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The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University of the Western Cape.
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The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Dec 25, 2015

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Page 1: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

The scientific risks of GMO release.

Dr. William H.L Stafford,Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology,Department of Biotechnology, University of the Western Cape.

Page 2: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

GMOs and breeding

We have been modifying our food sources for thousands of years, selecting for favourable characteristics. These breeding techniques rely on fertlization by cross-pollination of the same species

Biotechnology uses the tools of genetic engineering to modify a plant with any chosen characteristic. Species barriers can be crossed- we can take a gene from one organism and place it in another totally unrelated organism and create transgenics or GMOs

Page 3: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

GMOs

© Strong promoter

© Marker

gene

© Desired gene

©

Terminator

Marker gene for antibiotic resistance (ampicillin, kanamycin)

Viral Promoter eg. cauliflower mosaic virus (35SCamV)

Page 4: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Estimated 80 million hectares of GMOs planted to date. Mainly cotton, maize, canola, soya.

GMO crops that have Herbicide resistant genes or genes for insecticidal toxins account for more than 93% of the types of GM crops grown worldwide..

Bt Cotton

Bt maize

GMOs (food crops) have been released

-an experiment

Page 5: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Scientific Risk Assessments

Absence of Risk = Absence of Science..

Absence of evidence is not evidence of

absence! ”No harms reported” is not the same as

”no harms exist”!

Page 6: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Environmental interactions

Consumption of GMO plant: humans, birds, insects, amphibians, microbes

Outcrossing and horizontal gene transfer

Soil microbiota

Stability and persistence of transgene product (eg. Insecticide, herbicide)

Page 7: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS Random integration into the genome

Despite its importance for safety assessment, applications submitted to the USDA requesting permission to commercialise a transgenic line provide neither the sequence of the genomic DNA flanking the inserted transgene nor a comparison with the original genome.

Truncations, rearrangements, tandem repeats at one or more sites (perhaps reflecting the instability of the gene constructs) have been reported. (Collonier, et al. 2003)

Page 8: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

T25 maize - LibertylinkTM (Bayer)Tolerance to herbicide glufosinateConstruct content : truncated bla gene (bla*), pUC cloning vector (pUC), synthetic pat gene (pat), CaMV 35S promotor and terminator (P35S, T35S).

• Part of pUC cloning vector containing truncated B-lactamase gene (bla) • DNA rearrangement: presence of a second truncated and rearranged P35S on the 5’ end.

• Insertion site: the 5’ and 3’ ends of the insert show homologies with Huck retrotransposons.

Maize DNA35SCaMV pUC18 T35SpUC18bla*

bla*

pUC18 patT35S

bla*

Sequence observed

Sequence expected

(Presence of cloning vector + the 5 first bp of bla on the 3’ end )

35SCaMV

35SCaMVpat

Page 9: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Rearrangements, deletions and multiple insertions….

Mon 810 maize YieldGard (Monsanto) Modified for resistance to lepidopteran insects (butterflies & moths). Company data showed insert has a P35S

driving a CrylAb synthetic gene with terminator T-nos. Analysis revealed however, that T-nos and part of the 3’ (tail) end of the CrylAb gene have been deleted. T-nos has been detected elsewhere in the genome. The 5’ (head) end of the insertion site shows homology to the long terminal repeats (LTR) of the maize alpha Zein gene cluster.

GTS 40-3-2 Roundup ready soybean (Monsanto) Modified for tolerance to herbicide glyphosate. Company data showed insert with P35S driving a composite gene

containing the N-terminal chloroplast transit peptide (CPT4) joined to modified epsps gene with T-nos terminator. Analysis revealed that a 254bp piece of DNA homologous to the epsps gene and 534bp of unknown DNA have been joined to the 3’end of the insert. It was not possible to identify the insertion site.

Bt 176 maize (Syngenta) Modified for tolerance to herbicide glufosinate, male sterility and insect resistance. Company data showed insert

contains P35S driving the bar gene (glufosinate tolerance) terminated by T35S, followed by the ampicillin resistance (bla) gene plus bacterial promoter, and plasmid origin of replication, ori. Analysis revealed several fragments, all containing CaMV 35S promoter, one with P35S joined to T35S, a second with P35S joined to an unknown sequence, and a third with P35S joined to the bar gene with the T35S deleted. There were at least three insertion sites.

