The Question Concerning Renewable Technology

Bangor Social Sciences Seminar1st June 2011

Working Paper - Please do not cite without permission

The Question Concerning Renewable Technology:

Windfarms, Marx, Heidegger and the New Romantics

Abstract

The image and symbolism of the windmill has appeared in classical andpopular literature, art and philosophy for hundreds of years.

Perhaps the most well known literary reference is that in Cervantes DonQuixote where the gallant man of La Mancha mistakes windmills for lawlessgiants. More recently George Orwell used the construction of the windmillin Animal Farm as a critique of state initiated infrastructure projects inpost revolutionary Soviet Russia.

Windmills have also been commonly depicted in artistic work and featurestrongly in the Romantic period through works such as Constable’s ‘Windmillon a Hill with Cattle Drovers’ and Ladbrooke’s ‘Landscape with a Windmill’.

The image of the windmill has also been used in philosophical discourse. Inthe Poverty of Philosophy, for example, Marx uses it as a means of exploring thetechnological basis of pre and post industrial society and in The QuestionConcerning Technology Heidegger uses the windmill as an example of the ‘premodern’.

Today, windfarms provide equally strong images and their symbolism has beenannexed by supporters and objectors alike. Windfarms are increasinglycommon but their appearance in the landscape has tended to evoke strongemotions. Negative opinions continue to be dismissed as ‘NIMBY’ behaviouryet it is clear that opponents see themselves as sincere, not motivated byself interest and many also profess a passion to protect the environment

This paper explores a theoretical framework for analysing anti windfarmactivity based on the ideas of Bert Klandermans. Specifically, onecomponent of Klandermans model is developed - the idea that oppositionbehaviour can be ideologically motivated and it is suggested that the basisfor opposition based on ideology could lie in the relationship betweenhumans, technology and Nature.

The paper begins by outlining some of the philosophical foundations uponwhich the above idea is built. Beginning with Romanticism, the paperexplores the ideas of Marx, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse and

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seeks to identify common themes which can possibly be used to understandideologically based anti windfarm activity.

Finally, the early results of ongoing qualitative PhD fieldwork arediscussed in the context of Nature Protection and some tentativeconclusions are drawn.

Ian GardnerPhD Sociology & Social PolicyUniversity of BangorTel: 01745 550255E-Mail:[email protected]

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Introduction

This paper aims to take forward a line of thought first advanced bythe author in 2009. Specifically, that opposition to windfarms canbe more completely theorised using Bert Klandermans (2004)tripartite model of social movement participation. This modelsuggests that social movement activism can have instrumental,identity and ideological motivations and that the probability ofparticipation increases when each aspect is present. (Kandermans2004; 362)

Across the UK and in many other industrialised countries numerousopposition campaigns have emerged where on shore wind farms inparticular are proposed. Gardner (2010) has mapped the extent ofthese campaigns using Hyperlink Network Analysis (HNA) and thisresearch has been able to identify well over six hundred specificgroups and individuals worldwide, on the basis of internet websitesalone.

In parallel with the growth of opposition campaigns, a considerableliterature on windfarms as a form of renewable energy has also beendeveloping. This literature has been characterised as falling withinthree main discourses – a technical discourse, a protest discourseand a public opinion /attitudinal discourse (see Gardner 2009).

Within the protest discourse, thus far, objectors have tended togive voice to instrumental motives for opposition – largely becausethe statutory land use planning process has the effect of focussingdiscourses to those which the planning system itself can recognise.Within the same framework, windfarm developers and supporters havesought to respond to these concerns.

Academics on the other hand are somewhat less constrained and haveexplored both instrumental together with attitudinal (includingidentity based) motives underlying both support and opposition. SeeTable 1 below:

Table 1 - Selected Literature Review Instrumental and Identity Motives for Windfarm Opposition

Motive LiteratureInstrumental - House Prices

RICS (2004); RICS (2007); Sims, Dent &Oskrochi (2008); Williams et al (2008);

Instrumental – Noise

Van den Berg (2004); Bolin (2006); Alves-Pereira & Castelo Branco (2007a); Alves-

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Pereira & Castelo Branco (2007b) BERR (2007))

Attitude – including Identity basedconsiderations

Szarka (2004); Devine – Wright (2005); Bell,Gray & Haggett (2005); Warren et al (2005);Hubbard (2006); Barry, Ellis & Robinson (2006a); Barry, Ellis & Robinson (2006 b);Burningham, Barnett & Thrush (2006); Haggett& Toke (2006); Pederson et al (2007); Van derHorst (2007); Johansson & Laike (2007);Wustenhagen, Wolsink & Burer (2007); Devine-Wright (2007); Haggett (2008) Ladenburg(2009); Firestone et al (2009) Devine-Wright(2009)

More recently, as part of the academic study of attitudes towindfarmsi Devine–Wright (2009) and Devine-Wright and Howes (2010)have started to theorise Place Attachment as a feature of theidentity motive underpinning windfarm opposition. The most recentarticle, Devine-Wright and Howes (2010), explores the idea ofdisruption to place in the context of the offshore windfarm at Gwynty Mor - a 750 MW development which will be visible from the NorthWales coastal towns of Llandudno, Colwyn Bay and Rhyl.

In the context of this attitudinal dimension, in 2009 I suggestedthat in addition to identity based opposition, largely linked toPlace Attachment, ideology could be viewed as a limiting factor whenconsidering opposition to windfarms. Essentially I was proposingthat, adapting Kandermans’ model:

Movement Participation = ∑ Instrumental + Identity – Ideological motives

The thinking behind the negative sign for ideological reasoningstems from a definition of ideology which as Karl Lowenstein (1953)put it is:

“ A consistent integrated pattern of thoughts and beliefs explaining man’s attitudetowards life and his existence in society, and advocating a conduct and action patternresponsive to and commensurate with such thoughts and beliefs” (1953;52)

Working from such an ‘all embracing’ definition of ideology, it wasinitially difficult to conceive how opposition to windfarms had asignificant place within such a framework of values and beliefs. Itwas suggested however that other more significant life guidingvalues and beliefs, such as religious faith, Climate ChangeEnvironmentalismii, commitments to world peace, opposition to nucleararms, and the like might interact with identity to subordinate

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instrumental reasons for opposition. i.e. the ideology motive wasnegatively signed.

