The Political Ecology of Land Degradation

EG36CH12-Olsson ARI 19 September 2011 7:53

The Political Ecologyof Land DegradationElina Andersson, Sara Brogaard, and Lennart Olsson∗

Lund University Center for Sustainability Science, S-22100 Lund, Sweden;email: [email protected], [email protected],[email protected]

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2011. 36:295–319

First published online as a Review in Advance onAugust 1, 2011

The Annual Review of Environment and Resourcesis online at environ.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-033110-092827

Copyright c© 2011 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1543-5938/11/1121-0295$20.00

∗All authors contributed equally to this review.

Keywords

desertification, nutrient depletion, policy, Africa, China

Abstract

Land degradation, as a threat to smallholders in the tropics, attractsless attention than other global challenges. In addition, gaps betweenscientific understandings of land degradation and international policyregimes are problematic. We identify the three most significant de-bates including their different policy implications: desertification in theSahel, nutrient depletion in Africa, and rural reforms in China. Using apolitical ecology frame across disciplines, scales of inquiry, and regionalexperiences, we nuance the often polarized scientific debate while seek-ing to bridge the gap between science and policy. Three main findingsemerge: State-led rural reforms in China represent an important ap-proach to land degradation; a renewed focus on agriculture and sustain-ability in development discourses opens new ways for tackling nutrientdepletion with combined sociotechnological reforms; and a policy voidin Africa paves the way for market mechanisms, such as payment for en-vironmental services, that are insufficiently understood and put fairnessat risk.

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Desertification: landdegradation in arid,semiarid, and drysubhumid areasresulting from variousfactors, includingclimatic variations andhuman activities

Contents

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296ON POLITICAL ECOLOGY . . . . . . . . 297THE ELUSIVENESS OF LAND

DEGRADATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298THREE DECISIVE DEBATES . . . . . . 299

The Sahel Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299Soil-Fertility Decline in Africa . . . . . . 300Land Degradation in China . . . . . . . . 303

SCIENCE AND POLICYRELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305Land Degradation, Carbon Cycle,

Climate Change, and Paymentfor Environmental Services . . . . . . 306

Land Degradation, AgriculturalModernization, MillenniumDevelopment Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

CONCLUDING REMARKSAND RESEARCHRECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . 309

INTRODUCTION

Land degradation is a serious problem formany communities across the world, partic-ularly smallholders in tropical regions, andit has constituted a prominent field on theenvironmental research agenda for quite sometime. Land degradation has adverse impactson agricultural productivity, food insecurity,and rural livelihoods, and the connections toother environmental problems are numerous.However, the debate on land degradation hasbeen characterized by battles between disci-plines and perspectives. Compared with otherchallenges such as climate change and loss ofbiodiversity, the scientific understanding ofland degradation is highly fragmented and thegaps between science and policy are substantial(1, 2). In addition, land users’ own understand-ings and evaluation of environmental changeand degradation have been largely neglected.

In an effort to review and bring new perspec-tives to an extensive scientific discussion, we re-visit two related but sometimes disconnected

scientific debates—land degradation and polit-ical ecology (3, 4). We justify our political ecol-ogy approach by the urgent need to tie policybetter with research and by the fact that stud-ies and remedies of land degradation, in manycases, still neglect the connections betweenthe different biophysical manifestations of landdegradation and its driving forces embeddedin a larger societal context (see Political Ecol-ogy and Critical Realism, sidebar below). Thepolitical-ecology approach emphasizes thatland degradation results from the interactionbetween the physical environment and society,reflecting social, political, and economic pro-cesses at different temporal and spatial scales.By using critical realism as a combined onto-logical and epistemological approach and polit-ical ecology as a theoretical frame, we analyzehow biophysical manifestations of land degra-dation are associated with underlying social, po-litical, and economic causes, consequences, andremedies. In this review, we take an overall viewwhile also looking specifically into the cases ofChina, Sahel, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Land degradation is defined in manydifferent and competing ways. It is not ourintention to review the contested field ofdefinitions of land degradation, however.Instead, we proceed from and draw on therather open description in the latest GlobalEnvironmental Outlook (2007): “Land degrada-tion is a long-term loss of ecosystem functionand service, caused by disturbances from whichthe system cannot recover unaided” (5). Re-gardless of any ultimate definition, land degra-dation manifests itself in various and often seri-ous problems such as chemical contaminationand pollution, including salinity, soil erosion,nutrient depletion, overgrazing, deforestationin agricultural landscapes, and desertification.

Taking a critical-realist approach (6, 7), weassume that many of the biophysical aspectsmentioned here can be observed and assessed inobjective terms, whereas the underlying causes,consequences, and remedies require a criti-cal scrutiny of the social context wherein landdegradation occurs. The social context entailsseveral structural and institutional layers that

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we address using a political-ecology lens on landdegradation.

After a brief introduction to politicalecology, we review the historical battleover competing concepts and views in theland-degradation debate. We then identifyand investigate three particularly importantdiscussions on land degradation with differentpolicy implications: desertification in theSahel, nutrient depletion in Africa, and mainlystate-driven responses in China. On the basisof this, we illustrate the gap between scientificunderstanding and the international policy fordealing with land degradation. We also identifyhow responses have developed outside theland-degradation policy regime through theideas of payment for environmental services(PES) and agricultural modernization.

ON POLITICAL ECOLOGY

Political ecology has evolved and established it-self as a research field since the 1980s. Schol-ars in political ecology come from a variety ofacademic disciplines (see Political Ecology andCritical Realism, sidebar) (8). Rooted in polit-ical economy and, to some extent, in criticaltheory, the field of political ecology can be de-scribed better as a loosely organized approachwith broadly similar perspectives and concerns,rather than as a single body of theory. It devel-oped in reaction to what was perceived as nar-row views on human-environmental relationsin cultural ecology and other traditions, partic-ularly in terms of their deterministic models ofenvironmental change and their lack of atten-tion to power (8, 9).

As indicated by the name, political ecology isan explicit alternative to traditional “apolitical”ecology (9), in that it aims to understand societaland ecological processes as being fundamen-tally intertwined. By focusing on how politicaland economic factors at multiple levels shape,and are shaped by, the environment, politicalecology differs from conventional perspectivesnot only by politicizing environmental issues,but also by “ecologizing” political processes(10, 11).

POLITICAL ECOLOGY ANDCRITICAL REALISM

Political ecology, as with many other scientific terms, has severalmeanings. According to Timothy Forsyth (7), there are at leastfive definitions of political ecology: (a) the interaction of bio-physical processes, human needs, and the political-economic con-text (4, 202); (b) the environmental activism associated with deepecology (203, 204) and its critique of modernity and capitalism(203–205); (c) the Marxist debate on unequal power relationshipsin a global capitalist political economy as seen in world-systemstheory (206–208); (d ) the more general discussion on politics ofenvironmental problems (11, 209, 210); and (e) critical politicalecology, which problematizes the role of science (primarily nat-ural sciences) in environmental issues (7, 211).

