The State of Sovereignty: alternative conceptions of sovereignty in pursuit of effective crime control within the U.S.-Mexican Mérida Initiative

The State of Sovereignty Status Quo or Game Changer?

Alternative conceptions of sovereignty in pursuit of effective crime control within the

U.S.-Mexican Mérida Initiative

Thesis MA. International Security

J. Lakerveld1

University of Groningen

University Supervisor: Dr. M.E. Drent

Assistant Professor of International Relations

University of Groningen

June 2014

Abstract This thesis analyses the practical relevance of alternative theoretical conceptions of

sovereignty in the case of the security bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico.

The theories of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake form the fundament for investigating the impact of

globalization on the practice of sovereignty and the role of these two states in the combat against drugs

trade.

Keywords Sovereignty, Globalization, International Security, Transnational Organized Crime, State,

Non-state actor, Authority, Drug Trade, Drug Cartel

1 J. Lakerveld is Master of Arts student at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen | Faculty of Arts | Department of

International Relations and International Organization | Oude Kijk in ‘t Jatstraat 26, 9712 EK Groningen, The

Netherlands | Student ID 1723545

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Table of contents

List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ 3

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 4

Chapter One: Sovereignty .................................................................................................................... 9

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 9

1.2 Definition of Sovereignty .............................................................................................................. 9

1.3 Core Principles ............................................................................................................................ 10

1.4 The Classical Perspective ............................................................................................................ 12

1.5 The Constructivist Perspective .................................................................................................... 13

1.6 Questions for the unquestionable in the process of globalization ............................................... 14

1.7 The New Sovereignty .................................................................................................................. 15

1.8 Government Networks, Sovereignty Regimes and Hierarchy ..................................................... 15

1.8.1 Government Networks - Slaughter ....................................................................................... 16

1.8.2 Sovereignty Regimes – Agnew ............................................................................................ 18

1.8.3 Hierarchy – Lake .................................................................................................................. 21

1.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 23

Chapter Two: Globalization ............................................................................................................... 24

2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 24

2.2 Globalization process .................................................................................................................. 24

2.3 Impact on the role of the state ..................................................................................................... 25

2.5 Transnational organized crime .................................................................................................... 27

2.6 State responses ............................................................................................................................ 30

2.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 30

Chapter Three: The Mérida Initiative .............................................................................................. 32

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 32

3.2 The U.S.-Mexican context of globalization ................................................................................ 32

3.3 The Mérida Initiative ................................................................................................................... 34

3.4 Characteristics of the Mérida Initiative ....................................................................................... 36

3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 37

Chapter Four: The Mérida Initiative as Government Network - Slaughter ................................. 38

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 38

4.2 Government networks ................................................................................................................. 38

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4.3 The disaggregated state ............................................................................................................... 40

4.4 The disaggregated state in practice .............................................................................................. 42

4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 43

Chapter Five: The Mérida Initiative as Sovereignty Regime – Agnew .......................................... 44

5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 44

5.2 Re-interpreting territoriality ........................................................................................................ 44

5.3 Graduated Sovereignty ................................................................................................................ 46

5.4 Actors of labile sovereignty......................................................................................................... 47

5.5 Legitimacy ................................................................................................................................... 49

5.6 Sovereignty from below in practice ............................................................................................ 51

5.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 52

Chapter Six: The Mérida Initiative as Statement of Hierarchy – Lake ......................................... 53

6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 53

6.2 Variety of relationships ............................................................................................................... 53

6.3 Deviance in sovereignty .............................................................................................................. 54

6.4 Continuum of hierarchy relationships ......................................................................................... 56

6.5 Hierarchy in practice ................................................................................................................... 57

6.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 58

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 59

References ............................................................................................................................................ 66

Appendix I - Governmental Counterparts in the Mérida Initiative ............................................... 70

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List of Figures

page

Figure 1 Two-dimensional Framework 7.

Figure 2 Sovereignty Regimes - Agnew 20.

Figure 3 Continuum of Security Relationships - Lake 22.

Figure 4 Sovereignty Regimes in Practice 47.

Figure 5 Continuum of Security Relationships in Practice 57.

List of Abbreviations

CNPDPC Centro Nacional de Prevención de Delito y Participación Ciudadana (Mexico)

DCM Deputy Chiefs of Missions

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)

DHS Department of Home Security (U.S.)

DOD Department of Defence (U.S.)

DTO Drug Trade Organization

IAA Interagency Agreement (U.S.)

LOA Letter of Agreement (U.S.)

INL Bureau for International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement (U.S.)

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy (U.S.)

PGR Procurador General de la República (Mexico)

SEGOB Secreataría de Gobernación (Mexico)

SEMAR Secretaría de Marina (Mexico)

SRE Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico)

State Department of State (U.S.)

TOC Transnational Organized Crime

UN United Nations

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WHA Bureau of the Western Hemisphere (U.S.)

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Introduction

“Robin Hood, even in his most traditional forms, still means something in today’s world”2

Eric Hobsbawm

In the year 1969, the historian Eric Hobsbawm created a famous criminal archetype of the social

bandit: a criminal gaining fame and popular adulation through social significance. The Robin Hood of

the 21st century has just been captured: the Mexican drug lord Joaquin Guzmán, the world´s most

wanted criminal and a generous near-mythical figure capable of outsmarting the government, was

arrested on 23 February 2014 in the Mexican city of Mazatlán. This was the result of months of

collaborative work between the United States and Mexico to deprive Mexico's biggest drug-trafficking

organization the Sinaloa cartel of its leader. For many years, law enforcement agencies all over the

world have been combatting this multi-billion cartel that stretches along the Pacific coast and

smuggles tons of drugs into the United States, Europe and Asia. 3

The Sinaloa cartel is an example of local criminality that has taken opportunities of expansion

and development to become a transnational and cross-border drugs and crime network with a profit

estimated at 322 billion dollars a year.4 Other forms of organized crime such as human trafficking,

money-laundering and cybercrime also share this ‘glocal’ connection.5 The United Nations (UN)

unofficially defines this ‘transnational organized crime’ (TOC) as:’ virtually all profit-motivated

serious criminal activities with international implications.’ 6 Driven by these international

implications, many political scientists consider the engagement in criminal behavior on a transnational

basis as a substantial aspect of the process of globalization. 7

2 “Hobsbawm and the bandits,” The New Yorker, last modified October 2, 2012,

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/10/eric-hobsbawm-and-the-bandits.html 3 “Why El Chapo’s Capture is a Beginning, Not an End,” Time, last modified February 27, 2014,

http://ideas.time.com/2014/02/27/why-el-chapos-capture-is-a-beginning-not-an-

end/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+time%2Fideas+%28TIME+Ideas

%29 4“Thematic Debate of the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly on

Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development,” The United Nations, last modified June 26, 2005,

http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml 5 Felia Allum and Monica den Boer, “United We Stand? Conceptual Diversity in the EU Strategy Against

Organized Crime,” Journal of European Integration 35:2 (2013): 138. 6 “The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,’ General Assembly resolution 55/25,

last modified on 15 November 2000, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf 7 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2008), 337./ Katja Aas, Globalization & Crime (London: SAGE, 2013), 6. /Hobbs and

Dunningham 1998, 289, Manuel Castells 1998/Held, 1998.

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Since the 1990s, globalization has emerged as a central theme in political analysis and research.

Without a clear and widely accepted definition, the discourse on globalization has been shaped by a

great variety of approaches towards the impact of political, economic and social changes and the

direction of politics.8

One of the substantial discussions within the globalization discourse concerns the role of the state in a

context of transnational opportunities and ‘glocal’ threats. As of the year 2000, TOC is officially

considered a worldwide security threat by the UN, and the organization propagates that this serious

and growing problem should be tackled through close international cooperation.9 This U.N. statement

supports the pre-supposition of this thesis that the independent role of the nation state in the

international context should change because they can no longer provide effective solutions to

transnational crime threats on their own.10

When further deepening this hypothesis about the changing role of the nation state, the root of

modern statehood, the concept of sovereignty, becomes a crucial cornerstone. Sovereignty is about

providing the norm that legitimizes authority and power in the hands of the state.11

In this respect,

several analysts within the globalization discourse have initiated an examination of the nature of

sovereignty and its influence on the position of the state. 12

For the purpose of this thesis, the theories

on sovereignty of three of these analysts have been selected to constitute a framework for investigating

the impact of globalization on the practice of sovereignty, authority and power in the modern state.

The three theorists Anne-Marie Slaughter, John Agnew and David Lake support the earlier

mentioned hypothesis that the nation state is a boundary-setting institution which can change its role in

time and place.13

Inspired by the globalization process, all three academics have developed theoretical

arguments for a change in the role of a state that is embodied by alternative conceptions of

sovereignty. Is sovereignty still effective when only in hands of the state? In summary, their

arguments contain several ways of distributing sovereignty among many actors and on different

levels to effectively combat the challenges of globalization.

From this perspective, the influence of the transnationally organized Sinaloa cartel and other

drug cartels in Mexico is presumed to be one such a globalization challenge. Following the U.N. call

for more international cooperation, the United States and Mexico established a bilateral cooperation

8 Edward Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State: A Framework for Analyzing the Changing

Practice of Sovereignty,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:1 (2001): 75. 9 “The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,’ General Assembly resolution 55/25,

last modified on 15 November 2000, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf 10

John Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 112. 11

Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State,” 76. 12

Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State,” 75. 13

1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” Stanford Journal of

International Law 40 (2004)

2. John Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,”

Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95:2 (2005)

3. David Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Studies Review 5 (2003)

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programme, the Mérida Initiative, to counteract the power of the TOC networks trading drugs in both

countries.

This Mérida Initiative will serve as the case in which the practical value of the theoretical

implications of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake will be tested. Could evidence be found that distribution

of sovereignty among numerous actors and on different levels occurs in this specific case? Does that

influence the role of the two sovereign states in this cooperation?

In other words, the central question of this thesis is;

To what extent can alternative conceptions of sovereignty as defined by Slaughter, Agnew and

Lake be found within the bilateral security cooperation of the Mérida Initiative (from 2007-onwards)

between the United States and Mexico?

The thesis central concept of sovereignty is characterized by two sides; the legal existence or de jure

sovereignty in the heads of policy-makers may not always correspond to the practice of de facto

sovereignty.14

The aim of this thesis is to bridge this gap by reconciling theory about de jure

sovereignty with practical examples of de facto sovereignty, to see if it will make for a better

understanding on the role of the state in this globalized international context.

Officially, the theories of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake are not related yet for the purpose of

this thesis they have been put together because of their similar and complementing assumptions on

effective sovereignty. Two similarities are that they are all part of the globalization discourse and they

consider sovereignty as an attribute that can be divided into rights, which enables a way of distributing

sovereignty into different locations to be developed. They complement each other as they have chosen

different globalization themes to investigate the impact on the nature of sovereignty; international

cooperation (Slaughter uses Government Networks), de-territorialization (Agnew defines Graduated

sovereignty) and hierarchy (Lake).

Slaughter and Agnew are oriented towards a hybrid horizontal distribution of sovereignty

among multiple actors (states) and across borders (territorial and non-territorial actors), whereas Lake

is more focussed on a vertical distribution resulting in a hierarchy of different degrees of sovereignty

(among polities). Combining the theories will add a horizontal and vertical dimension to the

distribution of sovereignty resulting in a two-dimensional framework (Figure 1).

14

Wouter Werner and Jaap de Wilde, “The Endurance of Sovereignty,” European Journal of International

Relations 7:283 (2001): 300.

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Figure 1: Two-dimensional framework

Two-dimensional framework of distributing sovereignty using the theories of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake (Lakerveld, 2014)

This two-dimensional framework could be applied to many practical examples. A reason for selecting

the Mérida Initiative as the case of analysis in this thesis is the characteristics of the bilateral

cooperation that seem relevant to the theoretical framework; this international cooperation is high on

the political agenda of both countries and has an extended budget, elements of hierarchy are likely to

be found because of the asymmetry between the United States en Mexico and issues of de-

territorialization are presented as the problem of drug trade exceeds borders and it presumed an

international security threat. Therefore, the case of the Mérida Initiative is expected to offer

possibilities for alternative conceptions of sovereignty to occur.

In order to answer the central question of this thesis, the theoretical foundations of sovereignty

and globalization need to be assessed. The first step is to portray the history of the concept of

sovereignty and development of the discourse throughout the centuries. This can be done by a

historical account of the classical and constructivist theorists and a display of the development towards

alternative notions that account for a change in the meaning of the concept and the role of the state.

The ‘new sovereignty’ supporters are Slaughter, Agnew and Lake and their theories will be elaborated

on. Therefore, the first chapter will apply the following sub question;

To what extent has the changing discourse on sovereignty determined the role of the state in IR?

The second stride to build up the theoretical foundation is an analysis of the process of

globalization. There are many controversies surrounding this process, and neither is there an academic

consensus about the definition nor the impact of globalization. However, most discussions about

globalization evolve around the relationship between the state and the international context.

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Furthermore, the presumed growth of TOC networks worldwide will be investigated in perspective of

the globalization process. The second chapter will answer these considerations through the following

sub question;

To what extent did the process of globalization impact the role of the state in IR and the presence of

TOC?

The two sub questions above will account for the necessary theoretical foundation whereas the third

chapter will serve to introduce the central case in this thesis; the Mérida Initiative. This chapter will

assess the premises which have determined the context and content of this bilateral security

cooperation.

Issues surrounding the Mérida Initiative will be repeated and elaborated on when applying the

theoretical framework on the case to find an answer to the central question. In the last three chapters,

the emphasis will be placed on analysing and discussing the different parts of the two-dimensional

framework in the practice of the Mérida Initiative. The fourth chapter serves to analyze the theoretical

notions of Slaughter. Agnew’s assumptions establish the basis for the fifth chapter. Lastly, the

contributions of Lake will be discussed in the sixth chapter.

In the conclusion, the research question of this paper will be answered as to whether the role

of the state as the main carrier of sovereignty makes room for theoretical assumptions of a more

hybrid sovereignty across a wider range of players and locations in the practice of the Mérida

Initiative. Furthermore, this section will offer some final conclusions and suggestions for further

research.

Whereas there is an important value of this thesis within narrowing the gap between theory

and practice in IR, the research also carries its limitations. The theories of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake

are respectively dated from the years 2004, 2005 and 2003. As a consequence, these notions could be

argued to be out of date. However, the three theories on the new sovereignty are still considered

ambitious within IR. Furthermore, the case in this thesis is singular and could therefore not be

considered to provide the single answer to issues about the connection between globalization,

sovereignty and the state. Many perspectives and pre-suppositions are possible in the ongoing

discussions on these topics, and for this thesis an academic pattern is chosen which considers a mutual

correlation between globalization, sovereignty and TOC issues. The discussion is too extended to

reflect on all the opinions on this matter in the reach of this thesis. Nevertheless, this perspective on

the practical relevance of three new sovereignty conceptions aims to be a constructive contribute to the

discussion about the direction of international policies in the future.

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Chapter One: Sovereignty

1.1 Introduction

This chapter serves to create a theoretical framework around one of the most controversial concepts in

the history of International Relations (IR). Throughout the centuries, the discourse on sovereignty has

evolved towards an extensive scope of perspectives. The following sub question will be answered in

this section: To what extent has the changing discourse on sovereignty determined the role of the state

in IR?

Firstly, the definition of sovereignty is crucial and will be outlined within a historical perspective. As

the theoretical concept is hard to measure in practice, the third paragraph focusses on the real meaning

of sovereignty emerged from related core principles. Furthermore, for a long time did the discourse on

sovereignty depend on the classical and constructivist academics. These approaches will be shortly

outlined, and in particular the central role they assign to the state.

Subsequently, the influence of the process of globalization on the sovereignty discourse will

be addressed, which serves as an introduction to the central theories in this thesis. The last part of this

chapter will analyse the basic assumptions of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake and their position in the

sovereignty discourse. The aim is to draw a reliable picture of the extended landscape of and the new

developments on sovereignty that has changed throughout time.

1.2 Definition of Sovereignty

Historically, the concept of sovereignty contributes to the foundation of the Westphalian Treaty

marking the end of the Thirty Year’s War in 1648. This event is seen as the first official instalment of

a balance of power in Europe in which the new-born nation states were sovereign as they had ‘the

supreme authority over a certain territory,’15

or ‘the absolute territorial organization of political

authority.’16

During this era, the supreme and political authority was used to legitimize a strong and

undivided power that provided law and order in times of crisis. The Westphalian sovereignty was

highly based on the exclusion of external actors from the territory and any authority structures.

However, being a complex concept, this is only one of the four ways in which sovereignty has been

used as formulated by IR theorist Stephan Krasner.17

Secondly, sovereignty was relevant in the domestic context. This internal sovereignty should

fulfil three criteria; the ability of state to effectively control (1) its territory (2) and to have authority

over its citizens (3).18

Krasner has defined this form as ‘domestic sovereignty.’ Externally, Krasner

identifies the ‘international legal sovereignty’ of states in an international system defined by anarchy,

following the fourth criteria of external sovereignty; the ability to engage in relations with other

15

David Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Studies Review 5 (2003): 306. 16

Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty, 100. 17

Stephan Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3,4. 18

Lake, “The New Sovereignty,” 305.

