives,Colombo

Jayampathy WickramaratneMinistry of Constitutional Affairs, Sri Lanka

Javid YusufAttorney-at-Law, Colombo

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Background of the Conflicts in Northeast India

Northeast India owes its geographical distinctiveness in relation to theIndian “mainland” to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. But asan official Indian category it dates from 1971 following a radical reor-ganization of internal boundaries and creation of new states. The regionis connected with the rest of India through a narrow corridor, which isapproximate thirty-three kilometers wide on the eastern side and twen-ty-one kilometers wide on the western side. This constitutes barely onepercent of the boundaries of the region, while the remaining 99 percentof its boundaries are international––with China’s Tibet region to thenorth, Bangladesh to the southwest, Bhutan to the northwest, andBurma/Myanmar to the east.

The region comprises the seven Indian states of Assam, ArunachalPradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura––alsoknown as “Seven Sisters.” Since 2003, Sikkim has been included as the eighth member of the regional North Eastern Council. With theexception of Nagaland, which became a state in 1963, most of thestates in the region were reorganized between 1971 and 1987. Thesecover a total area of over 254,645 square kilometers (about 8.7 percentof India’s territory) and, according to the 2001 Census of India, have acombined population of 38,495,089 people––roughly 3.73 percent ofthe country’s population. The region accounts for one of the largestconcentrations of “tribal” people in the country––constituting about30 percent of the total population––though with a skewed distributionof over 60 percent in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya,Mizoram, and Nagaland together. Three states––Nagaland, Mizoram,and Meghalaya––contain an overwhelming majority of Christians (90,87, and 70 percent, respectively). The region is characterized byextraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, withmore than 160 Scheduled Tribes and over 400 distinct tribal and subtribal groupings, and a large and diverse nontribal population con-centrated mainly in Assam, Manipur, and Tripura. An estimated 220languages belonging to the Indo-Aryan, Sino-Tibetan, and Austric lan-guage families are spoken in the region––the largest concentration oflanguages in the subcontinent.

Although the Ahoms were successful in gradually consolidating thegreater part of the region under a single political unit in the course of

54

their rule (1228–1826), court chronicles of the Kacharis (1515–1818),the Jaintias (1500–1835), the Manipur Kings (1714–1949), and otherlocal groups point out how they had historically retained varyingdegrees of independence into the nineteenth century, when the Britishtook over the region. Colonial rulers took nearly a century to finallyannex the entire region and exercised their control over the hills prima-rily as a loosely administered “frontier” area, thereby separating it fromthe “subjects” of the thickly populated plains.

Northeast India has been the theater of the earliest and longest-last-ing insurgency in the country––in the Naga Hills––where violence cen-tering on independentist demands commenced in 1952, followed bythe Mizo rebellion in 1966 and a multiplicity of more recent conflictsthat have proliferated especially since the late 1970s. Every state in theregion excepting Sikkim is currently affected by some form of insurgentviolence, and four of these (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura)have witnessed scales of conflict that could––at least between 1990 and2000, be characterized as low intensity conflicts. The Government ofIndia has entered into ceasefire agreements––renewed from time totime until today—with two of the leading factions of the NationalSocialist Council of Nagaland in 1997 and 2001. The Government ofIndia and one of these factions, the National Socialist Council ofNagaland (Isak-Muivah), are now reportedly involved in discussing“substantive issues” while trying to reach a “permanent and honorable”solution to the long-standing problem. The Mizo National Front andthe Government of India signed a Memorandum of Understanding in1986 and their rebel leader, Laldenga, subsequently formed his ownpolitical party and became chief minister of Mizoram State. The UnitedNational Liberation Front (UNLF)––the armed opposition groupactive in the valley of Manipur, contests the “Merger Agreement” thatthe king of Manipur signed with the Government of India in 1949 onthe grounds that the king signed it under duress. The United LiberationFront of Assam (ULFA) too questions Assam’s inclusion in the IndianUnion. Attempts have been made to bring UNLF and ULFA to thenegotiating table. The Government’s response to independentistdemands so far has included enacting extraordinary legislation like theArmed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, utilizing security forces tosuppress rebellion, promoting economic development, and negotiatingpeace agreements with the insurgent organizations.

