The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among
the Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 10)1(c) 2013 Bart A.
Mazzetti
N.B. The reader will note that Scribd does not support my SGreek
Font.
1
Being a supplement to my paper Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements
of Language (Papers In Poetics 9).
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CONTENTS I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION.
II. ON HERMENEIA [INTERPRETATION], PHASIS [WORD], AND
SYNCATEGOREMATA OR CONSIGNIFICANTIA [CONSIGNIFYING WORDS]. III. ON
THE SIGNIFICATIVE AND CONSIGNIFICATIVE PARTS OF SPEECH
2
I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION. 1.
The doctrine with respect to the name or noun and the verb. Cf.
Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael
Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26) (insertions {between
curved braces} by B.A.M.):Porphyry,142 for his part, both in his
[commentary] To Gedalius and in his [commentary] By Questions and
Answers, says that the [25-26] goal ( skopos) of the book is about
predicates. These are simple words significant of realities, qua
significant, and not qua simple expressions {= lexeis?}. For qua
expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with
by Theophrastus in his work on the elements of speech, 143 [10,25]
as well as by his followers, who wrote [on such topics as] whether
nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or whether
articles, conjunctions, and other such things are also these, too,
are parts of vocabulary (lexis {= language}), but the parts of
speech ( logos) are nouns and verbs.144142 143
Porphyry fr. 46, 35-6 Smith. en ti Peri tn tou logou stoikhein .
Kalbfleisch assumed this was the title of a lost work by
Theophrastus (c. 370-288 BC), the student and successor of
Aristotle, while other schoolars interpret it as reference to
Theophrastus elsewhere attested work Peri lexes (On Expression)....
144 cf. Boethius Introductio in syllogismos categoricos, PL 64,
766A-B; In Perihermeneias2, 14.25ff. Meiser; De syllogismo
categorico, PL 64, 796Dff.; cited by G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the
Proposition, Amsterdam and London 1973, 124.
N.B. While Simplicius attributes the doctrine at issue here to
Theophrastus...as well as his followers rather than to Aristotle,
as we shall see, there is much evidence supporting the view that
the Philosopher himself is the source for these distinctions. In
particular, a remark by Boethius, shortly to be cited, attributes
to the Poetics essentials of this teaching.1 Likewise, passages
from Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian of Caesarea, and Ammonius
Hermeias among others support the same conclusion. Cf. ibid., p.
27:Porphyry also adds the remarks of Boethus, which are full of
sharp-wittedness ( ankhinoia) and tend in the same direction as
what has been said. He too says that with regard to nouns and
verbs, the division takes place in so far as the elements of speech
( logos), but [25] according to the categories the division takes
place in so far as expressions ( lexeis) have a relation (skhesis)
to beings, since they are significant of the latter. This, he says,
is the reason why conjunctions (sundesmoi), although they are found
within the vocabulary ( lexis), fall outside of the categories. For
they do not indicate any being, not substance, nor the qualified,
nor anything of the kind. 152 It is thus clear from what has been
said that these men do not define [30] the goal (skopos) as being
about mere words ( phnai), nor about beings themselves in so far as
they are beings, nor about notions (nomata) alone.1
To be sure, he may owe this observation, as well as the doctrine
he hands on, to one or more intermediate texts or authors otherwise
unknown to us, be it a commentary or doxographical report, but such
a provenance does not preclude the possibility that its ultimate
source was the Philosophers books About the Poetic Art.
3
Instead, because it is a prelude to the study of logic, 153 [the
Categories] is about simple words (phnai) and expressions (lexeis);
but [it deals with these] qua significant of primary and simple
beings, and not in so far as they decline 154 or are transformed in
order to accord 155 [with certain words], or undergo such-and-such
modifications ( path) and have such-andsuch forms (ideai),156 all
of [35] which the domain of the investigation of expressions qua
expressions. [12,1]152
B. was apparently replying to the objection that the Cat. is
incomplete, because it leaves out conjunctions and thus does not
deal with all lexeis; cf. Athenodorus and Cornutus (below,
18,24-19,1); Lucius, below, 64,18-65,3. [N.B. Boethus is at fault
here. Conjunctions, like all syncategorematic words, come under the
category of toward something or the relative (pros ti) insofar as
they indicate the way in which something has itself or stands
toward something else. What this early Peripatetic should have said
was that conjunctions, although they are found within lexis (=
language, not vocabulary), fall outside of logos (= speech) because
they do not signify anything by themselves, but only when conjoined
to other words, as the authorities shortly to be cited attest.
(B.A.M.)] 153 cf. above, 1,4-6; 9,9; cf. Ammon. In Cat. 10,9-10.
154 paraskhmatizontai. 155 suskhmatizontai. Cf., with Ph. Hoffman,
Ammon. In De Interp. 65,7-9; Apollonius Dyscolus, On Pronouns,
15,24; On Adverbs, 128,25; 131,3. 156 On grammatical path and
ideai, see above, nn. 128, 130.
Cf: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (=
Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp.
19-20). One might think there is a problem as to why, when he
treated of simple vocal sounds [phonai] at length in the book of
the Predicaments he here again undertakes to speak about the name
and the verb, each of which is obviously a simple vocal sound. The
answer is that a simple vocal sound, a name, a verb, a thing said [
phasis], and a term [horos]50 are the same in subject [toi
hupokeimeni] and differ only in relation [ tei skhesei],51 like [an
apple considered as] the seed and the fruit, or the ascent and the
descent. 52For when we consider that simple vocal sounds are
significant [smantikai] of the things [pragmata] to which they have
been assigned [tisthesthai], this is all we call them, simple vocal
sounds, since we do not in this distinguish names from verbs. But
when we have seen some lack of correspondence [diploe] among these,
and find that some of them are combined with articles and others
are not, or also that some signify a certain time in addition,
while others do not, we distinguish them from one another and call
those which are combined with articles and do not consignify time
names, and those which cannot be combined with articles but are
said according to a certain time we call verbs. But when, on the
other hand, we do not take each of these kinds of vocal sound by
and for itself but rather insofar as it is part of an affirmation
and denial, then we call it a thing said [ phasis], as Aristotle
will clearly teach us in what follows [cfr. 16b 26]. And when he
examines vocal sounds insofar as they are used in a syllogism, we
call them terms [ horoi], as will be said in the proem of the
Analytics.53 This is also how Plato spoke in the ninth book of the
Laws [878b]54.50 51
These represent the four stages of Porphyrys semantic theory....
[remainder omitted] The difference in relation ( skhesis) is a
favorite device of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists in general. 52
[footnote omitted] 53 An. Post. 1.1, 24b16. 54 Laws 9.878B.
4
Cf. ibid,, pp. 20-22 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.): [11,1] But why,
one might ask, when what the grammarians call the parts of speech [
tou merou logou] are various, does he now teach us only these, the
name and the verb? Because, we shall say, these alone, without all
the others, can make an assertoric sentence, 1 as when we [5] say
man is healthy. Therefore Aristotle conducts his investigation in
this only about these, which of necessity are used in every
assertoric sentence and suffice to generate the simple assertion.
5656
cf. Boethius II 14.7-30.
Cf. ibid., p. 67:One should not be surprised if we do not call
the parts of the names and verbs parts of speech consisting of
them, strictly speaking. However, the names and verbs themselves,
which effect not only the pronunciation but also the signification
( smasia) of speech through their own combination (sunthesis) and
which are the most primitive parts to have semantic force, are
rightly said by us to be [20] first parts of speech. Hence,
Socrates in the Cratylus also says that the smallest part of speech
is the name, 223 by which, of course, he means both the name
properly speaking and the verb.223
cf. Cratylus 385C.
N.B. For an additional witness to the provenance of the
foregoing teaching in Plato, cf. Plutarch, Quaest Plat. Question X
(= Moralia 1009 c):2The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and
Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. (tr. William Watson
Goodwin) [Greek Added by B.A.M.] Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C1011 E. (In:
Plutarchs Moralia In Seventeen Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C1032 F.
With an English Translation by Harold Cherniss. Platonic Questions
X, 1009 ff. QUESTION X. Question X a
WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Platos reason
for saying b COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of
nouns and verbs? (Platos Sophist, p. 262 A.) For he seems to make
no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a playful humor has
comprehended them all in one verse:1
For it seems that except for these two Plato dismissed all the
parts of speech whereas Homer in his exuberance went so far as to
pack all [C] together into a single line, the following:
That is, only these produce statement-making, or enunciative,
speech; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr.