Critical realism is an ontology, with epistemological impli-cations, in which the world is seen as structured, differentiated,and changing. It is structured in layers, from observable and map-pable physical features to increasingly abstract layers of structuresand mechanisms (6). Land degradation can be mapped and ob-served at a physical level but only explained and understood atlevels where hidden social, political, and economic structures areanalyzed.

Payment forenvironmentalservices (PES): thepractice of offeringincentives to farmersor landowners inexchange formanaging their land toprovide some sort ofecological service

The specific applications of political ecol-ogy are numerous and include a broad focuson particular environmental problems such asland degradation, discourse analysis of conceptscentral to human-environmental interactions,political-ecological interactions within specificgeographical regions, as well as the explorationof political-ecological questions in light of so-cial categories such as class, gender, and ethnic-ity (9, 11).

Political ecology struggles with many inter-nal controversies. Fundamental among these isthe issue regarding the very relationship be-tween politics, ecology, and policy. One de-bate deals with the extent to which politicalecology is “ecology without politics” (12); an-other is concerned with the extent to which it is“politics without ecology” (13, 14). Also de-bated is whether political ecology has becometoo academic, thereby running the risk of dis-tancing itself from policy (15).

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GLASOD: globalassessment of soildegradation

THE ELUSIVENESS OFLAND DEGRADATION

The intense struggle to define desertification inthe late 1970s and early 1980s (16, 17) and theattempts to measure and monitor global landdegradation (18, 19) have contributed to theelusiveness of the issue of land degradation. Weidentify two salient features of the debate. Firstis the perceived exaggeration of land degrada-tion, particularly concerning desertification, asa global problem, which stems from the lackof scientific rigor in defining and measuringdesertification and land degradation. Second isa strong empirical link between human actionand land degradation.

The perceived exaggeration of land degra-dation led to an unfortunate discussion wherethe severity as well as the existence of landdegradation were questioned (20, 21). Theperceived exaggeration was to a large extentinfluenced by the publication of the WorldAtlases of Desertification in 1992 and 1997 (19,22). Much criticism was directed toward the useof the GLASOD (Global Assessment of SoilDegradation) database that underpinned theatlases as well as many policy reports and state-ments on desertification. In a test that coveredthe African continent, the GLASOD data werefound to be inconsistent and not reproducible(23). Attempts to measure and monitor landdegradation at global and regional scales byaggregating local studies or expert opinionswere subsequently challenged by the devel-opments in Earth observation technologies.Earth observation allowed spatially explicit andcomplete coverage of landscapes as well as con-tinuous temporal studies of landscape dynamics(24–26). Such studies facilitated a much richeranalysis of both human and natural factors ofland degradation (27), but a major gap in ourknowledge on the extent, severity, and trends ofland degradation at the global scale remained.

The debate in the 1970s and early 1980swas dominated by a strong causal link betweenagriculture and grazing by domestic animals,on the one hand, and land degradation in theform of vegetation removal and soil erosion,

on the other. This strong link between landuse and land degradation was very influentialin shaping both the public debate and theinternational-policy responses. More recently,however, a constructive debate on land degra-dation has emerged, wherein scholars from arange of disciplines have engaged in exploringadditional aspects and scales of land degrada-tion. Scholars taking a political-ecology viewquestioned the validity of land-degradation re-search on both methodological and theoreticalgrounds (28). In terms of the very existence ofland/soil degradation, this resulted in a nearparadigmatic discussion between environmen-tal and agronomic scientists on one side versuscertain social scientists on the other. The scaleof analysis played an important role in thisdebate where environmental scientists wereaccused of exaggerating the problems of landdegradation by extrapolating from a few localexamples to whole landscapes (29), whereassocial scientists were accused of underplayingthe problem of land degradation (30).

Forsyth (7) used the term environmen-tal orthodoxies to describe a number ofstrong discourses in which environmentaldegradation was closely tied to human ac-tions and that featured land degradation.One of the most characteristic orthodox-ies was the Himalayan degradation theory,which sought to explain the rapid defor-estation and soil erosion of the Himalayas(31). According to this theory, a series ofhuman actions upstream in a river basin wereresponsible for causing environmental degrada-tion downstream (32). Later research, involvinga rich set of scientific methods, painted a muchmore nuanced picture (33). These researchmethods, sometimes referred to as hybridscience (34), harnessed local knowledge toreveal the underlying causes of the patterns andprocesses observed using scientific or so-calledWestern research methods (35). The scientificapproach can also be referred to as criticalrealism (28). In this richer and more nuancedpicture, local people were not portrayed asvictims of uncontrolled land degradation butas knowledgeable agents managing their land

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in a sustainable manner. Scholars applying acritical political-ecology perspective also sug-gested that the Himalayan orthodoxy theorywas a construction based on neo-Malthusianideas that dominated Western science atthat time (33). Another influential study thatchallenged the neo-Malthusian propositionof population density as a main driver of landdegradation was conducted in East Africa andpublished with the catchy and provoking title“More People, Less Erosion” (36). Studies ofdeforestation in West Africa also challengedthe link between population increase andland degradation (37). According to the con-ventional scientific wisdom, the West Africanopen-savannah landscape with scattered “forestislands” was a result of deforestation by localpeople over long periods, leaving only smallpatches of forest in a generally deforestedlandscape. Using hybrid science and a criticalrealism approach, the forest islands werereinterpreted as plantations by the local peopleand could be seen as land improvement ratherthan land degradation (38). Many other localstudies effectively linked observed biophysicalchanges in the landscape with a profoundunderstanding of the social, cultural, political,and economic conditions of livelihoods asso-ciated with these changes, thereby challengingthe neo-Malthusian view (2, 39–43).

THREE DECISIVE DEBATES

From the huge and diverse debate on landdegradation over the past decades, we identifythree debates that have been particularly impor-tant in shaping (mis)understandings and policyresponses. First is the desertification debate,which originated in the Sahel, peaked in the1970s and 1980s, became trend setting beyondthe desertification debate, and still has bearingon today’s research. Second is the more recentdebate on nutrient depletion in Africa that hasnot always been framed as land degradation.Third is the predominantly state-led debate onland degradation and rehabilitation in China.By reviewing and discussing these debatesand the links between them, as well as related

policy implications, we highlight importantdisconnections as well as opportunities totackle the heterogeneous and context-specificland-degradation phenomenon.

