The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans: A world of diverging views?

8 The social perception of organized crime in the BalkansA world of diverging views?

Jana Arsovska and Panos A. Kostakos

Over the past two decades, following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, more than 20 newly independent and quasi- sovereign states were formed. During this period, headline- grabbing images of violence and a myriad of special crime reports have persuaded many that the Balkan region in particular is unstable, flourishing mainly on crime and endemic corruption. Very quickly the Balkans, often referred to as a ‘gangster paradise’, became known for its demagogues, secret police agents and thugs who profited from the regional wars, and for the smuggling of people, arms, cigarettes and drugs.

The embryonic conditions of the economic and political institutions in the Balkan countries enabled the EU to emerge in the world arena as an institution that pro-motes normative order in ‘troublesome areas’. In the quest to promote democracy and the rule of law, EU politicians and other actors have placed great importance on the problems related to organized crime in the Balkan region. The European Security Strategy, endorsed by the European Council (2003), lists organized crime as one of the five ‘key threats’ to the EU. It implies that the threat is coming from foreign neighbours and that Europe has become a prime target for organized crime, mainly from the Balkans. The Council of the EU (2003) repeatedly claimed that organized crime is a real obstacle to stability, accountable institutions, the rule of law and economic development in the Western Balkans and a source of grave concern to the EU. According to numerous international organizations, organized crime is corroding the regulatory apparatus and is a major obstacle to legal, politi-cal and economic reforms (Europol 2003, 2004, 2005; Council of the European Union 2001, 2004). Many have acknowledged that organized crime destroys the potential benefits of introducing democracy and market disciplines. Consequently, investors, both domestic and foreign, are less willing to risk their capital. There are also political and social costs. General public mistrust of parliamentarians, public servants and state institutions reduces citizens’ respect for authority and willing-ness to abide by the rule of law. Organized crime has been regarded in many ways as a developmental issue in the region, reflecting the lack of adequately protected property rights, the lack of local economic opportunities and the lack of education, and the weak rule of law.

Consequently, from the late 1990s onward, the EU member states have passed numerous initiatives, regulations and treaties to control organized crime in the

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114 J. Arsovska and P. A. Kostakos

Balkan countries, imposing their own norms of conduct on the region. The rheto-ric adopted by the EU has been alarming. Even more alarming – in some cases ‘extortionist’ – has been the constant reminder of the higher marginal returns which the rule of law and democratic institutions provide to a country. When the EU leaders met in Thessaloniki, Greece in 2003, they concluded that ‘the future of the Western Balkans1 is within the European Union’ as long as the Western Balkan countries deal with the weak rule of law, poor governance, corruption and criminality (International Commission on the Balkans 2005).

However, do people from the Balkans regard organized crime as a real problem for the development of their countries? Do they understand what the EU means when it argues that organized crime poses a threat to their society? Or do they see organized crime as an ‘institution’ that fosters social mobility, capital accumula-tion, economic prosperity and nation building? A different reality to that of the EU may emerge if one looks at the organized crime phenomenon from a ‘Balkan perspective’. In this chapter we argue that in order for the EU’s anti- organized crime policies to be successful in the Balkans, some criteria have to be met. First, the values behind the norms promoted by the EU need to be perceived by the local people as pragmatic, timely and necessary. Second, the exported EU norms should not be at odds with the norms of the recipient countries. The pre- existing practices of a country must be taken into consideration, since they reflect a historical continu-ity that shapes the way people deal with different life events. The analysis and the conclusions drawn in this chapter are based on data that derives from systematic analysis of EU press releases2 and on a comprehensive examination of existing public surveys conducted in the Balkan region.3

EU perceptions of organized crime: a top- down approach

The conceptual elaboration and the meaning attached to the notion ‘perception’ in contemporary academic literature vary significantly. While modern thought claimed that problems such as crime could be discovered and solved through the scientific method, the ‘new criminology’ or ‘postmodern criminology’ rejected the belief that scientific rationality and state intervention are the main vehicles to knowledge and progress. Postmodernism argues that the modern social world and its rules of behavior, including definitions of crime and law, are arbitrary linguistic constructions made by official institutions. Reality and social actions are shaped by the written and spoken word which is not neutral (Henry and Milovanovic 2005). Therefore postmodern methods emphasize the deconstruction of the written and spoken word in order to expose implicit assumptions located in specific narratives. In this chapter we focus on the EU’s perception of organized crime as deduced from and expressed by institutional language. Our aim is to establish the nature of the rhetoric that frames anti- organized crime efforts.

