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The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin America Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Washington, DC, May 24 2011
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The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

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Page 1: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

The political viability of  progressive tax reforms in Brazil

Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin America

Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars

Washington, DC,

May 24 2011 

Page 2: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Puzzle

• The median vote theorem• Democratization in Brazil and Latin America has 

been accompanied by an expansion of the tax  burden via indirect taxation

tax burden in 1990 a 2008 = 7,3 %GDP 

Brazil =9,1%

2,5% gdp (34%) via direct taxation

4,8 gdp (66%) via indirect taxation

Brazil = 72%

Page 3: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Panel corrected estimate 1996‐2008, LA DV= increase in tax burden

Cte ‐46,12**(‐2,2)

LogR 7,81***(3,3)

Voice 2,91**(1,98)

Effectiveness 6,97**(2,04)

Pol. stability 0,91*(1,78)

Reg. quality ‐1,34(‐1,04)

Rule of law ‐1,14*(‐1,65)

Cont. corruption 0,72(1,04)

Índice de reforma 0,37(0,76)

2005 a 2008 stat significant

Brasil 5,3***(3,18)

Chile 5,34*(1,76)

Colômbia 4,12**(1,97)

Costa Rica 6,6***(1,98)

R2 0,97

Obs 180

F 130,48

Page 4: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

The median voter and mass democracy in Brazil % of population voting for President and Congress 1894‐2010

Page 5: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Rule of Law and Judicial independence in Latin America

Page 6: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

% cha

nge in prices pe

r year (IGP‐DI) 

24.48%1945‐1963

62.66%1964‐1984

1,050.62%1964‐1984

10.08%1995‐2008

1117%

431% 908%

2012%1216% 496%

1167%

2851%

The rise of entitlementsThe 1988 constitution and hyperinflation

Page 7: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Social expenditures by function 1980‐2008

Page 8: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

510

1520

gast

osoc

ial/F

itted

val

ues

0 2000 4000 6000 8000gdppcap

gastosocial Fitted values

COR

Latin America  – social spending as % of GDP(average 1990‐2007)

URU

CHI

BRA ARG

MEX

Page 9: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Consolidated public sector fiscal accounts 2000‐2008

Figure 1. 7

The fiscal imperative 

Page 10: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

The expansion of social contributions

Page 11: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

2019

6819

6919

7019

7119

7219

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

8019

8119

8219

8319

8419

8519

8619

8719

8819

8919

9019

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

0020

0120

0220

0320

0420

05

%GDP Value Added taxes

Cumulative Taxes

Total

Cumulative and value added taxes as % GDP, 1968‐ 2005 

Page 12: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Tax burden in Latin America (1990-2005)

An overburdened state

Page 13: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Incentives to reform ?

• Incentives to reform– The political success of the “scandinavian model”

– Risk aversion /fiscal imperative• Preference for revenue generation over 

efficiency/equity concerns 

– Aversion to institutional reformism

– A new paradigm shift ? • Alternative to cutting rates and broadening base?

Page 14: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Political and institutional obstacles to  reform?

• Capacity to reform– National level veto players? No!

• Constitutional Powers of Executives • Changing the Constitution• Coalition governments

– Subnational veto players? So, so!• Issue multidimensionality 

Page 15: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Constitutional reforms in Brazil 1989‐2008

Page 16: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

0,623

0,593

0,582

0,5940,596

0,599

0,634

0,612

0,602 0,599

0,598

0,592 0,593

0,581

0,566

0,552

0,54

0,55

0,56

0,57

0,58

0,59

0,6

0,61

0,62

0,63

0,64

1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

ano

Gini Index

Redistribution via targeted social expenditures

Page 17: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

venezuel

guatemal

colombia

peru

paraguay

costa ri

bolivia

mexico

nicaragu

honduras

uruguay

argentin

el salva

dom rep

panama

equador

brazil

chile

Presidents are powerful in Brazil…

Constitutional powers of president in Latin America

Page 18: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

The constitution and tax reform

• 17 articles (145 to 162) refers directly

to tax  issues 

• 3,291 words (approx 10% constitution)• Reforming consumption taxation is a highly 

contentious issue.

Page 19: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Length of constitutions

.

Page 20: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Constitutional rigidity (lutz index)

.

