The Philosophy of Social Science.pdf

11/7/2015 InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophySocialScience,PhilosophyofInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophyPrint

http://www.iep.utm.edu/socsci/print 1/22

ThePhilosophyofSocialScienceThephilosophyofsocialsciencecanbedescribedbroadlyashavingtwoaims.First,itseekstoproducearational reconstruction of social science. This entails describing the philosophical assumptions thatunderpin the practice of social inquiry, just as the philosophy of natural science seeks to lay bare themethodological and ontological assumptions that guide scientific investigation of natural phenomena.Second,thephilosophyofsocialscienceseekstocritiquethesocialscienceswiththeaimofenhancingtheirabilitytoexplainthesocialworldorotherwiseimproveourunderstandingofit.Thusphilosophyofsocialscienceisbothdescriptiveandprescriptive.Assuch,itconcernsanumberofinterrelatedquestions.Theseinclude:Whatisthemethod(ormethods)ofsocialscience?Doessocialscienceusethesamemethodsasnaturalscience?Ifnot,shoulditaspireto?Orarethemethodsappropriatetosocialinquiryfundamentallydifferent from those of natural science? Is scientific investigation of the socialworld even possible ordesirable?What typeofknowledgedoessocial inquiryproduce?Canthesocialsciencesbeobjectiveandvalueneutral?Shouldtheystrivetobe?Doesthesocialworldrepresentauniquerealmofinquirywithitsownpropertiesandlaws?Orcantheregularitiesandotherpropertiesofthesocialworldbereducedtofactsaboutindividuals?

The following article will survey how philosophers of social science have addressed and debated thesequestions. Itwill beginby examining thequestionofwhether social inquiry canor shouldhave thesame aims and use the same methods as the natural sciences. This is perhaps the most central andenduringissueinthephilosophyofsocialscience.Addressingitinevitablyleadstodiscussionofotherkeycontroversies in the field, such as the nature of explanation of social phenomena and the possibility ofvaluefree social science. Following examination of the views of proponents and critics of social inquirymodeledonthenaturalscienceswillbeadiscussionofthedebatebetweenmethodological individualistsandmethodologicalholists.Thisissueconcernswhethersocialphenomenacanbereducedtofactsaboutindividuals.Thepenultimatesectionofthearticleasksthequestion:Howdoessocialscienceascurrentlypracticedenhanceourunderstandingofthesocialworld?Evenifsocialsciencefallsshortofthegoalsofnaturalscience,suchasuncoveringlawlikeregularitiesandpredictingphenomena,itnonethelessmaystillproduce valuable knowledge. The article closes with a brief discussion ofmethodological pluralism. Nosingle approach to social inquiry seems capable of capturing all aspects of social reality. But a kind ofunificationofthesocialsciencescanbepositedbyenvisioningthevariousmethodsasparticipatinginanongoingdialoguewitheachother.

TableofContents

1. NaturalismandtheUnityofScientificMethod2. CritiquesofNaturalism

a. TheAbsenceofSocialLawsb. InterpretivismandtheMeaningfulnessoftheSocialWorld

i. Descriptivismii. Hermeneutics

c. TheHiddenIdeologyofValueNeutralityi. CriticalTheoryii. Postmodernism



3. MethodologicalIndividualismversusHolism4. WhatSocialScienceDoes

a. UncoveringFactsb. CorrelationAnalysisc. IdentifyingMechanisms

5. MethodologicalPluralism6. ReferencesandFurtherReading

1.NaturalismandtheUnityofScientificMethodTheachievementsofthenaturalsciencesinthewakeofthescientificrevolutionoftheseventeenthcenturyhavebeenmostimpressive.Theirinvestigationofnaturehasproducedelegantandpowerfultheoriesthathavenotonlygreatlyenhancedunderstandingofthenaturalworld,butalsoincreasedhumanpowerandcontroloverit.Modernphysics,forinstance,hasshedlightonsuchmysteriesastheoriginoftheuniverseand the source of the suns energy, and it has also spawned technology that has led to supercomputers,nuclear energy (andbombs), and spaceexploration.Natural science ismanifestlyprogressive, insofarasovertimeitstheoriestendtoincreaseindepth,rangeandpredictivepower.Itisalsoconsensual.Thatis,there is general agreement among natural scientists regardingwhat the aims of science are and how toconduct it, includinghow toevaluate theories.At least in the longrun,natural science tends toproduceconsent regarding which theories are valid. Given this evident success, many philosophers and socialtheoristshavebeeneagertoimportthemethodsofnaturalsciencetothestudyofthesocialworld.Ifsocialscienceweretoachievetheexplanatoryandpredictivepowerofnaturalscience,itcouldhelpsolvevexingsocialproblems,suchasviolenceandpoverty,improvetheperformanceofinstitutionsandgenerallyfosterhuman wellbeing. Those who believe that adapting the aims andmethods of natural science to socialinquiryisbothpossibleanddesirablesupporttheunityofscientificmethod.Suchadvocacyinthiscontextisalsoreferredtoasnaturalism.

Ofcourse,theefforttounifysocialandnaturalsciencerequiresreachingsomeagreementonwhattheaimsandmethodsof scienceare (or shouldbe). A schoolof thought,broadlyknownaspositivism,hasbeenparticularlyimportanthere.Ananalysisofpositivismskeydoctrinesiswellbeyondthescopeofthisarticle.However, brief mention of some of its key ideas is warranted, given their substantial influence oncontemporaryadvocatesofnaturalism.ThegenesisofpositivismcanbetracedtotheideasoftheBritishempiricistsof theseventeenthandeighteenthcentury, includingmostnotably JohnLocke,GeorgeBerkeley,andDavidHume.Asanepistemologicaldoctrine,empiricisminessenceholdsthatgenuineknowledgeoftheexternalworldmustbegroundedinexperienceandobservation.Inthenineteenthcentury,AugusteComte,whocoinedthetermpositivism,arguedthatalltheories,conceptsorentitiesthatareincapableofbeingverified empirically must be purged from scientific explanations. The aim of scientific explanation isprediction,heargued,ratherthantryingtounderstandanoumenalrealmthatliesbeyondoursensesandis thus unknowable. To generate predictions, science seeks to uncover laws of succession governingrelations between observed phenomena, ofwhich gravity andNewtons laws ofmotionwere exemplars.Comtealsoadvocated theunityof scientificmethod, arguing that thenatural and social sciences shouldbothadoptapositivistapproach.(Comtewasafounderofsociology,whichhealsocalledsocialphysics.)In the middle third of the twentieth century an influential version of positivism, known as logicalpositivism,emphasizedandrefinedthelogicalandlinguisticimplicationsofComtesempiricism,holdingthat meaningful statements about the world are limited to those that can be tested through directobservation.

Foravarietyofreasons,positivismbegantofalloutoffavoramongphilosophersofsciencebeginninginthe latter half of the twentieth century. Perhaps itsmost problematic featurewas the logical positivistscommitment to the verifiability criterion of meaning. Not only did this implausibly relegate a slew oftraditionalphilosophicalquestionstothecategoryofmeaningless,italsocalledintoquestionthevalidityofemploying unobservable theoretical entities, processes and forces in natural science theories. Logical



positivistsheldthatinprinciplethepropertiesofunobservables,suchaselectrons,quarksorgenes,couldbe translated intoobservableeffects. Inpractice,however, suchderivationsgenerallyproved impossible,and ridding unobservable entities of their explanatory role would require dispensing with the mostsuccessfulscienceofthetwentiethcentury.

Despite the collapse of positivism as a philosophical movement, it continues to exercise influence oncontemporary advocates of the unity of scientific method. Though there are important disagreementsamong naturalists about the propermethodology of science, three core tenets that trace their origin topositivism can be identified. First, advocates of naturalism remainwedded to the view that science is afundamentally empirical enterprise. Second,most naturalists hold that the primary aim of science is toproduce causal explanations grounded in lawlike regularities. And, finally, naturalists typically supportvalueneutralitytheviewthattheroleofscienceistodescribeandexplaintheworld,nottomakevaluejudgments.

Ataminimum,anempiricalapproachforthesocialsciencesrequiresproducingtheoriesaboutthesocialworldthatcanbetestedviaobservationandexperimentation.Indeed,manynaturalistssupporttheview,firstproposedbyKarlPopper,thatthelinedemarcatingsciencefromnonscienceisempiricalfalsifiability.Accordingtothisview,ifthereisnoimaginableempiricaltestthatcouldshowatheorytobefalse,thenitcannotbecalledascientifictheory.Producingempiricallyfalsifiabletheoriesinturnnecessitatescreatingtechniques for systematicallyandpreciselymeasuring thesocialworld.Muchof twentiethcenturysocialscience involved the formation of such tools, including figuring out ways to operationalize socialphenomenathatis,conceptualizetheminsuchawaythattheycanbemeasured.Thedataproducedbyoperationsinturnprovidetheraw,empiricalmaterialtoconstructandtesttheories.Atthepracticallevel,ensuringthatscientifictheoriesaresubjecttoproperempiricalrigorrequiresestablishinganinstitutionalframeworkthroughwhichacommunityofsocialscientistscantrytotesteachotherstheories.

Thepurposeofatheory,accordingtonaturalists,istoproducecausalexplanationsofeventsorregularitiesfoundinthenaturalandsocialworlds.Indeed,thisistheprimaryaimofscience.Forinstance,astronomersmaywishtoexplaintheappearanceofHaleyscommentatregularintervalsofseventyfiveyears,ortheymightwanttoexplainaparticularevent,suchasthecollisionofthecometShoemakerLevy9withJupiterinJuly1994.Scientificexplanationsofsuchregularitiesoreventsinturnrequireidentificationoflawlikeregularitiesthatgovernsuchphenomena.Aneventorregularityisformallyexplainedwhenitsoccurrenceis shown to be logically necessary, given certain causal laws and boundary conditions. This socalledcovering lawmodel thus views explanation as adhering to the structure of a deductive argument,with thelawsandboundaryconditionsservingaspremises inasyllogism. Underpinning theexplanationsof theperiodicreturnofHaleyscommentortheimpactofShoemakerLevy9inastronomy,forinstance,wouldbecertaincasuallawsofphysics,namelygravityandNewtonslawsofmotion.Theselawsmaybeinvokedtoproducecausalexplanationsofavarietyofothereventsandregularities,suchastheorbitoftheplanetsinoursolarsystem,thetrajectoryofprojectiles, thecollapseofstars,andsoforth.Thusthediscoveryoflawlikeregularitiesoffersthepowertoproduceparsimoniousexplanationsofawidevarietyofphenomena.Proponents of the unity of scientific method therefore hold that uncovering laws of social phenomenashouldbeaprimarygoalofsocialinquiry,andindeedrepresentsthesinequanonforachievinggenuinelyscientificsocialinvestigation.