The perception of the EU is embedded in institutional language produced by the instruments of the European Community. Over the past years, a number of treaties and declarations have constructed the body of norms known as the Acquis Communautaire. This body of institutional discourse has traditionally been

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The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans 115

examined to identify the EU norms and perceptions diffused in the international community. However, we believe that this body of discourse does not express the views of the much larger number of actors involved in that project. Thus, we decided to collect and analyze the language of EU press releases in order to have a more representative sample. In order to achieve this goal we adopted a corpus linguistic approach. This approach is helpful for achieving greater rigour and avoiding the selective nature of conventional discourse analysis (Gabrielatos and Sarmento 2006: 222).

Wordlist

Here we consider the 40 most frequent lexical words that appear in our corpus of EU press releases. The wordlist provides a comprehensive view of what the cor-pus is all about. When considering the first part of the wordlist with the 20 most frequent words, we note that although the list comprises single words, some of these words very often occur with other words from the same list and form word clusters. From subsequent semantic analysis of the wordlist a galactic configuration composed by a three- layered narrative structure was established.

First, we identified clusters that describe functional attributes related to the insti-tutional order and legitimacy of the EU, such as European Union, EU, European Council, European Commission, Member State(s), Countries, International Community, Security Council. Second, there are words or word clusters that describe actions undertaken by these legitimate structures such as International Agreements, Common Action, Community Policy, Security Policy, Economic Cooperation, Economic Policy, Economic Development, European Security. Third, there is a low frequency pattern of words which semantically entail normative elements such as Support, Cooperation, Progress, Information and Rights. Overall it can be seen that the corpus is composed of high- frequency lexis and word clusters organized and prioritized around three issues. Issues related to existential questions with state-ments that insert legitimacy and authority appear to form a strong core, around which a middle layer is built based on activities initiated by the EU, and an outer layer of normative discourse such as the rule of law, good governance and human rights.

The data indicate that organized crime is treated and often discussed as an add- on topic that accompanies other security issues in the agenda. It is indicative that the term organized crime ranks 182nd in the wordlist and is used 1,900 times in the corpus of 1,096 articles. The analysis of wordlists and clusters is helpful in expos-ing various discourses and narrative structures within our corpus, but it provides very little insight into lexical patterns of the specific term we are trying to exam-ine. We now turn to examine the lexical vicinity of the term ‘organized crime’ in order to establish which words in the corpus we have composed are more likely to accompany the phrase ‘organized crime’, and to interpret the findings.

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Collocations

Collocations index how a keyword or a phrase is structured within text in rela-tion to other words. This measurement is helpful for indicating the syntax and the semantic of keywords and phrases that we would like to examine. The semantic of a keyword is culturally based on the norms, values and perceptions of those who produce the discourse. Baker (2006: 114) notes that

When two words frequently collocate, there is evidence that the discourses surrounding them are particularly powerful – the strength of collocation implies that these are two concepts which have been linked in the minds of people and have been used again and again – perhaps to the point where even one half of the pair is likely to prime someone who hears or reads that word to think of the other half.

We would like to examine the collocations of the phrase ‘organized crime’ in order to understand which words are becoming ‘glued’ into one another. From this we would like to understand the semantics and cultural messages that these collocations express. By focusing on the language in the immediate vicinity of the idiom ‘organ-ized crime’ we can infer conclusions on the meaning and perceptions attached to it.

The data in Table 8.1 show three categories of collocates. First, there is a group of high- frequency collocates – often carrying negative connotations – which refer to some kind of action aimed at ‘defying’ the threat of organized crime. From our preliminary analysis, we establish that the phrase ‘organized crime’ is often accom-panied by words such as ‘fight’, ‘against’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘control’ and ‘prevention’. Second, we identified a category of high- frequency words referring to various organized crime- related activities that often entail strong trans- border attributes (e.g. terrorism, corruption, drugs, transnational, international, trafficking, border, cross, money and migration). The interesting aspect is that the word terror-ism has very high frequency, suggesting that phrases such as ‘organized crime and terrorism’ are becoming increasingly glued together and implying a very strong nexus between these two phenomena. Third, some institutional aspects were often noted, including words like ‘plan’, ‘council’, ‘report’ and ‘European’.