10

sovereign powers (4). This implies that each state is independent and all are equal as legitimate centres

of public power. States legitimize their claim to power and control by the mutual recognition which

lies at the origin of statehood.19

Finally, on the interface between the internal and external context, the

‘interdependence sovereignty’ refers to the ability to control the regulation of the flow of people,

goods, pollutants, capital and information across the borders.

These four kinds of sovereignty are manifestations of the one concept of sovereignty, however

they do not apply to all states as they show some contradictions among them. Moreover, the exercise

of one kind could undermine the other. For example, Krasner explains that the external focus to

engage, as part of the international legal sovereignty, can undermine the strict Westphalian rule ‘to be

left alone.’ On the other hand, the state of Taiwan enjoys Westphalian sovereignty and lacks

international legal sovereignty.20

1.3 Core Principles

The dissonance between these four interpretations of sovereignty are caused by the involvement of

different core principles of sovereignty. Although a frequently used and investigated concept,

sovereignty suffers from a certain lack of clarity.21

Being very abstract, the real meaning of

sovereignty emerges from these related core principles. These principles are visible and more

appealing to one’s imagination than the vagueness of sovereignty. In this way, they provide a very

important connection between theoretical policy-making and events in practice. Furthermore, these

core principles of sovereignty help to distinguish between the different meanings of sovereignty

defined by Krasner. All four are embedded in one or more of the following core principles of

sovereignty;

Authority

The sovereignty discourse is in the first place an attempt to define political authority with demarcated

boundaries.22

On the domestic level, the supreme political authority is entitled to allocate resources,

interchange politics and economy, classify society and distinguish cultures and groups. Moreover, the

legal political authority is responsible for providing a legal, administrative and cultural infrastructure

in which it can autonomously make decisions under all circumstances.23

On the international level, the

political authority provides a state’s membership of the system of sovereign states in which non-

intervention plays a distinctive role.24

Thus, authority is of crucial value in effectively forming

19

Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as a Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1996), 3. 20

Krasner, Sovereignty, 4. 21

Joseph Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse and Practice - Past and Future,” in Re-envisioning Sovereignty, ed.

Trudy Jacobsen et al. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 34. 22

Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse,” 35. 23

Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse,” 35, 38. 24

Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse,” 35, 38.

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sovereignty; any erosion of this authority is considered to challenge the sovereignty and, therefore, the

existence of the state.25

Control

Authority and control are often associated however their conditions are fundamentally distinctive.

Authority is a type of relationship; and mutual recognition and control can be achieved just by the use

of force while neglecting any type of recognition.26

Practically, authority and control are strongly

related as they can strengthen and weaken each other. In his book, Turbulence in World Politics,

James Rosenau concludes that the range of activities over which states can effectively exercise control

is declining. The rise of transnational phenomena such as drugs trade, terrorism, currency crises and

diseases are exceeding a national approach.27

Although, it is a mistake to derive rapid conclusions out

of this; a loss of control across borders (interdependence sovereignty) does not necessary imply a loss

of authority on the domestic level (domestic sovereignty) or a state is suddenly subject to external

authority structures (Westphalian sovereignty). As Krasner puts it; in quasi-states ‘rulers can lose

control over transborder flows and still be internationally recognized and be able to exclude external

actors.’28

Territoriality

This aspect of sovereignty provides the historical geographical condition to mark the distinction

between the domestic hierarchy within the state and the anarchy that exists beyond it.29

In other words,

the spatiality of political authority is reduced to the territorial template of sovereignty for political,

social and economic ends.

Legitimacy

The effectiveness of political authority is highly based on the compliance of the population, which is

also known as ‘consent of the governed.’ Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of authority and,

according to philosopher John Locke, the foundation of governmental power.30

A state government

can exert its legitimate powers on different grounds, such as tradition, charisma and rational-legal

arguments. Out of these three types defined by sociologist Max Weber, the latter is the most dominant

in Western societies. This rational-legal legitimacy is founded on public trust and has the institutional

grounds to establish and enforce the rule of law and order in the public interest.31

As a consequence,

legitimacy leads to a state monopoly of legal control of violence and institutional coercion.

Responsibility

25

See Seng Tan, “Whither Sovereignty in Souteast Asia Today?,” in Re-envisioning Sovereignty, ed. Trudy

Jacobsen et al. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 84. 26

Krasner, Sovereignty, 10. 27 James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 13. 28


Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty, 100. 30 Richard Ashcraft, John Locke: Critical Assessments Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 1991), 524. 31 Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, Essential Readings in Comparative Politics (New York:

W.W.Norton & Company, 2010), 35-38.

12

Responsibility as an aspect of sovereignty which derives from sociology. Among others, French

philosopher Rousseau defined the principle of the social contract; the agreement between state and

citizen, to exchange responsibilities and rights to establish a social order.32

To establish such an order,

he proposes ‘a form of association that may defend and protect with the whole force of the community

the person and property of every associate.’33

The so-called Social Contract comprises a reciprocal

engagement between the public (sovereign) and individuals. Individuals give up their freedom and in

return the government puts it focus on the common good and interest of the society as a whole.34

When combining these principles with the typology of Krasner, it is shown that Westphalian

sovereignty and international legal sovereignty involve issues of authority and legitimacy as they are

focused on recognition, juridical independence and exclusion of external actors. Domestic sovereignty

involves authority, control, legitimacy and territoriality when it comes to effectively governing the

population in a given territory. Lastly, interdependence sovereignty is exclusively concerned with

control in order to regulate flows across borders.35

The last core principle of responsibility has been contested and its relevance is dependent on a

certain point of view. Even when sovereignty was in its infancy, philosophers Hobbes and Locke

could not agree on the meaning of sovereignty to include either rights or responsibilities.

1.4 The Classical Perspective

As the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes writes in his famous work Leviathan (1651), an absolute

sovereign power was the only solution to the chaotic situation of ‘war of all against all.’36

Hobbes

considers the nature of all mankind as greedy and therefore in need of a supreme authority to create

civilization; a commonwealth.37

This supreme authority should be exclusively entrusted to the state as

the main actor and as protector to its subjects.

Parallel to Hobbes’ top-down perspective, other philosophers at that time were pointing at the

consent of the people as the sovereign source of power. John Locke was one of the representatives of

this ‘popular sovereignty’ focussing on the state obligations of responsibility and the rule of law to the

governed.38

Despite these differences in approach, these medieval thinkers all agreed to the words of

contemporary legal theorist Hugo Grotius, when he argued that a state is either sovereign or it is not a

32 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), 156. 33

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), 163. 34

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), 170. 35


Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books,1985), 54. 37

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books,1985), Chapter XVII 38

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1980),

Chapter V Of Propperty

13

state, claiming that sovereignty is assumed to be an absolute principle exclusively entrusted to states.39

In order to be fully effective, classical realists contend that sovereignty should be a fixed and

exogenous attribute of states with internal and external characteristics.40

1.5 The Constructivist Perspective

Contrary to the realists’ consideration of state sovereignty as a given natural existence, the social

constructivists declare a constructed reality. Starting from a post-positivist ontology and

epistemology, constructivists are interested in the social action of states. In their book ‘State

Sovereignty as a Social Construct,’ academics Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber consider

sovereignty as an ‘inherently social concept’ and under influence of social norms and practices. 41

Instead of being a timeless principle, their connection is the result of a normative conception on a

certain time and in a particular place.42

Another point of contradiction is the possibility of change, as constructivists underline the

continuing (re)construction of the state units. The practices of states produce social

constructs and influence the structures within the international society.43

The anarchic

structure of the international system, as claimed by the realists, is according to constructivist

Alexander Wendt ‘what states make of it.’44

Despite their ontological and epistemological differences, the realists and constructivists share

their opinion about a very fundamental condition; the notion of sovereignty being a given, powerful

and indivisible instrument exclusively entitled to the state. This is the so-called ‘foundational

principle’ of sovereignty.45

It has been this tight exclusive relation between sovereignty and state that

caused a cradle for self-determination, the control and power position of states and still plays an

indispensable part of the international system of today. This consensus is exactly the reason why

sovereignty of states for so long has remained unaffected by the ravages of time. These mainstream

views only form a small part of the extended spectrum of perspectives, thoughts, ideals and questions

that surround the highly contested concept of sovereignty. Events in the 21st century caused the once

firmly constituted concept, power and implications of sovereignty to become a highly debated topic.

39

Lake, “The New Sovereignty,” 305. 40


Biersteker and Weber, State Sovereignty, 1. 42



Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”

International Organization 46 (1992): 395. 45

Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty, 100.

14

1.6 Questions for the unquestionable in the process of globalization

For centuries, sovereignty of states indeed seemed to be invincible; strengthened by the

unquestionability of its existence and the absence of no other supreme authority. Until around the

1970s, a significant amount of articles were published that critically analyse the old concept of

sovereignty against a new and rapidly globalising world where boundaries slowly disappear. During

the globalization era, more academics ask for a new and fresh wind through the old notion of

sovereignty and its core principles. They noticed a ‘diminishing utility’ and requires that sovereignty

is need of a ‘revised analytical framework.’46

Moreover, the role of the state as the sovereign power

receives critical reviews; political theorist Hanna Arendt argues that the auto-effectiveness of the

sovereign power has ‘always been an illusion.’47

This illusion has been contested by the process of

globalization, the common denominator for the growing interdependence and transnational

phenomena such as organized crime networks. Globalization puts the central role of the sovereign

state into question 48

and the proliferation of transnational connections, rising power of multinationals,

and the growth of international organizations are seen to be signs of ‘withering of the state.’49

Furthermore, the diminishing role of the state in a time of growing interdependence reveals

‘two fundamental challenges’ for all forms of sovereignty. First of all the challenge of ineffectiveness,

political theorist Anne-Marie Slaughter cites the academic Robert Keohane to describe this problem;

‘the ability of governments to reach their objectives and control border flows has been undermined by

the growth of political and economic interdependence’ (interdependence sovereignty). In other words,

because the global economic system is less tied to geography, the implication of state territoriality is

no longer sufficient to govern the people effectively and the state fails in meeting its responsibilities

(domestic sovereignty). The second challenge to sovereignty is interference; when domestic conditions

within failed states are posing a threat to international peace and security, collective armed

intervention is sometimes required, as was the case during the genocide in Rwanda (international legal

sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty).50

With this experience from events in practice, the discourse on sovereignty fell apart in three

categories of analysis; the end of sovereignty, the centrality of sovereignty and the qualification of

sovereignty.51

Although interesting, the first two categories will be put aside as the latter will form a

point of departure in discovering the role of sovereignty in this research.

46

Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse,” 33. 47

Peter Gratton, State of Sovereignty, (New York, Suny Press, 2012), 10. 48


Aas, Globalization & Crime, 151. 50

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” Stanford Journal of

International Law 40 (2004): 284. 51

Camilleri, “Sovereignty Discourse,” 37.

15

1.7 The New Sovereignty

The first step in qualifying sovereignty is to be aware of the earlier mentioned discrepancy between

perceptions of sovereignty on paper and sovereignty in practice. The legal existence or de jure

sovereignty in the heads of policy-makers may not always correspond to the practice of de facto

sovereignty, for example when the international community accepts the sovereignty of failed states in

Africa.52

This paradox is illustrative for the current political position of nation states in a globalized

world with many horizontal and vertical layers. Anne-Marie Slaughter incites to get rid of, what she

calls the ‘analytical blinder’ that causes the international system to be seen solely through the lens of

unitary states and in self-imposed terms. The first basic assumption in this new sovereignty is the

acceptance that sovereignty is not territorial bounded to states. This approach opens upe a new

international landscape.53

A second basic assumption for the theorists of the new sovereignty is about the nature of the

concept. Academics Werner and the Wilde point out to the two-folded nature of sovereignty; a

claimed status and a bundle of rights. According to them, sovereign power is established in the status

of being the supreme authority and the rights, responsibilities and powers related to that status. The

status of sovereignty (being the supreme authority) cannot be divided because this is an indivisible

quality. However, the practical mechanisms derived from that status: rights, responsibilities and

powers can indeed be handed over to, as Werner and de Wilde suggest, other states and international

organizations.54

Sovereignty thus can be liberated out of the opaque entity of states and flow towards

higher international levels.

The above contested central role of the state and the two-folded nature of sovereignty do not

automatically infect the relevance of sovereignty. Many academics underline the notion that

sovereignty does not become less important when the role of the sovereign power (e.g. the state) is at

bay.55

Instead when qualifying sovereignty, the possibility of alternative carriers is less impossible

than earlier thought, and in this context the core principles of sovereignty could assist to discover other

sources of authority, control and legitimacy. Moreover, the importance of territoriality and the

meaning of responsibility become subject to critical analysis.

1.8 Government Networks, Sovereignty Regimes and Hierarchy

In the search for new conceptions of sovereignty within IR, many variations and directions are

possible. The main question is to investigate how sovereignty is distributed to effectively combat the

challenges of globalization. The following three academics all put the emphasis on different

52

Wouter Werner and Jaap de Wilde, “The Endurance of Sovereignty,” European Journal of International

Relations 7:283 (2001): 300. 53

Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 13. 54

Werner and De Wilde, “Endurance of Sovereignty,” 303. 55

Werner and De Wilde, “Endurance of Sovereignty,” 286.

16

implications of sovereignty, however in the end they plead for the same outcome: accept a more

hybrid form of sovereignty will benefit the correspondence with the practice of IR.

1.8.1 Government Networks - Slaughter

Academic Anne-Marie Slaughter is especially concerned with the effective authority of the sovereign

power. In the current circumstances of the globalized world, she points out that under the Westphalian

sovereignty, states can no longer govern in an effective way. As an alternative, she proposes that

‘states can only govern effectively by actively cooperating with other states and by collectively

reserving the power to intervene in other states’ affairs.’56

This statement stands opposite to the

traditional notions of anarchy, self-determination and the right to ‘be left alone.’

To illustrate her statement on this new conception of sovereignty, she defines the term

government networks, as an intensified network of cooperation and operation between government

officials of all kinds that exceeds borders and regulate individuals and corporations.57

Beside

international cooperation, one of the main aims is to address common problems on a global scale, such

as transnational organized crime, and to reach a higher effectiveness combatting these. Herein,

common interests and norms generate the main motive and a bonding factor among these cooperative

regimes. All share a number of basic features; building trust and relationships; establishing reliability;

exchanging information and offering technical assistance and professional socialization to less

developed actors. All because, as Slaughter puts it; ‘networked threats require a networked

response.’58

In today’s practice, numerous of these government networks already exist in political,

economic and judicial international fields; G20, NAFTA, Europol and ECJ.59

However, Slaughter

claims that ‘yet to see these networks as they exist, much less to imagine what they could become,

requires a deeper conceptual shift.’60

This conceptual shift is mainly concerning the current position of

the state.

Although Slaughter admits that the state still remains the central and most crucial actor, she

demands for a broader vision to see a variety of different institutions performing the basic functions of

government (legislation, adjudication and implementation) on a domestic and international scale.61

Sharing authority becomes plausible in order to overcome the loss of control over transnational

problems that go beyond the state’s capacity to manage on its own. To attain this, the state must be

‘disaggregated’ and parts of the state should become the building blocks in the international order.

Officials of courts, ministries, regulatory agencies and legislatures all participate on various levels and

56

Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power,” 285. 57


Slaughter, A New World Order, 2,3,4. 59

Slaughter, A New World Order, 2,3. 60

Slaughter, A New World Order, 5. 61

Slaughter, A New World Order, 5.

17

in different categories to create links across borders and between national and supranational

institutions. 62

These categories and levels make it possible to derive a categorization out of

Slaughter’s theory.

Despite frequent overlap, the three categories of government networks can be roughly divided.

Harmonization networks aim for a standardization of laws and regulations between states to effective

contribute to common interests in areas such as trade, environment and crime control. Enforcement

networks assist in enforcing laws to protect the public good on a national and international scale. And

information networks manage the exchange of information that could be valuable and helpful.63

Currently a topic of political discussion, the precise mechanisms of the latter have not been

internationally agreed on yet.

The various levels, through which these aggregations of institutions are operating, enable to

distinguish different relations within government networks. Horizontal networks are formed by the

links between counterpart officials across borders. For example, a state’s diplomatic network with

embassies in multiple countries. Less frequent are the vertical networks, as national government

officials collaborate with their supranational counterparts, such as the European Union. A very

important prerequisite of the existence of vertical networks is that states need to delegate their

sovereignty to empower the supranational institution.64

With the theory above, Slaughter is providing a new view on sovereignty; as relational and a

capacity to engage instead of the traditional emphasis on isolation and the right to resist. This signifies

consequences regarding the traditional unitary sovereign power and the attached rights of supreme

authority. In this new sovereignty, being sovereign means ‘the participation of as many government

officials as possible in, regional and global government networks.’65

The earlier mentioned two-folded

nature of sovereignty is necessary to act effectively; these legislative, executive and judicial officials

should be able to exercise independent rights and be subject to obligations. To fulfil this demand, a

certain measure of sovereignty should be granted to each government institution, tailored to their

functions and capabilities.66

However, it is important to bear in mind that this perspective is not directly violating the

classical nature of sovereignty yet it changes the meaning of it. The state remains the fully sovereign

power claiming that very status, and it disassembles the attributes of its sovereignty to different

government institutions active in multiple fields.

Thus, the aim of Slaughter is to create a necessary theoretical framework for current events as

the world is now in the process towards, what she calls, a Networked World Order. Seeing the world

through the lens of a disaggregated state instead of a unitary ‘billiard ball,’ provides new insights for

62





Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power,” 325.

