Midwest Political Science Association 66th Annual Conference April 3-6, 2008 Chicago, IL The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation: The Case of Illegal Labor Migration f rom Kyrgyzstan Saltanat Liebert, Ph.D. Assistant Professor L. Douglas Wilder School of Government & Public Affairs Virginia Commonwealth University Scherer Hall, Office 313 PO Box 842028 923 W. Franklin Street Richmond, VA 23284-2019 Phone: (804) 828-1874 E-mail: [email protected]DRAFT Comments and critique are welcome: please refer them to the author at [email protected]
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8/8/2019 The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation- The Case of Illegal Labor Migration Fro…
of Independent States (CIS)1 to the United States that has emerged in the last decade. There are
typically two categories of labor migrants from the CIS: highly educated individuals with fluent
English whose skills are in demand in the American labor market (such as scientists, high-tech
professionals, academics, accomplished athletes), and who can thus officially obtain U.S. work
visas; and unskilled (or with skills not in demand in the U.S.) labor migrants who are either
smuggled into the country or work illegally having arrived on tourist or other types of visas.
Such illegal labor migrants are primarily employed in unskilled low-wage jobs such as domestic
service workers, caregivers to children and the elderly, as well as in construction and in
sweatshops.
This research focuses on the latter group of migrants because due to lack or non-
transferability of their skills and education into the American labor market, there are practically
no legal channels for migration available for these groups of prospective migrants. Consequently,
they are more likely to use informal channels for migration.
The United States was chosen as the focus of this case study because immigration policy
is presently one of the most important and divisive issues in the country. Perhaps the most
obvious arena indicative of the status of immigration is politics: immigration has played a key
role in 2006 congressional elections and has been prominent in 2008 presidential debates. The
example of Kyrgyzstan-U.S. labor migration is important because it is a microcosm of the large
phenomenon of migration from developing to advanced countries. Kyrgyzstan was chosen for
this case study as an example of a post-Soviet transitional country that sends a large share of its
population abroad for labor. Kyrgyzstan has few exportable natural resources, which has created
1 Commonwealth of Independent States was created in December 1991 shortly before the official disintegration of the Soviet Union. It now includes all former Soviet republics with the exception of the three Baltic states.
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(i.e. policy implementation assigned to an agency that is well-staffed, has resources, and has a
champion, is likely to succeed); and 4) public support for the policy (Ingram and Mann 1980).
In addition, it has been argued that economic and social conditions, clear communication of
policy standards, incentives for compliance with new policy, and biases of implementation
officials are also likely to affect policy success (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).
2 There was also a practical consideration in choosing Kyrgyzstan for the case study. Migrant workers, some of whom might be undocumented and/or out of status in the receiving countries, are traditionally a difficult populationto access. Having been born and raised in Kyrgyzstan, I hoped (as it turned out, rightly so) that Kyrgyzstanimigrants, some of whom might be in the United States illegally, would be more likely to agree for an interview andshare their stories with a compatriot. In addition, securing interviews with migration policy makers and officials in apost-Soviet setting is a very challenging task. In a system that heavily relies on personal connections, bureaucrats“cold-called” by researchers would rarely agree to a meeting unless the latter are affiliated with potential donororganizations. As a Kyrgyz researcher, it was more feasible to secure interviews in a country where I had somepersonal contacts.
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institutions and systematically integrate informal organizations and informal politics into our
study of political order” (2004, 261).
Interaction between formal and informal institutions
A puzzle for many scholars and practitioners is trying to understand why similar
institutions in various settings produce different outcomes. Douglass North (1990) summarizes
this matter in the following statement:
Many Latin American countries adopted the U.S. Constitution (with somemodifications) in the nineteenth century, and many of the property rights laws of successfulWestern countries have been adopted by Third World countries. The results, however, are notsimilar to those in either the Untied States or other successful Western countries. Although therules are the same, the enforcement mechanism, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors are not (1990, 101).
In search of answers, several authors looked at the interaction between formal and
informal institutions in various economic, political and social spheres. Interaction between
formal and informal institutions is a recent and understudied area of research. As Pejovich states,
“… the relationship between formal and informal rules … is by no means a new question.
However, what is new is the systematic treatment of the relationship between formal and
informal institutions” (Pejovich 1999, 169). Several scholars have recently attempted to
categorize the types of interaction between formal and informal institutions. Lauth broke the
ground in this undertaking by identifying three ways in which formal and informal institutions
interact: complementary, substitutive, and conflicting (Lauth 2000, 25). Helmke and Levitsky
(2003) expanded on this typology and added the fourth, accommodating, interaction type
between formal and informal institutions. Grzymala-Busse (2004) refers to three types of
interactions – substitution, reinforcement , and undermining – in her review of formal-informal
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interaction in post-communist state transformation in East Central Europe. Finally, Pejovich
(1999) proposed a thesis of interaction between formal and informal institutions.
