The Pacific Islands - Part 1: Polynesia · 2016. 9. 14. · SOUTHEASTASIASERIES Vol. XXV No.2 (Polynesia, Micronesia,Melanesia) THEPACIFICISLANDS PartI: Polynesia byDonaldM.Topping

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About the writer:

DONALD M. TOPPING has maintained close association with Micronesia since 1956, when he taught for two yearsat the Territorial College of Guam. He returned to graduate work at Michigan State University where, after twomore years of teaching and fieldwork in Guam, he completed his Ph.D. in English and Linguistics in 1963. Sincejoining the University of Hawaii staff in 1962, where he is now Professor of Linguistics and Director of the SocialSciences and Linguistics Institute, Dr. Topping has been engaged in developing pedagogical materials for more than25 exotic languages of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, most of it in support of Peace Corps training programs. Hisown works in this area include three books on Chamorro, the language of the Mariana Islands: Spoken Charnorro(1969), Chamorro Reference Grammar (1973), and Chamorro-English Dictionary (1975). He is also the GeneralEditor of the PALI Language Texts, which include works on several languages of the Pacific Islands. In recentyears, he has broadened his travel and studies to include problems of changing societies in the islands of the SouthPacific, where he spent his sabbatic leave in 1976.

INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS: University of Alabama The Asia Society Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Brown University Dartmouth College

Indiana University Institute for the Study of World Politics University of Kansas Michigan State University University of Wisconsin

SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIESVol. XXV No. 2

(Polynesia, Micronesia, Melanesia)

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Part I: Polynesia

by Donald M. Topping

March 1977

Oceania. The Pacific Islands. The South Pacific.The South Seas. These are but some of the namesused to refer to the thousands of outcroppings ofland, some fairly large but mostly small, inter-spersed throughout the Pacific Ocean between140" east and 130" west, and 20* north to nearly25* south. When we look at a map of the world oureyes are usually drawn to the continents and theseas, overlooking the little specks in the blue or inour minds we lump them together as "the islands."But there they are, thousands of them, and theyform one of the last areas in the world to begin theprocess of post-World War II decolonization anddevelopment, a process which formally began in1962 with the independence of Western Samoa andis still very much in progress with some of the lastoutright colonies in the world now asking for theright to govern themselves.

In a series of three papers I will present an over-view of these Pacific Islands, grouping them intowhat has now become a traditional three-way parti-tion: Micronesia (the little islands), Polynesia (themany islands), and Melanesia (the black islands).This tripartite grouping suggests homogeneityamong the islands that fall within a particulargrouping. Nothing could be more misleading, forhomogeneity is rare in Oceania, even within singleisland groups or, in some cases, on a single, smallisland. Indeed, this fantastic diversity in the Pacifichas fascinated anthropologists, linguists, artists,and folklorists for generations, especially duringthe past two decades. And it is this irreplaceablediversity that is in jeopardy in some places as theresult of a strong drift toward Westernization. Thedesire to be an independent, twentieth-centuryisland nation while preserving traditional socialsystems and cultures has become a source of greatconflict among the islanders.

Because of the great diversity of languages (morethan 1,000), cultures, and traditional ties inOceania, the political boundaries imposed by thecolonial powers are becoming more and more diffi-cult to maintain and justify as the island statesmove onto the international arena as independentstates.

For example, the Trust Territory of the PacificIslands, which includes at least ten diverse lan-guages and cultures, was forced into a politicalmarriage by Germany at the turn of this century, astatus that was enforced by Japan, and later by theUnited States. This enforced union has recentlybegun to break up with the Mariana Islands joiningthe United States in a Commonwealth status, andthe Marshall Islands asking for independence.

The Gilbert Islands, which have long-standingties with their northern neighbors in the Marshalls,have separated from their colonial partner, theEllice Islands, with whom they were united for 84years as the Gilbert and Ellice Colony under Britishadministration. And the Bougainvilleans feel noparticular kinship with the rest of Papua NewGuinea (PNG), and consequently have become aseparate province since PNG became independentin 1975.

The sorting out of where each island groupbelongs politically in the post-colonial period is noeasy matter. Their populations are small. Theirisolation is great. The realities of international eco-nomics and politics must also be carefully studied.

The conflict between traditional concepts ofgroup identity and the colonial divisions of theisland groups is intensified by the economic tiesthat still persist strongly along the colonial lines.

Copyright (C) 1977, American Universities Field Staff, Inc.

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Western and Eastern (American) Samoa, forexample, were settled at the same time by the samepeople, and the family ties still remain. Yet,Western Samoan currency is not exchangeable inAmerican Samoa. Furthermore, Western Samoa’seconomy is geared to that of New Zealand, while inthe eastern part, everything is made in the UnitedStates. Likewise, the inhabitants of Puka Puka inthe northern Cook Islands are basically Samoan inlanguage and culture, but are in the New Zealandorbit by virtue of having been placed in an arbitrarypolitical grouping.

Until World War II American interest in thePacific Islands was pretty much restricted to hertwo inhabited territories, Guam in the north andAmerican (eastern) Samoa in the south, and theuninhabited atolls of Wake, Johnson, Howland,and Baker. However, following the war U.S. controlwas extended throughout the Pacific north of theequator through the formation of the Trust Terri-tory of the Pacific Islands which encompasses theMariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islandsall ofMicronesia except the Gilbert Islands which havebeen under British control since 1892, and Nauru,which is generally assigned to the Micronesian lin-guistic and cultural group.

Surprisingly, direct U.S. interest in the SouthPacific has been slight and her presence minimal.A consulate in Fiji and a new embassy in PapuaNew Guinea constitute the only official residences.Small amounts of American aid are providedthrough Peace Corps volunteers in Fiji, Tonga,Western Samoa, and the Solomon Islands; a$200,000 annual contribution to the South PacificCommission; and USAID support of an agencycalled Foundation for the Peoples of the SouthPacific.

But with the emergence of new nations in thePacific, the anticolonial pressures rapidly buildingup in the non-self-governing states, the growingimportance of the international boundaries of thesea, the U.S. fallback from Southeast Asia, and therecent emergence of the U.S.S.R. and China inPolynesia, it is most likely that the United States isgoing to develop a stronger interest in the 4.5million persons of the islands of the Pacific, which,with their 12 million square miles of waterways,cover approximately one-fifth of the surface of theearth, an area much too large to be ignored anylonger.

It has been felt and expressed by some thatimplicit in the ANZUS Treaty was the under-standing that the United States would leave themanagement of the South Pacific to her trustedAnglo-Saxon allies, assuming that the developmentwould be directed in the best interests of all. Somehave argued that the U.S. part of ANZUS,although it comes at the end of the acronym, is agiant tail wagging a dog that has only recently,since World War II, begun to find its own footingin the international arena of industry andcommerce. The dog has lately been asleep, and haslet the communists slip into the very heart of Poly-nesia. Perhaps it is time for the tail to wag a littlestronger.

Growing U.S. interest is becoming manifest,despite the denials by U.S. State Department offi-cials. That the State Department, for the first timein years, sent a career foreign service officer 1oattend a South Pacific Conference, paying an offi-cial call on Prime Minister Tupuola Eft of WesternSamoa while en route, is one indication. (TheUnited States has been represented by the InteriorDepartment at previous conferences, while othermetropolitan and island countries have frequentlybeen represented by heads of state.) OperationKangaroo II, a combined military exercise of theANZUS forces in the fall of 1976, followed by acruise through the Solomon Islands by nine U.S.warships, might be construed as another indicationof America’s growing concern, if not presence inthe South Pacific. And the recent (January 1977)U.S.-sponsored trip by the King and Queen ofTonga to Guam and selected parts of Micronesiathe first such gesture ever extendedsuggests thedawn of a new awareness on the part of the UnitedStates.

Pacific Islanders are somewhat amused at thesuddenness of the U.S. revival of interest, attributeit to the obvious causes (the official presence ofChina and the Soviet Union in Polynesia; PrimeMinister Somare’s recent visit to China), and arecalmly awaiting to see what additional moves theUnited States is going to make.

1. ANZUS is an acronym for Australia, New Zealand, andthe United States. The ANZUS Treaty was signed-September 1, 1951, with the aim of enabling mutual aid to beprovided in the event of aggression and of settling disputesby peaceful means. The ANZUS Council, consisting of theforeign ministers of the member states, may meet at anytime.

DMT-l-’77 -6-

Perhaps the most important question the PacificIslanders must face collectively is that ofregionalism. Prior to World War II they neverreally thought of themselves as forming a region.The distances between them were too great toencourage the development of such a concept.However, the jet age and satellite communicationshave served to bring them much closer together,and so, with some external encouragement, theidea of regionalism is growing. In view of the diffi-culties that each of the separate island communitieswould face if each tried to go its own way, someform of cooperative regional identity appears moreand more attractive as a means to bring themtogether to deal with issues that pertain to theentire region.

Will regionalism work any better in the Pacificthan in the Caribbean, for example? Are theadvantages to be gained strong enough to offset theinherent obstacles in trying to impose some form ofunity on people of so many diverse backgrounds?

Some see regionalism as the only hope, particu-larly for the smaller groups, and there already existsome important regional institutions that need tobe described briefly here.

The oldest of these regional institutions is theSouth Pacific Commission (SPC) which was formedin 1947 by the metropolitan countriesmAustralia,France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and theUnited States--as a "consultative and advisorybody." Although its role has changed considerablyover the years, it has served to bring PacificIslanders together to consider areas of commonconcern and interest. Many islanders feel that theSPC has outlived its usefulness, and that too muchof its appropriated money is spent on maintainingan elaborate administrative bureaucracy inNouma, where they are housed in an American-built mini-pentagon that served as the commandpost for the South Pacific campaign during thelater stages of World War II. Since 80 per cent ofthe SPC budget now goes for staff salaries andtravel, criticism is to be expected. The reorganiza-tion of the SPC adopted at the Sixteenth SouthPacific Conference in October 1976 has causedsome changes in the organization that may serve togive it new vitality.

The South Pacific Conference was established in1967 as a separate entity whose function was tobring together the leaders of the independentcountries, the Senior Commissioners of partici-pating governments, and the SPC staff. The Con-ference members meet annually to review the SPC’swork program and policies, and they provide finan-cial contributions to the SPC budget, therebysupplementing the larger amounts provided by themetropolitan countries. A Memorandum of Under-standing, signed in 1974 in Rarotonga, specifiesthat each member country of the Conference has anequal vote on all matters regarding the SPCactivities and expenditures.

The South Pacific Forum (SPF) was formed in1971, comprising the heads of state of all the inde-pendent countries of the region. Since it is still arelatively young organization, and still growing asnew island nations appear, its relative importanceis yet to be determined. It is, however, recognizedas the heavyweight regional organization in thePacific, formed by and of Pacific Islanders them-selves, with the metropolitan countries excluded,sometimes to their consternation.

The youngest and perhaps most importantregional organization is the South Pacific Bureaufor Economic Cooperation, commonly known asSPEC. Formed in 1972 as the economic arm of theForum, SPEC’s charge was "to encourage and pro-mote regional cooperation in the economic develop-ment of the island countries of the South Pacific.This concept is based on a close partnership withthe more industrially developed countries of theregion, Australia and New Zealand." SPEC’s inter-ests include "trade, economic development, trans-port, tourism, and other related matters," such ashandling financial aid from donor agencies, andcommunications, which promises to be fairly largein the far-flung islands still relatively untouched bymass media other than government-owned radio.

The ANZ special interest in SPEC is ratherblatant. The largely Pacific Islander staff (thedirector is a Tongan) are now housed in lavishliving and working quarters in Suva, built by NewZealand for A$1.5 million and furnished by Aus-tralia for a comparable figure. Since most of thetrade in the region is currently with Australia andNew Zealand, it seems certain that they will makeevery effort to keep it that way as the island nationsdevelop.

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SPEC’s biggest challenge at the moment is tomake the concept of regionalism work through thepromotion of regional trade, transportation, andtelecommunications. Since most of the islandscurrently produce similar exportablescopra,bananas, cocoa, citrus, and taro---the potential fortrade among themselves is not there. New productsand markets would have to be developed.

Without viable trade, a regional transport systemwould be difficult to sustain. And, without thetransport, trade can hardly be developed. Regionalair transportation exists now, but is a money-losingproposition for each of the carriers, which seem tobe competing largely for nationalistic reasons. AirNauru is reported to have lost 5;10 million duringthe past year, and Fiji’s Air Pacific must be bailedout annually by the Mara government. Not to beoutdone, Tonga, Western Samoa, the SolomonIslands, and Papua New Guinea also operate inter-national airlines within the region. The coordina-tion of efficient regional air transport provides animmediate and serious challenge to SPEC and itsphilosophy of regional cooperation.

It is most likely that SPEC will continue to growas economic development picks up steam, which itmust. Some predict that SPEC will render the SPCobsolete, thus contributing to its demise. ThePacific Islander staff of SPEC will no doubt provideadvice and influence on the kind of economic de-velopment that will take place within the region. Towhat degree their ideas for development jibe withthose of ANZ remains to be seen, for it is likely thatJapan and perhaps China will try to edge in; theyhave, in fact, already made some rather strongmoves.

