Page 1 of 55 THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim No. CV 2006-00075 BETWEEN SONALAL RAMROOP In his capacity as Administrator ad Litem of the estate Ramdeen Ramroop, deceased, Pursuant to the Order of Madame Justice Rajnauth Lee dated 25 th January, 2006 in proceedings CV 2006- 00075 Claimant AND Seeta Ganeias (1) Adam Ojar (2) Narendra Ojar Maharaj (3) George Ojar (4) Delip Comar Ganeais (5) Sati Ganeais (6) Pooran Baldah (7) Jennifer Baldah (8) Ronald Siewlal (9) Roland Siewlal (10) Kaloutee Singh (11) and Sindy Singh (12) Defendants
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Page 1 of 55
THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Claim No. CV 2006-00075
BETWEEN
SONALAL RAMROOP
In his capacity as Administrator ad Litem of the estate Ramdeen Ramroop, deceased, Pursuant to
the Order of Madame Justice Rajnauth Lee dated 25th
January, 2006 in proceedings CV 2006-
00075
Claimant
AND
Seeta Ganeias (1)
Adam Ojar (2)
Narendra Ojar Maharaj (3)
George Ojar (4)
Delip Comar Ganeais (5)
Sati Ganeais (6)
Pooran Baldah (7)
Jennifer Baldah (8)
Ronald Siewlal (9)
Roland Siewlal (10)
Kaloutee Singh (11)
and Sindy Singh (12) Defendants
Page 2 of 55
Before the Honourable Madame Justice Rajnauth-Lee
Appearances
Mr. Stanley Marcus S.C. leading Mr. Anand Singh instructed by Mr. Stephen Salandy for the
Claimant.
Mr. Kelvin Ramkissoon for the First Defendant.
Mr. Haresh Ramnath for the Second and Third Defendants.
Mr. Hendrickson Seunath S.C. leading Mr. Kelvin Ramkissoon for the Fourth Defendant.
Ms. Hayma Ramdhanie-Seemungal for the Seventh and Eighth Defendants.
Ms. Reah Sookhai for the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Defendants.
DATED: the 12th
December, 2011
*********************
JUDGMENT
THE CLAIM
1. This claim was commenced by the Claimant in his capacity as Administrator ad Litem of
the estate of Ramdeen Ramroop, deceased, pursuant to the Court’s order dated the 25th
January,
2006. By his Claim Form filed on the 6th
February, 2006, the Claimant sought the following
reliefs:
(1) A declaration that the following Deeds are void and of no effect:-
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 25th
March, 2003 and registered as DE
2003 015840 53D001 (“the Deed of Conveyance”) purportedly made
between Ramdeen Ramroop, deceased, (“Ramdeen”) and the Adam Ojar,
the Second Defendant (“Adam Ojar”).
Page 3 of 55
-Power of Attorney dated the 19th
March 2003 and registered as DE
200301436685D001 (“the Power of Attorney”) purportedly made by
Ramdeen in favour of the Seeta Ganeais, the First Defendant (“Seeta”).
-Deed of Gift dated the 3rd
April, 2003 and registered as DE 2003 020191
58D001 (“the Deed of Gift”) purportedly made by Ramdeen in favour of
Seeta.
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 10th
May, 2005 made between Adam Ojar
of the one part and Narendra Ojar Maharaj, the Third Defendant
(“Narendra Ojar Maharaj”) of the other part and registered on the 13th
June, 2005 as DE 2005 014552 74D001.
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 6th
June, 2005 made between Adam Ojar
of the one part and George Ojar, the 4th
Fourth Defendant (“Mr. Ojar”) of
the other part and registered on the 13th
July, 2005 as DE 2005 017375
40D001.
-Deed of Gift dated the 27th
June, 2005 made between Adam Ojar of the
one part and Delip Comar Ganeais and Sati Ganeais, the Fifth and Sixth
Defendants of the other part and registered on the 5th
July, 2005 as DE
2005 016595 93D001.
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 12th
July, 2005 made between Adam Ojar
of the one part and Pooran Baldah and Jennifer Baldah, the Seventh and
Eighth Defendants of the other part and registered on the 19th
July, 2005
as DE 2005 017839 85D001.
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 19th
July, 2005 made between Adam Ojar
of the one part and Ronald Siewlal and Roland Siewlal, the Ninth and
Tenth Defendants of the other part and registered on the 26th
July, 2005 as
DE2005 018606 68D001.
Page 4 of 55
-Deed of Conveyance dated the 19th
July, 2005 made between Adam Ojar
of the one part and Kaloutee Singh and Sindy Singh, the Eleventh and
Twelfth Defendants of the other part and registered on the 26th
July, 2005
as DE2005 018608 D001.
on the basis of fraud (all the deeds are collectively referred to as “the said Deeds”).
(2) An order setting aside the said Deeds.
(3) Alternatively an order that the Defendants do reconvey the
respective portions of lands conveyed to them by the said Deeds to
the estate of Ramdeen.
(4) Damages for fraud.
(5) Damages for unjust enrichment.
(6) Costs.
(7) All further accounts directions and inquiries as may be necessary.
(8) Any further or other relief.
2. The Claimant is the brother of Ramdeen who died on the 19th
May, 2003. Ramdeen was
69 years of age at the date of his death. The death certificate of Ramdeen disclosed that the
cause of death was acute renal failure, diabetes and hypertension. Ramdeen died at his home at
No. 80 Mausica Road, D’Abadie. It is undisputed that Ramdeen never married and never had
children. Ramdeen was a pensioner for fourteen (14) years prior to his demise, having retired at
the age of fifty-four in 1989 as a male nurse attached to the St Ann’s Mental Hospital.
Page 5 of 55
THE STATEMENT OF CASE
3. By his Statement of Case also filed on the 6th
February, 2006, the Claimant alleged at
paragraph 6 that at all natural times Ramdeen was entitled to and possessed of three parcels of
land in Mausica:
a. All and Singular that certain piece or parcel of land situate at Mausica Road,
D’Abadie, in the ward of Tacarigua, in the Island of Trinidad, comprising 0.5438
hectares more or less which said piece or parcel of land is delineated and shown
coloured pink as plot “B” on the survey plan marked “X” annexed to Deed No.
12993 of 1988 [“Mausica Parcel No. 1”]. The following particulars of title for the
Mausica Parcel No. 1 were set out.
Particulars of Title
i. Deed of Conveyance dated the 11th
June, 1988 made between Ramroop
(Ramdeen’s father) of the one part and Ramdeen of the other part and
registered as 12993 of 1988.
ii. Deed of Conveyance dated the 21st
June, 1966 made between Rampersad
of the one part and Rampersad, Ramroop and Sankal Ramroop of the other
part and registered as 6512 of 1966.
iii. The aforesaid Rampersad was Ramdeen’s uncle and the aforesaid Sankal
Ramroop was the Ramdeen’s mother. Rampersad died on the 1st July,
1981 and Sankal Ramroop died on the 18th
February, 1972 without
severing the joint tenancy created by the Deed of Conveyance registered
as 6512 of 1966.
b. All and Singular that certain piece or parcel of land situate at Mausica Road,
D’Abadie, in the Ward of Tacarigua, in the Island of Trinidad, comprising 2.4084
hectares which said piece or parcel of land is delineated and shown coloured pink
Page 6 of 55
as plot “A” on the survey plan marked “X” annexed to Deed No. 12993 of 1998
[“Mausica Parcel No. 2”]. The above particulars of title are relied on.
c. All and Singular that certain piece or parcel of land together with the buildings
thereon and the appurtenances thereto belonging situate at Mausica Road,
D’Abadie, in the Ward of Tacarigua, in the Island of Trinidad, comprising one
quarry more or less (more particularly described in the schedule to deed registered
as No. 1825 of 1990 [“Mausica Parcel No. 3”]. The following particulars of title
were relied on.
