The Reform of Military Education in Late Qing China

THE REFORM OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN LATE CH'ING CHINA, 1842-1895

RICHARD J. SMITH*

Troughout much of the nineteenth century, Chinese and Westerners alike perceived the need for meaningful reform in Chinese military education. The problem could hardly be ignored, especially after the disastrous Opium War of 1839-1842.1 But change in this key area of late Ch'ing administration came slowly. Not only did it involve sensitive political issues, such as internal security, civil-military relations, and central versus local government responsibility; it also raised basic questions of educational policy, including the relationship between elite and popular instruction, between Confucian moral cultivation and technical specialization, and ultimately between Chinese and Western forms of civil and military knowledge. Complicating matters were the usual practical problems facing Chinese modernizers in the nineteenth century: widespread and entrenched vested interests, bureaucratic inertia, scarcity of revenue, and foreign pressure.

The Ch'ing dynasty's basic approach to military education can be seen clearly in the Ch'ing-ch'ao t'ung-chih, officially compiled during the Ch'ien-lung period: "Our Emperor, succeeding and exalting the sages, treats the selection of talents as most important. In the literary arts, elegance and refinement is the aim. In military examination, familiarity with riding and shooting is [most] important."2 During the Tao-kuang reign, this emphasis on technical military skills received special stress. In 1833, for example, the emperor issued an edict stating that the education of Bannermen should be in horsemanship and archery, so that they would be kept "simple and straight and not exposed to weakening [literary] influences." Similar statements abound in the dynastic record.3

* Professor Smith writes: S. A. M. Adshead has recently remarked that while "China's failure to industrialize is well known, her failure to professionalize is less often commented upon." (See his review of John Fairbank et al "The I.G. in Peking" in the Journal of Asian Studies, 36.4 (August, 1977). This paper may be viewed as a brief comment on China's early effort to professionalize in military affairs.

The author is Associate Professor of History at Rice University, Houston, Texas.

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch

© RASHKB and author ISSN 1991-7295

Vol. 18 (1978 )

16 RICHARD J. SMITH

But Bannermen were not the only ones encouraged to avoid literary pursuits and concentrate on riding and shooting. The official military examinations, which paralleled, but did not come close to equalling in prestige, the civil service examinations, tested these and related skills almost exclusively, requiring only the reproduction of a hundred or so characters from one of three ancient military classics as a literary "test." At none of the three basic levels of examination did the literary exercise determine whether an individual would pass or not. Overall, there was simply no premium placed on the acquisition of knowledge concerning military history, strategy, tactics and so forth.4

Aside from a few so-called academies for Bannermen in Peking and other key locations, there were virtually no institutions that provided systematic military education for Chinese officers.5 Local "schools" for military examination graduates in the provinces provided much less educational breadth and depth than their civil service counterparts in the shu-yuan system; and many if not most of these schools were overseen by literary men who had little interest or expertise in military affairs. Private tutors were available to give military instruction to examination hopefuls, but the cost of equipment—bows and arrows, stones, swords, horses and practice facilities—often put tutorial assistance beyond the financial reach of many individuals.6 By default, the most valuable form of military education in China was army service itself.

Contrary to accepted opinion, most Ch'ing officers were not military examination graduates. The reasons are not hard to find. In the words of Shen Pao-chen: In the consideration of military promotions, "those selected by examination are . . . put after those who began their career in the rank and file, or have risen because of military merit. . . . The knowledge of military affairs among the former group cannot at all be compared with those from among the rank and file. Their spirit and bravery and ability to bear hardship cannot at all be compared with those who rise because of military merit. The reason is that what they learn is not of practical use."7 In short, military graduates who had not come up through the ranks were viewed by most of their peers as incompetents and outsiders. Ichisada Myazaki notes: "The influential leaders in the army were generals who had worked themselves up from the ranks and had shown their mettle in actual combat. The army was a



Vol. 18 (1978 )

MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895 17

special kind of society of its own, and men who had not experienced from the outset the hardships of military life were unable to handle the common soldiers."8

The question remains: What kind of training was available to military men in traditional Chinese armies? All the evidence suggests that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in fact well before, military education in China was woefully inadequate by almost any standard. Officers were unacquainted with even the rudiments of warfare, and the rank and file received only the most perfunctory drill.9 As early as the mid-eighteenth century, an investigation ordered by the Ch'ien-lung emperor revealed the lack of basic training in Banner forces everywhere in China Proper.10 The situation was no better for the degenerate Army of the Green Standard.11 Yet prior to the twin challenges of internal rebellion and external aggression in the mid-nineteenth century, there was comparatively little incentive for military men to engage in serious professional study, and even less incentive for most Ch'ing scholars to concern themselves with military affairs. As the redoubtable scholar-general Hu Lin-i remarked in the Hsien-feng period: "Under the established system of the dynasty, the military is controlled by the civil, but the civil often disesteems the military."12 The late Ch'ing period was perhaps the highwater mark of what Lei Hai-tsung describes as China's "a-military culture" (wu-ping ti wen-hua)P

The Opium War jolted at least some Ch'ing officials out of their complacency and ignorance. Unfortunately, however, many of those individuals who knew most about the Western military challenge and China's need to reform were least free to speak with complete candor. Lin Tse-hsii is, of course, the best-known example.14 One official who did speak his mind openly was Ch'i-shan's ill-fated and little-known successor as governor-general of Liang-kuang, Ch'i Kung. In 1842, Ch'i Kung memorialized the throne, suggesting that if China wanted the services of capable men in military affairs, it would be necessary to secure scholarly talent. The way to do this, he proposed, was to reform the traditional civil service examinations. Ch'i's plan was to test advanced candidates in five areas of military expertise — history, strategy and tactics, instrument-making and mathematics, meteorology, and geography — as the final exercise ("discourses on policy," ts'e-luri) in the three-part examination



Vol. 18 (1978 )

18 RICHARD J. SMITH

process. Ch'i's view was that by seeking "genuine scholarship," badly-needed military talent might be secured for the defense of the dynasty.15 His proposal was blocked however — undoubtedly in part because Ch'i fell out of favor as a negotiator with the British, but also because the proposal itself was so revolutionary in spirit.

In late 1851, the censor Wang Mao-yin resurrected Ch'i's innovative proposal. His memorial, dated November 11, stated baldly that "for seeking talent within the examination system, there is nothing better than Ch'i Kung's five categories to encourage scholars to study military affairs." The memorial was forwarded by the emperor to the Board of Rites for deliberation, but Wang's suggestion regarding the reform of the examination was not approved, on grounds that Chinese scholars were men of breadth and "need not be specialists" (pu-pi chuan-men ming chid).16 Once again Ch'i's proposal died a swift death. It had no other prominent advocates.