18

academics and policy-makers to uncover hidden patterns and features of the global system.67

Moreover, the close web of government officials compensates the decrease power of territoriality with

an increase in global reach. This multi-layered engagement in activities beyond borders welcomes the

conceptions of de-territorialization into the discourse on sovereignty.

1.8.2 Sovereignty Regimes – Agnew

The above-mentioned conception of the disaggregated state and the splitting of sovereignty among

government officials across borders leave room for re-interpreting the role of territory in sovereignty.

Political geographer John Agnew specifically focalizes on territoriality within sovereignty and

his theory is complementary to Slaughter’s perspectives. Sharing the same reasoning of the

unavoidable impact of globalization on the effectiveness of state authority and control, Agnew claims

that the relation between state territory and state sovereignty should be less tight. In other words, the

‘effective sovereignty is not necessarily predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed territorial

boundaries of individual states.’68

The traditional Westphalian conception of territoriality as the territorial division of space,

control over boundaries and demarcated domestic authoritative commands misperceive the distinction

between territory and space. Agnew explains when territory might be re-designed in the organization

of political authority, that does not imply that space disappears. Geography is not simply territorial and

the territorial state as a basic building block is only one of the many possibilities in which space can be

socially and politically constructed. 69

These two statements signify that effective sovereignty of states is not restricted by their

territorial boundaries and that outside these boundaries a space vacuum exists in which political

authority and control can also be exercised. Agnew uncovers his main argument distinguishing himself

from Slaughter: when political control and authority is not necessarily exclusively territorial, it is not

restricted solely to states.70

The role of the state as exclusive carrier of sovereignty has been put aside

by Agnew. As a consequence, competing sources of authority such as private entities, supranational

governments and even illicit criminal networks arise and might even correspond to a greater authority

than states in some international areas.71

This spatiality of authority has an effect on sovereignty, and

therefore Agnew pleads for a new conception of ‘graduated’ sovereignty; where claims to sovereignty

are both territorial based (by agents managing territories) and non-territorial based (by agents who

manage flows through space or through action at a distance).72

67


John Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,”

Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95:2 (2005): 438 69

Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty, 114-115. 70

Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes,” 441. 71


Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes,” 442.

19

It is remarkable how John Agnew manages to disregard the claimed absolutism of sovereignty

and to divide it among many actors. It turns out to be a matter of definition as he considers

sovereignty as a labile form of political authority not solely to be associated with territorial state

power. However, ‘having authority’ does not automatically entails ‘being sovereign’ and here Agnew

underlines that all claims to sovereignty need to satisfy certain criteria of legitimacy.73

In this respect, the source of power is essential as Agnew defines political authority as ‘the

legitimate exercise of power.’74

He uses the words of sociologist Michael Mann to illustrate the two

important types of state power that underline the state claims to sovereignty; despotic power and

infrastructural power. Despotic power concerns the power of the state elite over civil society and

infrastructural power denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities

of civil society through its own infrastructure.75

Both of these powers are centrally and directly

commanded and bound together as the centralized power of the state76

.

As the alternative, non-state actors and supranational entities, originate from different sources

of power. Here, Agnew positions ‘diffused power;’ power resulting from patterns of social interaction

and association in movements and groups, for example NGOs and economic forms of market

exchange. Agnew attempts to prove that the traditional association between despotic/infrastructural

power and centralized state authority is diminishing.77

As a result, these types of power as the

foundations of legitimate claims to sovereignty that used to belong to states, are now distributed

among the spectrum of diverse actors in the international field.

New deployments of infrastructural power (currencies, trading networks, regulatory activities

and information technologies) are used by hybrid public and private international organizations to

deliver a wide range of public goods from across the border.78

Nowadays, despotic power becomes

more and more established on a modicum of popular authority and consent, and when not satisfied

elites and pressure groups can easily shift their loyalties to non-territorial entities such as international

organizations, corporations and social movements.79

This migration of essential powers puts an overall

challenge for states to maintain their legitimacy in a growing global interaction. To further complicate

this, possible power mechanisms concerned with the exercise of authority could be divergent

(coercion, assent, seduction and co-optation) and have an immediate impact on society(despotic

power).

73



Michael Mann, “The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results,” European Journal

of Sociology 25 (1984): 188. 76





20

Where centralized power mainly is fixed and founded on automatic mechanisms of command

and obedience, the upcoming diffused power sources rely on flexible flows of assent and association.80

The latter could constitute competing sources of legitimate authority when satisfying the other criteria

of transparency, efficiency, accountability and expertise. It is evident to note that there is no such thing

as a strict territorial line between state and non-state actors; and centralized and diffused powers.

Centralized state actors can also operate over long distance, for example in the deployment of military

assets, and diffused power networks, such as NGOs, can be territorialized when constrained by a

central state authority. Included in this overlap is the general tendency that all actors are less

territorialized by state boundaries than at any time since the nineteenth century.81

Agnew brings up several practical examples of his theoretical thoughts about the migration of

authority, such as the emergence of the European Union, the shift from inter-state to civil wars (as

currently in Syria and Ukraine) and international security threats by criminal networks.82

He

underscores that these events cannot be captured in one single trend because the co-variation between

the effectiveness of the authority of states and their reliance on territoriality is different in various parts

of the world. For purposes of empirical analysis, John Agnew proposes four types of sovereignty

regimes; classic, integrative, imperialist and globalist (Figure 2: Sovereignty Regimes), classified by

the extent of state authority (the legitimate despotic power) and state territoriality (the administration

of infrastructural power).83

In this respect, a regime is a calculation s of rule in a given state or regional

bloc that provides insights into the effectiveness of sovereignty of a state over time and space. The

globalist type (open borders and strong central state authority) seems somewhat contradictive on

Agnew’s account, yet this combination could be possible when the state retains the capacity to close

its borders down. This element of state control might be a little overlooked in the theory of Agnew;

nevertheless it plays an indispensable part in the sovereignty discourse.

Figure 2: Sovereignty Regimes

Sovereignty Regimes, John Agnew84

80






21

Although these four categories are not exclusive and intersecting continua remain, it offers a

useable method to arrange states on the scale of effective sovereignty and their mechanisms of power.

Some states will exercise more control and authority beyond (and even within) their borders than do

others.85

This possibility makes room for the last stride in this theoretical framework; the issue of

hierarchy.

1.8.3 Hierarchy – Lake

With Slaughter and Agnew providing insights about the horizontal distribution of sovereignty within a

state; and between territorial and non-territorial actors, it requires only a small step to acknowledge

hierarchy’s presence and role in world politics of interdependence. Social scientist David Lake is

especially concerned with the existence of hierarchical relationships in sovereignty. His contributions

are shifting the discussion more vertically towards, as he calls it, the ‘dead horse’ within IR;

hierarchy.86

Acknowledging these hierarchical differences in sovereignty between states clash with

the norm of international legal sovereignty and the anarchic relationship of statehood.87

Lake

investigates how states enter into a variety of relationships and by doing this are denying the anarchic

claim on the international world. Sovereignty becomes shared and pooled across an extended spectrum

of institutionalized realms where some states enjoy more authority than others.88

Although controversial in the sovereignty discourse, several academics support Lake in his

notions; professor Barry Buzan openly wonders if heavily penetrated states such as Somalia and

Lesotho are equally sovereign to Britain and United States, in terms of deciding for themselves how

they will ‘cope with internal and external problems.’89

His conclusion is based on his practical

observation demonstrating that sovereignty, like power and independence, also varies in degree among

states. 90

According to Lake, the ontological recognition of incorporating variations in hierarchy into the

theories of international relations could resolve perplexing problems of globalization in current

policies.

Constructivists considered sovereignty to be a socially constructed force yet an absolute

condition in all states identically. In his search for academic acceptance, David Lake heavily relies on

the assumptions of Stephan Krasner who is trying to show deviance in sovereignty across units in the

international system. In particular, examining external restrictions and influences on state sovereignty,

such as forced economic reforms and financial support , reveal a wide range of authority relationships

85





Barry G. Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jacob de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynn

Riener Publishers, 1998), 70. 90

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security,71.

22

between state actors.91

Despite these necessary conclusions, Lake is slightly disappointed Krasner did

not develop these arguments into a pragmatic metric.

Therefore, Lake himself has identified several continuums between state actors pure anarchic

relationships at one end and purely hierarchic ones at the other. The most relevant in this case is the

continuum on security relationships, where in a situation of anarchy each party possesses full authority

and control and in an hierarchical situation only the dominant member can claim this right over the

subordinate member (see below for Figure 3: Continuum of Security Relationships).92

Members on

the continuum can vary between a single state, a collective cooperation, or even the United Nations.

Agnew uses the definition of polities to include all possible international actors, although in his

arguments he remains rather focussed on state actors. The intermediate range is defined by variations

in the equilibrium between the dominant and subordinate actor based on the distribution of authority

and control in the decision-making process.

Figure 3: Continuum of Security Relationships

Security Relationships Continuum, David Lake93

Similar to the proposition of Slaughter, Lake aims for the relational character of sovereignty

and the right to engage: actors should not be focused on domination yet cooperation should rule the

roost. The discovery of various authority relationships in cooperative structures highlight the multi-

layered hierarchy in IR. However, to fully operationalize this concept and to distinguish these

authority relationships remains rather difficult due to the complexity of the influences on all the

actors.94

Nevertheless, Lake highly supports the future development of operational indicators as he

recognizes the frequent discrepancy between theories and thoughts of policy-makers and the practice

in the daily world. When sovereignty is only conceived in absolute terms, no effective solutions could

be found for the current civil wars and revolutions in the Middle East. Thus, by introducing his studies

on hierarchy, Lake hopes to make for a better understanding of world politics and a comprehensive

affiliation to state behaviour.95

91






23

1.9 Conclusion

The discourse on sovereignty has long been dominated by the arguments of the classical and

constructivist theorists. Defining sovereignty as to have ‘the supreme authority over a certain

territory,’96

, the nation state was exclusively entrusted as the main actor of indivisible and absolute

sovereignty. As of the 1970s, stimulated by the results of globalization and increased independence

among states, several academics have initiated an alternative direction for the sovereignty discourse

that put the central role of the state into question. The new sovereignty is considered to be relational

and a capacity to engage, whereas the nature of sovereignty is considered to be two-folded; as a status

and a bundle of rights than can be divided.

As supporter of this new sovereignty, Slaughter proposes a horizontal and border-crossing

form of sovereignty carried out by close cooperating government networks. Agnew takes this view

beyond to the next level by underlining the diminishing of national borders of a state and introducing

other non-state carriers of sovereignty in the field, drawing form alternative legitimate power sources.

Lastly, Lake completes this theoretical framework with a vertical dimension by introducing

international stratification into the spectrum of sovereignty polities. Differences in sovereignty unfold

a pattern of hierarchy into the discussion of effective politics.

As the theoretical framework of this thesis, these divergent yet complementary assumptions

combined serve to create a new understanding of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of a more

fluid form of sovereignty as graphically shown in Figure 1: Two-dimensional framework.

Answering this chapter’s sub question shows that the introduction of a new sovereignty in the

sovereignty discourse is about status, engagement and the political ability to be actor of it. This has a

substantive effect on the role of the state in IR, no longer considered as the exclusive carrier of

sovereignty rights, and opens up a new landscape of possible carriers and locations of sovereignty.

Changing the meaning and practice of sovereignty is changing the conceptual lenses of the unitary

state into a two-dimensional spectrum of connections. This will place the current challenges of

transnational organized crime in this globalized world into a new light.

96

David Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Studies Review 5 (2003): 306.

24

Chapter Two: Globalization

2.1 Introduction

The three central theorists of this thesis share the opinion that the process of globalization has created

new incentives in the meaning of sovereignty and the role of the state in the IR. In this chapter, the

process of globalization is the subject of analysis, addressing the following sub question;

To what extent did the process of globalization impact the role of the state in IR and the presence of

TOC?

Firstly, the process of globalization and its consequences are analysed. Many political scientists

consider the growth of international opportunities as an essential part of globalization and deregulation

of national economies.97

This automatically has impact on the role and influence of the nation state

operating in a globalized world, as elaborated on in the third paragraph.

Thirdly, the presumed negative consequences of the globalization process will be examined. In

particular, the three most serious and harming forms of TOC; drug trade, arms trade and transportation

of human beings and their ways of operating will be mentioned. Lastly, it will be analyzed to what

extent the negative effects of these TOC results have led to state responses.

2.2 Globalization process

According to the astronomical laws of Kepler, the earth is constantly in motion. In less empirical

terms, the description of movement is also applicable to the current globalized world. The stirring

process of globalization is shaping contemporary life and the perceptions of community, identity and

culture all over the world.98

The discourse on globalization has been shaped by a great variety of

approaches with a lack of consensus on a definition. For the purpose of this thesis the following

definition has been chosen as it describes the impact of the process on all levels in the world;

globalization can be defined as ‘the process of increasing interconnectedness between states and

societies such that events in one part of the world increasingly have effects on people and societies far

away.’99

Besides, this definition displays the earlier mentioned ‘glocalization’, where local conditions

can have border-crossing or even global impact.

Among academics, there is controversy on the proclaimed impact and the newness of

globalization. Some analysts point to the fact that the term globalization might sound modern, it is just

a new name for an old-term feature and the outcome of historical processes of modernity, economic

growth and interdependence over the last centuries.100

97

Katja Aas, Globalization & Crime (London: SAGE, 2013), 17. 98


John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics (New York: Oxford


Baylis, Smith, Owen, The Globalization, 9.

25

Others do believe that the globalization process is marked after the end of the Cold War the

world enters a higher degree of interdependence; a so-called ‘interpenetration’ of a wide range of state

and non-state actors in a wide range of issue areas; political, economic, social and ideational.101

Regardless of any time frame, in practice, globalization can be measured in transnational flows of

commodities, people, capital, information and technology within a global space.102

By the end of the

21st century, these webs of interaction have become much denser while the transaction costs have

shrunk drastically.103

Another consequence of globalization is the dialectic between the local and the global; local

developments and events adjust to global interconnections operating a distance away. In this way,

global and local become intertwined104

yet this new synthesis of local and transnational elements does

not have a governmental counterpart to increase the control of states domestically and internationally.

This leads to the paradox of globalization: more government is needed on the global scale however

such political centralization of decision-making is too far away from the local communities in fear of a

democratic deficit.105

Although such type of world government is both infeasible and undesirable, its

absence leaves a vacuum of power fostering the rise of non-state actors in corporate, civic and criminal

sectors.

All in all, the consequences of a global space are restructuring the amount of authority,

autonomy, territoriality and control possessed by states. This leads to changes in the meaning and

practice of all four characterizations of sovereignty as defined by Krasner in the first chapter

(Westphalian, domestic, international legal and interdependence). Logically, this has an immediate

effect on the carrier of sovereignty: the state. Some academics consider these sovereignty changes

owing to proliferation of transnational connections, the growth of international organizations and the

rise of multinational corporations as a signal of ‘withering of the nation state’ and ‘hostile takeover.’106

Contrary to this claim, others allege globalization elicits a more activist state attitude pointing to the

attempt of states to re-assert their credibility by extensive multilateral and bilateral cooperation to

combat the negative challenges of globalization.107

2.3 Impact on the role of the state

The sovereign statehood has changed under the dynamics of globalization. Especially during the last

wave of globalization, a constant flux between inside and outside and the dissolving significance of

101

Michael Smith, International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 38. 102

Williams, Security Studies, 508. 103

Paul Williams, Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008), 508. 104


Slaughter, A New World Order,8. 106


Baylis, Smith, Owen, The Globalization, 28.

26

borders and boundaries created a form of hybridity among states instead of stable entities.108

As

globalization has intensified over the last three decades, these border-crossing interconnections such as

technological and global capital flows also have had their important impact on state vulnerability and

its capacities: reducing the state’s ability to unilaterally protect itself and forcing states to cooperate

internationally to manage threats resulting from the intensified openness at the global arena.109

This

quote of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, the former President of the International Court of Justice, clearly

outlines the connection between globalization, sovereignty and the impact on the state;

Globalization represents the reality that we live in a time when the walls of sovereignty are no

protection against the movements of capital, labor, information and ideas – nor can they provide

effective protection against harm and damage110

Furthermore, the emerging autonomic influence of the world economy leads some states no other

choice but to transfer economic authority to supranational institutions such as the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, states can no longer strictly separate the domestic and international

spheres of political and economic action.111

However, it is a mistake when stating that the state has

become a victim of the rapid globalization process. In his article, Globalization and the Boundaries of

the State, theorist Edward Cohen clearly states that during the 20th century, the economic well-being of

a state became a central priority of state policy. According to its priorities, a state can shape its

behaviour and decisions over time. For example, states has made a comparative assessment between

on the one hand, the assertion of absolute authority and control on its territory and on the other; the

liberal flow of persons, goods, capital and ideas with the assertion of some control to forces acting on

the global scale. 112

So, within the globalization process, every state should wonder what its priorities

and aims will be; its commitment to a globally structured organized economy or its role as defender of

territorial community. This notion supports the pre-supposition of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake, as

mentioned in the introduction chapter, that the nation state is a boundary-setting institution which can

change its role according to its aims.