B.A.M.): And so only enunciative speech in which the true or false
is found is called interpretation. Hence, what Blank calls the
assertoric sentence I call enunciative speech. On the enunciation
in the perspective of the logic of the second act, see further
below on the meaning of hermeneia. 2 N.B. I give both translations
of this text in full below (the appended notes being by Cherniss),
but cf. the remarks of Anneli Luhtala immediately following.
5
au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr eu)= ei)d$=j.
(Iliad, i. 185.)
Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well you may know
it.c
For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition,
article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particlede being put
instead of the preposition ei)j; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, is
said in the same sense as Aqh/naze, TO ATHENS.a
In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle and noun
and verb and preposition and article and conjunction and adverb,d
for the suffix ward has here been put in place of the preposition
to, the expression tentward being of the same kind as the
expression Athensward.e
This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De
Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden, 1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and
translated in part by A. von Mrl in Die Grosse Weltordnung
(Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in
detail by O. G ldi, Plutarchs
sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zrich, 1922), pp. 2-10.b
Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1,
Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b
4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M.
Cornford, Platos Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp.
307-308.cd
Iliad i, 185.
For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars
Grammatica 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As the Homeric line containing
all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in
Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36
[Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61;
and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (noun adjective
in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. noun 3]) was considered to be a
kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton (Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., 12 [p.
33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p.
553, 11-17....). e Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9
(Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as prefix or suffix 141,
47-52.
Cf. A. Luhtala, Imposition of Names in Ancient Grammar and
Philosophy [In: Stephanos Matthaios, Franco Montanari, Antonios
Rengakos (ed.), Ancient Scholarship and Grammar: Archetypes,
Concepts and Contexts. Trends in classics supplementary volumes, 8.
Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2011. pp. 483-484]:3. The
Philosophers versus Grammarians Parts of Speech The status of the
grammarians eight parts of speech as opposed to the philosophers
two parts was discussed in several philosophical and grammatical
works, starting with the Middle Platonist Plutarch (46-120 AD).
Inspired by the Sophist, he raised the question why Plato should
have recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb,
and dismissed all the other parts of speech, if Homer had included
them all in a [483-484] single verse (Quaest. Plat. [X] 1009c). He
drew a distinction between two kinds of words, (1) those which form
significant expressions with one another, and (2) those which
signify nothing either by themselves nor (sic) in association with
one another. 1 Such are conjunctions, articles and prepositions. He
defends the view that only the noun and verbs are parts of speech,
because they can signify and form a proposition without the other
parts. According to him, the other parts do contribute to speech,
but in a different way, just as salt contributes to a dish of food
and water to a barley-cake (1010c). 121
Cf. the texts of Boethius cited in sec. 3.
6
12
In accordance with the Sophist, he maintains that the noun and
the verb were first invented in order to signify agents and
patients as well action and undergoing action (1009d).
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr.
B.A.M.):Therefore the parts of speech according to the
Dialecticians 1 are two, the name [5] and the verb, since these two
alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the
other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say,
consignificantia [or co-signifying words].2
2. The several considerations of speech and the meaning of
complete speech. As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the
consideration of simple words significant of realities, qua
significant from their consideration qua simple expressions.
Likewise, speech considered as complex has a manifold
consideration, as Aristotle makes clear:Yet every instance of
speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in
them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is
neither true nor false. [5] Let us therefore dismiss all other
types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our
present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs
rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.3
The consideration of speech that is neither true nor false,
then, is proper to rhetoric and poetics, whereas the first is
proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas Aquinas lays
out these distinctions, together with an additional one, in the
following text:Enunciative speech belongs to the present
consideration. The reason for this is that the consideration of
this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which
the soul of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth
from those things that are proper to the thing; and so to this end
the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which
signifies things according as truth about them is in the soul. The
rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what
they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also
through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and
poets for the most part strive to move their hearers by arousing
certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his
Rhetoric (cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12).
And so the consideration of the species of speech mentioned, which
pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward something, falls to
the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense;
but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting
construction of the vocal sounds is considered in them.41
As Priscian goes on to cite the Stoics as holding five parts of
speech, the Dialecticians cannot include them, contra Philotheus
Boehner, Medieval Logic, excerpted below. 2 Partes igitur orationis
sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae
etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem
partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant.
These being words which signify only when joined to the others, as
will be made clear below. 3 Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation)
I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edgehill; slightly rev. B.A.M.). 4 In I
Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio
praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio est, quia consideratio
huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua
animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his
quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum
finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum
quod earum veritas est in anima. sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad
assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria
rei, sed
7
We can see, then, that there is also a consideration of speech
proper to the grammarian. Now as is clear from elsewhere in St.
Thomas commentary, the subject of the grammarians consideration is
oratio perfecta, perfect speech, which we call a sentence, being
that which completes a thought [perfectae orationis, quae complet
sententiam], and make[s] perfect sense in the soul of the hearer [
(facit) perfectum sensum in animo audientis] (cf. In I Peri Herm.,
lect. 7, n. 4).1 On this matter, consider the following: Cf.
Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike (tr. B.A.M.):Speech is a
composition of words disclosing a thought. 2
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.):Speech is a
fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought. 3
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4 (tr.
B.A.M.):Then when he says But not in every, etc. he shows that
through this definition the enunciation [or statement] differs from
the other speeches [= kinds of speech]. And indeed in the case of
imperfect speeches it is obvious that they do not signify the true
or false since they do not make perfect sense in the soul of the
hearer, [and] it is [also] obvious that they do not perfectly
express the judgement of reason, in which the true and the false
consist. Therefore, with these things having been determined, it
must be understood that of perfect speech, which completes a
thought, there are five forms [ species], namely, enunciative [=
making a statement, signifying the true or false], deprecative [=
expressing a prayer], imperative [= issuing a command],
interrogative [= asking a question] and vocative [= addressing a
person].4
Cf. also Plato, Crat. 431b (tr. Jowett; slightly rev.
B.A.M.):Speeches are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and
nouns.
Cf. Plato, Sophist 262 A (tr. Benjamin Jowett):etiam per
dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere
auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut
philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum
specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in
aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae,
ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout
consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. 1 Such speech
possessing both a subject and a predicate; a subject being that
about which we speak, a predicate that which we say of the subject.
See further under sec. II further below.2 3
logo/j e)sti le/cewj sun/qesij dia/noian dhlou=sa.
Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam
demonstrans . Note how Prisicians definition improves on that of
Thrax: the whole making up a sentence is more accurately described
as an ordering than as a composition. It is further specified as
fitting, an attribute of the sentence that is the proper concern of
the grammarian; and the thought expressed is described as complete,
which serves to distinguish the sentence from the phrase. 4 deinde
cum dicit: non autem in omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc
definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis orationibus. et quidem de
orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non significant verum
vel falsum, quia cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo
audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium
rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. his igitur
praetermissis, sciendum est quod perfectae orationis, quae complet
sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet enunciativa,
deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa et vocativa.
8
Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262] Theaet.
True. Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those
who do the actions, we call a noun.
Cf. the following, excerpted from an Internet article called The
Greeks:Plato (Sophist 262a3ff.) discusses onoma as the deloma,
disclosure, of pragma, that which is dealt with, and the rhema as
the deloma of praxis, the disclosure of the dealing with. Therefore
logos must always be an entwining ( symploke) of onoma and rhema,
such that neither a string of nouns alone, nor verbs, can
constitute a disclosive sentence.
N.B. I return to this subject below, but before proceeding, it
will be helpful to consider two additional texts which handle
several of the issues broached above, beginning with the following:
Cf. Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories. (Ancient Commentators on
Aristotle.) John M. Dillon (tr.) (London: Duckworth, 1990) Book 1,
32,17, p. 66:SELEUCUS: They also raise the question as to why he
left out conjunctions. 115 DEXIPPUS: Because, we say, the
employment of them is not a primary but a secondary use of
language, nor are they complete, but incomplete, nor really parts
of discourse ( lektik), but act as symbols (symbolik); nor do they
signify primarily [20], but rather in a subsidiary way, even as we
are accustomed to use marks of punctuation ( diplai),116 which in
combination with the text contribute to the signifying of breaks in
the thought, but on their own they mean nothing. So, also, then,
conjunctions signify in a subsidiary way, in combination with the
other parts of speech, but they in themselves are not significant
on their own, but are like glue.1 [25] It is for this reason that
we do not class them as elements of speech, but, if anything, as
parts of speech. Even if these do signify, they signify only in
combination, like, for example, the syllable ba, 2 and we say that
the present subject of discussion is words without combination
which are significant by themselves, and for the primary uses of
language, not the secondary ones.115 116
[footnote omitted] Diplai are really marginal marks, used by
grammarians and scribes to indicate such things as a variant
reading, a rejected verse, or a change of speaker, but this
translation preserves the sense well enough.
