The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the Perspective of …s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/75568/1/1t700354.pdf · 2019-04-29 · The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the

The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the Perspective of Good Governance

Seok-Jin Eom*

Abstract: This study analyzes the rural Saemaul Undong of the 1970s in theRepublic of Korea from the perspective of good governance. Diverse characteris-tics of good governance appeared in the Saemaul Undong—in particular, sponta-neous participation by village people. This participation was not only a primaryfactor in the achievements of the Saemaul Undong, but also made it consensus-oriented, responsive, and transparent in terms of decision-making and projectimplementation at the village level. Participation in the villages was promotedand supported by government intervention and strategies, which brought notonly efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability, but also increased equity andinclusiveness in the Saemaul Undong. The Saemaul Undong embodied a numberof characteristics of good governance.

Keywords: rural Saemaul Undong, good governance, rural development

INTRODUCTION

The rural Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement in English) was a community-based rural development program that emerged in the Republic of Korea in the 1970s.Recently, interest in the Saemaul Undong has increased. As antipoverty and communitydevelopment programs have been promoted in earnest in developing countries, it hasbegun to receive attention as a successful example of such a program. In particular,countries that promote community development policies, such as China, Vietnam, andAfrican countries, and international organizations that support the development ofrural areas and communities in the developing countries, have begun to send ruralcommunity leaders and public officials to the Republic of Korea to learn about the

Manuscript received June 13, 2011; out for review June 17, 2011; review completed July 14, 2011;accepted August 1, 2011.

The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2011), pp. 17-43.© 2011 by the GSPA, Seoul National University

* Seok-Jin Eom is an assistant professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration atSeoul National University. E-mail: [email protected]. The author deeply appreciates anony-mous reviewers’ valuable comments. This research was supported by a grant from the SeoulNational University Foundation in 2010.

procedures and elements that led to the success of the Saemaul Undong (Jeong, 2007;So, 2007).

In spite of this increased attention from policy makers and researchers, it seemsthat a more comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the Saemaul Undong is needed.Those working from a position that opposes the authoritarian political system of thePark Chung-hee era tend to offer a one-sided negation of it. Others stress only its posi-tive aspects and disregard its problems and limitations (Hwang, 2006). Due to this,analysis and evaluation of the Saemaul Undong has tended to resort to dichotomouslogic, presenting it in terms of success or failure and spontaneous participation orforced mobilization.

The various and multilayered functions of the Saemaul Undong as a modernizingproject cannot be properly analyzed from such extreme either-or perspectives. Becauseprevious research has adopted such perspectives, the institutional and social contextsthat defined the Saemaul Undong and the idiosyncratic interactions between the stateand rural communities in the course of implementing it have been overlooked, andempirical analyses of these contexts have not been fully carried out. Limitations likethese have contributed to scholars’ current inability to answer the most fundamentaland practical questions regarding it (Park, 2009; So, 2007): Is the rural SaemaulUndong of the 1970s relevant to the 21st century as a model of community develop-ment? What aspects of it should we preserve or discard?

This study revisits the Saemaul Undong by applying the good governance model.It explores structural and agency factors related to the Saemaul Undong using good-governance suggestions regarding characteristics that the public sector should have indeveloping countries that are also liberal democracies. This analysis is expected toidentify various multilayered characteristics of the Saemaul Undong and also re-evaluateit in terms of values governance should possess in the 21st century.

To best achieve the purpose and execute the detailed tasks of this study, its range islimited to rural aspects of the movement in the 1970s, the time of its greatest vigor andachievement. Since the 1980s, as an effect of the changing political environment, itscontent and range have changed greatly, and its achievements have lessened (Hwang,2006). Though the government expanded the Saemaul Undong to cities and workplacesafter the rural prototype proved successful, this analysis will focus on the early phaseof the rural Saemaul Undong, which had the most impressive results.

The following section examines previous studies on the Saemaul Undong andreviews the good governance model, establishing this study’s theoretical backgroundand key characteristics. Next, the background, development process, and achieve-ments of the Saemaul Undong are presented, followed by an analysis of the movementaccording to the characteristics of good governance. The conclusion evaluates the

18 The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the Perspective of Good Governance

The Korean Journal of Policy Studies

characteristics of the Saemaul Undong and suggests its policy implications for thecurrent era.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Positive Argument

Studies positively evaluating the Saemaul Undong tend to appreciate it as one ofthe modernizing strategies of the Park Chung-hee regime and find it to have con-tributed significantly to both modernization and economic development. Even thoughthey point out problems, such as the oppressive promotion of the Saemaul Undong,these scholars evaluate it as a successful community development effort that builtpeople’s confidence in social change and significantly reduced poverty in rural areas(Park, 2009; So, 2007; S. Ha, 2002; Y. Kim, 1991; J. Kim, 1990; Kim & Kim, 1981).

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (1981), the Saemaul Undong’s success-es included the national awakening of attitudes of confidence and aspiration to a betterlife, the introduction of new social education systems for promoting the movement,the operation of support systems appropriate to the circumstances of each village, andthe exhibition of tenacity among leadership. The National Council of SaemaulUndong (2000) has praised the government’s steadfast efforts to overcome poverty, itsmobilization of people to promote the Saemaul Undong, its investment in Saemaulprojects, the visible effects that stimulated people’s increased participation, and thegradual development of a farmers’ consciousness. Successes can be summarized asfollows: the nationwide governmental support and guidance, the promotion of theSaemaul Undong at the pan-government level, effective promotion, the participationof residents in the implementation phase, the representatives elected by residentsthemselves and their leadership, and the increase in diligence, self-help, and coopera-tion among ordinary people (Park, 2009; Hwang, 2006).