Comments made by participants in the pilot stage of ongoing PhDfieldwork, further reflection on the hyperlinks of anti windfarmgroup websites together with a re-reading of the literature onattitudinal discourse have, however, started to call this approachinto question and this paper proposes an alternativeconceptualisation of such opposition.

The aim of this paper is to explore what appears to be a commonthread within a section of the philosophical literature - a threadwhich has the potential to underpin a positively signed ideologicalmotive for windfarm opposition. Put simply, there appears to be abroadly similar critique of modernity based around the relationshipbetween humankind and technology, the idea of ‘alienation’ and aparticular conceptualisation of ‘Nature’ as something to beprotected.

The first part of the paper begins with a short review ofRomanticism, progresses through Marx and Heidegger and culminates inthe critiques of the ‘Frankfurt School’. The second part of thepaper discusses windfarm opposition in the context of NatureProtection and ends with some suggestions why anti windfarmcampaigns do not appear to have been encompassed within a widerrejection of modernity.

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The Search for Truth in Nature - Romanticism

To begin to understand Romanticism we first have to understandmodernity.

Modernity – or the modern age, is the product of two revolutions.The first – an intellectual one; the second - industrial. This isprobably a gross simplification, but we have to begin somewhere.

Firstly, consider the intellectual revolution which has come to beknown as the Enlightenment. Isaiah Berlin identified this as aparticular form of the Western philosophical tradition, a traditionwhich he suggests is based on three propositions – that all genuinequestions can be answered; that all answers are knowable and lastlythat all answers are compatible with one another. (Berlin 1999; 21)

For well over two millennia, this tradition embraced myth orreligion as the principal means of providing the answers toquestions asked by the curious. If someone wanted to know the answerto a question about the future in Ancient Greece, they consulted theOracle. If a rural labourer in the Middle Ages became ill, theycould seek the advice of a wise woman or if a pious Christian wantedto know what to do in difficult circumstances, they could pray toGod. If the King spoke and ordered the execution of a subject, itwas with the Divine authority vested in him as King. If peoplewanted to understand their history they would tell stories or singsongs. A picture of traditional ‘knowledge’ should be emerging fromthese examples.

The philosophers of the Enlightenment however, offered a differentway of knowing and understanding the world. Their view was that theonly correct way to know and understand was through the applicationof reason and logic – a process akin to seeing a mathematicalproblem as something which could be solved given enough time and thecorrect analytical technique. Followers of this new perspective heldthat by rigorously applying rational thought, previously hiddentruths would be discovered and this ‘progressive’ approach would, asBerlin (1999; 3) puts it, ‘liberate’ people from the ‘error’ and ‘confusion’of their old ways.

The second dimension to modernity came in the form of the IndustrialRevolution – the component parts of which are well known and includepopulation growth, urbanisation, free market competition,mechanisation, factories, mines, canals, railways, the decline ofhandcraft industry and the like.

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This revolution generated many tangible social and economic benefitsfor the growing population. Real wages rose, mortality ratesdeclined, per capita consumption of hitherto luxury goods (such ascoffee, sugar and tobacco) increased and improvements in transportfacilitated the development of mass travel. For some, therefore,industrialisation represented social progress. For others however,the impact of industrialisation had a downside. As EP Thompsonsuggested in The Making of the English Working Class (Thompson 1963) -although workers were “better off than their 1790s forerunners”, the smallimprovement in their condition was suffered as “a catastrophicexperience” (1963; 212).

Alain Touraine (Touraine 1995) combines both intellectual andindustrial revolutionary strands, and reports that modernityreplaced God with Science, religion with reason, freed individualsfrom the influence of patronage and nepotism and at the same timeprovided a moral and ethical framework based on the idea of socialutility. This image of modernity, he suggests, was seen asrevolutionary and liberating (1995; 12) since it claimed to set peoplefree from the domination of ‘traditional social bonds, feelings, customs andbeliefs’ (1995; 10).

The difficulty with this ‘progressive’, ‘revolutionary’ and ‘liberating’conception of modernity is that for some, as with industrialisation,the experience of revolution was less than positive. For some,instead of liberation, the ‘Light of Reason’ coupled withindustrialisation was a harbinger of oppression; instead of freedom,modernity generated exploitation; and the destruction of ‘traditionalsocial bonds, feelings, customs and beliefs’ far from being a release fromdomination simply created personal, social and cultural estrangementand alienation.

Romanticism was a reaction to this.

It was, as Gouldner (1973; 330) put it, a ‘many faceted social movement’,bringing together a broad alliance of anti Enlightenment thoughtcoalescing into what Lowy (1987) describes as ‘an all embracing worldview’(1987; 894).

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Perhaps the most visible expression of this Romantic worldview wasthe artistic depiction of Nature. Romanticism did not simply portrayNature in a sterile, technical way, but rather it expressed itsbeauty through the idealism and emotion of the Romantic mindset.Take for example the image of the windmill which is frequentlyillustrated as part of a pastoral landscape - a picture which canevoke strong feelings of rustic simplicity, harmony and tradition.Some examples are shown below:

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Figure 1Landscape with a Windmill J.B Ladbrooke

Figure 2Windmill on a Hill with Cattle DroversJohn Constable

Figure 3Dutch Winter Garden Scene of Windmill and SkatersW.F Christ

Notwithstanding its artistic element, the Romantic worldview hadmultiple dimensions and it would be inappropriate to considerRomanticism as purely an aesthetic movement. Berlin (1999; 14-16)for example describes the wide variety of perspectives withinRomanticism and consciously avoids trying to define it too closely.Instead he offers a sense, or feeling for what it was:

“Romanticism is the primitive, the untutored, it is youth, the exuberant sense of life ofthe natural man…It is the confused teeming fullness and richness of life...harmony withthe natural order, the music of the spheres, dissolution in the all-containing spirit. It isthe strange, the exotic, the grotesque, the mysterious, the supernatural, ruins,moonlight, enchanted castles, hunting horns, elves, giants, griffins, … the familiar, thesense of one’s unique tradition, joy in the smiling aspect of everyday nature and theaccustomed sights and sounds of contented, simple rural folk..” (1999; 17)

