the origins of the chinese communist party and the role played ...

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE COMINTERN

Liu Jianyi r-

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

the Department of Politics, University of York

March 2000

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the origins of the Chinese Communist Party, making full use of

primary materials, especially newly published Comintern documents and British archives.

In making a comprehensive survey of the international background of the foundation of

the CCP, the author proposes that the establishment of the CCP was a part of the Bolsheviks'

global strategy of world revolution, of the Comintern's efforts to expand Communist forces into

the East; it also served Soviet Russia's interests in the Far East.

The study reveals the important role that Soviet Russia and the Comintern played in the

establishment of the CCP. During the period 1918-1921, Soviet Russia and the Comintern

dispatched numerous emissaries to China and recruited many agents there. These people made

wide-ranging contacts with Chinese in different organisations and factions regardless of their

political beliefs, party affiliation or social strata. They conducted intensive agitation and

propaganda by various media and means, including supplying news and publicity to the press free of charge and publishing Communist booklets and journals in Chinese. They had a hand in

directing important student and worker organisations which emerged during the May Fourth

Movement, and later urged people who had a little knowledge of Marxism and who belonged to

anarchist organisations and the Guomindang to organise socialist and communist organisations

and parties. The CCP's important founders, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu's conversion to

Bolshevism and their creation of the CCP only happened after the Bolshevik agents' persuasion

and instruction.

Therefore, the thesis concludes that the establishment of the CCP was not, as official ideologists claim, the outcome of the combination of the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism

and the labour movement in China, but actually the result of political direction and financial

support by the Bolsheviks. In consequence, the CCP was built along Leninist lines from the

very beginning. This research further analyses the internal causes allowing Bolshevism to be

transplanted into China and points out that the ideology which the CCP embraced during its

founding period still has far-reaching influence upon politics in China today.

CONTENTS

Abstract

Table of Contents ii

Acknowledgments v

Abbreviations vii

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Bolsheviks and the World Revolution after the October Revolution 15

Section 1. Global Strategy 15 Critical Internal and International Situation Striving for World-wide Revolution Founding of the Communist International Changes in Strategy and Orientation

Section 2. Fundamental Strategy in the East 33 National Movement - "Water for Our Mill" Planting the "Socialist Beacon" in Russian Borderlands for Eastern Peoples Supporting the "Bourgeois Democratic Liberation Movement" in Colonies Various Tactics: Agitation, Diplomacy and Military Campaign The Apparatus and Organisations to Direct and Carry Out Revolution in the East

Section 3. General Policies towards China 52 The Biggest Neighbour - China's Important Position in the Far East Efforts to Establish Diplomatic Relations with the Chinese Government "The Karakhan Manifesto" Trying to Create a "Revolutionary China"

Chapter 2. Soviet Russia and the Comintern's Agents in China 69

Section 1. Emissaries Dispatched to China during 1918-1919 70 Russians Prisoners of War Others

ýection 2. Agents Recruited in China during 1918-1920 83

Section 3. Arrival of the Voitinsky Group and Other En-dssaries in 1920 91

Section 4. The Bolshevik Organisations and Centres in China before 1921 97 ii

The Secretariat of East Asia The Office of ShanRhai Life The Rosta-Dalta News Agency The Yourin Mission Other Organisations

* Chapter 3. Establishing Contact with the Chinese 120

Section 1. Contact with Radical Intellectuals 122

Section 2. Contact with Sun Yat-sen and His Party 139

Section 3. Contact with Anarchist Groups 158

Section 4. Contact with People of Other Political Forces and of Various Circles 172

Chapter 4. Propaganda and Agitation in China 176

(1) Contents: Anti-Imperialism Anti-Beijing Government Russian Revolution Socialism Marxism-Leninism

(2) Tactics: Scope Style Channels Means Steps

(3) Effects: Stimulating Mass Movement against Japanese and Beijing Government Creating Sentiments in favour of Soviet Russia Disseminating Marxism-Leninism and Bolshevism

Chapter 5. Working towards Unity and Organisation 232

Section 1. Societies for the Study of Marxism and Socialism 232 The Marxist Research Society The Socialist Studies Society

Section 2. Mass Organisations Which Emerged during the May 4th Period 241 Some Societies Founded in Beijing before the May 4 th Demonstration The National Students' Union, Trade Unions and the National Federation of All Circles of the People

Section 3. The Great Harmony Party and the Truth Society 265 a. The Great Harmony Party (Datong Dang) b. The Truth Society (Zhenli She)

iii

Chapter 6. The Creation of the Chinese Communist Party 290

Section 1. A Chinese Communist Party in Russia 292

Section 2. The Socialists' League and the Origins of the CCP 293

Section 3. The Process of the Formation of the Communist Groups 299 The Initiative of Soviet and Comintern Agents The Birth of the First Communist Nuceus in Shanghai The Communist Groups in Other Cities The Overseas Communist Groups

Section 4. The Founding of the Chinese Socialist Youth League 321

Section 5. Building A Bolshevik-Style Party 327 Seeking Unity in Thinking and Organisation Co-ordinated Preparation for Establishing Conununist Parties in the Far East The First Congress of the CCP The Second Congress of the CCP

Chapter 7. Analyses and Conclusions 347

Section 1. On the Assumed Prerequisites for the Foundation of the CCP 348 No Mature Labour Organisations and Movement No Widespread Dissemination of Marxism-Leninism The CCP Was Not the Outgrowth of the Combination of the Both Forces

Section 2. The CCP's Birth Was Brought about by Soviet Russia and the Comintern 357

Arrival of the Bolshevik Agents from 1918 Wide-ranging Contacts with Chinese Intensive Propaganda and Agitation Giving Impetus to the May 4 th Movement Alliance with Anarchists, Nationalists and Other Revolutionaries Manifold Organisation Activities Co-ordinate Party-Form Actions in the Far East

Section 3. Other Reasons Why Bolshevism Took Root in China 372 Resentment at the Status quo Nationalistic Sentiments Potential Predispositions to Socialism Vacuum in Faith Utilitarianism

Summary 388

Bibliography 390

iv

Ackn ow ledge ments

This thesis has taken me a long time to complete and I would like to take this

opportunity to express my gratitude to numerous people and institutions for their assistance in this process.