Lee and Lee (2005) argue that the Saemaul Undong helped educate people todevelop the powers latent within themselves, improve living conditions in rural areas,and create opportunities for financial independence. In addition, pro-Saemaul Undongscholars argue that the movement contributed to a transition from a clan society centeredon family loyalty to a civil society. They consider the communality of the SaemaulUndong as something to preserve and develop in the future (Hwang, 2006). Someargue that the Saemaul Undong had universal principles that can be applied to develop-ment programs in other developing nations: (1) many community leaders were pro-duced and actively played their roles in the villages; (2) residents participated as joint

The Rural Saemaul Undong Revisited from the Perspective of Good Governance 19


producers; (3) limited resources were used efficiently; and (4) participation and bottom-up approach of decision-making were carried out (So, 2007).

The Negative Argument

Those with a negative perspective on the Saemaul Undong view it as representativeof the domineering strategies of the Park Chung-hee regime. Most notably, some politi-cal and sociological studies evaluate the Saemaul Undong as a tool for maintaining theauthoritarian ruling system or an oppressive total mobilization system, though theyacknowledge that some of its achievements were positive (Cho, 2004; Jun, 2003; Oh,2002; Ryu, 2001; H. Kim, 2000; Park & Hahn, 1999). In the same vein, Koh (2006)recognizes that the Saemaul Undong, developed with the aim of modernizing ruralareas, responded to the deepening sense of loss and alienation among farmers thatemerged during the industrialization of the 1960s. The Saemaul Undong further isolatedrural areas from the political resistance to the authoritarian Park regime and was some-what successful in re-establishing farmers as a political stronghold for the regime.

From an economic perspective, several negative studies on the Saemaul Undonghave emerged. Ho (1979) argues that it began with the aim of solving issues related toincome differences between cities and rural areas, which resulted from the economicgrowth of the 1960s; however, it tried to increase rural household incomes not throughagriculture but through the development of nonfarm income sources, such as small-scale Saemaul factories in rural areas. Even the effort to create Saemaul factories andagricultural industrial complexes tended to have poor results due to insufficient resourcesand personnel, stagnant sales, poor infrastructure in rural areas, and insufficient funds(Cho & Joh, 1988). As a result, although the government praised its economic achieve-ments, the Saemaul Undong was not able to achieve qualitative economic improvementin the agricultural sector (Moore, 1984; Douglass, 1983).

Studies that criticize the Saemaul Undong point out that it did not achieve itsexpected results; rather, it made farmers and farm villages more dependent on govern-ment support and other outside resources, and even contributed to the collapse of ruralcommunities as traditional self-governing organizations, destroying the foundations onwhich local self-governing systems could have developed, and accelerating centraliza-tion (Park & Hahn 1999).

A Critical Review

Although the previously cited studies have increased understanding of the SaemaulUndong, both positive and negative arguments are limited in that they emphasize only



certain aspects of the Saemaul Undong. First, the negative argument highlights theoppression and forced mobilization that characterized the development of the SaemaulUndong, criticizing its achievements and the way in which it was promoted; however,it disregards positive aspects, such as the grassroots support for the Saemaul Undong,the spontaneous participation of local residents, and the agreement among townsthat adopted it. In fact, not only media reports published then but also more recentlypublished historical and sociological studies have recognized farmers’ high levels ofparticipation in and support for the Saemaul Undong (Y. Kim, 2009; D. Kim, 2004).

It has been suggested that the negative argument does not fully explain why amajority of farmers wanted to be exempt from the government’s forceful promotion ofprojects and unreasonable interference, but at the same time wanted increased govern-ment support (Yoo, Choi, & Oh, 2001). In brief, those who take a negative positionhave not provided sufficient explanation of how such enthusiastic participation andagreement on the Saemaul Undong could emerge in the 1970s.

Second, those who make negative arguments tend to have unrealistic perspectiveson political participants in rural areas in the 1970s, when the Republic of Korea wasstill relatively underdeveloped. It has been argued that we should not evaluate politicalparticipation in underdeveloped countries based on the standards for political partic-ipation in developed countries. Such an evaluation requires a realistic perspective, onethat acknowledges that widespread political participation in a developing country canbe only be achieved when three elements—personal interests, the commitment ofpolitical leaders, and the government’s administrative mobilization—are all presentand aligned (Dams, 1980, quoted in Whang, 1983). Scholars with a negative perspectiveon the Saemaul Undong seem to evaluate participation in the movement in the 1970sbased on the standard of political participation in advanced countries. Furthermore, itis necessary to consider whether those who embrace the negative argument overlookthe individual’s autonomy and the resilience of rural societies and farmers, excessivelyfocusing instead on the authoritarian characteristics of the Park regime (Park & Lee,1997).

Positive evaluations of the Saemaul Undong seem to be equally one-sided. Theytend to emphasize only its achievements, such as the level of residents’ participationand quantitative measures of improvement in residents’ living conditions and income-generation opportunities. They have not paid attention to the mechanisms and admin-istrative systems that brought about those successful results (So, 2007). For example,political leadership, pan-government-level promotion systems, political support, andthe participation of rural societies have been assumed to be elements of the SaemaulUndong’s success in the studies to date. However, there is a need for more analysisof the diverse strategies of government to motivate rural people to participate in the



Saemaul Undong, as well as the interactions between government actors and ruralpeople in the course of the Saemaul Undong.

Another limitation of the positive argument is that it does not comprehensivelyconsider various elements of the Saemaul Undong’s success. Research has empha-sized economic achievement or improvements in living conditions in rural areas aswell as spontaneous participation and government interventions. However, consideringthe fact that the Saemaul Undong was an integrated rural development program, it isnecessary to delineate its various aspects, including accountability, equity, inclusiveness,and responsiveness, and the mechanisms and administrative measures for facilitatingsuch aspects. Such limitations seem to be reasons for the general inability to satisfacto-rily illustrate the relevance of the Saemaul Undong in the 1970s to rural developmentin the 21st century.