Migration presents a particularly interesting case for the analysis of interaction between
formal and informal institutions. The most illustrative example of such interaction is that of
restrictive immigration laws and law enforcement versus migrant smuggling networks. The latter
continuously undermine the former, which prompts even more restrictive policies. Rey
Koslowski argues that "as more restrictive policies increase the obstacles to crossing borders,
migrants increasingly turn to smugglers rather than pay the growing costs of unaided attempts
that prove unsuccessful" (Koslowski 1999, 207-08). In a similar vein, Massey (1990) rightly
maintains that it would be difficult for governments to control migration flows because informal
migrant networks (including smugglers) are outside of governmental control.
However, this newly emerging body of research on the interaction between formal and
informal institutions focuses on such interaction in the context of one country. In contrast, this
article examines the institutional interaction in two countries and investigates transnational3
interaction between formal and informal institutions. Migration is a phenomenon that involves
actors and institutions in more than one country. Thus, in order to fully understand the impact of
institutional interaction on immigration policy, it is important to analyze the interaction between
formal and informal institutions that takes place across international borders.
3 Much of literature uses the terms “transnational”, “international” and “multinational” referring to the sametype of migration (sometimes interchangeably). Such confusion has (hopefully) been clarified by Portes whospecified that “transnational” refers to activities “initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be theyorganized groups or networks of individuals across borders” (Portes, 2001). He also states that “international”pertains to activities and programs of national-states, while “multinational” refers to large-scale institutions such ascorporations or religions whose activities take place in multiple countries.
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informal institutions they interact with. The project involves multiple units of observation –
formal and informal institutions involved in such migration and the labor migrants themselves.
Review of the U.S. and Kyrgyz migration laws and regulations. The initial phase of data
collection involved archival research. To understand the role of formal institutions involved in
migration processes, I reviewed migration-related laws and procedures of Kyrgyzstan and the
United States. This was important because such laws and regulations are a codification of formal
rules.
Interviews with labor migrants. The main part of the field research involved interviewing
migrants from Kyrgyzstan working in the New York metropolitan area (including New Jersey
counties adjacent to New York City), and Philadelphia. The purpose of migrant interviews was
to map out all institutions involved in irregular labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United
States and identify their roles in order to be able to analyze how formal and informal institutions
interact. I chose the New York metropolitan area as a field research site because it has a large
immigrant population of former Soviet citizens4, which naturally attracts labor migrants from
Kyrgyzstan due to linguistic and cultural links. In addition, New York City traditionally absorbs
large numbers of illegal migrant workers.
The interviews were conducted between November 2005 and February 2006. I conducted
30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with labor migrants via snowball sampling method
through referrals. Selection of persons to interview was purposive - I only interviewed migrants
who have legally or illegally arrived to the U.S. after 1991 and who are or were employed in
unskilled low-wage positions. I limited the inquiry to migrants who arrived in the U.S. after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1989-91 migration out of the Soviet Union was
4 It is estimated that over 1.6 million ethnic Russians live in New York Metropolitan area. Exact statistics onthe number of immigrants from the former Soviet republics are not available but are likely to be well over 2 million.
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very restricted, and with very few exceptions, emigration of Soviet citizens was not allowed (see,
for example, Shevtsova 1992).
I had prepared a list of questions to guide the interviews, and I documented the responses in
a systematic manner as if it was a survey. Interviews with migrants from Kyrgyzstan were
conducted in Russian or Kyrgyz languages depending on the migrants’ preference.5 Due to the
possibility that some of the respondents might have been in an irregular immigration status at the
time of the interviews, all interviews were anonymous.
Interviews with migration officials. To complement the review of migration laws and
understand the migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and regulations, I
interviewed policy makers and migration officials in Kyrgyzstan. Interviews took place in
September 2005 and in May 2006. These interviews were important to understand the informal
rules relevant to migration and migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and
regulations.
The US migration policies are more transparent and could be drawn from readily available
laws and immigration procedures. Nevertheless, to complement the review of U.S. migration
policies, I interviewed an employee of the American Consulate in Kyrgyzstan to identify on the
ground policies and procedures of the United States towards labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan.6
Migration facilitators/intermediaries. I was able to secure an interview with a migrant
who used to facilitate migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. She provided invaluable
5 Despite almost all migrants being ethnically Kyrgyz, some were more comfortable conversing in Russian,while others were more at ease speaking Kyrgyz. Such preference for Russian language among some urban ethnicKyrgyz is attributable to the russification policies of the Soviet government, especially in larger cities. Russian wasthe lingua franca during the Soviet era required for higher education and professional advancement (see JonesLuong 2004; Roy 2000 for a discussion of Soviet language policies).