Collonier C, Berthier G, Boyer F, Duplan M-N, Fernandez S, Kebdani N, Kobilinsky A, Romanuk M, Bertheau Y. Characterization of commercial GMO inserts: a source of useful material to study genome fluidity. Poster courtesy of Pr. Gilles-Eric Seralini, Président du Conseil Scientifique du CRII-GEN, www.crii-gen.org

Page 10: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

How do they occur ?

• When transgenic DNA is introduced into the plant cell a wound-response produces DNA repair enzymes that use DNA fragments for DNA repair, resulting in its rearrangement of the plant DNA.

• Twelve representative transgenic rice lines were analyzed, and found to have several rearrangements demonstrating transgenic instability. The 35SCamV promoter was identified as recombination hotspot (Kohli et al.,1999).

Page 11: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Gene transfer and escape

Genes can spread from transgenic plants by ordinary cross-pollination to nontransgenic plants of the same or similar species, and also by horizontal gene transfer to unrelated species.

With selection, such elements have increased penetrance into the environment and cannot easily be contained or controlled once they have entered the wider environment!

Page 12: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Hybridisation, Outcrossing and escape: Gene transfer and escape happens

Herbicide resistant transgenes from GMO plants were 20 times more likely to escape and spread than the same gene obtained by mutagenesis. (Bergelson, J. et al. 1998.)

Transgenic DNA introgressed into traditional maize landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico (Quist D and Chapela IH. 2001). Several cobs tested positive for the CaMV 35S promoter and sequence analysis of insertion site by inverse PCR indicated diverse sequences. Follow-up studies by two Mexican government laboratories found evidence of the CaMV 35S promoter in 12% of plants sample from Oaxaca and the adjacent state of Puebla (Mann 2002).

Transgenic DNA containing the CaMV 35S promoter is unstable and can randomly insert into the genome.

Page 13: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Contamination

Pollen flow may occur over large distances for some crops (km for maize, canola; only m for potato). Transport, storage, and processing of seeds and crops are also routes for contamination.

StarLink cry9 corn was approved for animal feed but not human consumption. It was discovered in a wide variety of processed foods. Despite a massive recall of food products and extraordinary efforts to cry9 transgenes still persisted at detectable levels in US corn supplies 3 years later (USDA 2003b).

Page 14: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Widespread contamination of seedlots

Seed purity has long been an important issue for agronomists and plant breeders. Test on non-GM canola seedlots were tested, the majority of tested seedlots contained at least trace amounts of genetically engineered herbicide-tolerance traits. In fact, 97% (32 of 33) of the seedlots tested by Friesen et al. (2003), and 59% (41 of 70) of the seedlot stested by Downey and Beckie (2002) had foreign transgenes present at detectable levels (above 0.01%).

This level of contamination in pedigreed seed is disturbing since even stringent segregation systems were not sufficient to deliver pure non-GM canola seed to farmers in western Canada.

Page 15: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Human error and contamination

BT11 maize (Cry1Ab insecticidal toxin under the 35SCaMV promoter and pat gene for resistance to the herbicide glufosinate, Basta) was approved for commercial release and grown in the USA (2001) and later in South Africa (2003).

December 2004, the Syngenta informed the US government that it had just learned that the Bt11 corn had been mislabeled and 165 000 tons of Bt10 seed were grown in the US and the resultant maize was sold as in the US and abroad.

Page 16: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Although Bt10 is “functionally equivalent” to Bt11 there are differences:

Bt11 is approved for commercial release and human consumption in, Bt10 is not.

The transgene is inserted at a different position in the plant DNA.

Bt10 produces only about 1/7th the amount of the insecticidalprotein as Bt11.

More than one Cry1Ab toxin protein produced in Bt11. The most substantial difference between Bt10 and Bt11 is that

Bt10 contains the bla gene for ampicillin resistance.

Page 17: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Effects on biodiversity

The most obvious effects of cross-pollination already identified are in creating herbicide-tolerant, or insecticidal weeds and superweeds and the loss of locally adapted (‘indigenous’) crop varieties.

Studies with oilseed rape (Brassica napus) have shown that the Bt gene can be passed on to a wild, weedier relative (Brassica rapa) (Halfhill, M.D., et al. 2002.).

Page 18: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Horizontal Gene Transfer (HGT)

Horizontal transfer from the transgenic plants may spread the novel genes and gene-constructs to unrelated species- bactreia, fungi and viruses in the soil, worms, insects reptiles, birds, small mammals and human beings

Horizontal gene transfer has been rare the billions of years of our evolution, because of natural species barriers preventing genetic exchange and because there are mechanisms which inactivate or break down foreign DNA.