In conclusion, existing studies of the Saemaul Undong tend to take a strongly one-sided approach, whether negative or positive. To overcome this limitation, it is neces-sary to analyze the movement from a theoretical perspective that acknowledges variousvalues. In that way, various aspects of the Saemaul Undong will be drawn out and itis possible to examine how the movement’s diverse characteristics could bring aboutits overall achievement. In addition, the institutional and social contexts affecting thevarious characteristics of the Saemaul Undong should be examined. When such analysesare carried out, not only will the level of understanding of the Saemaul Undong rise,but the dynamics of development in the 1970s in the Republic of Korea will be betterunderstood.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Governance: Definitions and Components

The term governance has often been used in recent literature on economics, socialdevelopment, and community development (ODI, 2006). Governance can be definedand utilized in various ways according to the context, as shown in terms such asenterprise governance, international relations governance, and regional governance(UNESCAP, 2007; Rhodes, 1996). In a broad sense, governance refers to a system,procedure, and administrative processing mechanism that decides how power is execut-ed, how people’s opinions are presented, and how decisions are made regarding publicinterests (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001, p. 7).1 International organizations supporting



1. In a narrower sense, governance can be defined as a way of problem-solving through

the economic and social development of developing countries define governance fromthis viewpoint. For example, the World Bank defines it as ‘the exercise of politicalpower to manage a nation’s affairs’ (Leftwich, 1993).

According to these definitions, governance is essentially political (UNESCAP,2007; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Pierre & Peters, 2005). Interactions like negotiationand compromise take place among participants with various interests. A variety ofofficial and unofficial agents participate, depending on the different levels and contextsof governance, and the government can be one of the participants. Also, participantsmake decisions and implement them within formal and informal constraints. Differentstructural factors influence governance depending on the context and level. In sum,governance is a result of interactions among various participants made under formal/informal institutions to solve common concerns.

Good Governance

Many governance theories and models have been proposed from diverse perspec-tives. While most of them focus on the industrialized countries, some internationalorganizations such as the World Bank have suggested key concepts and elements ofgood governance especially for developing countries, because good governance hasbeen considered “a requisite for many different forms of growth, whereas the variousfeatures of bad governance … corruption, waste, abuse of power and exploitation ofpublic means for private ends … tend to drive unfortunate nations into vicious spiralsof decline, disruption and destruction” (Tarschys, 2001: 28 and 40).

To achieve the institutionalization of democracy and economic performance indeveloping countries, the good governance model not only values efficiency andeffectiveness, but also regards transparency, inclusiveness for minorities, and a lowlevel of corruption as key elements of economic and social development. Moreover, itemphasizes transparency, responsiveness, and accountability to the current and futuredemands of society. For example, UNESCAP (2007: 3-4) said that good governancehas the following eight characteristics as follows:

1. Participation: Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone ofgood governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate



networks or democratic structures; as not a hierarchy or a market but a third societalcoordination mechanism, which functions through interdependence and spontaneouscooperation among networks or agencies; or as a way of solving social problems by variousmembers of the government and private sector who form an autonomous network withoutdepending upon the government’s official authority (Stoker, 1998).

intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation needs to beinformed and organized. This means freedom of association and expressionon the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.

2. Consensus-orientation: Good governance requires mediation of the differentinterests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in thebest interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It alsorequires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainablehuman development and how to achieve the goals of such development. Thiscan only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and socialcontexts of a given society or community.

3. Responsiveness: Good governance requires that institutions and processes tryto serve all stakeholders within a reasonable time frame.

4. Transparency: Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforce-ment are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also meansthat information is freely available and directly accessible to those who willbe affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means thatenough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understand-able forms and media.

5. Rule of law: Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforcedimpartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly thoseof minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciaryand an impartial and incorruptible police force.

6. Equity and inclusiveness: A society’s well being depends on ensuring that allits members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from themainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the mostvulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.

7. Effectiveness and efficiency: Good governance means that processes andinstitutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making thebest use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the contextof good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources andthe protection of the environment.

8. Accountability: Not only governmental institutions but also the private sectorand civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to theirinstitutional stakeholders in good governance. Who is accountable to whomvaries depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or externalto an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution isaccountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Account-ability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.



OVERVIEW OF THE RURAL SAEMAUL UNDONG

Background and Purpose

The Republic of Korea experienced successful economic growth in the 1960s byusing industrial policies and export-oriented trade policies. This selective strategy,however, put rural development on hold and widened the gap between urban and ruralstandards of living. For example, the agricultural sector’s share of GDP shrank, andthe productivity gap between the agricultural and industrial sectors grew (see table 1).This economic imbalance was followed by political instability and a decrease in politicalsupport for President Park and his administration, especially in rural areas.2 The needto ameliorate the widening economic gap between rural and urban areas and to main-tain political support for the ruling party and President Park comprised the economicand political background of the initiation of the Saemaul Undong (Park, 2009; So,2007; Park & Hahn, 1999).

Against this background, the purposes of the Saemaul Undong were as follows(Park, 1973). First, it aimed at improving living conditions and agricultural infra-structure. For this purpose, community rehabilitation projects such as the expansion ofvillage and farm roads, irrigation projects, housing improvements, and construction ofstorehouses and village halls were carried out. These projects were also expected toimprove rural people’s welfare and to employ idle workers during the agricultural off-season.

Second, the Saemaul Undong aimed at income generation and economic develop-



2. For example, in the national election of 1969, the approval rate for the ruling DemocraticRepublican Party of President Park fell by 15 percent—even in rural areas, which tradition-ally had been regarded as favorable to him (Park, 2009).