The Sahel Debate

The scientific debate on land degradation indrylands dates back to at least the 1920s (44–46). These early reports from the British andFrench colonies describe how vegetation dis-appeared owing to pressures from increasinghuman and animal populations, which was in-terpreted as an expansion of the Saharan desert.A renewed debate on whether the Sahara wasexpanding was triggered in the wake of the se-vere drought and famine in the Sahel regionduring the early 1970s. The recurrent droughtsand famines in the Sahel throughout the 1980sput land degradation high on the internationalscientific agenda (47).

The early desertification debate in the Sa-hel was, to a large extent, dominated by soilscientists and physical geographers with a poorunderstanding of ecological theory. Importantshifts took place in the 1980s when the con-cept of desertification was questioned, not onlyby social scientists, but also by many naturalscientists, primarily ecologists. One importantshift in the debate was to question the extent towhich desertification was to be seen as a long-term secular trend of degradation due to humanpressure or if drylands were in constant changedue to external pressures, both natural and hu-man, followed by adaptive responses by humansand nature. In these studies, researchers oftenused the landscape, rather than a community, astheir unit of inquiry in trying to understand bet-ter the interaction between climate, ecosystemdynamics, and social systems (48, 49). Thesestudies were highly influenced by nonequilib-rium ecological ideas and suggested that cli-mate variability played a much stronger role indriving changes in dryland ecosystems than wasacknowledged in the dominant desertificationdiscourse. However, the debate on equilibriumversus nonequilibrium ecology was not new. Asearly as 1930, Elton wrote that “the balance

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AGRA: Alliance for aGreen Revolution inAfrica

UNCCD: UnitedNations Conventionto CombatDesertification

of nature does not exist and perhaps never ex-isted” (50, p. 22). Despite this, not until the1970s was “the balance of nature view” more se-riously contested. The notion of resilience wasan important contribution for challenging theequilibrium paradigm (51), but it was not untilthe 1980s that Wiens (52) and Westoby et al.(53) coined the terms nonequilibrium ecologyand event-driven systems, respectively. Morerecently, both equilibrium and nonequilibriumtheories have been questioned by range ecol-ogists who are calling for reconciliation of thetwo paradigms (54). This reconciliation recog-nizes that different processes operate at differ-ent spatial and temporal scales (2, 55).

Local and landscape-based studies ofnonequilibrium systems were complementedby large-scale studies using a time series ofEarth observation data to reveal a spatially con-sistent pattern of expansion and contraction ofthe entire Sahel region (56). Later studies, har-nessing longer time series (more than 20 years)and showing a remarkably consistent green-ing of the southern edge of the Sahel, soontermed the phenomenon as “the greening of theSahel” (57, 58). The causes of the greening ofthe Sahel remains an ongoing debate. Climatevariations clearly play a dominant role (59, 60),but other factors, such as land use or demo-graphic changes, may not be ruled out as con-tributing factors (61–63).

The desertification debate originated in theSahel from which it was elevated to a globallevel because it provided the main basis for theUnited Nations Convention to Combat De-sertification (UNCCD) in 1994. The Sahel alsoplays a perhaps disproportionately large role inthe current policy, which also justifies why weemphasize and explore it in this context.

Soil-Fertility Decline in Africa

Despite being well established as a seriousproblem for many farmers in sub-SaharanAfrica, contributing to rural poverty and foodinsecurity (64–66), soil-fertility decline remainsa contested issue that has received much atten-tion in the debate on land degradation in Africa

over the past two decades. Lately, the scientificdebate on soil-fertility decline, or nutrientdepletion as it commonly is termed in policydocuments, has become more nuanced asvarious scholars have made important attemptsto challenge dominant discourses. Here, weidentify three main lines of critique: Firstare methodological concerns regarding theassessment of soil-fertility decline. Second areconcerns regarding the underlying ideas aboutdrivers of degradation. Third are concernsregarding the prescriptions for how to respondto the problem.

Basically, soil-fertility decline is a gradualprocess in which essential soil nutrients are lostthrough crop harvest, leaching, erosion, andother pathways at a faster rate than they are re-plenished by organic and inorganic inputs. Themost evident manifestation is declining cropyields (30). The problem is associated with un-sustainable intensification of agriculture, drivenby population growth and the introduction ofcontinuous cropping combined with inherentlypoor soils and low inputs of organic and/orsynthetic nutrients (67). Soil-fertility depletionhas been called “the fundamental biophysicalroot cause of declining per capita food produc-tion in Africa” (68, p. 3), a view that is fre-quently echoed in scientific reports and policydocuments.

The soil-fertility issue has been pushed tothe top of development agendas at nationaland regional levels by a combination of sci-entists, donors, and private-sector actors. Alarge number of new projects and programsaimed at tackling the problem have beenlaunched. The Abuja Africa Fertilizer Summitof 2006 laid the groundwork for a number ofnew major initiatives after the failure of theSoil Fertility Initiative for Africa, led by theWorld Bank 1998–2001. The ComprehensiveAfrican Agricultural Development Programhas emerged as one of the leading actors sincethe summit. Among the private philanthropy–supported initiatives, one of the largest is theSoil Health Initiative produced by the Alliancefor a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA),established in 2006, and funded by the Bill and

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Melinda Gates Foundation together with theRockefeller Foundation. Other major projects,including the Millennium Villages Project(MVP) and Sasakawa-Global 2000, have alsocontributed to the focus on soil fertility (69).In addition, private-sector-led initiatives suchas the African Green Revolution Forum, whichstems from an international conference hostedby the fertilizer company Yara International,have promoted the soil-fertility issue (70).

The scientific debate on soil-fertility deple-tion and management in Africa has been shapedlargely by perspectives in agronomy, soil sci-ence, and related natural sciences. As a result, astrong focus has been placed on the biophysicalaspects of the problem—and its technologicalsolutions (71). In 1990, Stoorvogel & Smaling(72) published a highly influential studycommissioned by the Food and AgricultureOrganization that indicated highly negativesoil nutrient balances across the continent.Since then, similar findings have been widelydocumented at various scales across differentparts of Africa (73–75). According to Henao& Baanante (73), nearly all African countries(approximately 90%) have a negative balanceof essential soil nutrients greater than 30 kg/hayearly. The highlands and subhumid regions ofEast Africa and the subhumid savannas of WestAfrica have been identified as the most affectedareas (73). Despite extensive methodologicalcriticism in terms of inaccurate calculations,misinterpretations, and uncritical use due toextrapolation of data from local cases (76–79),similar approaches are still widely used toindicate the severity of nutrient depletion (80).