Cf. The Reception of Aristotles Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220.
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Greek
and Latin Language and Literature (Classics) 30 March 2009. Michael
J. Griffin, pp. 300-301:The Co-Significant Dexippus 11,11 and the
related passage 32,17 ff. are relevant in exploring the attribution
of Simplicius 64,18-65,13. Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic)
argument that the Categories should include conjunctions among
other grammatical elements by remarking that the Categories
considers only what is significant and conjunctions are
co-significant (T2b.2):1 2
On this comparison, see the multitude of witnesses assembled
below. The reader would do well to keep in mind this comparison of
the syllable with the conjunction as agreeing in being
non-significative, as we shall meet it again in excerpts from
Boethius and Averroes below.
9
If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in
itself, such as blityri, or if something is significant by
reference to something else, as in the case of so-called
pronouns... or if a term is co-signicant () with something else, as
is the case with articles and conjunctions ( ), in no way would it
be proper to include these among the predicates ( ). [300-301] This
term co-signicant () is unusual. In our record, it first occurs in
Plotinuss treatment of the categories (6.1.5,14), where voice is
divided into the impact on air and the movement, one of which
signies as the other co-signies. It recurs later in Dexippus at
32,17, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to
Lucius above. At 11,11, under a chapter-heading dedicated to the
Stoics, Dexippus mentions the term briefly during his defense
against the arguments of Athenodorus presumably an epitome of the
arguments of Porphyry in the Ad Gedalium. At 32,17 we are given
much more detail about the reason why conjunctions are such
co-signifiers they specifically co-signify breaks in thought ( ,
32,22), but on their own they mean nothing.1
Doctrinal Summary: According to the foregoing writers, who are
either Peripatetics or witnesses to its tradition, in addition to
their treatment in the Categories, there were several
considerations of these simple parts of speech proper to other
sciences; the doctrine of concern to us being that the name and the
verb are to be considered the sole parts of speech because these
two alone produce complete or enunciative speech. Moreover,
according to Priscian, the other sorts of words were known as
syncategoreumata or consignificantia, terms the meanings of which
we shall have occasion to explore below. Again, as has been noted
above, the latter are components of speech which do not signify by
themselves, but only in combination with the other parts of speech,
that is, only when joined to others, namely, the name and verb, a
doctrine to which we next proceed.
1
As may be seen by a careful reading of the passage in question,
the author has clearly misunderstood Dexippus here: signifying
breaks in the thought being proper to diplai, which are merely
comparanda, not sundesmoi, the co-signification of which is made
perfectly evident by the witnesses we cite next.
10
3. The propria of the conjunction and preposition as conjunctive
parts of speech. Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis
Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed.
Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):Wherefore, since among the parts of
speech there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves,
yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do
conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call
interpretations. 1
Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex
Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr.
B.A.M.):For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by
itself . But not every vocal sound is interpretation; for there are
vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not
included under the word interpretation. Neither is every locution
interpretation because, as has been said, there are certain
utterances which lack signification and, although they do not
signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined
with the others do signify, like conjunctions. Interpretation,
however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signifying by
themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds
good, that whatever is an interpretation, that signifies, and
whatever signifies is named by the word interpretation. That is why
Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught
that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the
syllables as syllables signify nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20,
1456b 20ff.]. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify
nothing by themselves. 2 In this book, however, he has established
the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course,
signify by themselves. And nevertheless it cannot be denied that
speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from
parts which are significative, does not lack signification.
Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of the name and the verb,
and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution,
which is interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and
as the name interpretation designates verbs, names, and
significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On
Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated
in this book; that is, interpretation.31
Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil
significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones
uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus . Cf.
St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem., n. 3, excerpted below.
2 Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to
be found in the text of the Poetics which has come down to us,
whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein.
That is to say, of the three things he asserts about the
constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true. 3
Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans.
Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est, sunt enim caeterorum
animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec
omnis locutio interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt
locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per se
quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut
conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis
et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut
quidquid sit intepretatio, illud significet. Et quidquid
significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur . Unde etiam ipse
quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit,
locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit,
quarum syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino
significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem possunt, per
se vero nihil designant . Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro
constituit nomen et verbum, quae scilicet per seipsa significant.
Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et
ipsa cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione
non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de nomine
et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa
locutione, quae est interpret-tatio, in hoc libro ab Aristotele
tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et
significativis locut-ionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur, a
communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est
interpretatione, ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus
est .
11
Doctrinal Summary: According to Boethius, the conjunction and
the preposition agree in signifying nothing by themselves, but only
when conjoined to the others, namely, the name and the verb; both
being parts of language, according to the second text, and so are
not be reckoned interpretations, as he understands the term.
(Rather, as we have noted above, his contemporary Priscian holds
that they are syncategoreumata or consignificantia.) 4. That as
parts of language, connectives are like certain kinds of supports
or bonds. Cf. Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed.
Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr. B.A.M.):The name and the verb are reckoned
to be the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of speech but
rather supports: for as the bridle or reins of a chariot are not
parts, but are in a way certain ligaturesand, as has been said,
supports are not even partsso conjunctions and prepositions and
other things of this sort are not parts of speech but certain
bonds. 1
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., GL II, 551 18. (In: Anneli Luhtala,
Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam &
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004) p.
132):Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as
the sole parts of speech, and the others as having a supporting and
binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the
sides [or planks], the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are
not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together.2
Cf. Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I 3, p. 515,
19; tr. B.A.M.):The Peripatetics believed the parts of speech to be
two, the name and the verb; but the rest they did not say were
parts of speech, but were added for the sake of binding and gluing.
. 3
Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (In:
Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank;
slightly rev. B.A.M., pp. 21-22):1
Nomen et uerbum, duae solae partes sunt putandae, caeterae enim
non partes sed orationis supplementa sunt: ut enim quadrigarum
frena uel lora non partes sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et,
ut dictum est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic coniunctiones et
praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non partes orationis sunt sed
quaedam colligamenta. For an elaboration of this comparison, see
the text of Plutarch below. 2 Quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen
et verbum solas esse partes orationem, cetera vero admincula vel
iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes,
cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et
conglutinationes partium navis [hoc est tabularum et trabium], non
partes navis dicuntur . A more literal translation of the foregoing
Latin reads as follows: Some philosophers were agreed that the name
and the verb were the sole parts of speech, but the rest their
supports or bindings, in the way in which the parts of a ship are
planks and beams, but the rest, for instance, tow (or oakum) and
spikes (or nails) and similar bonds and joinings of the parts of a
ship [that is, of the planks and beams], are not called parts of
the ship.3
oi( Peripathtikoi\ du/o me/rh lo/gou e)do/casan ei)=nai, o)/noma
kai\ r(h=ma, ta\ de\ a)/lla ou) le/gousin ei)=nai me/rh lo/gou,
a)ll e(/neken sunde/sewj kai\ ko/llhj paralamba/nesqai . [N.B.
For
this last sentence, see Gabriel Nuchelmans Theories of the
Proposition, excerpted below. (B.A.M.)]
12
For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its
parts, while bolts, sailcloth1 and pitch are also added to hold
them together and for the unity of the whole, 64 in the same way in
the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs
themselves do the work of bolts,[2] but they would not correctly be
called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their
own produce a [30] complete speech. So these are not parts of
speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is
a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art
[e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse].65 And these are
useful for the [21-22] specific sorts of composition (sunthesis)
and construction (suntaxis)66 of the parts of speech with one
another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things
bound and glue to things joined by it.67 [35] But these are not
parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are conjunctions,
articles, prepositions or adverbs particles (moria) of
speech.6864
This is a common simile, known already to Apollonius Dyscolus in
the early second century as Peripatetic; cf. R. Schneider (ed.)
