The Principled Utility Maximiser: Normative Decision-Making by Foreign Policy Elite

Introduction

“Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to

do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”1 Thus spake

President George W. Bush, forty-third president of the United States of America. History

now shows that Saddam Hussein and his sons did not leave Iraq within forty-eight hours,

and that their refusal to do so resulted in military conflict, the commencement of which

was not, however, at a time of United States’ choosing. President Bush addressed the

nation at 8pm, Washington time, on the evening of Monday, March 17, 2003. The timing

is significant.

On the morning of March 19, with approximately twelve hours until the expiry of the

ultimatum, the President initiated the sequence of events that would commence

hostilities. The President met in the situation room with the members of the National

Security Council, General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief United States Central

Command, and, via secure video link on large screens, nine of his senior commanders in

the field.2 Bush first asked the members of the NSC, “Do you have any last comments,

recommendations or thoughts?”3 None did. He then turned to the field commanders and

asked each one in turn two questions, “Are you ready” and “Do you have everything you

need?” Each replied, “Yes Mr President, we’re ready.”4 Finally, Bush turned to General

Franks. “The rules of engagement and command and control are in place,” replied

Franks. “The force is ready to go, Mr President.”5 Bush stood and calmly said, “For the

peace of the world and the benefit and freedom of the Iraqi people, I hereby give the

order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom. May God bless the troops.” “May God bless

America,” Franks replied.6 Tears welled in Bush’s eyes, and Secretary of State, Colin

Powell, the career soldier, leant forward and touched the president’s hand.7 The massive

1 George W. Bush, Decision Points / George W. Bush (London: Virgin, 2010). p 253 2 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). p 378 3 Woodward, Plan of Attack. p 378 4 Bush's War, dir. Michael Kirk, Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, 2008. 5 Woodward, Plan of Attack. p 379 6 Woodward, Plan of Attack. p 379 7 Todd S Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing : America's War in Iraq / Todd S. Purdum and the Staff of the

air campaign would begin in less than forty-eight hours, the ground campaign, twenty-

four hours after that.

The old soldier’s maxim is that no battle plan survives beyond first contact with the

enemy. A situation had been developing over the preceding thirty-six hours that would

ensure that this battle plan would not survive even that long. Approximately six hours

after the president had given his orders, George Tenet, Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, received word that operatives inside Iraq had credible intelligence

of, not only Saddam Hussein’s whereabouts, but the whereabouts of his two sons, Uday

and Qusay. This represented a clear opportunity to decapitate the regime before a costly

war. Shortly after 3pm, Washington time, Tenet met with Bush, Powell, Vice President

Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Don

Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

Richard Myers, and White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card.8 The President sought the

counsel of all present and two major issues emerged: Firstly, the reliability of the

intelligence and the possibility of collateral damage, and secondly, the risk of departing

from the battle plan that was now in play. It was after midnight in Baghdad and the

decision would have to be made immediately, delay could see the opportunity missed.

All agreed that the opportunity was too good to pass up9 – all except the man whose

decision it remained. The president said, "Didn't you guys hear what I said? I gave him

48 hours. That's my word."10 At the risk of missing an opportunity to end the war before

it began, there would be no strike on the target until after the deadline had passed. The

President of the United States of America had given his word.

President Reagan declared that, in the “areas of defense and foreign affairs, the nation

must speak with one voice, and only the president is capable of providing that voice.”11

New York Times, 1st ed ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2003). p 106 8 Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing : America's War in Iraq / Todd S. Purdum and the Staff of the New York Times. 9 Bush, Decision Points / George W. Bush, Bush's War, dir. Kirk, Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing : America's War in Iraq / Todd S. Purdum and the Staff of the New York Times, Woodward, Plan of Attack. pp253-254 10 Bush's War, dir. Kirk. 11 President Ronald Reagan (1984). As quoted in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy : Pattern and Process, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

The voice of the president is, like Hobbes’ Leviathan, the voice of the United States.

