The Reconciliation Pyramid—A Narrative-Based Framework for Analyzing Identity Conflicts

The Reconciliation Pyramid—A Narrative-BasedFramework for Analyzing Identity Conflicts

Yehudith AuerbachBar Ilan University

The Reconciliation Pyramid is suggested in this article as a heuristic tool for exploringaccomplished or burgeoning reconciliation processes, as well as cases such as the MiddleEast, where only tentative and mostly failed steps have been taken towards reconciliation.The first part proposes a terminological framework indicating the relationship betweenmetanarratives, national metanarratives, and national narratives. This terminology is used toanalyze national narratives and their role in conflict evolvement and termination. Thesecond part elaborates the seven stages of the Reconciliation Pyramid: Narrative acquain-tance; narrative acknowledgement; expressing empathy; assumption of responsibility;readiness for restitution; asking and granting forgiveness and narrative integration. Thearticle concludes with a short case study of the Camp David negotiations and reflects uponthe suitability and contribution of the Reconciliation Pyramid to theoretical and empiricalreconciliation research.

KEY WORDS: Reconciliation pyramid, Reconciliation, Narrative, Metanarrative, Identity conflict

Reconciliation has been described as the apex of a long process of conflicttermination and being tantamount to a stable, warm peace (Rothstein, 1999).Kriesberg (1998a) views reconciliation as a “relatively amicable relationship typi-cally established after a rupture in relations involving one-sided or mutual inflic-tion of extreme injury” and outlines the steps taken by former rivals on their wayto reconciliation: “They acknowledge the reality of the terrible acts that wereperpetrated; accept with compassion those who committed injurious conduct, aswell as acknowledging each other’s sufferings; believe that their injustices arebeing redressed and anticipate mutual security and well-being” (pp. 351–352).

Recently there has been a decline in reconciliation studies and a reversion tomore modest concepts like “conflict resolution” and “conflict management,”which better reflect the realities of ongoing conflicts like that in the Middle East.

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0162-895X © 2009 International Society of Political PsychologyPublished by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,

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(For systematic comparisons between related modes of conflict termination, seeAuerbach, 2005a; Barak, 2005.)

This article will argue that it is too early to abandon the reconciliation conceptaltogether. It follows Kriesberg’s and Rothstein’s conceptualization of reconcili-ation as a long and deep process which aims at radical changes in the hearts andminds of the communities involved in an identity conflict (to be discussed below).Reconciliation, according to this approach, goes beyond the formal, intergovern-mental agreements, focused on the material aspects of a conflict and arrived atthrough “conflict resolution” or “conflict management.” In view of the importanceas well as the difficulties in reaching reconciliation, we advise formulating termi-nological and theoretical frameworks to address the problems of the reconciliationprocess as well as to assess the potential for overcoming obstacles and thusachieving reconciliation.

One problem in earlier reconciliation studies (among many others, extensivelydiscussed in Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004) was that scholars seemed to be torn betweentwo schools of thought. One claimed reconciliation to be “a difficult and delicateprocess that is not simply a matter of the head, but more so of the heart” (Fisher,2001a, p. 34) and highlighted its emotional, warm, healing aspects (e.g.,Montville, 1993; Staub, 1998, 2000, 2006). The other argued that the lofty goalof reconciliation would be better served if stripped from its warm, sentimentalwrapping and presented in a more political, realistic context (e.g., Arendt, 1958;Dwyer, 1999; Eisikovits, 2004; Long & Brecke, 2003).

Interestingly, these two schools of thought sometimes manifest themselveswithin the same person. Michael Ignatieff is a case in point. An astute observerof the international scene—particularly of interethnic conflicts—Ignatieff is byno means a naïve idealist. In The Warrior’s Honor (1999) he expresses a deepconviction that ethnic groups torn apart by hatred and violence have to undergomutual mourning and consolation processes: “Without an apology, withoutrecognition of what happened, the past cannot return to its place as the past. . . .Reconciliation built on mutual apology . . . has no chance against vengeance,unless it can replace the respect entailed in vengeance with rituals in whichcommunities once in war learn to mourn their dead together” (p. 190).

Several years later, and maybe as a result of his work in preparing the reporton the Balkan War with the International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty, Ignatieff is a much more sober realist. He lists all the obstaclesencountered on the way toward forgiveness and reconciliation and proposes asharp distinction between on the one hand, warm, sentimental processes suchas reconciliation, shared historical truth, and forgiveness and on the other, cold,realistic, and rational routes such as coexistence based on accepting the world “asit actually is.” He strictly recommends avoiding the former and adhering to thelatter (2003, pp. 325–333).

Other scholars argue that apology and forgiveness, as well as remorse andempathy, should be seen as part of the political process that leads to reconciliation

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(Amstutz, 2005; Biggar, 2001; Digeser, 2001; Tavuchis, 1991). The present articleechoes this argument but also emphasizes that reconciliation will not be achievedwithout addressing the cognitive (i.e., relatively “cold”) components of intractableconflicts, such as “societal beliefs” (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Bar-Tal &Bennink, 2004; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005), and especially national narratives(Kelman, 1987, 2001).

The “cold” narrative concept and “warm” moves such as empathy, remorse,and forgiveness are integrated into a proposed “Reconciliation Pyramid” frame-work for analyzing the reconciliation process. This framework is suggested as aheuristic tool for exploring burgeoning reconciliation processes (e.g., NorthernIreland, South Africa), as well as cases such as the Middle East, where onlytentative and mostly failed steps have been taken towards reconciliation.

The analytical framework presented in this article is exploratory and is aimedat generating further—theoretical as well as empirical—research on questionssuch as: Is reconciliation between two parties embroiled in an identity conflict anachievable goal? Is each phase of the suggested pyramid necessary for achievinggenuine reconciliation? Do all reconciliation processes follow the same pattern?

The first part of this article will propose a terminological framework indicat-ing the relationship between national metanarratives and national narratives. Thisterminology will then be used to analyze national narratives and their role in theevolvement and termination of identity conflicts. The third part will elaborate uponthe seven stages of the Reconciliation Pyramid. The theoretical discussion will beillustrated with examples drawn from different identity conflicts, with specialfocus on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The article concludes with a short examplefrom the 2000 Camp David negotiations and reflects upon the suitability andcontribution of the Reconciliation Pyramid to theoretical and empirical reconcili-ation research.