The University of South Pacific (USP) was estab-lished in Suva in 1968 as the regional university,although it did not receive its Royal Charter until1975. Since most of its 1,100 students are Fiji-bornIndians, the USP is still struggling to develop itsregional image. The satellite-linked extensioncenters in Rarotonga, Tonga, Western Samoa, andthe Solomon Islands are abetting the regionalidentity, as is the USP Agricultural College atAlafua in Western Samoa. However, many stillconsider it a University of Fiji.

Nevertheless, island governments are sendingsome of their most able students (and potential

future leaders) to USP for learning, the best ofwhich seems to come from one another, for it is atthe campus of USP that most of the students gettheir first real exposure to people from neighboringisland states. In the seminar and common rooms,some students discuss political, social, and eco-nomic issues germane to their own areas, and in theprocess discover many things in common. Theirreading material for their courses is often supple-mented by circulated copies of the writings of Mao,Marx, and Nyerere, as well as by the ever-growingnumber of papers and pamphlets produced byemerging political parties in the various islands.The growing political consciousness of the studentswill likely be heightened when the first researchcomponent of the University, the Institute ofPacific Studies (1976), gets rolling.

Other regional institutions include the PacificIslands Monthly (PIM), a Sydney-based monthlynow in its forty-seventh year, and the Pacific Theo-logical College (PTC) in Suva. PIM provides theonly regional news coverage, though it is still shy oninformation about the American Trust Territorywhere it receives, in turn, almost no circulation.The PTC, with a new Tongan principal, is likely tostart having greater influence on reform of thechurches in the South Pacific, particularly those ofPolynesia.

The number of international organizations in-volved in the Pacific on a regional level is alreadylarge, and growing: WHO, FAO, UNDP, PeaceCorps, Volunteer Services Abroad, YWCA, theEast West Center, the U.S. Agency for Inter-national Development, Asia Development Bank,Canadian International Development Agency, andthe International Planned Parenthood Federation,are but a few.

Reflecting the need for some kind of regionalidentity and cooperation is the emergence of apopular slogan, "The Pacific Way," the meaning ofwhich is extremely broad and deliberately impre-cise. In a recent publication by the same title, Pro-fessor Ron Crocombe of the University of the SouthPacific says that the term has caught on since firstintroduced in 1970 by the Prime Minister of Fijibecause "it satisfies both psychological and polit-ical needs, in that it helps to fulfill a growingdemand for respected Pacific-wide identifyingsymbols and for Pacific unity."

DMT-l-’77 -8-

Professor Crocombe goes on to say: "There isincreasing awareness that the common interests ofall island peoples can best be served by collabora-tion, and that effective unifying concepts can re-duce the extent and intensity of neo-colonial depen-dency of the island countries on the richer Pacificborderlands."

Other factors that may serve to foster the devel-opment of a South Pacific regional consciousnessare: (1)The need for some kind of defense againstforeign (Japanese, Okinawan, Taiwanese, andKorean) fishing fleets, which cast their nets in utterdisregard of territorial boundaries; (2) Commonresentment, to one degree or another, of colonial-ism. The degree of resentment varies considerablyfrom almost none in the new Commonwealth of theMarianas to bristling hostility in parts of Melanesiawhere colonialists are still firmly entrenched. Thishas contributed to a spirit of alliance amongislanders who see themselves as a team united byskin color against a common opponent. This formof alliance, however, is literally only skin deep, andis quickly forgotten when problems betweenspecific island groups emerge.

On the other side, there is one major deterrent tothe concept of regionalism" the English-French lin-guistic dichotomy. Whereas most educated PacificIslanders can communicate with each other and therest of the world by using English, those living inthe French-controlled areasmFrench Polynesia,New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna Islands, andthe Francophone portions of the New Hebrides--are much more restricted. In New Caledonia, espe-cially, Francophone Melanesians express a des-perate sense of isolation, while their Anglophonecounterparts in the other parts of the Pacific speakruefully of their ignorance of the French territories.

In this series of three papers I will try to presentan overview of the way things are in 1976 in Poly-nesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia. The overviewwill give only glimpses of some of the many com-plex problems the islanders are facing as they jointhe Third World family of small underdevelopednations. I will also attempt to describe some of theapproaches to the problems that the islanders andtheir metropolitan mentors are working out.

Omitted from the discussion, except in passing,are Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu, Gilbert Islands, and

Tokelau Islands, all of which are considered im-portant segments of the South Pacific picture, butcould not be included because of lack of space andtime.

POLYNESIA

The many and fabled islands of Polynesia form aneat, straight-sided triangle (if one excludes thelittle Polynesian outliers) ranging from theHawaiian Islands in the north to Easter Island inthe east to New Zealand in the south, encompassingmillions of square miles of ocean and, if we excludeNew Zealand, only a few thousand square miles ofland. Because of their distance from any landmasses, they were relatively unknown to theWestern world until the eighteenth century whenthe explorer-navigators of Europe, most notablyCaptain James Cook, began to chart the islands ontheir maps.

To claim that these European seafarers dis-covered the islands of Polynesia is to ignore the factthat the Polynesians themselves had been sailingthe Pacific waters and discovering landfalls nearly3,000 years before when, according to currentarchaeological theory, the islands of Samoa andTonga were settled. The Polynesian migrationscontinued for the next 1,500 years or so, with thelast settlements being made in Hawaii, NewZealand, and various outlying Polynesian islands inthe east and west, in some cases crossing into areasnow defined as Melanesia and Micronesia.

Since the coming of the European explorers andthe bands of traders, whalers, and missionaries whofollowed them, the people of Polynesia have untilrecently been under the rule of one Western gov-ernment or another: Germany, France, GreatBritain, Australia, New Zealand, the United States,or Chile. But since the end of World War II, inwhich Polynesia was only peripherally involved, theisland communities have been moving toward someform of self-government. For some groups, this hasmeant independence. For others, the relationshipwith the former colonial government is defined asfree association. And still others (i.e., the islands ofFrench Polynesia and American Samoa) remain ascolonies of a metropolitan country, but with asemblance of self-government. The political statusof each of the Polynesian communities to be dis-cussed is given in Table 1, along with other relevantdata.

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Island Political AreaGroup Status (in km"

American U.S. Territory 197Samoa

Western Independent 2,842Samoa (1962)

French Poly- French 4,000nesia Territory

Cook Islands Self-Governing 240Free Assoc. withN.Z. (1965)

Tonga Independent 549(1970)

Fiji Independent 18,272(1970)

TABLE 1

Population(1975)

30,000

151,000

130,000

19,500

99,000

569,000

MajorExports

fish

Copra,cocoa, bananas

Coconutoil,vanilla

Citrus,copra

Bananas,copra

Sugar,coconutoil, fish

Distancefrom nearestcontinent(km)

3,700

4,020

6,000

5,000

3,700

2,850

It will be noticed that several of the Polynesianisland groups have been omitted from the table,and will be mentioned only in passing in the dis-cussion to follow. These include the Tokelaus,Ellice Islands (now Tuvalu), Wallis Islands, andseveral separate islands such as Easter, Pitcairn,Niue, and Futuna. Hawaii and New Zealand areexcluded from the category of developing islandnations for obvious reasons.

It should also be borne in mind that within eachof the major island groups there are two distinctlydifferent types of societies: the one found in allmajor towns (usually one per island group), and theother, which constitutes the majority, the membersof which still follow a traditional subsistence life-style in the outer islands. And in all cases there is atremendous gulf between the two.

While there are deeply rooted cultural and lin-guistic links among all the Polynesians, the dif-ferences are quite pronounced, and have beenaccentuated through more than a century ofWestern influence and rule. However, from thisforeign experience, all of Polynesia shares at leastone common element: the Protestant religion,stemming directly or indirectly from the famousLondon Missionary Society that hit Polynesia like atyphoon in the 1820s, just at a time, it seems, whenthe Polynesian religious system was in shambles.

This European religion still plays an importantconservative role in all Polynesian societies today,and may emerge as a major force of change if someof the staff of the Pacific Theological College in Fijihave their way.

Other similarities can be seen in traditionalarchitecture, foods, languages, and social systems,but these similarities do not make for homogeneity.On the contrary, the differences among Poly-nesianseven between Eastern and WesternSamoansare very real and pronounced once wego beneath the surface, and they have existed sinceprehistoric times.

As "emerging nations" of the Pacific, thePolynesian islands have a head start on the otherisland groups, Melanesia and Micronesia. As such,they have come face to face with some of the prob-lems that are inherent in being an independentisland state. How realistically they are facing theseproblems is debatable.

Throughout Polynesia, even where independentgovernments are found, there are strong ties withmetropolitan governments, such as those bindingWestern Samoa and Tonga to New Zealand, orthose between Fiji and Australia. The strength ofthe ties can be measured in terms of economics.

DMT-l-’77 -10-

This economic reliance on the metropolitancountries is a fact of life that Polynesian leadersdecry and vow to end. The various country devel-opment plans optimistically talk about reduced aidand increased production, resulting in economicself-reliance "in the near future."

Along with this popular and widespread notionof political and economic independence is theequally ubiquitous refrain of the preservation oftraditional cultural values and integrity. The ethnicawareness that began sweeping Polynesia in the1960s is quite strong, and has already causedconflicts between efforts to develop and efforts toconserve. Whether the Polynesians can reconciledevelopment with conservationboth high priorityitemsis extremely doubtful, although Polynesiansare still maintaining, without much evidence thusfar, that it can be done.

In order to further economic development, all ofPolynesia is turning to foreign aid, most of itcoming from the metropolitan countries to whichthey were previously tied in the colonial relation-ship. The amount of foreign aid in Polynesia is sub-stantial. In a recent study commissioned by theSouth Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation(SPEC) it was estimated that in 1976 more than$500 million would go into foreign aid for the entireSouth Pacific region, with perhaps 10 to 20 per centmore coming through voluntary agencies. Whilethe authors of the study admit that hard statisticaldata are hard to come by, their estimates are basedupon fairly reliable information. Assuming theirfigures are accurate, the amount of foreign aid percapita (more than $120) far exceeds that of mostother parts of the underdeveloped world.

Characteristically, much of the aid is not veryeffective in terms of economic development (e.g., apolice training academy in Tonga, heavy farmingmachinery in Western Samoa). Much of it, accord-ing to the SPEC report, is manipulated to theadvantage of groups with political power amongboth donor and recipient countriesmnot an un-common phenomenon in developing countries.And large amounts go into the maintenance of theinfrastructures and bureaucracies left over fromthe colonial period. Very often lingering expatriate"technicians" are supported through aid, thusassuring continued maintenance of the donatedtechnology. The result of much of the foreign aid

seems to work against the stated objectives ofincreased self-reliance for the island states, claimsthe SPEC report. And the presence of highly paidexpatriate technicians breeds growing resentmentin most areas.

The economic ties to metropolitan countries arestrengthened by the existing communications andtransportation routes. One can telephone moreeasily from Papeete to Paris than from Papeete toPago Pago, a mere 1,200 miles away. Planes fly non-stop from Honolulu to Pago Pago and Fiji (en routeto Australia), but one must do considerable criss-crossing or backtracking to get from Honolulu toFrench Polynesia or the Cook Islands. Althoughregional air and shipping lines out of Nauru, Fiji,and Samoa are emerging (with substantial govern-ment subsidies and losses), the old colonial patternsof communications and transport are still domi-nant, thus inhibiting the development of intra-regional commerce.

There are still other common problems that theisland states of Polynesia must face. The similarityof resourcescopra, bananas, vanilla, root crops,and fishmdoes not look promising for intra-regional trade, even if the transport problems couldbe worked out. The isolation from large consumermarkets in the Americas, Asia, and Australia isanother negative factor with regard to increasedtrade. The small but high density populations withsoaring birthrates provide another serious problemstill to be faced realistically anywhere in Polynesia.

Unemployment simply defies calculation, but iswidely admitted (except in some official reports) tobe shockingly high. As the young people matricu-late through the Western education systemsmanother legacy from colonial timesand flock to thetowns in search of nonexisting white-collar jobs(only 12 per cent of Tonga’s secondary schoolgraduates found jobs during the past two years),the problem becomes intensified, and is com-pounded by the additional problems resulting fromrapid urban drift, especially alcohol addiction andlarceny.

The more successful, and usually more ablegraduates of the education system tend to emigrateto the metropolitan countries. According to Pro-fessor Ron Crocombe of the University of the SouthPacific,

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Over half as many Samoans live outsideSamoa as in it; more than three times moreNiueans live overseas than in Niue; moreWallis Islanders and Futunans live outsidethe territory than within; and nearly asmany Cook Islanders live in New Zealand asin the islands. These trends are veryrecentmainly over the last ten years.

By world standards, Polynesia is far from being apoverty area. No one goes hungry. In fact, nearlyeveryone is well fed, or could be were he willing toplant and fish. But despite the massive amounts ofaid, there is not much cash filtering out to thevillages. And it is more cash that most people seemto have in mind when they talk about economic de-velopment in Polynesia.