Table 1. Rate of Economic Growth (%)

Period Overall growth rate Agriculture and fisheries Mining and industry SOC and other services

1962-1966 7.9 5.9 14.3 8.5

1967-1971 9.6 1.6 19.9 12.4

1972-1976 9.7 6.2 18.2 8.5

1977-1981 6.0 1.2 9.9 5.9

Average 8.3 3.7 15.6 8.8Source: Bank of Korea. Annual Chronology of Economic Statistics, quoted in Compilation Committee for Korean Economy,

2010.

ment in the villages, implementing projects including the adoption of new agriculturaltechnologies, chemical fertilizers, and improved seeds. Improved agricultural infrastruc-ture was expected to lead to an increase in productivity and income growth. Saemaulwage-earning projects and factories in villages were also expected to increase employ-ment and to become new sources of income for farmers.

Third, the Saemaul Undong aimed to change farmers’ values and attitudes bystressing Saemaul values such as diligence, self-help, and cooperation. It was believedthat changes in the perceptions and attitudes of rural people were required for long-term sustainable changes and development in rural communities. To inculcate thedesired values and attitudes in individuals, formal and informal education programswere offered, and public relations campaigns were carried out by government agenciesand voluntary organizations.

Initiation and Progress

The Saemaul Undong started in the winter of 1970 with the distribution of 355packs of cement to each of 34,665 rural communities free of charge with one restric-tion: the cement was to be used for the welfare of the entire community (Ministry ofHome Affairs, 1981). The plan received a favorable reaction from local communitiesand achieved significant results beyond the government’s predictions. The cost ofthe free cement was 4.1 billion won, but the estimated monetary value of the projectscarried out by the rural communities was almost three times that much: 12.2 billionwon (Park & Lee, 1997).

Encouraged by this success and incorporating the lessons learned from previousrural development programs, the Saemaul Undong was carried out in three stages,emphasizing in turn (1) improving living conditions, (2) income generation and con-sciousness reform, and (3) broadening the impact of the Saemaul Undong as well asexpanding its scope with the promotion of urban-rural links (see table 2).



Table 2. Progress of Saemaul Undong in the 1970s

Emphasis Projects

Stage 1 Initiation • Living conditions improvements: expanding roads within 1970-1973 Led by the government towns, creating public laundry facilities, improving roofs

Priority: projects to improve and repairing wallsliving conditions • Improving infrastructure and income generation:

expanding agricultural roads, irrigating farmland, adopting new technologies, encouraging cooperation among villagers

• Education and public-relations campaigns to promote Saemaul values

Outcomes

Improvements in Living Conditions

In terms of improving living conditions, most of the projects exceeded their goals,as shown in table 3. It appears that these achievements helped improve both the stan-dard of living in rural areas and agricultural production.

More comprehensively, the Saemaul Undong also contributed to balancing regionaldevelopment, as shown in table 4.3 In 1972, 2,307 (7 percent) of 34,665 villages in the



Table 3. Major Achievements of Saemaul Undong Projects in the 1970s

Project Goal Outcome % achieved

Expanding village roads 26,266 km 43,558 166

Establishing farm roads 49,167 km 61,797 126

Building small bridges 76,749 bridges 79,516 104

Building village halls 35,608 halls 37,012 104

Building storehouses 34,665 22,143 64

Housing improvement 544,000 improvements 225,000 42

Community resettlement – 2,747 –

Installing sewage systems 8,654 km 15,559 179

Installing telephone lines in farming and fishing villages 2,834,000 households 2,777,500 98

Establishing Saemaul factories 950 factories 717 75

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1981.

Emphasis Projects

Stage 2 Spatial and functional • Improving infrastructure and income generation: farmland 1974-1976 expansion arrangement, encouragement of combined farming, building

Forming nationwide consensus joint workshops, developing non-farming income sourcesPriority: income improvement • Consciousness reform: Saemaul education, public relationsand consciousness reform campaign for change of consciousness and behaviors

• Living conditions improvement: improving houses, improving water supply systems, building community halls

Stage 3 Increasing scale • Rural areas: improving housing, cultivating special crops, 1977-1979 Promotion of urban-rural links building Saemaul factories

Distinguishing special features • Urban areas: street renovation and beautification, of each project campaign for observance of traffic rules

• Workplaces and factories: improving productivity, conserving resources, cultivating cooperation between labor and management

Source: National Council of Saemaul Undong, 2000.

country were classified as developed, 13,943 (40 percent) as developing, and 18,415(53 percent) as underdeveloped. However, in 1979, underdeveloped villages no longerexisted, developing villages comprised 3 percent of the total, and 97 percent of villageswere developed. This suggests that the general living standards and the level of agri-cultural infrastructure were enhanced during the Saemaul Undong period, partlybecause of its promotion.



3. Beginning in 1974, the movement adopted a step-by-step approach for advancing eachvillage to a higher level, from underdeveloped to developing to developed, based on specificcriteria. Each village in the country was assessed annually. The criteria for achieving“developing” status included the following: (1) the main streets and the entrance roadshould be completed; (2) more than 70 percent of roofs should be improved, and the mainditches should be maintained; (3) more than 70 percent of farmlands should have irrigation,and the small rivers in the town should be managed; (4) a community center, a warehouse,or a town joint workplace should be built, and the joint village fund should be more than500,000 won; and (5) more than one community income project should be carried out, andthe average annual income per household should be more than 800,000 won. The criteriafor achieving “developed” status included the following: (1) the central road of the townshould be completed, and a bridge less than 20 meters long should be completed; (2) morethan 80 percent of roofs and walls should be improved; (3) more than 85 percent of farmlandsshould have irrigation, and small streams around the town should be maintained; (4) threeor more of the facilities required for “developing” status—community center, warehouse,and joint workshop—should be completed, and the joint village fund should be more than1 million won; and (5) a profitable project other than agriculture should be promoted, andthe average income per household should be more than 1.4 million won (Ministry of HomeAffairs, 1981).