Thedoctrineofvalueneutralityisgroundedinthesocalledfact/valuedistinction,whichtracesitsoriginstoDavidHumesclaimthatanoughtcannotbederivedfroman is.That is, factualstatementsabout theworldcanneverlogicallycompelaparticularmoralevaluation.Forinstance,basedonscientificevidence,biologistsmightconcludethatviolenceandcompetitionarenaturalhumantraits.Butsuchafactualclaimitself does not tell us whether violence and competition are good or bad. According to advocates ofnaturalism,thesameholdstrueforclaimsaboutthesocialworld.Forexample,politicalscientistsmightbeable to tell us which social, political and material conditions are conducive to the development ofdemocracy.But,accordingtothisview,ascientificexplanationofthecausesofdemocracycannottelluswhetherweoughttostrivetobringaboutdemocracyorwhetherdemocracyitselfisagoodthing.Science



canhelpusbetterunderstandhowtomanipulatethesocialworldtohelpusachieveourgoals,butitcannottelluswhat thosegoalsought tobe.Tobelieveotherwise is to fallpreyto thesocallednaturalistic fallacy.However, value neutrality does not bar social scientists from providing an account of the values thatindividuals hold, nor does it prevent them from trying to discern the effects that valuesmight have onindividualsbehaviororsocialphenomena.Indeed,MaxWeber,acentralfigureinlatenineteenthandearlytwentieth century sociology and a defender of value neutrality, insisted that providing a rich account ofindividualsvaluesisakeytaskforsocialscientists.Buthemaintainedthatsocialscientistscanandshouldkeep their ethical judgment of peoples values separate from their scientific analysis of the nature andeffectsofthosevalues.

2.CritiquesofNaturalismNaturalismhasbeenhighly influential in thesocialsciences,especiallysince themiddle in the twentiethcenturyandparticularlyintheUnitedStates.Movementstomakesocialinquirygenuinelyscientifichavedominatedmanyfields,mostnotablypoliticalscienceandeconomics.However,whethertheseeffortshavebeensuccessful iscontestable,andnaturalismhasbeensubjectedtowiderangingcriticism.Somecriticspoint towhat they viewas formidableobstacles to subjecting the socialworld to scientific investigation.These includethepossibleabsenceof lawlikeregularitiesat thesocial level, thecomplexityof thesocialenvironment,andthedifficultyofconductingcontrolledexperiments.Theserepresentpracticaldifficulties,however,anddonotnecessarilyforcetheconclusionthatmodelingsocialinquiryonthenaturalsciencesisdoomedtofailure.Moreradicalcriticsofnaturalismarguethattheapproachisthoroughlymisconceived.Proponentsofinterpretivesocialinquiryareperhapsthemostsignificantamongsuchcritics.Advocatesofthis approach claim that the aim of social investigation should be to enhance our understanding of ameaningful social world rather than to produce causal explanations of social phenomena grounded inuniversal laws. In addition, many proponents of interpretive social inquiry also cast doubt on thepossibility, as well as the desirability, of naturalisms goals of objectivity and value neutrality. Theirskepticismissharedbyadherentsoftwootherinfluentialschoolsofsocialinquiry,knownascriticaltheoryandpostmodernism.Butproponentsoftheseapproachesalsoemphasizethevariouswaysinwhichsocialscience can mask domination in society and generally serve to reinforce the status quo. These variouscriticismsofnaturalismareconsideredbelow.

a.TheAbsenceofSocialLaws

Among critics who point to practical obstacles impeding efforts to model social inquiry on the naturalsciences,perhapstheirmostimportantobjectionquestionstheveryexistenceoflawlikeregularitiesinthesocial world. They argue that the stringent criteria that philosophers of science have established fordeeming an observed regularity to be an authentic lawlike regularity cannot bemet by proposed sociallaws. For a regularity to be deemed a genuine law of nature, the standard view holds that it must beuniversalthatis,itmustapplyinalltimesandplaces.Thesecondlawofthermodynamics,forexample,isheldtoapplyeverywhereintheuniverseandatallpointsinthepastandfuture.Inaddition,thetypesoflawsofmostimportancetosciencearecausallaws.Alawmaybedescribedascausal,asopposedtoamereaccidental regularity, if it represents somekindofnatural necessity a force orpower innature thatgoverns the behavior of phenomena. Not all lawlike regularities meet the causal requirement. Forinstance,itisaregularityofnaturethattheearthorbitsthesuninacertainellipticalpathonceevery364days.Buttheorbitalregularitiesofearthandtheotherplanetsinthesolarsystemhavenocausalpowersthemselves.Theyarerathertheproductofcertainconditionsandcertaincausallaws,namelygravityandNewtonslawsofmotion.

Whethertherearegenuinelawlikecausalregularitiesthatgovernsocialphenomenaisnotatallclear.Inanyevent,no lawsgoverning the socialworldhavebeendiscovered thatmeet thedemandingcriteriaofnatural science.Tobe sure, social scientistshave identifiedmanysocial regularities, someofwhich theyhaveevendubbedsociallaws.Examplesfromthedisciplineofeconomicswouldincludethelawsofsupplyand demand. From political science we find Roberto Michels iron law of oligarchy, which holds that



popular movements, regardless of how democratically inclined, over time will become hierarchical instructure. Another proposed law of politics is Duvergers Law, which posits that twoparty systemswillemerge inpolitical systems that feature simplemajority, singleballot electoral systems.Butupon closerinspection,theselawsfailtomeetthecriteriaforgenuinelawlikeregularities.Sometimes,particularlyineconomics (which boastsmore purported laws than the other social sciences), the lawsmerely describelogical relationships between concepts. These laws may be true by definition, but because they do notdescribe the empirical world, they are not scientific laws. On the other hand, social laws that claim todescribe empirical regularities invariably turn out to be imprecise, exception ridden and timebound orplaceboundratherthanpreciseanduniversal.Considerthelawofdemandfromeconomics,whichholdsthatconsumerdemandforagoodwilldecreaseifpricesgoupandincreaseifpricesgodown.Thoughthispattern typically occurs, it is not without exception. Sometimes increasing the price of a good alsoincreases demand for it. Thismay happenwhen consumers interpret a higher price as signaling higherqualityorbecausepurchasinganexpensivegoodprovidesanopportunityforconspicuousconsumptionwastefulexpenditureasadisplayofstatus.Moreover,thelawofdemandisaweaklawitmerelyspecifiesaninverserelationshipbetweenpriceanddemand.Unlikethemorepreciselawsofnaturalscience,itdoesnotspecifythemagnitudeoftheexpectedchange.

In many cases proposed social laws are grounded in simplified and therefore false assumptions abouthumannature.Forinstance,thelawsofeconomicsaretypicallygroundedintheassumptionsofrationalchoice theory. This theory posits that individuals always act rationally and instrumentally, weighingpotentialcostsandbenefitsastheyaimtomaximizetheirownutility.Butthoughindividualsmaytypicallyact rational in this sense, especially in the economic sphere, it is nonetheless the case that they do notalwaysdoso.Psychologists,forinstance,havedocumentednumerouswaysinwhichindividualsfrequentlyfailtoactrationally,owingtopredictablekindsofflawedreasoningorperceptualerrors. Moreover,itisevidentthatmuchbehavior,evenwithinthesphereofeconomics,isnotinstrumentalbutratherisguidedbysocialnorms,habitortradition.Thusthelawsofeconomicsgroundedintheassumptionofinstrumentalrationalityare in fact false.Outsideofeconomics, the lawsofsocialscienceare fewerandgenerallyevenmoredubious. Duvergers law,which is also grounded in similar assumptions abouthuman rationality,admitsofnumerousexceptions.Manysimplemajority,singleballotsystemsdoinfactexhibitmorethantwopoliticalparties.AndMichelshimselfacknowledgedthathiseponymouslawcouldbenullifiedifstepsweretakentoenhancenormsofdemocraticparticipationwithingroups.Atbest,suchpurportedlawscouldbedescribedastendenciesortypicalpatternsratherthangenuinelawlikeregularities.

Thereasonfortheabsenceofgenuinelawsinthesocialsciencesisasourceofdebate.Somearguethatthefailuretouncoversociallawsstemsfromthecomplexityofhumanbehaviorandthesocialworld.Humanbehavior is the product ofmanifold factors, including biological, psychological and perhaps sociologicalforces,eachofwhicharethemselvesquitecomplex.Moreover,thesocialsystemsinwhichhumanbehaviorare embedded are themselves highly intricate. Untangling the myriad interactions between multipleindividuals in,forexample,aneconomicsystemisadauntingtask.Perhapsitsimplyliesbeyondhumancognitive powers to detect lawlike patterns in such a milieu. Or perhaps no lawlike regularities evenobtainatthesociallevel,eveniflawsobtainatthelevelofindividuals.

Inadditiontocomplexity,anotherimpedimenttosocialscientistsabilitytouncoverlawlikeregularitiesisthedifficulty,andsometimesimpossibility,ofconductingcontrolledexperiments.Naturalscientistsoftenenjoytheabilitytomanipulatevariablesinacontrolledlaboratorysetting.Thishelpsthemidentifycausalfactorswithrespecttophenomenathattheyaretryingtoexplain.Forpracticalorethicalreasons,this isoftennotpossibleinthesocialsciences.Inmanycasesthebestasocialscientistcanhopeforistouncoversocalled natural experiments, in which a suspected causal factor is present in one naturally occurringsetting but absent in another. For instance, suppose social scientists wish to test the hypothesis thattelevision viewing causes violence. Theywould benefit fromanatural experiment if they could find twodemographically similar communities, one of which has just recently received access to television andanotherthatremainswithoutit.Theycouldthentrackviolenceratesovertimeinthetwocommunitiestodetermineifexposuretotelevisiondoesinfactleadtomoreviolence.Thedifficultyisthatsocialscientists



mustwaitfornaturalexperimentstocometothemand,inanyevent,suchexperimentsseldomoffertheopportunitytocontrolforallthepotentiallyrelevantvariables.

Someobservershavepointedtotherelativeyouthofsocialsciencetoexplainthefailuretouncoverlawlikeregularitiesofthesocialworld.Accordingtothisview,thesocialsciencesarestillawaitingtheirGalileoorNewtontoprovideanexplanatoryframeworkthatwillallowthemtobeginuncoveringsuchlaws.However,critics of this viewmaynote that rigorous, systematic attempts to explain social behavior arguably dateback all the way to the ancient Greeks. And attempts to produce empirically grounded social inquiryintentionallymodeledonnaturalsciencearealmostasoldasthescientificrevolutionitself.Atmanypointsinthehistoryofsocialscience,eminentfigureshaveemergedwhoseemedtoofferthepromiseofputtingsocialinvestigationonaproperscientificfooting.ThesewouldincludeThomasHobbes,AdamSmith,AugusteComte,EmileDurkheim,MaxWeber,aswellasthenumerousadvocatesofbehaviorismandpositivisminthetwentiethcentury.But,intheend,aconsensusonmethodandthehopedforscientificprogresshavefailedtomaterialize.