At the flip side of the coin, the process of globalization did not bring solely thriving outcomes

for individuals, communities and states. The significance of globalization and its impact differs

among the states making it not a singular condition or a linear process. Asymmetrical or deviant

globalization are terms to describe this inequality in distribution of benefits and wealth between rich

108


Smith, International Security, 39. 110

Julian Ku and John Yoo, “Globalization and Sovereignty,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 31:1 (2013)

: 210. 111

Baylis, Smith, Owen, The Globalization, 24. 112

Edward Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State: A Framework for Analyzing the Changing

Practice of Sovereignty,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:1 (2001): 80.

27

and ‘failed states’.113

Given such asymmetries, it is not surprising that globalization does not foretell

the emergence of a harmonious global community.

Quite the reverse is happening, when illicit actors take advantage of the undermining of international

norms and the vague intersection of inclusion and exclusion. After the end of the Cold War,

transnational organized crime emerged as a new security threat.114

2.5 Transnational organized crime

Several features of the globalization process have contributed to this emergence of TOC. Similar to

legitimate businesses, criminal organizations were able to benefit from the opportunities presented by

globalization. The globalized context of urbanization, open borders and free movement of persons,

goods and services constituted a fertile fundament to modernize and expand criminal activities beyond

the jurisdiction of individual states and limitations of single markets. 115

On the other hand, individual

deprivation and unequal distribution of wealth contributed to the growth of lucrative illegal business.

It is in this context that Eric Hobsbawm’s mythical figure of the social bandit could develop into a

dangerous international drug lord such as Joaquin Guzmán.

Furthermore, it is despite or thanks to their effort that states themselves actively provide

frameworks and possibilities for TOC networks to flourish. State corruption is very common form of

illegality worldwide and an important method for criminals to infiltrate in state structures to seek

political protection.116

Weak states with a low level of state legitimacy, absence of norms and

regulations, lack of government effectiveness and a failing border control system are attractive to

criminal organizations.

At the opposite, states with a strong political interference imposing taxes and quotas are just as

inviting because of the opportunities to circumvent these laws and regulations. Besides, these

administrative, financial and economic differences, the so-called ‘criminogenic asymmetries,’ among

weak and strong states also offer opportunities for TOC networks when seeking for lucrative markets

and safe havens. In particular, the constant high demand for illegal goods, the ‘glocal’ connection and

the high level of profit in different parts of the world keeps their extended business viable.117

Indeed, the business of transnational organized crime has an enormous extent considering the

definition of the U.N. claiming that TOC is ‘virtually all profit-motivated serious criminal activities

with international implications.’118

To even further complicate the study of organized crime, the

criminal actors do not comply with a single and all-embracing model. As these illegal international

activities are carried out by very diverse organizations when considering their location and reach;

113



Mark Findlay, The Globalisation of Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 116



“United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,” The United Nations, last modified

January 8, 2001, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf

28

structure and organization; their use of violence and corruption; and their balance of cooperation and

conflict with one another. Some organizations emphasize familial ties and loyalty where others are

built upon cultures and sub-cultures. Furthermore, TOC organizations can be centered around family,

or based upon an ethnic identity or on a cosmopolitan notion and their structures can vary from pure

hierarchical to completely horizontal.119

These former national and local organized groups have gone through a process of

internationalization changing the nature of their organizational aspects. The interconnectedness and

modern technology supported by globalization caused these groups to further ramify into transnational

networks with a global reach. Criminal networks are often described as ‘temporary, dynamic,

emergent, adaptive, entrepreneurial and flexible structures which often arise out of exchange

relationships among organizations.’120

They all share the same strategy of establishing their

management and production functions in low-risk areas while targeting on the areas with the most

affluent demand and higher revenues.121

A brief insight into transnational organized crime reveals a complex and powerful network of

illegal enterprise. The core of the TOC activities is the supply of illegal (stolen, prohibited, regulated

or taxed) goods and services to citizen customers and in this way these activities are highly dependent

on the laws of capitalist economies and the management of international illegal markets with

spontaneous demands. Within these markets, criminals try to reach a monopoly and a rule-making

role by governing and controlling the border-crossing underworld. Next to complete criminal markets,

TOC networks often are involved in state organizations and legal enterprises as well as creating a

sphere of connivance and ensuring profitability out of corruption, large-scale fraud operations or

money-laundering.122

Traditionally, the most profitable industry of illicit goods are drugs and all over the world

states are effected by the production, transport of consumption of this commodity. The trade is

distributed around four global narcotic markets concerning cannabis, amphetamine, cocaine and

heroin. As this immense illegal business operated in the shadow, it is for international organizations

such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol very hard to estimate

the worldwide profit generated from the trade on drugs and other forms of TOC. Most recent numbers

are dated from 2009 and have estimated that the worldwide illicit drugs industry roughly generates

between $300-$500 billion a year.123

Among the characteristics of the drugs market is the presence of a

wide range of actors such as large criminal organizations (drug cartels), and small organizations

depending on the different points of the supply chain (production, transportation, distribution, import

119


Peter N. Grabosky and Michael Stohl, Crime and Terrorism (London: Sage, 2010), 79. 121


Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, The Economics of Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge


Melvyn Levitsky, “Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security,” Syracuse Journal of

International Law and Commerce 30:2 (2003): 228.

29

and sale). The industry is build up by sophisticated production networks, marketing cycles and global

transit routes operating between developed and developing countries.124

Secondly, the illegal trafficking of fire arms is another major illicit market. Despite of strict

import and export regulations, the trade in small conventional arms, light weapons and also missile

systems, grenade launchers and machine guns is estimated to generate $60 billion a year.125

A

significant contributor to the trafficking of small arms was the break-up of the Soviet Union and the

following instability in the region causing an increased illegal flow of weapons from military

organizations.126

Due to the state’s monopoly of violence, the spectrum between state-authorized

activities and the illegal aspects of the arms business are not that clear-cut. This triangle business of

supply, demand and state involvement has been extensively distributed as almost all countries are

considered to be a transit route for arms, often destined to states on the continent of Africa and the

Middle East. 127

The third most profitable sector of organized crime is the fast growing illegal transportation of

human beings . Law enforcement agencies often distinguish the network of human smuggling and the

network of human trafficking arranged by a wide illegal spectrum from small and informal agents till

large criminal organizations. Human smuggling concerns the illegal immigration based on individual

voluntary choice to overcome poverty or political oppression. On the other hand, human trafficking is

an industry rooted in coercion and deception and it is often called ‘the new slave trade’ as more than

200 million people in total already have been the victim of trafficking.128

Against their will, people

are exploited for commercial sex or forced labor both en route or at their destination. Second

difference between these two forms is the object being at a disadvantage. In the case of human

smuggling, the crime is committed against the state and by human trafficking the individual concerned

is seriously deprived.129

In practice, these distinctions are often vague as, for example, illegal

immigrants can nevertheless be forced to work which is turning their status into victims. Over the last

decade, the illegal international flow of people has increased rapidly and the global profit made out of

all kinds of forced labor is estimated around $44.3 billion a year.130

Besides these three major markets, many other illegal commodities such as stolen cars,

diamonds, ivory, computer chips, endangered species and tropical hard woods are globally distributed

on a daily basis. These diverse branches in which TOC networks are active, demonstrate their high

degree of adaptation. Not having to comply with national regulation, ethical codes and international

124


Whitney Craig, “Ruling Arms,” World Policy Journal 29:4 (2012): 87. 126

Levitsky, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 231. 127

Aas, Globalization & Crime, 138./ Baylis, Smith, Owen, The Globalization, 333. 128



Anders, B. and Patrick Belser (eds), Forced Labour; Coercion and Exploitation in the Private Economy

(Geneva: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 16.

30

treaties, international organized crime groups have been able to take advantage of new opportunities

and modern technology more effectively than multinationals and governments.131

2.6 State responses

Transnational organized crime networks have significant impact on national and local levels due to the

earlier mentioned dialectic between local and global. By its nature, TOC is able to weaken public

institutions and indirectly attacking a state’s values of democracy and good governance. The

destructive influence of crime-related corruption could make states less responsive to societal needs

and could even create a lower civil support for legitimate governments. TOC activities also distort the

organization of national economies and the scale of employment by the influx of illegal financial

flows. Furthermore, the presence of TOC networks composes a threat to the national and international

levels of security. 132

To combat these destabilizing results of flourishing transnational organized crime, states have

developed an alley of instruments and institutions. Despite all these intents and purposes, TOC

networks have a significant advantage as they operate in a borderless world, while law enforcement

agencies are under the national constraints of sovereignty. To overcome these constraints, states

engage in international cooperation programs where law enforcement agencies and government

officials collaborate to effectively tackle the prosperity of TOC.

Transnational organized crime networks base their strategies and visibility on resources, law

enforcement and regulations of a particular state or regional trade bloc. Simultaneously, states´ anti-

crime strategies differ widely regarding preferences, priorities and methods. In the U.S.-Mexican

context, the priority is highly on counter-drugs cooperation policies to stop the illegals flows of drugs

in the region. Since 2007, the United States and Mexico have agreed on the establishment of an

bilateral security cooperation called the Mérida Initiative , which has a great emphasis on

counteracting drugs trade and violence.

2.7 Conclusion

During the last two decades of globalization, the level of nation states has made room for a new level

of governance; the explosive growth of the global economy, a higher degree of interdependence

between states and non-state actors facing upcoming global problems. The dialectic between the local

and the global has had consequence for the effectiveness of sovereignty and the position of the state.

Through the international pressures, many states have shifted their priorities towards economic well-

being and handed over some authority to international institutions at the international level.

When answering the sub question of this chapter, the process of globalization has had a significant

impact on the nature of sovereignty and the position of the state. Secondly, the globalized context of

131


Levitsky, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 235.

31

urbanization, open borders and free movement of persons, goods and services constituted an

opportunity for TOC networks to modernize and expand their criminal activities. As a consequence,

transnational organized crime networks have become more diverse, more professional, more pervasive

and more violent than ever before.133

All in all, the pressure of globalization on statehood and the

growing influences of transnational organized crime raises questions about the effectiveness of the

traditional state sovereignty.

To overcome the border crossing challenges of crime, international cooperation on the global

level is needed. This measure opens a new stage of state operation on the international level and

effects the rule of absolute and indivisible sovereignty. Through bilateral, multilateral and

supranational agreements, states transfer and sanction authoritative powers towards the ‘above.’134

Driven by these globalizing changes on the world level, the three theorists of this paper have

all presumed new insights on how this new sovereignty could be distributed among different actors

and locations in order to meet the upgraded standards of effective governing. Can these elements of

new sovereignty be found in the practical example of the Mérida Initiative? In the next chapter, the

U.S. and Mexican attempt to effectively counter the drug trade in the form of an bilateral cooperation

programme will be introduced and the content of this Mérida Initiative will be reflect upon.

133


Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson and Simon Bromley, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press,

2009), 239.

32

Chapter Three: The Mérida Initiative

3.1 Introduction

The shadows of globalization change colors among the several contexts of continents. Within Central

America, the bright sun filled countries are overshadowed by grey shades of insecurity. Root cause for

this problem is the international problem of drugs trade. For example, in the past two decades, the

Mexican drug lord Joaquin Guzmán pioneered in drug trade routes smuggling tons of cocaine from

Colombia through Mexico into the streets of the United States.135

States became aware that this cross-

bordering security threat could not be solved unilaterally. To be effective, the United States and

Mexico decided to cooperate to diminish these criminal threats.

The bilateral Mérida Initiative has been selected as the case of analysis in this thesis because

of its promising characteristics, that strengthens the presupposition that possibilities of distribution of

sovereignty might be found within this cooperation. To understand the context of this cooperation, and

this chapter serves to examine the context and content of the most serious attempt in the history of

U.S.-Mexican anti-drug cooperation so far.

Firstly, an introduction about the context and preamble towards the establishment of the

Mérida Initiative, secondly the characteristics, content and financial details of the agreement are

mentioned and lastly the consequences for the sovereignty of both states will be looked at.

3.2 The U.S.-Mexican context of globalization

The impact of globalization has been different worldwide. The international flows and

interconnections show distinct effects in regional and local areas. At the American continent, the

dominant influence of the United States has marked the impact of globalization on its southern

neighbors. This foreign influence, by several academics described as ‘Americanization’ or

‘McDonaldization,’ was strengthened by globalizing processes and exercised through economic and

political channels.136

The emergence of economic trade blocs, such as the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1993, eliminated most barriers to free trade between Canada, the

United States and Mexico and introduced new levels of international economic globalization. This

open-border trade led to increased capital investment from the U.S. towards Mexico to arrange an

economic bailout and secure the NAFTA passage. Diplomatic relations were tightened and bilateral

commissions, NGOs and corporations were established to support cooperation. Mexico’s economy

started to rely heavily on its contacts with the U.S. and at the beginning of the 21st century these trade

relations intensified to a percentage of 78 of its total national trade.137

135

Ray Walser, “Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight We Cannot Afford to Lose,” The

Heritage Foundation 2163 (2008): 7. 136


Philip Russell, The History of Mexico: From Pre-Conquest to Present (New York: Routledge, 2010), 567.

33

The Americanization influence did not solely bring economic neo-liberal prosperity. High

levels of U.S. investment into the Mexican border regions were only beneficial for a very small

percentage of the population. As a consequence, the industry of prohibited goods became an attractive

and lucrative source of income for many deprived Mexican laborers. The illegal drug trade soared

enormously as the NAFTA indirectly facilitated drug trafficking along legal cargo loaded on a high

amount of commercial trucks relying on the inability of customs to inspect each shipment.138

Furthermore, it was under high American political pressure that many countries shaped their

early drugs prohibition legislation. Academic Ethan Nadelmann is critical about the effects of this U.S.

global ‘War on Drugs’ on foreign law enforcement issues. According to him, many plausible

possibilities were unforeseen such as the high increase on the demand side of drugs that would cause

the prohibition legislation to be costly, problematic and difficult to reverse. In other words, states were

unaware of the fact that by giving priority to restriction of supply rather than demand, powerful illegal

business opportunities were created that could only be controlled with resort to criminal justice

measures. 139

Within the context of strict drug prohibition regime, extended economic globalization and a

high domestic demand for drugs on the U.S. market, the illegal drugs flows continued flourishing

across the U.S.-Mexican border. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had interrupted this

illegal status-quo between United States and Mexico as the U.S. began to secure its borders more

intensively. Although these shifting priorities were primarily focused on countering terrorism, it

revealed even more the overall presence of other problematic border issues such as drug trafficking

and illegal immigration. 140

However, it did not bring solution to the highly extended border-crossing drug distribution.

In the year 2006, an estimated 70 to 90 percent of the drugs (such as heroin, cocaine and marijuana)

illegally imported into the United States originated from Mexico. Several major cartels dominate this

lucrative Mexican drug trade routes as they are forming shifting alliances against the Mexican state.

Simultaneously, the cartels, also labelled as drug trafficking organisations (DTO), are struggling

among themselves for plazas (space) and control of these routes and distribution systems. This cartel’s

savagery are portrayed by tortured and decapitated corpses that are routinely dumped on roads and city

streets, and are affecting innocent citizens by bursts of extreme violence disrupting many local

communities. The historic leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel is the earlier mentioned bandit Joaquin

Guzmán. In a two decennia career, Guzmán has become a legend in Mexico, glorified in corridos

(ballads) for repeatedly escaping from Mexican prisons and avoiding extradition to the U.S. A deadly

138

Philip Russell, The History of Mexico, 570. 139

Ethan Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international security,”

International Organization 44:4 (1990): 510, 511. 140

Philip Russell, The History of Mexico, 567, 570.

34

blood feud between his clan and rival cartel did constitute even more insecurity in the southern region

at that time.141

It was around the same time in 2006, that the new-elected Mexican president Calderón began

to fulfill his pre-election promises of suppressing narco violence by starting his own Mexican ‘War on

Drugs.’142

In the absence of reliable professional law enforcement agencies, military armed forces

were assigned to capture several dozen of drug cartel capos (criminals). Unfortunately, the conflict has

escalated and taken its toll in terms of deaths, corruption, desertions, and charges by NGOs of

hundreds of human rights violations.143

The inability of the expensive operation to control the power of the Mexican drug cartels

showed the asymmetry between these professional and well-equipped cartels and the ineffective law

enforcement apparatus. As a consequence, the public security-level in Mexico reached its minimum.

This decrease in stability of its southern neighbor was among the reasons for U.S. president George

W. Bush to visit Mexico in March of 2007. The bilateral problems of immigration, illicit drug flows

and insecurity were discussed and Bush spoke about ‘more sharing of information among law

enforcement agencies, as well as about the possibility of the United States providing high-tech

scanning equipment for Mexico's ports.’144

Situated in Mérida, on the Mexican peninsula of Yucatán, the two presidents initiated the

development of a joint agreement to effectively combat drug cartels in Mexico and guarantee the

protection of the mutual borders.145

This event marked the onset of a new initiative combatting

transnational organized crime: the Mérida Initiative.

3.3 The Mérida Initiative

A few months later on October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico launched the actual Joint

Statement labelling the Merida Initiative as ‘a new paradigm of security cooperation.’ Both countries

were profoundly committed and considered the strategic cooperation as ‘necessary to combat

effectively this criminal activity’ of drug trafficking and other criminal organizations.146

However, this was not the first bilateral conjunction the United States signed in order to combat drugs

problems. In the 1990s, the United States have had an agreement on anti-drug assistance with

Colombia (Plan Colombia), which was neither cost-effective nor did it deliver the desired results.