Since the 1990s, social scientists and othershave tried to nuance, contextualize, and providealternative views to the dominant discoursesas well as reveal the basis of their nonscientificinterests. Many of these critical scholars arerooted in the broad field of political ecology,focusing on the social and political dimensionsof land management and degradation. Scholarshave attempted to destabilize those dominant“crisis narratives” around land degradation thatare seen as too generalized and deterministic(29, 37, 71, 81). Notions of diversity, complex-

ity, and nonlinear dynamics are central to thesecritical perspectives. Scholars have also madean effort to place soil-fertility management anddepletion in a broader social, economic, andpolitical context to highlight the role of localknowledge, the complexity of local farmingsystems, farmers’ adaptability, and the rationaleof soil investments. In addition, the debate hasshifted the focus to structural factors and insti-tutional dynamics behind resource degradation.

Various scholars have illustrated that a muchmore complex and diverse picture emerges atthe local scale, because levels of soil investmentand nutrient depletion are highly variable—both temporally and spatially—across regions,farming systems, field types, and social cate-gories of farmers (66, 76, 82–85). Many studiesshow how farmers’ incentives and capacities toinvest in land are shaped, not only by access tocritical resources such as land, labor, and capi-tal, but also by institutions and power structuresthat determine this access. For instance, con-trol over livelihood resources are largely shapedby patriarchal norms, suggesting that men andwomen are likely to have different options interms of land investment and technology use(86, 87). Furthermore, the ability to invest inland is also determined by access to output mar-kets and agricultural prices, which have histor-ically been low in Africa (30). In addition, theHIV/AIDS pandemic has hit rural areas hardand undermined the agricultural productioncapacity (88).

Several critical scholars argue that lo-cal knowledge and investment in land havebeen systematically neglected, and some haveraised questions about the very epistemologi-cal grounds of Western soil-science traditions(37, 66, 79, 89). At the same time, such scholarshave been accused of downplaying the sever-ity of soil degradation by confusing local andshort-term variations with longer-term trendsat higher spatial scales (30).

Others have raised concerns about the gen-erality of the widespread neo-Malthusian hy-pothesis of a nexus between population growth,poverty, and environmental degradation, whichis often articulated in the soil-fertility debate.

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This nexus idea portrays the linkages betweenpopulation growth and natural-resource degra-dation as mutually reinforcing, inevitably lead-ing to a downward spiral of low agriculturalproductivity and deepening rural poverty andvulnerability (90). Many studies have empha-sized that the linkages between poverty and en-vironmental management are both complex andcontextual and that outcomes are influenced bymany factors such as technologies, institutions,and policies (3, 91, 92). Following Boserup (93),various case studies have demonstrated that un-der favorable conditions farmers can adapt toor reverse degradation, even as the pressure onexisting resources increases (36, 94, 95). Thedownward spiral is, therefore, not inevitable;population growth can stimulate agriculturalinnovation and land investment. Yet, this typeof response is contextual and depends on a com-bination of factors, including agro-ecologicalconditions, farmers’ assets, market access, in-frastructure, nonfarm income possibilities, andbroader policy conditions influencing pathwaysof change (3, 66, 91, 96).

The critical attempt to take the African soil-fertility debate in another direction by chal-lenging dominant framings of the problem andtechnocratic, top-down types of responses hasgained ground in the past decade. For instance,the long and often much polarized debate be-tween those arguing that only the application oflarge amounts of inorganic fertilizer will solvethe problem and those promoting a more or-ganic or “low external input” approach (97) hasbeen replaced by wide agreement that an in-tegrated approach to soil-fertility managementis most appropriate. This integrated paradigmnot only acknowledges the positive synergiesbetween the different inputs from a technicalpoint of view, but also recognizes the complex-ity of social, economic, and political processesinfluencing soil-fertility management, suggest-ing that different contexts require differentapproaches (98).

Over the years, some general changes inapproaches to agricultural-technology devel-opment can be noted, including a shift fromblanket recommendations to context-specific

sensitivity and increased acknowledgment ofparticipatory approaches, local innovation, andfarmer-to-farmer learning. There are sev-eral drivers, including the failures of top-down, technology-focused, land-managementprograms as well as the general movement to-ward livelihood perspectives, stakeholder par-ticipation, and local solutions in developmentthinking (30, 85, 99, 100). In addition, a changeon the technical side of research has emergedover time, focusing not only on nutrient in-puts as such, but also on application strategies,for example, microdosing of inorganic fertilizer(101), and on improving the efficiency of nutri-ent uptake and reducing losses by combiningsoil-nutrient management with soil and waterconservation (102). More research attention isalso being directed toward alternative sourcesof nutrient inputs, such as ecological sanitation(103) and recycling of urban wastes for compost(104).

In sum, the scientific debate on soil-fertilitydecline and management has become more nu-anced over the years. The limitations of a nar-row focus on technical aspects, often resultingin solutions that do not respond to the com-plex realities of farmers, have been increasinglyrecognized. It is now widely accepted that landmanagement must be seen within the full con-text of farming, including all its ecological, so-cial, cultural, economic, and political aspects,and that a combination of many solutions isneeded to increase the productivity and sus-tainability of the sub-Saharan African agricul-ture. However, at best, these insights may beonly slowly translating into policy, where therelatively one-sided focus on technology, par-ticularly inorganic fertilizer, remains strong.Much of the AGRA’s work is, for example,focused on improving farmers’ access to fer-tilizers and other inputs by building up ruralmarkets and involving the private sector (105).One of the concrete outcomes of the AbujaAfrica Fertilizer Summit, hosted by the AfricanDevelopment Bank, was the establishment ofthe African Fertilizer Financing Mechanismintended to boost the use of fertilizer (106).The World Bank shares much of the same

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perspective and highlights “market-smart” sub-sidies for fertilizers as a potential measureto stimulate farmers’ investments in land andthe development of a private-sector-led inputmarket (107).

As discussed by many political-ecologyscholars, a narrow focus on technical solutionsruns the risk of leading to policy failure (11).This is not to say that technology has no roleto play; no one can doubt the enormously im-portant role inorganic fertilizers have played inincreasing global food production, although theenvironmental costs also have been substantial(108). One-sided portrayals of modern tech-nologies as nothing but “techno-fix” solutionsshould, therefore, be avoided as well. However,to tackle the problem of declining soil fertil-ity in sub-Saharan Africa, technology develop-ment must clearly be linked to broader policydevelopment aimed at improving the generalconditions of African agriculture and support-ing farmers’ capacity and incentives to invest insustainable land management.

Land Degradation in China

Compared with Africa, China has been moresuccessful in fighting land degradation (109,110). China has a long history of land degrada-tion, and the contemporary debate has a clearpolitical dimension (111, 112). Regardless ofthe debates regarding both the performance ofpolicies against land degradation and the rea-sons for active state intervention (113, 114),state-driven initiatives have been, and still are,important (115). Using political ecology as aframework, we identify three main reasons foractive state intervention against land degrada-tion in China.