Theexplanationsdiscussedaboveforwhysocialscientistshaveyettoidentifygenuinelawlikeregularitiescite the practical difficulties of uncovering such laws in the social realm. But more radical critics ofnaturalism argue that the attempt to unify the methods of the natural and social sciences is deeplymisguided. They claim that the social world is different from the natural world in crucial respects thatrenderthemethodsofnaturalscienceatbestinadequateforenhancingunderstandingofthesocialworld.Atworst,naturalismnotonly fundamentallymischaracterizes thesocialworld, italsoserves toreinforceoppressivebeliefs,valuesandsocialpractices.Thesecriticsincludeadvocatesofinterpretivesocialinquiry,criticaltheorists,andpostmodernists.

b.InterpretivismandtheMeaningfulnessoftheSocialWorld

Advocates of interpretivism propose an approach to social inquiry grounded in profoundly differentassumptions about the nature of the social world than those who support naturalism. In particular,interpretivistsassert that thesocialworld is fundamentallyunlike thenaturalworld insofaras thesocialworldismeaningfulinawaythatthenaturalworldisnot.Thisdifferencecanbemadeclearbyconsideringthedifferencebetweenhumanactionandthebehaviorofentitiesorsystemsfound in thenaturalworld.Supposethatthereisanactionbyanindividualthatwewishtoexplainforexample,votingataschoolboardmeeting for a particular proposal. Imagine that the individual votes for ameasure by raising hishand.The act of voting entailsmore thanaparticularphysicalmovement,however. In fact, indifferentsituationsthesamephysicalbehaviorofhandraisingcouldindicatedifferentthingsposingaquestion,pointingto theceiling,yawning,andso forth.Thustoadequatelyexplainthepersonsbehavior, it isnotenough to explain the physical processes that caused the hand raising. Indeed, in most cases of socialinquiry,thephysicalprocesseswillbeirrelevanttoexplanationofthebehavior.Rather,whatisrequiredisanaccountofthemeaningbehindtheaction.Inthisexample,thatwouldbeanaccountofwhatthepersonmeantbyraisinghishand,namelytovote.

Thereisnoequivalenttypeofexplanationinthephysicalsciences.Astronomers,forinstance,mightwishtoexplaintheorbitalpathofacomet.Todoso,theyciterelevantnaturallawsandconditionsthatproducethecometsorbitaltrajectory.Butthemotionofthecomethasnomeaningperse inneedofexplanation(although the appearance of the cometmight be interpreted by some human observers as having somemeaning, such as auguring ill fortune). Similarly, a physiologist might seek to explain the biophysicalprocessesthatcauselimbstorise.But,again,thephysicalprocessesthatcauseahumanarmtorisehavenomeaningassuch.Itisonlyfromthestandpointofsocial,asopposedtobiological,behaviorthattheactionhasmeaning.Moreover, theelementsofthenaturalworlditsobjects, forces,eventsandphenomenaare not created or constituted by the meanings that human beings attribute to them. They existindependentofhumanbeliefs,andthelawsthatgovernthemarenotdependentonhumanbeliefseither.Atoms,DNA,planets,andsoforth,wouldstillexistandbegovernedbynaturallawsifhumanbeingsdidnotexist.Thisisobviouslynotthecaseforthesocialworld.Socialinstitutionsamarketplace,achurch,a



businessfirm,asportsgame,marriage,andsofortharecreatedandgovernedinpartbythebeliefsthatpeopleholdaboutthem.

What implication does themeaningful nature of the social world have for themethods and aims socialinquiry?Accordingtointerpretivists,itmeansthatthekeyaimofsocialinquiryshouldbetoenhanceourunderstanding of the social worlds meanings as opposed to producing causal explanations of socialphenomena. Interpretivists often compare social inquiry to textual interpretation. The aim of textualinterpretationistomakesenseofanovel,play,essay,religiousdocumentorothertextbylayingbarethebeliefs,intentions,connectionsandcontextthatcomprisetheirmeaning.Similarly,interpretivistssay,theaimofsocialinquiryshouldbetomakesenseoftheactions,beliefs,socialpractices,rituals,valuesystems,institutionsandotherelementsthatcomprisethesocialworld.Thisinvolvesuncoveringtheintentionsandbeliefs that inform human action,which in turn requiresmaking sense of the broader social context inwhichthosebeliefs,intentions,andactionsreside.

i.Descriptivism

Interpretive theory has drawn much of its inspiration from the fields of cultural anthropology andethnomethodology,thestudyofhowpeoplemakesenseoftheireverydayworld.Indeed,someadvocatesofinterpretive social inquirywish tomake the aims andmethodsof these approaches the exemplar for allsocial inquiry.Akey goal of cultural anthropology is tomake senseof thebeliefs,norms,practices, andritualsofforeigncultures.Forinstance,supposeananthropologistwishestoexplainaparticularreligiousceremony practiced by a huntergather tribe. According to interpretivists, the aim of such inquiry hasnothing to do with identifying relevant lawlike regularities or causal mechanisms that govern theceremony. Nor should the litmus test of a successful explanation be the ability to generate predictionsaboutthetribesbehaviorintheceremony(althoughthecapacitytopredictbehaviormightbeabyproductofsuchinquiry).Rather,theanthropologistsaimshouldbetomakesenseofthepurposeandmeaningofthe ceremony. Naturally, this would require producing an account of how the members of the tribeunderstandtheirceremony.Butitwouldalsoentailplacingtheceremonywithinthebroadercontextofthetribesvalues,worldview,practicesor institutions. Theendproductofsuch investigationwouldbeasocalledthickdescription thatenhancesourunderstandingofthetribe,ratherthanacausalexplanationoftheirbehavior.Thiskindofsocialinquiryhasbeenlabeleddescriptivism.

Many social scientists and philosophers acknowledge that advocates of descriptivism have identified animportant difference between the social and natural worlds. And there is no doubt that the thickdescriptionsof foreign cultures that the approachproduceshave greatly enhancedourunderstandingofthem.Thisinturnhasincreasedunderstandingofhumansocietygenerally,insofarasithasrevealedthegreatdiversityofhumanbeliefs,values,traditions,andpractices.However,theclaimthattheprimarygoalof social inquiry should be to produce thick descriptions has been subjected to serious criticism fromadvocatesofnaturalismandwellasfromcriticswhoidentifywiththeinterpretiveapproach.

Akeyobjectiontodescriptivismisthatitwouldlimitinterpretiveinquirytodescribingculturesorsocietiesin their own terms, leaving no room for criticizing the beliefs, values or selfunderstandings of thosecultures or societies. Clearly, the objection runs, this is unsatisfactory, for persons and even culturescollectivelycanbeunawareordeeplymisguidedabouthowtheirsocietiesreallyfunction,andsomebeliefsandvaluesoperativeinasocietymaybeincoherent,contradictory,selfdefeatingorevendelusional.Surelya primary task of social inquiry must be to offer accounts that are more penetrating and critical thandescriptivismcanoffer. If, as theCanadianpolitical theoristCharlesTaylorhas said, theprimaryaimofsocial investigation is to tell us what is really going on, then descriptivism falls far short of this goal(1985b:92).

ii.Hermeneutics

An important criticism of descriptivism challenges the notion that the role of the social scientists is to



simplytoreexpress the ideas,beliefs,valuesandselfunderstandingsofacultureorsocietybyadoptingthe viewpoint of its inhabitants. This criticism has been developed by advocates of an alternative andinfluential version of interpretive theory that draws on the philosophical hermeneutics of continentalthinkerssuchasMartinHeidegger,HansGeorgGadamer,PaulRicoeur, aswell asAngloAmerican theoristsworking within the tradition, most notably Taylor. These theorists argue that coming to understand aculture or society or another person or even a text or work of art does not involve producing anobjectivedescriptionofanindependentobject.Thatis,thephilosophicalhermeneuticsapproachrejectsasubject/objectontologyinwhichknowledgeconsistsofanaccuraterepresentationofanexternalworldinthemindofasubject.Instead,explainingthebeliefsofacultureorsociety,whetherourownoraforeignone, entails a kind ofdialoguewith it. The process of coming to understand a culture, society or socialpractice isanalogous toaconversationwithanotherperson,especiallyoneaimedatgetting toknowtheother person. In such a conversation, both participants may have their views challenged, theirpresuppositionsabouttheotherexposed,andintheprocessabetterunderstandingofthemselvesandtheirconservationpartnerwillemerge.

The same holds for attempts to understandwhole societies or cultures, according to the hermeneuticaltheorists.Understandingisproducedthroughadialecticalprocessinwhichtheselfunderstandingofbothpartiestheinvestigatoraswellastheculturebeingstudiedmaybetransformed.Instrivingtoexplainthe worldview embedded in a culture its beliefs, values, and selfdefinitions we must necessarilycompareandcontrastthosebeliefs,values,andselfdefinitionstoourown.Indoingso,wemaycometoseelimitations, inconsistencies, contradictions, lacunae or even plain falsehoods associated with our ownworldview as well as that of others. Understanding, Charles Taylor has written, is inseparable fromcriticism,butthis inturnis inseparablefromselfcriticism(1985b:131). Advocatesofthephilosophicalhermeneutics approach emphasize that such interpretive inquirymay also be applied to our ownworld.Taylor, for instance, via deep interpretive inquiry has detected a legitimation crisis at the core ofcontemporaryWesternsociety(1985b:248288).Hearguesthattheinstrumentalistandacquisitivevaluesof modern industrial society are in contradiction with (and in fact erode) other fundamental Westernvalues,includinggenuineautonomyandcommunity.

Hermeneuticsrejectionofnaturalismssubject/objectepistemology,anditsembraceofadialogicalmodelof understanding, also leads to very different understanding of data in the social sciences. Naturalists,Taylorhasargued,wishtomakedataunivocal(1985a:117).Thatis,theyseektobuildtheoriesgroundedindata that will admit of only one meaning. Univocal data allow for intersubjective agreement amongscientists and thus are a key source of sciences claim to objectivity. In the natural science, the goal ofproducingunivocaldataisfrequentlyachieved.Naturalscientistsdoinfactoftenreachconsensusonthemeaningofdatausedtoconstructortestatheoryforexample,thecompositionofgassesdetectedinavolcaniceruption,thenumberofseaturtleeggsdetectedonabeach,orthekindofradiationemittedinasupernova.Butadvocatesofahermeneuticalapproachtosocialinquiryarguethatthedataofsocialsciencetheories can only be made univocal at the cost of producing a highly distorted or largely vacuousdescription of the social world. The data of the social world are partly composed of intentions, beliefs,values, rituals, practices and other elements in need of interpretation. Interpreting them requiresunpacking the largerwebofmeanings inwhich they are embedded.However, no interpretationof suchdatacanbeconsideredfinalanduncontestable.Aswiththeinterpretationofanovel,apoemorapainting,there will be no criteria or external data that can be appealed to that will produce a definitive andincorrigible interpretation of social phenomena. This does not mean that anything goes and that allinterpretations should be considered equally plausible or valid. But it doesmean that the data of socialsciencecannotbeunivocalinnaturalismssense.Rather,thedataofsocialsciencewillremainmultivocaland always open tomultiplemeanings. If consensus about themeaning of social phenomena it is to beattained,itmustbearrivedatviadialogueratherthanappealtodatadeemedtobeexternal,objectiveandbeyonddispute.