Particulars of Title
i. Deed of Conveyance dated the 24th
January, 1990 made between Ramdeen
of the one part and Ramdeen and Vera Ramroop (Ramdeen’s sister) of the
other part and registered as 1825 of 1990.
ii. Further particulars of title are unavailable at this date.
[In the Statement of Case, Mausica Parcel No. 1, Mausica Parcel No. 2 and Mausica
Parcel No. 3 were collectively referred to as “the said parcels of lands”].
4. At paragraph 7 of the Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that Mausica Parcel No. 1
and Mausica Parcel No. 2 were purportedly conveyed firstly to Adam Ojar and Mausica Parcel
No. 3 was purportedly conveyed to Seeta.
5. The following Particulars of Conveyance were set out at paragraph 7 of the Statement of
Case:
Particulars of Conveyance
Mausica Parcels Nos. 1 and 2 were purportedly conveyed by Ramdeen to Adam Ojar by
the Deed of Conveyance. The Deed of Conveyance was purportedly executed by
Ramdeen through Seeta, by virtue of the Power of Attorney. Mausica Parcel No. 3 was
purportedly conveyed by Ramdeen to Seeta by the Deed of Gift.
Page 7 of 55
6. At paragraph 8 of the Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that the Deed of
Conveyance and the Deed of Gift were procured by the fraud of Seeta, Adam Ojar and Mr. Ojar.
Mr. Ojar is an Attorney-at-Law practising in Trinidad and Tobago. The following particulars of
fraud are set out at paragraph 8:
Particulars of Fraud
In relation to the Deed of Conveyance
a. The Deed of Conveyance was executed by and pursuant to a fraudulent Power of
Attorney.
b. The purported thumbprint on the Power of Attorney is not a voluntary thumbprint
of Ramdeen whilst he was alive or otherwise or a thumbprint of Ramdeen at all.
c. The purported thumbprint on the Power of Attorney is a forgery.
d. The thumbprint on the Power of Attorney was affixed deliberately to prevent
proper identification.
e. Ramdeen did not by his own volition or at all execute the Power of Attorney.
f. There is no evidence from the Attorney who prepared the Power of Attorney (Mr.
Ojar) that he had any or any written instructions at all from Ramdeen to prepare
the Power of Attorney. Annexed to the Statement of Case as “S.R. “7” was a
copy of a letter dated the 18th
October, 2005 from the Claimant’s Attorney to Mr.
Ojar requesting instructions for the same and to which no response was ever
received.
g. There is neither evidence that the Power of Attorney was brought to the attention
of Ramdeen nor that the same was acquiesced or ratified by him.
h. Further and/or in the alternative, the Claimant will aver that Adam Ojar to whom
the Deed of Conveyance was in favour, had knowledge of the fraud. The
Page 8 of 55
knowledge of the aforesaid fraud is imputed and to be inferred by virtue from the
following:-
(i) Mr. Ojar and Adam Ojar are father and son respectively;
(ii) Adam Ojar had at all material times close relations to Mr. Ojar and his
offices; Adam Ojar, as will be shown below, appointed Mr. Ojar’s
employee as his attorney by virtue of a Power of Attorney dated 16th
August, 2004 and registered as DE 200402511388 which was used to deal
with lands forming part of Mausica Parcels Nos. 1 and 2;
(iii) All of the aforesaid transactions in (ii) above were dealt with by Mr. Ojar
and his offices;
(iv) Mr. Ojar and his offices acted at all material times as the agent of Adam
Ojar;
(v) The Claimant will also rely on inferences to be drawn from the aforesaid
subsequent conveyances of lands forming part of Mausica Parcels Nos. 1
and 2 to his brother, father and a Deed of Gift dated the 27th
June, 2005
and registered as DE 2005016595 93 D001 to the relations of Seeta as
evidence of collusion and the knowledge of the fraud to be inferred
therefrom.
i. There is no evidence of any consideration being received by Ramdeen or in fact
paid and that has been inferred from a request made to Adam Ojar’s Attorney to
provide the same in the letter annexed to the Statement of Case as “S.R. 7” and to
which no response has been given.
j. The Claimant will also rely on the particulars given below under the heading “The
Claimant will rely on the following facts as inferences of the allegation of fraud”
below as further particulars of fraud hereunder.
Page 9 of 55
In relation to the Deed of Gift
k. The thumbprint in relation to the Deed of Gift is not a voluntary thumbprint of
Ramdeen whilst he was alive or otherwise and/or thumbprint of Ramdeen at all;
the aforesaid thumbprint was made by a cadaver.
l. There is no evidence from the Attorney who prepared the Deed of Gift that he had
any or any written instructions at all from Ramdeen to prepare the Deed of Gift as
requested in the letter annexed at “S.R. “7” and to which no response has been
received.
m. The Claimant on the morning of Ramdeen’s death and following Ramdeen’s
death saw the attorney, Mr. Ojar, who prepared and witnessed the Deed of Gift
leaving Ramdeen’s premises with a large brown envelope with white pages
protruding from the same in the hands of Mr. Ojar.
n. The registration of the Deed of Gift being that of the 19th
May, 2003 and the date
of Ramdeen’s death suspiciously coincides.
o. The Claimant will also rely on the particulars given below under the heading “The
Claimant will rely on the following facts as inferences of the allegation of fraud”
below as further particulars of fraud hereunder.
The Claimant will rely on the following facts as inferences of the allegation of fraud
p. The purported thumbprint on the said Will is not the voluntary thumbprint of
Ramdeen whilst he was alive or otherwise or Ramdeen’s thumbprint at all.
q. The attorney who prepared the said Will, the Power of Attorney, the Deed of
Conveyance and the Deed of Gift is the same and is the attorney of Seeta and
Adam Ojar.
r. The quality of the thumbprints on all the documents compared with that on the
application for the firearm licence is vastly different.
Page 10 of 55
s. The manner of the affixation of the thumbprints rendered the same difficult for
proper identification.
t. Ramdeen was at all material times literate and used and was capable of using his
handwritten signature to execute and issue documents. Annexed to the Statement
of Case as “S.R. 6” were copies of an application for a firearm licence dated the
20th
May, 1997, a letter dated the 21st October, 1997, receipts for rent dated the 1
st
May 2000, the 1st February, 2001 and 2
nd January, 2002 and a life certificate dated
the 6th
October, 2002 for pensioners all signed by Ramdeen.
u. That Ramdeen during the period of the purported execution of the Power of
Attorney, Deed of Conveyance and Deed of Gift executed and issued receipts for
rent dated the 2nd
January, 2003 and the 29th
January, 2003 and signed his life
certificate dated the 3rd
April, 2003 for pensioners using his handwritten
signature.
v. The affidavits of due execution of the Power of Attorney and the Deed of Gift are
shams and were done to further the fraud.
w. Seeta’s Attorney is Mr. Ojar and all the documents were prepared by him and
were in favour of Seeta and Adam Ojar, the son of Mr. Ojar.
x. All the questioned documents form part of a series of close transactions all in
favour of Seeta and Adam Ojar and which are inconsistent with other transactions
of Ramdeen.
y. All the documents are in favour of Seeta and Adam Ojar.
z. That Seeta purported to claim fraudulently from a former employer Jai
Ramkisoon severance pay for the sum of $30,000. for ten (10) years’ service
when she only worked for two (2) years shows a propensity for fraud to achieve
her ends.