Several more years passed, during which time Wang Mao-yin attained the rank of senior vice-president of the Board of War. In the midst of both the "Arrow War" negotiations and the Taiping Rebellion, Wang again memorialized the throne (July 9, 1858), once more requesting meaningful military reform. Making pointed reference to the abortive proposals put forward by Ch'i Kung and himself over the past decade and a half, Wang suggested that they might now be reconsidered together with the policy of recommendation (pao-chii) as a means of recruiting badlyneeded military talent. He did not mince words. Reminding the throne that many of China's best military commanders were not in fact products of the examination system, he went on to criticize the appointment of imperial relatives to positions of military responsibility, and the throne's tendency to place military affairs in the hands of officials schooled only in essay-writing, poetry, and other literary skills. He ended with a highly moralistic appeal for self-cultivation (hsiu-shen) on the part of the emperor, replete with quotations from the Shu-ching and Ta-hsiieh, but his proposals fell on deaf ears.17 Wang retired from office within months of writing this bold but fruitless memorial.

Efforts to reform or abolish the nearly useless military examinations met with no more success than this. During the Hsien-feng emperor's reign, a number of officials advocated changes in the outdated system, including dispensing with the military examinations



Vol. 18 (1978 )


altogether. But fears over tampering with inherited institutions and respect for ancestral precedent (tsu-tsung ch'eng-fd) prevented the tests from being either transformed or abandoned.18 Subsequent attempts to reform or abolish the system of military examinations, such as ShenPao-chen's famous memorial of 1878, came to nothing.19

As late as 1898, we still find the throne ordering officials to determine what the policy of the imperial ancestors had been regarding military reform before taking concrete steps.20 Small wonder the prestigious civil service examinations also remained essentially unaltered throughout the nineteenth century.

There was, however, room for the reform of military education outside the examination system — particularly during the Taiping period. Not only did the Rebellion allow for the emergence of new civil and military leadership in China; it also resulted in the establishment of new-style military forces which placed comparatively heavy emphasis on military education. The yung-ying armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and others, for example, employed the highly effective training methods of the famous Ming general Ch'i Chi-kuang —techniques that had long since fallen into disuse.21 In addition to Confucian moral instruction, yung-ying armies received daily drill, which was all but unheard of in Banner and Green Standard forces. They practiced regularly with firearms, swords, knives, spears and other weapons, and were taught tactical formations such as Ch'i Chi-kuang's "mandarin duck" {yuan-yang) and the "three powers" {san-ts'ai).

It is true, of course, that officers received very little, if any, formal military training, since it was deemed sufficient that they be upright gentlemen (chiin-tzu) who led by moral example. Moreover, we know that active involvement by officers in troop training was generally considered demeaning. But at least some lower level personnel in yung-ying staff organizations (ying-wu ch'u), and perhaps some high-level officers as well, were more knowledgeable about key aspects of military affairs — planning, command, field maneuvers, discipline, supply, communication and so forth—than the vast majority of their Banner or Green Standard counterparts.22

After 1860, Western influences began to penetrate Chinese military forces. In the latter stages of the Ch'ing-Taiping War, the British and French took an active role in supporting the introduction of foreign-training to Chinese troops. Foreign-officered con-



Vol. 18 (1978 )

20 RICHARD J. SMITH

tingents such as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chiiri) brought Western drill and tactics to literally thousands of Chinese soldiers. Officers from these forces not only instructed their own men, but also trained large numbers of troops for Chinese officials, most notably Li Hung-chang.23 At about the same time, foreign-training programs arose in several port areas, including Tientsin, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow and Canton. A number of Green Standard forces at the capital (and eventually elsewhere) were transformed into Western^armed "retrained armies" (lien-chiin) on the yung-ying model, and several thousand Bannermen were molded into the famous Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), established by Wen-hsiang and others.24

The Peking Field Force was an especially interesting experiment. Until the late 1860's, selected members of the force were drilled by foreign instructors using English words of command but thereafter, Western-trained Bannermen carried on instruction independently in Manchu. Nominally 20,000 strong throughout most of the late nineteenth century, the Peking Field Force usually numbered closer to half that amount. According to Major A. E. J. Cavendish, a British military attache in China, the force as late as 1894 was considered to be an elite organization with "higher pay and quicker promotion" than in any other Banner units at the capital. Officers in the force were described as "the pick of the Banners," and posts in it were "eagerly sought after." Yet Cavendish formed a decidedly negative opinion of the force, which he decribed as poorly armed and superficially trained, with emphasis on form rather than content. One can imagine the shape of the rest of the traditional Ch'ing military establishment.25

A major deficiency in all of the early foreign-training efforts was lack of centralized direction and support. In the absence of adequate central government guidelines, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely from force to force and area to area. There was virtually no effort on the part of the Ch'ing government to co-ordinate its military programs, or to expand foreign-training in a systematic way.26 In fact, the Manchus seem to have been intent on compartmentalizing Western military knowledge as much as possible—presumably for reasons of internal control. In 1863, for example, the Tsungli Yamen stated explicitly that in the provinces only Bannermen should learn to make



Vol. 18 (1978 )


Western-style weapons, since they lived in designated garrisons that were "comparatively easy to guard."27 This early attempt to confine knowledge of foreign weapons to Banner forces, although ultimately unsuccessful, is nonetheless suggestive. As alien conquerors, the Manchus remained somewhat paranoid.28

Another serious problem with foreign-training programs in the 1860's and 70's was that they were not designed specifically as officer- training schools. Although the Tientsin program did train officers for the Peking Field Force and some Green Standard units as well, it trained the rank and file at the same time, in the same basic way. The emphasis was on military drill rather than on modern officer-education, and immediate military needs were always paramount. As long as rebellion raged, there were compelling reasons to continue producing Western-armed, Western-trained Chinese officers and men, despite the many difficulties involved in employing foreigners. But as the internal threat in a given area subsided, so did enthusiasm for reform; and as it did, the foreign-training programs quickly withered away.29 What remained was a certain number of Western-drilled troops and some low-ranking instructors, but very few officers with a real grasp of Western military knowledge. Again, there was little premium on acquiring it.

By the mid-1870's, the major rebellions in China had been suppressed, lulling the dynasty into a false sense of security. But it was far less Western-style military education and tactics than a new-found acquaintance with Western-style weapons that brought victory to the Ch'ing forces.30 With superior arms, traditional Chinese strategy and tactics usually sufficed against internal rebels, but such techniques were much less effective against rapidly modernizing external enemies.31 After 1875, the rise of foreign aggression on China's land and maritime frontiers complicated the dynasty's military choices, and made recourse to foreign military assistance all the more difficult.32 Yet in the absence of sufficient numbers of qualified Chinese military personnel for Western-style training, reform-minded Chinese officials continued to look to the West for aid.