The frequency figure on the right of the lemma column indicates how many times the lemma form of that word occurs within two spaces to the left and right of the search word

To sum up, it emerges that the EU employs language that promotes its author-ity as a legitimate actor willing to confront organized crime across and beyond its territorial boarders. The EU language with regards to organized crime also dem-onstrates its political will to take action against an ‘enemy’ that allegedly poses a ‘serious threat’. This conclusion is not a new one. However, interpreting our data through another prism we could argue that the EU is using organized crime as a ‘Trojan horse’ to impose its authority and political existence beyond its territorial borders. In search of more evidence to support this last point we now turn our atten-tion to the way people in the Balkans perceive the problem in question.

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Local perceptions of organized crime: a bottom- up approach

Organized crime: a key security threat for the Balkans?

This section examines whether organized crime is perceived as a threat by the local population in the Balkans. It argues that if the EU wants to successfully export its democratic norms, promoting the ‘fight against organized crime’ to other regions, it should first ensure that its demands are pragmatic. We try to answer here whether the fight against organized crime should be placed as a top priority on the political agendas of the Balkan countries in the first place.

Table 8.1 Most frequent ten collocates of ‘organized crime’ ranked by frequency (only lexical lemmas)

Rank Lemma Frequency

1 against 473

2 fight 410

3 terrorism 267

4 corruption 198

5 combating 190

6 drugs 134

7 transnational 116

8 trafficking 91

9 international 77

10 prevention 68

11 tackle 41

12 illegal 40

13 plan 35

14 border 36

15 council 32

16 cross 28

17 report 32

18 money 27

19 european 27

20 migration 24

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Although in the last decade the international community has focused largely on issues of inter- ethnic violence and organized crime in the Balkans, public surveys show that for many local people other threats to security are of much more impor-tance. Public surveys (Arsovska 2009; UNODC 2008; Cleland, et al. 2006) have found that the economic situation and current demographic trends mean that the greatest security challenge in the Balkans lies in promoting economic development. These surveys ascertain that there are three major threats – among other identified threats – which citizens of several Western Balkan countries consider to be the most significant: economic security; weak rule of law/lack of judicial recourse; and political instability.

Economic underdevelopment and unemployment

From a list of primary security concerns affecting the people of the Western Balkans, the most important revolved around the economic situation in their coun-tries (Cleland, et al. 2006). Although in reality absolute income poverty is low in most Balkan countries, in some of them a significant proportion of the population lives on less than US$2.15 (purchasing power parity: PPP) per day, with children being especially affected. For example, in Moldova around 53 per cent of the children and 43 per cent of the general population live on less than US$2.15 (PPP)

Figure 8.1 Interrelationship between identified threats in Kosovo (2006) (Cleland et al. 2006).

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per day and in Albania around 30 per cent of the children and 24 per cent of the population find themselves in the same situation (UNODC 2008: 16).

In a recent survey conducted by the first author (Arsovska 2009), most of the respondents from Albania, Kosovo and FYR of Macedonia stated that the eco-nomic situation in their country has been a serious problem in the last five years (Figure 8.2). In particular, 74.1 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed that the situation in their country was very bad during 2000–5; 10.9 per cent remained undecided and only 13.8 per cent (strongly) disagreed with the statement. Also, 41.1 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed that they do not see any future possibilities for personal economic growth in their country, whereas 22.4 per cent remained undecided (see Arsovska and Verduyn 2008).

The 2006 ISSR public survey conducted in Kosovo shows that the respondents of both Albanian and Serbian communities listed poverty and unemployment among their top three biggest threats to security (18 and 19 per cent respectively of the Albanian population indicated these two factors as top two security threats and 15 per cent each for Serbs) (Cleland, et al. 2006). Survey results indicate that an endemic part of the Balkans’ weak economic performance is high levels of unemployment. Available data from Kosovo, for example, shows that since 1999 unemployment has soared to 54.3 per cent, with 70 per cent of 16–24 year olds out of work (Figure 8.3).

The situation in other Balkan countries has been similar to that of Kosovo. In 2004, 37 per cent of the Macedonian population was unemployed, with 66 per cent of the population under 25 years of age being unemployed. According to EUROSTAT and UNODC estimates, in Albania in 2004 around 40 per cent of

Figure 8.2 Economic situation in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (2000–5) (Arsovska 2009).