Page 11 of 55
7. At paragraph 9 of the Statement of Case, the Claimant alleged that subsequent to the
Deed of Conveyance, Adam Ojar purported to convey several portions of the Mausica Parcels
Nos. 1 and 2 to the Third to Twelfth Defendant amongst other persons.
8. At paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13, the Claimant alleged as follows:
10. All these conveyances were executed by Adam Ojar pursuant to a Power of
Attorney dated the 16th
August, 2004 and registered as DE 200402511388 in favour of
Davi Kissoon, who is an employee of Mr. Ojar.
11. The Deeds of Conveyance and Deed of Gift averred to in paragraph 9 above
followed an unbroken chain of fraud and the titles from the same were derived from a
vendor whose title was neither that of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a
fraud nor free from taint of fraud and/or was derived from a forged instrument.
12. Further or in the alternative the Claimant will aver that Narendra Ojar Maharaj
is imputed with notice of the fraud by reason of the fact that the attorney-at-law acting
for him, being his agent in his conveyancing transaction, had full knowledge of the fraud.
13. Further or in the alternative the Claimant will aver that Mr. Ojar, by reason of
the matters above, had actual knowledge of the fraud.
9. In addition, as to Fifth to Twelfth Defendants, the Claimant alleged that they would have
had notice of the claims of the estate of Ramdeen by virtue of lis pendens which had been filed
by the Claimant.
DEFENCES
10. A Defence and Counterclaim was filed on behalf of Seeta on the 10th
October, 2006.
She described herself as the common law wife of Ramdeen and alleged that in or around 1986
Page 12 of 55
she and Ramdeen commenced a meaningful bona fide sharing relationship with genuine love
between them both as man and wife and since then to the date of his death, they exercised
conjugal rights with each other. It was further contended that at all material times Ramdeen held
himself out to be Seeta’s husband and Seeta held herself out to be Ramdeen’s wife [paragraph 3].
11. It was further alleged that Ramdeen and the Claimant throughout the course of their adult
life had a strained and acrimonious relationship stemming primarily, and inter alia, from issues
over the distribution of the estate of their late father, Ramroop (“Ramroop”) [paragraph 5].
12. At paragraph 12 of Seeta’s Defence and Counterclaim, it was contended that the
conveyances and transactions averred to in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Case were arm’s
length transactions for valuable consideration with terms and conditions of contract that were
within the parameters of law.
13, In essence, Seeta denied all particulars of fraud. As to the allegations of fraud in relation
to the Deed of Conveyance, it was contended on behalf of Seeta [paragraph 13 particulars a – l]:
a. The Power of Attorney was at all material times validly executed by Ramdeen at a
time when he was corpus mentis and had full control of all mental faculties. It
was prepared by his Attorney, Mr. Ojar, on the express instructions of Ramdeen
in Seeta’s presence.
b. The thumbprint affixed on the Power of Attorney was voluntarily and
conscientiously affixed by Ramdeen as and for his act and deed in the presence of
Davi Kissoon, Mr. Ojar and Ramdeen’s common law wife, Seeta. The document
represented the product of the expressed instructions by the maker thereof to
prepare such documents.
Page 13 of 55
c. The Claimant was put to strict proof as to the matters deposed to in sub-
paragraphs a, b, c, d, and e of paragraph 8. It was denied that the thumbprint on
the Power of Attorney was not Ramdeen’s thumbprint or that the same was a
forgery or was affixed deliberately to prevent proper identification or that
Ramdeen did not by his own volition execute the Power of Attorney.
d. In specific answer to paragraph 8 sub-paragraph f of the Statement of Case, it was
averred on behalf of Seeta that the Attorney who prepared the Power of Attorney
took instructions from Ramdeen for the preparation of the Power of Attorney,
which said instructions were reduced into writing by the Attorney. In further
response, it was alleged that at all material times correspondence and instructions
passing between Attorney-at-Law and client remain privileged and such attorney
could not receive instructions from a deceased client to waive such privilege.
e. In answer to paragraph 8, sub-paragraph g, it was alleged that Ramdeen agreed to
ratify and did ratify the contents as contained in the Power of Attorney as
evidenced by the following:-
“I George Ojar, Attorney at Law, having first audibly and
distinctly read over and explained the contents of the within document to
the Within Named RAMDEEN RAMROOP and he appeared to fully
understand and approved of same before affixing his right Thumb Print on
the within document”.
f. Paragraph 8, sub-paragraphs h, (i) to (v), were denied. Seeta denied the
imputation of fraud and knowledge to Adam Ojar, but it was admitted that Adam
Ojar and Mr. Ojar were son and father respectively.
g. In so far as it was stated that Adam Ojar had a close relation with Mr. Ojar and his
offices, it was contended that Adam Ojar had no close relation with Mr. Ojar’s
offices and that Adam Ojar at all materials times was domiciled out of the
jurisdiction in the United States of America. Seeta gave notice of her intention to
Page 14 of 55
rely upon extracts from Adam Ojar’s passport to attest to his domicility out of the
jurisdiction.
h. In further answer to sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of sub-paragraph h of paragraph 8,
it was alleged that Mr. Ojar’s employee held power of attorney over and in
respect of all lands and hereditaments vested in Adam Ojar’s name under and by
virtue of Powers of Attorney for more than fifteen (15) years with the power, inter
alia, to sign, execute, deliver and perfect all such acts, deeds, conveyances,
mortgages and assurances as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
disposition or alienation of lands belonging to Adam Ojar.
i. In specific answer to sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of sub-paragraph h of paragraph
8, it was averred that Mr. Ojar acted in his professional capacity and that all
transactions in relation thereto were done with full knowledge of Adam Ojar.
j. Paragraph (iv) of sub-paragraph h of paragraph 8 was denied. It was alleged that
Mr. Ojar acted for Adam Ojar on instructions in his professional capacity.
k. The Claimant was put to strict proof to the matters alleged in sub-paragraph (v) to
sub-paragraph h of paragraph 8 and it was contended that the inferences of
collusion and fraud were untenable.
l. In relation to sub-paragraph i of paragraph 8, Seeta denied that there was no
evidence of consideration received by the deceased and averred that payments by
cash and cheque in the amount of $120,000.00 constituted evidence of payments.
14. As to the allegations of fraud alleged by the Claimant in relation to the Deed of Gift, it
was contended on behalf of Seeta as follows:
m. In answer to sub-paragraphs k and l of paragraph 8, paragraph c above repeated.
n. It was contended that Seeta was a stranger to the averments in sub-paragraph m of
paragraph 8 of the Statement of Case and that on the date of Ramdeen’s death,
Page 15 of 55
Mr. Ojar was not present at the place or time of the death. It was further alleged
that Seeta was present at the house where Ramdeen died for the entirety of the
duration of the mourning period, including the cremation, since Hindu wives were
forbidden from attending the cremation of their husbands in local culture.
o. (i) In response to sub-paragraph n of paragraph 8, it was averred that the
Deed of Gift was prepared and executed on the 3rd
day April, 2003, one
month and two weeks prior to Ramdeen’s death and in so far as
the Deed of Gift was registered on the 19th
day of May, 2003, which was
the date of Ramdeen’s death, the same was purely coincidental and in
any event did not legally invalidate the efficacy of the Deed of Gift
which was executed prior to Ramdeen’s death.