Table 4. Improvements in Village Development Level

Year Total villages Underdeveloped villages (%) Developing villages (%) Developed villages (%)

1972 34,665 18,415 (53) 13,943 (40) 2,307 (7)

1973 34,665 10,656 (31) 19,769 (57) 4,246 (12)

1974 34,665 6,165 (18) 21,500 (62) 7,000 (20)

1975 35,031 4,046 (11) 20,936 (60) 10,049 (29)

1976 35,031 302 (1) 19,049 (54) 15,680 (45)

1977 35,031 – 11,709 (33) 23,322 (67)

1978 34,815 – 6,114 (18) 28,701 (82)

1979 34,871 – 976 (3) 33,893 (97)


Income Generation

The Saemaul Undong also contributed to some extent to income generation forrural households and to the decrease in urban-rural income differentials (Hwang,2006). As shown in table 5, rural household income was 79 percent of that of urbanworking-class households in 1971; however, as the Saemaul Undong was carried outin earnest, the urban-rural income differentials tended to decrease. From 1974 to 1977,the nominal income per rural household exceeded that of urban working-class house-holds. It is hard to deny that Saemaul Undong income-improvement projects helpedmitigate urban-rural income differentials and grow the rural economy. Nevertheless,these achievements seem to have had limitations. The improvement in rural householdincome and the mitigation of urban-rural income differentials might have been influ-enced by other agricultural programs such as the rice price policy. The income gapalso started to increase again in the late 1970s.

Attitude and Consciousness Change among Rural People

The Saemaul Undong has been evaluated as successfully affecting the attitudesand consciousness of farmers (Whang, 1980). Respondents told a 1978 survey of 821people in eight villages (Yu, Park, Benjamin, & Turner, 1980) that gambling haddecreased, funerals had been simplified, participation in decision making by villagershad increased, drinking had decreased, and the social status of women had increased



Table 5. Average Annual Income, Farming and Urban Working-Class Households

Nominal income per household Real income per household Real income per capita

Year(1,000 won) (1,000 won) (1,000 won)

Farming Urban % Farming Urban % Farming Urban %working class working class working class

1971 356 452 78.9 715 811 88.2 122.6 150.2 81.6

1972 429 517 83.0 761 831 91.6 133.3 156.5 85.2

1973 481 550 87.4 781 857 91.1 136.5 162.9 83.8

1974 674 645 104.6 835 808 103.3 147.5 154.8 95.3

1975 873 859 101.6 873 859 101.6 155.1 165.8 93.5

1976 1,156 1,152 100.4 926 999 92.7 167.1 195.1 85.6

1977 1,433 1,405 102.0 980 1,106 88.6 177.5 229.0 77.5

1978 1,884 1,916 98.3 991 1,319 75.1 184.2 278.9 66.0

1979 2,227 2,630 84.7 1,030 1,530 67.3 198.1 328.3 60.3

Source: Hwang, 2006.% = farming household income percentage of urban working-class household income.For rural households, the real income was deflated based on the standard rural household price index as of 1975, whereas income forurban households was deflated based on the consumer price index for all urban consumers as of 1975.

significantly in most villages during the 1970s (see table 6). These changes were biggerin the villages whose Saemaul Undong projects received the highest evaluations thanin typical villages. Of course, these changes cannot be seen as due only to the effectsof the Saemaul Undong. Yet it appears that some positive changes in farmers’ attitudesand consciousness occurred during the period of the Saemaul Undong.

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE SAEMAUL UNDONG

Participation

One of the main elements of the Saemaul Undong’s success is often assumed to bethe spontaneous participation of residents. In fact, during the Saemaul Undong’sprime, the number of participants in Saemaul projects per town sharply increased—from 216 in 1971 to 7,472 in 1978 (table 7).



Table 6. Reported Changes in Villages during the 1970s

Area of change Range of positive response (%)

Decrease in gambling 99-88

Simplification of funerals 95-75

Increase of participation in town’s decision-making 94-72

Decrease in drinking 95-62

Simplification of wedding ceremonies 91-40

Improved status of women 88-44

Source: Yu, Park, Benjamin, & Turner, 1980.

Table 7. Expansion and Diffusion of the Rural Saemaul Undong

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Number of villages 33,267 22,708 34,665 34,665 36,547 36,557 36,557 36,257

Number of participants (1,000) 7,200 32,000 69,280 106,852 116,880 117,528 137,193 270,928

Number of projects (1,000) 385 320 1,093 1,099 1.598 887 2,463 2,667

Average per town

Participants 216 1,409 1,999 3,082 3,198 3,215 3,753 7,472

Number of projects 12 13 32 32 44 24 67 74

Investment (1,000 won) 367 1,378 2,839 3,831 8,096 8,825 12,764 17,492


Residents not only participated in Saemaul projects but also donated constructionmaterials, land, and other assets. As shown in table 8, from 1971 to 1978, the amount ofinvestment by residents exceeded government investments every year.4 The spontaneousparticipation of residents allowed the mobilization of resources and their efficientdistribution. Additionally, the government was able to achieve its stated goals whileminimizing its budget allocation to the Saemaul Undong.

We should pay attention to the social context and the mechanisms by which theparticipation of village residents spread. In 1970, many farming villages were relativelyhomogeneous societies consisting of small farming households that mainly cultivated



4. As shown in table 8, residents’ investment ratios fell rapidly after 1975. The reason for thisis considered to be the loan method used by financial institutions to prepare investmentfunds that was introduced during the movement. In table 8, it was included in the categoryof government support. If loan amounts are converted into resident investments, residentinvestment’s proportion of total investments exceeded 70 percent (So, 2007).