This Romantic mindset, as Hay (2002; 5) suggests,

“..reached back to an earlier, pre-industrial time that was not beset with the social andphysical disruptions the romantics found so disturbing …, and which allowed for humansensitivity and individual spiritual fulfilment in a way in which the new hurly-burly worldof industrial ferment did not”

While it may be true to say that Romanticism reached back to thepast, it is however possible to identify both ‘traditional’ and‘progressive’ orientations. (Lowy 1987; 891). The ‘traditional’orientation tends to be associated with German idealism and itspreference for nationalism and cultural revitalisation and the ‘truelife’ of the past is often based on life in ancient Greece. There isalso a strong link to Christian theology in the traditionalorientation, wherein ‘communing with Nature’ is synonymous withexperiencing the glory of God. This latter perspective is perhapsbest understood through the words of Goethe (1774) in his Sorrows ofYoung Werther

“When in bygone days I gazed from these rocks upon yonder mountains across the river,and upon the green, flowery valley before me, and saw all nature budding and bursting

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Figure 4Summer Landscape with Harvesting Farmers Frederick Marianus Kruseman (1850)

around; the hills clothed from foot to peak with tall, thick forest trees; the valleys in alltheir varied windings, shaded with the loveliest woods; and the soft river gliding alongamongst the lisping reeds, mirroring the beautiful clouds which the soft evening breezewafted across the sky,- when I heard the groves about me melodious with the music ofbirds, and saw the million swarms of insects dancing in the last golden beams of the sun,whose setting rays awoke the humming beetles from their grassy beds, whilst thesubdued tumult around directed my attention to the ground, and I there observed thearid rock compelled to yield nutriment to the dry moss, whilst the heath flourished uponthe barren sands below me, all this displayed to me the inner warmth which animates allnature, and filled and glowed within my heart. I felt myself exalted by this overflowingfullness to the perception of the Godhead, and the glorious forms of an infinite universebecame visible to my soul! iii

For Goethe – and for other Romantics, Nature offered a connection tothe Divine, - a connection which as Harvey (1996; 157) argues, gavea sense of security and permanence and provided meaning in an‘otherwise fragmented world’. In times of rapid change, the Romanticscould hold on to the perceived ‘constancy’ of Nature and the worldcould be understood not by reference to reason but through naturalwisdom.

The ‘progressive’ strand of Romanticism also valued Nature but itdiffered from the ‘traditional’ strand in one key sense. Instead oflooking to the past for an image of the ‘hale life’, the progressivestrand saw liberation from modernity coming as a result of socialrevolution. Examples of supporters of this strand of Romanticismincluded John Ruskin and William Morris whose’ News from Nowhere(1890) painted a vivid picture of post revolutionary London.

Although both traditional and progressive strands of Romanticismvenerated Nature, it is important to realise that this was part of awider philosophical critique as summarised by Lowy (1987; 892):

“The central feature of industrial (bourgeois) civilisation that Romanticism criticises isnot the exploitation of the workers or social inequality – although these may also bedenounced… it is the quantification of life…i.e. the total domination of (quantitativeexchange value), of the cold calculation of price and profit, and of the laws of themarket, over the whole social fabric”

Expressed in these terms, Romanticism represented a rejection ofboth the utilitarian and analytical understanding characteristic ofEnlightenment thought together with the dehumanising effects ofindustrialisation in favour of a deeper, qualitative, emotional andspiritual understanding of “being” grounded in a particularrelationship with Nature. It offered a broadly based ideologicalresponse to change offering a sense of stability and certainty in arapidly changing and uncertain world.

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However Romanticism was not the only ideological response tomodernity as the rest of this paper will seek to outline.

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‘Alienated’ Nature, Marx and Technology

For Marx, the image of the windmill pointed to a bye-gone age. Inthe Poverty of Philosophy (1847), he wrote

'The windmill gives you society with the feudal lord: the steam-mill, society with theindustrial capitalist'iv

Marx saw the windmill as both a technical means by which Feudalismcreated and reproduced social relations, but also and perhaps moresignificantly, as a form of technology, that revealed the relationshipbetween humans and Nature. The windmill that existed in Feudalsociety is set against the modern technology of industrialcapitalism – the essence of which is described in Capital Vol 1:

“The machine, which is the starting-point of the industrial revolution, supersedes theworkman, who handles a single tool, by a mechanism operating with a number of similartools, and set in motion by a single motive power, whatever the form of that power maybe..”v

Marx’s argument was that whereas the pre-industrial productiverelationship between ‘the worker handling a single tool’ was emotionally,spiritually and socially fulfilling; the use of modern technologycreated distance between worker, product and fellow workers. Marxreferred to this as estrangement or alienation and he said of the workerunder such arrangements:

“[H]e does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery ratherthan well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but isphysically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself athome only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless.” (Marx 1844 p.15)

He continued

“A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labour, from hislife activity and from his species-life, is that man is alienated from other men. ... man isalienated from his species-life means that each man is alienated from others, and thateach of the others is likewise alienated from human life”. (Marx 1844 p.17)

For Marx therefore, the first level of estrangement under Capitalismwas between labour and the product of labour, and the consequencewas estrangement between workers. However there is another dimensionto such alienation and it comes in the form of the relationship withNature. In Capital Vol 1, Marx asserts that:

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“Technology reveals man’s dealings with Nature, discloses the direct productive activitiesof his life, thus throwing light upon social relations and the resultant mentalconceptions..” vi

Marx suggested that human beings have both a ‘physical’ or ‘organic’nature as well as a spiritual or ‘inorganic’ nature which combine toform the elements of their universal ‘species-being’. He writes:

“The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact thatman (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal man (or theanimal) is, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives……..

……Nature is man’s inorganic body.. man’s physical and spiritual life is linked tonature..”vii (Marx 1844)

For Marx, Nature both supplied the means by which human physicalexistence could be sustained and also the means by which thespiritual needs of universal beings could be met. Consequently, theuse of modern industrial technology by human beings and on Naturegenerated challenges at both the physical and spiritual level.