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the population under 25 years of age was unemployed (UNODC 2008: 29). Thus high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have certainly created an atmosphere of insecurity in most Balkan countries.

Weak rule of law and corruption

Public surveys and other studies show that weak public trust in the judicial systems and the police of many Balkan countries has been very prevalent (Cleland, et al. 2006; Arsovska 2009). In general, people from the Balkans lack confidence in their state system and government, which often leads to the weakening of conventional bonds (see Figure 8.4).4

Figure 8.4 Trust in government (International Commission on the Balkans 2005).

Figure 8.3 Unemployment rates by sex and age group in Kosovo (2003–4) (Cleland et al. 2006).

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In Arsovska’s survey (2009), most of the respondents believe that the criminal justice system in their country is completely dysfunctional: 62 per cent (strongly) agreed (442 out of 726) with the statement, whereas 24 per cent (strongly) disa-greed. In the SEESAC survey5 the respondents were also dissatisfied with the way the police operate in their countries. To the question how efficient do you judge the police to be in solving crimes and protecting people?, 32 per cent of the respondents stated (very) inefficient and 27.6 per cent stated ‘neither efficient nor inefficient’.

Perception surveys show that there has been a widespread fear of corruption and political interference in the criminal justice process. Of greater concern to the people from the Balkans is the impact that corruption can have on governance. In Arsovska’s survey (2009), 62.5 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed (445 out of 726) with the statement The government in my country is highly corrupt. Only 17.6 per cent (strongly) disagreed, and 17.6 per cent remained undecided. Similar results regarding political corruption were found in the World Values Survey conducted in Albania in 1998 (N = 999): 35.6 per cent of the respondents thought that there were few public officials engaged in corruption in Albania, whereas 50.9 per cent thought that most were engaged in corruption and 12.8 per cent stated that almost all were engaged.

A lack of public trust in institutions and a weak rule of law6 contribute to the perception that corruption is a large- scale problem. As a result, people from Balkan countries do not feel they have the opportunity to be treated fairly or equally under the law due to corruption and a malfunctioning system. People also feel that employment opportunities are restricted by endemic corruption. According to the ISSR survey, corruption was the third biggest threat for Kosovo Albanians in their country (16 per cent), while only 5 per cent of the Serbian population expressed similar concerns.

Corruption, however, is a widespread phenomenon in the Balkans and is not linked only to state institutions. In Arsovska’s survey (2009) the respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: In my coun-try crime and corruption are flourishing at all levels of society. Not surprisingly, 65 per cent (strongly) agreed (468 out of 726), 13.4 per cent remained undecided and only 21.2 per cent (strongly) disagreed. Although corruption is difficult to measure, there are two areas where South East Europe leads the world according to crime victim surveys: payment of bribes and consumer fraud. Recent surveys have shown that a large proportion of the population continues to report paying bribes. Albania had the highest rate of annual bribe paying (66 per cent) of the 57 coun-tries polled in the 2006 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, and the South East European average was 4.5 times as high as the West European average (see UNODC 2008).

The threat of corruption is thus believed by many in the Western Balkans to be somewhere between a necessary part of life to survive and an endemic problem that contributes heavily to the dysfunction of governmental authorities, business and general life in the territory.

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Organized crime

Various surveys show that organized crime is a recognized threat in the Balkans, but in comparison to other issues such as economic development, many people feel it unnecessary to voice this publicly as a major threat to their own security. Trafficking in persons falls into a similar category (Cleland, et al. 2006). For exam-ple, ISSR questionnaires collected from the public in Kosovo – allegedly a region with major organized crime- related problems – indicated that Serb and Albanian respondents rank organized crime lower than other threats such as economic instability, unemployment, corruption, political instability etc. (see Figure 8.1). Eleven per cent of Serbs felt that organized crime was a top threat and 7 per cent of Albanians ranked it among the top threats. Trafficking is also considered largely as a problem brought by the increasing number of personnel working for the UN and other international institutions.