Table 8. Investment by Year, Source, and Type (millions of won, %)

All investments Investment by residentsYear Total Investment by Investment

investment government by residents Other Cash Loan Labor Materials Land

1971 12,200 4,100 8,100(33.6) (66.4) – – – – – –

1972 31,594 3,581 27,348 665 21,116 5,238 994(11.3) (86.6) (2.1) – – (77.2) (19.2) (3.6)

1973 96,111 17,333 76,850 2,128(17.8) (80.0) (2.2) – – – – –

1974 132,790 30,780 98,734 3,272 17,923 14,699 54,139 10,089 1,888(23.1) (74.4) (2.5) (18.2) (14.9) (54.8) (10.2) (1.9)

1975 295,895 124,499 169,554 1,842 53,471 40,790 63,876 8,646 2,771(42.1) (57.3) (0.6) (31.6) (24.1) (37.6) (5.1) (1.6)

1976 322,652 88,060 227,440 7,152 56,734 77,080 78,197 12,553 2,885(27.3) (70.5) (2.2) (24.9) (33.9) (34.4) (5.5) (1.3)

1977 466,532 138,057 325,033 3,442 80,425 107,951 96,268 33,888 6,501(29.6) (69.7) (0.7) (24.7) (33.2) (29.6) (10.5) (2.0)

1978 634,191 145,703 487,835 653 113,337 192,697 102,437 42,803 36,561(23.0) (76.9) (0.1) (23.2) (39.5) (21.0) (8.8) (7.5)

Source: Whang, 1980.Won are given in 1971 values.The right-hand half of the table gives a detailed breakdown of the totals listed under “investment by residents” on the left.

rice. Cooperation among village residents in agriculture and life in the town wasessential. To achieve this, unofficial cooperative mechanisms such as gye, durae, andhyangyak were widely used.5 Various functional groups operated in these contexts,such as youth groups, women’s associations, agricultural co-ops, forestry gyes, andirrigation gyes. Through these organizations, communication, decision-making, anddebates on issues related to the common interest of the town were carried out (Y. Kim,2009; Park, 2009; Park & Lee, 1997). These small functional groups worked toachieve agreement on common village goals, promote members’ participation, andprevent exploitation, among other accomplishments.

In this context of rural societies, Saemaul leaders were elected or appointed inorder to encourage the participation of residents. They were in charge of contactingpublic institutions to promote Saemaul projects, and they took leadership roles in anymajor projects. Also, they determined the priorities of Saemaul projects, promoted theprojects, and encouraged residents’ participation (J. Chung, 2009; D. Kim, 2004).

The government’s methods for promoting projects and encouraging farmers’participation were effective (Y. Kim, 2009; So, 2007; D. Kim, 2004; Park & Lee,1997). First, in the early phase of the Saemaul Undong, the government providedcement and reinforcing steel rod to villages for free and trusted residents to agree ontheir use. The early Saemaul Undong was centered on projects aimed at improving liv-ing conditions and forming regional communities. These measures not only encouragedresidents to trust government policy on the Saemaul Undong, but also made it clearthat they would reap the benefits of their efforts in Saemaul projects, which furtherencouraged their participation (So, 2007; Whang, 1980).

Second, the government granted more support to the towns that achieved more,which stimulated competition between towns. Also, towns with high achievementswere showcased through various media outlets, the symbolic effect of which was furthermaximized by presidential awards and other such measures. Thus, by allocating supportpreferentially and recognizing the autonomy of Saemaul leaders who accomplishedexcellent results, the government promoted active participation by village residents. Avirtuous circle was formed in which government support and farmers’ joint effortsachieved results which, in turn, expanded participation.



5. Gyae is a small savings scheme that is especially popular among women. Doorae is a tradi-tion of cooperating to complete difficult work that could not be done by one household.Hyangyak is an autonomous customary norm promoting cooperation and good deedsamong villagers, based on the Confucian tradition (Park, 2009).

Consensus-Orientation

The Saemaul Undong was conducted through the agreement of entire villages.Early projects were determined by residents through town meeting discussions on howto use the reinforcing steel rods and cement the government had supplied for free.Therefore, the decisions on project priorities, beneficiaries, and residents’ investmentwere made in bottom-up way during the period of Saemaul Undong (So, 2007; Park &Lee 1997).6

Most Saemaul leaders were directly elected or recommended by town residents.About 48 percent of surveyed leaders were elected by a general vote or by the villagedevelopment committee (discussed in more detail below), 32 percent were eitherappointed at the request of village residents or volunteered, and 20 percent werenominated either by a government official or the village headman (Whang, 1980, pp.111-154).

Decision-making mechanisms at the village level could be divided into two cate-gories according to the range of participants included in the decision-making process.The first major mechanism was the town meeting, which all village residents had theright to attend. This was the top decision-making mechanism in each village, at whichspecific local problems and issues with far-reaching consequences for the village wereaddressed.

The second mechanism was the village development committee, whose main func-tion was to make decisions relating to the planning, coordination, and implementationof village development projects. This committee was chaired by the village headmanor the Saemaul leader and consisted of major decision makers, including the chiefs ofthe functional groups in the villages and some elected villagers. The daily tasks androutine issues concerning rural Saemaul Undong projects were dealt with at this meet-ing (Y. Kim, 2009, pp. 187-214; So, 2007).



6. This tendency can be indirectly confirmed by the results of a questionnaire on the democ-racy of decision-making and leadership during the movement. One survey, conducted inthe early 1980s in 320 towns, asked respondents how much discussion leaders engage inwhen making decisions about their town’s public affairs. Of the town residents participatingin the survey, 64 percent responded that leaders are required to discuss decisions while 31percent said they actually do so and 5 percent said they often do not do so at all (Choi &Jung, 1984, pp. 60-63, quoted in Park & Lee, 1997: 62).

Responsiveness

This consensus-oriented, participatory decision-making process effectivelyincreased responsiveness and led to the selection of Saemaul Undong projects thatpromoted residents’ long-term benefits and reflected their shared values. The govern-ment also tied its support to projects from which the most town residents could benefit.Therefore, most projects carried out in the first phase of the Saemaul Undong aimed toimprove living conditions in ways that strongly corresponded to the common valuesand demands of town residents (Whang, 1980, p. 32); this in turn further encouragedresidents to participate.