National Narratives and Metanarratives

Conflicts, whether between individuals or collectives, erupt when basic needsare unmet and when the two sides to the conflict have good reasons (at least in theirown eyes) to believe that the other is responsible for this deprivation. Human needsinclude both basic needs (food, security, etc.) and more elevated needs such asbelonging, recognition, and individual as well as collective identity (Ross, 2007,p. 22; Volkan, 2004, pp. 11–12). Studying conflicts from this angle one candifferentiate between two types: material conflicts and identity conflicts. In thecase of material conflicts, the dispute is mainly about fundamental concerns, suchas territory, defense borders, natural resources, and the like. Efforts at conflictsettlement, usually negotiated between formal representatives of the warring sides,sometimes with the mediation of third parties—usually governmental or interna-tional agents—are mainly aimed at satisfying the material aspects of the two sides,namely guaranteeing safe and recognized borders, assuring supply of oil, gas,

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basic commodities, etc. Little attention is given to identity issues, since they haveprobably not played a crucial role in the evolution and dynamics of the conflict.In the case of identity conflicts, it is the need for identity that lies at the center ofthe feud. An identity conflict erupts when at least one side feels that the other hasnegated its identity and denied its right as a legitimate player in the internationalarena. The emphasis on the subjective aspect of the identity conflict does not meanthat there is no objective factual base to the imagined world of negative feelings,emotions, or beliefs entertained by one of the sides in relation to the other. It ratherhighlights those factors that explain, at least according to the psycho-politicalschool, the depth and intensity of the mutual hostility between the sides in anidentity conflict. The collective identity is founded upon and nourished by nationalnarratives. National narratives about past and present glories and traumas, wherethe “other” was either the defeated (in case of glories) or the victorious (intraumas), are the building blocs of national/ethnic identity. Their centrality inidentity conflicts suggests that they can be (and usually are) barriers to a recon-ciliation process between the torn apart foes (Ross, 2007), but they can also triggersuch a process. It is hereby proposed that if one wishes to unearth more concealedpositive potential of narratives, one should differentiate between the basic narra-tives held by each side, which we term metanarratives, which are more deeplyrooted in the national psyche, and therefore more resistant to change, and nationalnarratives, which, although based on the more abstract metanarratives, are morefactually based and therefore potentially more flexible.

One should bear in mind of course, that these two types of conflicts are idealtypes in the Weberian sense. Hence, real conflicts are usually cases where materialand identity issues are inextricably interwoven. Thus, the parties in a materialconflict have their own, usually conflicting, narratives regarding central issues andevents, and they will draw upon them to bolster their position and justify theirconduct. On the other hand, identity conflicts have some vital material aspects,which should be taken into consideration when embarking on conflict resolution.However, while the chances of bringing about the settlement of material conflictsby focusing on political, military, and economic aspects are reasonable (e.g.,Germany and most of the European allies after World War II), identity conflicts,fueled and exacerbated by the constant cultivation of mutual victimhood narra-tives, need more. They require a deep and long process of attitude change, namely,reconciliation. Reconciliation, in the full meaning of the word (as defined byKriesberg, 1998a, 351–352), cannot be achieved without tackling the identityissues and the narratives on which they are built. This section will present met-anarratives and national narratives and discuss their role in reconciliation, largelyusing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a reference.

A narrative is “. . . a story, and stories tell about things that have happened orare happening to people, animals, aliens from outer space, insects—whatever. Thatis, a story contains a sequence of events, which means that narratives take placewithin or over . . . some kind of time period” (Berger, 1997, p. 4). A narrative has

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a plot, which must stand the test of coherence and consistency in order to bepowerful and convincing. It has five interrelated components which address thefollowing W questions: Who are the heroes of the story? What happened? When,where, and why did it happen? (Shuman, 1903; Later, a sixth question was added:The how question, which is sometimes submerged in the five others; Manoff &Shudson, 1986). The innate relationship between these five components lendscoherence and strength to the narrative. It also alludes to the possibility of decon-structing the narrative into its constituent components. This has special signifi-cance when discussing the role of national narratives in reconciliation.

Narratives in general, and particularly national ones in an identity conflict, arenot “merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent realevents in their aspect as developmental processes, but rather entail ontological andepistemic choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political impli-cations” (Hyden, as cited in Tachibana, 1998, p. 247). The epistemic, ontological,and ideological meanings of such narratives are derived from and inspired bymetanarratives.

The term “Meta” denotes “a nature of a higher order or more fundamental kind”(Brown, 1993, p. 1753). Metanarratives are stories about stories, i.e., they locate“national” stories within a wider, holistic scheme. Lyotard claims that postmodern-ism is characterized by growing suspicions towards the old, big, all-encompassingmetanarratives such as Christianity, the Enlightenment, Liberalism, Marxism,Freudianism, etc. However, he admits that local and national metanarratives stillheavily influence ethnic groups (Lyotard, 1988, 1992). One might posit that theimpact of such national metanarratives is even greater and more evident when ethnicgroups are in the process of building (or rebuilding) their national identity.

The crucial role of national metanarratives (also referred to as myths,see Kolakowski, 1970; Mali, 2003; Smith, 1999; and as shared worldviews, Ross,2003, 2007) as sources of identity and national legitimacy makes them “the basisof competing claims to territory, patrimony and resources,” thus contributing tothe transformation of “normal conflicts of interest . . . into cultural wars” (Smith,1999, p. 9). The conflicting claims in identity conflicts are not (at least not solely)inspired by demands on soil, water, or oil, which are naturally divisible andtherefore relatively easy to reconcile, but by deep beliefs regarding national iden-tity and rights to a specific territory, which are rooted in ancient history and areconsequently strongly held and maybe nonnegotiable.

What makes the metanarrative in identity conflicts particularly resistantto change is the focus on “the consciousness of (past, and often also present)victimhood among those groups that feel threatened, or are still burdened by thememories of past sufferings” (Bartov, 2003, p. 42). Ethnic groups, still entangledin sharp disputes over national identity and territory, have become more and morepreoccupied with the issue of victim versus victimizer, particularly since the1960s, often believing that they are the one and only victim in the conflict and theothers are the perpetrators (Barkan, 2000, 2005; Montville, 1993, 2002).


If one wishes to understand the heavy impact of national metanarratives on thedynamics of an ongoing identity conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a goodexample. Here, the clash of national metanarratives is particularly accentuated,producing a long and bloody conflict focused around the three issues mentionedabove:

1. Identity, i.e., what is the collective legal status of each of the sides? Are theyethnic groups? Religious communities? National entities?

2. Issues regarding each side’s rights to disputed territory, i.e., who is entitledto such territory? To part or to all of it? What justifies the claims?

3. Issues concerning suffering and victimhood, i.e., who is the victim and whois the victimizer?

The two protagonists view the disputed issues through the prism of theirrespective national metanarratives. Regarding identity, each side sees itself as anational entity, entitled to all the legitimate rights of a full member of the familyof nations. However, while many Israelis have come to recognize the Palestiniansas a national entity—particularly following the second Intifada—the majority ofPalestinians claim that Jews, or more precisely, Israeli Jews, are not an “authenticnation” (Kelman, 2001). Moreover, it seems the denial of the Jews as a nationalentity entitled to its own country is gaining momentum in Palestinian society, bothin and outside Israel. The Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, a body incorpo-rating the heads of Arab local authorities in Israel, on December 5, 2006, publisheda document entitled, “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel.” In thisdocument, authorized by the representatives of all Arab political factions in Israel,part of the first chapter reads as follows: “Israel is the outcome of a settlementprocess initiated by the Jewish-Zionist elite in Europe and the West and realized bycolonial countries, contributing to it, and by promoting Jewish immigration toPalestine, in light of the results of World War II and the Holocaust” (NationalCommittee, 2006, p. 5). Reactions from the Israeli (predominantly Jewish) popu-lation, as expressed in talkbacks, have been as harsh and offensive as one couldexpect (Talkbacks, Ha’aretz, 2006).