I should first of all like to thank my supervisors at the Department of Politics,

University of York, Professor John Crump and Professor Alex Callinicos, who provided

me with their invaluable advice and considerable instructions. My thanks are also due to Dr Hans J. van de Ven, who invited me to the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Cambridge, where I formed the initial ideas for this thesis. I am grateful to Professors

Wolfgang and Janice Stargardt of University of Cambridge and Professor Cao Tianyu from

Harvard University, who showed interest in my proposals and strongly encouraged me to

undertake doctoral studies. My sincere thanks specially go out to Research Professor

Zhang Zhenkun, former Chief of the Division of History of China's Foreign Relations, the Institute of Modem History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for his encouragement and moral support, which enabled me to overcome difficulties.

My debts in the respect of language are several. Mrs Taeko Crump, Dr Yin Sungbin, Dr Kim (a descendant of Russian and Korean Communists) and Dr Yu Minling

offered their kind help in translating Japanese, Russian and Korean materials; Dr Portia Dadely, Ms Barbara Koscia, Dr Ying Chang, and Ms Hilary Javis (in chronological order) carefully checked and polished part or the whole of my draft.

In view of the documentary character of this volume, importance attaches to the

assistance of the staff of the British Public Record Office, and librarians of the British Library, SOAS Library and other libraries in Cambridge, York, Leeds and London. Since there are not enough material available in the U. K., I had to seek other sources. I owe my thanks to Research Professors Tao Wenzhao, Yang Tianshi, Li Yuzhen, Wang Jianlang

and Ms Zhang Xianju, who are my former colleagues in the Institute of Modem History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and also to Associate Professor Ishikawa Yoshihiro

of Kobe University, Ms Wang Mei, Librarian of the Institute of World History, Chinese

V

Academy of Social Sciences, Associate Professor Lu Jing of Shanghai University of Technology and Research Professor Tian Xuan of Chinese Military Academy, for seeking

and posting the materials I needed for this research. Ms Yu Anlan and Ms Zhang Xiaoman

offered me their fathers', Yu Yuzhi's and Zhang Ximan's memoirs, which are very rare

and precious. I would also like to thank Lti Fangshang, Director of the Institute of Modem

History, Central Academy of Sciences (in Taiwan), and Dr Lin Chun, Lecturer of the

Department of Government, London School of Economics and Politics, for their

permission for access to their own book collections and the libraries of the Institute and the

School they are working for and for the books that they presented to me. Some friends of mine, Drs Ye Tianqing, Zhao Haibo and Yu Jiliang not only

helped me in solving computer problems, but also in printing out my whole thesis at the

University of York, while I was in London.

I would like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Great British-China

Centre by way of grants, and the financial help of the University of York for the waiver of

part of my tuition fees.

This work is dedicated to my wife, Li Danyang, with whom I interviewed, from the

early 1980s, numerous old people who had participated in the establishment of the CCP

and the May 4d' Movement. We both collected plenty of documents and other materials,

which are quite essential for this study. I used to discuss with her several topics

concerning this thesis and obtained useful comments from her.

Nevertheless, none of the people or organisations mentioned above should be held

responsible for my own tendency to error, although I owe them all a great deal.

Liu Jianyi

London, Summer 2000

vi

Abbreviations

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CNSAC Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China

Comintern Communist International

FO Archives of the British Foreign Office

GLZDC Gong-changRuoji Liangongbu yp Zhongggogerning dang anziliao con gshu (A Series of Archival Material on the Comintern, All-Union CP(B) and the Chinese Revolution)

GMD Guomindang (The Nationalist Party)

MRSANC Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927

NAA Narodny Azii Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa)

Narkomindel People's Comn-dssariat of Foreign Affairs

OFUFC The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet

RCP(B) Russian Communist Party (B)

PRC People's Republic of China

SIOPK Sovetskie Istoriki 0 Problemakh Kitaya (Soviet Historians on Problem of China)

Su Soviet Union

SY Chinese Socialist Youth League

USDS Archives of the Department of State, USA

VKKD VKP(b). Komintern I Kitaya. Dokuments (The All Union Communist Party(B), the Comintern and China)

ZDBX ý7_honurong dangshi baogao xuanbian (Selected Reports on the History of the CCP)

ZEGS Zhong-E guanxi shiliao (Archival Materials on Sino- Russian Relations)

ZSGGZH Zhong-Su guojia guanxishi ziliao huibian (Selected Materials on the History of Sino-Soviet State Relations)

vii

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND

THE ROLE PLAYED BY SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE

COMINTERN

INTRODUCTION

The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth abbreviated as

the CCP) is a significant event in Chinese history. It has had a vital and profound

influence on the development and vicissitudes of modem Chinese society.

Therefore, it is important to explain why and how the Chinese Communist Party

emerged in the early twenties of the 20th century.

For a long time there has been considerable interest in this subject, and some of

the relevant monographs have been notable scholarly achievements. Zhang Jingru's

Zhongguo Gongchandang de chengli (The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party)

(Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1981), A. Dirlik's The Origins of Chinese

Communism (Oxford, 1989), K. V. Shevelyov's "On the History of the Foundation of

the Communist Party of China", Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow, 1981, No. 1), Li Xin

and Chen Tiejian's Weida de kaiduan (The Great Beginning) (Beijing, 1983), Sima

Lu's Zhongizong de chengli yg chugi huodon (The Founding and Initial Activities of

the Communist Party of China) (Hong Kong, 1974), Shen Yunlong's Zhongguo

. gongchandang zhi laivuan (The Origins of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taibei,

1959), M. Luk's The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism (Oxford and Hong Kong, 1990)

and H. Van de Ven's From Friend to Comrade (Berkeley, 1991) are all worth

mentioning in this respect. The issue has also been treated in works on the history of I

the CCP, on Sino-Russian relations, and on relations between the Chinese

revolutionary movement and the Comintern.

In tracing the origins of the CCP, many historians both in China and abroad have

noticed the impact of the October Revolution and the role of the Comintern. But they

hold different views on the levels of the significance of these influences, which may be

roughly classified into the following categories:

1. Official books on the history of the CCP published in the People's Republic of

China (PRC) assert that the CCP came into being as an outcome of the combination of

the Chinese labour movement with the spread of the science of Marxism-Leninism

after the October Revolution! Though the authors of these books admit that the aid

given by Soviet Russia and the Comintern promoted the foundation of the CCP, they

regard it as a merely contributory factor. They resolutely deny that the creation of the

CCP was the result of transplanting Communism from abroad. Recently a Western

scholar, Hans ven de Van, went even further to suggest that without the efforts of the

Comintern a unified Communist party would have later emerged autonomously in

China.