“In estranging from man (1) Nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his lifeactivity, estranged labour estranges the species from man. It changes for him the lifeof the species into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the speciesand individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purposeof the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form.”viii

Marx saw Communism as ‘the genuine resolution of the conflict between man andNature’ and ‘the positive transcendence of human self-estrangement’ix, howeverGouldner (1973) suggested that this aim to transcend estrangement oralienation was a ‘characteristically Romantic effort to mend the split between andwithin men and to reunite sensuous man with rational man’. (1973; 337)

Gouldner was careful not to suggest that Marx was a Romantic afterall, Marx disliked Romanticism – the traditional strand at least –dismissing it as a reactionary bourgeois delusion. In the Grundrisse(1857) for example Marx wrote:

“In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully,because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them asindependent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn fora return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptinesshistory has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyondthis antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint and therefore the latter willaccompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end”.(1857;162)

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And more succinctly, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) heasserts

“The social revolution of the nineteenth century can only create its poetry from thefuture, not from the past” (2004; 89)

It would be easy to conclude from these two passages that “..Marx hasnothing to do with Romanticism” (Lowy 1987; 895) however it seems to methat the Romantic and Marxist perspectives are not so far apart.Lowy refers to a “warm stream” of Marxist thought which hadresonances with the “progressive” Romanticism referred to earlier(1987; 900) and within both perspectives Nature provides animportant link between ‘man’s physical and spiritual life’.

Although it is possible to reconcile ‘progressive’ Romanticism withMarx’s ideas on alienation and the revolutionary prescription whichfollows, it is not a straightforward matter. While there appear tobe what Gouldner calls ‘Romantic components’ (1973; 339) in Marxistthought, these appear to have been somewhat obscured over time.

Perhaps these similarities have been overlooked as critics focus onparticular inadequacies or inconsistencies in Marx’s description ofthe relationship with Nature. For example, notwithstanding the clearreferences to the spiritual dimension as outlined previously, someauthors have highlighted the economic reductionism of Marx’s writingand have emphasised his ‘objectification’ of Nature. (e.g. Bookchin1980, 1990; Eckersley 1988).

Equally while Marx sees Nature as something to which spiritual lifeis clearly linked, and has a value in itself, Harvey (1996) pointsto a passage in Volume 3 of Capital in which Marx actually suggeststhat the domination of nature is to some extent necessary for humanemancipation. Marx suggests that in the realm of freedom

“..the associate producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringingit under their common control, instead of being ruled by its blind power” (1996; 126)

This point is also made by Smith (1996; 48) who suggests that evenunder Marxist Utopia the position regarding domination or mastery ofnature is ‘not particularly clear’.

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Nature and Authenticity

Martin Heidegger does not make extensive references to Marx in hiswork; however there are apparent similarities in the way in whichboth Marx and Heidegger use the concept of estrangement / alienation;treat Nature as possessing both practical and spiritual qualitiesand adopt the idea that technology reveals a relationship betweenhumans and Nature.

In common with others, (e.g. Dutton 1988; Thiele 1994) I wouldcontend, that Heidegger drew on the ‘traditionalist’ strand ofRomanticism and its views of pre modernity and of Nature - viewswhich can be traced to the Sturm und Drang Enlightenmentcountermovement which exercised significant influence on Germanphilosophy, art, music and literature from the 1760’s to the 1780’s.The evidence for this genesis can be seen in his extensivereferences to and lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry accompanied by hisreferences to the philosophy of Hamann and Herder (Landes 2009) -both of which focus on what critics refer to as a form of “bucolicromanticism” (Thiele 1994; 286)

Heidegger’s work is both complex and controversial; attractingcriticism on both counts from authors such as Adorno (1964) andBourdieu (1988) and it is only possible in this paper to offer a fewthoughts on some core ideas.

Alienation and Inauthenticity

In Being & Time (Heidegger 1927), Heidegger explores the meaning ofbeing, and specifically human being. In his seminal work, he developshis own terminology for alienation and adopts the contrast between‘Inauthenticity’ and ‘Authenticity’ as a means of describing states of humanbeing. Unlike Marx, these states are initially defined withoutexplicit reference modern technology and its potentiallydehumanising nature – however this line of thinking emerges inHeidegger’s later works such as his Letter on Humanism and in his essayon The Question Concerning Technology.

For Heidegger, ‘Inauthenticity’ is essentially ‘not being one’s ownmaster’, ‘following’ or ‘being lost in the crowd’, ‘doing as othersdo’ and the opposite of ‘having a mind of one’s own’. Heideggercalls this “Being of the ‘They’’ and suggests that for the majority oftime, we experience this kind of being. He writes:

“.. there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness.. this has thecharacter of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’…Dasein has, in the first instance,

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fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality… and has fallen into the world..”(1927; 219-20)

This sense of fallen-ness is an important component ofInauthenticity and Heidegger describes the state as both ‘tranquilising’and ‘alienating’ (1927; 222). It is arguable that this terminology isderived from its scriptural use in the context of the ‘fall of man’as it has a similar sense.

The concept of inauthentic being used by Heidegger has a clearresonance with the idea of alienation as outlined in the Economic andPhilosophical Manuscripts. Despite this, Heidegger makes very few directreferences to Marx in his works. One notable exception can be foundin his Letter on Humanism (Heidegger 1947) in which he writes that

“Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to thinkthat destiny in terms of the history of being. What Marx recognized in an essential andsignificant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of the human beinghas in roots in the homelessness of modem human beings” (1947; 258)

So, if this is Inauthenticity, what does authentic ‘being’ or lifelook like?

Heidegger does not provide a concrete definition of authenticity inBeing & Time nor does he describe what life is or would be like, iflived authentically. Rather he suggests that to live authenticallyone has to live in a way that has the potential to reveal truth andin a way that recognises the possibility of death.

Authentic life is however indirectly referenced by Heidegger – it isthe life of Ancient Greece wherein poetry, art, handcrafts arerevered. It is the simplicity of rural life in a Bavarian village –it is, in short, Romantic life at its best.

Nature – Ready to Hand?