Perhaps the most prominent and powerful of these officials was Li Hung-chang, who, with substantial foreign assistance dating from the early 1860's, had by the 1870's built his Anhwei Army into the finest military force in the empire.33 An examination of



Vol. 18 (1978 )

22 RICHARD J. SMITH

Li's approach to officer education during his tenure as governor-general of Chihli from 1870 to 1895, at the apex of his power, may shed some light on the many problems involved in China's late nineteenth century effort to create a modern officer corps.34

Throughout his illustrious career up to 1895, Li continually drew upon foreign talent to instruct (and occasionally to lead) his forces.35

But in 1876, he took the unprecedented step of sending Chinese military men abroad for training, entrusting seven petty officers to one of his best German drill instructors, a man named Lehmayer. Li's plan was to employ these men as instructors in the Anhwei Army upon their return to China.36 Li had as early as 1874 inquired into the possibility of sending Chinese students to West Point, and in 1875 had discussed the establishment of a military academy in China with the American general Emory Upton.37 But political difficulties in the United States stood in the way of the first plan, and financial constraints made the second impossible.38 Li's writings in the mid-1870's indicate a full awareness of the value of military academy education, but apparently the need at the time was not sufficiently great to justify the cost of establishing a full-fledged military academy on Chinese soil.39

Of the seven men sent to study in Germany, two were recalled before completion of their planned three-year program of study because of their frivolous attitude and poor progress. One became sick and died, three i successfully completed their infantry training, and one—Wang Te-sheng—stayed on in Germany until 1881, receiving additional specialized instruction in Berlin. Of the seven, only Wang emerged as a prominent figure in the Anhwei Army, heading Li's crack "personal guard unit" (ch'in-ping), and eventually achieving the rank of tsung-ping. Overall, the educational experiment fell far short of complete success, and was marked by numerous problems, including disputes with the German supervisor, language difficulties, and, of course, high costs.40

As one of the three regular graduates of the German training program, Cha Lien-piao's experience as an instructor in the Anhwei Army is illuminating. Cha served in Chou Sheng-ch'uan's 10,000-man Sheng-chiin—perhaps the best detachment of the Anhwei Army in all of China up to the time of Chou's death in 1885.41 Convinced of the value of Western training and drill from long exposure to foreign instructors in Li's force (dating from the Taiping period),



Vol. 18 (1978 )


Chou lamented the fact that the spirit of foreign drill had not more fully permeated the Anhwei Army. Hoping to remedy the situation, and appreciative of Cha's contributions to the overall efficiency of the Sheng-chiin, Chou urged Li to "break the rules" by giving Cha a salary increase in order to reward and encourage him.42 Significantly, however, Chou did not recommend Cha for high-level promotion within the Green Standard system—a reward which most yung-ying officers especially esteemed.43 Although Chou's voluminous writings repeatedly emphasize the importance of Western-style drill,44 it is apparent that Chou himself was not prepared to request maximum rewards for those who had mastered it.45 How much more of a problem must this have been in other, less progressive military forces?

Another difficulty in the Anhwei Army was a certain hostility to foreigners and foreign influences. Although Chou took obvious pride in his knowledge of Western military science and technology,46

and took pains to point out that his foreign-trained officers were trusted by their men,47 it is clear that the acceptance of foreign influences within the Anhwei Army as a whole was less than complete. In the words of one well-informed observer of Li's force, "to be smart [in Western drill] is to be like a hated foreigner and to lose caste."48 This attitude, together with an inherited distaste for active involvement in drill, undoubtedly compromised the military effectiveness of the Anhwei Army's officer corps. Although Chou repeatedly admonished his battalion and company officers to become actively involved in the training process, it is evident that they continued to resist such direct and degrading participation. Chou's writings, as well as independent foreign observations, note this crucial and persistent problem, but little could be done to remedy it.49

Several times during the early 1880's, Chou confessed that the vaunted Sheng-chun had declined, that after two decades it had lost much of its sharpness and acquired a "twilight air." The experienced officers, he complained, lacked vigor, while the new and brave officers lacked knowledge.50 In order to alleviate the problem, and to bring the force more in line with Western practice, Chou suggested shortly before his death the establishment of a foreign-style Chinese military academy {Wu-pei yiiari).5i Apparently fearful of upsetting vested interests within the Anhwei Army, Chou em-



Vol. 18 (1978 )

24 RICHARD J. SMITH

phasized that it would "not be necessary to teach many commanders";52 but he did encourage Li to establish a "public office" (kung-so) as soon as possible to provide systematic instruction for Chinese soldiers under German supervision.53 The immediate incentive was three-fold: the military demands of Sino-French conflict, the support of other Anhwei Army commanders, and the presence of a core group of capable German instructors.54

Li's initial proposal for a military academy (Wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang) at Tientsin was quite modest. In part because of financial limitations, but also because of military exigency (and perhaps in deference to Chou), Li decided to train about one hundred petty officers and troops (pien-ping) selected from the Anhwei Army and lien-chim units, as well as some civil personnel (wen-yuan) who were "willing to learn about military affairs." The simplified curriculum, taught by German officers with the aid of Chinese interpreters, consisted of astronomy, geography, science, surveying, drafting, mathematics, fortifications, and military drill and operations. Li expected the students to complete their education in one year (it actually took two), after which time they would return to their original units to transmit the newly-acquired information to their comrades.55 In all, about 1,500 "cadets" were probably trained in this fashion from 1885 to 1900. Most served only as instructors, however; few became ranking officers. On the whole they were neither given authority nor esteemed by their older colleagues and superiors.56

In the spring of 1887, Li added a five-year program to the Tientsin Military Academy. In contrast to the short course, this program aimed at producing officers. Stringent requirements were imposed on the applicants, who ranged in age from thirteen to sixteen.57 Forty students were accepted at first. Each had to guarantee to study for five full years without asking for leave, taking the civil service examinations, or getting married. The five-year course of study was comparatively demanding. During the first three years, the students took a foreign language (German or English), arithmetic, algebra, geometry, mechanics, astronomy, natural science, geography, map-making, and, of course, Chinese history and the Classics. During the last two years, they studied gunnery, military drill, fortifications, and other technical subjects. Periodic examinations determined class standing, and provided the