Since the Polynesian island states are so small,forms of regional cooperation should help, and, in-deed some are beginning to appear. However, mostattempts at cooperation have thus far bredcompetition. Fiji’s Air Pacific is continuallyquibbling with Samoa and Tonga’s Polynesian AirLines over routes and landing rights. Tonga is inthe process of launching her own airline (withJapanese financing), while Air Nauru is stillswooping all over the region in search of newpassenger and cargo routes. The regional Univer-sity of the South Pacific is still considered by mostPacific Islanders to be the University of Fiji sincethe great majority of its students come from there.Still, attempts at regional cooperation are beinginitiated and supported, mainly by externallyfunded organizations such as SPEC and the SPC.

While regionalization may hold great promisefor the development of Polynesia, there are stillmany obstacles, not the least of which are themetropolitan alliances of the individual islandstates since they are tightly bound by the forces ofbilateral economic aid.

versary as a regional, nonsectarian Protestanttraining center for the upcoming corps of clergy-men in the region, drawing students fromMelanesia, Polynesia, and one from Micronesia(Marshall Islands). The three-year program coversa range of basic theological subject matter, plus aheavy infusion of political ideology, economics ofdeveloping countries, sociology, and communitydevelopment. The new clergy who complete thiscourse are forced to examine the century-old role ofthe pastor, particularly in Polynesia, and thendecide if they want to be agents of change at thevillage, island, or national level, or continue in theclergyman’s traditional conservative role in thePacific.

A growing number of critics in Polynesia com-plain that the ministers, like the matai (chiefs),abuse their prestigious positions by exacting toomuch allegiance from their supporters in exchangefor what they themselves produce. They are fre-quently accused of being leeches.

The PTC wants to change this role of the clergyin Polynesia from that of a passive consumer to oneof active leadership. The feeling is that sinceneither regional governments nor foreign aid isreaching the grassroots, the logical role for theminister, as he is the one official with genuinegrassroots contacts and unquestioned authority, isto capitalize on his ready-made status in thevillages and begin to give them some direction.

(Some of the Melanesian graduates and studentsare plunging into the thick of national politics inthe hope of having some influence on the initialdirections taken toward and with independence.The National Party of the New Hebrides forexample, which is aiming for independence with orwithout French sanction, is headed by a clergy-mail.)

All of Polynesia, except the American andFrench territories, is likely to be affected in thenear future by developments in three unrelatedareas: the Pacific Theological College, the immi-gration policies recently instituted by the conserva-tive Muldoon government in New Zealand, and thepresence of Russia and China in Polynesia.

The Pacific Theological College (PTC) on theoutskirts of Suva recently celebrated its tenth anni-

For the past decade and more, emigration toNew Zealand has provided a much needed escapevalve for the population pressures in Polynesia,particularly for Western Samoa, Tonga, the CookIslands, Niue, and the Tokelaus. Since theIslanders from the last three are New Zealandcitizens, they move freely to and from New Zealand,but mostly to. Not so, however, for the citizens ofindependent Tonga and Western Samoa whoseentry to New Zealand hinges upon having a proper

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THE GANGPLANK

New Zealand Herald, September 22, 1976.

visa and a work permit, and whose island econo-mies have become dependent on cash remittancessent from workers in New Zealand back to familiesstill in the islands.

Until 1975 New Zealand encouraged PacificIslanders from all over Polynesia to come to Auck-land where they formed the backbone of the NewZealand industrial force, and the largest concen-tration of Polynesians to be found in the world.However, when the worldwide economic recessionhit New Zealand’s industry, Islanders (often re-ferred to as "fuzzy-wuzzies" and similar derogatorykiwi-isms2) became a "problem" which theMuldoon government wasted no time in attackingas one of the major causes of social as well aseconomic ills.

2. Kiwi is the common, nonderogatory term for NewZealanders; the term comes from the name of their nationalemblem, a flightless bird, which some Kiwis consider an

appropriate symbol.

The "problem" centers on the "overstayers"the 10- to 12,000 Polynesians who are believed to beworking in New Zealand without valid visas or workpermits. Some of these overstayers have beenapprehended through 2:00 A.M. raids on suspectedhouseholds, a tactic that has not gone over too wellwith the governments of Tonga and Samoa.Thousands more are quietly working for theirequally silent bosses for somewhat less than thegoing wage.

The islanders are happy with the arrangementbecause they are earning money (which theycouldn’t do at home), a good portion of which issent to their families back in the islands as remit-tances, which in both Tonga and Western Samoarepresent a sizable portion of the gross nationalincome. Should these remittances be suddenly cutoff, all of the Polynesian islands in the New Zealandorbit would be hurting financially.

It appears that New Zealand has definitely closedthe doors on continued Polynesian immigration.

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The potential effects could be disastrous for theburgeoning young populations of Tonga andWestern Samoa who will soon find themselves withinsufficient land and no place to go. In view of NewZealand’s unemployment problem (which is ridicu-lously small when compared with the UnitedStates), it seems unlikely that immigration fromPolynesia will be encouraged in the future.

However, the new presence of the Soviet Unionand the People’s Republic of China in Polynesiaappears to be having a softening effect on Mr.Muldoon’s hard line regarding Polynesia, to whichhe once referred as just another territory of "a fewthousand acres with a few thousand coconut treeswhich nobody wants."

The extent of the intended Soviet involvement inTonga is not generally known, except by rumor,most of which seems fairly reliable. All reportsagree that Russia will assist in developing fisheries,agriculture, and a bigger airport in exchange formaritime facilities for Russian fishing boats and(possibly) ships of the Russian Navy. Many peoplehave interpreted "maritime facilities" to mean aSoviet naval base.

The People’s Republic of China opened an eight-man embassy in Apia, Western Samoa in October1976. Although the new legation has made nodramatic moves so far, its presence has alreadytriggered responses from New Zealand and theUnited States. Prime Minister Muldoon recentlysent a group of legislators on a "goodwill" missionthrough Polynesiathe first such diplomatic ges-tureand created a governmental Pacific IslandIndustrial Development Committee. The UnitedStates is reported to have extended an official in-vitation to Prime Minister Eft of Western Samoa,and sent a Deputy Undersecretary of State to callon Mr. Eft in his Apia office.

Thanks to the presence of the two big communistpowers, Polynesia has become central to inter-national diplomacy and, it would appear, rivalry.

In the following sections we will examine selectedareas of Polynesia individually in the followingorder" American Samoa, Western Samoa, FrenchPolynesia, Cook Islands, Tonga, and Fiji.

American Samoa

American Samoa is America’s lone outpost inthe South Pacific, a distinction which sets theAmerican Samoans quite apart from their Poly-nesian brothers in the rest of the South Pacific. The30,000 U.S. National Polynesians residing on thismountainous island, 2,600 miles southwest ofHawaii, have not seen much in the way of dramaticchange that has hit America’s other territory in theNorth Pacific, Guam. But, this dormant state maychange if the big powers of the communist bloccontinue their initial moves in the area.

Assumed by the United States in 1899, the fourislands of the group remained under Navy controluntil 1951 when they, along with Guam and theTrust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia),were placed under the jurisdiction of the Depart-ment of Interior. During the first half century ofAmerican rule, the islands were considered a U.S.Naval Station. Since 1951, after the decline inNavy’s interest, the islands have become thesouthernmost branch of the U.S. family of PacificIsland communities under the administration ofthe Director of the Office of Territorial Affairs, andhave been subjected to many of the same kinds ofinfluences.

The symbols of the Americanization of AmericanSamoa are everywhere: greenback dollars, over-sized cars with CB radios, and squads of armedpolice cruising in blue and white patrol cars. Inpreparation for the July 4th bicentennial celebra-tions, red, white, and blue became the standardcolors for everything from trash cans to basketballcourt nets. Even the Lucky Lager beer, the onlybeer available in many of the small village stores,and consumed in staggering quantities inAmerican Samoa, came in specially packaged tri-colored bicentennial cans. For the bicentennial July4th celebrations most Samoans of Tutuila (themain island)were involved in Boy Scout marches,athletic events, dancing, singing, weaving, or othertypes of contests in celebration of the 200th year,the major attraction of which was the longboat racebetween the villages and church organizations ofAmerican Samoa. These are hardly traditionalcanoes, but more like the American whaleboatsthat came to Samoa in the nineteenth century,perhaps reflecting another example of the Ameri-canization of the eastern islands of Samoa that

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Workers, mostly from Western Samoa and Tonga, in VanCamp fish cannery in Pago Pago, American Samoa. Photocourtesy George Chaplin.

started back in 1900 when they were formallyplaced under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy.

In addition to the 30,000 American Samoansliving in the South Pacific, there are another 50- to60,000 living abroad either in Hawaii or on the U.S.mainland. They all enjoy a rising birthrate thatdoes not seem to cause them much concern, sinceSamoans are the number one export item from theislands. The more babies born, the higher theexport.

The economy of American Samoa reflects theparent country. The term "cash flow" has becomethe catchword since the economic disaster that hitAmerican Samoa in 1974 and 1975 when the gov-ernment found itself $10 million in the hole. "Cashflow" is now used as synonym for hard times. It issomething that will be solved, of course, and thesolution is the infusion of more money from federalsources. (The increase in direct federal appropria-tions from $31.5 million in 1975 to $47 million for1976 is a good indicator of the U.S. method ofcoping with the "cash flow" problem.)

Government bureaucracy is evident everywhere,and is by far the largest employer, with approxi-

Boy Scouts on parade in American Samoa. Photo courtesyGeorge Chaplin.

mately 4,000 career employees with an additional2,841 on government retirement. With this kind ofpayroll to meet, it is not surprising that the govern-ment of American Samoa found itself with a debtthat was in part caused by inflation and partly by adrastic drop in tax revenue from the canningindustry during the 1975 drought.

The second largest employer in American Samoais the Van Camp Star Kist Fishing Cannery opera-tion, which provides a significant amount of fundsin revenue when it is operating in full capacity ($6million in 1975). However, most of the wage earnersin the cannery are either Western Samoans orTongans, for most American Samoans prefer othertypes of employment, or even no employment, toworking in the cannery. Very little of the moneypaid in wages at the cannery stays in Tutuila, sincemost of it is sent to employees’ families in Tongaand Western Samoa.

One of the major factors in the economic diffi-culties of American Samoa is that the Samoans,like their American mentors, are trying to maintainan inflated U.S. standard of living in a small, verymountainous island in the Pacific which could notpossibly support itself by such standards. On the

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main island of Tutuila there is an elaborate infra-structure" built by the United States, including 40miles of paved roads, full electrification (with fre-quent power failures), indoor plumbing throughoutthe island, two television stations, and super-markets where 46 pounds of imported frozen meatfor every man, woman, and child in AmericanSamoa were sold during 1975.

This elaborate infrastructure is based 100 percent on imported goods, mostly from the UnitedStates, and, as might be expected, the componentsof this infrastructure don’t always work, especiallythe power system. For the 40 miles of paved road,there were 3,242 registered vehicles in 1975. Duringthe same year, 1,183 of them were involved in acci-dents: one out of every three cars. The road onwhich all of the vehicles seem to be driving at allhours of the day is a very narrow, winding ribbonthat follows the jagged coastline from one side ofthe magnificent Pago Pago harbor to the other, andbeyond to the more remote villages of the island.Following the American principle of universalvehicular mobility, it is now possible to drive nearlyeverywhere on Tutuila. And nearly everybody doesjust that, often.

The oversized infrastructure is maintained by apublic works program that, after education, con-sumes most of the money that goes into the gov-ernment. Virtually all capital improvement projectsare handled by outside contractors and alien labor.

There is talk about developing the economy inthe areas of tourism and agriculture. The tourismindustry is and has been rather sick despite themany duty free shops that can be found inAmerican Samoa, put there in an attempt to luretourists as they are lured in such duty free places asFiji, Guam, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The onemajor hotel on the island has changed hands threetimes since it was built by Pan American Airlines inthe mid-1960s, and is owned now by the govern-ment of American Samoa. Pan American’smonopolistic service from Hawaii to Pago Pagodoes little to encourage tourist traffic, with theiroften overbooked flights arriving between 4 and5:00 A.M. And the tourist attractions, aside fromthe cable car ride to the top of Mt. Alava, arehardly extraordinary, except for the once magnifi-cent Pago Pago harbor, now the site of the starkmalodorous fish cannery.

There is also some talk about developing com-mercial agriculture, but it is not very high on thepriority list. The little bit of agriculture that nowexists is on a miniscule scale, and is largely in thehands of retired military families who grow freshproduce for the local market and taro for theirtaro-hungry relatives in Honolulu and San Diegowho can afford the exorbitant costs of air freight.The more enterprising of these farmers hire(illegally) Korean and Taiwanese laborers who haveeither jumped ship or are waiting for their fishingvessel to be repaired or resupplied.

It would seem highly unlikely that any significantagricultural development will ever take place inAmerican Samoa, mainly because there is so littlearable land and even less interest on the part of theSamoans in cultivating it, except for the few taroand bananas for immediate household consump-tion.

Education in American Samoa is basically anAmerican system, supported exclusively by federalfunds. All of the educational leaders are eitherAmericans or American trained, with nearly a thirdof the high school teaching staff on two-yearcontracts from the United States. There is someeffort being made, as in many places in the UnitedStates and its territories, to establish a sound bi-lingual, bicultural education system, but, like mostother things in American Samoa, this too is depen-dent upon federal funding.