141

Walser, “Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative, 7. 142

Sonja Wolf and Gonzalo Celorio Morayta, “La Guerra de México contra el Narcotráfico y la Iniciativa

Mérida: Piedras Angulares en la Búsqueda de Legitimidad,” Foro Internacional 51:4 (2011): 669. 143

George Grayson, “The Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War on Drugs on the Armed Forces: the

Prospects of Mexico’s ‘Militarization’ and Bilateral Relations,” Strategic Studies Institute title 17 (2013): III. 144

“From Mexico Also, The Message To Bush Is Immigration,” The New York Times, last modified March 14,

2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/americas/14prexy.html?fta=y 145

Nelson Arteaga, “The Merida Initiative: Security-Surveillance Harmonization in Latin America,” European

Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 87 (2009): 106. 146

“Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation,” U.S. Department of

State Archive, last modified October 22, 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93817.htm

35

Worse still, researchers point to the growth of the Mexican drug cartels as a direct effect of this U.S.

focus to disrupt Colombian drug smuggling operations.147

Based on this previous experience, the United States shifted its priorities from funding the

‘hard-side’ security elements such as military assistance to the ‘soft-side’ elements of empowering the

rule of law institutions.148

This policy choice is clearly visible when analysing the content of the

Mérida Initiative; the provision of assistance in equipment, technology, and training without a

significant military footprint in Mexico.

Officially signed in June of the year 2008, it was announced that the anti-drug assistance

financial budget of $ 1.5 billion would be spread over three years ($500 million annually). Compared

to smaller bilateral anti-narcotics programmes between the years 2000-2006 , this counted as an

increase of $369.6 million in U.S. assistance. This increase of budget underlines the statement that the

Mérida Initiative is the most serious attempt in the history of U.S.-Mexican anti-drug cooperation so

far. However, in the United States the ambitious scope of the project encountered resistance in the

Congress. Main points of criticism were the fear of creating a foreign resource drain, while

the domestic urgencies, such as improving security in the border region and reducing drug demand,

were not richly endowed with financial assistance. 149

In Mexico, the agreement was seen as very

promising and government officials emphasized the relatively equal footing on which the deal was

negotiated. 150

This equality of the two nations was again expressed in the Joint Statement; as the mutual

strategies were based on ‘full respect for the sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and legal frameworks

of each country.’151

However, the United States aimed at the whole of Central America. Parallel to

Mérida, they reserved a small part of the Mérida funds for the development of a more comprehensive

framework that would incorporate the Caribbean, the Central American corridor, the Andean source

areas, and the U.S. market into one integrated counterdrug strategy.

In March 2010, it became acknowledged that Mexico could not effectively confront organized

crime with these technical assistance alone, and the Obama Administration and the Mexican

government agreed to pursue a new strategic framework called ‘Beyond Mérida’; placing a larger

emphasis on addressing the socioeconomic factors underneath the violence.

147


Chester Oehme, “Plan Colombia: Reassessing the Strategic Framework,” Democracy and Security 6:3

(2010): 223. 149

Walser, “Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative,” 5. 150

Simon Palamar, “Global Governance and the Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime: The Role of the

Constructive Powers,” (paper presented at the CIGI Conference, Mexico City, Mexico, September 5-7, 2012) 7. 151

“Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative:”

36

The updated strategy was built on four pillars:

1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized criminal groups.

2. Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights.

3. Creating a 21st century border.

4. Building strong and resilient communities.152

In comparison to the initial content, the renovated version focuses more on institution-building than on

technology transfers and broadens the scope of bilateral efforts towards the local level of

municipalities, including community-based social programs.153

These changes have created a broader

view and are more comprehensive approach including the involvement of non-territorial actors.

3.4 Characteristics of the Mérida Initiative

Returning to the explicit statement of respecting each other’s sovereignty makes the Mérida Initiative

even more interesting in this case, considering the earlier mentioned difference between de jure and de

facto sovereignty. In fact, the sovereignty of both countries has already undergone some provocations

caused by their own policy choices to stimulate the economic interdependence by establishing the

open-border regime of NAFTA and the following negative side-effects such as the growth of the

transnational organized drugs cartels.

In this preamble towards the formation of the bilateral cooperation, the asymmetrical

characteristics of the Mérida Initiative have consequences for the different forms of sovereignty, as

defined by Krasner in the first chapter. The Westphalian sovereignty, highly based on the territorial

exclusion of external actors and any authority structures, is obviously violated by the increased

economic interdependence of the NAFTA. Moreover, illegal external actors, such as the drug cartels

have undermined authority and control of the U.S. and Mexican state powers by their immense border-

crossing transports of drugs. This connects to the erosion of the interdependence sovereignty; the

state’s ability to control the regulation of the flow of people, goods, pollutants, capital and information

across the border. Furthermore, especially Mexico has been struggling with the powerful presence of

drug cartels that effectively exercise authority and control in some parts of the country, often

supported and even glorified by a majority of the local communities.154

This local situation of disorder

reveals a weakening in the Mexican domestic sovereignty as the ability to effectively control its entire

territory and to have authority over all its citizens. On the contrary, engaging in intensified bilateral

relations confirms a mutual recognition between the two sovereign powers that have strengthened the

fourth form of sovereignty; ‘international legal sovereignty.’ This context of overall diminishing of the

core principles of sovereignty has increased the possibility to find alternative directions outside the

state territorial level.

152

Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Merida Initiative and

Beyond,” Congressional Research Service R41349 (2014): 6. 153

Seelke and Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation,” 6. 154


37

3.5 Conclusion

The influences of the globalization, NAFTA and the Americanization have led to cross-bordering

problems in the United States and Mexico. In October of the year 2007, both presidents agree on the

establishment of a bilateral security cooperation with a total budget of $1.5 billion, labelling it a

‘a new paradigm of security cooperation’, a statement that could be questioned given the asymmetrical

flow of money from the U.S. towards Mexico. Throughout the years, the priorities within the

cooperation have shifted from solely technical assistance to a more balanced context also addressing

socioeconomic factors. The most important characteristics of the Mérida Initiative are the

asymmetrical relationship, the high budget and priority on the political agenda, the presence of non-

territorial criminal actors and the impact on sovereignty of both countries.

Evaluating the past six years of the Mérida Initiative, it is hard to separate the results of

efforts funded via Mérida from other initiatives funded through other border security programmes.

Although some analysts have attributed the increased arrests of high-profile drug lords, certain drug

seizures and the downward trend on cocaine in the U.S. to the effects of the Mérida Initiative. Despite

the inability to measure its exact success, the Mérida Initiative will be extended in 2014. By March

2014, the two governments had agreed to $309 million worth of new projects.

The bilateral cooperation and interdependence have certainly increased through these mutual

reaction to the threats of violence and insecurity. This situation of entangling interests and sovereignty

at stake makes an ideal context of testing the theoretical implications of the three theorists in practice.

The practical value of these three theories will be investigated by comparing the theoretical content to

the practices and actors surrounding the implementation of the bilateral Mérida Initiative, starting in

2008.

38

Chapter Four: The Mérida Initiative as Government Network - Slaughter

4.1 Introduction

As main theme in this thesis, the search for alternative conceptions of sovereignty within international

cooperation structures is executed within a developed two-dimensional framework of analysis to

which three academic researchers contribute (see Figure 1 Two-dimensional framework). In this

chapter, the horizontal contributions of Anne-Marie Slaughter will be applied to the practice of the

Mérida Initiative to see if alternative conceptions of sovereignty can be found. She stimulates to

change the lenses of thinking in unitary states as ‘billiard balls’ towards states as boundary-setting

institutions in a broader horizontal landscape. She uses two main statements of how states will

organized themselves seeking ways to govern effectively.

Firstly, states will organize themselves within international cooperation structures, the so

called ‘government networks.’ Secondly, within these networks, the state will disaggregate into

different building blocks that are autonomously interacting with counterparts across the borders. In

this chapter, the Mérida Initiative will be examined with Slaughter’s glasses put on.

4.2 Government networks

At a first glance, the Mérida Initiative as an U.S.-Mexican attempt to collaborate in overcoming

mutual problems seems to be a perfect example of Slaughter’s assumption; actively cooperating with

other states will increase a government effectiveness. Even her one-liner ‘networked threats require a

networked response’ comes across in the agreement where the United States and Mexico both stated

that they are dealing with transnational organized crime as ‘a regional problem, which will require

regional solutions.’155

The modus operandi of international cooperating is labeled by Slaughter as a

government network; an intensified network of cooperation and operation between government

officials of all kinds. She has defined four characteristics of how these government networks should

operate across borders to govern effectively.

Firstly, among the most important basic features of such government network is the build-up

of trust and norms. In the context of U.S.-Mexican relations, these requirements of a stable partnership

is not automatically fulfilled. Some governmental resources conclude that previous misunderstandings

and cultural misperceptions have contributed to high levels of mistrust between the two countries.156

Moreover, their discord about human rights clearly reveals a lack of shared norms. Compliance with

network-wide norms will strongly improve a cooperation’s value as a global governance mechanism,

155

“U.S. Obligations under the Merida Initiative,” U.S. Department of State Archive, last modified February 7,

2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2008/q1/100163.htm 156

Walser, “Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative,” 13.

39

although even Slaughter admits that is often still in the future.157

The absence of substantial relations

of trust and norms are often causing turmoil within many network governments. To overcome these

fundamental challenges, government officials of both sides keep underscoring the common sense of

responsibility for fighting the security threat of drug trade and the Mexican DTOs.

Secondly, Slaughter points out to the re-characterization of sovereignty from an act of control

to a sense of responsibility. States should base their internal functions and external duties on an

internal responsibility to respect rights of their citizens and an external respect to sovereignty of other

states.158

These internal and external responsibility became interconnected by an extended debate in

the midst of 2006 that delayed the start of the implementation of the Mérida Initiative. Reasons given

were the conditions that the United States wanted to place on the Mérida aid; several members in the

U.S. Congress pleaded for an establishment of a Mexican human rights framework that would simplify

judicial trials for military offenders. The Mexican government felt this attempt to be a breach of

national sovereignty given the fact that these human rights conditions required legislative changes in

their domestic laws. After a critical meeting between U.S. and Mexican legislators, they agreed on the

development of less offensive conditions such as the improvement of transparency and accountability

of Mexican police forces; the monitoring and investigating of human rights violations; and the

prohibition to use testimonies obtained through torture.159

This example illustrates the responsibility

felt by the U.S. government not solely for their own population but also for the protection of Mexican

citizens. As a consequence, this foreign internal responsibility undermines the external responsibility

to respect the sovereignty of Mexico. However, Slaughter is supporting these blurring lines of internal

and external responsibility by stating that when counterparts take responsibility for each other’s

performances, it will enhance the effectiveness of their tasks. 160

A third feature of a government network that aims at an effective long-term partnership is the

transfer of rules, practices and even institutional structures. This is what Slaughter calls the ‘regulatory

export’161

and eventually she predicts that this exchange will deliver a higher degree of policy

convergence between members of a government network. The adapted framework of the Mérida

Initiative in 2010 brought new opportunities for this transfer. Concerning the highly contested policy

on human rights, Mexico seems to have given up its former stubbornness; when new elected Mexican

president Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took office at the end of

2012, he announced the protection and respect of human rights as an important cornerstone of a

security policy that involves binding commitments from all levels of government.162

In practice, the

actual development of the number of victims of human rights violations is hard to measure since the

157






Seelke and Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation,” 10.

40

Mexican government under Peña Nieto is no longer releasing information on trends in organized

crime-related killings.

The last feature of a government network is the offer of technical assistance to less developed

nations. This basically summarizes the aim of the Mérida Initiative; a multi-year program to

strengthen Mexico’s capabilities to fight organized crime. The initial emphasis is put clearly on

training and equipment to strengthen the Mexican law enforcement agencies and border, air, and

maritime controls when considering the 2008 $1.5 billion is funding for; aircraft, inspection equipment

and canine units ; technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of law enforcement and

crime prevention programs that address the root causes of crime.163

Furthermore, a majority of the

budget is destined for the acquisition of a professional airforce; roughly about 41 percent of the total

funding is reserved exclusively for the purchase of helicopters (Bell 412) and fixed-wing surveillance

aircraft (Casa 245). In this way, the content of the Mérida Initiative is dominated by technical devices

and directed towards federal levels of armed forces.

With different compliance to all these four features, Slaughter roughly divides three categories

of government networks (harmonization, enforcement and information), all having other priorities.

Although the government network of the Mérida Initiative has elements of all three categories, it can

be labelled as harmonization and enforcement government network, due to the regulatory export of

judicial elements and common crime enforcement mechanisms. The next paragraph will further

examine the internal governmental organisation that is running this complicated harmonization and

enforcement network.

4.3 The disaggregated state

A crucial point in Slaughter’s argument is the existence of the ‘disaggregated state’ where parts of the

state become the building blocks in the international order. Officials of courts, ministries, regulatory

agencies and legislatures all participate on various levels and in different categories to create links

across borders and between national and supranational institutions. 164

This paragraph will analyse the

governmental structures of the United States and Mexico to discover whether there is a certain

dismantlement of the state and distribution of sovereignty visible within the Mérida Initiative.

Starting with the domestic governmental structure of the United States, a pyramid-shaped

hierarchy is illustrative for the bureaucratic implementation of Mérida. The Department of State

(State) has the highest authority in the management of the project and in dialogue with the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID), it controls the budget and bilateral agreements

between the United States and Mexico. Internally, the State controls its interagency agreements with

other governmental agencies, such as Department of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS); and

163

U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided

Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support But Needs better Performance Measures,” Report to Congressional

Requesters 10-837 (2010): 3. 164

Slaughter, A New World Order, 6.

41

the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).165

Those agencies are responsible for the

executive part of the four pillars of the Mérida Initiative, and gain their legitimacy and necessary

resources through complex methods.

The financial resources are allocated by three different U.S. State bureaus, all using different

mechanisms to manage funding accounts and to reach obligation with the executive agencies.

One of those mechanisms is a Letter of Agreement (LOA), that only provides executive legitimacy

and legal liability to government agencies when it is signed by both the United States and Mexico.166

A second example is the Interagency Agreement (IAA); a contract necessary to formalize U.S. agency

roles and responsibilities and is only valid when approved by a multiple of stakeholders. 167

The executive and legislative powers of the U.S. authorities do also cross borders towards

Mexico. The U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) and the Bureau for International

Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement (INL), collaborate with the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and

share responsibility for the coordination of policy and programs funded under the Initiative.168

The Mexican governmental structure was being reorganised as part of the new security policy.

President Peña Nieto placed the former Secretariat of Public Security under the wings of the Ministry

of Interior Affairs (Secretaría de Gobernación; SEGOB). By doing this, the Mérida implementation

and the intelligence and police functions fell under responsibility of this ministry, making SEGOB the

focal point in the dense web of contact with U.S. counterparts and Mexican authorities at the

municipal and local government levels. In order to steer the U.S. originated funding’s into the right

direction, SEGOB made several regulatory changes. Among these were the appointment of the

assistance of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores; SRE) to control

the bilateral relationship; and the establishment of a new undersecretary the National Center of Crime

Prevencion and Citizen Participation (Centro Nacional de Prevención de Delito y Participación

Ciudadana; CNPDPC) responsible for the executive tasks to contribute to strong communities under

the fourth pillar. Another important actor within the Mexican structure is the Attorney General Office

(Procurador General de la República; PGR), which has been modernized as part of the judicial reforms

in order to fulfil the key objectives of the second pillar.169

Through these governmental channels of funding and coordinating do also flow independent rights

and responsibilities towards the government officials working in their daily offices (see Appendix I).

The extent to which they can exercise ‘a measure of sovereignty’ can be distinguished only in relation

to their acting in the international system. Because in Slaughter’s terms, sovereignty is the ability to

165

GOA, “Mérida Initiative,” 2. 166

GOA, “Mérida Initiative,” 12,13. 167




42

engage and connect with sovereign counterparts. 170

This ability can be discovered when examining

the bilateral structure of government since it is this border-crossing characteristic of government

networks that is essential in this case. In both countries the central State bureaus (Department of State

and SEGOB) grant legal obligations and independent rights (financial and executive) towards other

state agencies. Subsequently, these agencies are responsible to act on behalf of the State itself, for

example when contacting their counterparts on the other side of the border.

To facilitate the coordination on Mérida, the U.S. and Mexican governments have created

several multi-level working groups; the High-Level Consultative Group, the Policy Coordination

Group and the Bilateral Implementation Group. Within these groups, bilateral officials of all

implementation levels meet on a regular basis to coordinate and review the status of the projects

within the Initiative. This process is time-consuming as it demands approval of multiple stakeholders

and involves several iterations of negotiation.171

Furthermore, the Mérida Bilateral Implementation

Office is providing a signal of closer cooperation since this bilateral office situated in Mexico-City

will serve as a venue for officials from the United States and Mexico to work together on a daily basis.