Supportersofthehermeneuticalapproachalsoemphasizethatsocialinquiryisinherentlyevaluative.Herethehermeneuticaltraditiondepartsdecisivelyfromdescriptivismandnaturalism,bothofwhichembrace



theaimofobjective,valuefreesocialinquiry.Descriptivistsbelievethatanobjectiveaccountofaculturecanberenderedbyrecoveringthepointofviewoftheculturesmembers.Thereisnoneedtoassessthevalidity,coherenceormeritofaculturesdesiresandvalues.Infact,ifthecultureunderstudyisaforeignone,toattempttodosorisksethnocentricitytheimproperjudgingofanothercultureintermsofonesownvalues. Advocatesofnaturalism,embracingthefact/valuedistinctiondiscussedabove, tendtoviewdesires, purposes and values as merely individuals subjective preferences, which cannot be rationallyassessed.Wemayseektoexplainthecausesofpeoplesbeliefsandvalues,butmoralevaluationofthemlies beyond science. But hermeneutical interpretivists argue that desires, values and purposes are notmerely subjective. As humans we do not simply desire or value some end or trait unreflectively anduncritically.We also evaluate our values, desires and purposes assess them as noble or base, deep orsuperficial, authentic or inauthentic, rational or irrational. For instance, a person might desire to hurtsomeonephysically,butalsoviewthatdesireasshameful, inconsistentwithhismoredeeplyheldvalues,andnotreflectiveofthekindofpersonheaspirestobe.Importantly,thispersonwouldnotbetheonlyoneinpositiontoevaluatehisdesire.Infact,othersmightbemoreperceptiveinidentifyingtheinconsistenciesbetweenthepersonsdeepersenseofselfandhisdesiretohurtanother.Thismeansthatapersoncanbemistakenregardinghisorherownvalues,purposesordesires.Theydonotnecessarilyhavethefinalword.The same holds for entire societies and cultures. Incongruence between values, purposes, desires andbeliefsmayalsooccuratasocietywidelevel,andgoodinterpretiveinquirywillbringtheseinconsistenciestolight.Indoingso,itwillbeevaluative.

There isanothersense inwhichapurelydescriptivistaccountcanfail toprovideanadequateaccountofwhats really going on in a society. A descriptivist account may fail to identify causal processes ormechanismsthatoperate,toborrowaphrasefromKarlMarx,behindthebackofasocietys inhabitants.Identifyingsuchprocessesandmechanismsmaytaketheformofrevealinghowindividualactionsorsocialpolicies or practices may produce unintended consequences (sometimes welcome, but also oftenunwanted).AdamSmithsunpackingoftheinvisiblehandmechanismofthemarketisanexemplarofsuchkindsof explanations. Individuals and, indeed, entire societiesmaybedimlyor evenwhollyunawareofsuchprocesses,andsimplyproducingathickdescriptionofasocietymayleavethemobscure.Accordingtosomesocialscientists,unveilingsuchmechanismsisacentraltaskofsocialscience.Thisviewisdiscussedinthefinalsectionofthisarticle.

Advocatesofnaturalismaswellasofhermeneuticsmayagreethatanimportantaimofsocialinvestigationis to uncover such unseen causal processes. However, proponents of the philosophical hermeneuticsapproachwillinsistthatanysuchexplanationmustbeginwithanattempttomakesenseofindividualsontheirownterms,withtheirownconceptsandselfdescriptions.Interpretivesocialscience,Taylorsays,cannotbypasstheagentsselfunderstandingbycreatingsomepurportedlyneutralscientific language.(1985b:118).Butsomenaturalistswillinsistthatsocialscienceexplanationsneednotalwaysbetiedtotheparticular selfunderstandings of the people under study. In fact, both the explanandum (that is, thephenomena tobe explained) and theexplanans (the explanation itself)may sometimesbe couched in aneutral,transculturalscientificlanguage.Suchexplanationstypicallyattempttomakesenseofphenomenathatareeitheruniversalorcommonatleasttomosthumansocieties(forexample,birth,death,violence,order, domination, hierarchy). They would also be grounded in assumptions about human goals (forexample, nutrition, safety, material wellbeing, status) and human rationality (typically meansendrationality)positedtobespeciesspecificratherthanculturespecific.Theseexplanationsrequiremerelyathin, rather than a thick, description of the social practice or phenomena to be explained. In this way,naturalistsbelievethatsciencecanofferexplanationsofsocialphenomenathattranscendandareinfactsuperiortotheselfunderstandingofthesocietybeingexplained.

A related critiqueof interpretive social inquiry leveledbynaturalists is the chargeofparticularism.Thiscriticismsaysthatinterpretivesocialinquirywouldappeartoproducemerelyacollectionofparticularisticinterpretive accounts of different cultures. That is, an interpretive approach would seem to limit socialsciencesabilitytoexplainsimilarkindsofeventsandphenomenathatoccurindifferentcultures.Politicalscientists, forexample,donotwantmerely toexplain the IranianRevolutionor theRussianRevolution.



They also want to explain revolutions in general. This requires uncovering the typical conditions,mechanismsorlawsthatproducerevolutions.Thatis,itrequirescreatingamodelofatypicalrevolution.Thisinturnentailsabandoningthethickdescriptionsofhumanbeliefsandgoalsfavoredbyinterpretivistsandreplacingitwithathinner,moreabstractaccountofhumanactionthesortusedbyrationalchoicetheorists,forexample.Ifinterpretivistsobjecttousingthislevelofabstraction,naturalistsargue,itappearstheymust relinquish the goal of producing explanations of social phenomena that transcend particularcultures. This would necessitate abandoning many important questions that social sciences havetraditionallysoughttoanswer.

c.TheHiddenIdeologyofValueNeutrality

Twootherschoolsofthoughtthatrejectnaturalismarecriticaltheoryandpostmodernism.Bothoftheseapproaches agree that social inquiry must be in part interpretive. They also agree with advocates ofhermeneuticsthatinterpretationisaninherentlyevaluativeactivity.Thustheyrejectnaturalismsgoalofvalue neutrality. Their most important contribution to the critique of value neutrality lies in theirexplorationofthevariouswaysthatsocialsciencecanservetolegitimateandreinforceoppressivevalues,beliefsandpracticesandtherebymaskdomination.Farfrombeingunbiased,valueneutralityrepresentsahiddenideology.

i.CriticalTheory

CriticaltheorytracesisoriginstotheFrankfurtSchool,foundedinthe1920sinGermany,whichincludedsuchthinkersasMaxHorkheimer,TheodorAdorno,HerbertMarcuseandJurgenHabermas.ComingoutoftheMarxisttradition,membersofthisschooltooktoheartMarxsfamousconclusionfromhisThesesonFeuerbach:Philosophershavehithertoonlyinterpretedtheworldinvariouswaysthepointistochangeit. Marx viewed his efforts to explain the inner workings of capitalism and the logic of history as ascientific endeavor.But he also saw social inquiry as necessarily intertwinedwith critiquing society andultimatelyliberatingmankindfromoppression.Followinginthisvein,theoriginalcriticaltheoristsarguedthat a social scientist should not and cannot be a neutral observer of the social world. Thus theFrankfurtSchoolsoughttoretainthesocialcriticismintrinsictoMarxismwhiledistancingtheirapproachfromtherigidifiedorthodoxversionof thedoctrinethatproppedupthetotalitariansystemintheSovietUnionand itssatellites. InplaceoforthodoxMarxismtheyaimedtoproduceanewtheory thatcouldatonceexplainthefailureofsocialismintheWesternliberaldemocraciesandalsoprovideacritiqueofwhattheysawasoppressivefeaturesofdevelopedcapitalistsocieties.

Today critical theory encompasses a broader group of social theorists than solely the contemporarydescendents of theFrankfurt School. Use of the termhas expanded to includemanyother approaches,such as feminism and other liberation ideologies that claim to offer both a systematic explanation andcritique of economic, social and political structures, institutions or ideologies that are held to oppresspeople.Theaimofcriticaltheoryishumanemancipation,andthisisaccomplishedinpartbylayingbarestructural impediments to genuine freedom, contradictions and incoherencies in peoples beliefs andvalues,andhiddenideologiesthatmaskdomination.Liberationthuscomesthroughenlightenment.Whenpeoplearemadeawareofthetruenatureoftheirsituation,theywillcastofftheshacklesofoppression.Inthis sense, critical theory remains continuous with the broader Enlightenment project of theWest thatbegan in theseventeenthcentury: reasonwould triumphover irrationality, superstitionandprejudice tousherinaneweraoffreedomandjustice.

For critical theorists the sources of domination and false consciousness are wideranging. Those in theMarxist tradition, for instance, explore how the values, beliefs and hierarchies generated by capitalismserve to keep theworking class deluded and exploited. Feminist critical theorists examine how patriarchalvalues,whichtheyfindaredeeplyimbeddedincontemporaryinstitutions,legalsystems,andsocialvalues,servetokeepwomensubordinate.Butcritical theoristsalsotrainmuchof theircriticismonmainstreamsocialscience,particularlyitsclaimtovalueneutrality.Liketheadvocatesofhermeneuticalsocialinquiry



describedabove,criticaltheoristscontendthatsocialinquiryisaninherentlyevaluativeenterprise.Infact,criticaltheoristsholdthatthatsocialscienceisanecessarilypoliticalenterprise.Mainstreamsocialsciencemodeled on naturalism, they charge, reinforces the status quo and serves the interests of the powerful,though usually unwittingly. In contrast, critical theory wears its values on it sleeve as an intentionallypartisanendeavoronthesideofliberation.

How, according to critical theorists, does naturalistic social science serve the status quo and maskdomination?Theyarguethatmanyof thesupposedlyneutral,objectiveconceptsandcategoriesofsocialscienceactually subtlybutpowerfully supportparticularpolitical interests andworldviews.Consider theunderstandingofrationalitythatiscentraltostandardeconomictheory.Economistsconceptualizerationalaction in a particularway, namely asmaximizingutility choosing themost efficientmeans to achievesome end. Economists may claim that their concept of rationality is merely descriptive, containing nomoraljudgmentofindividualsbehavior.Butinordinaryuserationalityclearlyimpliesapositivemoralevaluation,anditsopposite,irrationality,indicatesanegativejudgment.Thereforedesignatingactionsasrationalorirrationalhastheeffectnotonlyofevaluatingcertainkindsofbehaviorassuperiortoothers,italso tends to justifypublicpolicygrounded inassumptionsaboutwhatconstitutes rational individualorgovernment behavior. In particular, public policy guided by economists conceptualization of rationalitywilltendtobegovernedbyinstrumentalreasoningachievingthemostefficientmeanstosomedesiredend. As such, it will be biased against other values or motivations for action that may interfere withefficiency,suchasocialjustice,tradition,orpreservingcommunity.Otherconceptsusedbysocialscientistsaresimilarlyvalueladen,criticaltheoristscharge.Whenpoliticalscientists,forinstance,describesocietiesas developed, developing or undeveloped, such classification necessarily implies a moral and politicalhierarchyamongnations,withthewealthy,capitalistsocietiesinvariablywindingupontop.