2. The prevailing view among students in Western countries, Taiwan and Hong

Kong is that the Russian Bolsheviks initiated the CCP's organisation. and nurtured the

Chinese Communist movement; therefore the CCP was a product of direct Comintern

intervention. 3 It is interesting to note that many historians of the ex-Soviet Union held

' Zhonggong zhongyang wenjianxuanbian (Sellected documents of the Central Committee of the CCP), Beijing: the CCP's Central Academy Press, 1992, p 145. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi, Zhongguo Gongchandang lishi (The History of the Chinese Commununist Party), Beijing: People's Press, 1991, p 47. 2 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Foundinq of the Chinese Communist Party. 1920-1927, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p 55. 3 Chen Yongfa, Zhon-qcluo cionqchan -qeminq gishinian (70 Years of the Chinese

2

similar views in spite of their different political standpoint; they declared that the

Chinese Communist movement emanated from Moscow and that Soviet Russia and

the Comintern played a crucial role in forming the CCp. 4 Nowadays this interpretation

has come to be shared by several Chinese scholars in PRC. 5

3. Some researchers accept the fact of involvement of Soviet Russia and the

Comintern, but take internal and historical factors into greater consideration. They

stress the indigenous roots of the Chinese Communist movement, pointing to China's

need for social revolution, the influences of China! s traditional political thought and

culture, the radical historical experiences, the contemporary nationalist sentiments and

the CCP founders' preoccupations and personal strains. These factors, they consider,

with some ideas, such as populism, cosmopolitanism, inclined radical Chinese to

believe in communism. 6

4. Another line of thinking asserts that the October Revolution did not bring

about the swift or wide dissemination of Marxism-Leninism. According to this

interpretation, it was other varieties of non-Marxist socialism, and especially

anarchism, which had a considerable influence on Chinese radical thinking during the

May 4th period. It follows that not only did anarchism have a pervasive influence on

radical circles at the time when Marxism-Leninism was introduced into China, but also

Communist Revolution), Part 1, Taibei: Lianjing Publishing Company, 1998; Sima Lu's Zhonqqonq de chengli yu chuqi huodong (The Founding and Initial Activities of the Communist Party of China) (Hong Kong, 1974). 4 K. V. Shevelyov's "On the History of the Foundation of the Communist Party of China", Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow, 1981, ). No. 1. 5 Gonqchanquoii ýu Zhonqquo geming quanxi lunwenii (Essays on the Relations between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), Shanghai: People's Press, 1985. 6 M. Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Ori-qins of Chinese Marxism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967; B. 1. Schwarts, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.

3

that anarchists played an important part in the early organisational activities which

culminated in the founding of the CCP. This point of view is mainly held by Arif

Dirlik.

It is not easy to reach a firm conclusion as to which of these interpretations is the

most accurate for a number of reasons. Different research angles and methods are

important factors that need to be taken into account. Some studies failed to relate the

Bolsheviks' global strategy and the broad scope of their Far Eastern policies to their

policies toward China; some scholars did not pay enough attention to the application of

Lenin's theory on the East to the Bolsheviks' practice in China at the early period; in

some works, the activities of Soviet Russia! s diplomats and the Comintern's agents in

China were dealt with separately and their co-operation was ignored; moreover, there

is a paucity of studies comparing the origins of the CCP with the origins of Communist

Parties in countries other than Russia. In short, there have been scant researches

soundly and dialectically to expound the relations between internal causes and external

influences, general strategy and specific policies, theoretical principles and concrete

practices, diplomatic and revolutionary activities.

Another reason for the deficiencies in the studies conducted was the shortage of

original historical materials.

It is beyond doubt that the major relevant records are kept in Russia. In the past,

although certain scholars of the ex-Soviet Union were given access to the Comintern

archives and were permitted to quote from the sources in these files, what they

revealed was far from satisfactory. This situation did not change until 1993 when a

7 A. Dirlik,. The Origins of Chinese Communism, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

4

great quantity of relevant archives kept in the Russian Modem Historical Documents

Storage and Research Centre was first opened to the public. Using the archives

relating to the Chinese revolutionary movement, the Institute of the Far East Studies of

the Russian Sciences Academy and the Society of the East Asian Studies of the Free

University of Berlin have been compiling a series of monumental books VKP(b),

Komintem i Kitaya, Dokuments, 1920-1949 (The All Union Communist Party (B) ,

the Comintem and China, Documents, 1920-1949) and published its first volume

(1920-1925) in Moscow and Berlin in 1994. This volume's several documents relate

to the founding of the CCP. In the introduction, the compilers express their belief that

some confidential documents were transferred to other archive systems or intentionally

destroyed; while some important archives, such as those of the Commissariats of

Foreign Affairs, and of National Defence and the Committee of State Security, have

not so far been opened. Despite this incompleteness, this newly published book still

provides valuable and reliable first-hand infori-nation for research purposes.

In China some collections of reference materials on the founding of the CCP

have been published, such as GonRchanzhuyi xiaozu (The Communist Groups), Yida

gianhou (The Period of the First Congress of the CCP) and Zhonjzguo Gongghandang

diyici daibiao dahui dangan ziliao (Archival Sources for the First Congress of the

CCP). But these mainly consist of some early documents of the CCP, articles by the

founders of the CCP and memoirs of persons who participated in its establishment.

Since the early documents and publications rarely recorded the events surrounding the

formation of the CCP in detail, many historical descriptions of the process by which it

emerged are based primarily on memoirs written in the 1950s and 1980s. However,

important founders of the CCP, such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun and Zhang

Tailei, died early without leaving memoirs relevant to the period of the CCP's 5

formation. In view of this, it is necessary to seek out and unearth other reliable

historical sources. In recent years, part of the archives of the former Chinese central

and local governments have been sorted out and published. Among these sources,

there are the publications of the Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai Archives, and also

Zhong-E gganxi shiliao (Archival Materials on Sino-Russian Relations), which were

compiled by the Institute of Modem History of the Central Academy of Sciences in

Taiwan from the archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Beijing Government (1910s-

1920s). While useful, these materials contain only fragmentary records of the

Bolsheviks' activities and the Chinese Communist movement. Under these

circumstances, it is necessary to make use of other countries' archives.

From about 1840 to 1949, China had close relations with the major foreign

powers, and there are therefore plenty of archives which record the events of 1918-

1922 in China kept in these countries. The diplomatic and intelligence bodies of

several major powers, together with the authorities of foreign settlements in China,

paid considerable attention to Chinaýs internal affairs as well as to its external affairs.