This shared workspace does not have an operational or law enforcement focus.172

4.4 The disaggregated state in practice

Comparing the two domestic governmental structures, it is remarkable to see the organisational and

cultural differences among them. The U.S. structure has a high developed pyramid structure of check

and balances with many layers and actors, while the implementation process in the Mexican

government is more horizontal with SEGOB as the centre. Both methods have their shortcomings;

due to the organisational complexity the U.S. struggle openly with the accuracy of the funding and

program delivery. Policy-makers have stated that the effectiveness of a bilateral program cannot be

measured by means of expenditure levels.173

In Mexico, the need for rigorous judicial reforms are

reflecting the inferiority of the state to build in systems of trust and accountability that are

minimalizing the possibilities of corruption. Within the implementation process, SEGOB is lacking a

reasonable methodology for selecting and evaluating the communities and objectives of funding.174

Despite the multiple levels of bilateral communication, the Mexican counterparts are clearly

not adjusted to the complex bureaucratic structures of their northern neighbour. Mexican officials

admitted that they lack understanding of the U.S. process for implementing the Initiative, particularly

regarding time frames for deliveries.175

Considering the one-dimensional direction of the financial

resources, the Mexican counterparts ’ actions rely heavily on the course of events and processes in the

170



Palamar, “Global Governance,” 7. 173

GOA, “Mérida Initiative,” 12, 14. 174


GOA, “Mérida Initiative,” 34.

43

United States government apparatus. These asymmetrical differences in bureaucratic governing among

the partners do not benefit the outcome and progress of the partnership. Moreover, lack of facilitating

management, accountability and personnel, and the time-consuming implementation logistics on the

U.S. side cause delays and misunderstandings on Mexican soil.

In a few cases, the Mexican government already purchased necessary equipment through its own

budget as the United States could simply not provide it on the agreed time.176

All in all, Slaughter’s theoretical implications are to some extent applicable in the case of the

Mérida Initiative, especially concerning the regular bilateral meetings. However, compared to the

practical obstacles during the implementation process, the theoretical promises of Anne-Marie

Slaughter seem utopian. Contrary to her point of view that every state as a member of a government

network participate equally and actively stands the asymmetrical partnership between the donor the

United States and receiver Mexico. She easily steps over the more realistic elements of networking,

and forgets to discuss the immense bureaucratic structures and large secretariats that have to facilitate

and coordinate this new form of cooperation. Moreover, she indirectly assumes that the participants of

her government networks are stable, legitimate and in full control of their operating government

officials. 177

Something that is highly questionable when considering the current state of corruption in

many government structures.

4.5 Conclusion

When applying Slaughter’s notions on the practice of the Mérida Initiative, many similarities can be

discovered. Despite some inadequate shortcomings on features of trust and shared norms, the Mérida

Initiative could be a reasonably good example of a government network. Also the ramifications of

both government structures and the presence of bilateral counterparts, form ideal assumptions of

government networks whereby autonomous agencies directly contact their counterparts. However,

putting on Slaughter’s lenses provides an ideal vision that does not correspond to the daily practices

in the Mérida Initiative. Her theoretical implications of delegating sovereignty and effective

cooperation among multicultural counterparts are too ambitious as they get clouded by practical

obstacles such as miscommunication, bureaucratic disorder and corruption. Moreover, flows of

sovereignty to different state agencies was limited to financial and executive responsibility. However,

the bilateral consultation groups where counterparts of both countries meet and evaluate do show that

Slaughter’s theory has practical relevance.

176



44

Chapter Five: The Mérida Initiative as Sovereignty Regime – Agnew

5.1 Introduction

Continuing on Slaughter’s themes of a more hybrid form of sovereignty within a government network,

Agnew takes it to the next level by changing one of the classical cornerstones of sovereignty: the

principle of territoriality. He demonstrates against the widely acknowledged view that the spatiality of

political authority is reduced to the territorial template of sovereignty. Among Agnew, more theorists

start to attack this ‘sacred cow’ of territoriality by claiming that the boundaries of state political

authority are disengaged from its territorial borders.178

This statement raises controversy as many

others consider still the scope of political authority limited to the people and resources within a set of

geographical boundaries.179

Agnew’s assumptions count for the second part of the two dimensional

framework as displayed in Figure 1 Two-dimensional framework. His reasoning is concerned among

the system of graduated sovereignty where territorial and non-territorial actors can claim some extent

of sovereignty.

As a consequence, states will enter into system of graduated sovereignty where forms of labile

sovereignty are distributed among a wide spectrum of actors. Here, Agnew moves further than

Slaughter, claiming that also non-state actors can possess sovereignty. In this chapter, the practical

value of these statements will be closer examined when comparing to the elements from the Mérida

Initiative. First, Agnew’s assumptions derive from the notion of de-territorialization. In particular,

Agnew has observed many examples of sovereignty crossing borders and dimensions. Secondly, his

system of graduated sovereignty will be explained and the two actors of the Mérida Initiative will be

placed within the Figure 4 of Sovereignty Regimes. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the actors of

labile sovereignty and examined the presence of these actors within the case of Mérida. Lastly, two

forms of sovereignty from below derived from the practice in Mexico are compared to discover

whether Agnew could explain their existence.

5.2 Re-interpreting territoriality

States in the international system have shifted their priorities and their spheres of activities throughout

the years. This change of political concern is visible in the way how states treat their borders.180

The

process of globalization served as a cause for Agnew to change his thoughts about the ways in which

these boundaries are governed effectively. In this paragraph, the territorial boundaries of the political

authority of the United States and Mexico will be examined to verify Agnew’s call for re-interpreting

178

Edward Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State: A Framework for Analyzing the Changing

Practice of Sovereignty,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:1 (2001): 76. 179

Janice Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and

Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39:2 (1995): 227. 180

Cohen, ‘Globalization and the Boundaries of the State,” 78.

45

territoriality.

When free trade became a priority for states, they changed the management of their border

control to become more suitable for facilitating the import and export of resources. According to

Agnew, these events in the growth of the global economic system are exactly the immediate cause to

re-interpret territoriality. Indeed, the establishment of NAFTA marked a new era of increased

economic activity in the border region between the U.S. and Mexico, where mutual issues of trade,

immigration and common problems such as smuggling and drug trade are blurring the strict lines of

the border .

Historically, the problems around exclusive territoriality have not just recently emerged. The

doctrine of extraterritoriality has a long history. Garret Mattingly describes the right of embassy in

medieval Europe where the new-born states enjoyed absolute sovereignty, yet they discovered they

could only communicate with each other ‘by tolerating within themselves little islands of alien

sovereignty.’181

In the Mérida context, the embassies of both countries do play an indispensable role

by the coordination of the project. In particular, the U.S. embassy in Mexico City ambassadors and

Deputy Chiefs of Missions (DCM) have the cross border responsibility for coordinating programs and

resources with other law enforcement activities and oversees the on-the-ground coordination with

Mexican counterparts. 182

Another example of a practicing form of the U.S. as ‘alien sovereignty’ on Mexican soil is

visible in the process of tracing high-profiled Mexican drug cartel leaders. The Mexican marines

(Secretaría de Marina; SEMAR) received assistance of U.S. intelligence, wiretaps, and surveillance

equipment, along with Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and U.S. Marshals. All of

this proceed eventually to the capture of the most wanted intangible social bandit of the Sinaloa Cartel

Joaquín Guzmán, without a shot being fired. This mutual operation has been praised in the U.S.

government reviews as an example of success within the history of bilateral police operation.183

This way of literally thinking outside their boundaries, is exactly the trend that Agnew is referring to.

Unfortunately, the Mexicans are not keen on following this political trend. In official Mexican reports

the emphasis was placed on the fact that with the participation of U.S. federal agents, the territorial

sovereignty as fundamental principle of national security was breached.184

All in all, these examples show that the political authority of the United States has not been

delimited by the U.S. territorial space. Agnew’s call for re-interpreting the relevance of territorial

boundaries for political authority has practical roots. This is explained when he argues that sovereignty

is a social fact, which is produced by actions of states, the behaviour of its leaders and gets its meaning

181

Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1996), 4. 182



Omar Hurtado and Rosa García Paz, “El narcotráfico en México como problema transnacional,” Revista

Mexicana de Política Exterior 97 (2013): 56, 57.

46

through the purposes of states in interaction. In his sense, de facto sovereignty is the only form that

matters. 185

This discrepancy is illustrative for the current clash between at one side, the supporters

considering sovereignty as a right to resist and at the other side, academics presuming sovereignty as

relational and the capacity to engage.

5.3 Graduated Sovereignty

When taking the de facto sovereignty as point of departure, the political authority of the United States

has not been delimited by the U.S. territorial space. Within the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. political

authority has crossed the territorial boundaries and is exercised in, using Agnew’s own words;

‘scattered pockets across space-spanning networks.’ One of these scattered pockets of authority is the

U.S. training and assistance programs within the Mérida second pillar to strengthen the Mexican

customs personnel, corrections staff, canine teams, and police at federal, state and local level. As of

May 2013, an estimated number of 19,000 law enforcement officers had completed the training

courses. Moreover, 8,500 federal and 22,500 state justice sector personnel had received training on

their roles in Mexico’s new accusatorial justice system.186

This constitutes a crucial influence allowing

the U.S. major opportunities to shape and mould the Mexican law enforcement institutions.

Such cross-bordering authority opens up possibilities to classify different sovereignty

situations. Agnew developed a classifying system of sovereignty regimes. This is a system to examine

a state’s effective sovereignty being built up by the extent of state authority (the legitimate despotic

power) and state territoriality (the administration of infrastructural power).187

The United States is seen

as an example of the globalist type, with a strong central state authority and relative open borders. It

must noticed that in the current sphere of events, the United States is moving towards the classic type

as it has strengthened its border policies after 9/11. However, in comparison to other countries the U.S.

borders have remained relatively open and in this way the U.S. can easily move it strong authority

across borders to impact other countries, as is the case with the substantial U.S. influence on the

judicial and enforcement system in Mexico. On the other hand, Mexico fits better in the imperialist

type, with open borders yet a weak central state authority characterized by high levels of corruption

(Figure 4: Sovereignty Regimes in Practice). Therefore, the combination of open borders and weak

central authority in Mexico gives an explanation for the presence of U.S. law enforcement officers

being active on the territory.

185

Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes,” 437, 440. 186

Seelke and Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation,” 8,9. 187


47

Figure 4: Sovereignty Regimes in Practice

Table 5.1 Sovereignty Regimes, John Agnew188 (red state names added by Lakerveld,, 2014)

Cross-border authority not directly aimed at breaching territorial state power is defined by

Agnew as ‘labile sovereignty.’ Using this definition opens up possibilities to classify different

sovereign forms and actors in a situation of ‘graduated sovereignty’ whereby the state maintains

control over its territory and lets other corporate entities (the so-called non-territorial actors) regulating

some domains in it.189

This summarizes Agnew´s main point; he disregards the classical requirement

that sovereign actors should be exclusively territorial state powers. In his eyes, sovereignty is a bundle

of rights. One of those unbundled sovereignty rights is the spatiality of political authority that is

distributed among both territorial and non-territorial agents.190

5.4 Actors of labile sovereignty

Agnew´s point of labile sovereignty has more strings attached. Since he considers sovereignty as the

‘legitimate exercise of power,’ even the non-territorial actors of labile sovereignty must fulfil the

criteria of legitimacy; exercised in a manner of transparency and efficiency, with expertise and

accountability. In the Mérida context, the active non-territorial agents not aiming at breaching the

territorial power of Mexico are the non-governmental organizations mainly clustered under the fourth

pillar of the Initiative; building strong and resilient communities with respect to human rights.

Compared to the other pillars, the fourth pillar is unique as it addresses the underlying social causes of

crime. To investigate patterns of labile sovereignty in the hands of non-territorial actors, a fourth pillar

community project in one of the most violent Mexican cities will serve as an example.

The drug shipping routes between the production in the Andes and consumption in North

America pushes patterns of violence along the U.S.-Mexican border. The city of Ciudad Juárez forms

the stage for a fierce battle between the drug cartels of Juárez and Sinaloa which is daily shown on the

188




48

streets through high homicide levels, extortion and express kidnappings.191

The fourth pillar of the

Mérida Initiative has several community development strategies, also outlaid in Ciudad Juárez. Next

to the financial support of already existing projects, new projects were launched under Mérida

characterized by a comprehensive bottom-up approach.

In early 2010, the community government program Todos Somos Juárez (We are all Juárez)

had been established in coordination with local citizens and entailed a wide range of 168 initiatives (to

improve conditions of education, neighbourhoods and human rights) to be fulfilled within the short

time frame of 100 days. The wide-ranged ‘umbrella project’ was coordinated by three levels of

Mexican government which identified funds to permit NGOs to execute the promising plans.192

The

local NGOs involved were acting autonomously with the help of many volunteers and this form of

citizen participation in Todos Somos Juarez introduced a higher degree of transparency in the

development and oversight of the programs.

Despite the excellent concept, the Todos Somos Juárez initiatives were of a short duration.

After one year , the government ended the funding in spite of the fact that many projects were still in

progress and the city suffered high levels of insecurity. A gun down of seven young men playing

soccer in a recently inaugurated park, built as part of the Todos Somos Juarez program, marked this

continuously flows of violence in the city. Real causes of this sudden termination were subject of

speculation; the project being too ambitious and complex, the 2010 elections and change of

government, and the slow disbursement of the 600 million federal Mexican pesos were called as

possible scenarios.193

According to a local spokesperson, the failure of the project unravels a national

problem; the lack of public participation and media attention. Despite the devotion of many

volunteers, a low involvement of citizens in the supervision section has resulted in a diminishing

degree of trust in the government.194

Parallel to local efforts, international NGOs are also active within the Mérida Initiative. Their

approach is the opposite; lobbying at the highest political levels. Reason to raise the alarm is the

reported ongoing violation of human rights by security forces in Mexico. According to the global

organization Amnesty International in 2009, the U.S. Congress should ‘honour its commitment to

withhold 15% of funding of the Merida Initiative until the Mexican government fulfills its human

rights obligations.’195

Later on in 2013, the obligations under the second pillar also set out in Peña

Nieto’s Security Strategy seem not to be fulfilled as claimed in a country report of Human Rights

191

Diana Negroponte, “Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Mérida: Adressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related

Crime and Violence in Mexico,” Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars Security Cooperation

Series (2013): 7 192

Negroponte, “Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Mérida,” 7. 193

Negroponte, “Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Mérida,” 7. 194

“Security Plan in Mexican Ciudad Juárez is a Failure,” Borderland Beat, last modified January 31, 2011,

http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/01/security-plan-in-mexican-ciudad-juarez.html 195

“Mexico: Merida Funds Must Be Frozen Until Human Rights Conditions Are Met,” Amnesty International

Press Release, last modified August 5, 2009, https://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/mexico-

merida-funds-must-be-frozen-until-human-rights-conditions-are-met

49

Watch;196

cases of extreme violence against civilians and journalists, torture to obtain information and

a failing judicial system are signs of a failing implementation. Nevertheless, these activities show that

the authority in the hands of the NGOs remains limited to lobby politicians, inform the public and

raise overall awareness.

Patterns of labile sovereignty are hard to find in this respect, irrespective of the assumption

that the comprehensive Todos Somos Juárez program indeed did meet to some extent the requirements

of legitimacy. The acting local NGOs did not have the political authority and financial resources to

decide over the project’s fate. When relating these practical examples to Agnew’s argument of a wide

range of sovereign actors, it seems that the centralized power sources of the U.S. and Mexican

government (such as command and obedience) gain more political authority than the diffused power

sources (such as social association and interaction) of the local and international NGOs. This

conclusion does not seem very surprising as it could be argued that in the Mérida context the political

authority should remain in the hand of the territorial powers just for the sake of democratic control.197

Of course, this does not necessarily indicates that territorial powers cannot delegate political authority

to non-territorial powers.198

Applying Agnew’s implications within the Mérida Initiative, it can be concluded that the

delegation of political authority to NGOs is limited to weak forms of executive responsibility.

However, it should be taken into account that patterns of real authority and influence are very hard to

measure. Theorist Janice Thompson gives an explanation why it is so difficult in practice to trace

patterns of political authority; ‘once that authority is delegated, it is no longer treated as political; it is

private, social, economic, religious, cultural, and so on.’199

5.5 Legitimacy

With his theory Agnew dives deeper into the foundations of claims to sovereignty. According to him,

territorial state powers rely on two important type of state power: despotic power and infrastructural

power. To put it more easily, these powers signify respectively to enjoy ‘the consent of the governed’

and the ability to ‘deliver the goods.’ Due to the results of globalization, Agnew attempts to prove that

the traditional association between despotic/infrastructural power and centralized state authority is

diminishing. He even makes it sound like a warning when he writes that the legitimacy of the state is

fragile and should not be taken for granted, pointing to the United States experiencing a loss of U.S.

public support after invading Iraq in 2003.200

A state’s population can shift loyalties to non-territorial

196

“World Report 2013 Mexico,” Human Rights Watch, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/world-

report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=3 197

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Public-Private Partnerships,” in Complex Sovereignty, ed. Edgar Grande

et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 212. 198

Börzel and Risse, “Public-Private Partnerships,” 201. 199

Thomson, “State Sovereignty,” 222. 200


50

entities and as a consequence this can cause a fragmentation of sovereignty. Examples of such non-

territorial actors are described by Agnew as international organizations, corporations but also social

movements and religious groupings.201

Obviously, all these actors must fulfil the condition of

legitimacy to become sovereign actors.