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Although landlocked on all sides, migration, whether from acrossthe international borders or from other parts of India, continuesunabated. A significant part of the immigration into the region isthought to be cross-border and illegal––especially of foreigners fromBangladesh. The region has frequently been rocked by violent tremorsof anti-immigrant sentiments. Although a major problem, theGovernment often finds it difficult to detect and disenfranchise—letalone deport the foreigners.

Conflicts in Northeast India have not only focused on the Indianstate, but also manifest intergroup and intragroup dimensions.Intergroup conflicts based on mutually rivaling “homeland” demands(say, between the Bodos and the non-Bodos, the Karbis and theDimasas in Assam, the Nagas and the Kukis/Paites in the hills ofManipur, the Mizos and the Brus/Reangs in Mizoram, etc.) and strug-gle for power among competing groups have sparked conflicts andinternal displacements. The multiple forms of resistance in the excep-tionally diverse ethnic landscape have produced politics and struggleswith multiple competing agendas.

Map of Northeast India

Policy Studies seriesA publication of the East-West Center

Series Editor: Dr. Satu P. LimayeFounding Series Editor: Dr. Muthiah AlagappaPublications Coordinator: Jeremy Sutherland

DescriptionPolicy Studies presents policy relevant analysis of key Asia Pacific issues.

Notes to Contributors Submissions may take the form of a proposal or completed manuscript. For moreinformation on the Policy Studies series, please contact the Series Editor:

Series Editor, Policy StudiesEast-West Center in Washington

1819 L St., NW, Suite 200Washington, D.C. 20036

Tel: 202-293-3995Fax: 202-293-1402

[email protected]

About this IssueIn the first decade after declaring

independence in 1947, the Indianstate faced numerous challenges toits very existence and legitimacy.These ranged from a war withPakistan over the state of Jammu andKashmir immediately after independ-ence to the first armed uprising inthe country in Telengana led byCommunists in what is today thestate of Andhra Pradesh.

When an armed revolt against thevery idea of India erupted in the dis-tant Naga Hills of Assam state in the1950s, the Indian government wasquick to act by using the full forceof the army and, in some cases, theair force, as well as its paramilitaryand local police. It enacted specialparliamentary legislation such as theArmed Forces Special Powers Act(AFSPA) to give security forces evenmore powers and protect them fromcriminal prosecution for any “normal”violation of the law since these wereregarded as extraordinary conditionsrequiring extraordinary responses.

This monograph addresses thetackling of nationalist aspirationsthrough the use of the AFSPA, witha focus on Nagaland; it analyzes theapproach and its impact on Nagasociety, as well as the fallout for theIndian state.

About the AuthorsCharles Chasie is an independent journalist, researcher, and author based in Kohima,Nagaland state. He can be contacted at [email protected]. Sanjoy Hazarika is awriter and Managing Trustee, Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research basedbetween the Northeast and New Delhi. He was a member of the Armed Forces SpecialPowers Act (AFSPA) review committee. He can be contacted at [email protected].

Recent Series Publications:Policy Studies 51Civil Society in Burma:The Development of Democracy amidst ConflictAshley South, Independent Consultant and Analyst, United Kingdom

Policy Studies 50Southern Thailand:The Dynamics of ConflictJohn Funston, Australian National University

Policy Studies 49Framing Security Agendas:U.S. Counterterrorist Policies and Southeast Asian ResponsesRosemary Foot, University of Oxford

Policy Studies 48Civil Society in Uncivil Places:Soft State and Regime Change in NepalSaubhagya Shah, Tribhuvan University

Policy Studies 47Supporting Peace in Aceh:Development Agencies and International InvolvementPatrick Barron, World Bank IndonesiaAdam Burke, London University

Policy Studies 46Peace Accords in Northeast India:Journey over MilestonesSwarna Rajagopalan, Political Analyst,Chennai, India

ISBN 978-1-932728-79-8

The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgency State Strikes Back: India and the Naga Insurgency by Charles Chasie and Sanjoy Hazarika ISBN: 978-1-932728-79-8 (online version)

Documents