Page 21: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Covernment coalitions and constitutional supermajority (1985/2006)

0 20 40 60 80 100

sarney 1

sarney 2

collor1

collor2

collor3

collor4

itamar1

itamar2

itamar3

itamar4

itamar5

fhcI 1

fhc 1 2

fhc II 1

fhc II 2

fhc II 3

fhc II 4

Lula I 1

Lula I 2

Lula I 3

Lula I 4

Lula I 5

Lula I 6

Page 22: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Administrative capabilities

Source: IADB

Page 23: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Tax burden in Latin America

country year

1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008

Argentina 18,5 19,2 18,3 16,02 20,26 21,48 26,84 30,6

Bolívia 8,40 ‐ ‐ 9,35 14,42 17,95 20,45 22,50

Brasil 23,2 22,7 ‐ 26,36 27,26 30,39 33,33 35,50

Colômbia 11,3 ‐ ‐ 9,51 13,98 14,93 17,73 21,70

Costa Rica 10,2 12,9 11,5 16,88 17,99 18,85 20,62 23,10

Equador 9,6 10,6 9,1 9,56 9,60 11,62 13,04 16,30

México 11,1 11,9 11,1 11,54 10,12 11,06 10,01 11,90

Nicarágua ‐ ‐ ‐ 9,03 14,16 17,50 20,28 23,00

Rep. Dom. 9,5 11,4 10,1 7,12 10,64 11,33 14,57 16,9

AL 10,7 ‐ ‐ 13,6 15,50 16,6 17,5 20,9

23

Page 24: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Gastos sociales federales por funcion % 2000‐2008

Page 25: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Summing up

• Net balance on constraints and capacity to  reform but no incentives!

• Scenario: parametric adjustments 

Page 26: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Social expenditures by function (R$) 2000‐2008

Page 27: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Gasto

en salud

y educacion

comoas % del total del gasto

federal, 2000‐2008 

Page 28: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

Year Legislation Status Scope

1988 Brazilian Constitution Implemented

• States granted a broad-base, value-added sales tax (ICMS);• Revenue-sharing funds increased to benefit states and municipalities;• Base of social contributions widened to compensate for federal revenue losses;• Municipalities assigned a tax on services and property.

1995Constitutional Amendment Proposal PEC n. 175

Not implemented(dropped after various amendments)

• Level of overall tax revenues at all tiers not to be reduced;• Cumulative social contributions to be changed into non-cumulative and extended as a surcharge on imports; • State VAT to be collected in the state of destination, not origin, as a means to end the “fiscal war”

1995 Substitute Proposal for the PEC n. 175

Not implemented(approved by a special committee,not voted on the floor)

• Uniform state VAT legislation all over the country to be created; • Municipal contributions to be created that finance public security and local services;• Provisional Measures (MP) to be prohibited on most tax issues; • Federal and municipal value-added sales taxes to be created.

1996 Law 9311 Bill approved in dec 1996

Created the CPMF – tax on financial transactions

1999 CPMF extended

2001Constitutional Amendment Proposal PEC n. 383

Not implemented(special committee not formed)

• Uniform state VAT legislation all over the country to be created;• Local for collection of state VAT, whether at the origin or destination of production, to be established by complimentary law.

2001Constitutional Amendment Proposal PEC n. 504

Implemented(converted into Constitutional Amendment n. 31)

Introduces a new Federal contribution for Intervention in the economic domain (CIDE)

Page 29: The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil · The political viability of progressive tax reforms in Brazil Presentation at the seminar Taxation and Equality in Latin

2002“Mini-reform”Provisional measure N 66 (Law 10637)

(converted into Constitutional Amendment n. 39)

The PIS/PASEP contributions were now non-cumulative, and the rate was increased from 0.65% to 1.65%. However, their cascading effects were reduced due to the utilization of tax credits on items at the production stage. The COFINS rate for financial institutions was increased from 3% to 4% and the tax base for the CSLL on the tertiary industries was amplified to32%.

2003Constitutional amendmentProposal PEC n.

Both Implemented(converted into Constitutional Amendment n. 42)

Introduces broad changes in tax regime, widening tax base and increasing rates; States are to receive 25% of CIDE’s revenue; municipalities in a state get 25% of the state’s share. Extend the de-earmarking of federal taxes from 2003 to 2007; raise the rate and extend the CPMF (tax on financial transactions).

2004Constitutional amendmentProposal PEC n.

Implemented(converted into Constitutional Amendment n. 44)

States are to receive 29% of CIDE’s revenue; municipalities in a state get 25% of the state’s share.

2007Constitutional amendmentProposal PEC n

Extends de-earmarking (FEF) of 20% of federal taxes to December 2011.

2007

Constitutional Amendment Proposal PEC n. 31-A (also known as PEC 255)

Special committee formed, awaits deliberation

• Uniform state VAT legislation all over the country to be created;• Turnover and cascading taxes (PIS/PASEP, COFINS) to be converted into a single federal tax;• Provisional contribution on financial transactions (CPMF) to be made permanent;• Non-imposed wealth tax (IGF) to be converted into a social security contribution.