Horizontal gene transfer of genes from one species to another may be a major factor in evolutionary change (Syvanen, M. 1986)

Page 19: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

HGT to soil microbes matters

Microorganisms dominate soil-borne communities, and largely determine ecosystem functions, such as nutrient cycling and decomposition. Their direct and indirect interactions with plants create strong feedback mechanisms, influencing primary production and vegetation dynamics. They are important in both plant pathogenicity and protection.

The majority (>99%) of the microbial world is uncultured. Thousands of bacterial species per gram of soil whose functions are unknown!

Bacteria can take up DNA by several ways- transformation (DNA uptake), transduction (virus) or conjugation (Hfr mating)

HGT to bacteria can spread antibiotic resistance marker genes to pathogenic microbes and disrupt ecosystem function.

Page 20: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Factors that increase HGT to bacteria

Factors affecting the likelihood of uptake of DNA into soil-borne microbes include: the stability of the inserted genetic material, the presence of similar (homologous) sequences in resident microorganisms the length of time that GM material or DNA remains intact and the proximity of potential recipient species.

Agents that induce a stress response (J. Beaber et al., 2003)“SOS response promotes horizontal dissemination of antibiotic resistance genes,”

Agricultural practices (Continual selection eg. Herbicide. Ploughing, etc).

Page 21: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

HGT to soil bacteria

Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) occurs at very low frequency (indetectable using some methods)

Experiments with the the nptII gene in transgenic potato plants coding for kanamycin resistance, detected HGT to Pseudomonas stutzeri and Acinetobacter BD413 at a frequency of 3x10-5 -1x10-4 despite the presence of a more than 106 fold excess of plant DNA. This dropped to 10-16–10-17 when no sequence similarity was present (de Vries J., Wackernagel W., 1998).

HGT to bacteria is most efficient where sequence similarity is present.

The bla and npt genes used as antibiotic resistance markers in some GM crops show sequence similarity to bacterial genes.

The pat and epsps genes (T25 maize - LibertylinkTM (Bayer) and GA21 maize (Monsanto) confer resistance to the glufosinate and glyphosphate herbicides (Basta and Roundup) also show significant sequence similarity to bacterial genes.

Page 22: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

HGT and virus recombination

New and successful variants of viruses do arise naturally by recombination with a frequency that varies depending on the virus family (e.g. Chenault and Melcher 1994; Revers et al 1996; Padidam et al 1999). Success of a given variant depends upon the conditions (selective pressures).

The CamV is a recombination hotspot and therefore subject to increased HGT. CamV is from pararetroviruses, family that includes Hepatitis.

Reactivation of dormant viruses and the generation of new viruses?

Page 23: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Effects of HGT

More important than the frequency of HGT is what happens to the resulting transgenic microorganisms. Without positive selection for the new trait, it will soon be lost and have no further impact on the system. However, even a low frequency event can have an important impact if selection is strong.

The novelty of a trait can also influence its potential impact, as completely novel genes might give rise to new genetic variants that are not possible within the normal genetic pool of the system.

Page 24: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Summary of ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS :

Generation of new bacterial pathogens and the spread of drug and antibiotic resistance marker genes among pathogens Reactivation and the generation of new viruses

Increased resistance to herbicides, leading to super-weed characteristics

Position effects with unwanted changes in gene expression and occurrence of cancers caused by random inserton (insertional mutagenesis).

Reduced biodiversity due to GMO selection, outcrossing and contamination

Unpredictable effects on genetic evolution and ecosystem function

Page 25: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

High levels of expression of transgene

The CaMv is a strong promoter providing a high level of gene expression.

All living organisms that interact with the transgenic plant (bacteria-birds and human beings) are exposed to high levels of the expressed transgene that are new to their physiology. Adverse immunological or allergic responses can be expected. The GMO insecticidal toxins such as Bt have been shown to affect beneficial non-target organisms including lacewings, ladybirds and earthworms (Birch, A.N.E., et al. 1997, and Marvier, M. 2001.) Bt can persist in certain soil types for up to 234 days.

There is evidence of insect pests becoming resistant after only a few years after the transgenic crops were first released since Bt-toxin genes are expressed continuously at high levels throughout the growing season.

Page 26: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

DNA persistence in the environment

DNA is not completely broken down in the gut. Genes can spread from ingested transgenic plant material to bacteria in the gut. Antibiotic resistant marker genes from genetically engineered bacteria can be transferred to indigenous gut bacteria (Netherwood T, et al. Technical report on the Food Standards Agency project G010008)

DNA can persist in the soil for years. Transgenes from GMO plants may be able to spread to soil bacteria, spreading antibiotic resistance marker genes among the pathogens.