However, in the context of rural Mexico, illicit non-territorial actors are threatening the

despotic and infrastructural power of the Mexican government apparatus. First of all, the drug cartels,

as the non-territorial actors, are undermining the sovereignty of the Mexican state. In some areas, the

influence of the drug cartels is so high that it constitutes a breakdown in law and order. For the last ten

years, the country´s three major drug cartels have struggled for territory. Enriched by the staggering

incomes of the drug trade, these cartels have control over large parts of the country by using

professional weaponry, corrupting government officials and ruthless killing.202

These sophisticated

criminal networks are very flexible and undermine the Mexican’s law enforcement efforts with a

method called the ‘balloon effect’; as the police increases its presence in own area, they will transfer to

places with less pressure, compared to the air in a balloon.203

However, it is not solely these criminal

activities that hollow the government. Beside controlling territory, the drug cartels also control the

population by the use of propaganda and the taken over of public offices in entire communities. 204

Throughout the years, the penetration into local communities have facilitated a popular discourse

visible in the sweet sonorities of Mexican song bespeaking a glorification of the narcos. Many poor

Mexicans use the so-called narcocorridos (ballads that celebrate and glamorize drugs trade) to show

their affection with the cartels.205

Regarding these characteristics, the Mexico drug cartels are

transforming into territorial actors, as they possess a kind of authority that directly breaches the

territorial state power of Mexico.

A second example of a claim to sovereignty from below derives directly from the combination

of the dominant presence of criminal cartels and the weak law enforcement efforts of the Mexican

government. It concerns the rise of auto-defensas; vigilante organizations to restore order to the local

communities. Despite the promises of president Enrique Peña Nieto to create an elite national police

force of 10.000 officers specialized to counter the violence of the cartels, many Mexicans have lost

their patience. In communities across the country, groups of citizens have picked up rifles, machetes

and masks to start patrolling their neighborhoods.206

In doing so, independent sources report in the

midst of 2013 that they successfully fill in the gaps of the local police. The national and bilateral

measures of Mérida to modernize Mexican’s security system take time to become effective, until then

201





John McDowell, “The Ballad of Narcomexico,” Journal of Folklore Research 49:3 (2012): 1. 206

“Rise of Mexico’s Self-Defense Forces,” Council on Foreign Affairs, last modified August 2013,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139462/patricio-asfura-heim-and-ralph-h-espach/the-rise-of-mexicos-

self-defense-forces

51

this citizen initiative has proven effective short term solution to counter the growing influence of drug

cartels.207

However, early 2014, the growth of these vigilantes groups did raise concern among the

population. Reports say the vigilantes had become more intimidating as heavily armed fighters with

uncertain loyalties. In some areas, the auto-defensas used the weak position of the government

officials to control them and force them into a fragile pact. An official call for the disarmament of the

vigilantes in the state of Michoacán did end up in a heavy protest and the killing of three locals by

federal forces. Critics portray this event as a low point revealing the inability of the Mexican

government to protect its own citizens, and instead even kill them.208

Both these examples demonstrate

the shortcomings of Agnew’s theory, that are analyzed in the following paragraph.

5.6 Sovereignty from below in practice

In Agnew’s theory, a system of graduated sovereignty entails forms of labile sovereignty to be

distributed among territorial and non-territorial powers across borders. As a consequence, former

exclusive state power sources (despotic and infrastructural) can also be distributed outside the state to

other actors that are fulfilling the conditions of sovereignty. Following his reasoning, the above

mentioned criminal practices of drug cartels and armed civilians cannot be considered claims to

sovereignty as they not meet the Agnew’s criteria of legitimacy (transparency, efficiency and

accountability). The two observations below will show that this notion is challenged when the

illegitimate actor become engaged with despotic and infrastructural power.

First, the examples of the population’s glorification towards the drug criminals point out that

the drug cartels start to rely on despotic power: the power over civil society with a foundation of

popular authority. An important power mechanism to obtain this control over a social group, is the use

of violent coercion. Again, this widely used method of drug cartels constitutes a breach into one of the

hallmarks of a state’s sovereignty; the traditional state claim on the monopoly of the use of violence

and organized coercion. Concerning these issues, it could be argued that the drugs cartels are putting

claims to sovereignty on the local level searching not to topple the government yet to hollow it so an

ideal situation of impunity arises.

Second, the case of the armed civilization groups shows the loss of federal infrastructural

power, ‘deliver the goods’ of security, into the hands of civilian armed groups. Also in this case, these

vigilantes turn to the monopolies of state sovereignty; the use of armed violence and coercion to obtain

their uncertain goals. Moreover, a questionable degree of accountability within these auto-defensas

groups, does not prove them legitimate in Agnew’s eyes.

207

“Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 5, 2014,

http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689#p5 208

“Vigilantes, Once Welcome, Frighten Many in Mexico,” The New York Times, last modified February 24,

2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/world/americas/vigilantes-once-welcome-frighten-many-in-

mexico.html?ref=americas&_r=0

52

These two examples can be seen as forms of sovereignty from below, and serve to prove a

weakness in the sovereignty discourse to which also Agnew is contributing; sovereignty is always

legitimate. If not, it cannot be portrayed as such. Furthermore, the conditions of legitimacy Agnew

maintains are very subjective and disputable. When considering legitimacy as the popular acceptance

of authority defined by John Locke, it could be argued that both drug cartels and the armed vigilantes

do enjoy some extent of legitimacy.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, Agnew’s assumptions has been to some extent applicable. It can be argued that U.S.

authority has been exercised on the Mexican territory by police training and judicial assistance

programs as part of the Mérida program. However, the DEA officials operating to capture drug cartel

leaders also show that the political authority of the United States has not been delimited by the U.S.

territorial space, even without the consent of Mexico. The latter could create political struggles as

Mexico and the United States did not agree on the legitimacy of these actions. It can be concluded that

his claim to re-interpret territoriality is certainly a valuable addition to the sovereignty discourse.

With his contribution of graduated sovereignty to the two-dimensional framework, Agnew

provides the possibility of territorial and non-territorial actors to exercise to some extent a ‘labile’

form of sovereignty. Within the international system, political authority seems not to be limited to

territorial boundaries and acknowledging this is an important step to enhance understanding. However,

the distribution of sovereignty in a graduated form, is limited to a form of ‘labile sovereignty,’ a form

of political authority with no intention of breaching territorial state power. The non-territorial actors

(local and international NGOs) within the fourth pillar of the Mérida Initiative presumed to be actors

of this ‘labile’ political authority, were in practice limited to weak forms of executive responsibility.

Furthermore, it could be argued that that ‘labile’ sovereignty is a weak description that does not earn

the label of sovereignty, which makes Agnew’s ideas a bit less revolutionary

Furthermore, the issue of legitimacy caused alternative non-territorial actors with substantial

power such as the Mexican to behave as territorial actors. The presence and influence of the

sovereignty actors form below; the drug cartels and armed civilian groups, could not be explained

using Agnew’s theory. In this way, on this point Agnew is widening what he wants to narrow; the gap

between theory and practice.

53

Chapter Six: The Mérida Initiative as Statement of Hierarchy – Lake

6.1 Introduction

The theories of Slaughter and Agnew were mainly focussed on the horizontal distribution of

sovereignty; among government actors or even non-territorial actors (Figure 1 Two-dimensional

framework). In this third theoretical pillar, the theoretical arguments of David Lake are tested within

the bilateral context of the Mérida Initiative. His contributions are shifting the discussion more

vertically towards as he calls it, the ‘dead horse’ within IR; hierarchy.209

The norm of indivisible international legal sovereignty has taken such deep roots that speaking

of hierarchy on the international level seems, as Lake states, ‘ impolite.’ Nevertheless, he is certainly

not concerned about breaching the political etiquette as he strives for incorporating variations in

hierarchy when analysing international issues. This chapter will elaborate on three arguments that

explain this main statement of existing hierarchy: the variety of relationships on the international

scale; possibilities of deviance in sovereignty and an analytic scheme to classify the relationships of

deviance in sovereignty.

6.2 Variety of relationships

To prove that this dead horse is also present in the classic sovereignty discourse, Lake analyses the

internal and external aspects of sovereignty. It is broadly acknowledge that when possessing internal

domestic sovereignty, an actor holds the ultimate authority in a given territory. This automatically

implies a hierarchic relationship between the sovereign and its domestic substitutes. In the external

aspect, all states have a mutual recognized relationship of equal international legal sovereignty;

therefore an international hierarchal order of sovereignty is de jure not accepted.

Opposed to this claim of indivisible sovereignty within an anarchic vacuum, Lake emphasizes

the relational character of sovereignty. According to him, many IR scholars accept too readily the

Westphalian model of interstate relations instead of looking through a lens of interactions.210

This

leads to his first argument that states enter into a variety of relationships while denying the anarchic

claim on the international world. Accelerated through economic interdependence, the bilateral

cooperation of the Mérida Initiative presents such state relationship. The mutual adjustment in their

security border policy reflects the relational character of sovereignty. However, when it concerns

security issues, Lake discovers that unilateralist acts often prevail.211

For instance, the United States

has a large history of dominant foreign policy actions via a variable bilateral and multilateral channels

visible in the earlier mentioned ‘Americanization’ influence. Patterns of bilateral security cooperation

209


David Lake, Entangling Relations:American Foreign Policy in its Century (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1999), 269. 211

Lake, Entangling Relations, 25.

54

are not that widespread as most states do not attempt to share security efforts. Therefore, the Mérida

Initiative seems an exception of this unwritten rule.

Although being a mutual security agreement, different degrees of authority and power are

present between the contracted states. And as a logical consequence, Lake introduces the lenses of

hierarchy in investigate these variety of state relationships. When putting his glass on, the Mérida

relationship between the United States and Mexico could indeed be described as asymmetrical, if only

because of the one-sided flow of financial support. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. government

officials on Mexican soil demonstrate the unequal authority distribution between the United States as

the dominant actor and Mexico as the subordinate actor. To strengthen his argument, Lake offers some

characteristics that are embodies such hierarchical relationships; the promotion of mutual aid and

trade; bandwagoning with dominant state; limitation on ability to abuse authority and decrease of the

defence budget.212

Not all conditions can be applied in the Mérida case; the possibility to abuse

authority remains plausible especially on Mexican government levels and both countries have not

limited their budget of border control.213

After ‘seeing’ hierarchy in IR, Lake examines that this observations can alter the behaviour of

dominant and subordinate states.214

These diverse contrasts in state behaviour and power positions

leads Lake to question the classic notion of sovereignty being an indivisible condition in all states

identically. His idea that not all international actors are fully and equally sovereign, introduces Lake’s

second theoretical argument.

6.3 Deviance in sovereignty

The modern globalized world and the dense web of relationships show major inequalities in power and

authority between states. Lake uses this observation for his second argument; to show deviance in

sovereignty across states in the international system. For example, some governments do not have full

control over their territories which constitutes a lack of conformity to the foundations of absolute

sovereignty. Lake immediately tries to put this argument into a hierarchical context; throughout

political arrangements and social contracts, absolute state sovereignty can be infringed in some areas.

In one of his articles, he states that relational ‘authority rests on a bargain between the ruler and the

ruled, premised on the former’s provision of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter’s loss

of freedom.’215

In this sense, hierarchy in sovereignty seems inevitable.

With this statement, Lake reveals that he considers sovereignty as a bundle of rights, of which

authority is the most suitable indicator. He defines hierarchy by ‘the extent of the authority exercised

212

David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (London: Cornwell University Press, 2009), 11. 213


Lake, Hierarchy, 10. 215

David Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International

Security 32 (2007): 54.

55

by the ruler over the ruled.’216

However, the line between coercion and willing subordination is very

thin and should not be confused. Lake relies on Stephan Krasner’s theoretical implications about

external restrictions. For instance, coercion between the dominant and subordinate actor takes place

when restrictions are imposed as a precondition for international acceptance or financial loans to avoid

bankruptcy. A country that agrees on reforming its economy in order to receive new capital is

considered as a willing subordinate.217

In the Mérida case, the U.S. has put restrictions on Mexico

concerning the improvement of human rights conditions. The conditions required that 15% of Foreign

Military Financing (FMF) assistance would be withheld until Mexican government reports in writing

that it has taken serious action in four human rights areas.218

Thus far, the U.S. State Department has

twice elected to hold back funding ($26 million and $18 million) until progress was made on the

human rights issues of impunity and transparency.219

Considering the multi-billion dollar budget of the

Mérida project, these amounts of restrained funding do not have significant impact. Therefore,

Mexico is more likely to be a willing subordinate enjoying freedom to draw its own plan and is

consciously safeguarding its boundaries of sovereignty.

Another indication for this, is the fact that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has not

been involved with the design of the Initiative and its role was limited to coordination of the delivery

of equipment (including aircraft) for Mexican security forces. The United States seems also not that

interested to involve military actions to solve the Mexican crime problem, this might be stemming

from its earlier experience in the Latin American region, for example its unsuccessful military

presence in the Colombian drugs war. Another reason for this non-military attitude, is to avoid the

possibility of inadvertently reinforcing a system of militarization in Mexico.220

More than that, the United States greatest interest is to build up the Mexican sovereignty

system so that its southern neighbour can better deal with the crime problem on its own. Mexico has

been entangled in authority relationships with on the one hand drug cartels trying to breach and

undermine its domestic sovereignty, and on the other hand the U.S. government trying to strengthen

Mexican domestic sovereignty by capacity building in training, surveillance and equipment.

The fact that the U.S. has the possibilities and the resources to restore its neighbours

sovereignty capacities, only confirms the deviance in sovereignty and the hierarchal relationship

between the two states. To put this hierarchy in an IR context, Lake developed a continuum that

portrays various possible forms of security hierarchy between polities.

216






56

6.4 Continuum of hierarchy relationships

Lake agrees with Krasner that a range of deviations in sovereignty could occur when some states enjoy

more authority and power than others. In this third argument, Lake uses these assumptions to develop

a pragmatic metric to create a useful framework for IR studies. Similar to Agnew, Lake argues that

states are not the exclusive sources of authority; polities on the continuum are broader and include

regions, ethnic groups, and other autonomous political entities with a potential of self-rule. This last

condition of Lake is important as it excludes polities such as small municipalities and community

enclaves that could not survive as independent actors.221

In other words, polities should root their

legitimacy in a social contract of responsibility and the establishment of a political order with the

consent of the governed.222

Within the bilateral security cooperation of the Mérida Initiative, the two contracting parties of

the agreement are the relevant polities on the continuum. On the horizontal scale of Lake’s continuum,

different degrees of hierarchy between two or more polities can be labelled. The left side of the scale

displays a relationship of anarchy as each polity possesses full authority and control. The right side of

the scale symbolizes a pure hierarchical relationship when the dominant member can claim full

authority over the subordinate member .223

Simply put, the range of hierarchy relations are defined by

variations in ‘who has the authority to decide what.’ Lake explains this in degrees of domestic

sovereignty possessed by the subordinate member; the greater amount of areas in hands of the

subordinate member, the less hierarchical the relationship will be.224

The relationship between the United States and Mexico in the context of the Mérida Initiative

could be put on the security continuum, as the external restrictions on Mexico fall in the category of

security policy. According to Lake, the degree of hierarchy between the two states depends on the

amount of Mexican authority in its domestic areas of security. Given the local threats of chaos and

violence, this authority can be questioned in the rural communities of Mexico. However, it is not an

U.S. external restriction that had caused this decrease in domestic sovereignty. Drug cartels and armed

civilian groups create as actors of sovereignty from below an authority ‘out-of-equilibrium.’

Furthermore, Lake is very much interested in the effects of hierarchy on a subordinate’s foreign

policy. In the Mérida context, the central point is an urgent need to change Mexico’s domestic policy.

Through these differences, the Lake continuum seems not perfectly applicable to this particular case.

Nevertheless, when the U.S.-Mexican security relationship has to be defined on the

continuum, the most suitable place would be around ‘sphere of influence’(Figure 5: Security

Relationships in practice). This spot indicates the dominant polity constraining authority rights in the

foreign policy area of the subordinate. This sphere of influence prevails to the extent that the United

States limit the possibility of Mexico to cooperate with other Central American states on security

221

Lake, Entangling Relations, 19. 222


Lake, “The New Sovereignty,” 312 224


57

policy affairs. Instead, the U.S. empowers its sphere of influence in the region to extend financial

assistance to Central America.225

Figure 5: Security Relationships in Practice

Table 6.1 Security Relationships Continuum, David Lake226(red arrow added by Lakerveld,, 2014)

All in all, it is not possible to completely verify Lake´s theoretical assumptions only on this

particular example of the Mérida Initiative. However, bringing the theory into practice does deliver

some observations on the practical value of Lake’s analytic scheme.

6.5 Hierarchy in practice

When considering the wide range of polities possible, Lake considers himself progressive as he

broadens the vision from states to polities and non-state actors in IR. If only referring to states as

relevant unit of analysis, he claims that ‘it will limit the questions asked and the answers found.’ 227

However, similar to Agnew, David Lake does not acknowledge drug cartels or self-defensive citizen

groups as legitimate sources of sovereignty and relevant units of analysis in IR. Unfortunately,

ignoring these illegitimate authority groups, does not change the practice of their existence.

Lake’s theoretical implications are focussed on influences outside a subordinate polity. He

considers deviance in sovereignty when subordinates accept external restrictions to be protected from

external threats. However, in the Mérida case, these threats are mainly originating from the inside.