Vol. 18 (1978 )


basis for progress reports to the throne.58 In 1890, a specialized program of instruction in railroad engineering was introduced, although no information exists on the total number of students involved.59

Periodically, students from the Tientsin Military Academy were sent to Port Arthur and Shan-hai-kuan for practical training in infantry, cavalry and artillery units.60 In addition, cadets at the school occasionally gained actual battle experience, notably in 1891 against rebel forces at Jehol and elsewhere. According to Li Hung-chang, the experiment was quite successful.61 Only one group of Tientsin academy cadets went abroad: In 1889, Li sent Tuan Ch'i-jui, Wu Ting-yiian, Shang Te-ch'iian, Kung Ch'ing-t'ang, and T'eng Yu-tsao to Germany for advanced study. After a year of military academy instruction in Berlin combined with advanced training at the Krupp gunworks in Essen, the students returned to China.62

Like the Tientsin Naval Academy, established by Li in 1880, the Tientsin Military Academy was financed by the shrinking Pei-yang maritime defense account.63 In all, the money was reasonably well-spent, but, as Wang Chia-chien has indicated, the academy suffered from a variety of administrative, financial, and other problems (including difficylties with foreign employees) — many of which also plagued the few other military and naval training facilities of the period.64

Nonetheless, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, China appeared to have built a respectable military and naval organization. In fact, when conflict between China and Japan seemed likely, most Westerners gave the strategic edge to China.65 But the illusion of of China's superiority on land and sea was quickly shattered by Japan's rapid drive into Korea, Manchuria and China Proper. Judiciously combining land and sea operations, the Japanese completely overwhelmed the diverse Chinese military forces sent to resist them.66 Throughout the war, reports from British, French, and other foreign observers repeatedly praised the Japanese for their able strategy and tactics, effective training, tight discipline, valor, espirit de corps, and the excellence of their support facilities. No. such praise was forthcoming for China.67

The Sino-Japanese War illustrated with striking clarity the bankruptcy of China's "self-strengthening" movement. In almost every respect, Japan's strengths during the conflict were China's



Vol. 18 (1978 )

26 RICHARD J. SMITH

weaknesses. Inspired by a vibrant form of nationalism, the Japanese were assured of widespread popular support at home, and heroic dedication on the part of both officers and men in battle. It was a truly national war. Overseas Japanese also rallied to the cause, establishing patriotic associations to discuss the issues, collect contributions, and even to train brigades of student soldiers.68 China's immediate response to the conflict, which has not been as fully studied,69 appears to have been less uniform and extensive, both in China and abroad. To be sure, patriotic voices could be heard even prior to news of China's humiliating capitulation, and Chinese forces occasionally performed heroic deeds on the battlefield. But in the main, China lacked the national cohesiveness of Japan, and her officers were not inspired by the same sense of national duty and self-sacrifice.70

Owing partially to abysmal lack of preparation and poor internal communications, but also to the natural hesitation of "province-minded" Chinese officials, the mobilization of China's military forces during the war was agonizingly slow. Many Chinese troops summoned from the south arrived in the north only tardily or not at all. Li Hung-chang complained bitterly that "one province, Chihli, is dealing with the whole nation of Japan."71 Ch'en Pi-kuang's effort to secure the release of the captured warship Kuang-ping after the battle at Wei-hai-wei, on grounds that the ship belonged to the Canton squadron which had not taken part in the war, is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Chinese provincialism; but it is not the only one.72 The preponderance of Ch'ing forces sent against the Japanese in Korea, Manchuria and China Proper were individual yung-ying, each with its own particularistic loyalties and provincial identifications. These diverse military forces, differently armed, trained and led, often had difficulty cooperating with one another.73 In the navy, provincial rivalries and lack of cooperation between Admiral Ting and his subordinates obviously hindered operations at sea, in addition to adversely affecting morale.74 Uniform military and naval education undoubtedly would have diminished these problems.

Japan's rapid and demoralizing offensive drive into Manchuria and China Proper was aided immeasurably by an extremely efficient General Staff, excellent transport facilities, and a well-organized commissariat service.75 China, however, lacked all three. The



Vol. 18 (1978 )


establishment of a Directorate for Military Affairs {Tu-pan chun-wu ch'u) in early November, 1894, did virtually nothing to alter the course of the war, and the nearly useless Naval Board (Hai-chun ya-meri) was disbanded even prior to the end of the fighting. Neither body found it possible to effectively coordinate land fighting or to insure cooperation between the army and navy.76 Meanwhile, poor field communications and transport facilities, inadequate preparation, faulty intelligence, and widespread corruption in pay and supply, made it virtually impossible for Chinese forces to fight efficiently.77 Ammunition shortages, worthless shells, and lack of standardization in weapons proved especially troublesome at sea. On land, ammunition shortages seem to have been less acute, but morale undoubtedly suffered from the absence of a modern hospital corps and ambulance service such as Japan possessed.78

Surprisingly, Chinese forces did not always do poorly, in spite of these handicaps. Portions of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army under Chang Kao-yuan, for example, performed admirably during the war, as they had done a decade earlier under Chang on Taiwan during the Sino-French hostilities. Chang, who had once served with the Ever-Victorious Army, received the praise of foreign observers not only prior to Sino-Japanese War but also during and after the conflict for his tactical ability and the training, discipline, and effective weapons of the troops under his command.79 I-k'o-t'ang-a, a Manchu general, also gained plaudits from foreigners, including the Japanese, who acknowledged that he had surprising tactical talent for "a Chinese warrior of the old school."80 A few other Ch'ing commanders, such as Tso Pao-kuei, at least received praise for their bravery against the Japanese. But overall, Chinese troops were poorly-led and unsuitably trained. Lack of effective leadership exacerbated all of China's military problems and undermined both discipline and morale. The overwhelming majority of China's field commanders and middle-grade officers were not graduates of China's two infant military academies, and although some such individuals served with distinction in low-ranking positions, their mere presence within a given army was seldom enough to inspire confidence among either officers or the rank and file.81

Generally, the Chinese were extremely timid on land and sea, encouraging the Japanese to attempt daring and highly successful tactics that would ordinarily be considered too hazardous for use



Vol. 18 (1978 )

28 RICHARD J. SMITH

against a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battleleld.83 Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or out-landishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84

Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.