The first reason is illustrated by an assumedlink between dust storms and land degrada-tion. Dust storms are caused by land use andland-cover change in combination with climateconditions. They are fed by source material of-ten originating from the northwestern regions(116) and pose a serious problem for manyurban centers across China, including Beijing(117). This link between land degradation in

rural areas and negative impacts on urban cen-ters and infrastructure creates political incen-tives to address the process of land degradation.

Most studies of land degradation are con-ducted in China’s northern and western re-gions, which are dominated by ethnic minori-ties and characterized by poor infrastructure,high dependence on agriculture, low incomes,and comparatively low literacy (118). Overtime, the damage from dust and drifting sandhas been a main reason for monitoring de-sertification and rehabilitating the land. Sincethe 1970s, or earlier, the frequency of sandstorms has decreased, indicating some successin land rehabilitation and land-cover improve-ment (116, 119). The severity and extent ofland degradation in China is debated, mainlybecause the results of the various assessmentsdeviate from each other. This deviation may bedue to variations in classification schemes, inthe technology used to measure the biophysicalmanifestations of land degradation, in the trans-lation of international definitions, or in the un-derstanding of ecosystem dynamics (109, 120).Although the declining trend in sand stormsis attributed to a complex combination of cli-matic conditions and land cover (121), it canalso be interpreted as an indicator of land-coverimprovements. Several studies using satellite-derived vegetation indices as a main data sourcesuggest that the vegetation cover in China’snorthern regions is broadly stable or improving(122–124), even within a historical perspective(125).

The debate on land degradation in Chinais also influenced by the Sahel discourse andreflected in alarmist reports of high rates ofsoil erosion and the emergence of desert-likelandscapes (120, 126, 127). Desertification isoften attributed to a combination of naturaland human factors such as a dry and windyclimate, sandy soils vulnerable to erosion, ex-pansion of cultivation, intensive grazing, andexcessive tree felling (128). Although humanimpact is generally seen as the main driver ac-celerating land degradation, Wang et al. (129)argue that climatic factors have been more im-portant for soil erosion in semiarid China over

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the past 50 years than was indicated by previousresearch.

Several large-scale rehabilitation programshave been initiated as a means to protect pro-ductive resources and reduce land degradation.The Three Norths Forest Shelterbelt Programis a 7,000-km-long green wall serving as a majorattempt to mobilize both resources and peopleon a national scale to address desertification inthe period 1978–2050 (130). The key goal isto increase the tree cover in arid and semiaridregions from 5% to 15%. The success of theprogram has varied (110, 130). In regions withmedium to low desertification risk, local gov-ernments have reported larger areas as havingbeen afforested than were actually confirmed(130). This triggered an intensive debate thatquestioned the sustainability of overambitioustree-planting projects in arid and semiarid re-gions where the survival rates of tree seedlingsis often as low as 15% or less (131). Plantedforests in areas receiving less than 500-mm an-nual rainfall are often unsustainable becausewater demand exceeds supply, especially as fast-growing tree species (e.g., Populus tremula) con-sume large amounts of soil moisture, which, inthe worst case, may lead to new desertification(132, 133).

The second reason for state interventionagainst land degradation is illustrated by the as-sumed link between land degradation in crop-lands and the flooding of major rivers. Thefact that floods cause massive economic damageto the more affluent parts of China has high-lighted the need to address soil erosion in theupper parts of watersheds (134). The assumedlink is inspired by the Himalayan degradationtheory (33, 112). After the severe floods in1998, the state initiated a major land-retirementand -reforestation program, the Sloped LandConversion Program, popularly known as theGrain for Green Program, and thereby mo-bilized the Chinese population against a se-vere disaster by using an approach similar toPES (135). As opposed to previous programsimplemented by state-owned forest enterprisesor local authorities, the Grain for Green Pro-gram points to a new direction in Chinese

natural-resource management (136) because itinvolves decentralized voluntary grassroots par-ticipation. However, it has been considered in-complete, and suggestions for improvementsinclude amendments such as increased local-community participation in design and imple-mentation, clarification of the environmentalservices targeted, verification of the measuresneeded to acquire such targets, as well as in-tegration of this program into complementaryrural policies (115).

The third reason for active state interestin halting land degradation is related to ruralpoverty alleviation and has resulted in a longseries of agrarian and rural policies (137, 138).The rural reforms have contributed to a spec-tacular increase in agricultural production atthe expense of severe environmental stress in-cluding land degradation (139). The politicalreforms have also resulted in increased diversifi-cation in rural areas (138, 140), a diversificationthat often competes with agriculture in termsof land use but offers income opportunities out-side agriculture. In spite of the many rural re-forms, the tension between rural and urban ar-eas persists and is increasing (113, 141). Landdegradation undermines many rural livelihoodsand can therefore be seen as a threat to the po-litical stability of rural communities, a threatthat may act as an incentive to fight land degra-dation such as in the later Western Develop-ment Program addressing economic, security,and ecological concerns (142).

The post-Mao pragmatic period that startedin 1978 was characterized by decollectivizationof rural life. The household again became thebasic production unit, and there was a movetoward a market economy. Implementation ofthe Household Production Responsibility Sys-tem included contracting land to each familyaccording to household size or labor force inreturn for tax payment and contribution to wel-fare funds. In the pastoral regions, two con-tracts could be signed by herders, one for theanimals and another for an assigned area ofgrassland. Although the majority of farmers ini-tially supported the reforms, they were againstthe short-term land contracts of 15 years. This

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hindered longer-term investments as farmerswere given no guarantee that they could re-main on their land long enough to recover theirinvestments (143). Rapid agrarian change hasalso resulted in a series of challenges includ-ing land fragmentation, increased use of steepslopes for cropping, changes in cropping pat-tern to more intense and soil-taxing practices,overuse of chemical fertilizers causing eutro-phication, and increased vulnerability of andrisk for individual households (144–146). Theextension of the contracts for cultivated land in1998 from 15 to 30 years was acknowledged byfarmers as an incentive for long-term invest-ments in land.

Concerning short-term food security, theimportance of chemical fertilizers has been em-phasized (147). However, in the post-reformperiod, the continuous intensification of agri-culture, for example, in marginal environments,has become a severe threat to agro-ecosystemhealth. Chief among the culprits is insufficientknowledge regarding sustainable use of waterand agro-chemicals (148).