American Samoa’s education system is probablybest known for the multimillion dollar educationaltelevision scheme that was introduced in 1964 and,for all practical purposes, was considered dead by1974. With a full production studio, receivers inevery classroom, and a transmitter constructedatop Mt. Alava, the educational television schemein American Samoa, which was originally plannedas the complete educational program, is now gen-erally admitted to have been a colossal flop. How-ever, it paved the way, and provided the facilitiesfor commercial television in the islands, now athriving business, with Hawaii Five-O andwrestling as the favorite shows. (The entrepreneursrecently offered their surplus outmoded transmitterto Western Samoa, which rejected it, preferring toremain without television for the time being.)

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In a sense one can say that the education systemis doing its job. Of the four high schools inAmerican Samoa (for a population of 29,000), 70percent of the graduates are no longer in AmericanSamoa within one year after graduation. Fifty to 60percent of the young men and women go into theUnited States Armed Forces, usually the Navy orthe Army, both of which now have recruiting officesin Pago Pago. The Director of Education reportedthat those high school graduates who do not passthe Army entrance exam given in American Samoasimply go to another recruiting station that needsto make its quota, and take the examination again,usually passing.

It seems that American Samoans are contentwith their present situation. They have come toexpect the kind of United States assistance thatcurrently is the mainstay of their economy and wayof life. Until recently there has been apparent con-tentment with the political structure, which is aunique marriage between the standard Americansystem coupled with some aspects of traditionalSamoan chieftainship. There is a bicameral legis-lature, to which the representatives in the Houseare elected at large, while the members of theSenate are selected through the traditional matai(chiefly) system. Both the matai system and thelegislature wield insignificant powers when com-pared with those of the Governor who is appointedby the President of the United States, and whoanswers directly to the Director of TerritorialAffairs in the Department of Interior.

In three separate referenda held during recentyears, the American Samoans indicated convinc-ingly that they did not wish to elect their own Gov-ernor. However, in November 1976 the Samoansdid an abrupt about face, and voted to elect theirown chief executive. This sudden change was nodoubt motivated, at least in part, by the pan-Pacific movement toward self-government. Anothermotivationpossibly an even stronger one--wasthe last appointed Governor, Earl Ruth, fromNorth Carolina, who left office shortly after thereferendum. Governor Ruth (sometimes referred toas "Governor Ruthless") was widely knownthroughout the island for his heavyhanded way ofdealing with Samoans. To say that he was a racist isan understatement. Perhaps he will be known asthe Governor who persuaded the AmericanSamoans to elect their own governor, not because

they particularly wanted to, but because theywanted to get rid of him.

What changes an elected governorship ofAmerican Samoa may cause are not known, butthey will probably not be meaningful. The Terri-tory, regardless of how its chief executive is chosen,will probably remain under the Department ofInterior along with the other U.S. Territories. It isvery likely, however, that the American Samoansmay follow the example set by Guam and the newCommonwealth of the Northern Marianas, both ofwhich are negotiating for constitutions that wouldgive the islanders more authority over such thingsas land alienation and usage, customs, excise taxes,and their relationship with the U.S. Congress.

What lies ahead for American Samoa? At thispoint it looks as though it will continue along muchthe same pattern, getting its annual dole from theU.S. government, while exporting its youth on tothe American military forces. There have recentlybeen whispers about the possibility of a majormilitary base in American Samoa, motivated byrecent talks between the Soviet Union and Tongarelating to the possibilities of fisheries develop-ment, building a major wharf, and the establish-ment of naval facilities in Tonga which could serveRussian ships. If these talks lead to action, it is con-ceivable that the United States would re-establish amajor naval complex in the American territory ofSamoa as a counterbalance of naval power in theSouth Pacific.

Not to be outdone by the Russians, the People’sRepublic of China recently established formal dip-lomatic relations with Western Samoa. With bothChina and the Soviets moving into the heart ofPolynesia, the likelihood of an American counter-move seems very strong.

Village store in bicentennial colors, American Samoa.

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Western Samoa

In contrast to the American Territory 50 miles tothe east, Western Samoa was struggling for itsindependence in the 1920s, shortly after the fourlarge (and several smaller) islands were transferredfrom Germany’s to New Zealand’s control as partof the global partitioning following World War I.And since 1962 her people have been struggling tocope with the problems of being an independentisland nation--the first in the Pacificcaught inthe bind between their aspirations and the realitiesof limited natural resources, isolation, and tradi-tions which most islanders don’t want to change.

The aspirations of the Samoan people and theirleaders are, on the surface, simple and straight-forward: better education, better health care,better housing, more public services, more cashincome, and self-sufficiency in achieving thesegoals. This is a tall order for any society, and itwould seem to be particularly difficult for an islandcountry of less than 1,500 square miles and a pop-ulation of 151,000 persons whose daily lives areregulated with considerable restraint by a tradi-tional family system and the Christian Congrega-tional Church. This church is the direct and almostunchanged successor to the London MissionarySociety (LMS), which arrived in Samoa in the 1820sand took firm roots throughout. To understand theproblems of developing Samoa, one must takethese two institutions into account.

The elections that brought Prime MinisterTupuola Eft to office in February 1976 created aresurgence of optimism and energy among theministerial and administrative members of thegovernment, who oversee a work force comprisingover 50 percent of the salaried workers of thecountry. Described as a liberal intellectual (degreein Law from New Zealand) with socialist leanings,Eft sees his country’s problems with absoluteclarity" the lowest per capita income of Pacificnations, declining exports, increasing imports,emigration of the more able young adults, astaggering birthrate, exhaustion of agriculturallands, and continued reliance on external aid, toname but a few. Nevertheless, the new Prime Min-ister is undaunted in his desire to set a newstandard for island nation development in thePacific.

One of the ubiquitous churches of Western Samoa.

"We Samoans are the most paradoxical peoplein the Pacific," says the Prime Minister. "We arethe most conservative in our family system and themost progressive in developmental change."

The conservative family system refers to the aiga,or extended family, with its elaborate network ofsocial and economic tribute, and the matai, orchief, of extended families. This complex socialsystem has been analyzed and described by morethan one Westerner, but its role in Samoa’s devel-oping society may not be fully recognized.

At the present time the family system is excep-tionally vital, and plays a strong conservative role inpreventing some of the radical social changes thatare occurring in other parts of Polynesia at a devas-tating pace. At the same time, it is, in the minds ofsome, hindering the development of the countryinasmuch as it discourages individual initiative andenterprise, the cherished virtues of the Western sys-tem which Samoa learned from its two colonialmentors.

Some of the leaders in Samoan society see cracksbeginning to appear in the very foundations of thesystem; others say (and perhaps believe) that thesystem is unshakable, while at the same timelamenting that the system as practiced by theirbrothers in AmeriCan Samoa functions at a super-ficial level only, having succumbed to Americaniza-tion.

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Prime Minister Tupuola Efi(right) of Western Samoachats with State SenatorJohn Ushijima of Hawaii.

The constitution of Western Samoa, which wascarefully worked out with New Zealand adminis-trators over a period of several years precedingindependence, made strong provisions for followingthe Samoan matai tradition. Only matai can vote orbe elected to political office. Only matai can owncustomary land (nearly 80 percent of total) oraward it to others for personal use. And only mataican award matai titles to others, thereby creatingmore matai. J.W. Davidson, the chief adviser forSamoa during its move to independence, saw bothadvantages and disadvantages to this system whenhe wrote:

Because of its political traditions, Samoa iswell protected against the tyranny and dis-order that have marked the early years ofmany other new states. For the same reason,it is in danger of failing to keep pace withevents. (Samoa Mo Samoa Oxford, 1967, p.427)

During the past couple of years new matai titles,which must be approved by the central govern-ment’s Office of Lands and Titles, have been pro-liferating at an unprecedented pace, reaching apeak just before the 1976 election when TupuolaEft defeated the conservative incumbent, TupuaTamasese Lealofi IV. It is generally acknowledgedthat the new titles, created almost wholesale by the

Eft forces, enabled the new Prime Minister to gainoffice. This political move apparently started atrendwhich has still not abatedtoward theproliferation of new titles, and therefore franchisedlandholders. Should the trend continue, the tradi-tional system, which has exerted a strong conserva-tive influence, could become weakened to the pointof becoming another cultural relic. The logical out-come is that everyone will hold a title, therebyrendering it meaningless in the traditional sense.Should this happen, then the process of Western-izing the social, political, and economic systemscan run its course more freely.

Not to be overlooked among the elites of theSamoan social structure are the clergy of thevarious churches that abound throughout theislands. When the LMS missionaries came to Poly-nesia in the 1820s, they fulfilled an ancientprophecy that a white-skinned messenger wouldcome to herald a new and living god, while simul-taneously showing the inefficacy of the traditionalPolynesian gods who were quickly cast aside. Thus,the new ministers of the gospel were accorded anelite status that has not been challenged for thepast century and a half. The authoritarianism ofnineteenth-century Protestantism is still intact inSamoa today, and serves in no small way along withthe matai system to retard social change.

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The monopoly of the London Missionary Society,however, has given way to other churches: theRoman Catholic, Mormon, Seventh Day Adventist,and various other denominations within the Protes-tant framework. The Mormons are the most visibleof the newcomers. With their handsome churchbuildings, schools, and plantations, they are bring-ing the message of affluence through enterprise, amessage which may run counter to the ways of thematai and the aiga, thus providing still anotherchallenge to the oldest and most traditional of theinstitutions.

In spite of the traditional obstacles to develop-ment, Samoa continues to plan for a better andindependent future. The aspirations of the leadersand the people are reasonably modest, and perhapsattainable. But the obstacles are very real.

One of the primary goals is to bring about a morefavorable balance of exports and imports, which atpresent is extremely uneven. In 1974, the countryexported slightly over $7 million worth of copra,cocoa, wood, bananas, and fresh vegetables (inthat order), and imported more than twice thatamount ($15,874,000), mainly for foodstuffs andmanufactured goods. Like most of the other Poly-

Family huddled in neo-traditional house during rain showerin Western Samoa. Note corrugated iron roof, which is re-placing thatch throughout the Pacific.

nesian communities, Western Samoa, which isbasically an agricultural country, spends the largestamount of its foreign exchange on imported food-stuffs, much of it in the form of tinned meat andfish!

Western Samoa, it appears, faces the problem ofall agricultural societies, that of trying to pay formanufactured goods with the proceeds obtainedfrom selling raw materials. The government seesthis problem clearly. But since agriculture is theironly viable export product, the new government isplacing number one priority on the systematicdevelopment of better, more efficient agriculturalmethods while simultaneously encouraging thatmore land be put under cultivation. Some effort isbeing made to encourage the fledgling furniture,soap, and tourist industries, but the major thrust isagriculture. What might now be described as sub-sistence affluencenobody goes hungry inSamoais expected to form the economic back-bone of the country. What steps must be taken tobring this about?

A high-priority item is the construction of aninternational airport so that the flesh fruits andvegetables can be airshipped directly to overseas

Mom and Pop village store in Western Samoa, where tinnedmeat and fish are best selling items. Photos courtesy GeorgeChaplin.

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markets (particularly New Zealand) rather thanthrough the costly and time-consuming transship-ment point at Pago Pago’s international terminal.Whereas the previous administration resisted theconstruction of such an airport for fear of its socialimpact, the present government and business com-munity, especially those in the tourist-orientedbusinesses, are strongly supportive. Although nodefinite plans have yet been made, there is a strongprobability that there will be a new internationalairport within the next couple of years.

More land must be put under cultivation. Theland is available, and is being distributed for farm-ing by rnatai to members of their clans, and toother matai through the proliferation of new titles.The concept that land, even though it cannot besold, can be used to generate money through com-mercial agriculture is rapidly taking hold, therebycreating an unprecedented demand for land to beawarded through the traditional system. Sincethere is still no real shortage of arable land, itstenure and utilization has not yet become a prob-lem, but may in the not too distant future as thepopulation still under 15 years of age (more than 50percent) reaches maturity and is unable to emigratefreely to New Zealand as it has been doing for thepast generation.

Better farming techniques must be introducedand implemented. The banana crop of 1975 wasscarcely 20 percent of the previous year due tounusually dry weather and soil exhaustion.Droughts, of course, are beyond anyone’s control,but soil exhaustion must be corrected either byfallow fields, which the country can ill afford, orthrough agricultural technology, which must besupplied through external aid, a considerableamount of which is already being supplied by NewZealand in the form of technical advisers, heavyequipment (of questionable value), and teachers atthe Alafua Agricultural College (recently desig-nated the South Pacific Regional College ofTropical Agriculture, a branch of the University ofthe South Pacific).

In the minds of some Samoan critics, the tradi-tional role of the rnatai must change so that the titleholder will become a producer rather than aconsumer. Traditionally the matai demanded andreceived portions of whatever was produced on theland that he controlled or awarded. A good matai

manager could, without much effort, live off histitle under the traditional system of subsistenceagriculture.