Other basic beliefs regarding identity, far more accentuated in Israeli (Jewish)heritage, are those of “ethnic election” and even more so the idea of “the covenant”(Smith, 1999). The repercussions of such beliefs are quite remarkable, as Smithnotes: “Ethnic election myths, and particularly covenantal schemes, confer on thecommunities that evolve such beliefs an extraordinary sense of rectitude and moralsuperiority” (p. 267).

This self-inflating image fuels and exacerbates identity conflicts, particularlyif Smith is right in noting a difference between communities with rich and well-documented ethno-histories, like the Jews (his example), and those with a weakercultural heritage. Referring to the latter he points out: “. . . their very lack ofrich ethno-history relative to other, better-endowed neighbors stimulates these

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culturally peripheral and politically underprivileged communities to remedy thisdeficiency in a world where power stems from culture, in the same way as relativeeconomic deprivation often spurs resentment and political emulation” (1999,p. 266).

Palestinian Arabs, unlike the Jews, are not defined by language, culture, orreligion. They are constantly seeking for a defining point for their identity. Thebattle over the control of Palestine has eventually brought them to define theiridentity in terms of the contested territory (Neuberger, 1990).

Territory has thus become the main point of conflict between the two sidesand their two very different metanarratives. The Palestinians see the battle withIsrael as the continuation of the war against European colonization, which startedin the twelfth century and culminated with the establishment of the State of Israelin 1948 (Connerton, 1989). This belief, which gives them total and exclusive rightsto Palestine, stands in sharp contrast to the Israeli (Jewish) conviction that EretzIsrael (“The Land of Israel” in Hebrew) is their divinely Promised Land. Thus,both sides exclusively claim the same territory and reject the other’s argumentsas false.

Victimhood has become especially predominant in the Middle East conflict.Each side sees itself both as the historic victim and as the definitive victim ofthe other. For the Israelis, the conflict with the Arabs, and more particularlythe Palestinians, is inextricably bound to their history of suffering, exiles, andpogroms, culminating with the Holocaust. The Palestinians “perceive themselvesas victims of a long process that started with the British and continued withIsrael in 1947–49, a process that denied their national existence” (Barkan, 2005,p. 89).

Indeed, “al-Nakba,” the Arab term for the perceived 1948 catastrophe,whereby hundreds of thousands of Palestinians lost their homes and becamerefugees, whether in “their stolen homeland,” the State of Israel, or in neighboringArab countries, became their ultimate “chosen trauma” (Volkan, 1997, p. 48). Ithas deepened and exacerbated the sense of humiliation and helplessness passedon from generation to generation all over the Muslim world since the decline ofthe Muslim civilization at the end of the fifteenth century. Thus, the al-Nakba forthe Palestinians, like the Shoah (“Holocaust”) for the Jews (which are different andaltogether incomparable events), reinforced their respective victimhood metanar-ratives. These two “chosen traumas” have become part of the two people’s respec-tive identities.

Let us now sum up this suggested terminology before examining how we canuse it to study reconciliation in identity conflicts.

Metanarratives are the all-encompassing, interpretive frameworks whichincorporate the basic symbols, values, beliefs, and behavioral codes of a collective,and serve, therefore, as the symbolic representation of the national ethos. These“meta” frameworks are believed to be formulated and conferred to the people bya mythic figure, often considered to possess some kind of divine quality (such as


Moses, Jesus, Buddha, or Mohammad). They are therefore deemed sacred anduntouchable. Efforts at changing the metanarratives in identity conflicts aredoomed to failure, at least when attempted too early, because they are perceived asa direct attack on the most cherished values and symbols of each protagonist.

Metanarratives are abstract, intangible, and nonfigurative. In order to betransmitted to and understood by ordinary people they need to take on concreteform and reality. In the Middle East context, Israelis find it difficult to identify withabstractions like self-sacrifice for the good of their country, but they can identifywith Joseph Trumpeldor, who was killed fighting the Arabs in 1920 with his dyingwords allegedly being: “it is good to die for our country.” Palestinians cannotimagine a future era of Arab glory without the image of Saladin, who defeated theCrusaders, before their eyes. In this way, the nation’s founding fathers, riding thechariots of divinely inspired metanarratives, cross the bridge of national narrativeson their way to becoming real-life, tangible heroes.

National narratives are concrete stories about national heroes and iconicevents in a nation’s history, told, retold, and reshaped by circumstances overgenerations. They derive their meaning and significance from the metanarrativeand are therefore respected almost as much. As we will see, the “ideal” nationalnarrative is a solid, self-sustained edifice that plays an important role in conflictdevelopment and often contributes to its exacerbation (Ross, 2007). However, itsstory-like structure makes it potentially more flexible and open to change if andwhen the two sides embark on a voyage of reconciliation.

The “Reconciliation Pyramid” presented below presumes that partners inan identity conflict will not be able to reach reconciliation unless they becomeacquainted with each other’s narratives, acknowledge their legitimacy, and beready to incorporate them into their own. This analysis suggests that metanarra-tives should be left to the end of the process. By focusing on the concrete nationalnarratives each side has assembled over the course of the conflict, they mightbe able, through narrative deconstruction, to isolate the more factual and lesscontestable components of these stories and thus gradually move forward.

The assumptions underlying the Reconciliation Pyramid echo Kaufman’ssymbolic politics theory, according to which, “the core causes of ethnic war[hereby termed identity conflicts] are ethnic hostility and the myths [herebyreferred to as metanarratives] and fears that promote it” (Kaufman, 2001, p. 42).Kaufman sees as a mistake the tendency of theoreticians and diplomats to dismisspeace building [reconciliation] as either naïve or ineffective, and calls upon peacebuilders to help the two feuds to “replace the myths about the other side withbetter information, to replace the hostility and fear with understanding, and mostof all to build cooperative inter-ethnic relationship to replace stereotyped hostileones” (p. 42). He suggests that ethno-nationalist myths should be “recast intocooperative and tolerant ones, especially by promoting the writing and teachingof fair-minded history instead of the ethnocentric and scapegoating kind” (2001,pp. 42–43).

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In view of the crucial role of national narratives in sustaining the antagonists’identities and sense of value and pride, the task of replacing them with morenuanced and inclusive narratives is not easy. The following section will endeavorto explain what turns national narratives into barriers to peace building. At thesame time it will elaborate on their potential for conflict mitigation, alluded to bysome of the reconciliation scholars (most particularly Ross, 2003, 2007).

The Role of National Narratives in Identity Conflicts

National narratives in an identity conflict tend to be “constructed as (a) set ofbinary opposites” (Cobb, 2003, p. 304). All constituent parts will be clearly andsharply delineated and then contrasted with their negatives in a way allowing forno confusion between perceived good and bad. If we follow Cobb’s thinking andexpand it in light of the five W questions mentioned above, national narratives canbe characterized as follows:

Who? In a typical national narrative the number of protagonists will belimited, with a clear division between the “good” (us) and the “bad” (them). The“good” group is portrayed as the very incarnation of merit: peace lovers, righteous,honest, irreproachable, and above all, victims of the other side—the “bad”—whichis of course the embodiment of wickedness and evil.