Apolloni Dyscoli Quae Supersunt, Grammatici Graeci II 3 Librorum
Apolloni Deperditorum Fragmenta, Leipzig 1910, 31.26ff. = Scholia
in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam [Sch. Lond.] 515,19ff.
Hilgard; Schneider (30) attributes this discussion to Apollonius
lost work on the division of the parts of speech ( peri merismou).
It was probably used also by Porphyry (Ebbesen, Porphyrys legacy to
logic, in Aristotle Transformed, op. cit., 156f.), as it appears
here, in Boethius in Int. II 6 Meiser, and elsewhere as well. 65
Poet. 20, 1456b20; cf. below. [Missing from our Poetics. (B.A.M.)]
66 Sunthesis and suntaxis may be used as synonyms; where they are
not, however, the former refers to the way letters, syllables and
words as sounds are used together, while the latter refers to the
combination of the meanings of words to create larger units such as
the sentence. 67 For the various bonds and joins used in this
paragraph, see Metaph. 8.2, 1042b17f. [N.B. For this and related
texts, see further below. (B.A.M.)] 68 The long discussion of this
Peripatetic argument in our fragment of Apollonius Dyscolus On
Division is concerned solely with the question whether name and
verb are the only parts of logos; that all the word-classes
together are the parts of lexis is never mentioned. The discussion
of Theophrastus On the Elements of the Sentence by Simplicius (in
Cat. 10,20-11,2 = fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) makes it clear that
Theophrastus did not actually make this distinction, for the words
as expression ( lexis) were discussed by him in that work. It seems
likely that the Stoics used the term elements of expression (
stoikheia lexes) to refer to the letters and elements of the
sentence to refer to the word-classes (Diogenes Laertius 7.56;
Galen, On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates 8.3). I believe
that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back
further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have
inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this way; note that
it is with Porphyrys book To Gedalius and By Question and Answer
that Simplicius introduces the note which cites Theophrastus.
Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of
the distinction (II 6.15ff.): like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to
the effect that the parts of expression (locutio = lexis) are
syllables or also conjunctions, neither of which are significant by
themselves, while the parts of the interpretation ( interpretatio,
one might translate speech) he establishes in this book as name and
verb.1
The underlying Greek being linon, flax, one kind of which is
tow, either of these two words would have been acceptable
translations, whereas sail-cloth, being a composing part and no
bond, is impossible. 2 ' , , . [added by B.A.M.]
13
He ends with the explanation: hence in this book Aristotle deals
not merely with the sentence (oratio), but also with verb and name,
nor indeed with mere expression ( locutio), but actually with
significant expressions, which is speech (interpretatio).
Cf. Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity
(Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co.,
2004), pp 136-137I will now proceed to highlight one more author,
who attests to the continuous interest shown in this topic by
philosophers of Late Antiquity, namely, Ammonius. The parts of
speech are described somewhat similarly as by Priscian and the
Scholiasts, as will emerge from the passages quoted below: Now
somebody might say: Seeing that there are more parts of speech as
the grammarians call them, why does he speak to us of only two,
onoma and rhema? Because, we shall say, only these two of them all
can form a proposition, for instance: Man thrives. () Now it is
worth knowing that of the often-named eight parts of sentence 1
some signify substances (physeis), or persons or doings or
sufferings or a combination of them like noun and pronoun and verb
and participle, which alone suffice to constitute a proposition
like Socrates walks or I walk or The runner walks Socrates is
running, the one being used as subject, the other as predicate,
whereas the other parts [136-137] of sentence have no such
signification: they designate a relation or the predicate to the
subject, like most of the adverbs, sc. how the predicate inheres in
the subject, or when or where, or how often, either definitely or
indefinitely, in what position to another, more or less, or
intensely inheres, or how we think something is or is not. () With
how the predicate inheres I mean the adverbs of the intermediate
kind ( mesotes) and of quality, like: Socrates disputes well,
Melanthius kicked Ulysses with the foot. The bees fly in clusters
and the adverbs which indicate whether the predicate inheres in
those we speak of altogether or not altogether. () Those parts of
speech then which signify substances or persons or doings or
sufferings or a combination of person and action or passion
Aristotle divides them all into onomata and rhemata, calling those
with indication of time and used as predicates in propositions
rhemata and those without temporal relation and taking the function
of subjects onomata, whereas those not used in either of these
functions though they belong to the propositions in other ways,
denoting inherence or non-inherence or when or why or how often a
predicate inheres in a subject, or some other mutual relation, he
does not call parts of sentence in the proper sense, for just as
the planks are the proper parts of a ship, while nails, flax, and
pitch are used for holding together the parts and for the union of
the whole, so the conjunctions, articles, prepositions and even the
adverbs in a sentence have the function of nails and so they are
not rightly called parts of the sentence being not fit to form a
complete sentence if joined to one another alone. These then are
not parts of sentence (logos), but parts of speech (lexis) () (tr.
Arens 1984: 66-67) [= Arens, Hans, 1984. Aristotles Theory of
Language and its Tradition. (= Studies in the Theory and History of
Linguistic Science, III.29). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.]
Cf ibid., p. 133:Schneider edited a discussion on this topic
among Apollonius fragments, which are preserved by the Scholiasts.2
The discussion elaborates on the notion of the parts of speech from
various viewpoints, and contains many Apollonian themes; yet it
cannot be regarded as genuinely Apollonian.1
For sentence one should read speech. Likewise, lexis below
should be translated language.
14
2
Quare non dubito totam illam egregiam disputationem, quae in
scholiis Londinensibus ad Dion. Thr. 515, 19-521, 37 Hilg. servata
est, ut desumptam ex Apollonii de merismo libro, transcribere (CG
II.3, 31, 23-25).
Cf. ibid., pp. 134-136:The following passage involves elements
which are distinctly Peripatetic and cannot therefore be ascribed
to Apollonius Dyscolus. It is said that the Peripatetic
philosophers recognized two parts of speech, the noun and the verb,
and claimed that the others are not parts of speech, but are merely
used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat
can be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding
agent, so a sentence can consist of just a noun and a verb, without
words of any other type. But a sentence cannot be formed with no
noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist
just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there are ships made of one
piece of wood only, he argues, similarly there are sentences which
need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei
Soc-rates is walking, Socrates flourishes ( GG I.3, 515, 28-29).
There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb, it
is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why
they do not need binding. Form and matter are concepts pertaining
to Peripatetic philosophy. In Apollonius surviving works,
Peripatetic philosophy is not used.No doubt even other parts of
speech have their own meanings, which are not those of the noun and
the verb, and they never bind together verbs with nouns. For when
we say ho anthropos peripatei, the article is joined to the noun
only, not the verb. Similarly in ho anthropos kalos peritpatei well
pertains to the verb only, not the [134-135] noun. And those that
we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb,
for nobody says Tryphon and reads. They bind either two nouns or
two verbs: Theon and Tryphon, I read and write. For conjunctions
combine similar parts by themselves: I, you and Apollonius. If even
those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and
the verb, it is clear that these parts are not used for the sake of
binding, but rather have a meaning of their own, which is not that
of binding and gluing. For the article indicates reference, which
is expressed neither by the noun nor the verb. And the pronoun
indicates reference or anaphora, and neither of these functions
pertain to the noun or the verb. Saying baino is not the same as
saying katabaino or hyperbaino, for the preposition changes the
meaning. Similarly the adverb. When it is said A man is walking or
A man is walking well, the meaning changes, for in the latter even
quality is expressed by the adverb. Even conjunctions have the
effect of changing meaning. The expression I write is complete
because it is an assertion, but the expression And I write is a
confirmation and is not independent. Neither are grapho men and
grapheis de independent. It has thus been proved that the parts of
speech are not used for the sake of binding, but for such a meaning
as is not contained in the noun and the verb. As for the view that
the sentence cannot exist without a noun and a verb, it can be said
that some parts of speech are more venerable than others, as is
also the case with man. Mans body parts are his hands and feet and
brain and heart; he can live without a hand or a leg, but not
without the brain and heart, and therefore a complete sentence
cannot occur without a noun and a verb ( GG I.3, 516, 28-36). A
further problem is inherent in the following argument: If those,
that are said to be parts of something, are missing, they cause
effects, as is the case with man. When he has lost a leg or a hand,
he has suffered something. Given that the sentence has eight or
seven or five parts, how can a complete sentence consist of two or
three or four parts? Therefore they are not parts of a
sentence.
The Scholiast then presents a long digression on the two modes
of being deficient ( GG I.3, 517, 4ff.), which will not be quoted.