In terms of police statistics, organized crime activities have never been signifi-cant in the Balkan region despite the great emphasis placed on the phenomenon by international organizations (UNODC 2008). For example, various EU reports estimate that around 70 to 80 per cent of the heroin entering Europe passes via the Balkan route and is regulated by ethnic Albanian organized crime groups,7 although according to police statistics the average heroin seizure in most Balkan countries is very low. Moreover, international reports often state that many Balkan organized crime groups make millions if not billions of dollars annually from their illegal activities and reinvest their dirty money in the Balkan economy. However, Interpol officials have noted that it is not so clear to see where those ‘millions of dollars’ made by the criminal actors have been invested in the Balkans.

Some plausible scenarios explaining the low crime figures and the lack of data are that law enforcement officials in the Balkans are ineffective, or that organized crime activities are simply ignored by the people in the region. The reason for this might be that these activities appear to be perceived by both the Balkan people and states as beneficial (Arsovska and Kostakos 2008; UNODC 2008). In Arsovska’s survey (2009), most of the respondents (strongly) agreed that ‘crime is seen as beneficial by many people in their country (not as a sinister entity)’ (525 out of 726). In personal interviews, law enforcement officials from Albania and Kosovo have stated that illegal immigration, for instance, has been helpful for the local economy of their countries. Channels for smuggling people to comparatively rich states were set up after the collapse of the communist regime in the Balkans. The deteriorating economic conditions in the Balkan countries have certainly contrib-uted to this phenomenon. Ardian Visha, former Director of Foreign Affairs in the Prosecution Office in Tirana, reported in a personal interview that until recently illegal migration was not considered a problem in Albania because emigrant com-munities regularly send money back home, and are helping the local economy. Smuggling of arms, on another level, has helped the Balkan people to ‘build their own independent states’ and thus it has contributed towards their continued exist-ence. Consequently, the booming ‘shadow economy’ in the Balkan countries (up to 70 per cent of the economy in the Balkans is a ‘grey economy’) has been seen

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by many people as a ‘good thing’ and not necessarily as a threat (Cleland, et al. 2006; UNODC 2008).

So far, the findings imply that various types of crime are widely accepted in the Balkan territories among a variety of people from different layers of the society. Thus, although the threat posed by organized crime in the Balkan region should not be underestimated, it is important to acknowledge local people’s percep-tions of this particular threat if we are to introduce effective anti- organized crime policies.

Organized crime and the formation of the Balkan states

We have already illustrated that people from the Balkan region do not perceive organized crime as a major threat to their security. The underlying reasons leading to the acceptance of certain deviant norms in the Balkans should also be inves-tigated. One of the reasons mentioned above is that the Balkan people are more concerned with their economic development than other security issues. The second reason, discussed more thoroughly in this section, is that due to various historical and socio- political factors, people often perceive organized crime as beneficial. This is important for understanding people’s mindset and for introducing more balanced anti- organized crime policies. Our investigation into the historical devel-opment of the modern states in the Balkans reveals that organized crime- related activities have been closely linked with the formation of the Balkan states, their class consciousness and capital.

Organized crime and the communist state

Internal police reports indicate that organized crime is not a new phenomenon; it existed during both communist and post- communist times. Generally speaking, during communism, organized crime activities were controlled mainly by the com-munist states. Former Interior Minister of Bulgaria Bogomil Bonev remarked, ‘One of the reasons our criminal groups became so powerful is that they were organized by the state itself’ (UNODC 2008: 48). According to confidential police reports, certain types of organized crime activities were tolerated in communist countries for three main reasons: earning some extra money for the state; supplying the consumer needs unmet by the official economy; and destabilising capitalist socie-ties. Also, in addition to creating the channels through which different goods were smuggled, the powerful shadow economy empowered a criminal class on which common people depended. It also generated cynicism about the rule of law and tolerance for shady entrepreneurs (UNODC 2008: 48–9).

A key part of communist governance was the internal security police. According to a UNODC (2008) report, the state security police, due to the importance given to their work, operated largely above the law. Underground operators and the security services joined forces (CSD 2004; Anastasijevic 2006). It also became common practice among the security agencies to informally retain professional criminals as informants. In the former Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito’s rule, the decision

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was made to ‘recruit promising young career criminals, straight out of prison, to do the dirty work of spying and occasionally killing overseas … They special-ized in extortion, robbing banks and jewellery stores, stealing art and trafficking in women’ (UNODC 2008: 48). Bulgaria and Romania, now EU members, also had strong secret security services actively involved in organized crime activities during communism.8