An “ideal” national narrative will not differentiate between the leaders andthe people of the other side, or between different layers of society. The “other”is perceived as a whole, whose constituent parts are subsumed into the collectiveidentity. “The atrocities [attributed to the other] are held to reveal the essentialidentity . . . of the people(s) in whose name they are committed” (Ignatieff, 1999,p. 177).

What? The answer to this seemingly factual question should be simple anduncontestable, but it never is. The What question in a national narrative cannotbe stripped from its mythological ties, which draw on the metanarrative andearlier national narratives. A classic example is the dramatic, heart-wrenchingpicture of the 12-year-old boy, Mohammed al-Dura, caught in a clash betweenIsraeli and Palestinian forces in the Gaza Strip on September 30, 2000. Thevideo, made by a French journalist, was broadcast around the world andpresented by Palestinian television (and most of the international media) as anexample of the Israel Defense Forces’ excessive use of force and even as anintentional killing.

Later investigations into the incident, most notably by ARD German TVcorrespondent Esther Schapira, and Philippe Karsenty, founder of the Frenchonline media watchdog, Media Ratings, cast doubt upon this version. Yet this didnot change the Palestinian perception of al-Dura as a victim of Israeli brutality.The innocent 12-year-old has taken his place on the never-ending list of Palestin-ian shahids (martyrs) and become a constant symbol of Palestinian victimhood(Liebes & First, 2003).


Why? Protagonists in an identity conflict usually adopt an attribution causalmodel (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). According to this model,antagonists will explain their and their adversary’s behavior in a way that strength-ens their moral position in the conflict. “Our” benign and conciliatory actions areattributed to our good and peace-loving nature, while our allegedly aggressiveactions are portrayed as necessary reactions to the other’s provocations. The samemechanism is used to explain the other’s behavior. “Their” benevolent actions areimposed by circumstances (e.g., international pressure), while malevolent behav-ior stems from their inherent wickedness and belligerence. This pattern of attrib-uting good motives to ourselves and bad motives to the other amplifies the negativeperception of the other and sears it into one’s consciousness. “Once identified, theexistence of such motives seemingly makes it easy to ‘predict’ another’s futureactions, and through one’s own behavior to turn such predictions to self-fulfillingprophesies” (Ross, 2007, p. 25). The causal component of the narrative adds anapparently logical, and in effect a psych-logical (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958)dimension to the national narrative, which thus becomes strong, coherent, andstarkly resistant to change.

Psych-logics also helps to settle apparent contradictions which often surfacein contradicting national narratives, when, for example, each side views itself assimultaneously weak and strong. This contradiction will usually be reconciled byclaiming: “we are fundamentally stronger, and will therefore win in the long run[if we behave wisely and do not yield to pressures]; the adversary is strong at thepresent [mainly because supported by mighty allies], but will ultimately be theloser” (Auerbach, and Ben-Yehuda, 1987, p. 327).

The responses to the Who, What, and Why questions are integrated into thevictimhood metanarrative and become major obstacles in any path of reconcilia-tion based on narrative dissolution and incorporation.

One would hope for better chances of reaching an agreement over theWhen and Where questions, which are ostensibly the most factual elements of thenarrative. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The temporal-spatial dimensions aredragged into the binary structure of the national narratives almost as easily as theWho, What, and Why components.

National narratives involve “the reconstruction of temporal sequence in orderto resituate a current predicament and enable future action” (Silverstein &Makdishi, 2006, p. 10). The collective group memory “retains only those eventsthat are of pedagogic character. The very manner in which memory distorts thefacts reflects the need to show that each one has significance beyond the eventitself; that it has a logical place in the complete history and that it comprises all theothers” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 223). Both sides are motivated to focus their nationalnarratives on the past because they wish to create a solid base for their contra-dictory demands and future action. The past, as told by protagonists, “has none ofthe fixed and stable identity of a document” (Ignatieff, 1999, p. 173). Furthermore,the “past is not past, and time . . . [is] simultaneous, not linear” (Ignatieff, 1999,

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p. 166). Volkan has coined the term “time collapse” to describe the process “inwhich the interpretations, fantasies and feelings about a past shared trauma com-mingle with those pertaining to a current situation” (Volkan, 1997, p. 35). The“time collapse” phenomenon applies to “chosen traumas” (p. 48) as well as to“chosen glories” (p. 81). For example, in the prayer recited by Jews on the festivalsof Hanukkah and Purim, each generation thanks the Almighty for “the miracles,and for the salvation, and for the mighty deeds, and for the victories, and for thebattles which You performed for our forefathers . . . in those days, at this time.”There is no demarcation between past and present. What happened “in the days ofMordechai and Esther in Shushan” (the ancient capital of the Persian Empire) in355 bce is equivalent to the events that took place “in the days of Mattathias, theson of Yochanan the High Priest, the Hasmonean and his sons” in 139 bce. Historyis indeed destined to repeat itself, and time is blurred. Present enemies becomejust reincarnations of the same wicked people who have tried to exterminate thepeople of God throughout history. This narrative is transmitted from generation togeneration, with each generation adding its contribution to the eternal story ofsuffering, victimhood, and miraculous salvation.

Where? The national narrative draws a clear distinction between Homelandand Exile. Homeland is the disputed territory each group claims as its own, oftenby virtue of a divine promise inscribed in the metanarrative. In the Middle East,national narratives will relate stories of endless battles between the legitimateowners of the Holy Land and those who have been unlawfully trying to appropriateit. Exile is everywhere the chosen group is dispersed outside this land. The peoplein exile will generally try to maintain their culture and avoid assimilation into localculture. They will preserve memories of their native land, lament their uprooting,and never stop dreaming about coming back to the beloved homeland. Thesedeeply entrenched beliefs and feelings toward the land legitimate and fuel theirnonnegotiable claim for the right of return to the homeland they were forced toleave.

The analysis of national narratives in an identity conflict suggests they areclosed, coherent, self-sustained systems and unshakeable. Both sides are appre-hensive that any change in their narratives or acceptance of even a small part of theother’s narrative would shatter their identity. This is a simplified representationof national narratives. Even in sharp identity conflicts, there will be individualsand groups that will consider their own as well as the other’s narrative in a morenuanced and subtle manner. Furthermore, narratives do change in the course of theconflict with or without connection to the behavior of the other side. However, thisideal type of national narrative emerges at times of crisis and increasing threats,when the need for bolstering national identity becomes more acute. As long as theantagonists, locked in their mutual sense of victimhood, put identity issues at thecenter of their conflict, the national narratives will basically keep their rigidity.

In light of this vicious circle of national narratives, with both sides perpetuallynegating each other and widening the gap of mistrust and hatred, any chance of


reconciliation may seem impossible. Nevertheless, there are some examples ofconflicts that do indeed appear to be on the—admittedly convoluted—road toreconciliation.

Current relations between China and Japan provide an example of a reason-ably successfully resolved conflict, where former foes have realized that genuinereconciliation is needed, and that this requires the nongovernmental treatment oftheir clashing national narratives.