After the October Revolution they attached importance to collecting information on

the dissemination of Bolshevism, on the activities of Russian Bolsheviks in China, and

on Chinese revolutionary movements. For instance, the Records of the US

Department of State relating to Chinaýs internal affairs include special files on

Bolshevik Activities in China and Socialism in China. The Archives of the Japanese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Japanese Army and Navy also contain relevant

files, such as Materials relatina to the Recent Communist Movement in China and

Manchuria, Report on Sino-Russian Joint Propaganda Activities and some reports on

the Chinese's relations with the Korean Communists. The archives of the foreign

concessions in China, such as Shanghai International Settlement Municipal Council 6

Minute Book, ShanjZhai International Settlement Municipal Council Police

Intelligence Summa[y, and Shanghai French Concession Administration Police

Report, have many records on the activities of the Bolshevik agents and Chinese

Communists in Shanghai. The Sneevliet Archive in Holland has a sizeable section

covering the first official Conýiintem plenipotentiary to China, Sneevliet's activities in

China. Britain was a dominant imperialist power in China and was also the leading

country in the world engaged in combating Bolshevism during the period in question.

So the British archives have many documents which are important for this research,

such as Memorandum respecting Bolshevism in the Far East, Report respectin

Bolshevism and Chinese Communism and Anarchism and Report on the Activities

and Tracks of the Comintern's Representatives in China. Moreover, the Secret

Abstracts from the China Command's Intelligence Diaries, the Secret Intelligence

Reports on the Asian Colonies by the Indian Bureau of Information, and the political

and intelligence reports from Shanghai, Tianjin, Harbin, Zhangzhou, Xiaman, Nanjing

and elsewhere record many details of the activities of Chinese Communists and

Russian Bolsheviks in China. Most of these British records can be seen in the files of

the Foreign Office (abbreviated to FO). These documents have rarely been utilised by

students of the history of the CCP, hence many important materials have been

overlooked.

In addition to consulting the relevant publications, especially the Chinese

translation of VKP(b), Komintern i KitUa, Dokuments, 1920-1949's first volume

Liangong(bu) Gongchanzuoij y2 Zhongguo g2omin gerning--yundong (the All-Union

Communist Party (B), the Comintern and the Chinese National Revolutionary

Movement, 1920-1925), which was published in Beijing in 1997 as the first volume of

Gongchanguoii Liangongbu y2 Zhongguo geming dang'an ziliao congshu (A Series of 7

Archival Material on the Comintern, the All-Union CP(B) and the Chinese

Revolution), I have made a particular endeavour to use original sources which have

not been published so far, especially the British archives kept in the Public Record

Office in London. By careful examination and textual research, many rarely known

historical facts can be sifted out and verified. I found that the relevant British

documents and the newly published Russian documents can complement and

corroborate each other. Moreover, my thesis adopted valuable recollections made by

some participants in the May 4th Movement and the founding of the CCP, which I

obtained through interviews and correspondence in the early1980s.

This study attempts to make a comprehensive survey of the origins of the

Chinese Communist movement, to explore its international background and

ideological roots. The intention is to observe from a broad perspective and study the

various incidents as an organic whole in order to find out their connections with one

another; and to penetrate the superficial appearance of things to reveal their underlying

reality. Since a number of works have already given a detailed account of the

formation of the CCP. I therefore have no intention of retracing a story whose facts

are already well-known. However, this monograph, based on copious primary source

material, will bring to light a number of historical aspects of this event that have

hitherto been ignored or skated over, and will also contain many findings which have

seldom or never been revealed. In addition, it provides some interpretations of a

number of phenomena that have been misread by certain historians and differ from

those have been widely maintained. In this way, new light may be shed on some of

the following issues:

1. Shortly after the October Revolution, the Bolshevik leaders began to pay

attention to China and proposed their policy towards China. As early as 1918, they 8

started sending emissaries to China and also recruiting agents among Russians which

had already been in China. These agents were numerous and well-organised.

Bolshevik centres were set up in several cities in China. The agents dispatched or

recruited by Soviet Russia and the Comintern made wide-ranging contacts with

Chinese in various organisations and factions. It is by no means the case, as some

historians have asserted, that the Bolsheviks had no time to attend to affairs in China

and they did not establish relations with Chinese revolutionaries until the reopening of

8 the Sino-Russian border in the spring of 1920.

2. The intensity of Soviet propaganda in China between 1919 and 1921 has been

underestimated. During this period special propaganda units were set up in Russia and

China to conduct agitation and propaganda directing at Chinese people. Many

propagandists were sent to China to incite the Chinese to revolt, and large quantities of

booklets and leaflets were printed and distributed. The Bolsheviks did not only have

their own organs but also established news agencies in China to supply news and

publicity to the press free of charge. In order to extend their influence and to conceal

the source of such propaganda, the Comintem agentý subsidised and created some

radical Chinese journals and enlisted the help of various Chinese to engage in

propaganda work. Soviet propaganda was perhaps an important factor in making

Soviet Russia win favour with the Chinese public opinion and in making some radical

intellectuals incline towards Bolshevik theory and practice around 1920-21.

3. The May 4th Movement is generally regarded as a spontaneous patriotic

movement. It has hardly been noticed that, behind the scenes, Bolshevik agents played

8 Xiang Oing, Gonachancjuowi vu Zhoncicluoqeminq Guanxi Lunwenoi (Essays on the Relations between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), (Shanghai: People's Press, 1985), p 81.

9

a part in stimulating the anti-Japanese and anti-Beijing Government campaigns and

had a hand in directing some important students' and workers' organisations which

emerged in the Movement. As a result, this Movement brought about the preliminary

integration of intellectuals and labourers, and fostered a batch of radicals who later

became the key members of the Chinese Communist party.

4. To ally with national bourgeois revolutionaries in colonial countries and to

support their national liberation movement was one of Lenin's major strategies in the

East. From a very early stage, the Bolsheviks tried to draw the Chinese nationalists,

led by Sun Yat-sen, into the common anti-imperialist struggle and to win them over to

Soviet Russia! s side. Contrary to the traditional view, the United Front policy was

applied to China even before its formal adoption at the 2nd Comintern Congress and

prior to the foundation of the CCP. Moreover, the Bolshevik agents persuaded several

Guomindang (GMD) leaders who believed in socialism to take the lead in forming a

socialist or Communist party subordinated to the Comintern.

5. In order to promote the world revolution and to fight against the opportunist

leaders of the 2nd International, the Bolsheviks for a time co-operated with anarchists

in countries other than Russia. In China, since numerous radical youth believed in

anarchism then, the Chinese anarchists became the main target that the Comintern

agents tried to make contact with. As a result of the efforts of the Bolsheviks, certain

anarchists were persuaded to undertake the revolutionary propaganda work which

benefited the interests of Soviet Russia and their organisational. links were exploited to

carry out organisational activities which related to the formation of the CCP.