(ii) In further answer to sub-paragraph n of paragraph 8, it was alleged that
fees and disbursements including stamp duty due and owing to Mr. Ojar
for legal services rendered in the preparation of the Deed of Gift were paid
two (2) days before Ramdeen’s death, that is on Saturday the 17th
May,
2003. The original receipt would be produced at the trial.
p. In response to sub-paragraph p of paragraph 8, it was contended that the thumbprint
on the said Will of Ramdeen was voluntarily affixed while he was alive and he had
the animus testandi and was in full control of all mental faculties at the time of
affixing his thumbprint. Further, Seeta gave notice of her intention to adduce into
evidence expert evidence.
q. Sub-paragraph q of paragraph 8 was admitted but it was alleged that the Attorney
who prepared the said Will and Power of Attorney had been the long-standing
family Attorney for Ramdeen and Seeta, that the Attorney at all material times
acted with due professional conduct, and that there was no conflict of interest or
other prohibition which militated against his capacity to act and to provide
professional service for any of the Defendants. Further, evidence was to be
adduced at the trial of this action to show that Mr. Ojar provided legal services to
Ramdeen since in or around 1996.
Page 16 of 55
r. No admission was made with respect to sub-paragraph r of paragraph 8 and Seeta
gave notice of her intention to rely on forensic evidence at the trial of this action to
prove that the thumbprints affixed on the relevant documents were indeed that of
Ramdeen.
s. The averments contained in sub-paragraph r of paragraph 8 were repeated.
t. It was admitted that Ramdeen was literate but it was contended that his continuing
deteriorating health from January, 2003 prevented him from writing.
PARTICULARS OF HEALTH CONDITION
(i) End Stage Renal disease secondary to Diabetes Nephropathy.
(ii) Diabetes Mellitus.
(iii) Swelling of both feet associated with pain, extreme weakness and
shortness of breath.
(iv) Diabetic foot ulcer.
(v) Leg ulcer and foot callus.
(vi) Cardiomegaly and bluntness of the right costovertebral angle with peri
hilar haziness.
(vii) Anemia secondary to Chronic Renal failure and Congestive cardiac failure
and Uraenic Encephoalapathy.
(viii) Joint space narrowing of bilateral hips with mild scoliosis.
[Seeta gave notice of her intention to produce all original medical
certificates at the trial of the action.]
Page 17 of 55
u. In response to sub-paragraph u of paragraph 8, it was averred that even before the
period of the execution of the Will, Power of Attorney and Deed of Gift, that is to
say, between the 1st January, 2003 and the 3
rd April, 2003, Ramdeen was unable
to write due to medical complications. It was alleged that the purported Life
Certificate exhibited as “S.R. 7” to the Statement of Case was not a genuine
document and that the same was false and fraudulent in every material respects.
Several particulars of fraud were alleged and these will be dealt with in detail
during the Court’s consideration of the evidence.
v. Seeta gave notice of her intention to adduce expert evidence at the trial of this
action to show that the signature on the rent receipt dated the 29th
January, 2003
exhibited as “S.R.7” to the Statement of Case was not Ramdeen’s signature.
w. Seeta denied that the affidavits of due execution of the Power of Attorney and
Deed of Gift were shams and/or that they were done in furtherance of any fraud.
y. Seeta also denied and contended that she was a stranger to the averments made in
sub-paragraphs x and y of paragraph 8 of the Statement of Case.
z. In response to sub-paragraph z of paragraph 8, Seeta denied the allegation stated
therein and averred that the said matters were scandalous and irrelevant and ought
to be struck out.
15. Seeta counterclaimed inter alia that she was the surviving cohabitant of Ramdeen and
was lawfully entitled to the benefit of his estate.
16. A Defence was filed on behalf of Adam Ojar on the 10th
October, 2006. In essence,
Adam Ojar denied the allegations of fraud made against him. Adam Ojar admitted that he was
the son of Mr. Ojar and the brother of Narendra Ojar Maharaj. He alleged that he was resident
and a citizen of the United States of America for the past twenty-four (24) years. He alleged that
he visited Trinidad and Tobago periodically.
Page 18 of 55
17. In addition, at paragraph 2 of his Defence, Adam Ojar contended that he was the Donor
of a Power of Attorney dated the 16th
August, 2004 in favour of Davi Kissoon.
18. Despite the Defence, Adam Ojar did not file any witness statements and played no further
part in the trial. Indeed, no evidence was advanced on his behalf at the trial.
19. A Defence was also filed on behalf of Narendra Ojar Maharaj on the 28th
July, 2006. He
denied any allegation of fraud made against him and contended that he lived in the United States
of America for almost twenty (20) years [paragraph 6] and that by virtue of his domicility out of
the jurisdiction, he could not reasonably be expected to have had any knowledge of any
impropriety or purported impropriety in the conduct of any transaction or transactions pertaining
to the lands in dispute [paragraph 7].
20. In addition, Narendra Ojar Maharaj alleged that he conducted the transaction of the
purchase of the parcel of land at arm’s length and had no knowledge of the existence of any
encumbrances which could have prevented such sale or affected the validity of title thereof
[paragraph 8].
21. The witness statement of Narendra Ojar Maharaj was filed on the 1st April, 2010, but he
was never presented as a witness at the trial and no evidence was advanced on his behalf.
22. A Defence and Counterclaim was filed on the 27th
July, 2006 on behalf of Mr. Ojar.
With respect to the allegations of fraud made against him, the Defence was basically in the same
terms as the Defence of Seeta referred to earlier in this judgment.
Page 19 of 55
23. A Defence was also filed on behalf of the Seventh and Eighth Defendants, Pooran Baldah
and Jennifer Baldah. According to the Defence, these Defendants alleged that they relied on the
professional advice of Mr. Ojar and were at no times advised of the lis pendens. In addition,
these Defendants alleged that they had been in continuous and undisputed occupation and
possession of the subject parcel of land for more than sixteen (16) years since on or about 1981,
both lot 51 and the subject parcel of land being treated and used as a single unit over the years.
A joint witness statement was filed on behalf of these Defendants, but they were not presented as
witnesses at the trial and no evidence was tendered on their behalf at the trial.
24. By their Defence filed on the 31st October, 2006, the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth
Defendants namely, Ronald Siewlal, Roland Siewlal, Kaloutee Singh and Sindy Singh, these
Defendants alleged that they have been living at No. 51 Calis Trace, Mausica Road, D’Abadie
for over thirty (38) years. Mr. Samaroo Siewlal, father of the Ninth and Tenth Defendants, was
on the 21st October, 1997 given written permission to cultivate a parcel of land known as Lot No.
7A Calis Trace, Mausica Road, D’Abadie by Ramdeen [paragraph 4].
25. In or around August 2005, Mr. Ojar approached them and informed them that he had
acquired Lot. No. 7A and was giving them first preference to purchase. On the 22nd
July, 2005,
these Defendants entered into an agreement to purchase a portion of Lot 7A from Mr. Ojar
[paragraph 5].
26. At paragraph 6 of the Defence, these Defendants contended that they had no notice of the
lis pendens, that they relied on the professional advice of Mr. Ojar and that they were never
advised about their option to seek independent legal advice.
Page 20 of 55
27. The Claimant filed no Reply to these Defences.
THE ISSUES
28. Although there are many issues of law and fact in dispute in this claim, there is one
central issue which falls to be determined by the Court:
Whether in all the circumstances of the case and having regard to the evidence and the
law, the said Deeds ought to be set aside on the ground that they were procured by the
fraud of Seeta and/or Adam Ojar and/or Mr. Ojar.
29. I propose to determine this issue in the light of certain other issues which have been
raised by the parties:
(i) Whether the Claimant has made out a prime facie case of fraud against Seeta,
Adam Ojar and Mr. Ojar.
(ii) The effect, if any, on the failure of Mr. Ojar and of Adam Ojar to give evidence at
the trial.