In December 2006, Japanese and Chinese scholars held the first in a plannedseries of historical study groups, ordered by their governments in order to mitigatehostility between the former enemies. There is a deep and seemingly unbridgeablegulf between Japan and China regarding What happened in the Japanese-Chineseconflict prior to the Second World War, Why it happened, and Who is responsible,particularly for “The Rape of Nanking” in 1937. The Chinese version claims therape, brutalization, and death of at least 350,000 noncombatants (What) wascommitted by the government-controlled Japanese army (Who), demonstratingJapanese proclivities for ruthlessness and brutality (Why). While some fringegroups in Japan deny this narrative altogether, saying that the “massacre” was afabrication of the communist government, the official Japanese narrative is thatwhat happened was an accident of war whereby some 30–40,000 Chinese soldierslost their lives (What) because a few nonauthorized soldiers (Who) excessivelyreacted to Chinese provocation (Why).

The two delegations held a second meeting in March 2007. Both sides agreedto confront the discrepancies between their respective national narratives, whileavoiding a discussion of the more controversial issues (such as the “comfortwomen”) and allegations regarding the sources of the mutual animosity (Interna-tional Herald Tribune, 2007). The question of victim and victimizer has thus beenput aside, paving the way to an agreement about the When and Where componentsof the clashing narratives. These elements, still in dispute between the twosides, may be easier to deal with than the more sensitive issues of identity andvictimhood.

Having put forward a terminological framework for addressing the role ofmetanarratives and national narratives in the process of reconciliation and illus-trated the problems as well as the potential of national narratives as avenues forreconciliation in identity conflicts, let us now present the Reconciliation Pyramid,using illustrations drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Reconciliation Pyramid: Conceptualization

The Reconciliation Pyramid is a metaphor for presenting the progressivestages antagonists have to overcome on their way to reconciliation. It is built ofseven consecutive stages (see Figure 1). The starting point of the reconciliationprocess is becoming acquainted with the clashing narratives relating to the core

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issues of their conflict. Familiarity with the narratives paves the way to fullacknowledgement of them and may prepare the ground for a “warmer” move, likethe expressions of empathy toward the other. Empathizing with the enemy can leadto the assumption of at least partial responsibility for the plight of the “other.” Thisrelatively “cold” step may be followed by material restitution (a legally basedformal step) and requests for forgiveness. The process reaches its apex when thetwo sides seriously and honestly consider replacing their old, ethno-centric narra-tives with new, integrated narratives, based on the mutual acknowledgment of pastmiseries and a joint vision of a the future.

The pyramid is based on the following assumptions:

1. Reconciliation, meaning changing attitudes from denial and resentment toacceptance and trust, is essential, particularly in identity conflicts. (For thedifference between material conflicts needing conflict resolution and identityconflicts demanding reconciliation, see Auerbach, 2005a.)

2. The reconciliation process in identity conflicts is a strenuous, prolonged, andgradated one. It can start before peace negotiations or run parallel to them, butwill usually continue long after the two sides have agreed upon a formal peaceagreement.

3. The process will usually be initiated by a narrow social stratum (e.g., authors,academics, religious authorities). Its success, however, requires the support ofofficial decision makers as well as acceptance by wider layers of the respectivesocieties.

4. The process incorporates both warm (empathy, apology, forgiveness) and cold(narrative acquaintance and acknowledgement) steps. The clashing nationalnarratives in an identity conflict are the keys for understanding its tenacity aswell as its potential for change.

Figure 1. The Reconciliation Pyramid.


5. Reconciliation between two sides first demands the dismantling and ulti-mately the incorporation of their conflicting national narratives into the publicdiscourse of the two (previously) antagonistic societies.

The underlying idea of the Reconciliation Pyramid is that identity conflicts,centered on victimhood metanarratives that carry so much pain and humiliation,need reconciliation in order to heal the wounds of the injured peoples. Materialarrangements achieved by political representatives at the negotiation table arecrucial components of conflict resolution and may play an important role in easingthe path toward reconciliation, but they cannot provide the psychological environ-ment necessary for genuine reconciliation. In order for identity conflicts to trans-form into a lasting peace based on change of heart and mind, they require deeperand longer processes. Genuine reconciliation is a kind of an end-state which maybe unattainable in most cases of protracted identity conflicts. But together withmany scholars of reconciliation, I suggest that the vision of attaining it shouldguide peace seekers on both sides, and it is the duty of students of peace to exploreways through which this vision can be achieved. The Pyramid is an effort in thisdirection.

It is noteworthy that the Pyramid is an analytical framework which neitherdescribes nor prescribes actual developments in reconciliation processes. Rather, itshould be seen as a tool for studying the psycho-political processes involved inclimbing the rungs of an imaginary reconciliation ladder. The formulation of theprogressive movement along seven stages is based on insights drawn mainly fromtheoretical and empirical reconciliation literature. It is assumed that if one partydoes not have the slightest knowledge of the other’s narratives of sufferance andvictimhood, it cannot acknowledge or accept as legitimate these narratives,let alone feel empathy, assume responsibility, or offer restitution for it. Genuineapology towards the other, which is deemed a difficult but essential condition forreaching full reconciliation, will be easier if preceded by the above mentionedsteps. Only then, when the cognitive as well as the emotional moves have beentaken by both sides to the identity conflict, will they be prepared to jointly examinetheir convoluted history and integrate the contradictory national narratives intotheir public discourse.

However, the order and pace of the movement are not predestined. There maybe movements back and forth across stages. It is suggested that reconciliationstudents use this Pyramid for investigating actual reconciliation cases and redesignit accordingly.

The Seven Stages of the Reconciliation Pyramid

Stage 1: Acquaintance with Clashing NarrativesReconciliation literature typically highlights the importance of acknowledg-

ing the other’s narrative in ethno-political conflicts (e.g., Govier and Verwoerd,

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2002; Kriesberg, 1998b, 1998c, 2004; Lederach, 1997, 1998, 1999; Montville,1993; Ross, 2004). However, not enough attention has been given to the differencebetween acquaintance, that is, knowing the facts about the other, and acknowl-edgement, which incorporates the recognition that the other’s version has somevalidity.

One of the problems of an identity conflict is that long-standing mutual hatredand fear are so strong they cause each side to concentrate on their own plight. Thiseliminates any possibility of even becoming acquainted with the other’s narratives.Not only are the two sides ignorant of the national narratives of the “other,” butthey are incapable of candidly scrutinizing their own national narratives, particu-larly those concerning central issues in the conflict, and admitting to possibleinaccuracies in their version of the truth. Preliminary steps toward narrativeacquaintance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been made by two groups ofIsraeli and Palestinian teachers and academics—led by the late Professor DanBar-On, of the Behavioral Sciences Department of Ben-Gurion University of theNegev, and Professor Sami Adwan, a lecturer in education at Bethlehem Univer-sity. The two groups have agreed to cooperate in order to examine the contrastingPalestinian and Israeli narratives regarding core issues of the conflict, such as whatis Zionism and when it started, the events of 1929 and 1936–39, the 1948 and 1967wars, the causes of the First Intifada of 1987, etc.

The aim of this project was to introduce the conflicting national narratives intothe history books of the two societies in a more neutral, balanced way and to thusinitiate a chain of reactions which would eventually culminate in reconciliation.However, the Education Ministry during the Likud government of 1996–99banned the project. By doing so, they gave voice to the prevalent view in Israelisociety, that is, we should adhere to “our” version of history and not listen toappeaseniks (one of the pejorative terms used by Internet talkbackists to degradethe initiators of the project). Palestinian reactions were no warmer (Kashti, 2007).The respective objections notwithstanding, the project is continuing under theunderstanding that the seeds of mutual trust are weak and require persistentcultivation.