Bush had given his word that he would give Hussein forty-eight hours to leave Iraq, but it

was not his word alone, it was the word of the United States. In Bush’s eyes, the United

States was a country that kept its word. Hussein would get his forty-eight hours, even if

it came at significant cost. In considering this particular aspect of decision-making, a

similar example exists whereby President Kennedy is debating the options in response to

the Cuban Missile Crisis, one of which was an un-alerted air strike. “For one hundred

and seventy-five years,” argued Senator Robert Kennedy, “unannounced Sunday-

morning attacks had been anathema to US tradition.”12 Evident in Bush and Kennedy’s

decision-making is an element that demonstrates more complexity than simple cost-

benefit analysis – we are witnessing normative behaviour. They are asking themselves:

Who am I? What is the situation? What does a person, such as I, do in a situation like

this?

This paper seeks to analyse just such normative behaviour. Norms are not a new line of

enquiry in International Relations. Liberals and institutionalists have for some decades

recognised the significance of norms, albeit not to the extent that we now employ them as

explanatory variables. They have existed for a much longer period in sociology and legal

theory, forming the basis of customary law. Normative behaviour in more recent times

has come to form part of the bedrock of constructivist IR theory. Much of the normative

research agenda has been engaged in making the simple point to an unreceptive audience

that norms matter. This has led to a situation of theoretical and methodological

overstretch, where the function and influence of norms has potentially been overstated.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson said he had to be ‘clearer than truth’ when elucidating

the Communist threat in order to garner American public and congressional support for

the Truman administration’s initial steps in containing the Soviet Union. One might

conclude that constructivist scholars have been ‘clearer than truth’ in prosecuting their

case that norms matter. Having said that, normative behaviour enjoys widespread, albeit

varying, support across the spectrum of IR research traditions. The first generation of

constructivists have established that norms matter. The next generation must now 12 Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times / Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 1st Ballantine Books ed ed. (New York Ballantine Books, 1979). p 806

determine how, and to what extent norms are a factor in world politics.

Ideas

“It is an illusion”, argued Henry Kissinger, “to believe that leaders gain in profundity

while they gain experience … the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching

high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in

office.”13 Gaddis made a similar observation in reviewing the Cold War strategies of the

US, and suggested that there exist for presidential administrations certain ‘strategic’ or

‘geopolitical’ codes, “assumptions about American interests in the world, potential

threats to them, and feasible responses, that tend to be formed either before or just after

an administration takes office”14. Weber made a clear distinction between ideas and a

worldview in his famous ‘switchmen of history’ metaphor15, though he explicitly

acknowledged their interconnectedness. All of these evaluations of the impact of ideas

on actors are based on the premise that ideas are basically static, and this may be, to some

degree and as pertaining to certain types of ideas, correct. What is not taken into account

is the degree to which social influences leverage actors and outcomes.

Goldstein and Keohane defined ideas as they related to the pursuit of political actors and

outcomes as beliefs held by individuals16. The pair, in the search for causal pathways

through which ideas influenced policy outcomes, identified three beliefs types.17 At the

most fundamental level and with the broadest impact on human action were worldviews –

conceptions of possibility embedded in culture and identity. The second category,

principled beliefs, specified criteria for distinguishing between right and wrong. The 13 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979). 14 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War / John Lewis Gaddis, Rev. and expanded ed ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 15 “Not ideas, but material and ideal [ideological] interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas, like a switchman, have determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” as quoted in Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, The Max Weber Dictionary : Key Words and Central Concepts / Richard Swedberg with the Assistance of Ola Agevall (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Social Sciences, 2005). 16 Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Foreign Policy Studies., Ideas and Foreign Policy : Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 17 Goldstein, Keohane and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Foreign Policy Studies., Ideas and Foreign Policy : Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change.

final category, causal beliefs, incorporates cause and effect relationships and derives

authority from the conventional wisdom of recognised elites. Goldstein and Keohane, in

pursuit of causal relationships, found utility in delineating these three belief types. They

did, however, note that this construct was clearest in the abstract, and that in social life,

all three belief-types might be linked in a seamless web.

At the core of constructivist thinking is the co-constitutive proposition that human beings

are social beings, and would not be so were it not for our social relations.18 That is to

say, social relations construct people into the type of being we are. Social constructivism

in general19, posits that people make society and society makes people in a continuous,

co-constitutive process. Agents do not exist independently of the structures around them,

and nor do structures exist independently of their reproduction and transformation by

agents.20 This is what Giddens referred to as the ‘duality of structure’ and speaks to the

significance of the co-constitution of agents and structures.