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF FRAUD [Where material witnesses are not called]
30. On the last day of the trial while evidence was being led, Mr. Seunath S.C. acting for Mr.
Ojar, announced to the Court that he was not calling any further evidence. Mr. Seunath
submitted that serious allegations had been made against his client and as Counsel he considered
it his duty to act in Mr. Ojar’s interest. In the written submissions filed on behalf of Mr. Ojar on
the 17th
September, 2010, Mr. Seunath contended that there was nothing for Mr. Ojar to answer
Page 21 of 55
and to prove and it was not open to the Court where nothing has been proved which was inimical
to Mr. Ojar’s conduct to conclude any impropriety on his part by his failure to give evidence. He
further submitted that Mr. Ojar’s choice not to give evidence at the trial should not be held
against him in the peculiar circumstances of this case where there was no evidence against him to
prove that he had perpetrated a fraud and the highest evidence against him was that he was with a
brown envelope on the morning of Ramdeen’s death. In the circumstances, therefore, although
Mr. Ojar had signed a witness statement and his case was also supported by the witness
statement of Ms. Davi Kissoon, neither of them was called as witnesses. Accordingly, their
witness statements cannot be relied on.
31. Having regard to this turn of events, Mr. Marcus S.C. acting for the Claimant, has
submitted that subject to a prime facie case being established by the Claimant, there arises the
necessity to displace that prima facie case by Adam Ojar and Mr. Ojar. In the event that these
Defendants or other persons with the knowledge to provide the material evidence are not called
as witnesses, and no acceptable explanation is given for their absence from the witness box, the
Court may draw the inference that the material evidence is being suppressed for fear that the
withheld evidence may prove helpful to their opponent’s case [page 4 paragraph 3(a) of the
Claimant’s written submissions filed on the 1st October, 2010].
32. The Claimant placed reliance on the case of Donovan Crawford and Others v
Financial Institutions Services Limited [Privy Council Appeal No. 34 of 2004]. In paragraph
7 of the reasons delivered by their Lordships, the Board in considering two points in regard to the
proceedings as a whole, stated as follows:
The first relates to the oral evidence, or rather the lack of oral evidence, at trial.
Despite the variety of serious allegations made in the pleadings against Mr.
Crawford, and the matters deposed to by the investigating accountants as calling
for explanation, neither Mr. Crawford nor any member of his family gave
evidence before the Chief Justice. It is well settled that in civil proceedings the
Page 22 of 55
court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call
evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. In
Herrington v British Railways Board [1972] AC 877, 930, Lord Diplock said of
such a decision,
“This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of
litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court
draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences
as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold.”
And at paragraph 12, it is said:
The weight to be attached to a defendant’s failure to testify varies with the
circumstances of the case. It is plain that in this case the Chief Justice and the
Court of Appeal attached a good deal of weight to Mr. Crawford’s silence, and
their Lordships are satisfied that they were right to do so. Mr. Crawford was the
chairman and chief executive of the Bank, the Building Society and the Merchant
Bank. It is an irresistible inference that he was the directing mind behind
Regardless, Holdings and the rest of the group. The consolidated proceedings
raised many grave issues as to his stewardship of the whole group of companies.
His failure to testify was a strong indication that he had no satisfactory answer to
what was alleged against him.
33. The case of Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] P.l.Q.R.
Volume 7 p. 324 was considered by this Court in the unreported case of Ian Sieunarine v Doc’s
Engineering Works (1992) Limited H.C.A. No. 2387 of 2000. In Wisniewski, the plaintiff
who was born at St. Mary’s Hospital, Manchester on the 15th
January 1988 suffered from
athetoid cerebral palsy from birth. It was contended inter alia on behalf of the plaintiff that the
defendant’s breach of duty was the effective cause of the irreversible brain damage suffered by
the plaintiff in the minutes immediately prior to his birth. At the time of the plaintiff’s birth, the
only medical staff involved in the care of the plaintiff’s mother was a midwife sister and the
Page 23 of 55
resident senior House Officer. The senior House Officer declined to return from Australia,
where he was training as a specialist, to give evidence at the trial. A short written statement in
which he stated that he had no independent recollection of his involvement in the case was
tendered and admitted into evidence under the Civil Evidence Act 1968. The statement made no
reference as to what he might have done if summoned by the midwife. The trial judge placed
considerable weight on the House Officer’s non-attendance, the absence of justifiable reason for
non-attendance and the failure to make any other arrangement to allow for his cross-examination
and inferred that the House Officer, if he had been summoned by the midwife, would have
proceeded to rupture the membrane and then to do a caesarean, thus preventing the catastrophe
which befell the plaintiff.
34. The Court of Appeal in Wisniewski examined the line of authorities which showed that if
a party does not call a witness who is not known to be unavailable and/or who has no good
reason for not attending, and if the other side has adduced some evidence on a relevant matter,
then in the absence of that witness, the trial judge is entitled to draw an inference adverse to that
party and to find that matter proved. The party seeking to rely on such an inference must
however establish a prima facie case on the matter in question. One of the cases considered was
Mc Queen v. Great Western Railway Company (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 569, where Cockburn C.J.
made the point [at page 574] that if a prima facie case is made out, capable of being displaced,
and if the party against whom it is established might by calling particular witnesses and
producing particular evidence displace that prima facie case, and he omits to adduce that
evidence, then the inference fairly arises, as a matter of inference for the jury and not a matter of
legal presumption, that the absence of that evidence is to be accounted for by the fact that even if
it were adduced, it would not displace the prima facie case. According to the Chief Justice, that
always presupposes that a prima facie case has been established; and unless we can see our way
clearly to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been established, the omission to call
witnesses who might have been called on the part of the defendant amounts to nothing.
Page 24 of 55
35. The Court of Appeal also cited the Australian case of O’Donnell v. Reichard (1975] V.
R. 916. In that case Gillard J. had conducted a review of earlier English and Australian cases
and concluded at page 920 that there must be some limitation imposed upon the application of
the rule. For example, any party upon whom the burden of proof on any issue is imposed must
always adduce a prima facie case on such issue to go to the jury, and the failure of the other
party to the litigation to call witnesses who may be expected to elucidate the matter cannot fill in
any gaps in the proof required.
36. Having examined several authorities, Brooke L. J. in delivering the judgment of the Court
of Appeal, set out the following principles in the context of the facts in Wisniewski:
(1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse
inferences from the absence of silence of a witness who might be expected
to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.
(2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the
evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the
evidence, if any adduced by the party who might reasonably have been
expected at call the witness.
(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced
by the former on the matter in question before the court if entitled to draw
the desired inference; in other words, there must be a case to answer on
that issue. [emphasis mine]
(4) If the reason for the witnesses’ absence or silence satisfies the court, then
no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is
such credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the
potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced
or nullified.
Page 25 of 55
37. Both parties cited the case of Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 - a decision of the
High Court of Australia. In that case, the cause of action was negligence causing the death of the
plaintiff’s husband, a truck driver. The defendants’ counsel at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s
case announced that he would not call evidence. Dixon C.J. said that he could not see how a jury
might reasonably infer that the plaintiff’s husband was killed by the negligence of the
defendants; the accident was simply left unexplained; and the all important question of the cause
of the vehicles hitting one another was left unresolved by the circumstantial evidence.
38. Citing from an unreported judgment of the High Court of Australia in the case of
Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (delivered on the 27th
April, 1951)1, Dixon C.J. made it clear
that all that is necessary was that according to the course of common experience the more
probable inference from the circumstances that sufficiently appeared by evidence or admission,
left unexplained, should be that the injury arose from the defendant’s negligence. By more
probable was meant no more than that upon a balance of probabilities such an inference might
reasonably be considered to have some greater degree of likelihood. But the law which this
passage attempted to explain did not authorise a court to choose between guesses, where the
possibilities were not unlimited, on the ground that one guess seemed more likely than another or
the others. The facts proved must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively
drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact might reasonably be satisfied.