He concludes that this is an argument against the Peripatetics, and
it is immediately clear that its orientation is Platonic.
Thereafter the Scholiast discusses the ordering of the parts of
speech definitely showing Apollonian influences; but this is quite
an independent elaboration of the Apollonian argument.
15
The noun and the verb are to be placed before the other parts,
since they can form an independent clause without the others, e.g.
Socrates is reading. It is justified to place them first, as they
are nearly the only parts and the others exist for their sake. That
which exists for the sake of something else is secondary. The noun
holds the primary position because it expresses the substance, and
the verb accidents, the substances being prior to accidents. Or
because when the noun is refuted, even the verb is refuted. Or the
noun is brought along, while the verb brings along; those that are
brought along are prior to those bringing along. And because the
noun makes (a construction) complete, and the verb is made
complete; those that make complete are prior to those that are made
complete. [135-136] Since the participle is nothing more than the
noun and the verb, it is placed before (the other five parts of
speech). The article precedes pronouns since articles are used with
nouns and pronouns are used instead of nouns, and that which is
used with something precedes that which is used instead of
something, and because the pronoun is not only used instead of the
noun, but even instead of the article which is attached to the
noun. The preposition precedes the adverbs, since the preposition
is used with the nouns on its own. The adverbs are joined to verbs
in their own right: I write well. Nouns precede verbs; it is
therefore appropriate that the preposition which is associated with
the noun should precede the verb which is associated with the verb.
The conjunction holds the final position, since its function is to
bind together the prior mentioned parts of speech (GG I.3, 515,
19-29).
But the Scholiast proceeds to claim that the function of these
parts of speech is not to bind the noun and the verb, but each part
has a meaning of its own, and they do not bind together nouns and
verbs. Thus in The man walks about the article the bears a
relationship to the noun, but none whatsoever to the verb.
Conversely, in the man walks about beautifully the adverb kals
bears a relationship to the verb but none whatever to the noun and
so forth ( GG I.3, 515, 35). The second objection is to the
argument that only a noun and a verb are needed to form a complete
sentence. That is so: but similarly a man, for example, may be
without hands or feet but cannot be without a brain or a heart. One
does not then say that hands or feet are not parts of a man.
Likewise it does not follow that the other elements are not parts
of a sentence; merely that the noun and the verb are the
pre-eminent parts. 1 Again, it appears unlikely that this
discussion is authentically Apollonian, as it explicitly refers to
Plato ( GG I.3, 517, 10).
Cf. also Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius.
sec. IV. [In: David Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of
Apuleius (Brill, 1987, p. 85)]:IV. A proposition, as Plato says in
the Theaetetus, consists of two very special parts of speech, the
noun and the verb,2 e.g. Apuleius argues, which is either true or
false, and so is a proposition. From this, some men have thought
that these two are the only parts of speech because a complete
utterance can be made from these alone that is, because they
express a meaning very well.3 Indeed, adverbs, pronouns,
participles, conjunctions, and other such things which grammarians
list are no more parts of speech than ornamented curved stems are
parts of ships or hair of men; or at least they are fit to be
classed in the general structure of speech like nails, pitch and
glue.41
On this matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect.
6, n. 6 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle): Now, since what is properly called
a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the
formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part,
some parts should be understood as the parts from which speech is
immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of
the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. But neither
should their various bindings and joinings be considered parts,
properly speaking. 2 More literally, the statement reads, Moreover,
as Plato says in the Theatetus, a proposition minimally
(paucissimus) consists of a noun [or name] and a verb. See the
Latin given below. 3 That is to say, a name composed with a verb
sufficiently comprehends a thought. 4 Ceterum propositio, ut ait in
Theateto Plato, duabus paucissimus orationis partibus constat,
nomine et verbo, ut: Apuleius disserit, quod aut verum aut falsam
est et ideo propositio est. Unde quidam rati sunt has duas solas
orationis esse partes, quod ex his soli fieri possit perfecta
oratio, id est, quod abunde
16
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr.
B.A.M.):Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are [the]
principal parts of speech. For under names are comprehended
pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless
determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But
under the verb, the participle, because it consignifies time,
although it have an agreement with the name. But the others are
more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship [
habitudo] of one thing to another, than parts of speech
[themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this
kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a
ship. 1
On the various bonds and gluings mentioned in the foregoing
texts, cf. Ineke Sluiter, Parapleromatic Lucubrations, from
footnote 30, p. 242:2The more general usage of and in Aristotle 3
also points in this direction. and are two of the means by which
unity is achieved, e.g. Ar. Met. 2, 1042bl6ff. (, , , , ); Met. 1,
1052a24 . Interestingly, these metaphors are picked up and applied
to all the lesser parts of speech by Ammonius In Ar. int., CAG IV
5.12.25ff.: ' , , ;4 cf. 13.3ff. Obviously, in none of these cases
does the application of the metaphor envisage the
parapleromatics.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 2 (1042b 15-19) (tr. H. G.
Apostle):But many differences appear to exist. For example, some
things are spoken of as being combinations of matters, as in the
case of things formed by fusion, such as honey-water, others as
being bound together, such as a bundle, others as being glued
together, such as a book, others as being nailed together, such as
a casket, others in more than one of the ways.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. X. 1 (1052a 151052b 2) (tr. H. G.
Apostle):[15] That one is used in many senses has been stated
previously in our account of the various meanings of terms.1
Although one has many meanings, things which are called one
primarily and essentially, but not accidentally, can be summarized
under four heads.sententiam comprehendant. Adverbia autem et
pronomina et participia et coniunctiones et id genus cetera, quae
grammaticii numerant, non magis partes orationis quam navium
aplustria et hominum pilos aut certe in universa compage orationis
vice clavorum et picis et glutinis deputanda . (excerpt from
Apuleius Liber Peri ermeneias) More literally: or at least they are
as a whole assigned the role of conjoining [the parts] of speech
like nails, pitch, and glue [conjoin the parts of a ship]. 1 vel
potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis
partes. sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi
non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco
nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat
tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. alia vero sunt
magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem
unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia
huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. 2
(https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en
[11/11/05]) 3 Desmos, bond, fetter; kolla, glue. I give next the
passages Sluiter cites from Aristotle. 4 Cf. Ammonius Hermeias
supra: For just as the planks of a ship are properly speaking its
parts, while bolts, [tow], and pitch are also added to hold them
together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech
conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the
work of bolts....
17
(1) Things are one if they are continuous, either simply 2, or
in the [20] highest degree by nature, and not by contact or by
being bound together, and of these, those whose motion is more
indivisible and more simple are one to a higher degree and are
prior. 31 2
1015b161017a6. That is, just continuous, without any
restrictions or regardless of the cause. 3 1016a5-17.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIV. 5 (1092a 22-28) (ed. & tr. W.
D. Ross):Those who say that existing things come from elements and
that the first of existing things are the numbers, should have
first distinguished the senses in which one thing comes from
another, and then said in which sense number comes from its first
principles. By intermixture? But (1) not everything is capable of
intermixture, and [25] (2) that which is produced by it is
different from its elements, and on this view the one will not
remain separate or a distinct entity; but they want it to be so. By
juxtaposition, like a syllable? But then (1) the elements must have
position; and (2) he who thinks of number will be able to think of
the unity and the plurality apart; number then will be thisa unit
and plurality, or the one and the unequal.
Doctrinal Summary: Unlike the name and the verb, which, being
conjoined, by themselves produce complete speech, conjunctions
(along with prepositions, or the conjunctive parts of speech
generally) are more like bonds of the parts of speech than parts
themselves; the former being like the composing parts of a ship,
its planks and beams, etc.; the latter, as with pitch, tow, and
nails, their bindings or gluings. One may therefore distinguish the
proper parts of speech being those which immediately enter into its
constitutionfrom the restconjunctions, prepositions, articles and
the like. In sum, just as one could not construct a ship out of
pitch and tow and wax, or nails and bolts and the like, so neither
can one produce speech out conjunctions, prepositions, articles, or
adverbs. 5. An overview of the foregoing witnesses. Cf. Gabriel
Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval
Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland:
Amsterdam and London, 1973), sec. 6.2.5, pp. 96-97:It is evident
that the importance assigned to the noun and the verb as the
indispensable ingredients of a self-sufficient utterance that can
be true or false has certain consequences for the treatment of the
other elements of speech. It seems that the Peripatetics took the
most radical attitude and refused to admit other parts of speech (
mer tou logou) than nouns and verbs. In his commentary on the De
interpretatione (ed. Busse p. 12, 29) Ammonius says that it would
be wrong to call conjunctions, articles, pronouns, and adverbs
parts of speech, because no combination of these elements alone can
yield a perfect utterance. This is confirmed by the Scholia on
Dionysius Thrax (ed. Hilgard p. 515, 19), where we read that the
Peripatetics recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the
verb. The other words are not parts of speech but are used only as
a means of binding the actual parts together, as a kind of glue.