Figure 1 – The Agent Structure Reciprocal over Time21

The Agent-Structure reciprocal over time (Figure 1) clearly demonstrates the cyclical and

continuous co-constitution of agency and structure over time. But to explain agency

behaviour, or structural change, it is necessary to begin inquiry at some point along the

spiral – agency and structure must be located within a temporal frame of reference. This

18 V. Kubálková, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf and Paul Kowert, International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). p 59 19 Referring here to the epistemology of Social Constructivism as opposed to its narrower application to International Relations. 20 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1984). 21 Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 36.3 (1992).

means slicing into the model at some point.

John Searle posits that in the creation of institutional facts, there is a primacy of social

acts over social objects.22 Searle argues that in social construction, the object is just the

continuous possibility of the activity; hence, process is prior to product. Searle favours

the term institutional fact rather than institutional object, and states that institutional facts

are really designed to serve agentic functions. He describes institutional facts as

placeholders for patterns of activities and the possibility of ongoing activities.23 Thus,

Searle argues, our interest should not be in the fact (or object), but in the processes and

events where agentic functions are manifested. The intersection of agency and structure,

of ideation and material, therefore, is just were Thucydides said it was – in the choices

and actions of human beings.

Norms

The choices of human beings may be broadly divided into ideas about what is possible

and about what is proper. The choices pursued in this analysis are those ideas which

prescribe or proscribe behaviour and, in doing so, speak to that which is proper. These

types of ideas are referred to as social norms. Social norms have been defined as rules

“governing an individual’s behaviour that third parties other than state agents diffusely

enforce by means of social sanctions”24. Many leading definitions deflect attention away

from the coercive influence of social sanctions; others omit this factor altogether.

Katzenstein, Wendt and Jepperson speak of “collective expectations about proper

behaviour for a given entity”25, whereas Keohane defines norms as “shared expectations,

on the part of a group, about appropriate behaviour”26. Finnemore and Sikkink

accentuate the importance of identity by referring to the “standard of appropriate

22 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). 23 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality. 24 Karl-Dieter Opp and Michael Hechter, Social Norms (New York ; [Great Britain]: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). p 35. 25 Peter J. Katzenstein and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Committee on International Peace & Security., The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics, New Directions in World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). p 54. 26 Robert O. Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (University of California, San Diego: 2009), vol.

behaviour for actors with a given identity.”27

From these definitions we are able to extract three crucial elements that define and

operationalise norms: Firstly, that expectations exist that regulate appropriate behaviour.

Secondly, that these expectations are held by, and act upon, a specific community of

actors. Thirdly, these expectations influence behaviour within the specific community. It

is important not to confuse norms with private ideas such as, what Keohane and

Goldstein referred to as, principled beliefs and worldviews.28 Norms can comprise both

principled beliefs and worldviews, and indeed, they may certainly flow from identity and

worldviews. However, norms do not reside in the cognition of individuals, but rather are

public beliefs institutionalised in community discourse, doctrine, policies, and practices.29

A further and important identifying feature is to distinguish norms from ideology, which

we can define as a conviction about the superiority of one set of social practices over

another. Norms are social structures that exist discrete from, though fundamentally

interconnected with, an individual’s beliefs.

Norms are traditionally characterised as either constitutive or regulative30. Constitutive

norms are those that create new actors, interests, or categories of action, whilst regulative

norms order and constrain behaviour.31 Keohane characterises constitutive norms as

those that “define the identity of actors or the cultural setting that is taken for granted by

the actors, whereas regulatory norms prescribe appropriate behaviour.”32 Keohane

warns, however, that the distinction does not create two entirely separate categories, but

rather, represents ideal types. In practice, identities may imply appropriate behaviour,

and perceptions about appropriate behaviour may be premised on assumptions of identity,

27 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52.04 (1998). 28 Goldstein, Keohane and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Foreign Policy Studies., Ideas and Foreign Policy : Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. pp 8-11. 29 Theo Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005). p 1. 30 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.", Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40.3 (1996), Katzenstein and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Committee on International Peace & Security., The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics, Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol, Opp and Hechter, Social Norms. 31 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." 32 Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol.

but the two categories should not be reified.33 Norms are, in essence, the shared beliefs

of a given community about who they are, what their environment is like, and given these

two factors, how they react in any given situation.

