The Regulation of International Trade in Enriched Uranium in a New Build Era Maxine Symington
Dec 18, 2015
The Regulation of International Trade in Enriched Uranium in a New Build Era
Maxine Symington
Introduction
Regulation of the international trade in enriched uranium has come a long way in a comparatively short time
In a new build era what are the challenges, do we need to take stock?
Proliferation- measures for control
Time for a new approach?
Uranium and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Where is uranium mined?
The largest producing Uranium mines in 2011
Mine Country Main owner Type Production (tU) % of world
McArthur River Canada Cameco underground 7686 14
Olympic Dam Australia BHP Billitonby-product/
underground3353 6
Arlit Niger Somair/ Areva open pit 2726 5
Tortkuduk Kazakhstan Katco JV/ Areva ISL 2608 5
Ranger Australia ERA (Rio Tinto 68%) open pit 2240 4
Kraznokamensk Russia ARMZ underground 2191 4
Budenovskoye 2 Kazakhstan Karatau JV/Kazatomprom-Uranium One ISL 2175 4
Rossing Namibia Rio Tinto (69%) open pit 1822 3
Inkai Kazakhstan Inkai JV/Cameco ISL 1602 3
South Inkai Kazakhstan Betpak Dala JV/ Uranium One ISL 1548 3
Top 10 total 27,951 52%
The balance between exploitation of atomic power for civil use and proliferation risk
Post 1945
How to open up trade? How to control it safely?
A bargain is struck in the hope of minimising proliferation
A regulatory agency is set up
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1970
The First Pillar
Non-proliferation
Art I&II NWS agree not to help NNWS develop or
acquire nuclear
weapons + Art III tasks IAEA
with inspection of
NNWS facilities
Nuclear disarmament
Art VI all parties to
pursue disarmament
Right of NNWS to use
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes Art
VI
The Second
Pillar
The Third Pillar
Article IV NPT
"Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."
Definition, guidelines and co-operation
Zangger
Committee
Nuclear Supplie
rs Group
S 123 Agreem
ents
Indian Atomic
Test
Other cooperation agreements are signed-diversion is a concern
Export Control/
Dual Use Technolo
gy
Timeline
1971 1974 19771975 1991
Tension between commerce and proliferation control
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
India is made an exception to the
NPT
Resolution 1887-
tightening of export control
NPT extensi
on
9/11 2001
With Technology advances, definition of
“export“ becomes
wider
Timeline
1995 2001 20052004 2009
New build era
At the IAEA’s 56th General Conference 2012 Director General Amano noted that developing countries show keen interest in nuclear power.
Some countries see states already benefitting from nuclear power, concerned about diversion of fissile material and nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development- particularly in relation to enrichment and reprocessing (E&R)- having a tendency to push the bar to entry ever higher.
Is the safeguarding regime still fit for purpose in its current form?
New ideas?A view from the European Commission
Concern that potentially differentiated control standards of third countries may distort competition.
Suggest an integrated, risk driven strategic trade control model.
Vision involves, “human security”, “smart security” and development of an “EU technological reaction capacity”.
Move to an effective response to use of cyberspace for proliferation.
Emphasis on end use monitoring and traceability of intangible transfers of technology, self auditing and post transfer monitoring.
Wider variety of export licences e.g. “low value shipments”, “encryption”, “Intra-company technology transfers”, and “large projects”.
New ideas? The IAEA, a Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA) INFCIRC/640 2005 Expert Group Report. Five possible approaches:
Range of transparent suppliers’ arrangements with government backing, such as fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, and commercial fuel banks (in 2010 IAEA authorised set up of a low enriched uranium fuel bank as a supply of last resort).
International supply guarantees with IAEA participation,
Voluntary conversion of existing facilities to a multilateral nuclear approach (MNA).
Creating multinational, regional MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership for uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, disposal and storage of spent fuel.
Consider up-scaling concept to nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements by region or by continent involving the IAEA and international community.
New ideas?..from the Project on Managing The Atom (Harvard)
Back to basics (Art IV) but offer incentives and opportunities as an alternative to national E&R.
NSG should try to reach agreement on “clean text”.
Revise trigger list and dual use controls.
Promote fuel assurances and multinational control of E&R facilities.
Recognise limitation of US-UAE model.
Cradle to grave options for countries with small nuclear programs.
Universal adoption of the Additional Protocol.
R&D of more proliferation resistant fuel cycle technology.
Diplomatic pressure.
Conclusion
Have we come full circle?
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