Critical theorists also point to other ways in which social science has helped to justify and reinforceoppressivepracticesandbeliefs. Inparticular, critical theorists charge that social scienceoften serves toreifysocialprocesses.Thatis,ittendstofostertheillusionthatmalleableorsociallyconstructedaspectsofsociety arenatural, permanentorotherwise incapableofbeingaltered.Social scientists tend to take theinstitutionsandsocialstructureofsocietyaswellasitsvalues,beliefs,customsandhabitsaretakenasagiven. In doing so they establish the parameterswithinwhich public policymust operate. According tocritical theorists, this produces a bias towards the status quo, and also tends to reinforce the power ofdominantgroupsorforcesinsociety.Forexample,orthodoxeconomiststendtodepictcertainfeaturesofcapitalisteconomies,suchasinequalityandunemployment,astheenduringandinevitable(ifunwelcome)resultsofthelawsofmarketsystem.Attemptstoeliminatethesefeatureswillbeultimatelyineffectiveorproduce unacceptably high tradeoffs, in the form of, for example, high inflation and sluggish growth.Nothingcanbedoneabout thisunhappysituation,economistsmaysay it results fromthe fundamentaland inalterable dynamics of economic systems. But critical theorists charge that the purported laws ofeconomics are in fact the product of certain institutional arrangements, beliefs and values that can bealtered.Otherkindsofeconomicsystemsareinfactpossible.Relyingonthe(oftenquestionable)expertiseoftheeconomistturnspublicpolicyintomerelyatechnicalmatter.Thereality isthateconomicpolicyisalso political policy. The institutions and values that underpin an economy reflect political choices.However, social science modeled on the natural sciences tends to blind the public as well as socialscientiststhemselvestothisreality.

Inadditiontohelpingreifysocialstructures,criticaltheoristsarguethattheknowledgeproducedbysocialsciencetooeasilybecomesatoolwithwhichtomanipulatepeopleratherthantoenlightenoremancipatethem.Consider, for instance, someof theways thatgovernmentsandprivate industryuse findings frompsychologyandsociology.Politiciansandinterestgroupshirepsychologiststofindthebestwaytoselltheirpolicyinitiativestothepublic,ratherthanattemptingtoenhancepublicunderstandingofcomplexpolicyissues.Politicalpartiesandprivatecorporationsusefocusgroupstodiscoverwhichwordsorimageshavethebiggestimpactonthepublicandadjusttheirrhetoricandadvertisingaccordingly.PoliticalconsultantsintheUnitedStates,forexample,inrecentyearshaveadvisedopponentsoftheestatetaxtodubitadeathtax,which focus group research shows reduces support for it. Such studies have also led consultants to



adviseopponentsofeffortstoreinincarbonemissionstousethetermclimatechangeratherthanglobalwarming.Publicopinionisthusmanufacturedratherthandiscoveredthroughdeliberationandanalysis.Criticaltheoristsclaimthatinthiswaysocialsciencefostersasocietygovernedbytechnocraticcontrolandisthusultimatelycorrosivetogenuinedemocracy.

Plainly critical theory hasmuch in common with the hermeneutical approach described above. Criticaltheoristsandproponentsofahermeneuticalsocial inquirybothagreethatsocialscienceisaninherentlyevaluative enterprise. Also, critical theorists agree that social inquiry must be, at least in part, aninterpretiveactivity.Socialinquiry,theyagree,mustaimatenhancingunderstandingofourworldratherthan merely enhancing our powers of prediction and technical control. But the two approaches differfundamentally in their ontological assumptions about the socialworld and the relationship between thesocial scientist and the objects of his or her study.Asnoted above, thehermeneutical school holds thatunderstanding is a dialogical and transformative process. Through what HansGeorg Gadamer called afusionofhorizons,boththesocialinquirerandthetargetofinquirycreateakindofhigherunderstandingthattranscendstheviewpointsofbothparties.

Incontrast, critical theorists,alongwith those in thenaturalismcamp, tend toembraceasubject/objectontology. From this standpoint, objective knowledge is produced when the social scientist produces anaccurate representation of the social world. This understanding of the relationship between the socialinvestigatorandthesubjectsofhisstudyprivilegesthesocialscientistastheknowingexpert.Thetruthprovidedbytheexpertenlightensthesubjectsof inquiryand, it ishoped,therebysetsthemfree.Theytradeintheirdistortedideologicalunderstandingforthecleareyedperspectiveprovidedbycriticaltheory.Butadvocatesofhermeneuticalinquiry,aswellasothercriticsofnaturalism,mayobjectthatthisapproachmayundermine the liberationist goalsof critical theory.Social inquiry shouldenlighten its subjects,butthisisbestattainedthroughdialogueratherthanatopdownimpositionofexpertanalysis.Indeed,peoplemaybeinclinedtorejecttheverdictofthecriticaltheorists,opposingsuchknowledgeasnotreflectiveoftheir own selfunderstanding or experience. For this reason some proponents of hermeneutical inquirysupport a participatory form of social science, in which social scientists and nonexpert citizens worktogetherinconductingresearchaimedatenlighteningsubjectsandsolvingsocialproblems.

It is important to note, however, that critical theorists often insist that the ultimate test of a theory iswhether its intendedaudienceaccepts itasvalid.Thepurportedlyoppressed forexample, theworkingclass,women, racialminoritiesmust come to see the critical theorists evaluationof their situation astrue.Nonetheless,theprivilegedpositionofthecriticaltheoristisperhapsstillretained.Forinpracticeheorshedecideswhenthesubjectsofhisinquiryarestillinthegripoffalseconsciousnessandwhentheyseetheirsituationasittrulyisthatis,whentheyseetheworldascriticaltheorydepictsit.Presumablynofeministcriticaltheoristwouldacceptthefalsificationofhertheoryofwomensoppressionifthesubjectsofher inquiry,afterdialogueandreflection,concludedthattraditionalgenderrolesbenefitwomen.Rather,shewouldconcludethatthedistortingpowersofpatriarchalideologyaremorepervasiveandentrenchedthanshehadthought.

ii.Postmodernism

Adherents of another influential school of thought, postmodernism, have also been critical of socialsciencesclaimtovalueneutralityand,againlikethecriticaltheorists,theytendtoseesocialscienceasapotentialsourceofdomination.Whilepostmodern isa rather looselydefinedcategory,with theviewsofthinkers associated with it varying widely, some key tenets of the approach can be identified. Centralamong them is culturalandhistorical relativism.According topostmodernists,what counts asknowledgeand truth isalwaysrelative toaparticularcultureorhistoricalperiod.Thisholdsnotonly formoralandaestheticjudgments,butalsofortheclaimstotruthmadebynaturalandsocialscience.Thussciencedoesnot offer a method for arriving at universal, objective truths that transcend time and place. Rather, itrepresentsonewayofknowingthatreflectscertainvalues,beliefsandinterestsofmodern,Westernsociety.Moreover, for postmodernists there is no fixed, universal human nature. Instead, human nature (our



beliefs,values,desires,interests,andevenouremotions)isitselfaproductofaparticularhistoryorsocialconfiguration or, as postmodernists sometimes say, human nature is socially constructed. (Hence avariantofpostmodernismisknownassocialconstructionism.)

Postmodernistsrelativismandtheirdenialofauniversalhumannatureleadtocertaincriticismsofsocialsciencemodeledonnaturalism.They rejectasdeeplymisguidedattemptsby social scientists touncoverpatterns, structures or laws that purportedly transcend history and culture. For postmodernists,understandingofparticularsocietiesmustbelocalandcontextual. Inthisrespect,postmodernistspartlyshare theconcernof critical theorists that social science tends to reify socialpatternsandstructure.Butpostmodernists are also skeptical of critical theorys approach to social inquiry. Though distortingideologies and power structures may obscure the truth, critical theorists maintain that ultimately anobjective picture of society can be rendered. Moreover, the critical theorists view of enlightenment isgroundedintheviewthatthereisanidentifiableuniversalhumannatureinneedofliberation.But,giventheirrelativism,postmoderniststendtoseetheseviewsassupportingsubtleformsofWesternimperialism.Inseekingtoemancipatepeople,criticaltheoristsriskimposingtheirownethnocentricviewsofrationality,autonomy and justice onto nonWestern societies (or reinforcing them in Western ones). Thus forpostmodernists, critical theory is grounded in many of the same faulty assumptions about objectivity,rationalityandknowledgeasmainstreamsocialscience.

Perhaps the most influential postmodern critic of social science was the French social theorist MichelFoucault.Foucaultnotonlychallenged thevalueneutralityof social science,healsodisputed thebroaderenlightenmentview(sharedbymostcriticaltheoristsaswellassocialsciencemodeledonnaturalism)thatmodernreasonandscienceprovidetheroutetomoralandepistemologicalprogress.Foucaultscritiqueofsocial science concerned the way social science categorized individuals and groups, which he believedconstituted a subtlebutpervasive formof social power.His critique is someways resembles the criticaltheorists observations described above regarding the ideological nature of social science categories. ButFoucaultscritiquewasmoreradical.

Foucault contended that most if not all of the social kinds identified and used by social scientists areinventions.Thatis,theyarethecreationsofsocialscienceasopposedtodiscoveriesofnaturalkindsthatreflecttherealunderlying,objectivestructureofsocialreality.Foucaulttrainedmuchofhiscriticismonthefields of clinical psychology, criminology, and sociology,which in thenineteenth centurybegan creatingelaborate taxonomiesof abnormal typesofpersons, for example,psychopaths,neurotics, kleptomaniacs,delinquents,andthelike.Manyofthesenewkindsofpersonswereidentifiedbyreferencetotheirsexualproclivities. For instance, before the emergence of clinical psychology as a discipline, the todaycommonplace view that homosexuals are a kind of person did not exist. Of course, people prior to theemergenceofpsychologyrecognizedthatsomeindividualsaresexuallyattractedtopeopleofthesamesex.Buttheydidnotgenerallyseethisfactasafundamentalelementofapersonsnaturethatcouldbeusedtocategorizehimorherasparticularkindofperson.