The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and
the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the
pitch, the tow, and the nails.
18
Others took a less extreme course: they admitted the other kinds
of words as parts of speech but drew a borderline between the nouns
and verbs, which are necessary components of a complete
statement-making utterance, and the rest. Nouns and verbs are the
parts of speech in the most proper and genuine sense, being as it
were the body and soul of the utterance (Anecdota Graeca, ed. I.
Bekker II, p. 881, 2; cf. also Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, ed.
Hilgard p. 216, 13). Apollonius Dyscolus ( De adverbiis, ed.
Schneider p. 121, 5) says that the noun and the verb are the most
important ( thematiktera) parts of speech and that the other parts
only serve to make them function in a ready way. Elsewhere ( De
syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 28, 6) he calls the noun and the verb the
most vital ( empsychotata) parts of speech; if the speaker does not
make them known, he will cause the hearer to ask questions about
them. One of the criteria for drawing a distinction between two
groups of parts of speech, then, is the contribution they make to
the completeness of an utterance. Another criterion is reminiscent
of what Aristotle ( De int. 16 b 20) says about the difference
between the copula and other verbs. As we saw in 3.2.2, verbs by
themselves do not yet signify something is the case or not, but
most of them have a meaning on their own in the sense that the
speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses. The copula, on
the other hand, is nothing by itself, but it additionally signifies
some synthesis, which cannot be thought of without the components.
This criterion whether or not the word is accompanied by a thought
which is relatively distinct and self-sufficient is also applied by
Plutarch ( Platonicae quaestiones 1010a), [96-97] as we already
noted in 4.1.4. The verbs beats and is beaten and the nouns
Socrates and Pythagoras make us think of something; but if such
words as men, gar, peri are pronounced in isolation, they are not
associated with any distinct thought or either a pragma or a sma.
Unless they are uttered in combination with nouns and verbs, they
are like empty noises; by themselves they signify nothing. In the
same vein is the remark made by Apollonius Dyscolus (De syntaxi,
ed. Uhlig p. 27, 10) that a conjunction does not signify in an
independent way, just as binding material is useless if there are
no objects which it binds together.1 In De syntaxi (ed. Uhlig p.
13, 1) he draws a parallel between words and sounds. Just as we can
distinguish between vowels (which by themselves form a sound) and
consonants (which cannot form a sound without a vowel), so we can
distinguish between, on the one hand, verbs, nouns, pronouns, and
some adverbs (for instance, Very well) and, on the other hand,
prepositions, articles, and con-junctions, which are more like
consonants in so far as they have no meaning on their own but
signify only together with the other parts of speech (syssmainein,
a term which is also used of conjunctions in De coniunctionibus,
ed. Schneider p. 222, 12).2 As the completeness of an utterance is
determined by the completeness of the thought expressed by it, it
is not surprising that the two criteria lead to much the same
result: nouns and verbs are the essential components of a complete
utterance because they contribute those parts of the complete
thought which can also be conceived in isolation.
Cf. ibid., sec. 8.1.1, pp. 123-124:Boethius identifies the
simple interpretationes with verbs and nouns among which he
includes also participles, pronouns, adverbs, and some
interjections and contrasts them with conjunctions and
prepositions, which by themselves do not signify anything but
designnate something only in combination with other words and are,
therefore, not interpretati1
Cf. ed. Householder, p. 27, cited above: 28. After all the parts
that have been listed we take the conjuncttion, which conjoins, and
cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these
words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical
objects [to connect]. Note how this explanation agrees both with
what Aristotle says about the copula, as well as with the
Peripatetic tradition on conjunctions as being bonds of the parts
of speech. (B.A.M.) 2 For this text, and the corresponding passage
in Priscian, see below.
19
ones. While the [123-124] grammarians distinguish eight parts of
speech ( orationis partes), the philosophers consider the parts of
speech only those expressions which have a full signification
(quidquid plenam significationem tenet ), namely the verb and the
noun, with which participles, adverbs, pronouns, and conventional
interjections may be aligned. Conjunctions and prepositions, on the
other hand, are not parts of speech for philosophers but merely
means of holding the actual parts together, comparable to a
chariots reins and strips of leather (In P. herm. (II) p. 14, 28;
Intr. 766 A-C; De syll. cat. 796 D). The copula est or non est is
said to signify or designate the quality of a statement, just as
the words omnis, nullus, and quidam signify the quantity (Intr. 769
A-B). As the signs of quality and of quantity are distinguished
from the termini, which are the nouns and the verbs serving as
subjects and predicates, their signification must be of the same
kind as the signification of conjunctions and prepositions: they
signify only in combination with interpretationes. Boethius does
not yet have a technical term for all those words which are not
interpretationnes. That such a technical term already existed is
shown by a remark of his contemporary Priscian (Institutiones
grammaticae, ed. Hertz I, p. 54, 5): according to the dialecticians
there are only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, since
they alone make a combination of words complete even if it consists
of nothing else; the other parts they called synkatgoremata, that
is, consignificantia. That the dialecticians cannot be the Stoics
is clear from the next line, in which Priscian says that according
to the Stoics there are five parts of speech. As to the meaning of
the Greek term synkatgoremata, it is advisable, I think, to follow
Priscians explanation, namely that it literally means things which
co-signify. There is good evidence that katgorein was used in the
sense of indicating, revealing, signifying, and katgorema in the
sense of indication or sign. It is therefore plausible to assume
that synkatgorein could be a synonym of such verbs as prossmainein
(Cf. 3.2.2)2 and syssmainein (Cf. 6.2.5). It is from this passage
in Priscians grammar that the technical terms syncategorema and
consignificans, which often occur in medieval writings,
originate.[1]2
In his translation of De interpretatione Boethius uses the verb
consignificare to render prossmainein.
6. The foregoing doctrine according to Priscian. Cf. Priscian,
Inst. gram. GL II 549-551. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and
Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John
Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 132-133]:Nec solum participium
non ab alique propria vi, sed ab affinitate nominis et verbi
nominatum est, sed aliae quoque quinque partes orationis non a sua
vi, sed ab adiunctione, quam habent ad nomen vel verbum, vocabulum
acceperunt: pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur, et
adverbium, quod verbo adiungitur, et praepositio, quae tam nomini
quam verbo praeponitur, et coniunctio, quae coniungit ea, et
interiectio, quae his interiacet. Not only the participle but even
the other five parts of speech are named according to their
connection with the noun and the verb rather than on account of
some property of their own. For the pronoun is so named because it
is used instead of a noun, and the adverb because it is joined to
the verb; and the preposition, as it is joined to both nouns and
verbs; and the conjunction, since it joins these two parts, and the
interjection, because it lies between them.
1[]
On the meanings of the terms Nuchelmans considers, see further
below.
20
Unde est dicendum, quod, si non sit nomen et verbum, nec alia
pars orationis constare poterit. Itaque quibusdam philosophis
placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis, cetera vero
admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae
et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula
et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est tabularum et trabium),
non partes navis dicuntur. sed est obiciendum ad hoc, quod cera et
stuppa non ex eadem constat materia, ex qua tabulae et trabes,
coniunctiones autem et praepositiones et similia ex eadem sunt
materia, ex qua et nomen et verbum constat, hoc est literis et
syllabis et accentibus et intellectu. itaque etiam per se prolatae,
quod partes sunt orationis, ostendunt. quid enim est aliud pars
orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id est cogitationem?
quaecumque igitur vox literata profertur significans aliquid, iure
pars orationis est dicenda. quod si non essent partes, numquam loco
earum nomina ponerentur, cum loco cerae vel stuppae in navi tabula
fungi non potest; invenimus enim loco adverbii nomen, ut una,
multum, falso, qua, et pronomen similiter: eo, illo, et loco
coniunctionis tam nomen quam pronomen: quare, ideo, et adverbium
loco nominis, ut mane novum et sponte sua et euge tuum et belle et
cras alterum. sed si, quia compaginem videntur praestare nomini et
verbo, non sunt partes orationis dicendae, ergo nec partes corporis
debemus accipere nervos, quia ligant membra et articulos, quod
penitus videtur absurdum. multo melius igitur, qui principales et
egregias partes nomen dicunt et verbum, alias autem his nominis et
verbi, nihil mirum, cum inueniuntur quaedam nominationes etiam ex
abnegatione nascentes, ut neutrum genus, quod nec masculinum est
nec femininum, et infinitum verbum, quod personam non habet.