39. The Court will return to other submissions advanced on behalf of the parties on this issue
later in the judgment and will determine whether a prima facie case of fraud has been made out
by the Claimant which required Mr. Ojar, Adam Ojar and Ms. Davi Kissoon to go into the
witness box.
1 Referred to in Holloway v. McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470.
Page 26 of 55
STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL FRAUD
40. In the case of In re B (Children)(Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS
Intervening) [2009] 1 A.C. 11, Lord Hoffmann took the opportunity to consider the standard of
proof in certain cases. According to him [paragraph 4] the question which appeared to have
given rise to some practical difficulty was the standard of proof, that is, the degree of persuasion
which a tribunal must feel before it decides that the fact in issue did happen. Citing In re H
(Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] A. C. 563, Lord Hoffmann said, that that
case made it clear that the ordinary civil standard of proof must be applied. The court must be
satisfied that the occurrence of the fact in question was more likely than not.
41. At paragraph 5, Lord Hoffmann went on to observe that some confusion had however
been caused by dicta which suggested that the standard of proof might vary with the gravity of
the misconduct alleged or even the seriousness of the consequences for the person concerned.
He pointed out that the cases in which such statements had been made fell into three categories.
First, there were cases in which the court had for one purpose classified the proceedings as civil
(for example, for the purposes of article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) but nevertheless thought that, because of the serious
consequences of he proceedings, the criminal standard of proof or something like it should have
been applied. Secondly, there were cases in which it had been observed that when some event
was inherently improbable, strong evidence might be needed to persuade a tribunal that it more
probably happened than not. Thirdly, there were cases in which judges were simply confused
about whether they were talking about the standard of proof or about the role of inherent
probabilities in deciding whether the burden of proving a fact to a given standard had been
discharged.
42. Lord Hoffman considered the case of Hornal v Neuberger Products Limited [1957] 1
Q.B 247 (cited by the parties to this Court), which he described as a case in the second category.
Page 27 of 55
In Hornal, Holdson L.J. cited Lord Denning’s judgment in Bater v Bater [1951] P. 35, 36, 37.
Lord Denning was of the view that the difference of opinion which had been evoked about the
standard of proof in recent cases might well turn out to be more a matter of words than anything
else. Lord Denning further stated that in civil cases, the case might be proved by a preponderance
of probability, but there might be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree
depended on the subject matter. According to Lord Denning, a civil court, when considering a
charge of fraud, would naturally require for itself a higher degree of probability than that which
it would require when asking if negligence was established. It did not adopt so high a degree as
a criminal court, even when it was considering a charge of a criminal nature but still it did
require a degree of probability which was commensurate with the occasion.
43. The case of In re Dellow’s Will Trusts [1964] 1 W.L.R. 451 was also cited to the Court.
In that case, Ungoed-Thomas J. observed that in civil cases it is not so much that a different
standard of proof is required in different circumstances varying according to the gravity of the
issue; the gravity of the issue becomes part of the circumstances which the court has to take into
consideration in deciding whether or not the burden of proof has been discharged. The more
serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of
what is alleged and thus prove it.
EXPERT EVIDENCE OF RAMDEEN’S THUMBPRINT
44. Although in his pleaded case the Claimant had alleged that the thumbprints on the
impugned documents were not Ramdeen’s, at the trial, the Claimant did not present any witness
to support that contention.
45. In fact, Mr. Marcus conceded that the experts’ evidence did not advance the case one way
or the other and was inconclusive, and that he did not propose to cross-examine them. Mr.
Page 28 of 55
Ramkissoon had filed the witness statement of Mr. Patrick Sealy on the 1st April, 2010, but he
was never tendered as a witness at the trial. On the other hand, the witness statement of Mr. Joel
Williams (“Mr. Williams”) had been filed on the 1st April, 2010 and he was tendered as a witness
for Mr. Ojar and he was cross-examined.
46. By consent, the Report of Mr. Williams and the exhibits were admitted into evidence,
save and except for one document - Exhibit “B” to Report marked “B” annexed to Mr. Williams’
witness statement. That document purported to be an authorisation from Ramdeen to Mr. Ojar
and dated the 4th
January, 2003. With the agreement of the parties, it was admitted de bene esse
and Mr. Marcus cross-examined Mr. Williams on it.
47. In addition, Mr. Williams met with Mr. Louis D. Andrews fingerprint expert who acted
for the Claimant and they produced a Joint Report, which joint report read as follows:
MEETING BETWEEN LOUIS ANDREWS AND JOEL WILLIAMS ON 2008-04-16
FINDINGS
1. There are FRICTION RIDGES IN THE PATTERN GIVEN.
2. There are Characteristics in the print, which might make it difficult to make a
positive identification.
3. There are a few Characteristics in the print, which might make it difficult to make
a positive identification.
4. Mr. Louis Andrews made a conclusion based on the fingerprints he received that
the print was made by a Cadaver. He now agrees that it is unsafe to make such a
conclusion. He made that conclusion because the print he was given was too
poor because of the medium (pad and ink) used to take the impression. He cannot
now SAFELY say that the print was that of a Cadaver.
Page 29 of 55
5. We concur that the patterns can be interpreted and that the ones on the firearm
application are LOOPS and WHORLS and that the other prints are that of
LOOPS. We also concur that the Thumbprints on the other documents are not
any of the fingerprints on the finger print form.
48. By his Expert report (marked B), Mr. Williams described in detail how he examined the
original document purporting to be the Last Will and Testament of Ramdeen (“the Will”) which
was extracted from estate proceedings No. L-1783 of 2003 [an application for a grant of probate
of the Will of Ramdeen].2
49. Mr. Williams also examined the original documents purporting to be the Power of
Attorney and the Deed of Gift. Having examined the fingerprints on the Will, the Deed of Gift
and the Power of Attorney, Mr. Williams concluded that the fingerprints appeared to have been
made by one and the same person [page 6 of his Report]. He also came to the conclusion that
the thumbprint affixed to the Deed of Gift was affixed by a living human being and not that of a
cadaver [page 6 of his Report].
50. Mr. Williams went on to recount the circumstances in which he examined the fingerprint
slip purportedly that of Ramdeen and issued and made by the Trinidad and Tobago Police
Service and taken by P.C. Kissoon No. 13424 on the 20th
May, 1997. According to page 7 of his
Report:
I went to the Police Headquarters, Police Administration Building Sackville Street, Port
of Spain, at the Firearm Section. There I met one Cpl Peters who was the officer in
charge of that Department. In my presence, Mr. Ojar detailed to Cpl Peters the reason
for his visit, which concerned an examination of the application including the finger print
2 Contentious proceedings have been commenced by Seeta against the Claimant in H.C.A. 198 of 2004 converted
to CV2007-03646, which is pending before the Court.
Page 30 of 55
slip for a firearm users licence on behalf of Ramdeen Ramroop deceased. I showed Cpl
Peters a copy of the form and finger print slip exhibited as “S.R.6” in the statement of
case and inquired from him whether it was possible to view the original of the document
for the purpose of comparing it with other finger print impressions of the deceased, the
said Ramdeen Ramroop.