Levels of Analysis

Norms exist and operate at multiple levels of analysis, and in considering their impact on

world politics, we can identify three distinct levels of particular significance that feature

prominently in the literature: international, transnational, and domestic.34 At the

international level, analysis of norms remains focussed on Hedley Bull’s society of states,

which “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common

values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a

common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of

common institutions.”35 Bull makes the important distinction between his society of

states and a system of states. Two or more states might be in contact with one another,

and interact such that they are important and necessary factors in each other’s

considerations, but with neither regard for common interests or values, nor bound by a set

of rules, nor contributing to the working of common institutions.36

Non-govermental organisations (NGOs), informal associations, and loose coalitions are

establishing a vast number of connections across state borders and injecting themselves

into a wide range of decision-making processes in a wide range of international issues.37

As the world becomes an increasingly integrated and complex system, this collection of

actors, increasingly referred to as transnational civil society, develop norms like other

societies. This interaction forms the basis of transnational norms, whereby norms are 33 Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol. 34 Norms exist at all levels of social interaction and the utility of analysing any given level is dependent upon research parameters and objectives. Farrell, in considering the impact of norms on warfare, utilised four levels of analysis: international, transnational, national strategic, and organisational. Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. 35 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). p 13. 36 Bull, The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics. pp 13-15. 37 Ann Florini, Nihon Kokusai Koryu Senta. and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., The Third Force : The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange ; Washington Carnegie Endowment for International Peace : Brookings Institution Press [distributor], 2000). p 2.

constructed through the interaction of NGOs and other non-state actors across national

boundaries.38 These norms are distinctive to the transnational civil society and are likely

to be “only imperfectly reflected in state behaviour.”39 The complex relationship

between international norms and non-state actors is gaining increasing interest in IR

theory. In what is referred to as the ‘boomerang effect’, transnational actors gain access

to, and influence over states more effectively when they identify with norms that states

have formally adopted. Thus, a redefinition of state interests “raises the diplomatic

salience of the specific norm, and thereby, increases its effectiveness.”40

Norms are also institutionalised at the domestic level through state policy and practice

and also at the sub-state level of organisational culture and domestic civil society.41

These norms are particularly evident in democratic political life, where the polity is a

“configuration of formally organised institutions that defines the setting within which

governance and policy making take place.”42

38 Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol. 39 Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol. 40 Daniel Thomas, "Boomerangs and Superpowers: International Norms, Transnational Networks and Us Foreign Policy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15.1 (2002). 41 Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. pp 5-7 42 James G March and Johan P Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness," The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, eds. Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E Goodwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Figure 2 - Levels of Norm Analysis

At all levels of analysis, norms act and exist in a co-constitutive manner, continuously

emerging, developing and regenerating the rules that direct and constitute social life.

Figure 2 illustrates how international norms connect with the state at the world system

level. Some of these international norms, though certainly not all, will be codified into

international law, however, even these legal norms have a broader social quality, imbuing

them with richer, and hence, more contestable meaning. As Burke said, “It is not what a

lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do.”43

At the state level, the national culture is the product of influences from the international

level, as well as the domestic civil society and sub-state organisational culture.

Transnational norms penetrate the shell of the state through transnational civil society and 43 Edmund Burke and Hammond Lamomt, Speech on Conciliation with America : Ed., with Notes and an Introduction, by Hammond Lamont (Boston and London: Ginn & company : 1897.).

impact on the national culture through the domestic civil society and the organisational

culture directly. At the lowest level (of this analysis), the organisational culture within

the state apparatus influences and is influenced by the national culture, the domestic civil

society, and the transnational civil society. Keohane points out that there is less

controversy about the role of norms at the domestic level than at the international and

transnational levels.44 It is important to note the degree of reciprocity within the system.

The state’s organisational culture informs, as well as is informed by, the national culture.

Similarly, international norms constitute and are constitutive of national culture.

Norms in Action

Having identified and situated norms within the world system, we must now analyse how

they shape foreign policy and, thereby, world politics. As previously stated, norms are,

in essence, the shared beliefs of a given community about who they are, what their

environment is like, and given these two factors, how they react in any given situation.

Stating this another way, we can say that norms take effect by interrogating the actor on

three elementary questions: What kind of actor am I? What kind of situation is this?

What does an actor like me do in a situation like this?

We noted that norms work in two fundamental ways, as regulative and constitutive

influences. Keohane warned against reifying these distinctions, and suggested that at the

practical level, the two are likely to operate in conjunction. Both constitutive and

regulatory norms, viewed either separately or under the collective set of norms, rely on a

fundamental ontological distinction of the logic of action. In their seminal works on

new-institutionalism, March and Olsen pursued the concept of decision-making

deliberations of actors and concluded that two logics govern the behaviour of actors and

organisations: the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness.