Practically every medical organization that has looked at GM crop safety has expressed concern, including the American Medical Association, World Health Organization, UK Royal Society, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Pasteur Institute, European Food Safety Authority, and Codex Alimentarius

The EU has decided to prohibit GMOs with antibiotic resistance genes after the 31st December 2004 (directive 2001/18EC and Revising Directive 90/220/CEE

Page 27: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

HEALTH RISKS: Expected and unexpected toxicity

Transgenic potatoes expressing GNA insecticide (“Snowdrop”, Galanthus nivalis, lectin) fed to rats resulted in increase in intestinal mucosal thickness and T-lymphocyte infiltration. (Ewen S. W. B, and Pusztai, A. 1999)

Monsanto's transgenic soya, has a 26.7% increase in a trypsin-inhibitor and has been shown to inhibit the growth rate of male rats. This raises the possibility that transgenic soya is responsible for the reported recent increase in soya allergy.

Human gene therapy experiments for severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) caused by a single non-functional gene (adenosine deaminase) were halted by the FDA after a second treated child died of cancer. Molecular analysis showed that the T cells were a single clone derived from one original cell that has multiplied out of control. The retroviral vector used – mouse Moloney leukaemia virus – had inserted into a gene on chromosome 11 causing truncation gene trucation and oncogenesis.

Page 28: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Requirements for GMO release

Efficient and specific gene targeting to cells

Stable, single insertion of gene at defined site with no other DNA (viral promoters or antibiotic resistance genes)

Normal levels of expression of desired gene

Proven safety (consumption and the evironment).

X The GMO crops on the market fulfill none of these criteria

Page 29: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Better methods available?

Site specific recombination using Zn finger protein linked to integrase-target gene.

Control under endogenous promoters. Plastid engineering (Daniell et al., 2002) Other marker genes, such as green fluorescent protein, or

mannose (Joersbo et al., 1998) Removing the antibiotic resistance genes before the plants are

released for commercial use (Lamtham and Day, 2000; Zuo et al., 2001), so that these genes can be used during development and then eliminated from the final product.

Use of introns to prevent expression in bacteria while allowing plant expression (Libiakova et al., 2001).

Page 30: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

A lack of labelling and monitoring

The transgenic genes of GMO crops are covered by patent. Since these GMO crops can be considered novel inventions however the food-crop is considered “functionally equivalent” (mainly un broad nutritional grounds) and no labelling is required in many countries including as South Africa.

If there are problems……there is no labelling, no monitoring and ten there will be

difficulties in tracking and establishing liability.Can we recall the release of a GMO from the environment?Which is more cost effective- proper risk assessment, monitoring

&labelling or loss of markets (EU) and clean-up cost from contamination?

Page 31: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

Future of GMOs

It is important to distinguish between contained use of transgenic organisms and their release to the environment.

It is vital that GMO crops are proven safe for through proper independent, long-term feeding trials and environmental impact assessments

It is essential to monitor GMOs since they have been released and we need to observe the effects in this experiment

Page 32: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.