Furthermore, some anarchists were spurred on to the conversion to Bolshevism and to

participate in a Communist party. That was why the Chinese anarchists were seen as

having served as midwives for the birth of the CCP. 10

6. Voitinsky was not the first and only Bolshevik emissary who attempted to

establish Communist organisations in China. Before his arrival, several other Soviet

and Comintern agents had already engaged in organising actions in China. Around the

CCP's formation, they sponsored, organised and supported a number of revolutionary

organisations, such as the Truth Society, the Socialist League, the Datong Party (later

evolved into Oriental Communist Party), the Zhina Communist Party and the Social

Communist Party. Some of these organisations were just built for making a show of

strength, or for serving as a stopgap, and some helped to lay the foundation for the

establishment of the CCP.

7. Why and how Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were suddenly converted to

Bolshevism and undertook to found the CCP have been contentious issues. This

research will show that Li Dazhao had been approached by Soviet agents before the

autumn of 1918 when he and. Chen started the first society for the study of Marxism,

despite the confused state of their thinking at that time; that Li Dazhao and Chen

Duxiu did not start their activities to establish the CCP until Bolshevik emissaries

urged them to do so; and that they organised the Communist groups totally under the

Comintern's leadership. It confirms that the CCP was by no means voluntarily

initiated by the Chinese.

8. Besides the Russian Bolsheviks, some internationally inclined activists

belonging to the Communist parties, socialist parties and revolutionary organisations

of some other countries (including Britain, America, France, Korea, Japan, Turkey,

India and Indonesia) also had close relations with Chinese radicals during the period

while the CCP was taking shape. Some of them even joined some revolutionary

organisations set up in China and were involved in the process of founding the CCP

and the CSY (the Chinese Socialist Youth League). The establishment of the Chinese 11

Communist Party was closely related to similar efforts being made in other Asian

countries, Korea and Japan in particular. This indicates that there were co-ordinated

operations in the Far East under the unified leadership of the Comintern.

The above may add something new to our knowledge of the origins of the CCP

and fill various gaps in this research field.

On the basis of the evidence presented, the conclusions can be drawn as follows:

The establishment of the CCP was not the outcome of the combination of the broad

spread of Marxism-Leninism in China and the Chinese labour movement. From

intemational perspective, this was one fruit of the efforts made by the Bolsheviks after

the October Revolution to expand Bolshevik revolution throughout the world and was

actually an integral part of the actions of the Comintem to found Communist parties in

many other countries. In China in particular, the founding of the CCP was, to a large

extent, the result of instigation and instruction by Bolshevik agents in China under the

guidance of Lenin's theory and strategy. If Soviet Russia and the Comintern had not

provided the initial dynamic for the rise of the Communist movement in China, it

would have been impossible to form a Communist Party in China in the early 1920s, at

a time when modem industry and a class-conscious proletariat were lacking, and when

there was no adequate ideological basis for such a movement, since few Chinese

intellectuals understood Marxism.

Besides researching into the origins of the CCP's establishment, this study will

also analyse internal causes why Bolshevism could be transplanted into China, and

why the CCP could be successfully founded, pointing out that many conditions in

China were the same as, or similar to, those found in Tsarist Russia. For example, the

economic backwardness, agricultural population constituted the majority, as well as

the existence of a long-standing tyrannical autocracy were comparable. Seeing that 12

social revolution had been successful in Russia, many Chinese radicals, eager to

change decadent Chinese society and to throw off the yoke of imperialist rule, were

inclined to look up to Bolshevism and a Party of Bolshevik-type as a remedy for

Chinaýs desperate condition. With some other internal reasons, the influence of some

traditions in Chinese political thinking, such as "Datong" (universal harmony) and

"Junping" (egalitarianism) and the Chinese historical tradition of violent peasants

rebellions made China a fertile soil for radical revolution. Given these circumstances,

we can understand the reason why "following the path of the Russians" became a

conclusion of some Chinese progressives, as Mao Zedong remarked. 9 It is no

exaggeration to say that it was these moves which decided the future direction and

destiny of modem China.

There is no doubt that in the 20th century no other state had greater influence on

China than Soviet Russia (the Soviet Union after 1922). Under the guidance of

Lenin's theory, the CCP, as a highly centralised and disciplined organisation, led the

Chinese people and in particular the peasants to seize state power through violent class

struggle and armed revolution. They established a regime which they called "the

people's democratic dictatorship. " But it was actually controlled by the CCP, which

retained power by the control of people's thinking and by the use of force and terror.

China thus turned into a Russian-style "Socialist country, "' politically totalitarian,

economically centralised and culturally monopolistic for quite some time after 1949.

Nowadays, Bolshevism (Leninism) has been cast away by most people in the

country of its birth and other former Communist countries, but the CCP has still

refused to abandon its political doctrinal heritage and insists on its basic tenets.

9 Mao Zedong Xuanii (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Beijing: People's Press, 1965, Vol. 3, p 374.

13

While conducting vast economic reforms, the hierarchy of the CCP now in power is

reluctant to carry out thorough political reform, and still uses Lenin's principles to

justify its one-party rule. This clearly demonstrates that up to now, some Bolshevik

concepts on politics are still believed by the CCP leaders as ideological orthodoxy.

This ossified way of thinking has become a serious hindrance to China! s further

progress. Hence, this study, in addition to clarifying the CCP's organisational

origins, may also help to find out the CCP's ideological roots from the time of its

birth, an ideology that has had far-reaching and significant influence on the China of

today.

14

CHAPTER ONE

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE WORLD REVOLUTION AFTER THE

OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Section 1. Global Strategy

In March 1917, the Russian people, who had suffered long from the rule of Tsarist

autocracy and the disaster of World War I, rose in a mass uprising. The Romanov Dynasty

collapsed overnight. On the basis of an agreement between the Temporary Committee of

the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, a Russian Provisional Government was formed

and would rule pending the election of a constituent assembly.

The February Revolution bore the character of a spontaneous people's uprising. The

principal Bolshevik leaders were far from the revolutionary centre - Petrograd. Convinced

that the World War had severely crippled the capitalist system, they had summoned the

world proletariat to end the imperialist war by turning it into a civil war; nevertheless the

outbreak of the revolution in their fatherland still caught them by surprise. V. I. Lenin even

said in a lecture which he gave in Zurich at the beginning of 1917 that a Russian revolution,

once it happened, would be "the prologue to the coming European revolution", which could

only be "a proletarian, socialist revolution. " However, he ended his speech gloomily: "We

of the old generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution. "10

These words clearly implied that, in Lenin's opinion, socialist revolution, both in Russia

and in Europe, would not come soon. When Lenin heard the news of the February

'0 V. 1. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960-70), Vol 23, p 253.