Transparency

Participatory, consensus-oriented decision-making within town units also increasedtransparency. Information about projects was disseminated through town meetingsand village development committees. In the course of carrying out projects, Saemaulleaders also played the role of information disseminators or educators for rural people.They actively offered village residents information about the background, purposes,and necessities of the Saemaul Undong as well as specific new farming technologies(Whang, 1980, pp. 139-140).

The government’s decision-making process involved setting objective standardsand constantly checking results. For example, towns were classified according to theirproject-related achievements, and government support for each town differed dependingon its classification as underdeveloped, developing, or developed. Quantitative criteria,defined in advance, were used for classification (see footnote 3).

Also, in the process of promoting the Saemaul Undong, local administrative insti-tutions tried to improve their transparency by separating departments that carried outplanning and evaluation from departments responsible for implementation. The govern-ment also established an evaluation system through which superior agencies regularlychecked the achievements of lower-level agencies, which provided a link betweenindividual towns and the central government (Whang, 1983). All these institutionalarrangements helped enhance transparency within the Saemaul Undong.

Rule of Law

Though the Saemaul Undong was repeatedly confirmed as a program of the highestpriority through presidential declarations and other means, its legal basis remainedweak. There was no constituting law for the Saemaul Undong; it was largely promoted



according to the president’s will and administrative intervention (K. Chung, 2010, p.51; Lee, 1998, p. 83).

However, as the Saemaul Undong began to be promoted more earnestly in the1970s, related organizations were founded and individual projects were carried outbased on the enactment and revision of laws and statutes. For example, the registrationof Saemaul properties was based on the Real Property Registration Act, and roof-improving activities followed the procedures set out by the Agricultural Housing RoofRenovation Act, which was revised on December 26, 1972.

Offices related to the Saemaul Undong were created in the Ministry of HomeAffairs by revising the Presidential Decree on the Organization of the Ministry ofHome Affairs on August 19, 1971. The Presidential Decree for the National Councilof Saemaul Undong was enacted on March 7, 1972. This presidential decree containedthe provisions for creating a national council to facilitate full-scale promotion of theSaemaul Undong, related decision-making processes, the formation of practical com-mittees, and other organizational tasks. The Saemaul Leader Training Center Installa-tion Act (December 28, 1979) enabled the operation of training programs for Saemaulleaders (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1981).

Equity and Inclusiveness

One of the main goals of the Saemaul Undong was securing social equity by reduc-ing the gap between regions and classes and improving urban-rural equity. It wasexpected that the improvement of the standard of living and income levels in ruralareas by the Saemaul Undong would increase purchasing power and help expandthe domestic market. Such improvements, in turn, would ultimately be expected topromote the social welfare of both urban and rural areas (Park, 1973).

This meant that the Saemaul Undong was one of the historical efforts that madeeconomic development broad-based with effective poverty reduction and relativelyequal distribution of income (Kwon, 2010). It can be argued that, through the SaemaulUndong, small farmers and their families started to be included in the government’spoverty-reduction programs and to be brought into the fold of modern citizenry (Koh,2006). Saemaul projects such as renovation of houses, reconstruction of town halls,and maintenance of village roads were evaluated to contribute to enhancing the livingstandard of rural villagers and to drastically reducing absolute poverty among bothrural and urban households, although the Saemaul Undong was limited in its ability toreduce the productivity gap between the agricultural and industrial sectors or toreverse the decline of the rural sector (see table 9).



Effectiveness and Efficiency

Various institutional devices were used to promote the Saemaul Undong more effi-ciently and effectively. At the town level, systems were formed to maximize the effec-tiveness of the Saemaul Undong. Decision-making and project-promoting systemswere established centering on Saemaul leaders and village headmen. Constant com-munication was maintained among the village headmen, Saemaul leaders, representa-tives of towns’ functional groups, and officials (Y. Kim, 2009; Park & Lee, 1997).Such promotion systems in towns brought about effects that included bridging differ-ences in opinions among the residents, preventing unfair advantages, and mobilizingvarious resources in towns, including residents’ labor forces and other contributions.

At the core of the promotion system in towns were the Saemaul leaders. They edu-cated residents about any information pertinent to the Saemaul Undong, collecting theresidents’ opinions and encouraging their participation. In addition, through the net-working of various functional groups (such as women’s associations and youthgroups) and their representatives, related officials, and leaders in neighboring towns,outside resources were mobilized and support systems constructed. Also, the leadersintroduced ideas for Saemaul projects and spearheaded the promotion of various pro-jects. Such activities effectively improved the achievements of the Saemaul projects atthe town level (J. Chung, 2009; D. Kim, 2004).

At the same time, the government supported the Saemaul Undong at the townshiplevel, not the individual level. Towns were classified by the extent of their develop-ment, and villages that excelled were continuously provided with more materials andhigher symbolic compensation than villages with ordinary achievements. This “principleof preferential support for excellent villages” led to competition between villages topromote participation in and the success of the Saemaul projects. In other words, asfarmers competed to work on the Saemaul projects and received the government sub-sidies selectively distributed to towns, the efficiency of project promotion increasedand other related improvements followed, such as the strengthening of welfare facilitiesin rural villages (Park, 2009).



Table 9. Incidence of Absolute Poverty, 1965-1991 (%)

1965 1970 1976 1980 1991

Urban households 54.9 16.2 18.1 10.4 8.7

Rural households 35.8 27.9 11.7 9.0 2.8

All households 40.9 23.4 14.8 9.8 7.6

Source: Kwon, 2010.The absolute poverty line was 121,000 won per month (at 1981 prices) for a five-person household.

With the promotion system at the village level, government-wide organizationalarrangements for promoting the Saemaul Undong were established. These arrange-ments included almost all the central agencies and local administrative institutions.First, major authority for the RSU was assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs,because this ministry originally had formal authority for managing public personnel incentral and local administrations and diverse policy tools for encouraging local admin-istrations to participate in the RSU. Based on this authority, bureaus and divisionsresponsible for implementing the Saemaul Undong were created in the Ministry ofHome Affairs and local administrations.