Stage 2: Acknowledging the Other’s Narratives, Without Necessarily AcceptingThem as True

Acknowledging the other’s national narratives implies understanding andrecognizing them as authentic and legitimate. The transition from Stage 1 to Stage2 is not easy. Becoming acquainted with the other’s version of central events in theconflict does not necessarily threaten one’s own identity. However, acknowledgingthe other’s core narratives constitutes a significant step toward lending legitimacyto national metanarratives. In a zero-sum identity conflict this may be tantamountto compromising one’s own legitimacy (Kelman, 2001).

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one can detect small but significant progresson the Israeli side towards acquaintance with the Palestinian narratives, most


particularly the al-Nakba (Catastrophe). However, although becoming familiarwith it, most Israelis will adamantly refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of theal-Nakba narrative, let alone participate in any Palestinian commemoration of it. Arare example of narrative acknowledgement on the Israeli part was a columnpublished in the Israeli right-wing newspaper Makor Rishon (“Primary Source”)by Eyal Megged. Megged is one of the few Israeli writers who aligned himselfwith the country’s political right wing. It was, therefore, surprising to read thefollowing: “The barrier to reconciliation is emotional. Granting legitimacy tothe authentic feelings of the Palestinians toward the whole country is the key forbreaking this barrier” (Megged, 2006, p. 66). This intriguing, though not repre-sentative, call to the Israeli public to acknowledge the authenticity of Palestinianfeelings has not yet attracted a counterpoint voice from the Palestinian side.Onecan also see signs of readiness amongst Palestinian Arabs in Israel (the term usedby the official representatives of Arab-Israeli citizens to define their identity; seeThe National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel,2006, p. 3) to move towards acknowledgment of the other’s foundational narra-tives, and particularly the place of the Holocaust in Israeli existential anxiety: forexample, organizing and participating in joint Arab-Israeli visits to the deathcamps in Poland (Bar-On & Sarsar, 2004; Lavy, 2003). However, many Israelistreat these visits with suspicion; they see it as part of a sophisticated Palestinianplot to counteract the use of the Holocaust to delegitimize Israeli national identity.Despite such isolated attempts at rapprochement, the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are still far away from the acknowledgement phase.

The importance of narrative acquaintance and acknowledgement as the start-ing initiative of a reconciliation process was poignantly illustrated in the long-lasting Turkish-Armenian conflict. On April 10, 2005, the Turkish prime ministeraddressed a public letter to the president of Armenia to mark “the 90th anniversaryof the 1915 events.” In his letter Prime-Minister Erdogan proposed “to establish ajoint group consisting of historians and other experts from our two countries tostudy the developments and events of 1915 . . . and to share their findings with theinternational public.” He further expressed his belief “that such an initiative wouldshed light on a disputed period of history and also constitute a step towardscontributing to the normalization of relations between our countries” (Erdogan,2005).

But was this a genuine step toward narrative acknowledgement? A meticulousstudy of the letter and the News Brief issued by the Turkish Embassy in Wash-ington will show that while demonstrating their awareness of the “disputed periodof history,” namely the fact that the Armenians adhere to a different version of “theevents of 1915,” nowhere do the Turks acknowledge the Armenian genocidenarrative. The answers to the three most important W questions, namely, Who,What, and Why, draw a grim picture of the “Cataclysmic events of 1915,” whenhundred of thousands of Turks and Armenians lost their lives (what). By empha-sizing that these tragic events happened “during the waning days of the Ottoman

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Empire,” the Turks actually say: we, namely the present regime, cannot be blamedfor whatever happened or was carried out by the previous regime (who). The whyquestion gets a straightforward answer: it all happened “as a result of the Armenianrevolt in the Ottoman Empire’s eastern provinces.” The allegation made in theTurkish Embassy’s Brief (though not in the letter to the Armenian president) that“Armenian terrorists” have “targeted Turkish compatriots . . . in the 1970’s and80’s,” underscores the inherent aggressiveness and cruelty which presumably areinnate Armenian characteristics, thus illustrating the aforementioned dual attribu-tion pattern: “They” are inherently bad. “We” are just reacting to their gruesomeacts (all quotes are from Turkey News Brief, 2005).

The reaction of the Armenian government to Erdogan’s proposal was unsur-prisingly negative: “. . . this kind of offer can be taken seriously only if there issome semblance of normalcy between our countries. Then, discussion on all otheraspects of our relations, including the border and genocide can and should becarried out . . . with recognition of the crimes of the past, we can move on to adialogue of reconciliation” (Oskanian, 2006, emphasis added).

The Turkish-Armenian example is indicative of the link between the realistic-material aspects of settling an identity conflict and its psycho-political features.Two parties to an identity-ethnic conflict may be pushed, by realistic calculations,to settle their dispute through diplomatic and other intergovernmental acts. Formalconflict settlement (“some semblance of normalcy”) should precede grassrootsacademic steps towards reconciliation. But without genuine efforts to tackle theissues of the past through narrative acquaintance and acknowledgement, there willbe no reconciliation between peoples.

Stage 3: Expressing Empathy for the Other’s PlightEmpathy, typically seen as the ability to identify with and understand another

person’s feelings, is a “warm” and very demanding move, hardly imaginable fortwo rivals in an identity conflict. Any empathetic exchange is much more likely ona personal level, for example, between parents on both sides who have lost theirchildren in the conflict. In some societies, identification with the enemy may beconsidered tantamount to treason. In view of these difficulties, scholars underlin-ing the political aspect of reconciliation (e.g., Amstutz, 2005; Digeser, 2001;Tavuchis, 1991) exclude empathy from their discussion. Eisikovits (2004) sug-gests replacing it with “sympathy.” However, if preceded by the acquaintance andacknowledgement of the other’s narratives, empathy towards the other’s sufferingmay become more feasible.

Stage 4: Assuming (at Least) Partial Responsibility for the Other’s Alleged PlightsAssuming responsibility—even partially—may be tantamount to pleading

guilty, which makes it very difficult for each side in an identity conflict. Israeliswould not accept responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, because itwould be interpreted as an admission that Israel was “born in sin” (Kelman, 2001).


Similarly, in the Ben-Gurion-Bethlehem universities acquaintance exercisementioned above, the Israelis waited in vain for their Palestinian colleagues toadmit responsibility for the killings of innocent Jews in Hebron and elsewhereduring the Arab riots of 1936–39.

From time to time, there are efforts—mostly on the Israeli side—towardsadmitting responsibility for the suffering of the other. A typical example was aseries of advertisements in the distinguished leftist daily newspaper, Ha’aretz, inwhich writers and artists called upon the leadership and peoples of the two nationsto resume peace talks based on a mutual acknowledgment of the other’s suffering,assuming partial responsibility and expressing empathy (Ha’aretz, 2005). Butagain, this initiative did not garner support from the wider Palestinian or Israelisocieties.