These two logics were juxtaposed to each other and used discretely to analyse the

behaviour of institutional actors.45

44 Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol. 45 James G March and Johan P Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," The American Political Science Review 78.3 (1984), James G. March and Johan P. Olsen,

Utilising a logic of expected consequences, decisions are taken on the basis of an actor’s

rational choice, comprising a variant of Savage’s subjective expected utility.46 Subjective

expected utility maximization theory posits that actors are “forward-looking maximizers”

who, based on the “available information and their best estimates of what the future

holds”, assign subjective probabilities to various “future states of the world” and make

their decisions “according to these subjective probabilities.”47 The logic of expected

consequences is underpinned by a number of assumptions, namely: actors should be

“aware of their own capacities”, and “should see several options for action”, they should

calculate beforehand “the costs and benefits of moving in every direction”, and should act

in the way that “maximizes their own benefits.”48 In this logic of action, regulative

norms are adhered to either because it benefits the actor or because it is enforced by

sanctions.49

The second logic of action that governs the behaviour of actors and organisations – the

logic of appropriateness – is premised on socialised actors within a given community, or

with a given identity, and is driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour,

organised into institutions.50 Olsen notes that institutionalism “holds that politics

involves a search for collective purpose, direction, meaning, and belonging.”51 Further

explaining this perspective on human action, Olsen states that to act appropriately is to

“proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity and mutual

understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good.”52 This explanation

has profound intimation of morality, but the rules of appropriate behaviour give grounds

for “atrocities of action, such as ethnic cleansing and blood feuds, as well as moral

Rediscovering Institutions : The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). 46 For a concise explanation of Savage’s theory and mathematical model, see Edi Karni, "Savages' Subjective Expected Utility Model," (Johns Hopkins University, 2005), vol. 47 Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, "Sociological Rational Choice Theory," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997). 48 Robert Nalbandov, "Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia," Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3.1 (2009). 49 Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. p 8. 50 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 51 Johan P Olsen, "Understanding Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness: Introductory Essay," Arena Working Papers 13 (2007). 52 Olsen, "Understanding Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness: Introductory Essay."

heroism.”53 Thus we see constructivism’s deeper constitutive function in defining and

redifining identity and appropriate behaviour in actors. As Finnemore suggests, it is a

different type of logic than that involved in consequentialist action, with the actor “asking

themselves, ‘what kind of situation is this?’ and “What am I supposed to do now?’ rather

than, ‘How do I get what I want?’”54

The logics of action are not mutually exclusive as March and Olsen point out; “political

action cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or

appropriateness” rather, “any particular action probably involves elements of each.”55

Considering Table 356 theoretically, the logics are discrete ontological abstractions,

however, in practice, they comprise a spectrum of real-world decision-making

deliberations.

53 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 54 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). p 29 55 James G March and Johan P Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International Organization 52.4 (1998). 56 This table is an adaptation on Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. p 9

Table 1 – Norms in Action

The prism through which we can view actor’s decision-making is on a continuum

between rationalist and constructivist approaches, with the ontological effect of either

regulative or constitutive norms being the result of causality or constitutional

mechanisms. Farrell identified three mechanisms on the causal continuum: inducement

and coercion, moral pressure and persuasion, and, social learning and habit.57 We are

able to draw a corollary between this spectrum of cause and effect and the logics of

action.

Thus at the rationalist end of the spectrum, regulative norms, through inducement and

coercion, govern actor’s behaviours through a logic of expected consequences. Wendt, in

seeking a rationalist approach to social theory, made this very point, in that “norms are

causal insofar as they regulate behaviour.”58 At the constructivist end of the spectrum,

constitutive norms, through social learning and habit59, govern actor’s behaviours through

a logic of appropriateness.

March and Olsen describe action as rule-based, but only partly so.60 The great diversity

of human motivation and modes of action mean that behaviour is “driven by habit,

emotion, coercion, and calculated expected utility, as well as interpretation of internalized

rules and principles.”61 Any theory of purposeful behaviour must consider this diversity

in accounting for the relationship and interaction between the two logics of action.