Foucaultarguedthatintheprocessofcreatingsuchcategories,socialscienceatthesametimecreatedanddisseminatedaparticularviewofnormality.Inthiswaysocialsciencebecameanewandimportantkindofpotentially oppressivepower in themodernworld.According toFoucault, the stateworkshand inhandwithother institutionsofthemodernworldprisons,schools,medicalclinics, themilitarytomonitorand control people. It accomplishes this, however, neither principally through brute force nor via aregimentofrewardsandpunishments.Rather,thestateworksinconcertwithsocialsciencetoconstructtheverycategoriesthroughwhichindividualsunderstandthemselves.Indoingsoitestablishesthecriteriabywhichnormalandabnormalbehaviorisunderstood,andtherebyregulatesbehaviormostimportantlybygettingpeopletoregulatethemselves.Inthiswaysocialsciencehasineffectbecomeahandmaidentothe forces of domination rather than a potential source of emancipation. Significantly, Foucault neverclaimedthatthisnewtypeofcontrolisintentional.Itismerelyanunwelcomeartifactofsocialscience.

Foucaults depiction of social science was part of his broader account of how all social orders generate



claimstotruthandknowledge.ForFoucaultwhatcountsastruthorknowledge inaparticularsociety ismerelytheproductofacertainconfigurationofpowerrelations.Thereisnotruthorknowledgeoutsideofsuchpowerregimes,heargued.Since thenineteenthcentury, thesocial sciences inconjunctionwith thestatehavebeeninstrumentalinsettingupanewsystemofpower/knowledge,principallythroughcreating not discovering the categories bywhichwemake sense of our social world. But, for Foucault, theallianceofthestateandsocialscienceismerelythelatestpowerregimeinhumanhistory.Othersystemsprecededitandnodoubtnewsystemsofpower/knowledgewillemergeinthefuture.Herecriticspointtoadisturbing implication of Foucaults ideas. It appears that for Foucault human beings, collectively orindividually,cannotliberatethemselvesfromthegripofsuchpowerregimes.Theymaytradeoneregimefor another, but no genuine emancipation is possible. Indeed, given Foucaults views of the self asthoroughlyconstructedbysocialforces,theverynotionofliberationbecomesincoherent.ThusFoucaultsradicalrelativismwouldseemtounderminethecentralaimofanycriticalapproachthatseekstounmaskoppressiveideologies,enhancehumanautonomy,advancejusticeorpromotegreatersocialtransparency.Theideasofotherinfluentialpostmodernandsocialconstructionistcriticsofsocialinquiry(suchasRichardRorty andKennethGergen) that entail relativismanddeny the existenceof a fixedhumannaturewouldseem tobe vulnerable to such criticism, too.Postmodernistsmay charge thatmainstream social sciencemodeledonnaturalismandcriticaltheoryalikebothhavetheeffectofimposingcertainmodernistnotionsofnormality,rationality,andautonomy.Butcriticsofpostmodernismcanretortthatbyunderminingtheverypossibilityofgenuineemancipationpostmodernisminvitesnihilism,quietismorapathy.

3.MethodologicalIndividualismversusHolismAnotherlongstandingcontroversyinthephilosophyofsocialscienceisthedebatebetweenmethodologicalindividualistsandmethodologicalholists.Theformerholdthatsocialfactsandphenomenaarereduciblewithoutremaindertofactsaboutindividuals.Advocatesofmethodologicalholism,ontheotherhand,arguethat there are some facts, conventionally dubbed social facts, that are not reducible to facts aboutindividuals and that social phenomena can sometimes be adequately explained without reference toindividuals.Itshouldbenotedthatthereisnonecessaryconnectionbetweensupportformethodologicalindividualismorholismandonesstancevisvisthenaturalismdebate.Nonethelessthereisatendencyfor advocates of naturalism to embrace methodological individualism. Still, holists are found in thenaturalist camp, too, includingEmileDurkheim andAuguste Comte, both ofwhomwere key figures infoundingthefieldofsociology.

The individualismholismdebate can be somewhat confusing because the terms of debate often refer todifferent claims. Sometimesmethodological individualism is understood to be a theory ofmeaning thatholds thatall statementsabout social entitiesorphenomenacanbedefined in terms that refer solely toindividuals.So,accordingtothisview,themeaningofbureaucracycanbedefinedexclusivelyintermsofthe individuals that compose a bureaucracy without reference to the properties of a bureaucracy as aninstitution.Methodologicalindividualismcanalsoconstituteanontologicaltheory.Thisversionclaimsthatonly individuals are real and that social entities, facts or phenomena are, at best, useful abstractions.Accordingtothisviewwemayspeakofarmies,tradecyclesorriotsinourexplanations,butwemustkeepinmind that such entities and phenomenamerely describe individuals and their interactionswith eachother. Our terms describing social entities and phenomena may be useful for formulating shorthanddescriptions or explanations, but this doesnotmean that the entities andphenomena that they refer toactuallyexist.

Boththemeaningandtheontologicalversionsofmethodologicalindividualismarecontested.Criticsofthemeaningtheorynotethattheviewentailsbarringreferencetoinstitutions,rules,andnormswhendefiningsocial entities and phenomena. This, they charge, is simply not possible. For instance, explaining themeaning of armywould require defining it in terms of the individuals that compose an army, namelysoldiers.Butthedescriptionofthesoldierscouldnotcontainanyreferencetotherules,aims,norms,socialrelationsandstructuresthatinpartcreateanarmy.Notonlywould,forexample,adescriptionofasoldier



as someonewhobelongs to an armybebarred, alsoprohibitedwouldbe any reference to otherholisticphenomenaandentities,suchaswarsorplatoons.Theaccountofsoldierswouldhavetobelimitedsolelytonarrowdescriptionsof theirpsychologicaldispositions.Suchrestrictionseemshighly implausible,nottheleastofwhichbecausesoldiersselfunderstandingnaturallyincludesholisticentitiesandphenomena.Ifindividualsincorporateholisticentitiesintotheiractionsandselfdescriptions,whymustsocialsciencebebarredfromdoingso?Moreover,asocialsciencebereftofsuchreferencesseemsunimaginable,and,inany event, social scientists routinely and without controversy employ them in their descriptions andexplanations.Thusfewactualpractitionersofsocialinquiryacceptthemeaningthesis.

Theontological thesis isgenerally regardedas lessobjectionablebut is still contested. It isarguable thatindividualsaretheonlyrealinhabitantsofthesocialworld,evenifpeopletypicallyactasifsocialentitiesandphenomenaarereal.So,forinstance,apersonmightfavorprivatizationofgovernmentservicesonthegroundthat,inherjudgment,governmentcontrolfostersbureaucracies,whichinherviewareinherentlyinefficient. Shemay hold this belief about bureaucracieswithout knowing anything about the attitudes,valuesandsoforthofparticularindividualswhoworkinthem.Thatis,shebelievessomethingaboutthenatureofbureaucraciesthemselvesasopposedtomerelyholdingcertainbeliefsabouttheindividualsthatinhabit them. Methodological holists may claim that her belief is grounded in a proper realistunderstanding of institutions. Bureaucracies are real entities, they argue, because the institutionalstructure of bureaucracies affects the behavior of the individuals within in them. But methodologicalindividualistscanretortthatinprinciplethestructuralpropertiesofabureaucracycanbereducedtofactsabout the individuals that comprise them. This is true even if individuals, including bureaucratsthemselves,believeandactasifbureaucraciesthemselveshavecertainproperties.Itmaybeimpossibletodefine a bureaucracy in terms that omit reference to holistic entities, but that does not mean thatbureaucraciesorotherholisticentitiesarereal.Thesituationcanbecomparedtotherelationshipbetweenparanormalinvestigatorsandtheghoststhattheybelievein.Itmaybeimpossibletodefineparanormalinvestigatorwithoutreferencetotheideaofghostsandotherfantasticalentities.Anditmaybethecasethatbelief inghostsaffectsthebehaviorofparanormal investigators.Butnoneof thisprovesthatghostsexist.

A third and least controversial version of methodological individualism merely posits that socialphenomena must be animated by individual actions. Therefore any satisfactory explanation of a socialeventorregularitymustshowhowitistheresultofindividualsrespondingtoaparticularsocialsituation.Thisviewdoesnotrequirethatholisticentitiesorphenomenabedefinedintermsofindividuallevelfacts,nordoesitrequiredenyingtherealityofholisticentitiesorphenomena.Itsimplyrequiresthatwheneveraholisticentityorphenomenaisclaimedtocausecertaineffects,orwheneverasocialregularityisidentified,someplausiblemechanismattheindividuallevelthatproducesthephenomenamustbeidentified.

Some advocates of methodological individualism have argued that methodological holism is politicallydangerous.Theyclaimthatascribingrealitytoholisticentitieslendscredencetotheviewthatsuchentitieshaveneedsorinterestsoftheirown.Assuch,methodologicalholismtooreadilybecomesthehandmaidentotyrannicalregimesthatclaimthattheneedsofthestateorthenationtranscendthoseofactual, livingpeople. For this reason, Karl Popper called methodological individualism a democraticindividualistapproachtosocialinquiry,whereasmethodologicalcollectivismsupportedtotalitarianjustice.However,criticsofmethodologicalindividualismclaimthatittoohasitsownbuiltinbiases.Bydenyingtherealityofinstitutionalstructuresandotherholisticentitiesorat leastdownplayingthedegreetowhichtheycanconstrain individuals actions methodological individualism tends to support a conservative politicaloutlook.Thisworldviewattributesindividualssocialoreconomicpositionprincipallytotheirownactionsandabilitiesratherthanthesocialsituationthattheyareembeddedin.Thusthepoorarepoorowingtotheir own choices and effort, and not because the capitalist system presents obstacles to exiting theirsituation.

4.WhatSocialScienceDoes



Reflectingthetendencyofphilosophyofsocialscience,mostofthisarticlehasfocusedoncomparingsocialscience to thenaturalsciences.Wehaveseen that formidableproblemsareencounteredwhenthesocialsciences strive to produce theories that approach the range, elegance, predictive power and objectivityassociated with natural science. But instead of asking whether social science can or should mirror thenatural sciences, anotherway to evaluate social science is to ask:How does social science enhance ourunderstandingofthesocialworld?Assessingthemeritsofsocialscienceinthiswayentailsreflectionontheactualpracticesofsocialscientiststhemethodstheyuse,thequestionstheyask,thepuzzlestheytrytosolve, the kind of evidence that they produce, and so forth. Even if social science has failed to producetheoriesthatrivaltheelegantandpowerfultheoriesofthenaturalsciencesthatdoesnotnecessarilyshowthatsocialscienceisnotaworthwhileendeavor.Onewaytomeasurethesuccessofthesocialsciencesistoaskwhether their findingssurpasscommonsenseor folkwisdom,orotherwise tellussomethinguseful,nonobviousorcounterintuitiveaboutthesocialworld.Thissectionexaminesthreeways inwhichsocialscience could be deemed successful by this standard: uncovering facts about the social world, findingcorrelations,andidentifyingmechanisms.

a.UncoveringFacts

An important taskof social inquiry is to laybare factsaboutanoftenmurkysocialworld.This canbeasignificantachievementinitsownright,evenifthediscoveryandcollectionoffactsneverleadstothemoredesirablegoalsofproducingeleganttheoriesandcausalexplanationsofsocialphenomenaorempowersustomakeprecisepredictionsaboutthesocialworld.Withoutsocialscience,ourfactualunderstandingofthesocialworldwouldbeleftmainlytofolkwisdomandanecdotalevidence,neitherofwhichisveryreliable.Uncovering factsabout thesocialworld isnomeanfeat. Itoftenrequiresempiricalrigorandconceptualsophistication. It also often necessitates developing special methods for measuring the entities andphenomenaofthesocialworld.

