The Rojava Revolution - Evergreen State College · were seen flying over the city. With that, the Rojava revolution was all but inevitable, and in the years since then the world has

The Rojava Revolution

By Aram Shabanian

Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion

the events that would eventually culminate in the multi­front Syrian Civil War we

see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its

principles of self­defense, gender equality, democratic leadership and

environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth

Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more

autonomy and, just perhaps, an independent state. The purpose of this paper is

to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection

Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus

should be initiated immediately. Throughout this paper there will be sources

linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from

beginning to end for yourself. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil

War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a

war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political

experiment the likes of which has never been seen before.

The Kurds are the second­largest ethnic group in the middle east today,

spanning four countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) but lacking a home state of

their own. Sometimes called the ultimate losers in the Sykes­Picot agreement,

the Kurds have fought for a homeland of their own ever since said agreement

was signed in 1916. The Kurds in all of the aforementioned nations are engaged

in some degree of insurrection or another. In Turkey, a full­blown insurgency is

underway between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK) , a militant Kurdish group deemed a terrorist organization by the US State 1

Department, the Turkish government, and many other countries. In Iran, the

Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been peacefully coexisting alongside 2

the Iranian government more­or­less since 2004. PJAK is designated a terrorist

organization by Iran, Turkey, and the United States, but notably not the UN or

EU. Iraq has several Kurdish groups vying for power, but by far the most

powerful (and current political leadership) in Iraq is the Kurdish Regional

Government , or KRG.3

1 "About the PKK." The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). http://www.pkkonline.com/en/. 2 "About PJAK." Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20110716053631/http://www.pjak.org/eng/about.php. 3 "Kurdistan Regional Government." Kurdistan Regional Government. http://www.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12.

Discrimination against Syrian Kurds dates back to the creation of

modern­day Syria after WWII. This culminated in several events, namely the

Jazira Census of 1962. On August 23rd, 1962, the government of the Syrian

Arab Republic (Henceforth Syria) conducted a special population census that

failed to include about 120,000 Kurds. As a result, they were stripped of their 4

citizenship and categorized as aliens. Kurds in Syria thereafter were treated as

second­class citizens, even if they happened to retain their Syrian citizenship.

This resulted in widespread dissatisfaction with the Damascus government and a

desire for self­rule and an eventual place in an independent Kurdistan.

The Syrian Civil War started for Rojava in the city of Al­Hasakah when a local

man, Hasan Ali Akleh, doused himself in gasoline and set himself on fire. As a result of

his self­immolation local activists called for a “Day of Rage” which, due to fear of

government reprisal, was attended by few. Finally on March 7th, 2011, thirteen 5

political prisoners of the Bashar al­Assad regime went on hunger strike, which gained

much support for the steadily­growing revolution. Five days later, major protests

broke out in the Rojavan cities of Al­Qamishli and Al­Hasakah, both celebrating 6

Kurdish Martyr’s Day and simultaneously protesting against the Assad regime. In

4 "Syria: THE SILENCED KURDS." Human Rights Watch. October 1996. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria.htm. 5 Iddon, Paul. "A Recap of the Syrian Crisis to Date." Digital Journal. July 30, 2012. Accessed April 15, 2016. http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/329590. 6 Kurdish Protest Al­Qamishli. YouTube. April 28, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nj2tubl3bPk.

late May a summit was held in Antalya, Turkey, between various factions of the

newly­proclaimed Free Syrian Army and other anti­government groups in Syria.

This summit was skipped by a major coalition of 12 Kurdish political parties, who

stated that they would not be party to a meeting in Turkey as it would be a

detriment to Kurds in Syria. As a result, when the Syrian National Council was 7

announced after the summit, most Kurdish political parties were left out. The

Syrian National Council would later go on to merge with several other groups to

form the National Council for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or the

Syrian National Coalition. 8

On June 11, 2012, the two major Kurdish political parties in Rojava, the

Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC)

signed an agreement in the presence of Iraqi Kurdistan’s president, Massoud

Barzani, in the Iraqi­Kurdish city of Erbil. This agreement fell through for various

reasons, but about a month later (July 12) a new agreement was drawn up which

formed the foundation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee, a body to govern all

Kurdish­controlled territories in Syria (the cantons of Jazira, Kobanê, and Afrin). 9

7 "Syrian Kurdish Parties Boycott Syrian Opposition Conference in Antalya, Turkey." Monthly Review Magazine, June 1, 2011. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/kb010611.html. 8 "Syrian Activists Form a 'national Council'" CNN, August 24, 2011. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/08/23/syria.un.resolution/index.html?eref=mrss_igoogle_cnn. 9 WILGENBURG, Wladimir Van. "Syrian Kurds Try to Maintain Unity." Rudaw, February 17, 2011. http://web.archive.org/web/20120723012730/http://www.rudaw.net:80/english/news/syria/4964.html.

Elsewhere in Syria the revolution began picking up speed and intensity.

Very rapidly protests in cities like Dara’a, Hama, and Homs went from peaceful,

unarmed protests to full­blown armed insurrection as government forces cracked

down with bullets and bombs. As the revolution gained strength, the Syrian 10

Arab Army (SAA) began pulling forces from less­threatened parts of the country

and began consolidating forces along the coastline and in several major cities in

particular (Tartus, Latakia, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo). In the absence of 11

SAA forces, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) took control of the city

of Kobanê on July 19, 2012. The following day their control expanded to the 12

cities of Amuda and Afrin and, by the end of the month, included several other

key cities. In fact, the only sizable Kurdish majority cities that remained under

government control at that time were the cities of Al­Hasakah and Al­Qamishli.

On the morning of August 2nd, 2012, the National Coordination Committee

for Democratic Change, a large umbrella organization under which most Syrian

rebel groups fell, declared that, with the notable exceptions of Al­Hasakah and

Al­Qamishli, most Kurdish cities and towns in Syria were thus under the control

10 Violence Continues across Syria. YouTube. April 13, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gwle0­pP7r4. 11 Shadid, Anthony. "Syria Pulls Its Armed Forces From Some Contested Cities." The New York Times, June 29, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/middleeast/30syria.html. 12 "More Kurdish Cities Liberated As Syrian Army Withdraws from Area." Rudaw, July 20, 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20120721142617/http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4978.html.

of Kurdish political parties and not the Syrian government. In Al­Qamishli, 13

soldiers and police officers were given orders not to leave their barracks and

police stations, and the red, white, green and yellow colors of the Kurdish flag

were seen flying over the city. With that, the Rojava revolution was all but

inevitable, and in the years since then the world has watched as an

unprecedented social experiment has unfolded in what has become the most

deadly country on the planet.