March and Olsen suggest that the two logics be explored as complementary, rather than

to adopt a dominant behavioural logic to the exclusion of the other.62 The pair devised

four alternatives to reconciling the two logics of action. The first alternative is to assume

a hierarchy between the logics, where, for example, “one logic is used for major

decisions whilst the other is used for refinements of those decisions”,63 or, alternatively,

57 Farrell, The Norms of War : Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. pp 8-12 58 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). p 82 59 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002). 60 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 61 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 62 March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders." 63 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness."

one logic governs the behaviour of a certain strata of political actor, whilst the other

govern the behaviour of another strata.64 Another alternative is to differentiate logics of

action based on their prescriptive clarity – whereby a clear logic will dominate a more

obscure one. Rules and interests provide clear guidance and make the adoption of the

logic of consequences or appropriateness more, or less likely. Alternatively, the

resources available to an actor may make it impossible to follow a prescription based on

one or the other logic of action. Thus, variation and change in the resources available

might account for variation and change in the relative importance of the two logics of

action.65 A particularly interesting alternative is that the change between logics of action

may be the result of specific experiences. Here rules of appropriateness are “likely to

evolve as a result of accumulated experience with a specific situation over extended time

periods.”66 Given this situation, rules and standard operating procedures are likely to be

the dominant determinant when actors have “long tenure, frequent interaction, and shared

experience and information”67. These alternatives illustrate that the interaction and

interconnectedness of the logics of action are not well understood, where

accomplishments are dwarfed by unanswered questions – the gap providing fertile

ground for a future research agenda.

Foreign Policy Under the Microscope

Much research within the social constructivist tradition emphasises the impact and

dynamics of international norms.68 Examination of the formulation of domestic norms is,

64 March and Olsen draw attention to the suggestion that politics follows the logic of consequentiality, whilst the bureaucracy and judges follow the logic of appropriateness. 65 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 66 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." p 704 67 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." p 705 68 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," European Journal of International Relations 3 (1997), Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999), Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.", Keohane, "Social Norms and Agency in World Politics," vol, Renee de Nevers, "Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement," International Studies Review 9.1 (2007), Opp and Hechter, Social Norms, Richard Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics," World Politics 55 (2003), Wayne Sandholtz, "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder," European Journal of International Relations 14.1 (2008), Wayne Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder : How Norms Change / Wayne Sandholtz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Emma Sjöström, "Shareholders as Norm Entrepreneurs for Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics 94.2 (2009), Cass Sunstein,

however, significantly poorer. Research typically situates the domestic or societal level

as the recipient of international norms. Thus, the research agenda has focussed on the

reception of international norms on domestic regimes in a top-down architecture.

Alternatively, research has focussed on transnational norms permeating the shell of the

state and interacting through issue networks. When domestic or societal level norms are

addressed specifically, it is typically to analyse how these norms are adopted at the

international level, either through transnational actors or the state as international actor.

This research focuses on the shaping and reshaping of domestic norms within the State

and draws on the theoretical inspiration from Hopf69, and Boekle, Rittberger, and

Wagner.70

Figure 3 - Levels of Analysis - United States

"Social Norms and Social Roles," Columbia Law Review 96.4 (1996), Thomas, "Boomerangs and Superpowers: International Norms, Transnational Networks and Us Foreign Policy.", Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 69 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. 70 Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, "Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory," German Foreign Policy since Unification, ed. Volker Rittberger (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

Whilst this speaks to a level of analysis in broad terms, it is an unmanageably deep level

of analysis. In our discussion of agency in world politics, we noted that if we conceive of

abstract agents as subjective, intentional and with the ability to choose and, by doing so,

influence social phenomena, then we are compelled to consider that the most appropriate

manifestation of the abstract ‘agent’ in international relations is the referent international

political elite.

The foreign policy elite of the United States is a select group. David Rothkopf made this

point by linking, by two degrees or less, all of the National Security Advisors that

followed him to Kissinger.71 It is precisely this societal-level community, centred on the

foreign polity elite of the United States, and in particular the Executive Office of the

President, the National Security Council and its Deputies Committee, that is the subject

of this research.

The question arises as to the manner in which to approach an analysis of this community.