In terms of rangeland degradation, a sys-tem of privately owned livestock and grasslandsto be managed in common was implementedin the mid-1980s through which long-termland-lease contracts were granted to individ-ual households for a 50-year period (149). De-spite the distribution of land and the requiredfencing of land in the pastoral areas, however,many regions can still be characterized by openaccess often leading to grassland destruction.Poor farmers cannot afford to enclose their landgiven the high cost of wire, and so long as for-age is still available, those who can afford it willgraze their herds on areas used as public range(150, 151). Some rangelands remain commonlymanaged despite household contracts becausesuch tenure may be more cost-effective and eco-logically sustainable in poor regions where re-sources are highly variable and marginal, par-ticularly in terms of water availability and theseasonal utilization of grasslands (152, 153).

Population resettlement has been and stillis a political measure on various grounds, suchas populating marginal regions with more Han

UNCBD: UnitedNations Conventionon Biodiversity

UNFCC: UnitedNations FrameworkConvention onClimate Change

Chinese, increasing agricultural production,and reducing poverty by relocating farmersfrom disaster-prone areas. Recent governmentprojects include the relocation of 2.8 millionpeople to safe areas from regions in the Shaanxiprovince frequently hit by flash floods, land-slides, and mudslides. The project should becompleted in the coming decade (154).

A program called Nurturing the Land by theLand Itself has been suggested as a more eco-nomically efficient model for increasing landrehabilitation in pastoral areas. The programwould, if implemented, use high-tech input insome areas, while leaving other areas idle to re-cover naturally in a ratio of approximately 1:100(155). Yet, this would also require a resettle-ment of farmers and herders. For example, inAlaxa Banner in Inner Mongolia, 15,000 house-holds would have to move to residential com-munities to acquire entrepreneurial support.Such enterprises could create agri-industrialchains involving intensive animal husbandry,dairy production, and interregional trade (156).This would, in turn, facilitate the developmentof infrastructure such as electricity, water sup-ply, and transport routes.

SCIENCE AND POLICYRELATIONS

Land degradation, climate change, and loss ofbiodiversity are three prominent multilateralenvironmental policy regimes with a strongconnection to the UN Conference on Envi-ronment and Development meeting in Riode Janeiro in 1992. Their respective policyoutcomes are often referred to as the RioConventions: UNCCD, UN Framework Con-vention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and UNConvention on Biodiversity (UNCBD). Thethree conventions share many organizationalfeatures, but they differ enormously in onerespect: their link between science and policy.Of the three global policy areas, desertificationis the oldest. In the 1970s, the internationalcommunity reacted swiftly after the devastatingdroughts in the Sahel by initiating a rangeof scientific inquiries into the causes and

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consequences of land degradation with a focuson the drylands across the globe. The UnitedNations convened a special internationalconference, the UN Conference on Desertifi-cation, in Nairobi in 1977, during which a largenumber of high-quality scientific documentswere prepared and presented (16, 157). Lateron, the desertification discourse increasinglydistanced itself from the evolution of thescientific understanding of land degradation,and when the United Nations finally createdthe UNCCD in 1994, policy was seriouslydisconnected from science (1, 158–162).

From a scientific point of view, it is easy tosee the many connections between land degra-dation, climate change, and loss of biodiversity.It is also easy to identify synergies between po-tential policies across these fields (163, 164), butthis approach has proved much more difficultin the international policy regimes. Attemptsto establish closer links between the UNCCD,UNCBD, and UNFCC have been called formany times, and an effort to forge such collab-oration was tried by forming the special JointLiaison Group between the three Rio conven-tions (165). Alas, the coordination at the na-tional and subnational levels is much more dif-ficult to achieve owing to several reasons, suchas competition between ministries and govern-ment agencies, lack of coordination between fo-cal points at different levels, and lack of skilledpersonnel (166). Linkages are also hampered bythe inconsistencies in how the various policiesare handled between developing countries andOECD countries. In OECD countries, most ofthe focal points are in ministries of foreign af-fairs or international cooperation, whereas inAfrica, for example, most focal points are as-sociated with ministries of agriculture, ruraldevelopment, or environment (166).

In terms of types of activities implementedby the conventions, the UNCCD is charac-terized by a lack of consistency between dif-ferent implementation attempts. At one level,the Global Environment Facility (which is themain funding agency for the Rio Conventions)is promoting local initiatives of sustainable landmanagement (164). At another, much higher

political level, the African Union, in collabora-tion with the European Union and promotedby the UNCCD, is funding a very controver-sial megaproject, the Green Wall of Africa overa 10-year period (167). This green wall of treesacross the Sahel, from the Atlantic Ocean to theRed Sea, is inspired by the very successful (atleast in rhetoric) Great Green Wall of China.

Outside the formal policy of land degrada-tion, we have identified two important chainswhere science, research, and policy makers havecome together to form influential policies. Inthe first, investigators used research on landdegradation and climate change to formulatean important synergy through the carbon cy-cle. Economics and policy sciences added theconcept of PES by which this synergy couldbe addressed and put into practice. In the sec-ond, researchers framed nutrient depletion asa land-degradation issue and included the con-nection to agricultural policies. The renewedinterest in agriculture as an economic key sectorwhere poverty alleviation and environmentalconcern could be integrated (107) increasinglylinked land degradation to development andmodernization.

Land Degradation, Carbon Cycle,Climate Change, and Paymentfor Environmental Services

A new opportunity to approach land degrada-tion appeared in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocolof the UNFCC was negotiated. The protocolallowed the trading of aboveground carbonsinks through afforestation and reforestation,with the understanding that soil carbon inagricultural and forest soils would be addedlater. A price on carbon in the soil wouldopen up new ways of promoting sustainableland management. This initiated a spur of re-search on the links between land managementand carbon dynamics (163, 168–170). Thesimultaneous development of the concept ofenvironmental services by ecologists (171, 172)and the concept of payment for such servicesby ecological/environmental economists (173)paved the way for formulating innovative

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responses to the problem of land degradation.The anticipated inclusion of agricultural soilsas an eligible carbon sink under the KyotoProtocol did not materialize, but this has beencompensated for by developments outsidethe formal rules of the Kyoto Protocol, theso-called voluntary carbon offsets (174). TheWorld Bank pioneered the links between de-velopmental and environmental policies usingthe concept of PES by setting up the PrototypeCarbon Fund (175), which is now a boomingmarket that engages various developmentinstitutions including the World Bank. One ofthe main players on this market is the ChicagoClimate Exchange, set up by a number of largecompanies in 2003 (176). In this exchange,soil carbon has become the largest type ofcarbon-offset project, comprising approxi-mately one-third of the total carbon offsetsduring 2003–2009 (177). At the other end,nongovernmental organizations have oftenbeen able to reap the benefits of voluntary car-bon offsets (178). China has also embraced theideas of PES as a means to promote watershedprotection, such as downstream-water userspaying upstream farmers for adopting land usesthat limit soil erosion and carbon sequestrationas a cobenefit increasing over time (115).