Flag of the KCK

It is important to understand the vast number of actors in the Rojava

conflict. In terms of Kurdish groups, most of those in Syria and Iraq (along

with many in Turkey and Iran) answer to, at the top of the food chain, the

Koma Civakên Kurdistan, or in English the Group of Communities in

Kurdistan. The KCK is led by Abdullah Öcalan, who is currently imprisoned in

Turkey on İmralı island, in the Sea of Marmara. The KCK was founded in

13 "PYD Press Release: A Call for Support and Protection of the Peaceful Establishment, the Self­governed Rojava Region | هيئة التنسيق الوطنية لقوى التغيير الديمقراطي." PYD Press Office, August 2, 2012. http://syrianncb.org/2012/08/02/pyd­press­release­a­call­for­support­and­protection­of­the­peaceful­establishment­the­self­governed­syrian­kurdish­region/.

2005 with the goal of promoting the ideology of democratic confederalism

Öcalan advocated for following his 2009 arrest. In theory the organization is 14

supposed to provide guidance and authority over the PKK, but in reality that

power lies with the leaders of the PKK itself and the various organizations

which will be described shortly. Alongside the KCK is the KJK, or the Komalên

Jinên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Communities of Women), another umbrella

organization designed to coordinate the various Kurdish women’s rights

groups which are affiliated with the PKK. 15

Flag of the PYD

Within Syria itself are several other organizations. The first and foremost is

the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party), or the PYD. The PYD

was founded in 2003 after the PKK withdrew from Syria in the late 1990s. The

14 Ocalan, Abdullah. "Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan." WikiSource. March 20, 2005. Accessed April 30, 2016. http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Declaration_of_Democratic_Confederalism_in_Kurdistan. 15 "Komalên Jinên Kurdistan." KJK Komaln Jinn Kurdistan RSS. March 2011. Accessed April 23, 2016. http://www.kjk­online.org/hakkimizda/?lang=en.

PYD represents the most dominant political force in Rojava and exerts influence

over the YPG and other Kurdish militias, which will be discussed shortly. 16

Flag of TEV­DEM

The TEV­DEM, Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk (or Movement for a

Democratic Society) is a coalition of the PYD along with other

ideologically­similar groups created to manage and govern Rojava following the

withdrawal of the SAA. This organization is de facto under the control of the PYD.

The Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê (Kurdistan Democratic Party of 17

Syria or KDPS) is the Syrian affiliate to the Iraqi KDP. They stand ideologically

opposed to the PYD’s autonomous federal cantons and instead advocate for

all­out independence and unification with Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDPS initially 18

refused to take part in the Syrian National Council (SNC), the official

representatives of the Syrian opposition, as they could not secure a guarantee of

16 "The Kurdish Democratic Union Party." Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed April 25, 2016. http://carnegie­mec.org/publications/?fa=48526. 17 "The Project of a Democratic Syria: Movement for a Democratic Society, Rojava." Ekurd Daily, February 17, 2015. http://ekurd.net/the­project­of­a­democratic­syria­movement­for­a­democratic­society­rojava­2015­02­17. 18 "The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (al­Parti)." Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed April 22, 2016. http://carnegie­mec.org/publications/?fa=48360.

Kurdish cultural rights. However, should those rights be guaranteed the KDPS

would join the SNC and stands opposed to the federalization program in Rojava.

The KDPS falls under the ENKS/KNC, or Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê

(Kurdish National Council). This group was created in part by Iraqi Kurdish

president Barzani and does not participate in the autonomous federal system

being enacted in Rojava. 19

Flag of the YPG

The armed wings of the PYD are the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina

Gel/People's Protection Units) and the YPJ (Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê/Women's

Protection Units). The YPG was initially founded after the Al­Qamishli riots of 20

2004 resulted in the deaths of at least 30 Syrian Kurds at the hands of

19 "The Kurdish National Council in Syria." Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed April 22, 2016. http://carnegie­mec.org/publications/?fa=48502. 20 "PYD Announces Surprise Interim Government in Syria’s Kurdish Regions." Rudaw, November 13, 2013. http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/13112013.

government forces and existed as a secretive guerrilla force until around

2011/2012, when its existence became known to a wider audience. The YPJ is

the women’s arm of the YPG and acts with the same level of authority and

autonomy as the YPG. It is important to note the discrepancies between the

equipment of the YPG/J and their enemies in the Islamic State of Iraq and

al­Sham (ISIS/ISIL/IS, henceforth Daesh). The YPG/J are mostly light militias

armed with American and Soviet assault rifles and machine guns. They are also

equipped with several types of anti­tank weapon (Namely the Soviet RPG­7 and

the American FGM­148 Javelin) and less than 100 mortars. In terms of armored

fighting vehicles (AFVs) the YPG has captured a few main battle tanks (At least 21

two T­72 and two T­55, one of which was heavily modified with a machine gun

turret in place of the main gun) and a few dozen captured American Humvees

which were looted from the Iraqi army by Daesh following the collapse of Mosul.

These are supplemented by a generous helping of homemade armored fighting

vehicles, from simple Toyota pickup trucks with DShK heavy machine guns in

them to armored garbage trucks painted to look like a lion. Combined the YPG/J

number about 65,000­70,000 people, but these numbers are unreliable at best

and fluctuate from time to time. 22

21 YPG Tank Taburu & Düşmanlar Korkun. YouTube. August 8, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXSs5R5Ydzc 22 The Military Balance. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016.

Contrast this level of equipment with the equipment possessed by Daesh

and one can quickly come to understand why the YPG has come to depend on

Coalition air strikes to help combat Daesh. Along with the same assault rifles and

machine guns as the YPG has in their possession, Daesh also has various light

machine guns, squad automatic weapons, hand grenades, grenade launchers

(namely the Soviet AGS­17), rocket propelled grenades (RPG), man­portable air

defense systems (MANPADS), which are capable of taking down low­flying

aircraft and helicopters (including the notorious American FIM­92 Stinger), and

anti­tank missiles (such as the BGM­71 TOW). In addition to this, Daesh has

captured several types of towed artillery such as the Soviet Type 59­1 and D­30

field guns, the Soviet ZU­23­2 and AZP­S­60 anti­aircraft guns, and the American

M198 howitzer, of which they own up to 50. While the YPG does own several

dozen American Humvees, Daesh captured at least 2,300 from the Iraqi army in

their early days of advances, and these are supplemented by the same pickup

truck­mounted machine gun contraptions (technicals) that have been seen in use

by the YPG. The real power in terms of Daesh equipment comes from their

heavier armored vehicles. Daesh captured the following armored personnel

carriers from the Iraqi military: BMP­1 (20 captured), MT­LB (50 captured),

various American­made Mine­Resistant Ambush­Protected vehicles (MRAP,

about 15­20 captured), M1117 (50 captured), and the venerable American M113

(unknown number, at least 50). In addition to this, Daesh has captured at least

two American M1A1M Abrams main battle tanks (which have since been

destroyed), approximately 10 T­72s of various types, and at least 30 T­55s.