Followingarejustafewexamplesoffactualquestionsthatsocialsciencecanhelpanswer.Thesequestionsseeminherentlyinterestingorareimportantfromthestandpointofpublicpolicy,andtheanswerstothemare not likely to be evident without sophisticated inquiry. From economics: What types of economicsystemsproducethemostrobusteconomicgrowth?Istheeconomycurrentlyshrinkingorgrowing?Whatis the current unemployment rate? Has the income of themedian worker in European Unionmemberstatesincreasedinthepastdecade,and,ifso,byhowmuch?Hassocialmobilityincreasedordecreasedinadvancedindustrialsocieties?Frompoliticalscience:Whichnationsenjoythemostpoliticalfreedom?Haspolitical freedom throughout the world increased in recent decades? Has warfare? How popular is thecurrentU.S.presidentwiththeAmericanpeople?Ispoliticaldiscoursegettingmoresophisticatedorless?Fromsociology:HavecommunitytiesgrownstrongerourweakerinWesternsocietiesinthepastcentury?Are people in societieswith individualistic values happier than those in communitarian societies? Fromcriminology:Hascrimeincreasedinrecentdecades?Ifso,whatkindsofcommunitieshaveseenthebiggestincreases? From social psychology: How many people in the Western world suffer from clinicaldepression? Has this number increased or decreased recently? We can also include among the factsuncoveredby social inquiry the thickdescriptionsof cultures andpractices that interpretive inquiry canproduce.

Of course, what counts as a factwill be a partly interpretivematter and thus dependent upon the selfunderstandings of the persons being studied. How, for example, should we conceptualize andmeasurefreedom or individualism or depression? The definitions of these terms will always be contestable andsubjecttochange.Andsocialscientistswillalwaysbevulnerabletothecritique,discussedabove,thatthefactstheyuncoverreflecttheirownbiases,interestsorworldviews.Nonetheless,therearefactsaboutthesocialworld,anditseemsfatuoustodenythatsocialscienceatitsbesthasnotmadeusbetteracquaintedwiththem,evenifnopurelyneutralandobjectiveconceptscanbeusedtodescribethem.Thesameistrue,afterall,fornaturalscience.

b.CorrelationAnalysis



Aparticularlyimportanttoolofthesocialsciencesforenhancingunderstandingofthesocialworldisahostofstatisticaltechniquesthatcanbebroadlydescribedascorrelationanalysis.Thesestatisticalinnovationsweredevelopedbysocialscientistsinthelatenineteenthcenturyandcameintowidespreadusebeginninginthetwentieth.Theaimbehindtheirdevelopmentwastohelpgetahandleononeofthemostdifficultproblems confronting social science:How to account for the oftenbewilderingnumber of variables thatpotentiallyinfluencesocialphenomena.Asnotedabove,isolatingtheeffectsofparticularvariablesinthesocial realmpresentsa formidablechallenge tosocial scientists,owing to thedifficultyandsometimesimpossibilityofconductingcontrolledexperiments.Multivariateregressionanalysis,structuralequationmodelingandothersophisticatedstatisticaltoolsaddressthisproblembygivingsocialscientiststheabilitytogaugewithmathematicalprecisiontheimpactofmultiplevariablesonsocialphenomena.Forexample,supposecriminologistswishtoshedlightonthefactorsthatinfluencetherateofviolentcrime.Ahostofpotential social variables might plausibly be thought to do so, including poverty, education, sex, race,population density, guncontrol laws, television viewing, and so forth. Multivariate regression, whichprovides the ability to holdmultiple variables artificially constant, allows researchers to determine howstronglyeachofthesevariablesisassociatedwithviolentcrime.Suchanalysismightbeabletotellus,forexample, that poverty, sex, and education level accounts for 60%of the variance in crime and that guncontrol lawshavenoeffect.Multivariateregressioncanevenhelpgaugethe interactiveeffectsofvariousfactors,perhapsshowingthateducationlevelalonehaslittleeffectoncrimebutdoeshaveanimpactwhencombinedwithpovertyandhighpopulationdensity.

Correlation analysis has greatly enhanced social scientists understanding of the social world, but it ishamperedby serious limitations. Inparticular, it cannever tell researcherswhetherone variablecauseschangesinanothervariable.Thisissoevenifaonetoonecorrespondencebetweenvariablesinuncovered.Foritisalwayspossiblethatthereisanunknownthirdvariablethatisthetruecausebehindchangesinthevariablethatinvestigatorsseekstoexplain.Forexample,supposestatisticalanalysisdemonstratesastrongand stable correlation between individuals average televisionviewing hours and violence: the moretelevision individualswatch, themore likely they are to commit violent acts.But such evidenceby itselfcannottellresearcherswhetherwatchingtelevisionmakespeoplemoreinclinedtocommitactsofviolenceorwhethertheviolencepronearemorelikelytowatchtelevision.Perhapsanunaccountedforthirdfactorsay,poorsocialskillsorunemploymentisthetruecauseoftheviolenceandtheincreasedtelevisionviewing.Explainingthecauseofsomephenomenonrequiresunderstandingofthecausalmechanismthatproduces it.Thiscorrelationanalysiscannotprovide. Itcan,however, tell social scientistswhenacausalconnection does not exist. Correlation does not entail causation, but causal connections always producecorrelation.Sofailuretouncoveracorrelationbetweencertainvariablescaninformresearchersthatthereis no causal connection between them. In this way, correlation analysis provides an important tool forfalsifyinghypotheses.

c.IdentifyingMechanisms

Somephilosophershavearguedthattheprimaryexplanatorypowerofsocialscienceresidesinitsabilitytoidentify mechanisms, as opposed to discovery of lawlike generalizations. Among the more importantadvocates of this view is Jon Elster, who defines mechanisms as frequently occurring and easilyrecognizable causal patterns that are triggered under unknown conditions or with indeterminateconsequences (1999:1).Mechanisms,Elster says, allowus toexplain,butnotpredict.Wemaynotbeabletosaypreciselyunderwhatconditionsamechanismwillbetriggeredorexactlyhowitwilloperateinparticularcircumstances.Nonetheless,weknowamechanismwhenweseeone. Elsterdeniesthatsocialscience has uncovered any genuine lawlike regularities and doubts that it ever will. However, socialscientistscanandhaveidentifiednumerousmechanisms,whichproduceexplanationsthatgobeyondmeredescription,eveniftheyfallshortofexplanationsgroundedinuniversallawsortheories.Explanationbymechanismsmaynotalwayspermitus tomakepredictions,butwe canoften identify theiroperation inhindsight.Keyaimsof social science thus include identifyingmechanisms,describing themwithgreaterdetail,and,ifpossible,morepreciselyidentifyingthekindsofsituationsthatcantriggerthem.



With respect to social inquiry, mechanisms can be divided into individuallevel and sociallevel kinds.Individuallevelmechanismsdescribetypicalwaysinwhichindividualsformdesiresandbeliefsorfallpreytoperceptionorreasoningerrors.An importantcategoryof thesemechanismshas theeffectofreducingcognitivedissonancetheuncomfortablepsychologicalstresscausedbyholdingtwoincompatiblebeliefssimultaneously.Onecommonmechanismthatcombatscognitivedissonancesiswishfulthinking,inwhichapersonrepressesunpleasantbeliefsthatheorsheknowstobetrue.Thesourgrapeseffect,incontrast,worksondesiresratherthanbeliefs.ThismechanismtakesitsnamefromoneofAesopsfablesinwhichafoxdecidesthatsomegrapesareundesirablebecausetheyaretoohighatopavineforhimtoreach.Thesepsychologicalmechanismsmay be triggeredwhenever individuals find themselves in a situation that iscontrarytothewaytheywouldpreferittobe.However,wewillgenerallynotbeabletopredictwhetheroneofthesemechanismswillbetriggeredinsuchasituationor, ifoneistriggered,whichone.Butwecanidentify their operation retrospectively, and in this sense they provide some general explanatory power.Elsterargues that theworksof theablest socialobservers in theWestern traditionare repletewithsuchmechanisms.MuchofhisanalysishasfocusedonAlexisdeTocquevillesDemocracyinAmericaandPaulVeynesBreadandCircuses,whichexplorethecomplexinteractionbetweenbeliefs,desiresandnormsin,respectively, nineteenthcenturyAmericandemocracy and thepolitical institutions of classical antiquity.Theirinsightfuluseofmechanismsintheirexplanationsallowstheirworktotranscendmereidiographicdescriptionandtoshedlightoncontemporarypolitics.

Sociallevelmechanisms involve the interaction of individuals.Unveiling them requires untangling suchinteractiontorevealhowitproducessocialphenomena.Oftenthemostimportantpartof,forexample,aneconomistsworkresidesindevelopingmodelsthatshowhowconsumersandproducers(orothertypesofactors)interactwitheachothertoproduceparticulareconomicphenomenon.Accordingtothisview,thelawsofeconomicsandpoliticsdiscussedabovearebestunderstoodastypicalpatternsproducedbyhumaninteractionrather thangenuine lawlikeregularities.Seenthisway, that the lawofdemandandMichelslaws,forinstance,areexceptionriddenandfarfromuniversaldoesnotcompletelyvitiatetheirexplanatorypower. They still capture important features of human social relations, even if they fail to give socialscientiststheabilitytodeterminepreciselywhenorunderwhatcircumstancessuchphenomenawilloccur.Theirrealvalueresidesnotinpredictingoutcomesbutindemystifyinganoftenopaquesocialmilieu.

Ofspecialinteresttosocialscientistsaresociallevelmechanismsthatproduceunintendedconsequences.The paradigmatic case of an unintended consequences explanation is Adam Smiths invisible hand, aconceptdevelopedinhisseminalworkTheWealthofNations.Theinvisiblehandoccurswhenindividualscontributetothepublicgoodbypursuingtheirown,narrowinterests.Thisphenomenonisubiquitousinacapitalisteconomy.Firmsseektoincreasetheirprofitbystrivingtoproducethebestgoodsforthelowestprice,andconsumersseektosatisfytheirowndesiresbypurchasingsuchgoods.Butinseekingtoadvancetheirownaims,bothalsoatthesametimespureconomicgrowth,whichreducesunemploymentandraiseslivingstandards.Theunintendedandhappyresultof suchselfinterestedbehavior isgreateroverallwealthandprosperity.Sometimesunintendedconsequencesareunwelcomeorevendisastrous,as inthecase of the socalled tragedy of the commons. This phenomena, described by Garrett Hardin in aninfluential 1968Science essay, occurswhen individuals have free access to somedesirable resource andeachseekstomaximizehisorhertakeoftheresource,resultinginitsdepletion,whichmakeseverybodyworse off. An example is provided by the rapid exhaustion of the oceans stock of fish. Commercialfishermeneachstrive tomaximize theirhaulof fish, leading to the swiftdeclineof the total stockandareductionineachfishermansdailyhaul.Paradoxically,toincreasetheirtakeoverthelongrun,fishermenmustsubmittolimitsonhowmuchfishtheycanremovefromthesea.