ReferencesHo, M.W., Meyer, H. and Cummins, J. (1998). The biotechnology bubble. The Ecologist 28(3), 146-153 Kohli A.,Griffiths S, Palacios N, Twyman R, Vain P, Laurie D and Christou P. (1999) Molecular characterization of transforming plasmid rearrangements in transgenic rice reveals a recombination hot spot in the CaMV 35S promoter and confirms the predominance of microhomology mediated recombination" Plant.J. 17,591-601. Sengelov G, Kristensen KJ, Sorensen AH, Kroer N, and Sorensen SJ. Effect of genomic location on horizontal transfer of a recombinant gene cassette between Pseudomonas strains in the rhizosphere and spermosphere of barley seedlings. Current Microbiology 2001, 42, 160-7. George A. Kowalchuk, Maaike Bruinsma and Johannes A. van Veen. Assessing responses of soil microorganisms to GM plants TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution Vol.18 No.8 August 2003 Bergelson, J., Purrington, C.B. and Wichmann, G. (1998). Promiscuity in transgenic plants. Nature 395, 25 Quist D and Chapela IH. (2001) Transgenic DNA introgressed into traditional maize landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico. Nature, 414, 541-3, 2001 Syvanen, M . 1986. Cross-species gene transfer: a major factor in evolution?   Trends In Genetics pp 1—4 Hilbeck, A., Baumgartner, M., Fried, P.M. and Bigler, F. (1997). Effects of transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis-corn-fed prey on mortality and development time of immature Chrysoperla carnea (Neuroptera: Chrysopidae). Environmental Entomology Halfhill, M.D., R.J. Millwood, P.L. Raymer, and C.N.Stewart, Jr. 2002. Bt-transgenic oilseed rape hybridization with its weedy relative, Brassica rapa.Environmental Biosafety Research 1: 19-28. Birch, A.N.E., Geoghegan, I.I., Majerus, M.E.N., Hackett, C. and Allen, J. (1997). Interaction between plant resistance genes, pest aphid-population and beneficial aphid predators. Soft Fruit and Pernial Crops. October, 68-79. Hilbeck, A., Baumgartner, M., Fried, P.M. and Bigler, F. (1997). Effects of transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis-corn-fed prey on mortality and development time of immature Chrysoperla carnea (Neuroptera: Chrysopidae). Environmental Entomology 27, 480-487.Vaden V.S. and Melcher, U. (1990). Recombination sites in cauliflower mosaic virus DNAs: implications for mechanisms of recombination. Virology 177, 717-26Halfhill, M.D., R.J. Millwood, P.L. Raymer, and C.N.Stewart, Jr. 2002. Bt-transgenic oilseed rape hybridization with its weedy relative, Brassica rapa.. Environmental Biosafety Research 1: 19-28. Lommel, S.A. and Xiong, Z. (1991). Recombination of a functional red clover necrotic mosaic virus by recombination rescue of the cell-to-cell movement gene expressed in a transgenic plant. J. Cell Biochem. 15A, 151; Greene, A.E. and Allison, R.F. (1994). Recombination between viral RNA and transgenic plant transcripts. Science 263, 1423-5; Wintermantel, W.M. and Schoelz, J.E. (1996). Isolation of recombinant viruses between cauliflower mosaic virus and a viral gene in transgenic plants under conditions of moderate selection pressure. Virology 223, 156-64. Sengelov G, Kristensen KJ, Sorensen AH, Kroer N, and Sorensen SJ. (2001) Effect of genomic location on horizontal transfer of a recombinant gene cassette between Pseudomonas strains in the rhizosphere and spermosphere of barley seedlings. Current Microbiology, 42, 160-7. Ewen S. W. B, and Pusztai,A. (1999) Effect of diets containing genetically modified potatoes expressing Galanthus nivalis lectin on rat small intestine Lancet 16 OctoberMacKenzie, D. (1999). Gut reaction. New Scientist 30 Jan., p.4. Schubbert, R., Renz, D., Schmitz, B. and Doerfler, W. (1997). Foreign (M13) DNA ingested by mice reaches peripheral leukocytes, spleen and liver via the intestinal wall mucosa and can be covalently linked to mouse DNA. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 94, 961-6. Netherwood T, Martin-Orue SM, O'Donnell AG, Gockling S, Gilbert HJ and Mathers JC. Transgenes in genetically modified Soya survive passage through the small bowel but are completely degraded in the colon. Technical report on the Food Standards Agency project G010008 "Evaluating the risks associated with using GMOs in human foods"- University of Newcastle. Marvier, M. 2001. Ecology of transgenic crops. American Scientist 89: 160-167Collonier C, Berthier G, Boyer F, Duplan M-N, Fernandez S, Kebdani N, Kobilinsky A, Romanuk M, Bertheau Y. (June 2003) Characterization of commercial GMO inserts: a source of useful material to study genome fluidity. Poster courtesy of Pr. Gilles-Eric Seralini, Président du Conseil Scientifique du CRII-GEN, www.crii-gen.org de Vries J, Wackernagel W (1998) Detection of nptII (kanamycin resistance) genes in genomes of transgenic plants by marker-rescue transformation. Mol Gen Genet 257:606-613Koskella, J. and G. Stotzky. 1997. Microbial utilization of free and clay-bound insecticidal toxins from Bacillus thuringiensis and their retention of insecticidal activityafter incubation with microbes. Applied and Environmental Microbiology 63: 3561-3568;Tapp, H. and G. Stotzky. 1998. Persistence of the insecticidal toxin from Bacillus thuringiensis subsp. kurstaki in soil. SoilBiology Biochem. 30(4): 471-476.

Page 33: The scientific risks of GMO release. Dr. William H.L Stafford, Advanced Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Department of Biotechnology, University.