These are supplemented with several 2S1 Gvozdika self­propelled howitzers, a

few ZSU­23­4 Shilka self­propelled anti­aircraft guns, and some BM­21 Grad

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), all captured from the SAA. 23

On September 23rd, 2014, President Barack Obama confirmed rumors

that had been circulating of an American air strike on targets in Syria. The

president said, in part, “Last night, on my orders, America’s armed forces began

strikes against ISIL targets in Syria.” The strikes were launched against four 24

Syrian cities; Raqqa (three strikes) Deir ez­Zor (four strikes), Al­Hasakah (two 25

strikes), and Abu Kamal (four strikes). The strikes were carried out by aircraft 26

from the United States along with support and aircraft from Saudi Arabia, the

UAE, Jordan, Qatar, and in particular Bahrain. 272829

23 Ibid. 24 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. "Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria." News release, September 23, 2014. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2014/09/23/statement­president­airstrikes­syria. 25 23 Sept Strike on ISIL Building and Tanks. YouTube. September 25, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxelVX5i_QM. 26 Sept. 23: ISIL Vehicle Staging Ground. YouTube. September 23, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nShvy9S4pg4. 27 United States Central Command. Media Affairs. "Sept. 23: U.S. Military, Partner Nations Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria." News release, September 23, 2014. United States CENTCOM. http://www.centcom.mil/news/press­release/sept.­23­u.s.­military­partner­nations­conduct­airstrikes­against­isil­in­s. 28 Bahraini Ministry of Defense. "Bahrain Confirms It Participated in Strikes Against Daesh." News release, September 23, 2014. AlRiyadh. http://www.alriyadh.com/978961.

These airstrikes were missiles from the US Navy, including at least two vessels,

which fired Tomahawk Cruise Missiles at targets in Syria. It is worth noting that 30

the majority of these strikes took place in areas with Kurdish forces nearby. Thus

began American and Coalition support for Rojava.

The Coalition refers to a broad collection of nations providing different

levels of support to the various factions in the wars in Syria and Iraq. In Syria,

military support for Rojava comes from the United States, Australia , France , 31 32

the Netherlands, Jordan, Morocco, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 33 34 35 36 37

Denmark, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates 38

29 CENTCOM. "Sept. 23: ISIL Compound Strike." YouTube. 2014. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bpakeG9x7o. 30 US Navy. "USS Philippine Sea Launches Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles to Combat ISIL." YouTube. 2014. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onexkO2cxbs. 31 Om, Jason. "Federal Cabinet Gives Go Ahead to RAAF Air Strikes on Islamic State in Syria." ABC Australia, September 19, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2015/s4309514.htm. 32 Irish, John. "France Launches Air Strikes against Islamic State in Syria." Reuters News, September 27, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us­mideast­crisis­france­syria­idUSKCN0RR07Y20150927#eReZqrtooLY13th4.97. 33 "Dutch Jets to Join Bombing of ISIL Targets in Syria." Al Jazeera, January 29, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/dutch­jets­join­bombing­isil­targets­syria­160129174717499.html. .Accessed April 30, 2016 .القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة األردنية ­ الجيش العربي." القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة األردنية ­ الجيش العربي" 34http://www.jaf.mil.jo/News.aspx. 35 "Moroccan F­16 Carry Out Airstrikes Against ISIS." Morocco World News, December 10, 2014. http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/12/146456/moroccan­f­16­carry­out­airstrikes­against­isis/. 36 "Update: Air Strikes against Daesh." ­ News Stories. Accessed April 22, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update­air­strikes­against­daesh. 37 "Belgian OIR Air Strikes." Defense.Be. http://www.mil.be/nl/irak­0. 38 "Mission Update ­ RDAF F­16 Operation Inherent Resolve." Danish Ministry of Defense. http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/intops/Pages/l.aspx.

(and formerly Australia and Canada ). These nations make up Combined Joint 39 40

Task Force ­ Operation Inherent Resolve, otherwise known as CJTF­OIR.

Additional military aid is provided by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,

Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,

Kuwait ,Lebanon, Spain and Singapore, along with other unnamed Eastern

European and Middle Eastern nations. 41

Unfortunately for Rojava, these airstrikes would largely only begin after the

city of Kobanê was nearly overrun by Daesh. Prior to this, the Rojava conflict was

largely unknown to Westerners, but the actual clashing with outside forces began

for Rojava all the way back in 2011, shortly after the aforementioned protests

took place. There were reports on 16 March 2011 of clashes in Al­Hasakah

between government forces and local protesters. The early morning of 23 42

March 2011 saw bloodshed in the southern city of Dara’a, with 15 or 16

protesters being killed by police and military officials. The 31st saw great 43

promise for the Kurds; initially, President Assad offered to investigate the loss of

39 "Global Operations." Air Task Group : Operation OKRA : Department of Defence. Accessed April 30, 2016. http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/ATG.asp. 40 "Operation IMPACT – Air Task Force­Iraq Airstrikes." Government of Canada, National Defence. Accessed April 30, 2016. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations­abroad­current/op­impact­airstrikes.page. 41 Payne, Sebastian. "What the 60­plus Members of the Anti­Islamic State Coalition Are Doing." The Washington Post, September 25, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/25/what­the­60­members­of­the­anti­islamic­state­coalition­are­doing/. 42 "In Syria, Crackdown After Protests." The New York Times, March 18, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html?_r=0. 43 "15 Killed in Clashes in Southern Syria." Chicago Sun Times, March 24, 2011. http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/world/4472184­418/15­killed­in­clashes­in­southern­syria.html.

Syrian citizenship by 150,000 Kurds in Al­Hasakah under his father Hafez

al­Assad, an attempt to placate the Kurds and keep them from joining the

rebellion. As April began, chaos began to spread to certain parts of Syria.