15

Revolution, he exclaimed: "It is so incredibly unexpected! "" According to L. Trotsky's

memoirs, before the February Revolution most socialists held the view that "the productive

forces of Russia were not sufficient for the conquest of power by the working class. " K.

Radek did not even concede the possibility of a proletarian revolution in the advanced

capitalist countries in the near future, given that "the productive forces of mankind, taken as

a whole, are not sufficiently developed. " 12

The majority of the Bolshevik leaders gave their tentative support for the Provisional

Government. L. B. Kamenev and J. V. Stalin, who had returned from Siberian exile,

assumed in the Party's organ, Pravda, that the bourgeois stage of the revolution still had a

long way to run and that the immediate tasks of the Bolsheviks lay in constructive work

within the social democratic movement. Nevertheless, no sooner had Lenin returned to

Russia than he advanced the famous "April Theses", which called for a new revolution to

transfer power to 'the proletariat and the poorest peasants' and to start immediate transition

to the stage of a proletarian socialist revolution. In these theses, he put forward a

programme which called for the establishment of a republic of soviets, soviet control over

all social production and distribution, the changing of the party's name to "Communist",

and the rebuilding of the International. 13 Lenin gradually won over the majority of the

Bolshevik Party's centre, but accepted that a lengthy period of agitation would be needed

before the masses would be ready to follow the Bolsheviks to the next stage of the

revolution. Along with promises to give "bread to the workers, land to the peasants and

" 0. Figes, A People's Tragedy, The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), p 385.

12 L. Trotsky, Mv Life, An Attempt at an Autobiography, (Gloucester, Mass., 1970), p 239.

13 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 24, pp 55-88. 16

peace to all", Lenin raised the slogan "All power to the Soviets", aimed at the conquest of

state power through the Soviets.

At first most Soviets were dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist

Revolutionaries. After the failure of the Komilov coup the Bolsheviks gradually won

control of some principal urban and military soviets. The situation was, again, to the

Bolsheviks' advantage after their abortive coup de force in July. From September Lenin,

from his hiding place in Finland, wrote several letters to spur the Bolshevik Central

Committee to organise an insurrection. He argued, the Bolsheviks "can and must take state

power into their own hands. " There were "indisputable symptoms ... that we are on the

eve of a world wide revolution". To "miss such a moment and wait for the Congress of

Soviets would be utter idiocy, or sheer treachery. " 14 But other Bolshevik leaders were less

willing to support Lenin's proposals. For example, Kamenev suggested that a

democratic government be formed together with other socialist parties. The Central

Committee even wanted to destroy those letters by Lenin. It was not till 23 October when

Lenin secretly returned to Petrograd and attended a session of the Central Committee that

the Bolshevik leadership finally yielded to Lenin's instructions and voted overwhelmingly

for an insurrection. In order to justify their proposed armed uprising, the Bolshevik Party

CC's resolution referred to "the international situation", and identified an incipient navel

mutiny in Germany as "the extreme manifestation of the growth of the world-wide socialist

revolution all over Europe. "15 According to Lenin's theory, the triumph of the Russian

Revolution would be a break in the weakest link of the capitalist system or, to switch

14 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, p 67,74,82. 15 J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918: Documents and

Materials, (California: Stanford University Press, 1934), p 58. 17

metaphors, would be a "spark" which would cause a series of revolutions throughout the

world.

The Bolsheviks set up the Military Revolutionary Centre, but most military

preparations were mainly done by the Petrograd Soviet's Military Revolutionary

Committee, which was in fact led by Trotsky, who had joined the Bolsheviks in August

and was the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He advocated organising an insurrection

through the Petrograd Soviet coinciding with the Soviet Congress. Yet Lenin intended

to launch an insurrection before the 2 nd Congress of Soviet in order to present it with a

fait accompli. 16 He eagerly urged an early uprising by arguing:

It would be a disaster, or a sheer formality, to wait for the uncertain voting of

October 25th [November 7 th] . The people have the right and are in duty bound

to decide such questions not by vote, but by force. 17

On 6 November 1917, soon after Kerensky took measures to check the proposed

Bolshevik insurrection, the Petrograd Soviet's Military Revolutionary Committee

initiated counteracting measures. At Lenin's insistence after he arrived Smolny Palace

about the midnight, the Bolshevik CC decided to give the order for an offensive operation.

The military coup took place on 7 November, on the same day of the opening of the

Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. After the assault on the Winter Palace, the

Russian Provisional Government was overthrown.

The Bolsheviks seized state power and a purely Bolshevik government, the Council

of People's Commissars, was formed afterwards. 18 In the name of the dictatorship of

16 According to Orlando Figes' analysis, if the transfer of power to the Soviet took place by a vote of the Soviet Congress, the result would certainly be a coalition government made up of all the Soviet parties, whereas Lenin was unwilling to share power with them. See A People's Traged , pp 471-2.

17 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, p 235. 18

proletariat, the Bolsheviks closed down hostile newspapers, created the Cheka and set up

revolutionary tribunals. Furthermore, they dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which was

the product of a free election, 19 and outlawed their opponents. In March 1918, the

Bolsheviks changed their party's name to the Communist Party [henceforth RCP(B)] and

declared their goal to be the creation of a Communist society. It was in such circumstances

and by such methods that the first state to proclaim itself socialist and to be ruled by a

Communist Party appeared upon the world stage.

Recovering from their shock over the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, various anti-

Bolshevik forces and dissident elements began to challenge the new regime. Following the

Don Cossacks' revolt in December 1917, the Civil War broke out. The German Army,

after a temporary armistice, launched an offensive on the Russian front. The Soviet State

was also menaced by armed intervention by the Allies. British troops, followed by French

and American marines, occupied Murmansk in March 1918. The tense situation was

aggravated by the clash between the Czechoslovak Corps and Soviet forces. By the

summer of 1918, three-quarters of the territory of the country was in the hands of foreign

forces and the White Guards. The Soviet State was surrounded by battle fronts on all sides.

"World revolution" hence ceased to be a mere prophecy and became an urgent need

for the Soviet Regime's survival. First of all, they counted on a European revolution.