The introduction of cash crops, however, haspresented certain problems relating to the peculiarfact that a farmer is much more willing to remit aportion of his produce to the matai than anequivalent amount of cash derived from the sale ofthe produce. This phenomenon lends considerablecredence to the argument that a money-basedeconomy is incompatible with most traditionalPacific island lifestyles, an argument that has beenput forward by more than one social anthropolo-gist, but has by no means convinced the Samoanleadership.

The question is, can the rnatai be persuaded tochange from their traditional role as privileged con-sumer to a new role that calls for productive leader-ship? This still forms a substantial obstacle in theway of significant agricultural development.

Timber, which seemed most promising ten yearsago, has proved disappointing. The PotlatchCorporation, an American company based inIdaho, established a sizable timber operation onthe big island of Savai’i a few years ago, but willcease operations in mid-1977 due to lack of profits.Since Potlatch employs 380 people25 percent offull-time paid employees on the islandthe gov-ernment will purchase the equipment from Pot-latch, and attempt to take over the entire opera-tion. This plan will be impossible to implementwithout considerable amounts of external aid.

The small furniture industry that was expectedto develop has not, despite a recent contract withaffluent Nauru to supply some household furniture.The furniture that is now produced is crudelyfashioned, and could not compete on the worldmarket. The most popular item for the local mar-ket is the wooden coffin with a plate glass facemask and various amounts of decorative chrome-plated crosses, handles, and figurines, dependingon the price a bereaved customer is willing to pay.

There is some talk of fisheries as another area ofeconomic development, but the prospects are nottoo good without a very sophisticated fishing fleetcomparable with those of Japan and Russia.

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And, of course, there is tourism which, at thepresent time, is not doing very well. The newgovernment-owned (75 percent)Tusitala Hotel,comfortable and modern by any standards, had a27 percent occupancy rate in 1975. Still, the thirdfive-year development plan targets 85,000 annualvisitors by 1981, which may reflect more wishfulthinking than calculated projections.

Regardless of which area of economic develop-ment the leaders of Western Samoa choose to em-phasize, outside sources of cash are required, evento maintain the status quo. Although bilateralforeign aid is the most readily available source, ithas become a less attractive one to Western Samoaand some other countries of the Pacific because ofthe inevitable restrictions and obligations.

Another important external source of cash isfound in the remittances sent back to families bythe thousands of expatriate Samoans living in NewZealand. There is no way to calculate the amount ofmoney coming from this source, but it is a rarefamily that doesn’t have money coming in from atleast one family member living abroad. This sourceof revenue, however, is likely to dwindle, owing toNew Zealand’s growing economic problems, andthe new quota system imposed on immigrants fromWestern Samoa.

Western Samoan police in Apia. Unlike their counterparts in

Pago Pago, they walk and do not carry weapons.

A new potential source of revenue is now loomingon the horizon in the form of recently establishedrelations with the two major communist powers,the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic ofChina. It is generally acknowledged that both ofthese countries want a toehold in the South Pacific,although the extent of their anticipated activities isnot yet known. The strong rumors that Russia willbuild a maritime facility in Tonga could mark thebeginning of a series of military and related devel-opments in the region which, at the moment, is freefrom any military bases except those in FrenchPolynesia, approximately 1,500 miles to the east.What the United States is likely to do in the eventof a communist force of any size in the SouthPacifican area hitherto ignoredremains to beseen. But it is highly unlikely that the United Stateswill not react in some way, possibly in the form ofgenerous amounts of aid. The fact that PrimeMinister Eft was visited in late 1976 by a U.S.Deputy Undersecretary of State may be an indica-tion of things to come.

The new Chinese Embassy in Apia will no doubtlead to increased trade between the two countries,but it is too early even to speculate about what itmight amount to. The extent of China’s activities inWestern Samoa may be determined, at least inpart, by the extent of Soviet activities in nearbyTonga, and perhaps in Western Samoa itself.

How do the Samoan people feel about the stateof things in 1976 in the face of a rising population(3.5 percent growth rate) and decreasing job oppor-tunities? (More than half the population is under15, a distinction that Western Samoa shares alongwith the Cook Islands.) Their feelings are bestexpressed by their actions.

Urban drift is most evident. From the villages,the young men and women migrate to Apia insearch ofwork and new experiences. From Apia thedrift has been toward Auckland, with a small frac-tion going to Pago Pago to work in the fish cannery

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Tide-flushed toilets in Western Samoa. The government is

eliminating this type in favor of open pit privies in the villages.Building a traditional style house in Western Samoa. Photocourtesy George Chaplin.

Some ofWestern Samoa’s 80,000 children under age 15, who are the focus of thecountry’s population problem. Photo courtesy George Chaplin.

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Young village men in West-ern Samoa. Will they followtheir brothers to Apia or

Auckland, or stay behind tocultivate the land? Photocourtesy George Chaplin.

earning several times more than they can earn aslaborers at home. In 1974, 4,244 persons emigratedfrom Western Samoa, most of them in search ofsalaried employment in New Zealand, for there isalmost no work, except for agriculture, in theislands. The government is powerless to alleviatethis unemployment problem, but will soon have toface the situation head on in view of the NewZealand quota system which was instituted withinthe past two years.

Those who choose to remain in the villagesexpress satisfaction with their lot. There is littlemoney, but adequate food, and, most important,each man is his own boss within the traditionalSamoan system. The matai and the pastors rulesupreme, and succeed in maintaining an extremelyorderly and peaceful society, with no police and vir-tually no crimes that cannot be dealt with throughthe traditional judiciary process, which may in-clude a fine or a caning.

Samoan villagers appreciate fa’a SamoatheSamoan way--and are flattered to be able to sharesome of their life with the occasional visitor. Thenew government has recently established a Village

Development Plan that is designed to help main-tain the independence and integrity of villageSamoa, utilizing the existing systems of governancethrough the matai and the churches.

As for the future, Western Samoans express dif-ferent attitudes. The Western-educated (usuallyNew Zealand) government worker expressesguarded optimism that he can play a part in devel-oping a more prosperous country that will retain itstraditional Polynesian customs and values, eventhough he has already divorced himself to onedegree or another from the aiga. The businessman(also Western educated) looks for increased activityto be stimulated by a new airport and foreignmonies coming either from tourists or from foreignaid, and he doesn’t really care which. The youngmen and women of the villages hope for escape toApia or to Auckland, but are becoming vaguelyaware of the saturation of the job market in the cityand the new quota system of the Muldoon govern-ment, which permits no more than 1,300 newSamoans per year to enter the country.

When asked what he would do were he youngagain and starting over, a 58-year-old man from the

DMT-l-’77 -24-

village of Fa’ala on the island of Savai’i, who hadbeen a constable in Apia from 1940 to 1950,chuckled and replied" "Go to school, get a job, andrun away from the aiga."

Does he speak for the majority of villageSamoans? Probably. But, the facts of life are goingto render escape from the village and the aiga moredifficult. Perhaps then Western Samoans will re-appraise their aspirations in the light of what ispossible for an independent island nation toachieve.

Main Street in Apia on a weekday (top) and on Sunday.

French Polynesia

Perhaps none of the islands of Polynesia conjureup such visions of romance and beauty in the SouthSeas as those of French Polynesia: Tahiti, BoraBora, Moorea, the Marquesas. Indeed, the 39islands and atolls, spread over two million squaremiles of some of the Pacific’s bluest and warmestwaters, deserve their reputation for some of themost dramatic scenery in the Pacific. All is notbeautiful in French Polynesia in 1976, however. Asthe only outright colony left in Polynesiaexceptfor Wallis and Futuna Islands, also French, andabout to become an integral DepartmenttheFrench Polynesians from the Marquesas, Tua-motus, Austral, Gambier, and Society Islandsthefive major groupsare beginning to talk aboutmore self-government in the form of autonomism.

Technically, French Polynesia has been a FrenchOverseas Territory since 1946, a status confirmedby referendum held in the is|ands in 1958; however,the colonial relationship with France goes back to1843, when Du Petit-Thouars took formal posses-sion of Queen Pomare’s dynasty in the name ofFrance.

Under the present arrangement, a French gov-ernor for the islands is appointed in Paris throughthe office of the Secretary of State for OverseasDepartments and Territories. Since 1946, theFrench government has appropriated an annualoperating budget for French Polynesia that is ad-ministered through the Governor and the Terri-torial Assembly, the locally elected governing body.French Polynesia in turn is represented in theFrench National Assembly by a locally electeddeputy. This arrangement, while acceptable in the1950s, has not proved satisfactory to many, perhapseven the majority of French Polynesians in 1976.

The simmering unrest began to boil in early 1976following the appointment of the new governor, M.Charles Schmitt, whose expulsion of the head of theTahiti Labor Office signaled a "tightening up" ofgovernance in the territory. In a show of force, thePapeete-based Territorial Assembly refused tomeet, thus blocking the theoretical governingprocedures. At the same time, Assembly leadersand the French Polynesian Deputy to Paris sub-mitted a letter to the French National Assemblydemanding the right to manage their own affairs

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(the autonomists’ basic platform). The letteropened with the warning, "The way things aregoing between Paris and Tahiti, Polynesia will notremain French much longer."

Confrontation of such magnitude is new toFrench Polynesia, though not, of course, to France,which has bitterly resisted the defection of morethan one colony. The response from France hasbeen low key, but clearly negative. There was, forexample, no budget for the Territory for 1976,which forced each department to operate month-to-month based upon the previous year’s alloca-tion. The French Secretary of State for OverseasDepartments and Territories withdrew a statute hehad proposed more than a year earlier to giveTahiti more self-determination in running its ownaffairs, but stopping short of internal autonomy orindependence. And, the national government hasnot responded to the autonomists’ demand to dis-solve the Territorial Assembly and hold early elec-tions rather than wait until 1977 when the nextelection is scheduled to take place. Finally, on June10, 1976, when the autonomists blocked GovernorSchmitt from entering the grounds of the Terri-torial Assembly in Papeete, government forcesconfronted them with arms, thus preventing anysort of legislative proceedings.

While the autonomists are claiming to speak forthe majority of French Polynesians, it is not clear atthis point that they do. As more and more Poly-nesians are brought into the cash economy, eitheras a result of "l’expriment" (a euphemism for thenuclear bomb operations centered on MururoaAtoll, officially known as the Centre d’Exp6rimen-tation du Pacifique, or C.E.P.) or through migra-tion to nickel-rich New Caledonia, the demand forchange is softened. Many of the Polynesians areeither indifferent or do not wish to see any changein the status quo that might threaten the good life,as they see it, provided by the French administra-tion, even if it is colonial in its approach. That theelected President (by one vote) of the TerritorialAssembly is pro-French is a sign that the Poly-nesians are far from unanimous in their desire forgreater independence, and the French have cer-tainly not overlooked this.

In the eyes of most other Pacific Islanders, theFrench Polynesians who want no change in their

present relationship with France have been"bought out." Salaried jobs are more meaningfulthan the personal satisfaction that might comefrom being independent Polynesians. The truth ofthis judgment is borne out in part by the internalmigration figures of French Polynesia that indicatea greater movement of people toward urban areasthan anywhere else in Polynesia, if we exclude thecombined Polynesian movements from WesternSamoa, Tonga, Niue, and the Tokelaus to Auck-land.

Most movement is to greater Papeete, whichspread into suburbs at an annual increase of 9.5percent between 1967 and 1971 (most recent avail-able figures). The closest suburban areas of Faaaand Pirae grew by 184.5 and 125.8 per cent between1962 and 1971 and the rate of movement has accel-erated considerably during the past five years.More than half the French Polynesians are nowliving in the "urban" area, which is where thejobs are.

Coupled with the urban spread is the inevitabledevelopment of les bidonvilles, crowded shanty-towns that are cleanly divided into distinct outerisland groups from the Taumotus, Marquesas, andSO orl.

Not to be overlooked are the more than 7,000French Polynesians who have gone to France’sother major colony in the Pacific, New Caledonia,to work in the nickel and building industries forwhat by Pacific standards are incredibly highwages.

Such massive migration produces many effects,most of which appear to strengthen the Frenchposition. It serves to accelerate the change from aPacific-style rural subsistence economy to a cash-based economy that is totally dependent upon the"experiment" and a modest amount of tourism.Traditional values and identification are badlystrained as Polynesians leave their home islandsand families to follow the job market. Dependencyon the metropolitan country that provides thesejobs is continually strengthened. All of these factorsargue against any serious movement toward inde-pendence, at least until the job market becomessignificantly overloaded, which has not happenedyet.

DMT-l-’77 -26-

French Navy visits Papeete on Bastille Day, in betweenatomic blasts at Mururoa, site of L’Exp6riment.

The new Tahitian youth in Papeete, Bastille Day 1976.

Since the French government is doing nothing todiscourage migration both within French Polynesiaand to New Caledonia, it will likely continue alongthe same pattern for the near future, thus furtherweakening the cause of the autonomist movement.

One must ask, what is in it for France? There areat least three reasons that come to mind, not theleast of which is France’s desire to maintain hermilitary presence in the Pacific. Despite the some-times highly visible and vociferous protests byPacific Islanders and others for a nuclear-freePacific or a moratorium on all nuclear testing, theC.E.P. set off two unannounced nuclear explosionsin July 1976, just before and after Bastille Day.French Polynesia is France’s major nuclearshooting gallery, and she is not likely to give it upeasily.