Unknown gunmen began firing on protesters. On 7 April President Assad 44

granted citizenship to 220,000 Kurds who had been stripped of their nationality in

the 1960s (along with their children) in a further attempt to calm the Kurdish

people and prevent them from joining the revolution. April 22nd became a rallying

call for many around the nation, with mass protests resulting in at least 100

deaths. April 25 saw the beginning of the siege of Dara’a, which ended with 45

several hundred civilians killed. The siege saw some of the first widespread use

of military against civilians, including at least 20 tanks. This resulted in solidarity 46

protests in many Syrian cities on the following friday, April 29th, as students and

workers got out of their jobs and classes for the weekend. In Al­Qamishli, at least

15,000 people stood together and chanted “With our soul and with our blood we

will sacrifice ourselves for Dara’a”. May saw a dramatic uptick in violence, with 47

several other cities coming under siege. However, protesters were not

dissuaded, and many thousands kept taking to the streets in cities like Homs,

44 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zJYKLb72Y1k 45 "'Deadliest Day' in Syria Uprising." Al Jazeera, April 23, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/201142212452973755.html. 46 "Syria Protests: Rights Group Warns of 'Deraa Massacre'" BBC News, May 5, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world­middle­east­13299793. 47 "Scores Killed on Syria's 'day of Rage'" Al Jazeera, April 29, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/201142993412242172.html.

Hama, Dara’a, Latakia, and many more. In Dara’a, the body of a 13­year­old 48

boy named Hamza Ali Al­Khateeb was returned to his family after a month in

police captivity. The body showed signs of mutilation and torture, and his death

reinvigorated protests around the country. 49

By now at least 1,000 people had been killed around Syria, with at least a

dozen cities and towns under military siege. Jisr ash­Shugur was attacked with

gunships and tanks and was finally stormed on the 13th of June. Seven days

later, President Assad gave a long, rambling speech, in which he blamed

foreigners and outside intervention for the protests and the violence. This served

to further aggravate the Syrian people, who took to the streets in greater

numbers than ever before. Protests began in Damascus for the first time, and the

international community began placing sanctions on Syria. In Deir ez­Zor, mass

protests of over 450,000 people began taking place in late June and early July,

finally culminating in a mass defection of Syrian army personnel on the 29th and

the creation of the Free Syrian Army, or FSA. 50

The next major date for Syrian Kurds was 7 October 2011, when activist

Mashaal al­Tammo was murdered by unknown gunmen in his home. The attack

was later blamed on the government. In Al­Qamishli, tens of thousands took to

48 Souria123. "حماة جمعة حماة الديار اعتصام اكثرمن ستين الف متظاهر في ساحة العاصي." YouTube. 2011. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=93khEb4KJTE. 49 "Syria protests escalate over death of boy". Financial Times. 29 May 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/730f7f62­8a25­11e0­beff­00144feab49a.html#axzz1NuqtHVgG 50 "Defecting troops form 'Free Syrian Army', target Assad security forces". World Tribune. 3 August 2011.

the streets outside the hospital al­Tammo’s body was taken to in protest. The 51

following day at least 14 mourners were killed in a government crackdown after

around 50,000 people took to the streets of Al­Qamishli to remember al­Tammo.

On January 10, 2012, president Assad gave a rambling speech in which he 52

blamed the ongoing unrest on foreign dissidents, provocateurs, and terrorists, a

line he would continue to echo for years to come. 53

In February the war began to take on a darker turn, with hundreds being

killed by the Regime on a daily basis. In the international realm, several nations,

including the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations

(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates)

closed or restricted their diplomatic missions to Syria. Sanctions were attempted

through the United Nations Security Council (Resolutions S/2012/77 and

S/2012/538), but these were vetoed by Russia and China.

From February until June Kurdish front stayed largely quiet, with mass

protests occasionally breaking out in Al­Qamishli. On 19 June the FSA called

upon the Kurds to join in the fight against the Syrian government. In exchange,

they promised to end “injustice” against the Kurds in a future Syria. On 19 July 54

51 "Syrian Kurdish Activist Mishaal Al­Tammo Shot Dead." BBC News, October 7, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world­middle­east­15222001. 52 "Syria Security Forces 'open Fire at Kurd's Funeral'" BBC News, October 8, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world­middle­east­15227172. 53 SyriansWorldwide. "1| President Bashar Al­Assad's Speech Highlights (English Subtitles)." YouTube. 2012. Accessed April 22, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCcy3KkB2Js. 54 "Free Syrian Army Calls on Kurdish Brothers to Join Fight as Clashes Erupt." Al Arabiya, June 19, 2012. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/19/221535.html.

the border city of Kobanê was taken over without a shot fired by the Kurdish

Popular Defense Committees as the SAA pulled back to cover the “heartland”. 55

Toward the end of July, Salih Muslim, one of the co­leaders of the PYD, told the

BBC that the Kurds were ready to “govern themselves”, but reiterated that he did

not mean Kurdish independence; rather, he was referring to increased autonomy

in a new, democratic Syria. 56

August started with a condemnation of the Syrian government by the

United Nations General Assembly. The resolution, 66/253, read, in part:

1. Condemns the increasing use by the Syrian authorities of heavy weapons, including indiscriminate shelling from tanks and helicopters, in population centres and the failure to withdraw their troops and heavy weapons to their barracks, contrary to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2042 (2012) and paragraph 2 of Council resolution 2043 (2012);

2. Strongly condemns the continued widespread and systematic

gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities and pro­Government militias, such as the use of force against civilians, massacres, arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protestors, human rights defenders and journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill­treatment, including against children, as well as any human rights abuses by armed opposition groups;

3. Condemns all violence, irrespective of where it comes from,

including terrorist acts; 57

55 "Syrian Kurdish Town Declares Independence from Damascus." Http://www.timesofisrael.com/syrian­kurdish­town­declares­independence­from­damascus/, July 19, 2012. 56 Davies, Wyre. "Crisis in Syria Emboldens Country's Kurds." BBC News, July 28, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world­middle­east­19021766. 57 United Nations General Assembly. Press Office. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 3 August 2012 66/253. The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic." News release, August 7, 2012. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/253 B.