6 Due to the sensitive nature of the information shared by this individual, his name is not disclosed in the textand is referred to as “Informant”.
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Competing Interaction. Migration intermediaries play a critical role in the process of labor
migration by enabling migrants from Kyrgyzstan to obtain tourist and other types of visas.
Migration intermediaries, usually operating as a turisticheskoe agentstvo (travel agency) in
Kyrgyzstan, have established partnerships with intermediary firms in the United States. The
U.S.-based intermediaries supply letters of invitation from U.S. citizens and companies to
prospective migrants in Kyrgyzstan for fees ranging from $150 to $2,000. In almost all cases
such invitations are fraudulent: even if they are signed by individuals and companies that exist,
these actors do not know the prospective migrants and have no intention of hosting them in the
United States.
7
There appear to be hundreds of entities in the New York metropolitan area
supplying invitations to prospective migrants. As a former migration intermediary reports, “Here
[in Brooklyn, New York] you can get those invitations on every corner, even in law firms. If you
pay them, they’ll arrange for an invitation.”8
Upon receipt of the invitations, visa applicants are coached by the intermediaries in
Kyrgyzstan to memorize an invented story to be recited to the U.S. consul: how they know the
individual or a firm that is inviting them, the purpose of their visit, etc. A former travel agent
who supplied letters of invitation to potential migrants in Kyrgyzstan estimated that thirty
percent of her clients received visas to the United States. Once her clients received visas, the
Kyrgyz intermediary would call her American counterpart who would then meet those clients at
the airport upon their arrival in the United States.9 As this example demonstrates, migration
intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and the United States engage in transnational interaction.
Collectively, these intermediaries undermine the U.S. policies intended to prevent illegal
7 The invitations have to come from real individuals and firms because the U.S. Consulate could potentiallytelephone these parties before issuing a visa to an applicant.8 Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.9 Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.
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for some actors due to the cost, accessibility, and availability (i.e. hotels are sometimes fully
booked).
Table 2. Modified Typology of Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions
Effective FormalInstitutions
Ineffective or Unavailable
Formal Institutions
Compatible Goals Complementary Substitutive
Conflicting Goals Accommodating Competing
As many studies report, there is a substantial shortage of good quality, affordable childcare
in the United States (Blau and Robins 1988; Kisker and Ross 1997; Blau 1993; Johansen,
Leibowitz, and Waite 1996; Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001). The demand for formal
childcare that provides learning opportunities for children far outstrips the supply. The shortage
of childcare options is an often-cited impediment to women’s participation in the formal labor
force and to a manageable balance between work and family (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale
2001). Formal childcare is often either unaffordable or unavailable, and many parents are not
satisfied with its quality. Hondagneu-Sotelo argues that many middle-class families are deeply
prejudiced against formal childcare centers, “perceiving them as offering cold, institutionalized,
and second-class child care” (2001, 4). Children attending formal childcare centers also tend to
get sick more often, forcing parents to miss work. As a result, many parents turn to informal
childcare11
, much of which is provided by female migrant workers. Twenty percent of female
interviewees in this study were live-in caregivers for children. Their responsibilities also
included numerous other household chores such as cleaning the house, cooking, doing laundry,
11 Formal childcare includes childcare centers or family childcare homes that are regulated by state authorities.Informal childcare is performed in unregulated home settings (Kisker and Ross 1997).
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context of one country but also in a transnational setting. With some modification, namely the
categorization of formal institutions as “ineffective and/or unavailable” as opposed to
exclusively “ineffective”, the typology holds true for examining not only political but economic
formal and informal institutions as well.
This research project discovered a significant number of informal institutions undermining
formal institutions and rules designed to control illegal immigration. It therefore comes as no
surprise that the current immigration situation in the United States is considered to be “broken”,
and the government is unable to manage illegal immigration to the extent that some individuals
have taken matters into their hands, as demonstrated by grass-roots initiatives such as the
“Minuteman project”.12
The widespread perception in the literature on informal institutions is that informality is a
feature of an under-developed Third World state (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987;
Sztompka 1993). Some scholars argue that informal institutions are prevalent in developing
countries, where formal institutions are more likely to be ineffective as compared to developed
countries (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; Jones Luong 2004; Collins 2004; Peng
2004; Sztompka 1993). This research project, however, finds that in the context of labor
migration, informal institutions are almost as prevalent in the United States as they are in
Kyrgyzstan. The findings of this study suggest that the emergence and resilience of informal
institutions in developed countries such as the United States is due to local supply and demand.
The demand for inexpensive migrant labor in the United States is so great that migration
intermediaries find ways to bring in migrant workers. Domestic services are increasingly
performed by paid workers in the United States as more American women are entering the
12 The Minuteman Project is a movement that started in 2005 in several border states of the United States. Civilianactivists patrol the borders to intercept and report migrants attempting to illegally cross the Mexico-U.S. border.
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