Another reason is that if France relinquishes herhold on one territory, it might set a precedent forthe others, particularly New Caledonia and the NewHebrides where a growing number of Melanesiansare talking in terms of total independence. Giventhe vast mineral deposits remaining in NewCaledonia, where thousands of pieds noires immi-grated from former colonies in Africa and Indo-china, France would be most reluctant to let it go.

A third reason is that virtually 100 percent of themoney that is floating around in French Poly-nesiaa considerable amount by Pacific stan-dardsgoes toward the purchase of French-madeimports, thus creating a substantial market forfoodstuffs, consumer goods, and heavy machinery.

Finally, there is probably an element of Frenchpride at stake as well.

For the French Polynesians, what is the alterna-tive? Aside from sagging copra and vanilla produc-tion, agriculture beyond the subsistence level holdsvirtually no promise. Tourism might prove viableexcept for the incredibly inflated prices that dis-courage most first-time tourists from returning fora second visit. Commercial fishing on a scalebeyond supplying the local market does not exist,and is not being encouraged by the government. Inshort, the prospects for self-sufficiency are prettydim.

This current situation, coupled with the extremesocial dislocation, is likely to serve as a good pre-ventive to a significant change in the political oreconomic status in French Polynesia, which, fromall indications, is just the way France wants it.

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The Cook Islands

The Cook Islands are every Pacific buffs favoriteplace to visit in Polynesia. The natural beauty, theclimate, the people, the music, and the prices areright. It is a country with relatively few of the prob-lems found in the rest of Polynesia. One can’t helpwondering how this state of affairs came to pass.

The noted Pacific scholar, Douglas Oliver,referred to the Cooks as "the crumbs that were leftafter the choicer morsels had been swallowed up"by the European colonial powers in the nineteenthcentury. Since the 14 islands and atolls are rela-tively small (93 square miles in total) and widelyscattered (1,000 miles from Mangaia in the south toPenrhyn in the north), they never held muchattraction for the more ambitious colonizers. NewZealand assumed the role of mother country in1901, and in 1965 granted the Cooks internal self-government in a status of Free Association, anarrangement that is being carefully studied bysome Micronesians.

Perhaps the most advantageous feature of thispolitical arrangement with New Zealand is thatCook Islanders are British subjects and citizens ofNew Zealand, and therefore, unlike most otherPolynesians, are exempt from the New Zealand"overstayer" problem that is causing difficulties forSamoans, Tongans, and, to a lesser extent, Fijians.The Cook Islanders are at liberty to travel to andfrom New Zealand at will, and enjoy all the workingrights of any other Kiwi.

Cook Islanders, both the Maoris from Rarotongaand the Samoic-type peoples from the northernislands, have made considerable use of thisfreedom to immigrate to New Zealand. In 1936there were 135 Cook Islanders in New Zealand, by1945 there were 354 and in 1976, there were morethan 25,000, while only 19,000 remain in theislands, more than half of them living on littleRarotonga. Still, the Cook Islands do not appear torun the risk of complete population attrition, as doNiue and the Tokelaus.

This massive postwar emigration has helped alle-viate two common problems that plague the rest ofPolynesia" overpopulation and unemployment.Since the Cooks share with Western Samoa the dis-tinction of having more than 50 percent of the

population under the age of 15, the unimpededemigration route to New Zealand serves to releasewhat could soon prove to be unbearable populationpressures. (The Tokelau Islands and Niue, bothwith negligible populations of under 5,000, alsoshare this privilege of unlimited immigration toNew Zealand.)

The Free Association status with New Zealandalso guarantees other privileges to the Cooks. NewZealand controls foreign affairs and defense for theislands. Air New Zealand provides convenienttransportation to Fiji and New Zealand, linkingonce a week with Tahiti. New Zealand provides asteady market for the Cook Islands major exportitems" tinned Raro brand orange juice and freshvegetables. Perhaps more important, New Zealandprovides much of the islands’ New Zealand cur-rency that keeps Premier Sir Albert Henry’s(K.B.E.) government from going broke. (Twiceduring recent years Sir Albert simply advanced thedate of the beginning of a new fiscal year becausethe treasury was running out of funds.) In short, theCooks have a good thing going with New Zealand,an arrangement which nobody talks seriously aboutwanting to change, except for a few conservativeKiwis who grumble that high-cost foreign aid isbeing spent on ungrateful islanders.

Despite the generous arrangement with NewZealand, which helps Sir Albert (the most colorfulpolitician in the South Pacific) maintain a fullcomplement of cabinet ministers and civil servants,the Cook Islands are not without their problems.There is, of course, internal politics, with a vigorousopposition party headed by Dr. Tom Davis, aRarotongan who, like many of his compatriots,spends a good bit of his time in New Zealand. Theelection season invariably gives rise to renewedcharges and accusations, mostly against Sir Albertfor being a spendthrift and for placing friends andrelatives from his home island of Aitutaki inappointed positions. Sir Albert’s response to theaccusation of nepotism is candid" he trusts hisfriends and relatives more than he does otherpeople, and apparently there are enough of them tohelp maintain control of Cook Islands’ politics.

While people acknowledge Sir Albert’s basicintegrity, there is great concern (mostly unspoken)about who will succeed the 68-year-old Premierwhen he dies. Since he had one serious heart attack

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while attending the 1976 South Pacific ArtsFestival in Rotorua, New Zealand, concern is grow-ing. However, the Henry clan is so firmly en-trenched, the dynasty would probably persist evenwithout its pioneering leader.

People also talk about economic developmentand economic independence in the Cook Islands.Yet, a report from the 1976 economic analysisstates: "All the productive sectors are witheringwhile the consuming sectors are seemingly bloom-ing. This is a situation which cannot and should notcontinue." One looks pretty much in vain forcountermeasures.

The increased consumption in the Cooks indicatesthat there is no great shortage of money. Becausethe islands use New Zealand currency, it is impos-sible to determine how much of it comes from theremittances of Cook Islanders living in NewZealand. Foreign aid transactions are soobfuscated as to be equally incalculable, yet thesemust be the primary sources of funds that permitthe consuming sector to bloom. Retired CookIslanders on the New Zealand superannuationscheme also help to support the growing con-sumerism.’

As in the rest of Polynesia, Cook Islanders lookto agriculture for increased productivity, eventhough the crops, aside from citrus, are thestandard ones found everywhere in Polynesia:bananas, copra, taro, and some vegetables.Excepting the successful Raro juice factory, agri-cultural development is lagging, as elsewhere inPolynesia, due to poor transportation and market-ing. With direct flights to Auckland, a fewRarotonga-grown fresh vegetables are finding theirway to the New Zealand winter market. This type ofagricultural enterprise is barely off the ground,however, and even if more fully developed woud beof benefit only to Rarotongans, while their relativesin the outer islands are limited to copra andpossibly taro as their only cash crops, all othersbeing too perishable to survive the erratic shippingschedules.

In view of the Cooks’ reputation as the mostdelightful place in the Pacific to visit, tourism de-velopment would seem a logical choice, yet theislands were excluded almost completely from thetourist circuit until the international airport was

Cook Islands National ArtsRarotonga Airport.

Theatre performing at

opened with much Polynesian and European fan-fare by Queen Elizabeth in 1974. Rarotonga is stilla terminal point from Auckland and Nadi, exceptfor the once-weekly flight from Papeete, and thetraffic from New Zealand and Fiji is anything butheavy. Consequently, tourism is still an infant in-dustry in the Cooks.

If the mass tourist market were tappedwhich isthe only way to gain significant revenuesRaro-tonga would certainly lose its fabled charm. Theisland is simply not big enough to absorb any morethan the 10,000-odd annual visitors, mostly fromNew Zealand, it now entertains. Still, changes areon the way. The number of rooms in the handful ofsmall motels and the one 30-room hotel will soon bedoubled by the completion of Stage I of the partlygovernment-owned 150-room Rarotonga Hotel,although plans for the hotel’s second stage havebeen cancelled by the government because of in-creasing concern over the social impact of largernumbers of tourists in such a small community. Itwould appear that the Cook Islands are seriouslystudying the question "What Price Tourism?"

Partly in connection with the potential for touristdevelopment, the education system in the Cooksplaces considerable emphasis on Cook IslandMaori song and dance, which is the finest in the

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Pacific, according to most observers. Cultural con-servation is achieved through the universal partici-pation of the school students, who have annualcompetitions which include modernized versions oftraditional action songs lionizing Sir Albert. In theprocess, many of them develop marketable talentsfor the tourist industry in the Cooks as well as inother parts of the Pacific. This aspect is in keepingwith the apparent underlying educational philoso-phy in the Cooks, that is, to prepare the studentsfor emigration in the absence of a salaried positionat home.

In terms of regional development, the Cooks aredefinitely on the periphery, particularly as long asFrench Polynesia, the closest neighbor, maintainsexclusive links with France. The population andland area are too small to be of any real significanceexcept to Cook Islanders. Apart from having thebest dancers in the Pacific and passable tinnedorange juice, the Cooks don’t really have much tooffer to the other island groups in the region.

Perhaps the present arrangement with NewZealand, which does not generate any serious com-plaints, is the optimum one. It allows for freemigration. It permits Sir Albert to conduct a gov-ernment with all the pomp and circumstances ofany head of state. And it somehow makes for whatis the highest overall standard of living in Poly-nesia, possibly in the whole Pacific (except for thephosphate islands of Nauru and Banaba). Underthe circumstances it is likely that development willnot be dramatic in the Cooks in the near future. Itmight even be that the Cooks have hit upon aworkable arrangement with a metropolitan countrythat some of the other small island groups, espe-cially those of Micronesia, could follow.

One might ask what New Zealand gets out of thisarrangement. Part of the answer can be found bylooking at the place of origin of most consumergoods in Rarotonga, save at the duty free shopswhich are loaded with Sonys, Nikons, and otherJapanese products. There is also a conspicuousnumber of New Zealand expatriates holding gov-ernment jobs. Nor should one overlook the fact thatCook Island Maoris blend very nicely with theirNew Zealand Maori cousins, and form a reliableaddition to the industrial work force. It is one ofthose arrangements, it appears, whereby everybodygains something. And that is rare in the Pacific.

Perhaps they have hit upon the ideal method tomaintain a steady balance, and at the same time tokeep the cash and goods flowing in a modern kula-ring system.

Tonga

To talk of Tonga one must begin with thechurch, or the state, or both, for in no other placein Polynesiaor possibly in the modern worldare the two so close and so powerful, both working,some say, to keep the Tongans the poorest of all thePolynesians by almost any standard, while theruling elite are among the richest. Nowhere else inPolynesia is the contrast so stark.

Western visitors constantly remark on the simi-larity between the present-day ruling elite in Tongaand the eighteenth-century divine monarchies ofEurope. The similarities are surely there. Generallyregarded as oppressive and outdated, it was prob-ably this strong blend of church and state that keptTonga a self-governing protectorate of GreatBritain from 1900 to 1970, while all of her Poly-nesian neighbors became colonies of one Easternpower or another.

The history of this church-state development is afascinating one which has been well-described by aTongan intellectual who currently teaches historyat the University of Papua New Guinea. WhileGermany, Great Britain, and France were carvingup various fragments of Polynesia during the late1800s (their way having been paved by the front-running missionaries), a lone, highly energetic andcreative missionary, the Rev. Shirley Baker, steeredTonga’s then ruling monarch (King George TupouI) to a middle ground which kept the Westernpowers at bay. His argument was that if Tongadidn’t want to become a colony, it should declareitself a country and acquire the necessary accoutre-ments.

Working with the complete support of Tupou I(who appointed him to the post of prime ministerand several other ministerial positions), Baker thenproceeded to write a constitution, design a flag,compose a national anthem, and provide all theother necessary appurtenances to legitimize thekingdom in international circles. Baker’s Consti-tution for the Kingdom of Tonga, adopted in 1875,has been only slightly modified during the past

DMT-l-’77 -30-

hundred years. Since it was designed to support aconstitutional monarchy, it is probably one of themost archaic constitutions in the world today, andit still stands as an almost irrefutable source ofsanction.

The 1875 constitution specifies that the titles ofthe king and of the 33 nopele (Tonganized form of"’noble") are inherited. The nearly 100,000Tongans are thus ruled by 34 males whose power,virtually absolute, is vested in them by accident ofbirth. The present constitution also specifies that 7of the 21 members of the legislative assembly beelected by popular vote. But, since the other 14members, as well as the entire cabinet and privycouncil, are appointed, largely from among thenopele, popular representation in the governmentof the kingdom is only token.

The church in Tonga (meaning the FreeWesleyan Church of Tonga)supports the monar-chical system, and is in turn supported by it in asymbiotic relationship which places the Tonganclergy in a stronger position than any of theircounterparts elsewhere in Polynesia. King Taufa’-ahau Tupou IV still makes all important announce-rnents at Sunday services in the church, and main-tains his own private chapel on the palace grounds,a beautiful nineteenth-century wood structure ofclassic Victorian design. This show of royal supportfor the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga strengthensthe position of the clergy, a strength that can oftenbe measured in economic terms.