Therefore, it must be said, that without the noun and the verb,
no other part would exist. Therefore some philosophers regarded the
noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the others as
having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a
ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow
and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts
together. But to this it must be objected that wax, tow and nails
are not made of the same material as the sides, rudder and the
sail; but conjunctions and prepositions and their like are made of
the same material, as even the noun and the verb, that is of
letters, syllables, accents and meaning. Therefore, even when
pronounced as such, they prove to be parts of speech. [For what is
a part of speech unless a vocal expression which signifies a mental
concept, namely a thought? Whatever is expressed by means of a
literate vocal form, which signifies something, is a part of
speech.] Were they not parts of speech, nouns could not be used
instead of them, whereas pitch and tow cannot replace the sides of
a ship. For the noun is used instead of the adverb, e.g., una,
multum, falso, qua; and so can the pronoun: eo, illo; both the noun
and the pronoun can be used instead of the conjunction (quare,
ideo), and the adverb instead of the noun, e.g., mane novum and
sponte sua and euge tuum and belle et cras alterum. For if they are
not to be called parts of speech because they seem to bind the noun
and the verb, neither must sinews be regarded as parts of a body,
because they join together limbs and joints, what [read which]
seems totally absurd. It is therefore much preferable to say that
the noun and the verb are the principal and most eminent parts, the
others being adjuncts. It is no wonder that the participle should
receive its name from the noun and the verb, since even some names
derive from a negation, e.g. neuter gender, which is neither
masculine nor feminine, and infinite verb, which lacks person.
21
participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro verbo accipitur,
ex quo et derivatur naturaliter, genus et casum habens ad
similitudinem nominis et accidentia verbo absque discretione
personarum et modorum.
[Therefore the participle is a part of speech which is taken in
place of the verb, from which it naturally derives, having gender
and case similar to the noun and accidents to the verb without
distinction of persons and moods. (tr. B.A.M)]
6. Note on the foregoing. The reader will note that the
objections raised against the doctrinal point at issue in the
foregoing passage are exceedingly weak and quite easily disposed
of. With respect to the first objection, to claim that, inasmuch as
they are made of the same stuff, conjunctions and the like are
therefore the same kind of thing as the name and the verb is like
claiming that a table is the same kind of thing as the chairs
surrounding it because they happen to be made of the same kind of
wood; it being the form of a thing rather than its matter which
gives it its species. As for the second objection, were one
so-called part of speech to be used as another, it would no longer
taken as that part of speech. Conversely, just as a pair of pliers
would not become a hammer if someone were to manage to use them to
drive in a nail, so neither would a noun become a conjunction were
someone to find a way to use it to conjoin the other parts of
speech, supposing such a thing even possible.
22
7. The copulative conjunction according to Averroes. Cf.
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete
Hermanno Alemanno, textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles
Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi
De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [eng. tr.
B.A.M.]:DIXIT. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa
separatim, ut est et, deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones
consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad
se invicem; et hec autem in principio sermonis, ut quoniam, quidem;
et dictiones conditionales que significant continuationem, ut si,
quando et consimiles. DIXIT. Disiunctio vero est etiam vox
composita non significativa separatim disiunc-tiva dictionis a
dictione, ut aut, vel,* sive, et consimiles; et dictiones
exceptive, ut preter, preterquam, et consimiles; et adversative ut
sed, verum, verumtamen, et consimiles. Et iste aut ponuntur in
principio orationis aut in fine [B 236] aut in medio. Et intendimus
hic per sermonem nostrum vox non significativa separatim voces
simplices que, quando coniunguntur aliis, consignificant ut
dictiones sincathegoreumatice, non voces simplices ut sunt littere;
quoniam voces significative separatim composite ex vocibus pluribus
aut tribus aut quator aut amplius secundum [L 33] figures
compositionum sillibicarum, sunt nomen et verbum. HE SAID. A
copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately,
as is and, then, and also, and in general consignificative words,
which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another; and
these, however, [are placed] at the beginning of speech, such as
seeing that, indeed [or now]; and conditional words which signify
continuation, such as if, when, and the like. HE SAID. But a
disjunctive is also a composite vocal sound not significative
separately that disjoins a word from a word, such as either or or,
and the like; and exceptive words, such as except, except for, and
the like; and adversative [words], such as but, however, but
indeed, and the like. And these are placed either at the beginning
of speech, or at the end, or in the middle. And by our remark vocal
sound not significative separately here we mean simple vocal sounds
which when conjoined to others consignify as syncategorematic
words, not simple vocal sounds like letters [or elements] , seeing
as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many
vocal sounds, whether three or four or more according to the
[various] arrangements of the composition of syllables, are the
name and the verb.
* N.B. Minio-Paluello is wrong to treat vel as an example;
rather it must be taken formally as joining the other two words in
the example, as is the case with the Preminger translation (for
which see elsewhere) and the corresponding passage as translated by
Butterworth. See my separate discussion.
8. Note on Averroes text. 23
The reader will note here that the text of Averroes explanation
requires revision, as it makes no sense as it stands. Taken
generally, the sense of his remarks is clear: those simple vocal
sounds which do not signify something by themselves are said to
consignify as syncategorematic words; such vocal sounds being
called simple in a sense different from that of letters. To
understand this last observation, it must be borne in mind that the
letter or elementum is distinguished from the syllable inasmuch as
the former is indivisible, whereas the latter, being composed of
two or more letters, is composite. 1 But a similar distinction is
made with respect to a vocal sound significative by itself, it
being either simple, like black or bird, or composite, like
blackbird. 2 Now if we emend the text in the light of these
distinctions, we can arrive at the following (intelligible)
reading:seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately, <
being either simple, or> composed from many vocal sounds,
whether three or four or more according to the [various]
arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and
the verb.
That is to say, those vocal sounds which are significative
separately are the name and the verb, and these are either simple
or are composed from many vocal sounds, whether two or three or
four or however many, etc. Still, it must be pointed out that, as
explained elsewhere, even syncategorematic words, though called
simple here, can be composite, as Averroes own (Arabic) examples
show.3 But a further emendation regarding the mention of letters in
the preceding member is called for by Averroes reference to the
composition of the syllables in the present clause, as well as by
the role played by the syllable in the definition of speech, as at
De Int. I. 4 16b 30.4 In light of these considerations, I read the
letters (i.e. elements) . Moreover, as we have seen from our
discussion on the forms of name, there is a reason why Aristotle
would have drawn a distinction between syllables and conjunctions
on the one hand, and the name and the verb on the other, seeing as
how the former agree in not signifying something by themselves,
whereas the latter do. But then he would have had to have noted the
difference between them in this regard, inasmuch as the former, as
parts of compound names, signify in a certain respect, whereas the
latter only consignifythat is, when conjoined to the others, as our
witnesses attest, Averroes statement, however, still appears
incomplete, but may be perfected by supplementing it with the
relevant parts of other witnesses cited above, as we shall endeavor
to show in our separate reconstruction of the definition of the
conjunction. 8. Note on the provenance of the foregoing doctrines:
As we have seen, with regard to the doctrine under discussion,
namely, that the name and the verb were considered to be the two
sole parts of speech , David Blank, the translator of Ammonius
Hermeias, states:1 2
Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1456b 22-25; 34-35) And note that this
difference of being either simple or composed is addressed by
Aristotle in his various accounts of the double name (for which,
see elsewhere in this paper). 3 And why is he calling them simple
when he has just defined them as composite? 4 And cf. St. Thomas
Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.): But because
that is properly called a part of some whole which immediately
enters into the constitution of the whole, but not the part of a
part; therefore, this must be understood about the parts from which
speech is immediately constituted, namely, from the name and the
verb, but not about the parts of the name or the verb, which are
syllables or letters .
24
I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be
traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic
may have inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this
way....