However, development has not beenwithout critique. From the point of viewof indigenous people’s rights, scholars areconcerned that PES may further increase themarginalization of indigenous people throughan overly narrow focus on a few monetarizedaspects of the ecosystem (179, 180) and that thedominant mode of quantitative inquiry does notadequately listen to the locals (142). Scholars inpolitical ecology and development studies areconcerned that the aim of PES is to make “a lo-cal bill for a global free lunch” (181) and therebyfurther reinforce global inequalities. Fromthe point of view of earth-system governance,another concern arises regarding a mismatchbetween mechanisms at the global level andmodes of implementation at the local level(154). From a political-ecology perspective, thelinks between PES and power relationships areparticularly important. PES, as we know it, is

Carbonsequestration: theremoval and storage ofcarbon from theatmosphere in carbonsinks (e.g., oceans,forests, or soils)through physical orbiological processes

informed by an underlying “Coasian” approachassuming that property rights if not optimallyallocated will become so through bargainingon the market (182). Many smallholders in thetropics have vague or nonexistent rights to theland they work, and because they are oftenengaged in subsistence livelihoods, they have aweak bargaining position in the market. Con-cerns over property rights, therefore, pose themost important stumbling block for harnessingthe potentials of PES (111, 112, 183).

Land Degradation, AgriculturalModernization, MillenniumDevelopment Goals

The return of agriculture to the global de-velopment agenda in recent years is anothertrend with important implications in terms ofland degradation. The previously widespreadgloom and doom depictions of the prospectsfor agricultural development in sub-SaharanAfrica (184) have now been replaced by greateroptimism. This has been followed by substan-tial policy and funding commitments by bothinternational donors and national governments(185). This shift was partially mediated by the“World Development Report 2008” (107),which emphasized the role of agricultural-led growth in the development process andcontributed to a policy discourse centered onproduction increases through technologicalimprovement and sustainable natural-resourcemanagement. Soil-fertility constraints at-tracted particularly strong attention, and land-degradation issues became increasingly linkedto modernization and development discourses.

The linkage between land degradation andeconomics was further facilitated by the con-ceptualization of natural capital as a produced,rather than a primary, input to agriculturalproduction (186). Such a view essentiallyframes land degradation as a problem thatcan be overcome by investment. This stanceis mirrored by the common use of variouseconomic metaphors, such as nutrient budgetand soil recapitalization, in the soil-fertilitydebate. Fairhead & Scoones (79, p. 35) argue

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that such an understanding rests on neoliberalideas and ignores the social contexts of landuse by treating “soil fertility simply as if it was acapital reserve that can be drawn down, addedto, and transferred between accounts.”

Changes in the dominant development dis-course can be traced to the endorsement ofthe Millennium Declaration by the UN mem-ber states in 2000 (187), which shifted the fo-cus from fostering economic growth per se toencouraging “pro-poor growth” and increas-ingly incorporating environmental concerns inthe development process. Particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of poorpeople depend on agriculture for their liveli-hood, it was argued that the achievement ofthe Millennium Development Goals largelyhinges on agricultural-led growth (188). Theessence of the agricultural-modernization dis-course is that a transition from a subsistence-based agricultural economy to a commerciallyoriented agricultural sector and a diversifiedeconomic structure is key to poverty allevia-tion and overall growth (189). A central argu-ment is that no country has ever successfullyreduced poverty without increasing agriculturalproductivity (190).

Political support for this new approach ismanifested by a number of initiatives, suchas the UN Task Force on Hunger, the es-tablishment of Comprehensive African Agri-culture Development Program, and the newlylaunched Global Agriculture and Food SecurityProgram—a multidonor trust fund coordinatedby the World Bank with a budget totalling morethan 900 million dollars to be used to invest ininfrastructure, improved access to inputs, andpromotion of natural-resource management inthe world’s poorest countries to boost foodproduction (191). Initiatives supported by pri-vate donors have increasingly come to influenceAfrican development. Two such major initia-tives are the MVP and the AGRA.

The MVP was initiated in 2004 to providesuccessful evidence on how to achieve rapidlythe Millennium Development Goals (192). Re-lying on a private-donor support, the MVP aimsto kick-start the development process through

a “big push” of investment in a package of inter-ventions in agriculture and other sectors (193),aimed at benefiting approximately half a millionpeople in 80 villages in ten African countries(185). Although some significant achievementshave been recorded, including an increase of upto threefold in crop yields thanks to subsidizedfertilizer and improved seeds (194), critique ofthe MVP is mounting (195). Critical concernsinclude the sustainability of such capital inten-sive, aid-funded initiatives; limitations of up-scaling (196), top-down-driven agendas; lack oflocal ownership (197); and the risk of increasingstratification between poor households as a re-sult of unequal distribution of resources (195).

The AGRA is one of the largest private-donor-supported initiatives to promote agricul-tural development in sub-Saharan Africa. Withinitial investments of 400 million dollars, theAGRA aims to increase agricultural productionand food security largely through a technology-and market-driven process. The program hasfour main components: improved seeds, soilfertility, market access, and policy environment(105). Although the creation of the AGRA waswelcomed by many, its approach has also beenmet by extensive criticism, which relates toreplacement of state-led development and re-search by private-sector-led approaches (1), anarrow portrayal of Africa’s agricultural chal-lenges as mainly technical (158), insufficient at-tention to other factors hampering rural devel-opment such as land rights, as well as the lackof an explicit focus on gender, which runs therisk of limiting the impacts of interventions onwomen (88).

Recently, various signs of reorientationwithin the agricultural-modernization dis-course can be noted, which has implications forapproaches to land management and degrada-tions. In 2002, the World Bank and the Foodand Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations initiated a project known as Interna-tional Assessment of Agricultural Science andTechnology for Development, which broughttogether governments, international organiza-tions, and civil society as well as the privatesector. The aim was to evaluate the current

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state, relevance, and potential of agriculturalknowledge and science and technology in re-ducing hunger and poverty, improving rurallivelihoods, and facilitating sustainable devel-opment. In the project’s synthesis report (108),the great contribution of agricultural knowl-edge and science and technology in increasingagricultural productivity, nutrition, and eco-nomic growth is acknowledged, but it is alsorecognized that this development has been ac-companied by major environmental and socialcosts. The conclusion is that new strategiesare required to meet future needs in terms ofpoverty reduction and reduced environmentalimpacts of agriculture. In the context of natural-resource management, the conventional fo-cus on productivity increase is criticized andmore systems-oriented approaches are calledfor. Proposed actions and policy measures in-clude increased focus on underlying causesof natural-resource mismanagement such asthe various risk factors faced by small-scale

farmers including lack of secure long-termland-use rights, more context-specific ap-proaches in technology development, upscalingof existing small-scale system solutions, recog-nition of community-based innovation, bet-ter integration of science and local knowledge,as well as an end to subsidies that contributeto unsustainable practices. A recent report inrural poverty by the International Fund forAgricultural Development (165) shares many ofthe same perspectives.