Although the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga isthe king’s church, and therefore the dominant one,its position is being challenged by other groups, oneof which emerged from the schism that occurredwithin the original Wesleyans whom the Rev.Shirley Baker established as the Church of theState. They are known simply as the WesleyanChurch. The Catholic Church, which has been inTonga since the days of the earliest French mis-sionaries in the Pacific, now claims 16 percent ofthe population.

Mormons from Salt Lake City are the most con-spicuous church group in Tonga today. With theirflashy American-style churches and schoolscomplete with chain-link fences, lighted black-topped basketball courts (often powered by the onlygenerator in the village), and white shirts and blackties (though shoes are not required), they aregaining converts by the score. Many youngTongans see the Mormon Church as a way out ofTonga to either Hawaii or Salt Lake City, both sitesof Brigham Young University, and it is not un-known for bright Tongan youths to stay with theMormons through a tertiary education program,and then to drop out of sight to seek careersoverseas. Young Tongan Elders are rewarded byoverseas scholarships after fulfilling a prescribedquota of converts.

While the great majority of Tongans scratch afairly difficult subsistence living from the increas-ingly crowded land, the royal family, nobles, and

The King’s palace and chapel in Tongatapu. The Mormon Church has sunk firm roots in Tonga.

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Young Tongan Elders of the Mormon Church. Enough newconverts can mean a ticket to Hawaii or Salt Lake City.

clergy live in relative splendor, deriving most of itfrom payments of one form or another from thepeasants. All land in the 150 islands of the king-dom belongs to the king, who in turn authorizes the33 nopele, each of whom has a traditional allot-ment, to lease the land at relatively low rates totheir countrymen. Theoretically each male, uponreaching the age of 16, is entitled to eight and one-fourth acres of farm land and two-fifths of an acreof town land on which to build a house. But, as thepopulation grows at one of the fastest rates inPolynesia (3.5 percent), land becomes less and lessavailable. Already, there is not enough land forevery 16-year-old male to receive his quota.

The land issue is being exacerbated by a rela-tively recent practice" the nobles are simply notleasing the land as provided in the constitution.One Tongan intellectual and clergyman recentlypublished that there are at least 50,000 acres ofunreleased land in Tonga while 14,000 landlessTongan taxpayers go begging, which usually meanssharing the land allocated to an older brother.

Such an outdated and inequitable system of landtenure seems incompatible with Tonga’s stated eco-nomic objectives, which give priority to agricultural

development. Although blessed with the richest,most productive soil in the Pacific, plus a spread ofclimates from tropical in the northern Vava’ugroup to subtropical in the southern Tongatapugroup, agriculture is still practiced by largely tra-ditional methods, and none too successfully. On theother hand, the clergy and the nobles place suchheavy demands on the individual farmers for theirfruits, produce, and cash, that farmers are dis-couraged from trying to develop cash crops.Weekly feasts for visiting pastors put a steadystrain on the individual farmers who are compelledby tradition to contribute what they are told;church demands for cash "contributions" of up to25 percent of an average family’s $300 annualincome keep the church members (which includesevery Tongan living in Tonga) money poor. Suchcontributions are used to pay for the church build-ings, schools, pastors’ salaries, and, of all things,Tongan missionaries serving overseas. The church,therefore, plays a significant role in blocking com-mercial agricultural development.

There are, however, signs of reform from withinthe church. Equally important, since the combinedchurches provide more than 75 percent of the sec-ondary education in Tongawith newly initiatedadult education programs complementing conven-tional effortsthey may be in a position to sow theseeds of change in fertile minds. Moreover, thechurch in Tonga has a voice that is second only tothat of the king, and it is a very close second. If thespirit of reform catches on within that venerableinstitution, it could possibly spread throughout thekingdom.

Some of the younger clergy in Tonga, both inProtestant and Catholic circles, are talking publiclyof reform. Such talk does not please the govern-ment, which is known to impose heavy levies onschool supplies and books, delay visas for expa-triate staff, and refuse to provide any form of finan-cial assistance. Echoing the new theology of thePacific Theological College in Suva, the reform-minded clergy of Tonga, still a minority, areteaching that the church has grown more parasiticwith time, and the clergy along with it. To fulfilltheir proper role, claim the reformers, clergymenmust turn from being consumers to being pro-ducers, from being followers of royal decrees tobeing community leaders and developers. Theiraspirations are based on the strength and status of

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the clergy in the community, a status they hope touse to lead reform within the kingdom. As oneleading Tongan clergyman put it:

We need to change the feudalistic system ofgovernance and the feudalistic concepts ofthe church. We must help people recognizetheir individuality, their potential as freepeople, rather than as servants of a man orGod. We must shift our concern from thesoul to the whole person, including his placein society.

One example of the action of the reform-mindedclergy in Tonga was the Conference on Land andMigration (1976) sponsored by the National(Tongan) Council of Churches. Some of the paperspresented advocated reform in the land tenuresystem which would be considered heretical by theking and the landed class of nopele.

Also feeding the spirit of reform is the fact thatthe people of Tonga, like other Polynesians, want"development," which may have different mean-ings depending on who is using the term. The sub-sistence farmer-fisherman would like some cashand a frame house to replace his thatch one. Thetown-dwelling government clerk would like elec-tricity and refrigeration. The higher level civil ser-vants, particularly those in Nuku’alofa, the capital,want a new Toyota (or Holden), while the kingwants a newer Mercedes-Benz limousine, anairline, and a bigger defense forcethe only one inPolynesia except for Fiji’s.

Development in Tonga is still pretty much in thetalking stage. There is talk of developing fisheries,agriculture, tourism, and light industry, and thereare rumors about a Soviet maritime facility, whichcould service fishing and other types of vessels. It isdifficult to determine at this point how much of thistalk will materialize soon enough to save the gov-ernment of Tonga from bankruptcy (about whichthere is even more talk throughout the Pacific).

The desire is certainly there, and there are possi-bilities of fulfillment. But there are certainobstacles, more perhaps, than anywhere else inPolynesia.

The most viable possibility for immediate devel-opment, agriculture, is paralyzed by the landtenure system. Since no one, except a noble, has

access to more than eight and one-quarter acres offarm land (and many Tongans have less or none),even medium-scale agriculture is impossible. Thebest a farmer can hope for is irregular sales of smallamounts of coconuts, bananas, taro, yam, and afew fresh vegetables. His coconuts are collected asthey drop from the tree, then sold at a fixed price tothe government-owned Copra Commodities Board,where they are husked, shelled, and dried for ship-ment to a foreign coconut oil processing plant.Bananas and fresh vegetables find a small marketin Nuku’alofa, most of whose residents have left theland for salaried jobs.

Some fresh produce actually gets shipped to NewZealand, but the amount is small and dwindling.Transportation is irregular and unreliable. NewZealanders prefer bananas from Ecuador becausethey are prettier, though not nearly so tasty, andthe importers can depend upon a regular supply.Tongan tomatoes are "not the right size" for NewZealand tastes, and few of them survive shipmentanyway. In addition, the growing racism in NewZealand with regard to the Pacific Islanders has nothelped in the efforts to develop an island-suppliedfruit and vegetable market there.

Whole coconuts and taro, both hardy enough tosurvive the vagaries of shipment by the notoriouslyinefficient government-owned Pacific NavigationCompany, find their way to the New Zealand Poly-nesian community (ca. 100,000) where residentislanders pay five times the home market price forthe cherished starch and fresh coconut cream, bothbasic to Polynesian cuisine. However, the scale ofthis agricultural market is minuscule, and theTongan farmers must compete with their counter-parts in Samoa for their share of it.

Despite Tonga’s fertility, climate, and proximityto New Zealand, the prospects for economic devel-opment through agriculture are not good. The landtenure system, the lack of reliable transport, and anuninterested target market are formidable ob-stacles.

Fishing too lacks promiseunless Tonga followsthrough with the widely rumored plan to go intobusiness with the U.S.S.R. or Japan. Most fishingin Tonga today is done with a one-man net, a60-pound line coiled around a 25-ounce beer bottle,or a homemade spear gun. Since there are no

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Tongan fishermen’s cooperative in Ha’apai. The ubiquitous Burns Philp Company--the J.C. Penny of theSouth Seas--Ha’apai, Tonga Branch.

storage facilities outside the Burns Philp or MorrisHedstrom food markets in Nuku’alofa, fish are soldand eaten locally on the day they are caught. Such asystem provides fresh fish for Tongans, but forms aweak base for economic development.

Tonga is approaching tourism with caution, asare most other Pacific communities. At a PacificTourism Conference held in Nuku’alofa (at themoney-losing government-owned Dateline Hotel) inSeptember 1976, the Director of SPEC, a Tongan,voiced a somber note of caution, shared by manyPacific Islanders, regarding the conflict betweenthe preservation of island cultures and the devel-opment of a profitable tourist trade. Fiji’s manyempty resort hotel rooms stand as a grim reminderof the economic risk involved. What is more, mostPacific travelers agree that Tonga, despite theromantic allure of its name, simply doesn’t havemuch in the way of natural attractions to drawtourists away from other accessible resort areas,such as Fiji, Samoa, Rarotonga, New Caledonia,and Norfolk Island, which has succeeded in devel-oping a small Australian tourist market. The abso-lute flatness of the island (save for the Vava’ugroup far to the north) is far more suitable forfarming than for scenery, and the beaches, wherethey can be found, are not out of the ordinary andare generally off-limits on the Sabbath.

In short, tourism in Tonga may have alreadypeaked with its twice monthly (average) visit of P &O cruise ships which call at Nuku’alofa for 24hours or less. Proposed new air service betweenPago Pago and Nuku’alofa, with intermediate stops

in the northern and central groups, may strengthenthe efforts in tourism.

There is some talk of developing light industryinTonga, where none currently exists, through theassistance of the Asia Development Bank. Primaryemphasis would be given to manufacturing itemsfor domestic consumption, such as soap, matches,corrugated iron, cement, and construction lumber,virtually all of which is now imported from NewZealand, thereby adding to the increasingly lop-sided negative trade balance (1972 imports:$6,304,900; 1972 exports: $2,200,200). Industrialdevelopment would have to start from ground zero,however, for Tonga is the least industrialized of allthe independent Polynesian communities. Evenlittle Rarotonga has its Raro juice factory, whichperhaps was the example that inspired the Tongangovernment to start planning seriously for its owntomato cannery.

With all the apparent odds against self-develop-ment in Tonga, what are the options? Status quo,or more developmental aid, some of which may beforthcoming from non-ANZUS sources?

Even if Tonga should opt for the status quo--most unlikelyit might prove difficult to maintain.With each new birth, the land grgws scarcer, thusaggravating the already problem-ridden landtenure system. The primary escape valve for over-populationemigration to New Zealandhasbeen nearly closed offby the Muldoon government.

DMT-l-’77 -34-

The "overstayer" (one who has stayed in NewZealand beyond the period of his work permit)problem has become especially acute in NewZealand since 1975. In addition to the nearly 5,000registered Polynesian migrant laborers, there arethousands more who are working without permitsor valid visas. The former New Zealand Minister ofImmigration stated" "New Zealand industry isdependent on illegal island labor. Unless they usesuch labor, production and export targets cannotbe met." Still, overstayers are not only beingactively sought and deported, sometimes as a resultof 2:00 A.M. raids in the Polynesian sections ofAuckland, but the number of visitor permits forTongans to New Zealand has been reduced from4,133 in 1974 to a mere 714 for the first half of1976.

The remittances from working Tongans in NewZealand to their families back in the islands hasprovided a sizable amount of income to Tonga,being for some families the only source of cash. Therecent cutbacks hurt. While there is no way to cal-culate the exact amount from remittances,3 allagree that it is considerable, and that Tonga wouldbe in even worse financial shape without it.

With dwindling agricultural exports and remit-tances, the revenues for maintaining governmentservices are likely to become more strained unlessadditional foreign money is obtained. Like all theother Polynesian communities, Tonga is heavilydependent on foreign aid. In 1970, the UnitedKingdom and Australia were the principal donorsof official development assistance. New Zealand aidis quite visible, and reportedly increasing. UnitedStates aid is limited to 80-odd Peace Corps Volun-teers, most of whom are teaching in the inter-mediate and secondary schools, and two ancient PTboats, which form the Royal Tongan Navy. In anattempt to secure more foreign capital, the Tongangovernment recently rented the largest ship of itsPacific Navigation Company, the 6,500-tonTauloto, to the People’s Republic of China, a movethat was possibly more political than economic.

3. An Auckland newspaper gave the following figures forremittances to Tonga: 1974: $2,435,341. 1975: $1,538,656.January-June 1976: $392,555.

It is now generally accepted in the Pacific thatTonga has entered the international aid game inearnest. The Crown, with the solid backing of thegrowing cadre of civil service elite (many of whosejobs are supported by foreign aid), has been con-ducting serious discussions with the U.S.S.R. andJapan concerning the development of an inter-national airport for Tonga in exchange for mari-time facilities, both to be built by the donor coun-try. It is the nature of the "maritime" facilities thatworries the ANZUS members, particularly NewZealand, which sees it as a potential Russian navalbase in the South Pacific, although Russia hasmaintained that it wants only anchorage for itsfishing fleet.