Stage 5: Expressing Readiness for Restitution or Reparation for Past WrongsThe four previous stages are typical “people-to-people” moves, usually initi-

ated by small, elite groups hoping to transmit the reconciliation message through-out society and eventually reaching the political leadership. The fifth stage,expressing readiness for restitution and actually granting reparation to “victims ofthe state,” is a political act within the sole jurisdiction of formal decision makers.It is, therefore, a cold, calculated move, rarely taken by wary leaders. If and whensuch a decision is made, it may be a useful vehicle for reconciliation betweenformer antagonists. Indeed, there is a school of thought that claims restitutions andreparations are crucial for restoring morality after evil and for bringing about asuccessful reconciliation process (Barkan, 2000, 2005).

However, if restitution is not accompanied by full acknowledgement of pastevils and sincere forgiveness, the chances for genuine reconciliation betweenvictim and perpetrator are scant. The reparations granted by West Germany toIsrael in 1953 in the wake of the Holocaust provide a telling example. AlthoughIsrael-Germany relations today can be characterized as normal, and maybe evenspecial (Gardner-Feldman, 1984), the relations between the two sides still bear thestamp of the past, and there is still no full reconciliation between the two countries.One possible reason for this is that neither Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who tookthe bold decision regarding reparations, nor any of his successors, has fully andgenuinely acknowledged Germany’s crimes towards the Jewish people, let alonemade a sincere request for forgiveness (Auerbach, 2004, 2005a; Lustick, 2005).

Stage 6: Publicly Apologizing and Asking for Forgiveness for Past WrongsForgiveness, which in terms of the suggested conceptualization is comparable

to apology, is a crucial phase on the way to reconciliation in identity conflicts(Auerbach, 2004, 2005a).

From a “warm-cold” perspective, forgiveness can be seen as a complexphenomenon incorporating both elements. On the one hand, since it involves apublic declaration resulting partly from practical considerations, it is a purely

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political and therefore a cold process. However, for the request of forgiveness toconvey the right message and consequently contribute to reconciliation, it must bea genuine, warm expression of remorse, stemming from deep regret and theassumption of full responsibility. It is obviously very difficult to distinguish candiddeclarations of mea culpa from insincere political acts (Amstutz, 2005; Gibney &Roxtrom, 2001; Govier and Verwoerd, 2002). For example, the apology publishedby the Irish Republican Army in the wake of the 20th anniversary of “BloodySunday” (1982) was seen as a cynical and manipulative act by many Protestants,especially the victims’ families (Ferguson et al., 2007; Hewstone et al., 2004).Similarly, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s June 1997 apology to the Irish for Britishbehavior during the great famine of 1850 could have been presented as a politicallymotivated shrewd act that was “too late and too little.” Nevertheless, NorthernIreland largely applauded it as a significant moral move and an important steptowards reconciliation (Henderson, 2002).

This blend of feelings, politics, and morality makes forgiveness so attractivefor scholars from diverse disciplines, particularly from psychology, theology,and philosophy (e.g., Appleby, 2000; Enright & North, 1998; Gopin, 2000, 2002;Haber, 1991; Montville, 1993, 2002; Murphy 2003; Murphy & Hampton, 1988;Petersen 2002; Schimmel, 2002; Shriver, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Tutu, 1999;Worthington, 2005, 2006). The issues most frequently discussed by these scholarsare: Should political forgiveness be considered as a genuinely moral expressionof remorse and repentance, or as a cynical act of public relations? Is it possibleto forgive and, at the same time, not forget? And if not, should a victim, be it anindividual or a national collective, forgive his perpetrators? Is forgiveness a real-istic and necessary condition for reconciliation between peoples? What is the besttiming for a useful bid of forgiveness, and how should it be made? Should it startthe reconciliation process or end it? (Auerbach, 2005b; Wiesenthal, 1998).

In the case of South Africa, it is noteworthy that the Truth and ReconciliationCommission, set up by Prime Minister Nelson Mandela and Archbishop DesmondTutu as the main mechanism for establishing peace and reconciliation betweenblacks and whites, did not make forgiveness a condition for amnesty. Whiteoffenders were invited to appear before the Commission, relate the story of theircrimes against the black population, and take full responsibility for their actions.Despite the importance attributed to forgiveness by Archbishop Tutu (as reflectedin the title of his book: No Future without Forgiveness, 1999), he did not insist onit. Why not? Apparently, both these visionary but nonetheless realist leadersrealized that South Africa could have immediately deteriorated into an even biggerbloodbath, possibly providing an excuse for the restoration of apartheid, had theyinsisted on starting with the crucial yet difficult step of forgiveness. Forgivenesshas been deferred to a later stage of reconciliation in South Africa.

With such cases in mind, the Reconciliation Pyramid framework positionsforgiveness as the sixth stage, following cold, cognitively based as well as warm,emotionally based steps. By this stage, hopefully having overcome the plethora


of realistic and psychological difficulties, there is a greater chance of forgivenessand consequently full reconciliation.

Stage 7: Striving to Incorporate Opposite Narratives into Accepted MutualAccounts of the Past

It has been suggested that the reconciliation process will only be completed“. . . if the two groups communicate their stories and form a public commonhistory. The public narrative needs to consider positive and negative behaviors ofboth sides of the conflict” (Worthington, 2006, p. 263) and incorporate them intothe common narrative of the conflict.

Indeed, if and when the two sides to an identity conflict have managed toclimb the aforementioned rungs, they should be ripe for a fully fledged narrativeincorporation, which will bring the reconciliation between them to its culmination.However, in view of the difficulties inherent in each of the stages of the Recon-ciliation Pyramid, the probability of reaching this last stage seems quite slim. Butif one adopts a less ambitious version of narrative incorporation, the seeminglyunattainable goal may become more realistic. Following other narrative research-ers, I believe that “it is not required that all parties settle on a single interpretation,only that they are mutually tolerant of a limited set of interpretations” regardingthe disruptive events which fuel the conflict (Dwyer, 1999, p. 89; see also Kelman,2004; Staub, 2006).

The Reconciliation Pyramid is an “ideal type model.” It does not claim toreplicate reality or be another technique for resolving intractable conflicts (such asvarious third party intervention methods described in Fisher, 2001b, 2005; Kelman& Fisher, 2003, the most notorious being the “problem-solving interactive work-shops” suggested by Kelman, 1979, 1997, 2001). The seven stages are arrangedin ascending difficulty, and it is assumed that the parties will not attain a higherlevel before going through the preceding one. But the order of the phases is notpreordained. In some cases restitutions will precede apology (e.g., Israel-WestGermany); in others the two phases will coincide (e.g., USA-Japanese Americans).In still others, asking for forgiveness will be detached from reparations (e.g.,Britain-Ireland). Moving along the rungs of the Pyramid is by no means automaticor easy. Crucially, the seven stages are not of equal importance. Arguably, the firsttwo are necessary to ignite the engine of reconciliation. Their significance derivesfrom the crucial role collective narratives play in transmitting a nation’s conscious-ness and memory and in sustaining the collective identity.