The relations between the Albanian secret police (known as the Sigurimi) and organized crime are less well documented but are not non- existent. According to confidential reports, in the 1960s the Albanian communist state made secret arrangements with criminal organizations from Southern Italy. It provided Italian criminals with escape routes via the Adriatic Sea. When Italian Mafiosi were trying to escape from the Italian police, they were allowed to make use of the Adriatic as well as Albanian airports where they stored smuggled cigarettes. This agreement was signed between the Sigurimi and the Italian criminal organizations. The agree-ment was approved by the political bureau and the dictator Enver Hoxha. On the basis of this agreement a special unit was created in Albania – ‘101K’. The unit was stationed in the village of Rrushbull in Durres, 5 km from the port of Durres in Albania. It was composed of officials of the Albanian border police. The members of the unit were guarding ships full of cigarettes which were departing from Durres, as well as the cigarette storage houses located in the village of Rrushbull. Mustafaraj Ilir, the former Albanian vice minister, reported that in one year the Italian Mafia had paid US$22 million in cash to the Albanian state. The money went to the state budget, part of it going to the budget of the Ministry of the Interior. Rama Mersin, the father of Rama Luan (Minister of the Interior in Albania in the period 2002–3 and a member of the Socialist Party), was commandant of the elite group ‘101K’. The agreement between the Italian mobsters and the Albanian state was allegedly negotiated between Myftin Qazim and Nenshati Lorenc, two important agents of the Sigurimi. They were granted political asylum and are now living in Switzerland.9

Based on internal police reports, other state- controlled criminal activities in Albania were the cultivation of Papaver somniferum (opium poppy) and the estab-lishment of parallel systems for the distribution of food.

Political–criminal post- communist ties

The post- communist transition from totalitarian regime to democracy is often associ-ated with the growth of corruption, privatization fraud, protection rackets and other forms of organized crime. Rapid social, economic and political change and policy uncertainty also contribute to higher crime rates, along with conflicts and political instability. During the last two decades, the Balkan countries have undergone both of these difficult historical processes (transition and conflict) simultaneously.

State security and police agents

After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, members of the secret police and their criminal allies were well placed to make profits out of the ‘emerging capitalism’.

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Research shows that party functionaries were awarded state- owned companies at non- competitive rates (CSD 2004). In the Balkans, these functionaries were often secret policemen, who ‘teamed their clandestine skills with their criminal contacts to create local monopolies and shady multinational conglomerates’ (UNODC 2008). They also maintained their links with those in political power, leading to a substantial merger of the political, the commercial, and the criminal.

[In Serbia] at the top sit functionaries who are unequivocally loyal to Milosevic. They distribute monopolies for the import of gas, cigarettes, and other profit-able merchandise among various businessmen, while taking their own cut. Policemen and customs officers, whose job is to shut their eyes when neces-sary, also get a piece of the action.

(UNODC 2008)

In Albania the abolition of the Albanian secret service Sigurimi in 1991 left around 10,000 agents unemployed.10 In 1996, one analyst noted:

Liberalization had brought with it corruption and profiteering by ruthless men … It has been these men who continue to profit, and now have the means to travel in and out of Albania with relative ease. Establishing themselves as legitimate businessmen, they easily obtain travel visas from the Albanian gov-ernment … [In 1992–3] the Albanian government removed nearly two thirds of [Sigurimi] personnel. Many of the ex- Sigurimi agents, once in feared positions of power, now found themselves unemployed, stripped of their state pensions. Antagonistic towards the new government, these personnel offered their serv-ices to those willing and capable of paying for them, organized crime.

(UNODC 2008: 50)

The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the fall of the pyramid schemes in Albania in 199711 were particularly exploited by the security agents and some criminal segments of the Balkan societies. These actors made use of international sanc-tions as a money- making opportunity. The UN embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1992 offered an immediate opportunity – organising smuggling channels to supply Yugoslavia with oil. Oil smuggling was initially organized by the Serbian State Security Service (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti: SDB), but many ‘ordinary’ citizens also became involved in the business. The value of smuggled oil some-times reached more than US$1 million per day – a great source of income for the Albanians. Fortunes were made importing oil illegally from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and FYR of Macedonia under the coordination of the secret police (UNODC 2008; CSD 2004). Large- scale smuggling of cigarettes and coffee to Montenegro, using the oil smuggling routes, followed in 1993. Importantly, the various forms of smuggling were perceived by many as necessary for survival.