Second, a series of committees and consultative meetings with government agenciesfrom the central government to the village level were established, as summarized infigure 1. At the central government level, the central consultative meeting, in which allcentral government departments participated, was organized with the general purpose



Figure 1. Organizational Arrangements for the Saemaul Undong

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1981.Eup and Myeon are levels of district in local administrative system in Korea.

of promoting and coordinating the Saemaul Undong more systematically and effi-ciently. In addition, this meeting served to establish and to adjust long- and mid-termplans as well as to make action plans for education and promotional activities for theSaemaul Undong.

At each local level, consultative meetings or promotional committees were estab-lished and took responsibility for promoting the Saemaul Undong. The upper-levelcouncils gave the lower-level councils comprehensive plans and guidance for carryingout projects. The lower-level councils were responsible for reporting the results of theRSU in their own jurisdictions and had the authority to ask for support for projectsfrom the upper-level councils.

Through these vertical and horizontal promotion systems, promotion plans for eachproject were formed and adjusted. The results of Saemaul Undong projects in eachregion were reported back to the central administrators, and rewards and punishmentswere delivered accordingly in order to encourage the greatest effectiveness. This com-prehensive promotion system became an institutional prerequisite for quick andresponsible support and evaluation as well as coordination and adjustment for theSaemaul Undong (Park, 2009; Whang, 1983).

Local administrative organizations were also reformed to promote the SaemaulUndong. In February 1973, city and provincial administrative organizations wererestructured, and an Office of Saemaul Guidance was established in each city andprovince administration, as well as a general Saemaul Department. On January 1,1975, the operations of the Saemaul Department were transferred to the vice governorfor enforcement. The new vice governor was in charge of all Saemaul Undong-relatedoperations with the authorities for planning, budgeting, and auditing (Ministry ofHome Affairs, 1981).

Accountability

The Saemaul Undong was motivated by a sense of accountability of village resi-dents and officials. First, farmers were held accountable for the results of the Saemaulprojects in their villages, because the government supports were linked to those results(So, 2007). If the results in some villages were not good, they could lose governmentsupports. This can be viewed as a project promotion strategy based on accountability.

Various crucial accountabilities were imposed upon public officials. If their com-munities achieved or exceeded project goals, they would be rewarded.7 However, if



7. Because of this, central and local government officials preferred to work in departmentsrelated to the movement, since it gave them a better chance of being promoted. The most

they did not cooperate with the Saemaul Undong, or their project achievements wereunsatisfactory, they could suffer personnel-related repercussions, including dismissal.Project-related officials and superior officers were considered responsible for poorprogress, and the government intensively exercised its authority to fire mayors, villageheadmen, and township staff members calling them account for the poor outcomes ofthe Saemaul projects within their jurisdictions (Y. Kim, 2009; J. Ha, 2006).

CONCLUSION

This study re-evaluated the Saemaul Undong of the 1970s from the perspective ofgood governance. It found many characteristics of good governance in the SaemaulUndong, which produced a number of achievements. In particular, diverse types ofparticipation by village people were found. This participation made the SaemaulUndong agreement-oriented and, in turn, led to responsive and transparent decision-making and project implementation at the village level. Participation in the villageswas promoted and supported by administrative intervention, which enhanced the effi-ciency, effectiveness, and accountability as well as the equity and inclusiveness of theSaemaul Undong. It is noteworthy that the Saemaul Undong embodied a number ofcharacteristics of good governance.

However, this embodiment of diverse characteristics of good governance shouldnot be taken for granted. As critics claim, there are also many cases in which govern-ment intervention overwhelmed spontaneous community participation in the imple-mentation of Saemaul Undong projects. Those led to various side effects, such ascomplaints by villagers of “window dressing,” and resulted in achieving other charac-teristics of good governance (Park, 2009: Park & Hahn, 1999). In addition, SaemaulUndong activities in urban areas are usually seen as having lower achievement levelsthan those in rural areas. The reason for this is that urban areas lacked the commu-nality that existed in rural villages, an effective regional promotional system was notestablished, and spontaneous participation was accordingly lacking (Yoo, 1983).

The results of this study suggest the following policy implications for other devel-oping countries that are promoting poverty-reduction and rural development programs.First, community development and economic and social growth programs shouldstrive to produce the diverse characteristics of good governance, and more importantly,



competent officials were assigned to the Saemaul Department, given extra points in theirefficiency ratings, and given personnel-related benefits that could be applied to two-yearlimits on length of service and preferential promotion systems (Kim, 2004).

a balanced combination of the good governance characteristics should be consideredin the course of formulating and implementing such programs. For these, the synergy ofspontaneous participation by rural people and effective and efficient institutionalizedsupports from the government will be needed, as is clear when considering the case ofthe Saemaul Undong.

Second, the importance of institutional innovations for achieving a combination ofgood governance characteristics should be stressed. For the success of the SaemaulUndong, a series of innovations were adopted, such as the pan-governmental organiza-tional arrangement, management training programs for local officials, and strategiesbased on the principle of “the better village, the first support,” which promoted com-petition between villages. Based on the analysis of the Saemaul Undong, it is predictedthat these innovations will not only be instrumental in stimulating rural change but alsobecome driving forces for promoting good governance in rural development programsin other developing countries.

In spite of its contributions to understanding of the rural Saemaul Undong, this studyhas some limitations. The good governance model was developed by internationalorganizations to promote neoliberal and democratic reforms in developing countries,and thus may not be relevant to the rural Saemaul Undong during the authoritarian Parkregime. In addition, the credence of the data used in this research may be doubtful. Itis possible that information on the rural Saemaul Undong that was reported by govern-ment agencies during the authoritarian Park regime was manipulated in order toemphasize the movement’s positive aspects. Future research should address theseissues with more relevant theories on developmental issues in authoritarian regimesand reliable data on the rural Saemaul Undong.

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