Throughout the remainder of 2012 and into 2013 the Kurds in Rojava

continued to consolidate power in their cities. All cities were cleared of

government forces save for Al­Hasakah and Al­Qamishli, wherein the garrisons

remained and controlled substantial portions of the city. On 27 October, 2012,

approximately 30 people were killed in clashes between the YPG in a Kurdish

neighborhood of Aleppo and unknown Arab rebels. An additional 200 people

were taken prisoner by either side (total of 200). 58

On 18 January 2013, two radical jihadist groups, Ghuraba al­Sham and

Jabhat al­Nusra (Syrian offshoot of al­Qaeda ), the latter designated a terrorist 5960

group by the United States and many other nations/organizations, launched an

attack on the city of Kobanê. Heavy fighting ensued, and at one point the

jihadists were reinforced by three tanks that were driven in from the Turkish

border. However, the YPG managed to hold the town and actually capture one of

the tanks, which proved to be extremely useful in later operations. 61

58 "30 Dead as Rebels Clash with Kurds in Syria City: Watchdog." Ahram Online, October 27, 2012. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/56604/World/Region/­dead­as­rebels­clash­with­Kurds­in­Syria­city­Wat.aspx. 59 Abouzeid, Rania. "Interview with Official of Jabhat Al­Nusra, Syria’s Islamist Militia Group." Time Magazine, December 25, 2012. http://world.time.com/2012/12/25/interview­with­a­newly­designated­syrias­jabhat­al­nusra/. 60 "Al­Qaeda Leader in Syria Speaks to Al Jazeera." Al Jazeera, December 19, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/al­qaeda­leader­syria­speaks­al­jazeera­20131218155917935989.html. 61 "Kurd­jihadist Firefights Rage in Syria." The Daily Star ­­ Lebanon, January 18, 2013. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle­East/2013/Jan­18/202794­kurd­jihadist­firefights­rage­in­northern­syria.ashx.

The first major clash between YPG and Islamist forces came on 16 July,

2013, in the town of Ras al­Ayn. Since the conclusion of the Battle of Ras al­Ayn

on 19 February 2013, the town had been divided between Arab and Kurdish

fighters. On the 16th of July, a YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) patrol was

ambushed by al­Nusra (Henceforth JaN), which had recently reinforced its

positions in the city with approximately 200 more fighters. The driver was

captured, but two passengers in the vehicle were able to escape. Proverbial 62

alarm bells sounded and the YPG brought in reinforcements from the nearby

town of al­Derbasiya. Clashes broke out between the YPG and JaN, and within a

few hours the YPG had taken control of the local JaN headquarters. By 6364

midday on the 17th the YPG had routed JaN from the city and captured the

Turkish/Syrian border crossing, but not before two Kurdish and nine JaN fighters

died. Fighting continued through the 19th in the towns of Tal A’lo, Karhouk and

A’li Agha. Between the 16th and the 19th at least 35 Islamist and 19 YPG fighters

had been killed in the clashes.

By August Daesh had announced their intention to capture the YPG

headquarters city of Kobanê. The month saw continued clashes in smaller

62 Wilgenburg, Wladimir Van. "Clashes Re­Erupt in Syria Between Al­Qaeda, Kurds." Al­Monitor, July 16, 2013. http://www.al­monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/fighting­al­qaeda­kurdish­forces­in­syria.html. 63 "Fierce Clashes in Serekaniye, Eight Dead, Five Wounded." Support Kurds in Syria SKS. July 16, 2013. Accessed April 29, 2016. http://supportkurds.org/tuesday­16­july­2013/. 64 Kurdish Force and Jihadists Clash in Ras Al­Ayn(Sere Kaniye) LiveLeak. July 16, 2013. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=413_1374021489&comments=1.

villages around Kobanê, namely between the FSA/Islamists and the YPG. At this

point, JaN and Daesh were still allies. As August came to a close the YPG

seemed on the retreat, with Islamist factions gaining ground in Kobanê canton.

These advances, and similar advances in Aleppo, led to some Kurds fleeing

toward Kobanê and Afrin. As Islamist groups, in particular Daesh, took control of

these villages and towns, they began ethnically cleansing members of the

Kurdish community. In the absence of heavy weapons, Daesh was able to 65

quickly overrun YPG positions. As noted previously, Daesh has in their inventory

many main battle tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, something the YPG

lacked at the time (and still largely lacks).

Finally on 13 September 2014, Daesh initiated a large­scale offensive to

capture the Kobanê canton and the city of Kobanê itself. Since February Daesh 66

had been separate from JaN, so as Daesh forces encircled Kobanê elements of 67

the FSA joined Kurds fleeing Daesh and seeking refuge in Kobanê or Turkey

itself. Heavy combat ensued, with the YPG pledging not to give up Kobanê and 68

65 Doornbos, Harald, and Jenan Moussa. "The Civil War Within Syria’s Civil War." Foreign Policy, August 28, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/28/the­civil­war­within­syrias­civil­war/. 66 Albayrak, Ayla, Joe Parkinson, and David Gauthier­Villars. "Thousands of Syrian Kurds Flee Islamic State Fighters Into Turkey." The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/thousands­of­syrian­kurds­flee­islamic­state­fighters­into­turkey­1411151657. 67 "Al­Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq." The Washington Post, February 3, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al­qaeda­disavows­any­ties­with­radical­islamist­isis­group­in­syria­iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a­8cef­11e3­98ab­fe5228217bd1_story.html. 68 "Kobanêi Refugee Vehicles." Wikimapia. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=36.906203&lon=38.317780&z=16&m=b.

Daesh pledging not to halt until the town was taken. By 19 September Daesh 69

had captured approximately 40 Kurdish villages near Kobanê and was advancing

rapidly on the city itself. As Daesh closed in on at least 100 more smaller 70

villages, the YPG began evacuating civilians to safety in Turkey despite

sustained enemy artillery fire. All­told, approximately 300,000 civilians were

evacuated through Kobanê in September/November 2014. Still others were left 71

stranded at the border, unable to cross into Turkey as­per Turkish officials. 72

Evidence of this human exodus is visible via satellite imagery, with thousands of

cars seen parked in large encampments every several miles along the

Turkish/Syrian border near Kobanê. The YPG swung into crisis mode, 73

consolidating their forces in Kobanê and receiving at least 300 reinforcements via

Turkey. Meanwhile Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK official in Turkey, called upon 74

Kurdish youth in Turkey to answer the call and respond to Kobanê. 75

69 Uncut Chronicles: Kobanêi. Kurds vs ISIS (SEPT­OCT 2014). YouTube. November 4, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoeDl­emIHI. 70 "Syrian Kurds Warn of Mounting Crisis as ISIS Advances, Takes More Villages." Q13 Fox, September 19, 2014. http://q13fox.com/2014/09/19/syrian­kurds­warn­of­mounting­crisis­as­isis­advances­takes­more­villages/. 71 "Turkey Struggles with Spillover as Syrian Kurds Battle Islamic State." EuroNews, September 22, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140922220715/http://www.euronews.com:80/newswires/2699412­turkish­deputy­pm­says­45000­syrian­kurds­enter­turkey­fleeing­islamic­state­advance. 72 "Thousands of Syrians Seek Refuge from ISIL in Turkey." EuroNews, September 19, 2014. http://www.euronews.com/2014/09/19/thousands­of­syrians­seek­refuge­from­isil­in­turkey/. 73 "Kobanê Refugee Vehicles." Wikimapia. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=36.906203&lon=38.317780&z=16&m=b. 74 "About 60,000 Syrian Kurds Flee to Turkey from Islamic State Advance." Reuters, September 20, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us­syria­crisis­turkey­kurds­idUSKBN0HF05I20140920. 75 "PKK Appeals to Kurds in Turkey to Fight for Kobanê." Rudaw, September 19, 2014. http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19092014.