Cpl. Peters after conducting a search, informed us that there was no finger slip with
Ramdeen Ramroop’s fingerprints in his department. These documents were kept at the
Finger Print Department at the second floor of the said building. I then proceeded to the
fingerprint Department in the said building with Mr. Ojar and met one Cpl Junior
Benjamin to whom I detailed the purpose of the visit. Cpl Benjamin told me and I verily
believe that there was no application made by Ramdeen Ramroop and there was no
fingerprint slip of Ramdeen Ramroop in that Department. I did not get to see any
fingerprint document relative to Ramdeen Ramroop at the said Department.
51. Mr. Williams nevertheless examined the copy he had received from Mr. Ramkissoon and
conducted an analysis of the document which had been exhibited as “S.R.6” to the Claimant’s
Statement of case purporting to be a fingerprint slip made by Ramdeen. He compared what
purported to be the right thumbprint of Ramdeen on the fingerprint slip with the Will, the Power
of Attorney and the Deed of Gift and concluded that it was different in style, character and other
features. He therefore came to the conclusion that the thumbprint impression on the fingerprint
slip was not the same as on the Will, the Power of Attorney and the Deed of Gift.
52. What was made clear from the cross-examination of Mr. Williams was that he had never
seen the undisputed thumbprint of Ramdeen. All that he had done was to compare the
thumbprints which were shown to him. In addition, Mr. Williams said that he could not, as an
expert, discern whether the thumbprints which were examined were of a person whose thumb
was swollen.
Page 31 of 55
53. As to the objection taken by Mr. Marcus as to the admissibility of Exhibit B to Report
marked B, purporting to be an authorisation from Ramdeen to Mr. Ojar and dated the 4th
January,
2003, the Court upholds that objection. As pointed out earlier, Mr. Ojar did not give evidence;
the authorisation which was purportedly given to him by Ramdeen ought to have been put into
evidence through Mr. Ojar. Accordingly, that document remained a disputed document and is
inadmissible.
THE EVIDENCE
The Claimant’s Witness Statement
54. The Claimant is a Retired Supervisor with the Ministry of Agriculture, who lived at L.P.
47 Back Street, D’Abadie about three-quarter of a mile from Ramdeen’s home. According to the
Claimant’s witness statement filed on the 1st April, 2010, the Claimant also owned a house
approximately fifty (50) feet to the south of Ramdeen’s home. That house was the subject of a
legal action between Ramdeen and the Claimant and as a result of that legal action Ramdeen and
the Claimant were not on speaking terms. The Claimant said that Ramdeen was a pensioner for
fourteen (14) years prior to his death. Ramdeen retired at the early age of fifty-four (54) years in
1989 as a male nurse attached to the St. Ann’s Mental Hospital. At the time of his retirement,
Ramdeen was afflicted with diabetes.
55. According to the Claimant’s witness statement, Seeta lived at Ramdeen’s address for
some years prior to his death. After Ramdeen’s sister, Vera Ramroop, left Trinidad in or about
1991 – 1992, Seeta stayed there until Ramdeen’s death in 2003. According to the Claimant,
from the time Seeta came to Ramdeen’s premises in 1990, he did not visit Ramdeen’s home.
Page 32 of 55
56. The Claimant went onto say that on Monday the 19th
May, 2003, after receiving a
telephone call from his niece at about 4.30 in the morning he visited Ramdeen’s home. He
sounded his horn and went towards the gate which was locked. The lights were on in the house
but when he called out at the gate for about 5 – 10 minutes, the lights in the house went off and
no one answered. He left and went to his home.
57. At paragraphs 15 – 17 of the Claimant’s witness statement, he gave the following
evidence:
15. Later on the morning of 19th
May 2003 at about 6:45 to 7:00 I went to a house
which I own approx 50 in the house for security purposes since it is not continuously
occupied on the southern side of Ramdeen’s house to ensure it was secure and generally
look around. I visit the house very often and sometimes may stay a night there to give the
impression of a presence.
16. The house referred to in the preceding paragraph is an upstairs house and from
the gallery of that house I could see the gallery of the deceased’s house.
17. Whilst at my house at about 6:45 to 7:00 on 19th
May 2003 I saw George Ojar in
a dark coloured suit standing in the Gallery of the deceased’s home with a large brown
envelope in his hand., He was speaking to Seeta Ganeais and then they walked into the
living.
58. By his witness statement, the Claimant also said that subsequent to Ramdeen’s death he
discovered that Ramdeen had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Seeta, that Seeta had
conveyed to Adam Ojar a parcel of land pursuant to the Power of Attorney and that another
parcel of land was conveyed to Seeta. The Claimant also said that the Attorney who prepared
and took execution of all the deeds was Mr. Ojar and that Adam Ojar was Mr. Ojar’s son to
whom two parcels of land were conveyed. In addition, searches revealed that Adam Ojar,
Page 33 of 55
through his duly constituted Attorney Ms. Davi Kissoon, a Law Clerk in Mr. Ojar’s office, sold
several parcels of the Mausica lands to some of the Defendants.3
59. Further, the Claimant gave evidence as to the firearm users license (“FUL”) for which he
alleged Ramdeen had applied. At paragraphs 28-29 of the Claimant’s witness statement, he
stated how the FUL came into his possession. Prior to the commencement of this action he had
advised his previous Attorney, Mr. Gurley of Messrs J.D. Sellier & Co. that Ramdeen had
applied for a FUL. The Claimant had obtained that information from one Sgt. Anand Madoo of
Arima who had since died. The Claimant received advice from Mr. Gurley and that very day, he
went to Police Headquarters at the corner of Sackville Street and Edward Street and requested
Ramdeen’s FUL. He showed the officer who attended to him and whose name he did not know
a copy of the newspaper publication of the application for Ramdeen’s estate and his death
certificate. After thirty (30) minutes, the officer returned and handed to him a FUL application
signed by Ramdeen. According to the Claimant, as soon as he left Police Headquarters, he went
directly to Mr. Gurley and gave him the FUL application form. Thereafter, the Claimant
changed Attorneys and according to him, his entire file, including the FUL application, was
given to him and he handed same over to his present Attorney.
The Cross-Examination of the Claimant
60. During cross-examination, the Claimant agreed that he had not spoken to Ramdeen for
twenty (20) years and that he was not pleased that Ramdeen was in a relationship with Seeta. He
denied that Seeta helped with the care of his ailing father Ramroop who died in 1990 and that
Seeta was living permanently with Ramdeen as man and wife. He also agreed that as a brother
he did not volunteer to perform the rituals at Ramdeen’s funeral according to the Hindu tradition,
because according to him, the wife or children of the deceased could do so; although he admitted
3 Paragraphs 23, 24 and 25.
Page 34 of 55
that at a Hindu funeral males carry out those traditions of circumambulating the pier and shaving
the hair. The Claimant later said that he was not asked to perform the rituals and also that he
wanted no part of the Kali tradition practised by Seeta and her family. “He backed off”, he said.
He further admitted that Seeta’s son, Delip, performed the Hindu rituals at Ramdeen’s funeral.
61. The Claimant again agreed that his relationship with Ramdeen was not a good one
because the Claimant had tremendous objections to Ramdeen’s relationship with Seeta. The
Claimant also agreed that Ramdeen was very ill in the last few years of his life and suffered from
diabetes and renal failure and was weak for several months.
62. The Claimant was also cross-examined on the FUL which he produced to the Court.
Whilst admitting that Ramdeen had retired in 1989 as being medically unfit and began to get
very ill around 1994 – 1995, he saw nothing strange about a man coming down in age and
suffering from such afflictions, applying for a FUL.