Another serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87

The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attache that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since "it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers."88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90

At sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of



Vol. 18 (1978 )


the Yalu River in mid-September, 1894, China and Japan each had twelve ships, but the encounter was no contest. China's problem was less the quality of her ships than the lack of an effective command structure, poor communications, cowardice (on the part of Liu Pu-ch'an), poor training, and ammunition shortages.91 Chinese firing was comparatively effective, especially in the early stages of the fighting, but too often the shells were faulty. At Wei-hai-wei, in early 1895, the situation was even more grim. By this time, the war had been lost, and Chinese naval forces were completely demoralized, even mutinous.92

China's use of foreign talent could not remedy her military deficiencies. Unlike the Japanese, who succeeded in eliminating reliance on foreigners entirely by the outbreak of the war, the Chinese were forced to continue using them on both land and sea. A surprising number served, in spite of the existence of various neutrality ordinances and foreign enlistment acts.93 At one point, the Ch'ing government even contemplated establishing an army of 100,000 Chinese troops under 2,000 foreign officers—an effort, in the words of the North-China Herald to "re-create an Ever-Victorious Army" under Constantin von Hanneken.94 Predictably, however, the plan met heavy opposition from Ch'ing officials, including Li Hung-chang, and it was never implemented.95

In all, the Sino-Japanese War was a disaster for China. Yet there were optimistic voices to be heard even in the midst of China's despair. The journalist, Wang T'ao—as shocked as anyone by Japan's sudden victory—undoubtedly spoke for many reform-minded Chinese in expressing the hope that defeat by the Japanese would finally shake China out of her lethargy. National humiliation was a prelude, he felt, to meaningful change.96

The alliance between Chinese nationalism and agitation for reform, was evident in many sectors of Chinese society during the first few years following the Treaty of Shiminoseki. The writings of newly-politicized Chinese intellectuals, as well as the publications of the burgeoning Chinese periodical press, reflected these related concerns.97 The immediate post-war era also witnessed the proliferation of Chinese reform associations and study groups. Even remote Szechwan was touched by the reform spirit. In late 1896, a group of gentry members issued a manifesto which called for the abolition of footbinding and argued with tortured but telling logic: "The present is no time of peace. Foreign women have natural feet,



Vol. 18 (1978 )

30 RICHARD J. SMITH

they are fierce and they can fight. But Chinese women have bound feet, and are too weak even to bear the weight of their own clothes."**

Nowhere was the burst of patriotic sentiment and the impulse to reform more obvious than in military affairs. In the years from 1895 to 1898, a spate of memorials on the question of military change reached Peking. Many dealt with the problem of military education. Chang Chih-tung, in particular, became an ardent advocate of military schools as a means of improving the Chinese army." Chang and others also put forward additional reform proposals touching on a wide range of pressing military problems. A number of officials agitated for the elimination of corruption, incompetence, and nepotism in Chinese military forces. Others suggested revisions in the traditional military examinations. Still others proposed drastic cuts in the Green Standard army and the reinvigora-tion of the degenerate Eight Banners. Not all of these proposals bore immediate fruit, but together they indicated a heightened awareness on the part of many of the need for basic military reform.100 The Sino-Japanese War had begun to teach its lessons.

In the post-war era, the Chinese navy no longer occupied a position of prominence. Limited and largely uncoordinated efforts were still made by various provincial officials to acquire modern vessels and other types of naval material, but only about half of the naval academies established in China prior to 1895 survived past the first decade of the twentieth century. By contrast, Chinese military schools and academies grew rapidly during the late 1890's and especially the early 1900's.101 This demonstrated interest in military education suggests a new attitude toward the profession of arms, inspired by rising Chinese nationalism. To be sure, ingrained prejudices did not disappear overnight—especially since the civil service examinations continued to offer an almost irresistibly attractive alternative to military service. When Li Hung-chang established his long-term officers' training program at the Tientsin Military Academy in 1887, he was fortunate to find enough capable applicants to fill the allotted forty positions; whereas by 1896 Chang Chih-tung's announcement of the first entrance examinations for his newly-founded Hupei Military Academy attracted 4,000 applicants for only 120 positions.102

Chinese military academies, including Li's pioneering Tientsin establishment, eventually came to exert a profound influence on



Vol. 18 (1978 )


Chinese society.103 The new content of military education, which emphasized technical skills and diluted traditional values and loyalties somewhat, created a new professional elite that was significantly different in outlook from even such relatively progressive (and rare) individuals as Chou Sheng-chuan.104 For all his innovativeness, Chou remained bound by the inhibiting institutional structure of the Anhwei Army as well as the limits of his own educational experience within that force. As a result, he was never able to resolve certain fundamental conflicts in his self-image, attitude, and approach toward military affairs and reform.105

One is tempted to see in Chou the tensions of becoming "modern" and remaining "Chinese" suggested by Joseph Levenson, and even a kind of nineteenth century version of the "red versus expert" dilemma of more recent times. Although Chou obviously admired Western military organization and repeatedly solicited foreign military advice, he was also anxious to demonstrate that the Chinese yung-ying model was in many respects equivalent or superior to the Western model, and he often reacted quite defensively to foreign criticisms.106 Chou admired foreign technology (at one point maintaining that bullets were more important than rations), but he also repeatedly stressed the human factor in warfare, down-playing on occasion foreign advantages in organization and weapons, emphasizing the importance of "will" (chih-ch'i), and periodically suggesting to Li Hung-chang the utility of rapidly recruiting volunteers (i-yung) and employing them as "surprise troops" (ch'i-ping).101

Obsessed with the need for intensive drill, Chou nonetheless continually employed the Sheng-chiin in non-military tasks which undoubtedly compromised its fighting effectiveness—work on military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ieri), land reclamation, flood and famine relief work, and so forth.108 Finally, although Chou seems to have considered himself to be a professional soldier, and was anxious to foster positive attitudes toward the military, he, like virtually all of his fellow officers and commanders, esteemed civil status and sought identification with the civil bureaucracy.109

The more genuinely professional education provided by the Tientsin Military Academy after Chou's death helped resolve some of the tensions that seem to have plagued Chou.110 Certainly it allowed the many Tientsin-trained commanders in Yuan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang Army to accept more readily the modern principle and



Vol. 18 (1978 )

32 RICHARD J. SMITH

practice of "interchangeable commanders"—a striking departure from the personalistic command structure of yung-ying armies such as Chou's.111 Moreover, the Tientsin academy provided a large pool of new talent for modernizing purposes, men whose "careers were grounded in change" and whose "qualifying education and . . . prominence were owed to reform."112 Many Tientsin Military Academy graduates became instructors in other military schools established after 1895;113 several prominent engineers were produced by the academy;114 and of course many of the most famous political and military leaders of the early Republic—including Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Juo-chang, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, Chang Huai-chih and many others—were Tientsin Military Academy graduates.115