CONCLUDING REMARKSAND RESEARCHRECOMMENDATIONS

Research on land degradation is often closelylinked to ideas on what can and should be donein terms of remedies. Using a drivers-pressure-state-impacts-responses (DPSIR) scheme, de-picted in Figure 1, we illustrate how various

State

Pressure

Driving ForcesResponses

Impacts

population pressure,unequal access to various types of

assets and markets,gendered division of labor,environmental preconditions,

bad governance

people forced to overexploit resources,cannot optimize due to risk aversion and imperfect markets

Redistribution, land reform,

access to education

Soi

l & w

ater

con

serv

atio

n,

impr

oved

agr

icul

tura

l pra

ctices

Capacity building,

diversification of liv

elihoodsE

me

rge

ncy

feil

er

land degradation,nutrient depletion,

soil erosion

food insecurity,social vulnerabilityillness, conflicts, forced migration

Figure 1Land degradation and potential responses by society expressed in the form of a DPSIR (drivers, pressure, state, impacts, responses)scheme. Arrow directed toward “State” represents the short-term responses; arrow directed toward “Driving forces” represents changesto various power structures. The policy debate on land degradation in Africa seems to focus on the responses aimed at “Pressure” and“State,” i.e., soil conservation and nutrient management (State) corroborated by capacity building, extension services, credit, andinsurance opportunities (Pressure).

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scientific perspectives are linked to particulartypes of remedies. The DPSIR framework is asimple tool for illustrating responses to complexenvironmental issues, such as land degradation.It is particularly useful for identifying the rangeof short- and long-term responses.

Many of the short-term responses corre-spond to activities aimed at correcting the ob-servable and mappable problems of land degra-dation, such as nutrient deficiency and soilerosion. Ideally, such problems could easilybe remedied by the application of nutrients(through synthetic fertilizers or manure) andsoil conservation, but the lack of necessary in-frastructure and institutions may present bar-riers. Using a critical-realism ontology andepistemology, we can start exploring the ex-istence of barriers by investigating the under-lying structural problems causing land degra-dation, i.e., pressures. Capacity building inthe form of agricultural extension and diver-sification of livelihoods may be pertinent re-sponses here. Further analysis, using a political-ecology approach, can identify the powerstructures creating and maintaining some of thebarriers.

Outside China, we have found very fewpolicy responses that address the underlyingdrivers of land degradation, such as redistribu-tion of land and wealth or access to educationfor people to progress out of a direct depen-dence on the land. In this respect, China is a veryimportant exception because rural reforms, in-cluding land reforms, are potentially the mostimportant instruments for tackling land degra-dation, but these responses in China are notwithout problems. For example, a recent con-cern in China is the rapid acidification of agri-cultural soils owing to an overuse of syntheticfertilizers (139).

Land degradation cannot be understood inisolation of other trends in society and nature.Globalization affects rural livelihoods acrossthe world. An important global megatrendthat is not the result of deliberate policy isthe rapid diversification of rural livelihoods,sometimes referred to as depeasantization(198). A large volume of remittances fromurban centers within or outside the countryplays an increasing role in diversifying rurallivelihoods away from dependence on the land(199, 200). Remittances are becoming a majorsource of income for many peasant households(201). One reason why land-degradationpolicies, such as sustainable land management,have been difficult to implement could be astrong underlying trend of depeasantization bywhich people increasingly see opportunities inlivelihoods other than agriculture. In addition,climate change will have profound effects onprocesses of land degradation, both directlythrough changing climates and indirectlythough changing demands for agriculturalproducts. Most scenarios of future agriculturalproduction project increasing conflicts interms of land use for food and energy. In theDPSIR scheme, such megatrends would berepresented by changing driving forces.

The slow implementation of effective land-degradation remedies has prompted many ac-tors in the international development commu-nity to embrace market solutions instead ofstruggling with inefficient government agen-cies. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to assume thatmarkets for environmental services can func-tion without adequate governance structures.The potential seems to be very promising, butthere is a risk that without effective governmentinstitutions the poorest of the poor will be leftout.

SUMMARY POINTS

1. Land degradation was one of the first global environmental issues to be highlighted bythe international community. The scientific discussion on land degradation has oftenbeen very polarized between alarmists and optimists as well as between natural and socialscientists.

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2. Currently, a constructive dialogue exists between natural and social scientists, resultingin a much richer understanding of the causes and potential remedies of land degradation.

3. Unfortunately, there is also a wide gap between the scientific understanding of landdegradation and the international policy regime responsible for formulating and imple-menting remedies. Compared with other international environmental policy regimes,the land-degradation regime suffers from poor scientific credibility.

4. New initiatives for fighting land degradation are emerging on the basis of the ideas of PES.Many of the new initiatives are synergies between land degradation and climate changemitigation through improved land management and carbon sequestration in vegetationand soils.

5. A renewed focus on agriculture in the development discourse has put land degradationin the form of nutrient depletion on the international policy agenda, and many newinitiatives are emerging. A majority of the initiatives favor modern technological solutionsover more comprehensive land-management strategies.

6. In China, land degradation is a high priority for government interventions in the formof a wide range of rural reforms. There are many examples of success, albeit not withoutcritique from both natural and social scientists.

FUTURE ISSUES

1. The international policy regime on land degradation, primarily the UNCCD, shouldrecognize the scientific understanding of land degradation and create mechanisms fora continuous dialogue with the scientific community in a similar way to that of otherglobal environmental regimes. This is an important topic for research on earth-systemgovernance.

2. The current enthusiasm for market-based mechanisms in natural resource managementhas a large potential for mobilizing new sources of funding for land-degradation remedies.However, aspects of access and fairness in these market-based mechanisms are still poorlyunderstood and remain contested. Both problem solving and critical research are needed.

3. New initiatives to deal with land degradation must be profoundly anchored in both thecurrent scientific understanding and the local context. This calls for hybrid science.

4. Land degradation is an urgent problem for many poor communities across the tropics.This calls for action-oriented science.

5. Global climate change in combination with global political and economic changes willhave profound implications for future land degradation. New research is needed to in-tegrate multiple stressors into current theories and methods.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holding thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful for the financial support of the research project Land Use Today and Tomor-row (LUsTT) and the Linnaeus Centre LUCID, both funded by the Swedish Research CouncilFormas.

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