In addition to the idea of Inauthenticity and authenticity, Heideggerdevelops some further terminology to elaborate his thoughts in Beingand Time.

The terms ’ready to hand’ and ‘present at hand’ are used to describedifferent forms of regarding something. If something is ‘ready to hand’it factually exists but its existence is defined by its expecteduse. A hammer being used is ready to hand when it is correctly used bya skilled worker. The observer does not focus on the hammer as anentity with its particular characteristics and qualities but rather

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its essence is given by its use.. the hammer is a tool which enablesthe craftsperson to hit things.

If, however the hammer breaks or if it is used inappropriately itcould become visible in itself and is ‘present at hand’. If the hammer isbroken the characteristics it holds become visible.. i.e. It is anold hammer, the handle is made of wood, the head of steel etc. Itbecomes an object of study in itself and is defined in terms of thestudy. These terms are used in reference to Nature.

Heidegger suggests that in the first instance – or primordially, Naturecan be considered as ‘ready to hand’ because

“The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water power,the wind is wind ‘in the sails’ (1927; 100)

However, Nature can also be an object of study, in the sense that aBotanist might regard plant species (1927; 100) and can therefore be‘present at hand’.

Initially, Heidegger does not apply a normative judgement regardingthe relative merits of these two states rather he simply assertsthat Nature is primordially experienced as ‘ready to hand’. BeforeNature can be analysed, it must be experienced in its initial stateand this initial state is in the state of its being as a supplier offood, rock or timber etc

However, Heidegger suggests that neither of these two ways ofregarding Nature are adequate as they fail to reveal an importantaspect of its essence. He writes

“ The Nature by which we are ‘surrounded’ is, of course, an entity within-the-world; butthe kind of Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready to hand nor to what ispresent at hand as ‘Things of Nature’” (1927; 254).

This is because

“..the Nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails us and enthrals us as landscape,remains hidden” (1927;100)

This third (and normative) conception grants a spiritual value toNature over and above its physical value as a resource and goesbeyond a conception of nature as something to be studied. It is fromthis perspective that Heidegger proceeds when he explores therelationship with modern technology.

Nature and Technology

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In The Question Concerning Technology (1954), Heidegger explores theessence of technology. He writes:

“Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionatelyaffirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when weregard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we areparticularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology”(1977;4)

Heidegger argues that there is an instrumental definition oftechnology, a description of it as a means to an end. Under thisdefinition, technology can be “mastered” and “used” to achieve humanends. Such a definition is however, incomplete, and there is afurther definition which he suggests has a greater complexity andimportance.

Technology has an essence which needs to be uncovered to enable ourrelationship with it to be free and unhidden. This is what Heideggerattempts to do in The Question and over the course of the essay hedevelops a line of thinking which asserts that

1 “Technology is… no mere means. It is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this,then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. Itis the realm of revealing, i.e. of truth” (1977; 12)

2 “The word [technology] stems from the Greek Technikon whichbelongs to techne…..the name not only for the activities and skills of thecraftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts…” (1977; 13)

3 The word techne has an association with the concept of “bringingforth”, a way producing things which is characterised by“.the growing things of Nature as well as whatever is completed through the craftsand the arts come at any given time to their appearance” (1977; 11)

4 However,“In opposition to this definition of the essential domain of technology, one canobject that it indeed holds for Greek thought and that at best it might apply to thetechniques of the handcraftsman, but it simply does not fit modern machinepowered technology…” (1977; 13)

5 Modern Technology does not associate well with “bringingforth” as a way of producing things, but instead it is a “challenging which puts to Nature the unreasonable demand that it supply theenergy that can be extracted and stored as such” (1977;14)

It is at this point that Heidegger uses the analogy of the windmillto explain the difference between older technology and pre modernproductive practice and modern technology and productive practicewhich “sets upon Nature” (1977; 15). He writes:

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“But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turnin the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does notunlock energy from the air currents to store it” (1977; 14)

Modern technology creates a different relationship between humansand nature. Older technology ‘works with’ Nature but moderntechnology ‘takes from it’ diminishing it in the process and turningit into mere “standing reserve” (1977; 17) – “a gigantic gasoline station, anenergy source for modern technology and industry” (1966; 50)

It is from this standpoint that Heidegger develops a differentprescription for the ills of modernity. He argues:

“The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethalmachines and apparatuses of technology. The actual threat has already affected man inhis essence …. the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more originalrevealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth..” (1977; 28)

Heidegger suggests that the path to a more original and primal truthlies in the experience of the “saving power” of poiesis , a way ofcreating or ‘bringing forth’ which is found in art, poetry and handcraftmanufacture (1977;10). We are not all invited to become poets orartists or craftspersons, but rather, he suggests that theseactivities can be used to highlight the challenging which ischaracteristic of modern technology.

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Nature Dominated - Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse

Critical Theorists - Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse also share abroadly common appreciation of the idea of alienation / estrangement- initially articulated in Romanticism and subsequently developed byMarx. They also possess a similar understanding of the relationshipbetween humans and Nature and in particular the position of humanbeings in technological society. However, the horror of Nazi Germanycoupled with the disappointment of the Communist Revolutionexperienced through Stalinism together with the rise of mass cultureprompted a rejection of Marx’s view of historical progress leadingto a particularly pessimistic view of modernity. Touraine (1995;154) calls this “the end of historicism and its faith in our progress towards happinessand freedom….”

One component of this pessimistic view is a particularly strongcritique of the ‘domination of nature’ arising through technologicalprogress and Harvey (1999; 133) suggests that the Frankfurt School(of which Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse were key members)approached their task via a “full frontal assault”. This assault can bebetter understood by reference to three key texts:

Firstly, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) Max Horkheimer & TheodoreAdorno set out to explain why ‘humanity, instead of entering into a truly humanstate, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism’ (1947; xiv). A central thesis isthat the Enlightenment instead of offering a better form ofknowledge has itself fallen into myth. It has lost the ability to bereflective and has failed to identify and respond to some of themore regressive characteristics of modernity.