In short, significant changes in Chinese military education took place prior to 1895, despite the absence of meaningful reform in either the civil or military examinations and numerous other problems.116 Nonetheless, it took the successive humiliations of the Sino-Japanese War, the "Scramble for Concessions," and the Boxer fiasco to prompt the Ch'ing dynasty into fundamental military reform.117 And even then, "national" policies were often implemented piecemeal at the local level.118

In retrospect, it seems evident that the obstacles to meaningful reform in Chinese military education were less ideological than institutional.119 To be certain, Confucian critics of new-style training programs could always be found, especially after the establishment of modern military academies in China during the 1880's.120

But the throne's lack of enthusiasm for military reform along Western lines certainly cannot be explained in terms of ideology alone. In the first place, it must be remembered that little if anything in the way of Confucian learning had ever been expected of regular Ch'ing military officers. Paradoxically, it was in the innovative yung-ying armies, about which the throne had very mixed feelings, rather than the Green Standard and Banner forces of the empire, that the inculcation of Confucian virtues received special stress. Moreover, officials such as Chang Chih-tung, and even the pragmatic Li Hung-chang, emphasized the importance of Confucian education not only in their own "personal" armies but also in their new-style military academies.121 Surely, the subordinate officers of Chang and Li were no less "Confucian" than their Green Standard and Banner counterparts.



Vol. 18 (1978 )


The major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted support to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills.122 It is true, of course, that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China—particularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces.

Ironically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchus sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynnasty might have been able to build a Meiji-style system of military education and dispense with foreign instructors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch'ing government by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style military force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on internal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time "dwarf bandits" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences.

NOTES

Abbreviations: CJCC Chung-Jih chan-cheng CWCK Chou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States IWSM Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo LWCK Li Wen-chung-kung ch'uun-chi NCH North-China Herald YWYT Yang-wu yiin-tung



Vol. 18 (1978 )

34 RICHARD J. SMITH

1 Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, informed Western observers repeatedly pointed to the lack of a modern, Western-trained officer corps as the key deficiency of the Chinese army. See, for example, Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (New York, 1967), 201; Major A. E. J. Cavendish, "The Armed Strength (?) of China," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 42.244 (June, 1898), 720-722; NCH, July 6, 1880; Chinese Times, December 3, 1887; etc. For an interesting and informative discussion of officer education in the West, consult Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites," Journal of Contemporary History, 2.3 (July, 1967).

2 Cited in Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry (Seattle, 1955), 174. 3 Helmutt Wilhelm, "Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great

Encounter," in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965), 288-289.

4 Etienne Zi, Pratique des examens militaires en Chine (Shanghai, 1896), 111-112. For other critiques of the traditional military examinations, see Chang Chung-li, 181, 187-190; William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 178-182; Ichisada Miyazaki, China's Examination Hell (New York and Tokyo, 1976), chapter 8.

5 Richard J. Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860," Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 128.

6 Hsieh Pao Chao, The Government of China, 1644-1911 (Baltimore, 1925), 311-312; Chang Chung-li, 187.

7 Cited in Chang Chung-li, 181. 8 Miyazaki, 106. See also Robert Marsh, The Mandarins, (New York,

1961), 149-151.

9 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 135.

10 \ y u Wei-p'ing, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), 1969), 84-88.

11 Lo Erh-kang, Lii-ying ping-chih (Chungking, 1945), 199-200.

12 Cited in ibid., 53.

13 Lei Hai-tsung, Chung-kuo wen-hua yii Chung-kuo ti ping (Changsha, 1940).

14 W. T. deBary, et. al., eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York and London, 1960), 2 : 9-10.

is IWSM, Hsien-feng, 28 : 46b-47.

16 Ibid., 28 : 47a-b.

17 Ibid., 28 : 47b-49.

18 Zi, 112.

19 Chang Chung-li, 181 and note 69. See also Chang Pe'i-lun's reform proposals in 1889, YWYT, 3 : 527-530, and Chang Chih-tung's in 1898, Ayers, 178-182.

20 Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 93.

21 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 150-156; see also Wang Erh-min, Huai-chiin chih (Taipei, 1967) 191-193, 207-208.



Vol. 18 (1978 )


22 See J o n a t h o n Porter , Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy (Berkeley, 1972), 74-76, 127.

23 Consult Richard J. Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China (Millwood, New York, 1978).

24 Richard J. Smith, "Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873," Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976), 196-197; also Kwang-ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: The Northwest and the Coast," in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, Part Two, Chapter 4, forthcoming.

25 Cavendish, 709-710. See also the sources cited above , no te 24.

26 Smith, "Fore ign-Tra in ing ," 196, 220-223.

27 IWSM, Tung-chih, 2 5 : 3.

28 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 220-223; also Richard J. Smith, "Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan: Military Aspects," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (1976).

29 Ibid,, (both sources); Smith , Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapters 8 and 9.

30 Smith, "Fore ign-Tra in ing ," 215-223. See also M a r k Bell, China (Simla, 1884), 2 : 58; Will iam Bales, Tso Tsungt'ang Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai , 1937), 339; K. C. Liu , "Nine teen th-Century C h i n a , " in T a n g T s o u and P. T . H o , eds., China in Crisis (Chicago, 1966), 120.

31 On the relat ionship between modern weapons and tactics and officer-training in the West, see E m o r y Upton , The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York , 1878), 270-271, 318-319, 324, 328-330 and passim. See also NCH, July 28, 1866, cited in Wright , The Last Stand, 201 . F o r U p t o n ' s cri t ique of Chinese tactics and t ra ining in the mid-1870's consul t The Armies, 20-23. For the use of lien-chun in suppressing internal rebels , see Kung-chung tang Kuang-hsii ch'ao tsou-che, 2 : 302, 664, 667; 3 : 172, 318, 323, 399, 445, 518, 753, etc. 1 a m indebted to Professor K. C. Liu for supplying this reference. F o r a cri t ique of yung-ying and lien-chun forces in the 1890's, consul t Cavendish , 712-714.

32 Smith, "Fore ign-Tra in ing ," 216 and notes .

33 Bell, 2 : 4. The standard works on Li's army are: Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, 1964); Wang, Huai-chiin chih (Hong Kong, 1973).

34 See Chang Chili-lung's somewhat comparab l e effort in the 1880's and 1890's, discussed in Ayers , chapter 5. For a brief overview of the prob lems connected with officer educat ion in la te Ch ' ing Ch ina , consul t Powell, 40-45.

35 Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapte r 9.