Considering the explanatory practices of some other fields that we are inclined to call sciences lendssupporttothelegitimacyofexplanationviamechanismsratherthanuniversallaws.AsRoyDAndradehasnoted, the explanations produced by, for example, biology, geology, meteorology and oceanographytypicallydonotrelyonuniversallaws.Asinthesocialworld,theregularitiesandpatternsfoundinthesesciencesarenottimelessanduniversal.Insteadtheyarecontingentandcontextualinthesensethattheyaredependentuponcertainhistoricalandenvironmentalfactors.Changetheconditionsandthepatterns



orregularitiesmayalterordisappearaltogether.The[biologists]descriptionofDNA,DAndradenotes,isnotthedescriptionofalaw,butratherthedescriptionofacomplexcontingentmechanism(1986:21,emphasisadded).Sciencesthatexplainviaidentificationofsuchmechanisms,whichhedubsthenaturalsciences (as opposed to the physical sciences, such as physics, astronomy and chemistry), include, hesays,muchofpsychology,sociology,anthropology,economicsandothersocialsciences.Naturalsciencestendtoviewtheobjectsoftheirinquiriesasmachines.Themachinesofthesocialsciences(understoodasnatural sciences inDAndrades sense)would includesocial structuresand institutions, suchasmarkets,bureaucracies and electoral systems. The questions that scientists ask about amachine are:What is itmade of? and How does it work? Offering a mechanistic account of the inner workings of machinesprovides an explanation that offers a degree of generalizable knowledge. However, he adds that in thenaturalsciences,[G]eneralizationsabouthowthingsworkareoftencomplex,trueonlyofoneparticularkindofthing,andusuallybeststatedinasimplifiednaturallanguage(1986:21).Thiswelldescribesthetypeofmechanismsdiscussedabovethatsocialscienceuncovers.

5.MethodologicalPluralismAtpresentthereisnoagreementabouttheproperapproachtoinvestigatingthesocialworld,asthistourthroughsomelongstandingissuesanddebatesinthephilosophyofsocialscienceshouldhavemadeclear.This lackofconsensus isreflected inthemethodologicalpluralismthatmarkssocial inquiryascurrentlypracticed.Socialscientistsinthenaturalistmoldusevariouskindsofquantitativeanalyses,rationalchoicemodels (particularly in economics and political science), and experimental research (particularly inpsychology) to uncover facts, patterns, and mechanisms in the social realm. Outside the mainstream,various approaches informed by the descriptivist, hermeneutical, critical theory, and postmodern viewsdescribed in previous sections can be seen. These would include (to name but a few) existential andhumanistic psychology ethnomethodology in anthropology phenomenology, deconstructionism, andFoucauldiangenealogyinsociologyMarxism,constructivism,andcriticaltheoryinpoliticalscienceanddifferentkindsofparticipatoryresearchinvariousfields.

Itwould be facile to suggest that all of thesemethods and the theories underpinning them can be fullyreconciled.Butitalsoseemsdoubtfulthatoneapproachalone(eitheramongthosecurrentlyinuseoroneyettobediscovered)couldcapturethewholeofsocialrealityinallitsmultitextureddimensions.Thusthepresentmethodologicalpluralismofsocialscienceseemswelcomeandnecessary.Thatthesocialworldisameaningfulworldcreatedbyselfinterpretingbeings,astheinterpretiveschoolholds,isundeniable.Thusoneoftheaimsofsocialinquiryshouldbetocapturethatmeaning.Also,asthehermeneutical,postmodernand critical theory approaches insist, social inquiry is inherently evaluative. A purely objective, neutralscienceofthesocialworldisneitherpossiblenordesirable.So,roommustbemadeinsocialinvestigationfor reflection on the biases, interests and ideologies embedded in various social sciencemethods. And,finally, naturalistic mainstream social scientists are surely right to continue searching for patterns,mechanisms and causal processes in the social world, for they do exist, even if they are only relativelyenduringanddependentuponsocialcontext,includingtheshiftingselfunderstandingsofhumanbeings.

Fromthisvantage,akindofunificationofthesocialsciencescanbeenvisioned,thoughnot inthesenseadvocatedbynaturalism.Unificationinthissenserequires,asthehermeneuticalapproachsuggests,thatweviewsocialscienceassocialpractice.Theeffortsofsocialscientistsshouldbeseenaspartofawider,ongoing human project to better understand ourselves and ourworld, and tomake ourworld better. Thefacts,patternsandmechanismsthatmainstreamsocialscienceuncovers,themeaningsthatdescriptivismunveils,andtheselfreflectiveawarenessof thevaluesembedded insuch inquiry thatcritical theoryandhermeneuticscounsel,shouldallbepartofthisbroaderhumanconversation.

6.ReferencesandFurtherReadingAdorno,Theodoretal.1976.ThePositivistDisputeinGermanSociology.NewYork:Harper&Row.

Advocatesofnaturalism,includingKarlPopperandHansAlbert,debatecriticaltheoristsTheodorAdornoandJurgenHabermas.



Bishop,RobertC.2007.ThePhilosophyoftheSocialSciences.NewYork:Continuum.

Athoroughandaccessibleoverviewofkeyissuesinthephilosophyofsocialscience,butalsoanargumentagainstanobjectivistviewof

socialinquiryandadefenseofadialogicalone.

Collingwood,R.G.1946.TheIdeaofHistory.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Tracesthedevelopmentofinterpretivesocialinquiryanddefendsitasproperapproachforhistoricalexplanations.

Comte,Auguste.1988.IntroductiontoPositivePhilosophy.FrederickFerre,trans.Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.

Classicdefenseofnaturalismandmethodologicalholismbythenineteenthcenturyfounderofsociology.

DAndrade,Roy.1986.ThreeScientificWorldViewsandtheCoveringLawModel,inMetatheoryinSocialScience,DonaldW.FiskeandRichardA.Shweder(Eds.).Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress.

Durkheim,Emile.1951.Suicide:AStudyinSociology.NewYork:TheFreePress.

Durkheimsexplanationofsuicide,citinganomieasthekeysocialfactorleadingtohighersuiciderates.

Durkheim,Emile.1982.RulesofSociologicalMethod.NewYork:TheFreePress.

ContainsDurkheimsdefenseofnaturalismandmethodologicalholism.

Elster,Jon.1993.PoliticalPsychology.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

ExamineshowTocquevilleandVeyneusepsychologicalandsociallevelmechanismstoshedlighton,respectively,modernegalitarian

democracyandthepoliticalinstitutionsandpracticesofclassicalantiquity.

Elster,Jon.1999.AlchemiesoftheMind.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Explorestheworkofclassicaltheorists,literatureandfolkwisdomforinsightintomechanismsgoverningtheinteractionbetween

rationalityandtheemotions.

Elster,Jon.2007.ExplainingSocialBehavior:MoreNutsandBoltsfortheSocialSciences.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Adefenseoftheviewthatsocialscienceexplanationsrequireidentificationofcausalmechanisms,aswellasanoverviewofthedifferent

toolsandconceptsatthedisposalofsocialscientiststohelpthemdoso.

Foucault,Michel.1970.TheOrderofThings:AnArchaeologyoftheHumanSciences.AlanSheridan,trans.NewYork:Pantheon.

Arguesthattheemergenceofthesocialsciencesmarkstheemergenceofmanasanewkindofobjectofknowledge.

Foucault,Michel.1977.DisciplineandPunish:TheBirthofthePrison.AlanSheridan,trans.NewYork:Pantheon.

Arguesthat,beginninginthelateeighteenthcentury,thelocusofpunishmentshiftedfromthebodytothesoul,reflectinganewkind

ofcontrol.

Geertz,Clifford.1977.TheInterpretationofCultures.NewYork:BasicBooks.

ContainsGeertzsargumentthattheaimofsocialinquiryistoproducethickdescriptionsofhumancultures.

Habermas,Jurgen.1972.KnowledgeandHumanInterest.Boston:BeaconPress.

Arguesthatdifferentkindsofhumaninquiryreflectdifferentinterests.Theproperaimofsocialinquiryishumanemancipationnot

technologicalcontrol.

Hardin,Garrett.1968.TheTragedyoftheCommons.Science162:12431248.

Held,David.1980.IntroductiontoCriticalTheory.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Anexpansiveintroductionto,andevaluationof,theFrankfurtschool.

Hempel,CarlG.1942.TheFunctionofGeneralLawsinHistory.JournalofPhilosophy39:3548.

Classicdefenseofthecoveringlawordeductivenomologicalmodelofexplanation.

Hollis,Martin.1994.ThePhilosophyofSocialScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Introductiontokeyissuesandcontroversiesinthephilosophyofsocialscience.

Little,Daniel.1991.VarietiesofSocialExplanation:AnIntroductiontothePhilosophyofSocialScience.Boulder,



Colo.:WestviewPress.

Introductiontothephilosophyofsocialsciencewithemphasisonactualexplanationsofpracticingsocialscientists.Defendsrational

choiceandmaterialistexplanations,andadvocatesmethodologicalpluralism.

Lukes,Steven.1968.MethodologicalIndividualismReconsidered.BritishJournalofSociology19:119129.

Overviewofdifferentmeaningsascribedtomethodologicalindividualismandanalysisoftheirplausibility.

Martin,MichaelandLeeC.McIntyre(Eds.)1994.ReadingsinthePhilosophyofSocialScience.Cambridge,MA.:TheMITPress.

Containsmostoftheclassicessaysinthefieldaswellasimportantcontemporaryarticles.

Nagel,Ernest.1979.TheStructureofScience.Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.

Includesaninfluentialdefenseofnaturalismandthepossibilityofvalueneutralsocialscience.

Popper,Karl.1985.IndividualismversusCollectivism.InPopperSelections.EditedbyDavidMiller.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Arguesagainstthepossibilityofreducingsociologicalphenomenatofactsaboutindividualpsychologybutmaintainsthataparticular

kindofmethodologicalholismmethodologicalcollectivismisphilosophicallyconfusedandpoliticallydangerous.

Richardson,FrankC.andBlaineJ.Fowers.1998.InterpretiveSocialScience:AnOverview.AmericanBehavioralScientist41:46595.

Anoverviewandcritiqueofnaturalism,descriptivism,criticaltheory,postmodernismandsocialconstructionism,andanargumentfor

understandingsocialtheoryassocialpracticegroundedinahermeneuticalontology.

Rosenberg,Alexander.1995.PhilosophyofSocialScience.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress.

Athoroug

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