Furthermore, in the early 1990s, smuggling channels in Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo were created to obtain weapons and resources to supply the newly formed Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian armies.

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Smuggling of weapons, commonly associated with ‘nation building’, was also per-ceived as beneficial by many Balkan people and governments. Sources point out that the first weapon smuggling channels in Bosnia were set up by the head of the KOS (Counter- Intelligence Service), Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a Bosnian Serb (CSD 2004: 47). Other countries in the region were also involved in arms trafficking, often through official government channels (see Arsovska and Kostakos 2008).

Moreover, according to the Albanian government, in the period between 1997 and 2002 around 150,000 small arms and light weapons were illegally transferred from Albania, mainly to Kosovo and Macedonia. Most of these weapons ended up in the hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) (Anastasijevic 2006; Zaborskiy 2007). During 2004 the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano was accused of trafficking weapons to the KLA in the late 1990s. Although he formally denied the allegations, Nano stated that it was morally defensible to assist the KLA at that time (Arsovska 2009).

Paramilitaries and criminal groups

Many of the distinctive features of the Yugoslav conflicts are attributable to the use of irregular combat groups or paramilitaries. These criminal combatants protected and exploited their co- patriots, while alternately trading gunfire and consumer goods with their ‘enemies’. They were able to simultaneously enrich themselves and serve their respective causes, gaining both economic and political capital.

In addition to looting and smuggling, the paramilitary groups found many other ways of making money. International aid was stolen or resold to desperate communities who, paradoxically, saw their exploiters as ‘lifelines’. During the post- conflict period, local communities in the Balkans relied heavily on home- grown criminals for protection. Consequently, many of these criminals were respected by their communities. One such character was ‘Juka’, a Sarajevo rack-eteer who rose during the war in Bosnia. ‘Juka’ was a repeat offender who ran a collection agency/extortion scheme in Sarajevo. He was able to employ a staff of some 300 men in this racket, who would become the basis of his paramilitary unit (the ‘Wolves’) during the siege of the city. He was widely praised for his valour, becoming the subject of war- time songs (UNODC 2008: 51).

Many paramilitary fighters from the Balkans also became members of the state security units, further reinforcing the link between the government and the under-world. One of the most notorious paramilitary leaders was ‘Arkan’, a Serb whose career included stints as a bank robber, international fugitive, political assassin, cake shop proprietor, paramilitary commander, indicted war criminal, soccer club owner, parliamentarian, and tabloid celebrity (UNODC 2008: 54). Many of the former KLA fighters, both criminals and honest men, also entered politics after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, or were given jobs in the state security units (Arsovska and Kostakos 2008).

According to UN studies, some of those who profited the most from war have successfully ‘cleaned’ their wealth, and now present themselves as legitimate

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economic as well as political elites in their respective countries (UNODC 2008: 53). In a personal interview with the first author, Filip de Ceuninck, an international police expert working in the EU police mission ‘Proxima’ in Macedonia stated:

After the conflict period in Macedonia [2001] and the broader region, a sig-nificant number of criminal figures were wearing ‘four hats’. Many of them started as freedom fighters and warlords, and then moved into politics. For personal gains some of these politicians became involved in different scams, including organized and white- collar crime.

In summary, after the fall of communism in the Balkans a more symbiotic rela-tionship developed as both crime groups and the modern Balkan states evolved. Political–criminal interrelations during the formation of new states in the Balkans have left a legacy of institutional ambivalence towards illicit activities. For various reasons, criminal behaviour was also reinforced by the social masses who often saw crime as beneficial for their own personal survival as well as for the creation and strengthening of their newly established states (‘nation building’).

Discussion and conclusion

Our findings show that the EU regards organized crime as a serious issue that requires military responses. After analyzing the language of more than 1,000 press releases we also identified two strong narrative structures promoting the legitimacy and authority of the EU as an institution actively seeking to ‘fight organized crime’. However, we argue here that the EU cannot impose its normative order on other countries and ‘fight organized crime’ without taking into careful consideration the perceptions of local people with regards to the threats and problems addressed in the EU anti- organized crime policies; and the historical, political and social developments of the countries where the EU normative order is to be established. We consider these components vital for the effective establishment of normative order in foreign socio- cultural contexts.