Daesh is adept at using vehicle­borne improvised explosive devices

(VBIEDs), in layman’s terms a car full of bombs driven by a suicidal fighter

toward enemy lines. Their humble beginnings were red­and­white Nissan sedans

with trunks full of old artillery shells driven at American forces in Iraq during the

occupation of that country which began in 2003. More contemporary Daesh

VBIEDs feature heavy armor plating, making it nearly impossible to stop them

with anything short of an anti­tank guided missile (ATGM), a tank, or an airstrike.

Again, as previously stated, Daesh had in their inventory a wide variety of

armored vehicles. However, it is important to note that these vehicles do not

equate an effective mechanized force on their own. Modern weapons of war

require extensive maintenance, repair, and resources. Thus, as many captured

tanks and armored personnel carriers ran out of ammunition, they were filled with

explosives and driven at YPG lines. Armored recovery vehicles and ambulances

were also used in the assaults, along with a plethora of homemade vehicles,

from armored garbage trucks to pickup trucks sporting massive anti­aircraft guns.

However, perhaps one of the deadliest and most feared weapons on the Daesh

inventory is none other than the armored bulldozer. In an interview with an Iraqi 76

Peshmerga member, the details of these vehicles was fully revealed. Essentially

a standard bulldozer (or a military bulldozer in some cases) is taken and

76 "The Islamic State Going DIY, from Earthmover to Earthbreaker." Oryx Blog (blog), August 21, 2015. http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2015/08/the­islamic­state­going­diy­from_21.html.

up­armored with steel plating around vital areas. Then, in some cases, the

vehicle is also given concrete reinforcement. Finally it is packed with explosives

and sent chugging toward enemy lines. Often ATGMs and tank shells fail to 77

destroy the improvised bulldozers, leaving only airstrikes to prevent them from

wreaking havoc on Kurdish lines.

VBIEDs are used in conjunction with other armored vehicles and infantry

waves to overwhelm and shock defenders. Often two or three VBIEDs will be

used in quick succession, eliminating layers of defenses and allowing Daesh

fighters to infiltrate behind Kurdish defenses. After Daesh began massacring

Yazidi civilians in Shingal, Iraq, the United States, as previously mentioned,

began bombing the terrorist group on behalf of Baghdad. In late September

2014, that focus shifted to include Syria as well, and on 27 September the first

airstrike was carried out by an American F­15E near Kobanê, targeting a Daesh

building and two armored vehicles (possibly VBIEDs). 7879

Despite the airstrikes, Daesh continued to shell the city. The following day,

28 September, over 1,500 Kurdish fighters arrived from Turkey to join the fight. 80

77 A., Z. "Interview with Iraqi Peshmerga Veteran." Interview by author. March 23, 2016. 78 "Sept. 27: U.S. Military, Partner Nations Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIL in Iraq and Syria." CENTCOM. September 28, 2014. http://www.centcom.mil/news/press­release/sept.­27­u.s.­military­partner­nations­conduct­airstrikes­against­isil­in­i. 79 Centcom. "27 Sept F 15E Strike on ISIL Compound near Kobanê, Syria." YouTube. September 27, 2014. Accessed April 28, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1kMXX9B518. 80 "1,500 Kurdish Fighters Join Forces Against IS in Syria." The New Indian Express, September 28, 2014. http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/1500­Kurdish­Fighters­Join­Forces­Against­IS­in­Syria/2014/09/28/article2453611.ece.

As October arrived, soldiers inside Kobanê proper began preparing for increased

urban combat as the fighting came closer and closer to the city center. Sandbag

emplacements were installed and heavily defended, but in the end a lack of

ammunition and heavy weaponry led the YPG to retreat from outlying city

positions. As YPG forces retreated, Daesh moved in and immediately began

embarking on a campaign of ethnic cleansing, torture, and crimes against

humanity. Thousands crowded the Turkish border crossing, where Turkish 81

troops were deployed but not ordered to intervene. Stories of children having

their hearts cut out of their chests and elderly persons being brutally beaten and

murdered spread like wildfire, adding to the panic at the border. Captured

fighters, particularly women of the YPJ, were beaten, often raped, and beheaded.

The true brutality of Daesh really came out in their campaign against Kobanê and

reminded the Kurds what they were fighting for. 82

The use of suicide bombers was not unique to Daesh. In rare desperation,

a Kurdish woman was used as a suicide bomber against IS positions, killing at

least a dozen. Nine days into October and the YPG was running low on 83

81 James, Catherine. "Tales of Torture, Mutilation and Rape as Isis Targets Key Town of Kobanê." The Guardian, October 4, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/04/turkey­troops­isis­siege­Kobani­refugees­rape­and­murder. 82 Mezzofiore, Gianluca. "Syria: Isis Beheads Kurdish Women Soldiers as Battle for Kobani Rages On." October 1, 2014. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis­beheads­three­kurdish­women­battle­Kobanêi­rages­1468078. 83 "Kurds Battle for Key Syria Town, Woman Suicide Bomber Hits IS." Yahoo News Australia, October 6, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20141006131500/https://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/25190353/kurds­battle­for­key­syria­town­woman­suicide­bomber­hits­is/.

ammunition and other supplies. Outnumbered and outgunned, the situation

looked dire as Daesh fighters began setting fire to Kobanê to create a smoke

screen designed to thwart the prying eyes of the Coalition. Quick to adapt, 84

Daesh began dressing fighters up in YPG uniforms, flying YPG flags from their

motorcycles (which they began using to ferry ammunition around the city) , and 85

driving tanks into the city under the cover of smoke and darkness. 40% of

Kobanê was captured by 10 October. By the 15th of October the fighting had 86

spread to the Turkish/Syrian border crossing, which Daesh assaulted at least

four times. Over the course of four days (between the 13th and the 17th) the

coalition launched over 53 airstrikes against Daesh in and around Kobanê alone.