Horkheimer and Adorno advance the idea that while social progressconfers certain benefits, it does so at the expense ofindividualism, freedom, equality and of Nature. They write of theseregressive characteristics:

“..The increase in economic productivity which creates the conditions for a more justworld also affords the technical apparatus and the social groups controlling it adisproportionate advantage over the rest of the population. The individual is entirelynullified in the face of the economic powers. These powers are taking society’sdomination over nature to unimagined heights. While individuals as such are vanishingbefore the apparatus they serve, they are provided for by that apparatus and better thanever before. In the unjust state of society the powerlessness and pliability of the massesincrease with the quantity of goods allocated to them. ….” (1947: xvii)

The effect of what is referred to as ‘total society’ is that humanbeings are

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‘..turned back into … mere examples of the species, identical to one another, throughisolation within the compulsively controlled collectivity’ (1947 ; 29)

Collective control, for Horkheimer and Adorno included a powerfulcultural dimension – mass culture which reinforces the ideology ofconsumption and entertainment and promotes ‘business’ (1947; 109). Inshort, Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that modern society is whollysubjugated to blind objectivity and that the masses are controlledby their desire for consumption and entertainment. Within thistechnologically progressive ‘total society’ Nature has to beexploited as never before to feed the incessant desire for newproducts and services.

Secondly, Horkheimer, builds on the ideas articulated several yearsearlier and focuses on what he calls, ‘the growing apparatus of massmanipulation’ in his Eclipse of Reason (1947). The situation Horkheimerfound so disillusioning is outlined in the preface to his 1947 workabove:

“The present potentialities of social achievement surpass the expectations of all thephilosophers and statesmen who have ever outlined in Utopian programs the idea of atruly human society. Yet there is a universal feeling of fear and disillusionment. Thehopes of mankind seem to be farther from fulfilment today than they were even in thegroping epochs when they were first formulated by humanists. It seems that even astechnical knowledge expands the horizon of man's thought and activity, his autonomy asan individual, his ability to resist the growing apparatus of mass manipulation, hispower of imagination, his independent judgment appear to be reduced. Advance intechnical facilities for enlightenment is accompanied by a process of dehumanization”.(1947 ; v-vi)

This account of the impact of reason and extent of technicaladvancement led him to argue, following Marx, that

“..nature is today more than ever conceived as a mere tool of man. It is the object oftotal exploitation that has no aim set by reason, and therefore no limit. Man's boundlessimperialism is never satisfied” (1947; 108)

Horkheimer argued that this ‘domination of nature’ can be tracedback to the first chapters of Genesis (1947; 104) and he echoed Marxwhen he wrote that “Domination of Nature involves domination of man” (1947; 93).However Horkheimer did not seek to return to the “doctrines that exaltnature or primitivism” (1947; 127) as he saw for example that

“The pleasure of keeping a garden goes back to ancient times when gardens belonged tothe gods and were cultivated for them. The sense of beauty in both nature and art isconnected, by a thousand delicate threads, to these old superstitions. (1947; 36)

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Horkheimer’s respect for Nature (and his opposition to itsdomination) was not therefore based on links to the past, butstemmed from its capacity to engender “opposite, independent thought” (1947;127) – an idea that appears in Heidegger’s notion of the “saving power”of poiesis.

Finally, in One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse (1964) echoes Marxwhen he suggests that the scientific method provides “theinstrumentalities for the ever more effective domination of man through the domination ofNature” (1964; 162). Marcuse argues that the triumph of modernity is tocreate a One Dimensional society where

“..domination in the guise of affluence and liberty – extends to all spheres of private andpublic existence, integrates all authentic opposition, absorbs all alternatives” (1964:20)

..and produces “exhausting, stupefying, inhuman slavery” (1964; 27). All in alla definite downside to social progress and one which calls forresistance - be it through culture or revolution.

Windfarm Opponents - The New Romantics?

The thread which runs through each of the perspectives outlinedearlier is that Nature has special qualities which should beprotected or at least, should not be inappropriately exploited.Nature has a value in itself not simply in a Utilitarian sense andmodernity as something that exploits, subjugates and dominatesnature is something to be resisted.

Is it is possible that this pattern of thoughts and beliefs isshared by opponents of windfarms?

Nature viewed from an Anti Windfarm activist perspective

As part of the pilot stage of ongoing PhD research, a small numberof Welsh anti windfarm ‘activists’ were interviewed to road test astructured interview proforma designed to draw out Klandermans(2004) tripartite model of social movement participation. Thequestionnaire was structured to collect socio-demographic data fromall interviewees together with questions designed to explorepossible instrumental, identity and ideological motives for windfarmopposition. In respect of the latter, the responses given toquestion 46 –

“If a wind farm is visible from your home, favourite place or generally from within yourcommunity, how do you consider this to have affected the view?”

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included:

“It has trivialised the horizon”. (Interviewee No 1)

“Windfarms have turned something natural and fluid into something manmade”(Interviewee No 3)

“Because they are rigid and moving in a uniform way they take your eye towardsthem” (Interviewee No 3)

“I find the white towers against the landscape a disturbing presence”(Interviewee No 4)

Interviewee No 4 also referred to the ‘alien nature of the technology’ andto “concern regarding the desecration of the landscape”

These responses appear to emphasise the objectors’ value of thefluidity and non uniformity of Nature together with the absence ofmanmade structures – on the horizon, or in the landscape generally.These views appear to resonate with ideas expressed by Price (2007)who suggests that

“The main reason behind the formalized anti-wind power movement within the UK is thatmore wind power capacity leads to increasing numbers of wind turbines located withinthe natural environment, and by necessity in windy, often remote areas usually bereft ofother anthropogenic developments. It is within such unspoilt countryside that some liketo escape, seeking peace and tranquillity and away from urbanisation. Such areas ofrefuge are, some would argue, under attack from creeping industrialization. Thus theanti-wind power fraternity see themselves as protectors of the natural environment, andso perceive themselves to be ‘greener’ than some other environmental groups, such asGreenpeace” (2007 ; 9)

Price’s further point – the self identification of windfarmobjectors as environmentalists also appears to be borne out in thepilot interviews. He continues:

“Coming from a deep-rooted, often life-long passion for, and engagement with, theenvironment and belief in their pro-environmental ‘cause’, ardent wind farm objectorscite issues such as taking refuge from industrialized areas and the personal need forpeace and tranquillity as things worth fighting for. Some objectors view the advancingonslaught of technology as being obtrusively and inappropriately placed within thenatural landscape, becoming abhorrent and stirring emotions that become strongmotivators for action”. (2007; 10)

In the pilot interviews, all of the participants viewed themselvesas environmentally responsible to some extent – for exampleinterviewee No 2 referred to herself as being “‘obsessive’ about theenvironment” and interviewee No 1 recounted that “the countryside and thelandscape are an important part of my life...from childhood”. Furthermore, eachof the interviewees could cite personal environmental commitmentsincluding:

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protesting against roads / houses in the countryside not buying peat based compost or imported food, rejection of ‘free’ carrier bags not using chemicals to kill garden weeds buying free range eggs, organic and fair-trade produce recycling waste having energy saving light bulbs replacing oil heating with log-burners creating a wildflower meadow and being involved in beekeeping

However the interviewees distinguished between ‘protecting’ theenvironment or landscape and being “green” – regarding the latter as“trendy”. For example:

“I am more interested in the environment than in morality or being ‘green’”(Interviewee No 1)

“I don’t think of myself as ‘green’ but I am ‘greener’ than most people I know”(Interviewee No 4)

These interviews would seem to support the view that for somewindfarm opponents, ‘true’ environmentalism is seen as the‘protection’ of Nature and the countryside from the ravages ofindustrialisation. This is essentially a Romantic notion and onewhich has been reinterpreted by others over time. On this basis,support for Nature Protection Organisations (NPO’s) should not beseen as a surprise.Windfarm Opposition and Nature Protection Organisation Membership

Rootes (2007; 2009) explores the growth and extent of NPO’s inEngland, and asserts that these form part of an ‘extraordinarily rich andcomplex’ environmental movement (2007; 13). The genesis of modernNPO’s, Rootes argues can be found in the conservation movement ofthe late 19th Century (2007; 2) and now includes such organisationsas The National Trust, the Ramblers Association (RA) and theCampaigns to Protect Rural England (CPRE) and Wales (CPRW).Interviewees included in the pilot stage of the research confirmedpersonal membership of a number of these NPO’s as shown in Figure 5below:

Figure 5Selected Welsh Anti Windfarm Activist Membership of NPO’s

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i To some extent the academic study of attitudes to windfarms is takingplace within a normative framework, as some research funding is focussed onremoving barriers to deployment of renewable energy technology (e.g. ESRCSustainable Technologies Programme) and as some authors seek to speed thedelivery of low carbon societies (e.g. Barry & Ellis (2010) ii For the current status of Climate Change Environmentalism as a coherentphilosophical system of belief - See Grainger PLC v Nicholson (2009) –Employment Appeal Tribunal UKEAT/0219/07/ZT. Transcript available onlinefrom http://www.bindmans.com/fileadmin/bindmans/user/News_stories_-_PDFs/Tim_Nicholson/Nicholson_-_EAT_Judgement_03_11_09.pdf (Accessed 15/2/2011)iii

iv J.W. von Goethe - The Sorrows of Yound Werther Translated by R.D.Boylan available online at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2527/2527-h/2527-h.htm (Accessed 23/2/11)iv Marx, K. The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) Vol 2 Second Observationavailable online athttp://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm(Accessed 23/2/11)v Capital Vol 1 Ch 15 Section 1 – The Development of Machineryvi Capital Volume 1 p392vii Marx, K (1844) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Manuscript No 1available online athttp://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm(Accessed 23/2/11)viii See vii aboveix Marx, K (1844) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Manuscript No 3available online athttp://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/epm/3rd.htm#s2 (Accessed23/2/11)

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The protectionist / conservationist dimension of these NPO’s can beseen in the words they use to describe their aims and objects:

The Snowdonia Society

The Snowdonia Society has a current membership of over 2500x and wasformed in 1967 with the following objectsxi:

a) to work to conserve the scenery, the natural and historicfeatures, and the wildlife within the Snowdonia National Parkand to keep them unimpaired for the enjoyment of present andfuture generations

b) to promote the reconciliation of various land uses andinterests within the Park and to work for mutual understandingbetween all people who visit, live and work in the Park

c) to persuade the authorities concerned to make public theirplans for the Park; to see that these plans are compatible andto watch that they are consistently applied; but the Societymay disagree with any plan, or any part of it, or itsapplication in any particular case

d) to co-operate with individuals, other organizations andstatutory bodies, in order to achieve these objectives.

Ramblers Association

The Ramblers Association has a current membership of around 125,000xii

and was formed in 1935, although its’ roots can be traced back tothe 1820’s. The objectsxiii of the association are to promote,encourage or assist in:

a) The provision and protection of foot paths and other ways overwhich the public have a right of way or access on foot,including the prevention of obstruction of public rights ofway

b) The protection and enhancement for the benefit of the publicof the beauty of the countryside and other areas by suchlawful means as the trustees think fit, including by

x http://www.waleslink.org/membership/members/snowdoniasociety (Accessed23/2/11)xihttp://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/ScannedAccounts/ Ends31/0000253231_ac_20100630_e_c.pdf -Annual Accounts 2010 (Accessed23/2/11) xii http://www.ramblers.org.uk/aboutus/structure (Accessed 23/2/2011)xiii http://www.ramblers.org.uk/aboutus/charitableobjects (Accessed23/2/2011)

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encouraging the provision, preservation and extension ofpublic access to land on foot.

c) The provision of facilities for the organising of open-airrecreational activities and in particular rambling andmountaineering with the object of improving the conditions oflife for the persons for whom the facilities are intended,namely the public at large, and in the interests of socialwelfare (including health)

d) Advancing the education of the public in subjects relating toaccess to, and the preservation and conservation of, thecountryside and of the health benefits of outdoor recreationalpursuits

Campaign to Protect Rural Wales (CPRW)

CPRW has a current membership of just over 1800xiv and was formed in1928 with the following principal objectsxv:

a) To organise concerted action to secure the protection andimprovement of the landscape and environment of thecountryside of Wales, recognising the importance of itscommunities and its indigenous cultures

b) To act as a centre for furnishing or procuring advice andinformation upon any matters affecting such protection andenhancement

c) To arouse, form and educate opinion in order to ensure thepromotion of the aforesaid objects