36 Wang , Huai-chiin, 203; LWCK, Let ters to the Tsungl i Y a m e n , 4 : 39-41, 41-43; LWCK, Memor ia l s , 2 7 : 4-5.

37 On the West Point inquiry, sec Chester H o l c o m b e , China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 82-83; FRUS, 1875, par t 1, 227-228. On Li's negotiat ions with Upton , consult LWCK, Let ters to the Tsungl i Yamen , 4 : 39a-41a; YWYT, 3 : 592; Peter Michie , The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York , 1885), 29-298, 309-310.



Vol. 18 (1978 )

36 RICHARD J. SMITH

38 Holcombe, 82-83; LWCK, Memorials, 27: 405. See also Wang Chia-chien, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang ti chuang-she chi ch'i yin-hsiang," Kuo-li T'ai-wan shih-fan ta-hsiieh li-shih hsiieh-pai (April, 1976), 3.

39 LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4 : 39-41. 40 Wang, Huai-chun, 203 and passim; LWCK Memorials, 35; 33b-34,

34b-35. On Wang, see also Bell, 2 : 49. 4 1 On Chou's army, see Japan, Ministry of War, comp. Rimpo heibi

ryaku (1882), 3 : 45b-46b; Bell, 2 : 4, 57-59; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 128-130; FRUS, 1873, part 1, 182-188; CWCK, 1.4: 36b-32; etc. Chou's nien-p'u is included in CWCK. His writings and nien-p'u indicate a rather progressive outlook, including an appreciation not only of Western weapons and military methods, but also of certain aspects of Western science and medicine.

42 CWCK, 2.2: 13a-b; also 1.4: 2b-3, 32-33. 4 3 Ibid., see also 2.2: 1-8. On the attractiveness of Green Standard

rank, consult K. C. Liu, "The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal," Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 10.2 (July, 1974), 210, and esp. 218.

4 4 See, for example, CWCK 1.1.2: 24b; 1.4: 2-3, 5-13b, 19-24, 26b-27, 32-33b; 2.2: l-2b; "supplement," 1: 11-23, 44; etc.

« See, for example, CWCK, 1.1.2: 16b-17, 23-24, 27-28; 1.4: 3b-4, lOa-b, 27, 30-32; "supplement," 1: 7-24.

46 CWCK, 1.1.2: 17b-18; 1.4: 30-41; etc.

47 Ibid., 1.4: 33b.

48 Bell, 2 : 57; see also Cavendish, 721.

49 Bell, 2 : 57, 197; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 129, "The Army of Li Hung-chang"; CWCK, "supplement," 1: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b-37b; see also CWCK, 1.4: 36b-37.

50 CWCK, 1.1: 19b; 1.1.2: 41b-42; 2.2: 22b. 51 Wang, "Pei-yang, wu-pei hstleh-t'ang," 3-4, 23-24, note 18.

52 CWCK, 1.4: 34.

53 CWCK, 1.4: 33b-34; also 1.1.2: 41b-42.

54 See note 40. 5 5 Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in

China (Ithaca, 1961), 61-62; Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York, 1932), 10-12; Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 7-8.

56 Ibid. (Wang), 7-8.

57 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887. The entrance examination consisted of three parts. The theme for the essay was: "(When the people have been taught patriotism and loyalty) they may easily overcome their enemies." The theme for the discourse was: "Much planning brings success." And the subject for the poetry exercise was: "Though summer has come, nature is still mild and pleasant." Ibid.

58 Biggerstaff, 63; NCH, April 13, 1887; Chinese Times, April 23, 1887, "The Tientsin Military School"; etc. The most complete discussion of the establishment, rise, structure, administration and influence of the Tientsin Military Academy is Wang Chia-chien's, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang."



Vol. 18 (1978 )


59 Ibid. (Wang), 8. 6 0 Ibid. Wang notes that branch schools of the Tientsin Military

Academy were established at Shan-hai-kuan and We-hai-wei.

61 Ibid., citing LWCK, Memorials, 74: 25.

62 Ibid., 8-9. 63 Ibid., 7. On Li's financial difficulties, consult Wang, Huai-chiln,

275-290; Spector, chapter 7. 6 4 Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 9-12. The major problems,

according to Wang, were: (1) The administrators of the academy were not well suited to their tasks (non-specialists); (2) the foreign instructors were arrogant, overpaid, unappreciative, and remiss in their teaching responsibilities; (3) heavy reliance on interpreters was inefficient and confusing; and (4) both academic and practical training tended to degenerate into formalism. Other problems included capricious grading, reports of cheating, and shortages and lack of standardization in equipment. For problems in China's other military and naval schools, consult Ayers, 108-113, 179-180, and John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), passim.

6 5 Rawlinson, 163, 169; Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression (Tucson, 1965, 140-141; NCH, September 21, 1894.

6 6 For a summary of the fighting on land and sea, consult Liu and Smith, "The Military Challenge."

6 7 See, for example, E. Bujac, Precis de quelques campagnes contem-poraines (Paris, 1896), vol. 2; N.W.H. Du Boulay, An Epitome of the China-Japanese War, 1894-95 (London, 1896); Lieutenant Sauvage, La guerre Sino-Japonaise 1894-1,895 (Paris, 1897); Richard Wallach, "The War in the East," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 21.4 (1895); T. A. Brassey, ed., The Naval Annual (Portsmouth, 1895); Vladimir (pseudonym for Zenone Volpicelli), The China-Japan War (London, 1896).

6 8 On the Japanese response to the war, see Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan," in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in. Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971); also Jeffery Dorwart, The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Amherst, Mass., 1975), 94-96.

69 Professor Samuel Chu of Ohio State University is currently studying the Chinese response to the war, and has produced several illuminating but as yet unpublished papers on the subject. For the time being, the best available discussion of Chinese attitudes is Kuo Sung-p'ing, "The Chinese Reaction to Foreign Encroachment" (unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 1953).

7 0 See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's critique, cited in Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 111; consult also Kuo, 49-50, 81-83, etc.

71 Cited in Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1928, translated and edited by S. Y. Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton, Toronto, London and New York, 1956). See also Japanese Imperial General Staff, eds., History of the War between Japan and China (Tokyo, 1904), 1: 30-32.

72 Rawlinson, 190.

73 Liu Feng-han, "Chia-wu chan-cheng shuang-fang ping-li ti fen-hsi," Chung-kuo i-chou, 829 (March 14, 1966) and 830 (March 21, 1966); CJCC,



Vol. 18 (1978 )

38 RICHARD J. SMITH

1: 15-24; Japanese Imperial General Staff, History of the War between Japan and China, 1: 26-29; Vladimir, 255; Wallach, 718.

74 CJCC, 1: 63; Japanese Imperial General Staff, History of the War between Japan and China, 1: 30-32; Rawlinson, 174-177, 180.