Furthermore, it often seems that hierarchy between dominant member and subordinate

member is an expression of power in the dominant member’s interest to prolong this situation.

Although Lake is pointing out the sacrifice to the common good that both states have to make in

hierarchy due to immense governance costs, he is not convincing enough to refute the neo-realist

claim that hierarchy is just another expression of power politics.228

To accomplish a public order in

Mexico, the United States are strengthening the Mexican sovereignty capacities and in this way is

trying to neutralize the differences in sovereignty. To be effective, Mexico need to be an reliable and

capable counterpart. It is in the interests of both states that their hierarchical relationship becomes less

225



Lake, Entangling Relations, 20. 228


58

hierarchical. Unfortunately, Lake’s theoretical assumptions are not designed to predict such a

direction of a hierarchy on the move; his aim is to recognize hierarchy on a certain point in time.

Thus, operationalizing the degree of hierarchy is quite complex. The international system is an

intense web of relationships and it would be implausible to put them all in a just a few categories on a

horizontal scale. Nevertheless, Lake’s attempt to address the politically contentious taboo of hierarchy

is a valuable contribution to the widening and deepening of the IR studies.

6.6 Conclusion

In the many articles, reports and literature available on the Mérida Initiative, the word hierarchy has

not been found. This confirms the presence of the ‘dead horse’ of hierarchy in IR literature. Lake’s

contributions have opened up the vertical distribution of sovereignty. The deviance of sovereignty

between a dominant and subordinate actors with differences in authority and power, certainly have

influence on the behaviour and interests of states. Acknowledging this will enhance better

understanding and improved prediction of possible scenarios of state action. For example, admitting

differences in sovereignty opens up the explanation that the United States is actually trying to

eliminate hierarchy by building up the Mexican sovereignty system to effectively counteract the root

cause of the drug problem. However, Lake’s theory also has some shortcomings. His developed metric

is clearly in its early stages as Lake does not explain the usefulness and purpose of hierarchy for states.

Furthermore, in his analysis Lake is very focussed on external restrictions and external threats on

subordinate states., while in the case of Mexico, these threats are from the inside. Similar to Agnew,

Lake does not adapt fully to the practice of the Mérida Initiative ignoring these illegitimate domestic

authority groups.

All in all, shifting the sovereignty discourse towards the role of hierarchy in IR is a valuable

alternative point of view that offers new insights into practical examples such as the Mérida Initiative.

59

Conclusion

Referring back to the Robin Hood-quote used in the introduction of this thesis, the term ‘social bandit’

in the publication of Eric Hobsbawm’s book ‘Bandits,’ receives support from an unexpected side. In a

postscript written in 1999, Hobsbawm revealed with pride that he had received a message from

members of a Mexican peasant group. They said they had approved his writings on social banditry.

Hobsbawm accepted this approval as a sign that his contributions were ‘more than an exercise in

academic speculation.’229

Indeed, the experiences out of practice can positively improve the value of ‘academic

speculation.’ The connection between academic theory and practice is an important aspect in this

thesis. The role of the state in a context of transnational opportunities and ‘glocal’ threats serves as a

point of departure towards the evaluation of the concept of sovereignty. These developments

stimulated several theorists of the globalization discourse to re-think the effectiveness of sovereignty

in the hands of the state. Combining the alternative perspectives of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake offers

possibilities for these ongoing challenges that globalization puts on a state. To improve the

effectiveness of a state, they all plead for a more hybrid form of sovereignty that could be divided

among many actors and on different locations. For the purpose of this thesis, these three theories are

combined which resulted in a two-dimensional framework with a horizontal dimension (Slaughter and

Agnew) and a vertical dimension (Lake) (see Figure 1 Two-dimensional framework), suitable to

investigate the impact of globalization on the practice of sovereignty, authority and power in the

modern state. By applying this two-dimensional framework to the practice of the U.S-Mexican

Mérida Initiative, this thesis aims to contribute to the discussion and narrow the gap between theory

and practice, using the following central research question;

To what extent can alternative conceptions of sovereignty as defined by Slaughter, Agnew and Lake be

found within the bilateral security cooperation of the Mérida Initiative (2007-onwards) between the

United States and Mexico?

As stated in the introduction, three basic assumptions were made; firstly on the independent role of the

nation state in the international context. This has to change because states can no longer provide

effective solutions to transnational crime threats on their own.230

Secondly, the mutual correlation

between globalization, sovereignty and TOC issues is presumed in the introduction. The third

hypothesis is the relevance of the case of analysis in this research: the Mérida Initiative. Due to its

229

“Hobsbawm and the bandits,” The New Yorker, last modified October 2, 2012,

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/10/eric-hobsbawm-and-the-bandits.html 230

John Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 112.

60

characteristics, the Mérida Initiative is expected to offer possibilities for alternative conceptions of

sovereignty. All of the chapters of this thesis were dealing to some extent with these three

assumptions.

Sovereignty discourse

In the first chapter, the theoretical landscape of the sovereignty concept has been explained, departing

from the assumptions of the medieval classical theorists. Westphalian sovereignty was considered to

absolute and highly based on the exclusion of external actors from the territory and any authority

structures. Beside Westphalian sovereignty theorist Stephan Krasner identified three other types of

sovereignty. The differences among them are caused by the involvement of different core principles of

sovereignty (authority, control, territoriality, legitimacy and responsibility). Classical and

constructivist perspectives disagree on the nature of sovereignty, however both underline the

absoluteness and indivisibility of sovereignty that is exclusively entrusted to the state. Until around the

1970s, a significant amount of articles were published that critically analyse the old concept of

sovereignty against a new and rapidly globalising world where boundaries are slowly disappearing.

The discourse on sovereignty was being renewed through the process of globalization. The new

sovereignty became relational and did emphasize two important changes; the central role of the state

was questioned and the two-folded nature of sovereignty (a status and a bundle of rights) was

introduced.

As part of the approach of the new sovereignty, Slaughter, Agnew and Lake investigated that

this bundle of rights could easily be unfold so that the rights of sovereignty can be distributed among

numerous actors. Furthermore, all three aim to investigate how sovereignty is distributed either

horizontally or vertically to effectively combat the challenges of globalization (see Figure 1).

Theoretical framework

The first part of the theoretical framework of this thesis is the horizontal dimension constituted by

Anne-Marie Slaughter, she proposes that ‘states can only govern effectively by actively cooperating

with other states and by collectively reserving the power to intervene in other states’ affairs.’231

Slaughter uses two main statements of how states will organize themselves seeking ways to govern

effectively. Firstly, states will organized themselves within international cooperation structures, the so

called ‘government networks.’ Secondly, within these networks, the state remains as central actor and

will disaggregate into different building blocks that are exercising independent rights and are

autonomously interacting with counterparts across the borders.Slaughter’s conception of the

disaggregated state and the splitting of sovereignty among government officials across borders leave

room for re-interpreting the role of territory in sovereignty.

231


61

The contributions of John Agnew are complementary to Slaughter’s perspectives. The second

part of the framework is shaped by two statements signifying that effective sovereignty of states is not

restricted by their territorial boundaries and that outside these boundaries a space vacuum exists in

which political authority and control can also be exercised by territorial and non-territorial actors. As a

consequence, states will enter into system of graduated sovereignty where forms of labile sovereignty

are distributed among a wide spectrum of legitimate actors.

The last contributor to the theoretical framework of this thesis is David Lake. He is concerned

with the existence of hierarchical relationships in sovereignty. His contributions have shifted the

discussion to the vertical dimension towards hierarchy within IR. Lake investigates how states enter

into a variety of relationships and by doing this are denying the anarchy claim of the international

world. In his search for academic acceptance, David Lake heavily relies on the assumptions of Stephan

Krasner and has the different types of authority relationships outlined in a pragmatic metric. Lake

himself has identified several continuums between state actors with pure anarchic relationships at one

end of the scale and on purely hierarchic ones at the other.

Globalization

In the second chapter, the theoretical fundament is laid around the concept of globalization.

Globalization can be defined as ‘the process of increasing interconnectedness between states and

societies such that events in one part of the world increasingly have effects on people and societies far

away.’232

During the process of globalization, these border-crossing interconnections such as

technological and global capital flows have also had an important impact on state vulnerability and its

capacities: reducing the state’s ability to unilaterally protect itself and forcing states to cooperate

internationally to manage threats resulting from the opening of borders at the global arena.

Globalization puts the central role of the sovereign state into question 233

and the proliferation of

transnational connections, rising power of multinationals, and the growth of international

organizations are seen to be signs of ‘withering of the state.’234

The transnational presence of former national or local criminal networks can be considered as

a negative impact of globalization. Similar to legitimate businesses, criminal organizations were able

to benefit from the opportunities presented by globalization, such as diminishing regulation and open

border policies. The constant high demand for illegal goods, the ‘glocal’ connection and the high level

of profit in different parts of the world keeps their extended business viable. Traditionally, the most

profitable industry of illicit goods is the drugs trade and all over the world states are effected by the

production, transport and consumption of this commodity.235

Through these two chapters, the first and second assumption of this thesis have met academic

232




Levitsky, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” 228.

62

foundations; the process of globalization has placed the role of the state into a new international

dimension where the former promises of sovereignty have a different meaning in the light of

upcoming security threats. Within the perspective of this thesis, this statement is sufficient however

within the academic world the statement of the correlation between globalization, sovereignty and

TOC threats remains an issue of dissension.

The Mérida Initiative

The third chapter of the thesis, introduces the U.S.-Mexican context, whereby the priority of the two

states lies on counter-drugs cooperation policies to stop the illegals flows of drugs in the region. Since

2007, the United States and Mexico have agreed on the establishment of an bilateral security

cooperation called the Mérida Initiative , which has a great emphasis on counteracting drugs trade and

violence. Considering the high financial budget, this bilateral cooperation is seen as the most serious

attempt in the history of U.S.-Mexican anti-drug cooperation so far. In 2008, the U.S. and Mexico

agreed on the content of the Mérida Initiative; the provision of assistance in equipment, technology,

and training without a significant military footprint in Mexico. In the year 2010, it became

acknowledged that Mexico could not effectively confront organized crime with these technical

assistance alone. A revised framework was established with an emphasis on institution-building and

with a broad scope of bilateral efforts at the local level of municipalities, including community-based

social programs.236

Due to the asymmetrical characteristics of the Mérida Initiative, there are

consequences for the different forms of sovereignty. Therefore, the case of the Merida Initiative seems

again very suitable as a subject for analysis and it could offer possibilities for alternative conceptions

of sovereignty to occur. Whether the assumption about the usefulness of the Mérida Initiative is true or

not, is subject of analysis in the last three chapters of this thesis.

Slaughter

In the fourth chapter, Slaughter’s notions were applied on the practice of the Mérida Initiative. In fact,

many similarities could be discovered. The horizontal distribution of sovereignty rights within the

government network can be found. Despite some shortcomings on features of trust and shared norms,

the Mérida Initiative could be a sufficient example of a government network. Also the ramifications of

both government structures and the presence of bilateral counterparts, form ideal assumptions of

government networks whereby autonomous agencies directly contact their counterparts. However,

Slaughter’s point of view provides too much of an ideal vision that does not correspond to the

practices of the Mérida Initiative. Her theoretical implications of delegating sovereignty and effective

cooperation among multicultural counterparts are too ambitious and they get clouded by practical

obstacles such as miscommunication, bureaucratic disorder and corruption. Moreover, the flows of

sovereignty to different state agencies within the Mérida Initiative were limited to financial and

236


63

executive responsibility. However, the bilateral consultation groups and evaluation meetings of the

bilateral counterparts do prove that Slaughter’s assumptions have some practical relevance.

Agnew

Agnew’s claim to re-interpret territoriality is the topic for the fifth chapter and certainly a valuable

addition to the sovereignty discourse. His horizontal distribution of hybrid sovereignty to the two-

dimensional framework finds resonance within the international system; patterns of political authority

are not limited to territorial boundaries and acknowledging this is an important step to enhance

understanding. However, the distribution of sovereignty in a system of graduated sovereignty, is

limited to a form of ‘labile sovereignty.’ Agnew considers this as political authority with no intention

of breaching territorial state power. One could argue that this weak description does not earn the label

of sovereignty, which would make Agnew’s ideas a bit less revolutionary. His claim of the distribution

of labile sovereignty into the hands of non-territorial actors cannot be found within the context of the

Mérida Initiative. Furthermore, the issue of legitimacy caused alternative non-territorial actors with

substantial power sources such as the Mexican drug cartels and armed civilian groups to be ignored

within Agnew’s theory. In this way, Agnew is widening what he wants to narrow; the gap between

theory and practice.

Lake

In the many articles, reports and literature available on the Mérida Initiative, the word hierarchy has

not been found. This confirms the presence of the ‘dead horse’ of hierarchy in IR literature. Lake’s

contributions have opened up the vertical distribution of sovereignty within the two-dimensional

framework. The deviance of sovereignty between a dominant and subordinate actors with differences

in authority and power, certainly have influence on the behaviour and interests of states.

Acknowledging this will enhance understanding and improved prediction of possible scenarios of state

action. For example, admitting differences in sovereignty opens up the explanation that the United

States is actually trying to eliminate hierarchy by building up the Mexican sovereignty system to

effectively counteract the root cause of the drug problem. However, Lake’s theory also has some

shortcomings. His developed metric is clearly in its early stages as Lake does not explain the

usefulness and purpose of hierarchy for states. Furthermore, in his analysis Lake is very focussed on

external restrictions and external threats on subordinate states, while in the case of Mexico, these

threats are originated from the inside. Similar to Agnew, Lake does not adapt fully to the IR practice

by ignoring these illegitimate domestic authority groups.

All in all, shifting the sovereignty discourse towards the role of hierarchy in IR is a rather valuable

alternative point of view that offers new insights into practical examples such as the Mérida Initiative.

64

Final conclusions

All in all, the process of globalization did indeed affect the nature of sovereignty and the role of the

state. Sovereignty is more seen as relational and shared responsibilities and authority structures are

less restricted to the territorial boundaries. Moreover, within the Mérida Initiative alternative

conceptions of sovereignty have been found. Several elements of authority out of the Mérida practice

cannot be explained by the classic and constructivist notion of absolute sovereignty in the hands of the

sovereign power. These observations were highlighted by the various concepts taken from the three

theorists in the two-dimensional framework (Figure 1):

- Patterns of sovereignty responsibilities distributed to government agencies in a government

network were revealed within bilateral meeting groups between the United States and Mexico.

- Forms of political authority exercised across borders in a system of graduated sovereignty

became visible by effectively operating DEA officers on Mexican territory.

- Structures of hierarchy and deviance of sovereignty between the United States and Mexico

were uncovered by the U.S. attempt to eliminate hierarchy by building up the Mexican

sovereignty system.

However, when translating this to the consequences of the role of the state, these flows of

sovereignty rights appeared on a relatively small scale. This means that the common rule of

sovereignty is still the hands of the state according to the case of the Mérida Initiative. The role of the

state in this particular case remains central yet the behaviour of Mexico and the United States is less

independent and has proven to be more cooperative towards each other as they underlined their mutual

responsibility. It is this shared responsibility in the current IR that stimulates states to enter into

cooperation and partnerships. However, within these cooperation structures, the role of the state has

not been affected on a large scale yet on a small scale whereby cross bordering patterns of authority

were discovered.

Besides, the theorists were not able to explain the alternative conceptions of sovereignty from

below. Powerful and aggressive drug cartels and armed civilian groups did not meet the conditions of

legitimacy, although they have significant impact on the break-down of Mexico’s sovereignty. One

suggestion for future research which would make the theoretical framework more up-to-date is the

extension of the two-dimensional framework with another theory covering a third dimension of the

non-legitimate sovereignty actors. As stated in the introduction, the two-dimensional framework of

Slaughter, Agnew and Lake is suitable to apply to many other practical cases in IR. More research on

this topic will lead to more reliable conclusions about the practical relevance of the theoretical

assumptions on horizontal and vertical distribution of sovereignty. Even the two-dimensional

framework, created in this thesis, could perhaps show its relevance on a broader scale when applied to

more cases.

Although the theoretical promises of Slaughter, Agnew and Lake are somewhat ambitious

when being applied to the case of the Mérida Initiative, they indeed offer important insights into the

65

presence of sovereignty in IR. Breaking taboos and incorporating possibilities of horizontal and

vertical variations of sovereignty into the sovereignty discourse and policy-making processes will

definitely enhance understanding and participating on practices. The conclusions drawn in this thesis

can be interpreted in a broader perspective. The status quo of International Relations is in constant

development. Exploring new horizons on the already extended discourse of sovereignty will only

contribute to a more comprehensive connection between theory and practice.

In the meantime, the Mexican social bandidos might lose their jobs and reputation on

the lucrative drug demand markets. The liberalization of marihuana in the U.S. states of Washington

and Colorado could be a game changer in the enduring struggle of the war on drug. In Mexico taboos

are broken as the possibilities of drug legalization are currently a hot topic on the political agenda.237

237

International Crisis Group, “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico,” Latin

American Report 48 (2013): 42.

66

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Appendix I - Governmental Counterparts in the Mérida Initiative

Governmental counterparts regarding each pillar in the Mérida Initiative238

238

GOA, “Mérida Initiative,” 33.

The State of Sovereignty: alternative conceptions of sovereignty in pursuit of effective crime control within the U.S.-Mexican Mérida Initiative

Documents