Reconciliation in ongoing identity conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian oneis an important enough goal to justify interdisciplinary academic efforts to studythe chances of and barriers to its achievement. The Reconciliation Pyramidrepresents such an effort. It is a tool for exploring reconciliation processes. Moreprecisely, it is a benchmark by which reconciliation researchers, using the ques-tionnaire presented in the appendix (see appendix), can measure how far the twosides are from the top of the pyramid or how close or symmetrical their positions

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along the pyramid’s rungs are. Such comparative examination can also reveal theextent of congruity between this ideal type model and real reconciliation pro-cesses, thus contributing to the improvement of the model and the enhancement ofempirical and theoretical reconciliation knowledge. It is my hope that the Pyramidwill inspire empirical research and thus contribute to the understanding andenhancement of reconciliation in still ongoing cases of identity conflicts.

Concluding Remarks

At the Camp David negotiations between the Israeli government and thePalestinian Authority in 2000, Dan Meridor, former Justice and Finance Ministerin the Likud government, suggested separating the question of territorial rightsfrom the actual fulfillment of these rights. Israel would acknowledge the Palestin-ian right to return to Haifa, Jaffa, and other places inhabited by an Arab populationbefore 1948, but demand the Palestinians renounce the realization of this right.

Similarly, Palestinians would acknowledge Israel’s historical links to Bethle-hem and Nablus, and in return, the Israelis would relinquish the idea of actuallyliving there, at least not as Israeli citizens. For Meridor, this constituted a radicalconcession, which could have brought about sharp condemnation within Israelipublic opinion, let alone Meridor’s own right-wing constituency. However, thePalestinians, who apparently perceived the acknowledgement of Israeli rights toeven one piece of territory in “Palestine” as an act of recognizing Israel’s nationalidentity—which would consequently mean the denial of their own—rejectedMeridor’s suggestion. In Meridor’s eyes, this episode attested to the completeintransigence of the Palestinians and deepened his own pessimism regarding theirreadiness to walk together along the reconciliation path (Meridor, 2006).

Is this pessimism justified? It depends. In contrast to other conflicts citedin this article such as Northern Ireland, South Africa, or China-Japan, where wehave seen significant advancement towards peace and reconciliation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to be akin to treading through quicksand. Serious effortshave been made to bridge the gaps both at the highest levels and through nonof-ficial, track-two diplomacy, but to no avail.

Arguably, one of the most important reasons for this is the huge contradictionbetween the metanarratives of the two sides, where issues of identity, territory, andvictimhood are inextricably intertwined. The Camp David episode, as reported byMeridor, apparently lends veracity to the claim that while the Israelis may haveovercome some psychological barriers (hitherto preventing critical narrative scru-tiny), the Palestinians are still buried in their identity-territory nexus dominatedby the victimhood theme. For them, “giving up the victimhood narrative seemsincompatible with survival itself” (Govier, 2002, p. 148).

On the basis of the framework proposed here, let us suggest a somewhat morenuanced conclusion. Meridor is essentially telling us one cannot and should not tryand resolve identity conflicts without proper understanding of their inherent psy-


chological dynamics. Meridor’s proposal, originating from very good intentions,was the wrong act, committed by the wrong man, at the wrong time. For thePalestinians as well as for many Israelis, the deeper implication of Meridor’ssuggestion was to shatter the very foundations of their most cherished metanarra-tives of identity, territory, and victimhood. As we have illustrated, metanarrativedissolution is a very advanced stage in the reconciliation process. It cannot beexecuted by a formal representative of one side, and surely not at such an earlystage of the peace process, when each side is still mistrustful of the other. Instead,it is a prolonged process to be undertaken by representatives of two respectivecivilian societies, parallel to the formal peace process (Klein, 2006). As we havesuggested, this process should follow the seven stages of the ReconciliationPyramid, beginning with the cold move of becoming acquainted with the other’snational narratives, breaking them down into their component parts, identifyingthe parts that are less controversial and/or essential, and eventually crafting full,mutual acknowledgement of the contrasting national narratives. Only then will thesides be ready to express empathy, assume responsibility, and suggest restitutionfor at least part of the other’s suffering. By this stage, the door will hopefully haveopened to a meaningful and mutual bid of forgiveness.

The opposite metanarrative will not appear as threatening as it was at the footof the pyramid, and the two sides will be ready to consider suggestions such as thatof Meridor. They may display readiness to introduce different versions of theirnational narratives into the public discourse, particularly—but not exclusively—through the school curriculum (as recommended by Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005;Naveh and Yogev, 2002), and finally integrate them into a shared common narra-tive of the conflict. When international relations reach this Everest—the pinnacleof the Reconciliation Pyramid—the world will be a much better place in whichto live.

Appendix

The Reconciliation Pyramid is posited in this article as a heuristic tool forexploring reconciliation processes. This can be done through interpersonal inter-views, focus groups, or surveys. Initial steps have already been made to test thevalidity of the assumptions and the reliability of the questionnaire built upon theReconciliation Pyramid in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This writer and one of her colleagues have held several half-structured inter-views with influential personalities among Jewish and Palestinian communitiesin the State of Israel. The core questions as derived from the Pyramid model werethe following:

1) To what extent are you familiar with the other’s versions (national metanarratives) of the conflict regarding his and your mutual:a) Collective identity: As a nation, religion, ethnic group.

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b) Right to and sovereignty over the disputed territory.c) Identity of the main victim in the conflict.

2) To what extent are you familiar with the other’s versions (national narratives)regarding core issues of the conflict such as the 1948, 1967, 1973 wars; therefugee problem; the Intifada, etc.

3) To what extent do you accept as true/authentic the other’s versions of theconflict?

4) To what extent are you ready to take full or partial responsibility for theother’s suffering?

5) To what extent does the other deserve reparations or restitution of some sort?6) To what extent are you ready to feel empathy with the other’s suffering and

apologize for your wrongdoing in the conflict?7) To what extent are you ready that your leadership issues a public declaration

whereby it apologizes to the other?8) Do you believe that it is worthwhile and/or possible to integrate the conflicting

narratives into one shared account of the conflict?9) Do you believe that the above mentioned steps (1–9) will promote genuine

reconciliation?10) How should the process of reconciliation be carried out? What is the best

timing for it: before, parallel to, or after the formal peace process? Who shouldinitiate and undertake this process? Government? NGOs? Civil society,meaning intellectual elites and media?

The answers were, one may say, unsurprising, and quite disenchanting interms of prospects for reconciliation between the two quarrelling sides. On themethodological level, the interviews proved the utility and validity of the mainresearch tool, namely the questionnaire built on the Reconciliation Pyramid, as abenchmark for assessing the perceptions and attitudes of our interlocutors regard-ing the process of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. It enabled us todiscern subtle differences among the interviewees on each side and between thetwo sides regarding their readiness to climb the Reconciliation Pyramid. Thequestionnaire will have to be revised in further empirical study according to themode (focus groups, surveys) of inquiry.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article was written while a Sabbatical Fellow at “The Desmond TutuCentre for War & Peace Studies,” Hope University, Liverpool. An earlier versionof this article was presented at the thirty first annual meeting of the InternationalSociety of Political Psychology, July 9–12, Paris. The author wishes to thankHerbert Kelman and Nehemia Geva, as well as the anonymous referees of themanuscript, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Correspondence


concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Yehudith Auerbach, Division ofCommunication and Journalism Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900,Israel. E-mail: [email protected]

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The Reconciliation Pyramid—A Narrative-Based Framework for Analyzing Identity Conflicts

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