75 See, for example, Presseisen, 140-141; Vladimir, 112, 118, 164, 242-243, 260; Wallach, 718-719.

76 Wang Chia-chien, "Ch'ing-chi ti Hai-chun ya-men (1885-1895)," Chung-kuo li-shih hsuen-hui shih-hsiien chi-k'an, no. 5; Rawlinson, 186; Vladimir, 281.

77 See, for example, Chang Yin-lin, "Chia-wu Chung-kuo hai-chtin chan-chi k'ao," Ch'ing-hua hsiieh-pao, 10.1 (January, 1935); also CJCC, 4 : 72-82, 166-244, 245-271, etc.

78 See Dorwart, 112-113; Cavendish, 717.

79 NCH, January 14, 1898; Vladimir, 267-268.

80 NCH, January 14, 1898; Vladimir, 243.

81 For the participation of Tientsin Military Academy graduates in the early stages of the war, consult CJCC, 1: 18.

82 Vladimir, 126, 193, 248.

83 For criticisms of China's officer corps by foreign contemporaries, consult Du Boulay, 8, 11, 160; Bujac, 217; Brassey, 128-129, 139, 143; NCH, October 19, 1894; etc.

84 Cavendish, 722.

85 Vladimir, 124, 153-154, 192, 198-199, 208, 217, 277; also Wallach, 695, 719; CJCC, 1: 236, 256, 276, etc.

86 Wallach, 709, 712-713; Vladimir, 109, 150, 231, 256; Sauvage, 221. 87 Brassey, 139.

88 Cavendish, 721.

89 Brassey, 127.

90 Vladimir, 251-252; Du Boulay, 73.

91 See Rawlinson, 174-185; CJCC, 1 : 34, 63-69, 239-245.

92 Rawlinson, 188-190.

93 See ibid., 175-187; Brassey, 90, 92, 99-101, 110, 115, 120, 124, 127; NCH, February 1, February 8, and March 22, 1895.

94 NCH, January 25 and February 1, 1895.

95 See Powell, 71-72; WCSL, 101 : 6b-10; Liu Feng-han, Hsin-chien lu-chiin (Taipei, 1967), 45-46.

96 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 108, 232.

97 Roswell Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press 1800-1912 (Shanghai, 1933), esp. chapter 8.

98 Cited in NCH, October 2, 1896. See also Wang Erh-min, Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang shih (Taipei, 1977), 122-123, 124.

99 Ayers, 130-136.



Vol. 18 (1978 )


wo Powell, 56-59; Pcakc, 20-22; Wang, Huai-chiin, 363; etc.

101 Wang Chia-chicn, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 1, 8; Powell, 235-236.

102 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887; Ayers, 118.

103 Sec Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution," in James Crowley, cd., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (New York, etc., 1971), 160-162; Yoshihiro Hatano, "The New Armies," in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution (New Haven and London, 1968), and Powell, passim.

104 p o r abundant documentation on the dilution of traditional values and loyalties at the Tientsin Military Academy, see Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 9, 11-12, 19-20, and notes. Li Hung-chang had pointed out the need to study the Classics and History "in order to strengthen the root," but Wang claims that the students tended to adopt a foreign-worship mentality, ignored China's legendary heros, and (in the words of a contemporary critic) neither discussed the virtues of integrity (chieh) and duty («'), nor knew of honesty (lien) and shame (ch'ih). Cf. Chou Sheng-ch'uan's army song (Sheng-chiin lisiin-yung ko), CWCK, "supplement," 1: 50-52b.

105 The evidence, contained in CWCK, remains to be gathered systematically, but even a brief glance at Chou's nien-p'u and his extensive writings suggests these conflicts.

106 CrVCK, 1.4: 30-47b, e sp . 33b and 37.

107 ibid., 1.1: 20a-b; 1.1.1: lOa-b; 1.1.2: 15b, 19b-20, 23b (on bullets and rations), 40b-41; etc.

108 CWCK, "introductory chiian (Chou's nien-p'uT 31b-56 passim. Ironically, after Chou's death, the Sheng-chiin was employed in work on the grounds of the Tientsin Military Academy. Chinese Times, May 28, 1887.

109 For Chou's concern with positive attitudes toward the military, see CWCK, "supplement," 1 : 20b-21, 22b-23, 50-52b. For Chou's esteem for civil status, see CWCK, "introductory chiian," 57n. Cf. sources cited in note 72.

no xhese tensions were not, of course, fully resolved — but neither were such tensions in the West. See Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites," esp. 21, 27, etc. On the emphasis on technical education at the Tientsin Military Academy, see the sources cited in note 104.

i l l Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor, 1977), 58-59.

H2 Ibid., 56.

113 Powell, 160.

114 Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 8; Biggerstaff, 63.

115 Young, Yiian Shih-k'ai, 56-64; Powell, 79-81; Jerome Ch'en, "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions," Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, 31.3 (1966), and especially Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang," 12-19, which discusses the careers of over 60 individuals from the academy. Young, 56, notes that of thirty "leading military participants" singled out by Liu Fenghan for "their subsequent prominence in the early republic," twenty-five had attended the Tientsin Military Academy before joining Yuan Shih-k'ai at Hsiao-chan (in the period 1895-1899). See Liu Fenghan, Hsin-chien lu-chiin, 113-125.



Vol. 18 (1978 )

40 RICHARD J. SMITH

116 I have discussed many of these problems in Mercenaries and Mandarins and "Foreign-Training," 215-223 and notes.

117 Powell, chapters 2-8; Hatano, "The New Armies"; Young, "Nationalism," etc.

118 Powell amply documents this point. See also the discussion by Sue Fawn Chung, "The Image of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi," in Paul Cohen and John Schrecker, eds., Reform in Nineteenth-Century China (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), esp. 105-106.

119 For the importance of ideology in other areas of reform, however, see K. C. Liu, "Politics, Intellectual Outlook, and Reform: The T'ung-wen Kuan Controversy of 1867," in Cohen and Schrecker, Reform.

120 See Wang Chia-chien, cited in note 104; also Rawlinson, 89.

121 See note 104; also Ayers, 111.

122 The civil service examination system continued to be a nearly irresistible lure to the best minds of the empire, and even Li Hung-chang encouraged foreign-trained military and naval personnel to seek identification with the civil service. See Rawlinson, 203. Biggerstaff, 85, maintains that vested interests were more pervasive in military organizations than the navy.

123 On these problems, see Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapter 9.

124 See Smith, "Reflections"; also Liu and Smith, "The Military Challenge."



Vol. 18 (1978 )

The Reform of Military Education in Late Qing China

Documents