In our discussion of two logics of action, we determined that human actions as rule-

based, but only partly so.72 The great diversity of human motivation and modes of action

mean that behaviour is “driven by habit, emotion, coercion, and calculated expected

utility, as well as interpretation of internalized rules and principles.”73 Kissinger made

this very point; “I believed equally that no nation could face or even define its choices

without a moral compass that set a course through the ambiguities of reality and thus

made sacrifices meaningful.”74 Holsti made a similar observation in stating that belief

systems impose “cognitive restraints on rationality.”75 Whilst the logics of actions are

considered a fault-line between rationalists and constructivists, individual rationality as

Sunstein notes, “is a function of social norms. The costs and benefits of action, from the

standpoint of individual agents, include the consequences of acting inconsistently with

71 David J. (David Jochanan) Rothkopf, Running the World : The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power / David J. Rothkopf, 1st ed ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). 72 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 73 March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness." 74 Kissinger, White House Years. p 55 75 Ole Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 3.01 (1970).

social norms.”76 We must consider this diversity in an individual’s decision-making

processes. I consider this diverse approach the most advantageous in considering foreign

policy decision-making in the pursuit of problem-driven research. Both logics of action

play a part in the process, hence, I have designated the decision-maker a principled utility

maximiser.

I have devised a model of decision-making by the principled utility maximiser, whereby

decisions are based on both a logic of expected consequences and a logic of

appropriateness. The model is based on the working of an optical microscope in that

expected utility and norms bring certain options into focus. An optical microscope works

on the basis of a number of different lenses to view samples on a slide. To focus at

different focal depths the lens-to-sample distance is adjusted; to get a wider or narrower

field of view, a different magnification objective lens is used. A microscope must also be

able to resolve the fine details of the object that are of interest to the viewer. My model

of a principled utility maximiser works in the same manner. Policy options are arranged

on the slide and placed under the microscope. By considering the expected utility of the

options, the view is made wider or narrower, excluding some options from further

consideration. Finally norms act to bring particular options (of those remaining) into

focus by proscribing or prescribing them.

The much analysed Cuban missile crisis provides and ideal example. Allison identified

six options available to Kennedy during the crisis; do nothing, diplomatic pressures, a

secret approach to Castro, invasion, surgical air strike, and naval blockade.77 Allison’s

landmark tripartite analysis explains that discussion in ExCom quickly narrowed the live

options down to two: an air strike and a blockade.78 At which point discussions took a

decidedly normative turn. Senator Robert Kennedy, in opposing the air strike option,

argued that “whatever validity the military and political arguments were for an attack in

preference to a blockade, America’s traditions and history would not permit such a course

of action. Whatever military reasons he and others could marshal, they were nevertheless,

76 Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles." 77 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). pp 56-62 78 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. p 123

in the last analysis, advocating a surprise attack by a very large nation against a very

small one. This, I said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our

moral position at home and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism

throughout the world was far more than physical survival ñ it had as its essence our

heritage and our ideals, and these we must not destroy.”79

Here Senator Kennedy is the principled utility maximiser. If we apply the model to this

crisis we see a three-part process. Firstly, policy options are arranged on the slide and

placed under the microscope. By considering the expected utility of the options, the view

is made wider or narrower, leaving only an air strike and blockade for further

consideration. Finally the norms shared by the Kennedy’s and others within ExCom are

applied proscribing the air strike option and leaving the blockade as the principled

utilitarian option.

Conclusion

Increasingly, constructivism is seen as the main rival to rationalist research traditions of

international relations and foreign policy. Constructivism rejects the basic tenet of

rationalist theories that actors pursue their exogenously determined preferences according

to a logic of consequentiality. Instead, in its explanation of foreign policy behavior,

constructivism assumes the working of a logic of appropriateness. Norms, which are

defined as value-based, shared expectations about appropriate behavior, are the

independent variable of constructivist foreign policy theory. Norms shape actors'

identities and preferences, define collective goals and prescribe or proscribe behavior.

The analysis of intersubjective norms in Constructivist foreign policy theory draws on

two research traditions. International and transnational constructivism emphasizes the

influence of norms that are shared by international society or by subsets of that society as

embodied by regional or function-specific international organisations. International law,

resolutions of international organizations and final acts of international conferences are

the indicators for international norms. Societal constructivism, on the other hand, stresses 79 Robert F Kennedy, Thirteen Days; a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. With an Afterword by Richard E. Neustadt and Graham T. Allison (New York, Norton, 1971). pp 38-39

the importance of norms that are shared within domestic society.

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