Japan has more recently entered the picture witha better offer which includes not only the upgrad-ing of harbor facilities and airport, but an airline aswell! Meeting in Nuku’alofa in September 1976,the Royal Tonga Club (whose members includeActing Chairmen M. Fusimoto, Secretary YasuiehiYasuno, Legal Consultant Yochi Kawagoe, and tworegular directors Messrs. Yamanaka Katsuo andYoshihiro Matsunaga) announced its intention toestablish an airline in Tonga, develop fisheries, andexplore for oil. Which of the offers will actuallymaterialize and be accepted is still a matter of con-jecture, but it is certain that ANZUS is wary of anygreater Russian presence in the Pacific. A delega-tion from the New Zealand Parliament flew toTonga for a "goodwill" visit soon after the news ofthe Russian and Japanese offers were made public,and the United States invited the King and Queento visit Guam and selected parts of Micronesia inJanuary 1977.

Tonga needs foreign aid badly just to maintainthe status quo. Without fairly sizable increases, herchances for development are slim. The outcome ofthe aid game now beginning in Tonga, and alreadyspreading to Western Samoa, will be crucial to thebalance of power in the South Pacific which, untilnow, has been safely in the hands of ANZUS, theUnited Kingdom, and France. With the manganesedeposits and other mineral potential lying withinTonga’s ocean waters (to be defined eventually,they hope, by the International Law of the Sea),plus the promise of good anchorage for fishing andpossibly military vessels, the little Kingdom ofTonga may indeed be in a good position to drive ahard bargain with the competing giants.

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Traditional Fijian bre. Government building stands atupper left.

Fj

Fabled Fiji stands at the crossroads of Polynesiaand Melanesia and in many respects represents ablend of the two with identifiable features of each.It is a land of notable contrasts, not the least ofwhich is that between the high, middle, and lowincome classes, with a larger group in the middlethan exists anywhere else in Polynesia.

At the helm of this island nation is Ratu SirKamisese Mara, the elected Prime Minister, who isemerging as the top political dog of the SouthPacific region, followed closely by the compara-tively young Michael Somare, the first electedPrime Minister (1975) of Papua New Guinea. RatuMara brings with him a traditional chiefly titlewhich serves to solidify his already strong positionwith the Fiji electorate.4 Dropping bits of socialistrhetoric in selected places, he continues to lead thecountry into the Australia-New Zealand (ANZ)economic orbit, and at the same time is fastbecoming known by the U.S. Department of State,having been invited to the East-West Center, Inc.,in 1975 to give a lecture in the prestigious Dilling-ham Series on "The Pacific Way," and subse-quently appointed to the Board of Trustees of thatinstitution.

4. In an astonishing upset, the Hon. Siddiq Koya defeatedPrime Minister Mara in a recent (April) election, throwingthe government in a state of panic. In an unprecedented moveto avoid possible racial unrest, the Governor Generalappointed Ratu Mara to continue as Prime Minister of theminority government until the issue is resolved by a newelection.

In addition to the problems attendant to anydeveloping society, Ratu Mara faces the problem ofpotentially explosive racial tension in Fiji. Withslightly more than 50 percent of the populationbeing Indian, most of them descendants of sugarplantation laborers imported by the British fromGujarat between 1879 and 1916, the Fijians aresimply outnumbered, especially in the towns, wherethe ratio is even more out of balance, and where thenumber of landless Indians grows at an acceleratedpace.

As land becomes more valued as a source of cashcrop agriculture, the short-term leases (ten years)held by Indian farmers are often not renewed. Thissituation leaves the Indians with little choice: eithergo to the towns and hope to find work, or emigrateto Commonwealth countries, all of which aretightening their immigration quotas.

The ultimate consequence of this land squeezeon the Indians is something that most people prefernot to talk about. The newly displaced Indians arevisible in the towns, doing such chores as sweepingstreets with push brooms, while their more entrep-renurial kinsmen, previously urbanized, can beseen in knee-length white stockings (the mark ofthe colonial uniform) overseeing the workers,running the Indian-owned shops, and working inmajor government and commercial offices. Reti-cence, however, is becoming more difficult tomaintain since it has become a major politicalissue, with the Honorable Siddiq Koya, leader ofthe opposition National Federation Party, arguingloudly for Crown Land leases to be granted toIndians in perpetuity, and at the same time advo-cating the abolishment of that part of the constitu-tion which allocates seats in Parliament alongracial lines, which results in acute underrepresenta-tion of the Indian majority.

Like the rest of Polynesia, Fiji is predominantlyan agricultural country and there as elsewhere agri-culture is in trouble. It is not that there is ashortage of arable land or people to farm it. Bothare in plentiful supply. There are problems oftransportation and marketing, but these could beovercome, and in fact are being improved uponsteadily through a highly visible and mechanizedPublic Works Department that is linking uphitherto isolated areas of Vanua Levu, the secondlargest and least developed of the islands. The realproblems lie again in the racial make-up of the

DMT-I-’77 -36-

Indian women working Fijian rice fields. What will happenwhen the lease expires?

Mixed government school in Fiji where Fijians and Indians study in English. Photos courtesy George Chaplin.

Indian-owned duty free shops line the streets of Suva,waiting for the dwindling ranks of tourists.

country, the land tenure system, the traditional life-style of the village Fijians, and some singularlyunenlightened government policies.

While the Indians do not predominate in ruralFiji as they do in the towns, Indians are found onfarms in virtually all parts of Fiji. In mostinstances, they are living and working on leaseholdland, and here they have retained their traditionaldress, food, language, and schools for more thanthree generations. As aggressive at farming as theyare at merchandizing in the towns, they can makethe soil produce, and are known for their ability todo so. Given free rein and just minimum support

they could possibly have the country on a solid agri-cultural footing and keep it there.

However, the Fijians own the land, and landalienation for any purpose is virtually impossible. AFijian may be awarded lease-hold land through thetraditional mataqali (clan) system. The deal ismade on a very personal and generous basis, interms of length and amount of lease, and is thensanctioned by the powerful Native Lands TrustBoard. Since an Indian cannot belong to amataqali, his land comes on different terms: ten-year maximum leases, or none at all, even if theIndian has been leasing and working the plot fordecades.

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Above, Indians flock to the towns inFiji in search of new livelihood.

Right, Fijian dining room staff. Is waitingtables for the tourists preferable to villagelife?

Photos courtesy George Chaplin.

DMT-I -’77 -38-

When the Fijian landholder refuses to reneweven a ten-year lease to the Indian tenant, who hasnowhere to go but to the town or to virtually non-arable land, it is not necessarily because the Fijianwants to work the land himself. As a result ofgrowing land consciousness in the Pacific Islands,the Fijian wants to take the land back from theIndian so that his own son can have it, even thoughthe son may be only three years old. Thus a growingnumber of abandoned farms are rapidly beingtaken over by boondock, and a concommitantnumber of Indians are flooding the towns in searchof nonexisting jobs. (In its most recent session, Par-liament passed legislation introduced by the Hon.Siddiq Koya to extend leasehold periods to 30years.

The Fijian villager has never been geared to thesort of work ethic that seems to be needed for suc-cessful commercial agriculture. Traditional Fijianagriculture has always provided amply for domesticconsumption. With abundant seasonal tree crops,mangrove swamps, and a sea full of fish withinreach of coastal dwellers, Fijians have alwaysenjoyed a good diet with minimum effort. The cashcrops of copra, cocoa, sugar, and rice require a dif-ferent approach to life involving regularity andtedious, hard work, none of which Fijians are yetready to accept to any great extent. The demand forcash is growing nevertheless and some Fijians arebeginning to accept the demands of agriculturalentrepreneurship.

Unfortunately, small farmers are not gettingmuch support from the government despite itsprofessed emphasis on agriculture. Agriculturaldevelopment loans of up to $200 are available for amaximum 12-month period. Heavy machinery isavailable through the Department of Agricultureon a rental basis, but at a price only few can afford.And, the ten-year maximum lease period forIndians (now being challenged hotly by the oppo-sition party) offers further discouragement. Allthings considered, the picture does not look good.Though no one will formally admit it, as theIndians leave the land, production dips.

In an effort to develop agriculture on a larger,commercial scale, the government has become in,

volved in some grandiose schemes that, if success-ful, could lay a solid base for continued agriculturaldevelopment. The two largest government-backedenterprises in the country--and probably in theentire Pacific regioninvolve sugar (Fiji’s principal

export) and pulpwood. Both look promising, andthe schemes may be expanded, thereby assuringRatu Mara and his Alliance Party continued tenurein office.

The government’s decision to get more directlyinvolved in production stems partly from afrightening decline in exports between 1970, whenFiji exported 335,000 tons of sugar, and 1974, whenthe export tonnage declined to 269,000 tons. Othermotivations for the government’s action in eco-nomic matters are given in the Seventh Develop-ment Plan (1976-1980):

Fiji’s economic situation has long beendominated by three major problems:

l. dependence on one crop (sugar);2. dependence upon the outside world for

capital, and expertise;3. rigidity of economic and ethnic divi-

sions.

The Mara government also pursued developmentin tourism and transportation, but with rather dis-appointing results. In the great tourism rush of theearly 1970s, numerous posh resort hotels were builtalong a fair weather stretch of beachfront nowknown as the Gold Coast, extending along thesouthern coast of Viti Levu. Mostly foreign owned(with generous tax concessions from the Maragovernment), the hotels now stand completely orpartially empty, with some of them having lockedtheir doors during the past year.

Fiji’s Air Pacific (started in 1971)---one of fourregional airlinesis, like its competitors, losingmoney and must be bailed out regularly by supple-mental government appropriations, usually re-quested by the European Minister of Finance, whoalso happens to be the wealthiest businessman inthe country. An increase in tourism would help putAir Pacific in the black, but there is little real hopefor a positive change until the world economicpicture brightens. (The South Pacific area seems tobe about two years behind Western economicchanges.)

Some light import-substituting industries arealready well established in the Suva area, and areproducing such items as flour, beer, biscuits, softdrinks, textiles, steel roofing, paints, cement,matches, and soap. According to the DevelopmentPlan, "a number of these industries are already

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making inroads into the export markets of thePacific." However, the Plan fails to specify whichones.

Suva (population 70,000)is rapidly emerging asthe commercial and political hub of the SouthPacific region. Its leaders would like to see it recog-nized as a sort of regional capital, though such talkis generally avoided because that is what leaders ofother states in the region suspect.5 Already the siteof the regional University of the South Pacific, theSouth Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation(SPEC), the United Nations Development Program(UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO),the Chinese Trade Commission, an AmericanEmbassy Charge, Air Pacific, and other regionalcommercial enterprises, Suva is throbbing with theincreasing energy of development within the region,but not to everyone’s satisfaction, particularly theleaders of some of the smaller states who are waryof concentrating everything in Suva. Suva seemsdestined nevertheless to solidify its position as thehub, jealousies from such places as Apia and PortMoresby notwithstanding. Basic lines of communi-cations and transport are already good, thanks tothe usually thorough British Colonial Office, and itwould take any of the other towns in the region along time to match them.

The path of development that Fiji has taken,under the leadership of Ratu Mara, is patternedafter the Australian model, and is being supportedby Australian funds, both private and government.Urban housing projects, government superannua-tion schemes, and the courtship of foreign donorsand investors are clear indicators that Fiji will try torealize the Western middle-class dream. The freeenterprise system, introduced by the British, stilloperates unabated, and is dominated by Indiansand a few expatriates. Such a situation is not the

(students still sit for the New Zealand Certificate),come to Suva in search of jobs. Unemployment inthe city is astronomical, as are the numbers ofarrests for drunkenness, theft, and other crimesagainst people. The social problems of Suva are asgrave as anywhere in the Pacific, includinginfamous Port Moresby, and everyone despairs ofknowing what to do about them.

Given Fiji’s underdeveloped land resources,minerals potential ($8.5 million in gold in 1974),location, and already developed infrastructure(particularly in the towns), it may be that it can setan example for Pacific Island development.However, most cynics throughout the Pacific feelthat Fiji is so hopelessly trapped in Australia’seconomy that development, if it does succeed, willcontinue to benefit foreign investors primarily, withlocal politicians and public servants getting theirshare, while the great majority of the populationplods along in traditional ways. Such a scenariomight prove workable, except that the aspirationsof the rural population have already been raised bythe various devices of a consumer-oriented mer-cantile class.

The feeling throughout Fiji is that seeds of dis-content have been sown, albeit inadvertently. Whatthe eventual harvest will beaggravated turmoil orpeaceful development for all--will be determinedin the near future by the directions that the Maragovernment and its Australian backers decide totake. The decisions affecting race relations andland tenure will be most critical to Fiji’s future.

best palliative for the already strained race rela-tions.

The approach to development has also encour-aged the urban drift by young Fijians and Indianswho, having finished their Western-style schooling

5. The only major regional organization not in Suva is theSouth Pacific Commission, which is housed in an American-built, minipentagon-type structure of World War II vintagein Noumea, the strongest outpost of colonialism remaining inthe Pacific. While most of the participating countries andstates would like to see the SPC relocated, they don’t want itto go to Suva, which is the only logical choice.

Traditional Fijian Kava ceremony. Photo courtesy FijiVisitors Bureau.