On the 19th, the first Coalition airdrops of supplies to YPG forces took place, with

supplies coming from Iraqi Kurdistan as well as Coalition countries. 87

In early September a joint­operations room had been founded , 88

comprising of the YPG/YPJ and elements of the FSA. This coalition, known as

84 "Report: A Third of Kobani Captured by Islamic State Read More: Http://www.haaretz.com/middle­east­news/1.620011." Haaretz, October 9, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle­east/1.620011. 85 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Public Relations. "10 October Press Release." News release, October 10, 2014. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe/posts/594840690624273. 86 "Islamic State Fighters Capture Kurd HQ in Syria's Kobanê: Monitor." Deccan Chronicle, October 10, 2014. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/141010/world­middle­east/article/islamic­state­fighters­capture­kurd­hq­syrias­Kobanê­monitor. 87 "US Airdrops Weapons for Kurds Fighting ISIL." Al Jazeera, October 20, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/fierce­fighting­rages­syria­Kobanê­20141019122812238305.html. 88 Announcement of the Euphrates Volcano. YouTube. September 10, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abjSkn_hcYY.

Euphrates Volcano, was announced on 10 September 2014. Euphrates Volcano

is comprised of the following groups, along with the YPG and the YPJ: the

Islamic Front (Aleppo Division), Tawhid Brigade (Northern Sector), Jaysh

al­Thuwar, Jabhat al­Akrad, Kita’ib Shams al­Shamal, Liwa Thuwar ar­Raqqa,

Liwa al­Jihad fi Sabeel Allah, Saraya Jarablus, Tahrir Brigade, Jaysh al­Qasas,

and Liwa Amna ar­Raqqa. On 29 October, FSA fighters began arriving via 89

Turkey, the first time Turkey had allowed non­Syrian Kurds to cross the border to

fight. In addition to FSA reinforcements, comrades from Iraqi Kurdistan began 90

crossing the border with Syria (of which they had controlled the northern section

of for about a month) and arriving via Turkey, bringing with them much­needed

heavy equipment. 91

As more Kurdish defenders streamed into the city, the once­thriving

Kobanê turned into a meatgrinder. Daesh began pulling forces from other areas

of Syria and throwing them into the offensive, desperate not to let their assault

die out. By November the situation had reached its worst point, with 60% of the 92

city under Daesh control. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) began

89 Cafarella, Jennifer, and Genevieve Casagrande. "SYRIAN OPPOSITION GUIDE." Institute for the Study of War, October 7, 2014. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian Opposition Guide_0.pdf. 90 Pamuk, Humeyra, and Raheem Salman. "Kurdish Peshmerga Forces Enter Syria's Kobanê after Further Air Strikes." Reuters, October 31, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us­mideast­crisis­idUSKBN0IK15M20141031. 91 Coles, Isabel, and Jonny Hogg. "Kurds Seize Iraq/Syria Border Post; Sunni Tribe Joins Fight against Islamic State." Reuters, September 30, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us­mideast­crisis­idUSKCN0HO12G20140930. 92 "IS Recalls Dozens of Fighters in Order to Fight in Kobanê." Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 10, 2014. http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/11/10/is­recalls­dozens­of­fighters­in­order­to­fight­in­Kobani/.

sending more fighters and equipment across the border to bolster Syrian Kurdish

forces, and by the end of November the tides had begun to turn. Coalition

airstrikes, along with reinforcements and resupply, bloodied the nose of Daesh,

who stubbornly refused to back down from the confrontation. To some this

inability to throw in the towel, so to speak, was surprising. To others it was

absolutely expected.

Daesh was formed partially by former Iraqi Ba’ath party members, many of

whom were in the Iraqi military. The Iraqi military, while historically decent at

logistics and supply operations, suffered when it came to tactical battlefield

decision making. During their numerous wars with Israel, Iraqi forces often

brought more than enough equipment, ammunition and fuel, but junior officers

failed their troops. Furthermore, as evidenced at the beginning of the Iran­Iraq

war, Iraqi generals lacked originality and would refuse to guard their flanks.

Forces were sent into enemy territory with no reconnaissance done, with no flank

guards, and while they did well when facing an enemy head­on (and the Iranians

did suffer in early head­on battles), simply maneuvering to the sides of the

massed Iraqi armor would allow Iranian forces to attack the weaker parts of the

armored columns, routing them time and again. When frustrated by a lack of

action, Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein would launch large­scale chemical

weapons attacks against the masses of Iranian infantry, who were lightly armed

and poorly trained. This tactic would rear its ugly head several more times before

Saddam was ultimately removed from power. Again during the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait and subsequent action against American and Coalition forces, while

some Iraqi soldiers fought tenaciously and bravely, the majority were routed

simply due to a lack of military intelligence and combined arms abilities. After the

war, Shia and Kurdish minorities in the south and north of Iraq (respectively) rose

up at the urging of the US, only to be brutally put down by Saddam’s security

forces. This was hardly the first time the Iraqi military had been used against the

Kurds; the Iraqi government and Kurdish citizens had battled several times

throughout the short history of the Mesopotamian nation­state. Thus, animosity

among Saddam’s men toward the Kurds was widespread, especially among

military officers.

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, loyalist forces under President Hussein

often fought to the bitter end; the Fedayeen Saddam, created after the first Gulf

War to help bolster the Iraqi regime against internal threats, along with some

members of the Republican Guard, stood against nearly impossible odds and

fought the Coalition invaders, dying in their thousands while doing

next­to­nothing for the war effort itself. These tactics can still be seen in use

against forces like the YPG today.

As reinforcements and supplies continued to come in from abroad, Daesh

went on the defensive. Several attempted advances were halted with air support

and the extremist forces were pushed back. By the end of December, Daesh was

barely holding onto the city, and a series of rapid advances in early January

proved to be the final blow against the organization in Kobanê. On January 26th,

the YPG announced the liberation of Kobanê and the beginning of their clean­up

operations in the town. 93

As Kobanê proved, local Kurdish and allied forces, supported by American

and Coalition airstrikes could prove absolutely lethal to Daesh. September ­

October 2014’s airstrikes alone totalled the following:

September 2014 ­­ Building (1); Armed Vehicle (3); Artillery (1); Tank

(1); 94

October 2014 ­­ Checkpoint (2); Fighting Position (6); Armed

Vehicle (33); Tank (3); Other (59); Artillery (2); Supply Depot (1);

Building (30) 95

November 2014 ­­ Other (100); Armed Vehicle (8); Building (6); 96

93 "General Command of the People's Defense Units (#YPG) regarding the Liberation of #Kobanê (Jan. 26, 2015)." Twitter (blog), January 26, 2015. https://twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/559858898736517120. 94 "Military Reports – September 2014." Airwars. https://airwars.org/daily­reports­sep14/. 95 Strike against an ISIL VBIED near Kobanê, Syria on Oct. 21, 2014. U.S. Central Command. YouTube. October 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxgIR4LhLAU. 96 “Military Reports ­­ November 2014.” Airwars. https://airwars.org/daily­reports­nov14/

In those three months alone (and September barely counts), it is clear to

see the impact the coalition made on Daesh’s operational capabilities. The

strikes target a wide variety of targets beyond VBIEDs as mentioned earlier,

including buildings, machine gun nests, sniper positions, training centers, artillery

positions, fighting positions, checkpoints, and other military infrastructure.