Lenin, in his report to the Party Congress in March 1918, pointed out:

There would doubtless be no hope for the ultimate victory of our revolution if it

were to remain alone, if there were no revolutionary movements in other

"3 There was, however, a coalition government which included the Left Socialist Revolutionaries for a short period from the end of 1917 to the spring of 1918.

'9 In this election, the Socialist Revolutionary Party won 370 seats, while the Bolshevik Party had only 175 seats and their Left SR allies a further 40 seats, being in the minority.

19

countries. ... Our salvation from all these difficulties is an all-European

revolution. 20

Trotsky also pinned all hope on a European revolution, saying:

There are only two alternatives: either the Russian revolution will create a

revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers will destroy the

Russian Revolution ! 21

However, the desired "world revolution" did not happen of its own accord. It was

therefore only natural that, in order to extricate themselves from their predicament, the

Bolshevik leaders should have resolved to create a "world revolution". They endeavoured

to outline a global strategy in the drive for world revolution - initially a European

revolution - and this became a state policy.

The first instrument for carrying out world revolution was the People's Commissariat

of Foreign Affairs (henceforth Narkomindel), which was intended to be little more than a

disseminator of the world revolution. Trotsky, the People's Commissar of Narkomindel,

declared: "I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and

,, 22 then shut up shop. An appeal from Narkomindel on 19 December 1917 summoned "the

toiling, oppressed, 'and exhausted peoples of Europe" to join "the victorious struggle against

all imperialists" and close up the ranks of proletarians of all countries "under the banner of

the social revolution. " It also declared that the Soviet Government would "use all the

means at our disposal, to help the working class in all lands to overthrow the rule of capital

and to seize political power in order to reconstruct Europe and the whole world on

20 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, pp 95-8. 21 John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977),

p 142. 22 Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives, United States (ed. ),

Soviet Diplomacv and Nenotiatinq Behaviour: Emerainq New Context for U. S. Diplomacy, (Washington, D. C., 1979), p 48.

20

democratic and socialist lines. , 23 A special body, the International Propaganda Bureau,

was established under Narkomindel, headed by Radek. The various people in this Bureau

who spoke foreign languages were engaged in propagating the ideas of the Bolshevik

revolution abroad. Soviet "diplomatic couriers" frequently left for the European capitals

with trunk-loads of propaganda materials.

Every Soviet representative abroad was also entrusted with the mission to stir up

revolution. Trotsky stated publicly that the Soviet authorities considered "diplomatic

intercourse necessary not only with governments, but also with revolutionary socialist

parties bent on the overthrow of the existing government. , 24 On 26 December 1917, the

Council of People's Commissars issued a decree, resolving "to allocate two million rubles

for the needs of the revolutionary international movement and to put this sum at the

" 25 disposal of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

A. Joffe's embassy in Berlin was depicted by Lenin as "a burning house [which]

would set all Germany alight. , 26 Joffe admitted that his embassy was "the staff

headquarters of the German revolution. ... more than ten Independent Socialist Party

newspapers were directed and supported by the Soviet embassy in the German capital. "27

The Soviet diplomatic representative in London, M. Litvinov, often gave advice to

socialists, and issued literature originating from Russia. 28 V. Vorovsky, who had been a

23 J. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1 (1917-1924), (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p 18-21.

24 E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1961), Vol 3,29.

5 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, p 22. 26 B. Lazitch and M. M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (California: Stanford

University Press, 1972), Vol 1, p 39. 27 L. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of Relations Between the Soviet

Union and the Rest of the World. 1917-1929, (N. J. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), Vol 1, pp 75-6.

2" Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, pp 130-31; Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol 3, pp 19-20.

21

member of the Bolshevik Party's Foreign Bureau in Stockholm, represented Soviet Russia

in Sweden, which became a centre for indirect liaison between Moscow and Western

Europe from 1918 to 1920. Switzerland was a Bolshevik propaganda base in Europe. I.

Berzin, the Soviet ambassador to Switzerland, received several instructions from Lenin

during the second half of 1918. Lenin urged him:

For God's sake don't save the money for publishing purposes in German, French,

Italian, English, use it fast, fast. 29

Similar instructions were also given by Lenin to other Soviet representatives and agents,

prodding them to spend money unsparingly on fostering revolution in European countries.

Besides the formal diplomats, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Govemment also

appointed and dispatched many secret agents abroad. According to John Reed, a radical

American journalist, by September 1918, Narkomindel had on its payroll 68 agents in

Austria-Hungary, and more than that in Germany, as well as others in France, Switzerland,

and Ital Y. 30 A. Balabanova reminisced that large sums of money were sent to Switzerland

to pay those agents who were "creating Bolshevik movements and newspapers throughout

the world. 01

International work was also pursued amongst prisoners of war, Allied soldiers and

foreign residents in Russia. Publications in German, Magyar, Romanian, Serb, Czech and

Turkish were widely circulated. Bolshevik emissaries were sent out to POW camps

throughout Russia and under their direction many Soldiers' Committees were set up by

prisoners. 32 The All-Russian Congress of International Social Democratic Prisoners of

War, which was held in Moscow on 14 March 1918, proceeded to consider an agenda that

29 Lazitch, et al., ibid., p 199, p 41. 30

3 W. H. Chamberlin, The Russia Revolution, (London: Macmillan, 1935),

Ip 380.

1 A. Balabanova, My Life as A Rebel, (New York, 1938), p 175. 32 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 30.

22

included the organisation of an international Communist Party, and issued a manifesto

appealing to homeward-bound prisoners to be the pioneers of the international proletarian

social revolution and to be ready for an armed insurrection. 33 In May 1918, the Federation

of Foreign Groups of the RCP(B) was formed, under the leadership of Bela Kun, a

Hungarian Communist. Its duties were not limited to Russian territory. Some key

members of this Federation, including B. Kun himself, played an important role in forming

Communist Parties and building up revolutionary movements in their own homeland. The

Bolsheviks even gave material support to the ex-war prisoners of France, Austria, Germany

and other countries, who were sent abroad for revolutionary work. Under the Bolsheviks'

direction and support, many former POWs in Russia fought for the world revolution in the

van. To their activities, Lenin at the 8th Congress of the RCP(B) expressed his satisfaction:

"Hundreds of thousands of war prisoners. ... upon returning to Hungary, Germany and

Austria, thoroughly infected those countries with the germs of Bolshevism. ', 34

Setting up "a strong guiding centre" to lead international revolutionary movements

was indispensable for Moscow. Lenin had the idea of establishing a new International at

the beginning of World War I; he believed that the majority of the leaders of the 2nd

International had betrayed socialism by supporting the war efforts of their respective

bourgeois governments and misleading the proletarian movement. According to Lenin's

proposal in the "April Theses", the Bolshevik party resolved on 29 April 1917: "It is the

task of our party, ... to take the initiative in creating a third International. "35 Once in power,

Lenin and his colleagues were anxious to realise this scheme. At the end of 1918, Lenin

33 R. L. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hunclarian Soviet Republi , (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p 66; Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 43.

