the resulting position is type-F a taxonomy of …web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/2409S06old/2409slides/26...24.09 spring 06 15 final exam •sample quotation identification & explanation.

1

24.09 spring 061

24.09 Minds and Machinesspring 2006

• handouts

• McGinn

• final exam questions

24.09 spring 062

a consistent tetrad1 if (t-/o-) physicalism is true, a priori (t-

/o-) physicalism is true*2-t a priori t-physicalism is false3-o if o-physicalism is false,

epiphenomenalism is true4 epiphenomenalism is false

*i.e. if t-physicalism is true, a priori t-physicalism is true, and ifo-physicalism is true, a priori o-physicalism is true

24.09 spring 063

the resulting position is type-Fmonism (panprotopsychism)

• “consciousness is constituted by the[categorical] properties of fundamental physicalentities...phenomenal or protophenomenal [i.e.o-physical] properties are located at thefundamental level of physical reality”(Chalmers, C&IPIN)

• n.b. the nature of the protophenomenal [o-physical] properties is unknown, becausephysical theory does not tell us about them

24.09 spring 064

a taxonomy of theories• type-A materialism/a priori physicalism (Lewis,

Dennett)• type-B materialism/a posteriori physicalism (Tye,

Levine)• type-C materialism/a priori mysterianism (Nagel,

McGinn [maybe]• type-D dualism/cartesian interactionism (Descartes)• type-E dualism/epiphenomenalism (Jackson [when he

wrote “epiphenomenal qualia”])• type-F monism/panprotopsychism (Chalmers,

Stoljar)

24.09 spring 065

“Can we solve the mind-bodyproblem?”

“How it is that anything soremarkable as a state ofconsciousness comes about as aresult of initiating nerve tissue, isjust as unaccountable as theappearance of the Djin, whereAladdin rubbed his lamp in thestory”

(Julian Huxley)

24.09 spring 066

McGinn’s mysterianism• McGinn argues that although there is a

solution to the mind-body problem,impoverished minds like ours (at least)are incapable of grasping it

physicalism?can we solve theproblem?

Nagel probablyprospect of an“objectivephenomenology”

Levine maybe who knows?

McGinn ?? nope

2

24.09 spring 067

• a type of mind M is cognitively closed withrespect to a property P (or theory T) if and onlyif the concept-forming procedures at M’s disposalcannot extend to a grasp of P (or anunderstanding of T)

24.09 spring 068

the argument

1. brains do not give rise to consciousness by magic, by thepower of God, etc. Consciousness is a naturalphenomenon (396); therefore:

2. there is some brain property P in virtue of which thebrain is the basis of consciousness (equivalently, there’sa theory T, referring to P, which fully explains thedependence of conscious states on brain states) (396-7)

3. there are two ways we might grasp P: by investigatingconsciousness directly (this includes introspection andalso conceptual analysis); by studying the brain (397)

24.09 spring 069

4. we can’t grasp P by introspection, or byconceptual analysis (397)

5. if we can grasp P by studying the brain, theneither P is a perceptible property of the brain,or else a property we could introduce toexplain perceptible properties of the brain (398)

6. P is not a perceptible property of the brain(398-9)

7. P could not be introduced as part of anexplanation of perceptible properties of thebrain (399-400); therefore:

24.09 spring 0610

8 we can’t grasp P (that is, human minds arecognitively closed with respect to P); therefore(from 2, 8)

9 the mind-body problem has a solution, but we areconstitutionally incapable of understanding it

24.09 spring 0611

1. brains do not give rise to consciousness by magic, by the power of God,etc. Consciousness is a natural phenomenon; therefore:

2. there is some brain property P in virtue of which the brain is the basis ofconsciousness (equivalently, there’s a theory T, referring to P, which fullyexplains the dependence of conscious states on brain states)

3. there are two ways we might grasp P: by investigating consciousnessdirectly (this includes introspection and also conceptual analysis); bystudying the brain

4. we can’t grasp P by introspection, or by conceptual analysis5. if we can grasp P by studying the brain, then either P is a perceptible

property of the brain, or else a property we could introduce to explainperceptible properties of the brain

6. P is not a perceptible property of the brain7. P could not be introduced as part of an explanation of perceptible

properties of the brain; therefore:8. we can’t grasp P (that is, human minds are cognitively closed with respect

to P); therefore (from 2, 8):9. the mind-body problem has a solution, but we are constitutionally

incapable of understanding it24.09 spring 06

12

• consider part of McGinn’s argument for (7):

[I]t seems to me that even a more unconstrainedconception of inference to the best explanation would stillnot do what is required: it would no more serve tointroduce P than it serves to introduce the property ofconsciousness itself. To explain the observed physical datawe need only such theoretical properties as bear uponthose data, not the property that explains consciousness,which does not occur in the data. Since we do not needconsciousness to explain those data, we do not need theproperty that explains consciousness…No conceptneeded to explain the workings of the physical world willsuffice to explain how the physical world producesconsciousness.

3

24.09 spring 0613

• but suppose that we include, in our “data”,facts about consciousness and mentation ingeneral, in addition to physical facts aboutthe brain

• McGinn’s line of argument apparently doesnot work against the view that we mightone day need to introduce P to explainsuch psychophysical data

24.09 spring 0614

3 There are (only) two ways we might grasp P: (i)by investigating consciousness directly (thisincludes introspection and also conceptualanalysis); (ii) by studying the brain [as a purelyphysical system]

• read this way, as McGinn seems to intend, (3) isfalse

• there is a third way we might grasp P—P could beintroduced as part of an explanation of thepsychophysical features of the brain

• what is McGinn’s argument against this third way?

24.09 spring 0615

final exam

• sample quotation identification & explanation.Identity the authors of the following quotations.For each quotation, write a sentence or twoexplaining the main point.

• “cut the pie any way you like, meanings just ain’tin the head!”

24.09 spring 0616

• sample multiple choice:• 1. Is Ned Block's example of the Aunt Bubbles

machine supposed to refute functionalism?• 2. Does Searle think that strong AI is false?• sample short answer (a paragraph):• 1. What is behaviorism? Describe one objection

to behaviorism that we discussed in class.

24.09 spring 0617

essay questions (answer 2 out of 3)

• 1. Nagel, Jackson, and McGinn all think thatconsciousness poses a problem forphysicalism, on somewhat similar grounds.Critically compare and contrast their views.Is it true that “with consciousness, [themind-body problem] seems hopeless”?

24.09 spring 0618

• 2. In “Consciousness and its place in nature”,Chalmers distinguishes Type-A Materialism, Type-B Materialism, Type-C Materialism, Type-DDualism, Type-E Dualism, and Type-F Monism.Pick one that you think is false. Explain what thistheory is, and why you think it’s false. Now takethe theory that you think is true (or, at any rate,is the least implausible of the lot). Explain whatthis theory is, and defend it against objections.

4

24.09 spring 0619

• 3. Could a suitably fancy robot think? More specifically,could a robot believe that it’s raining in Cambridge? (Takethe robot to be constructed from the usual materials:microprocessors, cables, servomotors, etc., with a varietyof external sensors like cameras and microphones.) Coulda suitably fancy robot have conscious experiences? Morespecifically, could a robot feel pain, or have a yellowy-orange afterimage? Approach these questions byconsidering how they might be answered by variousphilosophers we have encountered, for instanceDescartes, Smart, Block, Lewis, Putnam, Dennett, andChalmers.

24.09 spring 0620

THE END