Continuation of these strikes, with an emphasis on limited or eliminating

altogether civilian casualties, is a must for the United States and the global

coalition (CJTF­OIR). Without continued air support, the tides could just as easily

shift against the YPG and back into the hands of Daesh. As recently as May

2016 Daesh has been on the offensive, showing their ability to gain ground is still

intact.

In a move heavily supported politically by the United States, on 10 October

2015 a new organization was founded in Northern Syria, the Syrian Democratic

Forces, or SDF. The SDF is comprised of, on top of the YPJ/YPG, the following 97

groups: The Syrian Arab Coalition, members of the Shammer tribal militias , the 98

Al­Sanadid Forces, the former Euphrates Volcano, Army of Revolutionaries, the

Northern Sun Battalion, the Martyrs of Dam Brigade , Liwa Jund Al Haramayn, 99

97 "The Syrian Democratic Forces" Formed By Various Factions. Ronahi TV English. YouTube. October 21, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ga04B2a6­KU. 98 Jamestown Foundation, Kurdish Strategy Towards Ethnically­Mixed Areas in the Syrian Conflict, 13 December 2013, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 23, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/52aef0e34.html 99 Martyrs of Dam Brigade. "Martyrs of Dam Brigade Join Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)." News release, February 4, 2016. Martyrs of Dam Brigade. http://dckurd.org/2016/02/04/martyrs­of­dam­brigade­join­syrian­democratic­forces­sdf/.

Martyr Kaseem Al Areef Battalion, Jabhat al­Akrad, Seljuq Brigade, Liwa

Thuwwar al­Raqqa, Jaish al­Salam, Furat Jarablus, New Syrian Forces, Liwai 99

Musat, Brigade Groups of Al­Jazira, Euphrates Martyr’s Battalion, Free Jarabulus

Battalion, Liwa Ahrar al­Raqqah, A­lShaitat tribal militia members,Liwaa Siqur

El­Badiye, Manbij Turkmen Brigade, the Syriac Union Party, the Syriac Military

Council, and Sutoro.

Through air strikes, the Western powers can show their political and

military support of Rojava and express their will to support Kurdish

self­determination. One of the deciding factors in any military intervention should

without a doubt be the thought of political repercussions; that is to say, if the

Russians oppose supporting a group of fighters, supporting them anyway hurts

relations with Russia. In the case of the PYD (And via them the YPG/YPJ), there

is no real danger of hurting relations with Russia. In fact, the only real negative

side to said support would be relations with Turkey. Turkey is a member of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is thus a close American ally. As

the YPG is a sister organization of the PKK, it can be seen as supporting the

PKK to support the YPG.

In order to secure Turkish support for such a venture, the United States

would need to either (1) find a way to guarantee materials will not end up in the

hands of the PKK, (2) provide only air support and no ground support, or (3)

refuse to support Rojava altogether. Anti­tank missile systems, such as the

BGM­71 TOW, would help the YPG combat Daesh’s heavy equipment, but would

also allow the PKK to destroy Turkish tanks in combat. In an attempt to

circumvent this issue, the United States could provide advanced defensive

systems to Turkey for use on tanks and other armored fighting vehicles,

technology from the currently­deployed US M1A2SEP2 Abrams main battle tank

which could easily be converted to Turkey’s extensive fleet of Leopard I and M60

main battle tanks. Turkey’s own domestic tank, the Altay, could be supplemented

with advanced technology, making it nearly invulnerable to most BGM­71 TOW

systems (older ones, at least).

Recently the Iraqi military embarked on a campaign to liberate the

al­Rutbah area of western Iraq. In the attacks the Iraqi military used extensive

close air support and flanking tactics, tactics the Iraqi military previously was

unable to pull off. As the war has progressed in Iraq and Syria, repeatedly it has

been proven that when faced with a competent military utilizing close air support,

Daesh can be defeated. This was evidenced recently at al­Rutbah and Ramadi in

Iraq, and Palmyra in Syria. The SDF provides a vessel through which American

and coalition influence can be exerted via air strikes and supply drops, along with

embedded trainers.

A major part of US efforts, however, will need to be political and diplomatic.

In order to properly carry out attacks in Syria, the US must secure peace

between the PKK and the Turkish government. This must be done or any efforts

will be in vain as Kurdish forces loyal to the PKK may trickle back into Turkey,

prompting a Turkish invasion of Rojava. Real, solid negotiations are required and

much political maneuvering must be achieved. It will take a skillful set of

politicians in the US to accomplish this, making the upcoming election even more

important.

Furthermore, negotiations between Rojava and the Kurdish Regional

Government in Iraq must be worked out. The two sides are at least amicable at

the current time, but it is anybody’s guess as to how long that will last.

In closing, it is important to bear in mind the key role airstrikes and supply

drops have had on the battlefield. WIthout them, Kobanê surely would have

fallen. If the coalition is to see success in the upcoming (currently­underway as of

this writing) operation to retake Raqqa, they will surely need to continue

supporting local forces such as the SDF and in particular the YPG. This means

more heavy weaponry, medical supplies, and other forms of equipment on top of

continuing airstrikes in the region. For these purposes it is recommended to

deploy a carrier battle group or additional USAF assets to the region. However,

the impetus must be on reducing and eliminating civilian casualties, similar to the

NATO campaign in Libya. Surplus armored bulldozers should be delivered to the

SDF, along with anti­mine equipment and the training on how to use the

advanced equipment. A possible (unlikely) scenario would see US and Russian

military sappers working side­by­side in Syria behind the SDF, clearing IEDs

from the countryside as the Kurdish and allied forces advance.

The potential for a stable, democratic and popularly­supported Rojava is

real. The world needs to recognize this opportunity at a unique political

experiment, a federal system which may prove to be the foundation for solving

other issues (such as Israel/Palestine, Morocco/Western Sahara, etc.). In order

to allow this system to develop, the world must also stand in support of the local

forces in the area and provide them with the equipment, training and military

support necessary to defeat Daesh and protect the Kurdish lands.

As of this writing, the battle for the Daesh capital city of Raqqa has begun

with the SDF leading the fight.