Now inasmuch as it is inextricably bound up with other teachings
that are undeniably those of the Philosopher himself, one is left
to wonder what sort of evidence Blank would require in order to
accept Aristotle as its ultimate source. As the reader will have
observed, essential components of this complexus are directly
attributed to the Poetics by Boethius, Ammonius, and Averroes; the
last reporting essentials of the same doctrine in the text of the
Poetics he was commenting upon. Those witnesses who do not mention
Aristotle, but are in evident agreement with them, such as
Apollonius Dyscolus, the Scholiast, and Priscian, it is reasonable
to believe must ultimately derive from the same source. 1
Consequently, I see no reason to resort to a work of Porphyry, or
of any similar predecessor, whether influenced by the Stoics or
otherwise, to account for the provenance of this teaching. Now in
light of the fact that our versions of Aristotles book or books
About the Poetic Art are incomplete, it is not unreasonable to
presume Aristotle and the Poetics to be their fons et origo.
Indeed, unless one discover some manifest incompatibility with the
Philosophers assured teaching, the most reasonable course is to
treat these witnesses as preserving otherwise lost portions of the
text. Of course, the reader may agree with this view of things
without taking my reconstructions as definitive; but then, as this
sort of undertaking could never be more than provisional, I make no
such claim on their behalf. 9. Some additional texts supplementing
the foregoing. Cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotles
Poetics. Translation by Charles E. Butterworth, from the Arabic
MSS, p. 11881. He said: the conjunction is a compound sound that
has no meaning when taken by itself. In general, they are the
letters binding one part of discourse to another....
Cf. The Middle Commentary of Averroes of Cordova on the Poetics
of Aristotle. Translated by Alex Preminger, O.B. Hardison, &
Kevin Kerrane, p. 373:Aristotle says: A conjunction is a composite
sound that does not mean anything by itself, ...and in general
words of like meaning that are like the cords tying the parts of
the statement together.
Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae [sc.
Aristotelis], ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 66 (tr. B.A.M.):HE SAID. A
copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately,
...and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of
the parts of speech with one another....2
1
And I know of no route by which Latin authors such as Boethius
and Priscian could have reached an Islamic philosopher like Ibn
Rushd, for which reason the simplest hypothesis to account for
their evident agreement is a common source: but two of these three
witnesses explicitly cite the Poetics for their doctrine. 2 Dixit.
Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est et,
deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones consignificative, que
sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem ....
25
Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri
Suntaxes [De Constructione] of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and
with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n. 28, p. 28:After
all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which
conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the
substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if
there are no physical objects [to connect].
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz,
tr. B.A.M.):For they always consignifythat is, they signify when
conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not.1
On the parts of speech in general, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad
Syllogismos Categoricos, init. (ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr.
B.A.M.):Restat igitur ut de oratione dicamus sed prius uidetur esse
monstrandum utrumne nomen et uerbum sola in partibus orationis
ponantur, an ut grammatici uolunt et reliquae orationis partibus
debeant aggregari. Grammatici enim considerantes uocum figuras,
octo orationis partes annumerant. [766B] Philosophi uero, quorum
omnis de nomine uerboque tractatus in significatione est
constituta, duas tantum orationis partes esse docuerunt, quidquid
plenam significationem tenet, siquidem sine tempore significat,
nomen uocantes, uerbum uero si cum tempore: atque ideo aduerbia
quidem atque pronomina nominibus iungunt, sine tempore enim quiddam
constitutum definitumque significant, nec interest quod flecti
casibus nequeunt, non est hoc nominum proprium ut casibus
inflectantur. Sunt enim nomina quae a grammaticis *monoptota*
nominantur, participium uero quia temporis significationem trahit,
etsi casibus effertur, uerbo tamen recte coniungitur. Accordingly
it remains for us to speak about speech, but first it seems that
whether the noun and the verb alone are [to be] placed among the
parts of speech must be shown, or whether, as the grammarians wish,
the remaining parts of speech ought to be included. For
grammarians, considering the (various) arrangements of words,
enumerate eight parts of speech. [766B] But philosophers, all of
whom have treated the noun and the verb as being established in
signification, have taught that there are only two parts of speech,
calling whatever has a complete signification a noun if it
signifies without time, but a verb if (it signifies) with time: and
so accordingly they join adverbs and pronouns to nouns, for some of
them [being so] constituted and defined signify without time, which
are not inflected for case; for this is not unique to the noun,
that they be inflected for cases. For there are nouns which are
named monoptota by grammarians, but the participle because it draws
to itself the signification of time, even if it is put forward with
cases, is nevertheless rightly conjoined to the verb.
1
eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis
significant, per se autem non . Cp. Boethius remarks just cited to
the effect that conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify
nothing by themselves unless joined to the others; statements
manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine.
26
Interiectiones autem siquidem, naturaliter significent, nec
uerbo, nec nomini copulandae sunt; uerbi enim ac nominis
definitiones non habent esse [766C] naturalia sed ad ponentis
placitum constituta, atque ideo nec in orationis partibus
numerabuntur.
But interjections in fact signify naturally, [and so] are to be
coupled neither to the noun nor the verb. For the definitions of
the verb and the noun need not be natural but are established at
the pleasure of the one imposing the name, and so accordingly they
[interjections] are not to be numbered among the parts of
speech.1
For more a particular observation relevant to the foregoing, cf.
Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos (ed. Migne, PL 64,
762 D ff.; tr. B.A.M.):...uelut quod nomen designatiua uox dicitur.
Sunt enim uoces quae nihil designant, ut syllabae, nomen uero
designatiua uox est, quoniam nomen designat id semper cuius nomen
est. Quae uero ipsa, quidem nulla propria significatione nituntur,
cum aliis uero iunctae designnant, ut coniunctiones atque
praepositiones, illae ne partes quidem orationis esse dicendae
sunt; oratio enim ex significatiuis partibus iuncta est. Quocirca
recte nomen ac uerbum solae orationis partes esse dicuntur. ...just
as a name is called a designative vocal sound. For there are vocal
sounds which designate nothing, like syllables, but the name is a
designnative vocal sound since a name always designnates that of
which it is the name. But those which themselves depend on no
signification of their own, but designate when joined to the
others, like conjunctions and prepositions, are not in fact to be
called parts of speech; for speech is joined from significative
parts. For which reason the name and verb are rightly said to be
the parts of speech.
Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias
Secundae Editionis, Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64;
tr. B.A.M.):Quamquam duae propriae partes orationis esse dicendae
sint, nomen scilicet atque uerbum. Haec enim per sese utraque
significant, coniunctiones autem uel praepositiones nihil omnino
nisi cum aliis iunctae designant.... Therefore two things are to be
called the proper parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb.
For these two signify by themselves; but conjunctions or
prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are joined to the
others....
1
If the Latin text is correct, I confess I do not understand the
point being made here.
27
10. The Peripatetic tradition on the conjunctive parts of speech
in relation to the name and the verb: a compendium of texts.(1) A
copulative is a [simple or] composite (2) After all the parts that
have been listed we vocal sound not significative separately, 1 as
is take the conjunction, which conjoins, and canand, then, and
also, not convey any meaning by itself without the substance of
these words, and in general consignificative words, which just as
physical bonds are no use if there are no are like bonds of the
parts of speech with physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius
Dysone another.... (Averroes) colus) (3) But conjunctions in fact
can consignify, but (4) For they always consignifythat is, they
signify nothing by themselves. (Boethius) signify when conjoined to
the othersbut by themselves they do not. (Priscian) (5) Therefore
two things are to be called the proper parts of speech, namely, the
name and the verb. For these two signify by themselves; but
conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are
joined to the others.... (Boethius)
[cf. Poet. ch 20, where Aristotles definition of the name makes
it clear that, unlike the syllables some of them are composed of,
as with Theodoron, it signifies by itself]
(6) Therefore the parts of speech according to (7) But why, one
might ask, when what the the Dialecticians are two, the name [5]
and the grammarians call the parts of speech (tou verb, merou
logou) are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and
the verb? since these two alone by themselves when conjoined
produce complete speech. Because, we shall say, these alone,
without all the others, can produce enunciative speech, as when we
[5] say man is healthy. (Ammonius Hermeias)
But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say,
consignificantia [or co- [On these technical terms, cf. (9) infra]
signifying words]. (Priscian) (8) Wherefore, since among the parts
of speech there are certain ones wh