With regards to the first point we showed that high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity in the Balkan countries. Economic instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption and increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Balkan state institutions. Because the lack of economic devel-opment and unemployment are key threats, people have tried to find ‘innovative ways’ to pursue their success goals as well as to survive. The Western capitalist societies, on the one hand, have placed enormous pressure on the local population to be rich, promoting materialistic values. The governments, on the other hand, could not offer these people legitimate opportunities to make money, which has consequently resulted in an increase in the grey economy in the Balkans. As Merton argues, ‘dominant pressure [to be wealthy] has led towards the gradual attenua-tion of legitimate, but by and large ineffectual, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more effective, expedients’ (1968: 199–200).

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Thus it appears that organized crime has become a vehicle for accumulating capital and power since it provides avenues for achieving the emblematic goals promoted by the West. The main challenge for the Balkans now lies in developing a solid, job- creating economy able to support its fast- growing population and less in ‘fighting organized crime’. Organized crime and other profit- oriented activities have been seen as beneficial by many people in the Balkans, not as a key threat to security. And as Charles Tilly (1985) points out, organized crime seems to be closely linked with the development of nation- states. Paradoxically, policing organized crime can be regarded as an effort to facilitate the construction of the EU’s political identity as an international actor.

With regards to the second point we show that the EU has presented the problem of organized crime as a ‘new phenomenon’, without investigating thoroughly the social and political context in which it emerged. Overall, various examples from the Balkans have shown that temporary accommodations between authorities and organized crime during the creation of new states has led to a permanent trans-formation of state interests into private ones and has fostered the development of non- transparent, crime- permeated societies. The research findings show that due to various historical processes (transition, conflict, etc.) the people in the Balkans still perceive many organized crime activities as beneficial. They do not understand why these activities nowadays present, as the EU claims, a major threat to their security. All this serves as an obstacle to the effective implementation of the EU anti- organized crime policies in the Western Balkans.

Notes 1 The EU’s existing member states have accepted these countries – namely Albania,

Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo – as potential future members.

2 The corpus analyzed comprises press releases from the Europa Rapid Database. The database was searched for articles that contained the key phrase ‘organized crime’. The links of 1096 articles were subsequently analyzed using text- mining techniques in order to extract the text of press releases in English. The output of this analysis produced a single file that contained 1006 press releases from 1994 to 2008 totalling 2,835,519 words. This corpus was subsequently fed into corpus linguistic software (Antconc 3.2) in order to identify linguistic and semantic patterns in the text.

3 In 2006, a cross- national survey on the meaning of violence and crime in an eth-nic Albanian context was conducted by Arsovska (2009). A sample of 864 ethnic Albanian respondents from Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo were interviewed. Moreover, references to the findings of other public surveys such as those conducted by the Internal Security Reform Sector in Kosovo (2006), World Values Survey and the International Commission in the Balkans (2005) are made in this chapter.

4 ISSR public opinion survey completed by approximately 800 homes in Kosovo. 5 As illustrated later in this chapter, the distrust of state institutions and police is not

necessarily a new phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in the Balkan history (‘state as the enemy’).

6 SEESAC Survey, Gani Bobi Institute/Safeworld, June 2006. 7 Most of the countries of the Balkan region perform very poorly in terms of the standard-

ized indicators relating to rule of law. The World Bank provides composite governance figures. Kosovo (Serbia) and Albania fell lower in the ranking than the average in

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sub- Saharan Africa, and the Balkan region in general scored less than the average for East Europe or the OECD countries (UNODC 2008: 20).

8 Based on estimates provided by Europol and Interpol. 9 The Bulgarian secret police were referred to as the Committee for State Security

(Darzhavna Sigurnost, or DS). The DS engaged in state- sponsored smuggling, alleg-edly including drug smuggling. In Romania, the secret police were known as the Securitate, and were the largest such group in the Eastern Bloc, with some 14,000 agents and an informant network estimated at 500,000. Securitate agents were also involved in smuggling of drugs, guns and cigarettes (UNODC 2008; CSD 2004).

10 Based on a confidential intelligence report. 11 Investigated criminal files from Belgium (1992–2005) confirm the involvement of

ex- Sigurimi agents in organized crime activities in the West (see also Leman and Janssens 2006).

12 Some have argued that the collapse was related to the loss of revenues from sanctions busting, particularly the oil embargo, since some of the schemes derived income from this source (UNODC 2008: 52).

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The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans: A world of diverging views?

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