National Trust

The National Trust has a current membership of 3.7 millionxvi and wasformed in 1895 with the objective “To promote the permanent preservation forthe benefit of the nation of lands and tenements (including buildings) of beauty or historicinterest”xvii

NPO’s and the Anti Windfarm Hyperlink Network

A number of these NPO’s were also seen in the hyperlink networkanalysis of websites belonging to anti windfarm groups, which was

xiv E mail from CPRW Director dated 23 March 2010xv http://www.cprw.org.uk/aims_objectives.htm (Accessed 23/2/2011)xvi http://92.52.118.192/w-annualreport.pdf (Accessed 23/2/2011)xvii National Trust Annual Report 2008/9 page 2

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undertaken in 2009/10 (Gardner 2010). The NPO’s in the UK includeCPRW, CPRE and the RA and when compared with the anti windfarmnetwork as a whole, the ego net of NPO’s (the network formed bylinks between NPO websites and other websites) accounts for justunder 8.7% of the total networkxviii. The extent to which theseorganisations are linked to the websites of anti windfarm groups isshown in Figure 6 below:

Figure 6 Nature Protection Organisations in the Anti Windfarm Hyperlink Network

One feature of the NPO websites which is noteworthy is that antiwindfarm groups tend to link to NPO websites but such links are notgenerally reciprocated. ‘In links’ signify the ‘prestige’ ofparticular sites within a hyperlink network and within the NPO

xviii Selected Properties of the NPO Egonet within the Anti WindfarmHyperlink Network

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MeasureOverall Hyperlink

NetworkCPRE,CPRW,

Ramblers EgoNetNetwork

Size635 nodes55 nodesEgonet as % of overall Network100%8.66%Network Density0.0112(SD 0.105)0.1155(SD 0.3196)Network Densityt- test

t= 56 > 3.29

Bootstrap Method

t=5.89 > 3.29t= 19.57 > 3.29

Bootstrap Method

t= 4.42 > 3.29Network

Clustering Coefficient0. 3920.379Reciprocity20.88%19.1%

egonet, CPRE had 27 ‘in-links’, CPRW had 21 and the RamblersAssociation had 11 compared with an overall network average of 7‘in-links’. On this basis it is reasonable to conclude that AWFG’ssee NPO’s as prestigious and being worthy of positive association.

On the basis of this limited pilot study, it would appear that thereis some evidence of opponents of windfarms sharing a ‘protectionist’approach to Nature – an ideological perspective rooted in a reactionto modernity. At the same time such opposition is seen by some antiwindfarm activists as being consistent with broader environmentalism– indeed for some it represents ‘true’ rather than ‘trendy’environmental conscience. This ideology appears to sustain activismdespite the presence of feelings of isolation, tiredness and anger.As one activist put it when asked what involvement in anti windfarmactivities made them feel –

“It does not fill me with a sense of wellbeing! - It is just something one has to do becauseI feel strongly about it” (Interview No 4)

Comments and Conclusions

So where does this leave us?

Well, firstly, there does appear to be a common thread linking anumber of philosophical critiques of modernity and its impact on therelationship between humankind, technology and nature. While thereare varying interpretations within the broad thrust, the essentialmessage is the same, that modernity has generated estrangementbetween humans and the products of their labour, between humans andNature and between humans themselves. Consequently ‘authentic being’is difficult to achieve.

Secondly, it is clear that for some anti windfarm opponents, Natureis seen as something to be protected and this is demonstrated in thelanguage used by activists when faced with the appearance ofwindfarms in the landscape and through their membership of NatureProtection Organisations as described by Rootes (2007).

There appears to be some evidence that some anti windfarm activistsshare this broad ideological perspective (in addition to theinstrumental and identity motives they may hold individually orcollectively) which is perhaps closer to traditional Romanticismthan revolutionary Marxism, however their rejection of thedomination of Nature should present a point of unity across theideological divide.

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One might expect the common concern regarding the commodificationand exploitation of nature to generate some level ofinterconnectedness between the struggles of environmentalists fromthe Left and the activism of opponents to windfarms. However – basedon observations not referenced in this paper, this does not appearto be the case.

I would like to conclude this paper by suggesting that there arefour possible explanations for this

Reason Number 1 – Thus far, the ideological linkages referred to inthis paper have not been recognised, theorised or internalised bymovement participants / network actors. Don Quixote did notappreciate that his giants were windmills until the trusted SanchPanza pointed this out…

Reason Number 2 – The protest discourse involved in windfarmopposition has been structurally limited to those dimensions thatcan be accommodated by the Planning and Development Control process.There has been little space available within which Identity andIdeological motives can be given a valid airing in this highlyinstrumental life-world. In my experience, Planning Inspectors andwindfarm developers’ care very little about metaphysics…

Reason Number 3 – The ideological terrain is contested and iscertainly not unified. Within the Marxist critique of modernitythere are examples of Romantic Socialism, readings of Marx whichstress the reactionary nature of Romanticism and positions inbetween. Marx’s own description of the relationship betweenhumankind and Nature even under Communism is, as Smith (1996) putsit “unclear”. Heidegger has attracted criticism on the basis of hisdalliance with National Socialism and it is simultaneously bothfashionable and dangerous to advocate authenticity. The FrankfurtSchool remains credible (if pessimistic), but one can’t help thinkthat Adorno’s critique of Heidegger has a basis which is similar tothat of Bourdieu – the emphasis being on Heidegger’s politicalontology.

Taken alongside the Postmodern Constructionist critique of Nature assomething which is socially created it is hard to see how evensignificant overlaps between ideologies would be strong enough tounite campaigns on the ground. Environmental activists might suggestthat “the science of climate change is settled” but the ideologythat surrounds it certainly isn’t..

Reason Number 4 – Both Identity and Ideology can be non singular andthere can be competition between identities and ideologies. In

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Klandermans model the respective weightings of instrumentality,identity and ideology have not been tested as far as windfarmopposition is concerned - but perhaps this will become clearer asthe fieldwork progresses…

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Endnotes

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