63. The Claimant was also cross-examined about a medical report of Dr. Clyde Tilluckdharry
dated the 21st February, 2006. According to Dr. Tilluckdharry, Ramdeen visited Auzonville
Clinic on the 20th
May, 1997 and had insertion of pack in his right ear. In other words, on the
same date that is the 20th
May, 1997, that Ramdeen was alleged to have made the FUL
application, he had visited Dr. Tilluckdharry for a medical procedure.
64. The Claimant also conceded that the Commissioner of Police by letter dated the 18th
July,
2006, had stated that Ramdeen did not at any time apply for a FUL. As a result, the
Commissioner of Police indicated that no fingerprint impression or slip in favour of Ramdeen
could be furnished.
Page 35 of 55
65. In addition, the Claimant was cross-examined on certain life certificates of Ramdeen
which had been tendered to the Court. He agreed that life certificate dated the 8th April. 2003
and Pension Notice (document bearing No. 8) both bore the same pension number (0051-)9-
020696. He acknowledged on the other hand that life certificates dated the 6th
October, 2002 and
the 3rd
April, 2003 carried a different pension number 23228 and were incomplete, the bottom
halves of both these documents not being filled out. The Claimant also admitted that these last
two (2) documents were provided by him to his Attorneys.
66. The Claimant agreed that by a letter dated the 20th
July, 2006, the Comptroller of
Accounts had responded to Mr. Ojar’s letter and indicated inter alia that life certificates are
destroyed after noting and that Ramdeen’s pension number was 9-020696.
67. The Claimant was also cross-examined by Mr. Seunath. The cross-examination revealed
inter alia that the lion’s share of Ramroop’s lands was left to Ramdeen, and in 1990 Vera and
Ramdeen took the Claimant to court over a property on which his house was located. The
Claimant conceded that when that case was filed against him, he was not getting along with
Ramdeen. Indeed, the Claimant described Ramdeen as his enemy and admitted that Seeta and
her children looked after Ramdeen who was a sick man, while he a blood brother, did not go to
visit him. The Claimant also said that Ramdeen and Seeta could not be man and wife since
Ramdeen was a sick man.
68. In addition, the Claimant admitted that although his case was premised (partly) on his
allegation that the Deed of Gift prepared by Mr. Ojar was a fraud or forgery because Ramdeen
could sign his name, he had not seen Ramdeen face to face for more than ten (10) years. In
addition, the Claimant also conceded that he could not say from his own personal knowledge
from the 3rd
April, 2003, whether Ramdeen was able to write.
Page 36 of 55
The Evidence of Sayeed Reeyad Ali
69. The witness, Sayeed Reeyad Ali (“Mr. Ali”) signed a witness statement on behalf of the
Claimant [dated the 31st March, 2010]. According to Mr. Ali, for some 30 years his family had
operated a poultry shop at 147 Aranguez Main Road, Aranguez on a property owned by
Ramdeen. He took over operations of the poultry shop in 1998 and he knew Ramdeen and could
recognise his signature. According to his witness statement, over the years he had heard his
uncle and his father [both of whom who previously operated the poultry shop] expressing their
desire to purchase the property at 147 Aranguez Main Road, Aranguez (“the Aranguez
property”).
70. According to Mr. Ali’s witness statement, in November, 2002, Ramdeen telephoned him
and said that he wanted to meet him. Ramdeen indicated that he did not want Mr. Ali to come to
his home because he did not want Seeta to be part of or to hear their discussions. According to
Mr. Ali’s witness statement, Ramdeen came to him and told him that he was ready to sell the
Aranguez property to him. Mr. Ali further stated that on many other occasions whilst speaking
to him Ramdeen said that he did not want Seeta or her family who were living in the same house
with him to get anything. Mr. Ali said in his witness statement that Ramdeen indicated to him
that Seeta and her family were after his property.4
71. According to Mr. Ali’s witness statement, he and Ramdeen negotiated the price and
arrived at a figure. He obtained a valuation on the Aranguez property on the 16th
December,
2002. He was $100,000.00 short of what Ramdeen required and Ramdeen took him to Mr. Ojar
to make out a paper whereby he would pay the sum of $100,000.00 by installments. Mr. Ali
stated that although he went to Mr. Ojar’s office to sign a document for the payment of the sum
of $100,000.00 by installments, and an agreement for sale, he never received either of the
4 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the witness statement
Page 37 of 55
documents. According to Mr. Ali’s witness statement, after he received a letter of offer dated the
20th
February, 2003, the bank itself gave him a document which they requested that Ramdeen
sign agreeing to sell the Aranguez property to him. Mr. Ali further said in his witness statement,
that he gave the document to Ramdeen in early March, 2003 but by that time he was bedridden
and too weak to sign and appeared delirious.5
72. Mr. Ali also gave evidence in his witness statement of rent receipts received from
Ramdeen. According to him, the last rent receipt he received from Ramdeen was for the month
of December, 2002. That was the last time Ramdeen had come to his business to collect rent. In
January, 2003 when rent became due he went to Ramdeen’s home since he had communicated
with him by telephone. He was moving about the house. According to Mr. Ali, he did not
collect a receipt but he could not remember why he did not collect it. Further, he said that he
attended his home and paid him money. Again he did not receive a receipt from him. On that
occasion though he was obviously unwell, yet he was walking around and speaking to him.6
73. According to Mr. Ali’s witness statement, he went to Ramdeen to pay him rent for May,
2003. Ramdeen appeared very weak and was lying on his bed and was groaning as though in
pain. He further stated that having paid the rent for May, 2003, he received receipts for the
months of January, 2003 to May, 2003 from either Seeta or her daughter in law although he
could not remember from whom. According to him, the receipts were signed Ramdeen
Ramroop, but he did not recognise it as Ramdeen’s signature [paragraph 18].
74. On the 7th
May, 2010, an amplified witness statement of Mr. Ali was filed. Paragraphs 2
and 3 of this amplified witness statements are set out hereunder:
5 Paragraphs 10-14 of the witness statement
6 Paragraphs 15-17
Page 38 of 55
2 At paragraph 6 of my principal witness statement I stated that I still have many
receipts signed by Mr. Ramroop in my possession. These receipts were for rent
for the months of January, 2001 and November and December, 2002. Mr.
Ramroop would sign these receipts in my presence. I can recognise these receipts
mentioned if I see them. All of the receipts were from a general standard receipt
book, the name of my businesses (being either Reeyad Poultry Depot for the 2002
receipts or Poultry and Party Ice Ltd for the 2001 receipts) being the recipient
are stated on them, it states the rent received as $1500.00 and they have the
signature of Mr. Ramdeen Ramroop. These receipts are shown to me forming
part of what I am told is a bundle of documents and I also shown the originals
which I had in my possession and passed to Mr. Stephen Salandy and they are the
same receipts that I have indicated at paragraph 6 of my principal witness
statement and in this paragraph and are hereto annexed and marked SRA “1”.
3 At paragraph 18 of my principal witness statement I also stated that in the month
of May 2003 I received receipts for the months of January, 2003 to May 2003
from either Seeta Ganeais or her daughter in law. I can recognise these receipts
mentioned if I see them. All of the receipts were also from a general standard
receipt book, the name of my business being the recipient are stated on them, it
states the rent received as $1500.00. These receipts are shown to me forming
part of what I am told is a bundle of documents and I also shown the originals
which I had in my possession and passed to Mr. Stephen Salandy and they are the
same receipts that I have indicated at paragraph 18 of my principal witness
statement and in this paragraph and are hereto annexed as a bundle and marked
SRA “2”.
75. Mr. Ali was cross-examined. He said that Ramdeen personally issued receipts for rent
until he became sick and was unable to write. During the cross-examination of this witness, the
original rent receipts were tendered into evidence. The documents were tendered in two (2)