34 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 29, p 161. 35 J. Degras (ed. ), The Communist International. 1919-1943. Documents, (London:

Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol 1, p 1. 23

considered that the time for the creation of the 3rd International was ripe and would brook

no delay. There were various reasons why he thought so: the social and economic chaos in

Europe, especially in Central Europe, had increased since the Armistice; the German

Communist Party had been founded; and the leaders of the 2nd International were going to

convene a conference in Berne to resuscitate the old organisation. In a note to G.

Chicherin, who had succeeded Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lenin stressed:

"We urgently need to set up an international socialist conference for the founding of the 3rd

Intemational . 06 Narkorrýindel was in charge of the preparatory work for the setting up of

the new International.

On 24 January 1919, an invitation was published in Pravda and Izvestfia and

broadcast on radio, inviting revolutionary parties and organisations throughout the world to

send representatives to a congress which would create a new revolutionary International.

The invitation declared:

The Congress must establish a common fighting organ for the purpose of

maintaining pen-nanent co-ordination and systematic leadership of the

movement, a centre of the communist international, subordinating the interests

of the movement in each country to the common interest of the international

revolution. 37

Since communications between Russia and the outside world were very difficult, a

few foreign parties and groups sent their delegates to Moscow. Without any hesitation, the

Bolsheviks therefore set about creating "foreign delegates". They assembled the members

of parties of some countries that were under Russia's control, such as Latvia and Lithuania;

these delegates were in fact members of the RCP(B); they selected prisoners of war and

36 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 53. 37 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 5.

24

emigrants who had been in Russia for several years and were affiliated to the Bolshevik

Federation of Foreign Communist Groups of the RCP(B); and they even called in foreign

radicals who had worked as employees of Narkomindel. Balabanova, the first secretary of

the Comintern, revealed later: "Among the thirty-five assembly members only one had the

" 38 political right to represent his country and to vote as its delegate. This man was H.

Eberlin, who was in possession of a full mandate from the German Communist Party, and

had been instructed to oppose the formation of the 3rd International on the grounds that it

was premature. This opinion stemmed from the views of Rosa Luxemburg, who had been

murdered on 15 January 1919. However, the foundation of the new International was

proclaimed with the affirmative votes of the "majority of delegates" on 4 March 1919 . 39

Even the president of the Comintern, Zinoviev admitted later that the Communist

International, founded in March 1919, was "nothing but a figment of propaganda". 40

The first Congress of the Comintem issued several documents drafted by Bolshevik

Leaders, in particular by Lenin, as the subsequent congresses were to do also. Those theses

which were adopted by the first Congress reiterated the theories of Lenin and the

standpoint of the Bolsheviks. They emphasised that capitalism was doomed, and that

communism was now emerging from the ruins of capitalism. Therefore, the proletariat

must take over the power of the bourgeois state and establish the dictatorship of the

proletariat - "the new, proletarian democracy" to replace bourgeois democracy and the

parliamentary system. On the closing day of the Congress, Lenin concluded:

38 Balabanova, Impressions of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, 1964), p 69. 39 According to the Bolsheviks, the First Congress of the Comintern was held from 2 to

6 March 1919. 40 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 135.

25 UNIVERSITY

OFYORK LIBRARY

The victory of the proletarian revolution on a world scale is assured. The

founding of an international soviet republic is on the way. 41

The Comintern had an Executive Committee, known as the ECCI (the Executive

Committee of the Comintern), whose function was to conduct the Comintern's work

between the congresses and act on its behalf. The first ECCI was composed of

representatives from the important European parties but was, in effect, controlled by a

bureau of five Bolsheviks. Balabanova found that the ECCI meetings were nothing more

than a mere formality and that real authority rested with the Bolshevik Party Politburo. In

fact, according to Trotsky, "On all basic questions involving the International, Lenin called

the tune. , 42

The initial apparatus of the Comintern derived from the Soviet Government and

RCP(B). For example, the Propaganda Bureau of Narkomindel was described by an

intimate of Lenin's as the "embryo" of the Comintern; 43 and the work of the Federation of

Foreign Groups of the RCP(B) was regarded by Lenin as having laid "the real foundation"

of the 3rd International. " In addition, many local leaders of the Russian Party,

Government and Army were concurrently heads of the regional branches of the Comintem.

Rakovsky of the Southern Bureau, Sokolnikov of the Central Asiatic Bureau and

Shumiatsky of the Far Eastern Secretariat are all cases in point. It is obvious that the

Comintem, which was known as "the international general staff of the proletarian

revolution" was virtually an apparatus established and entirely controlled by the Bolsheviks

themselves. Whether viewed in the light of its political platform, or assessed in terms of its

41 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 28, pp 475-77. 42 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 138. 43 ibid., p 133. 44 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 29, p 161.

26

internal organisation, it was nothing but Lenin's new vehicle for transforming the Bolshevik

revolution into a universal cause.

The Comintem and the Soviet Government linked arms in the service of a single

authority: the Bolshevik Party. In their work aimed at foreign countries, the Comintem and

Narkomindel were distinct but related channels. Basically, their interests were compatible

and mutually reinforcing.

The year 1919, when the Con-ýintem was founded, was seen as "the year of Soviet

Russiaýs most complete isolation from the outside world. "45 The Allies, though from the

spring of 1919 in the process of withdrawing part of their troops, did not stop the economic

blockade or their support for the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies. The White forces, under

the command of A. Kolchak, A. Denikin and N. N. Yudenich, advanced from every

direction with Moscow as their destination. The Civil War and the economic blockade still

posed a serious threat to Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks thought it necessary to take some

of the pressure off Soviet Russia through a variety of actions in the West.

In order to trigger and direct the revolution in the West more effectively, more secret

emissaries and agents were appointed and dispatched abroad by the Comintern and the

Soviet Government. Lenin took particular interest in this work. He himself had talks with

some important emissaries before their departure, and even learned some agents' names by

heart. 46 Since many old Bolsheviks had achieved senior positions in the Party, the State

and the Red Army, few of them were available and suitable for work abroad, so some

fon-ner Mensheviks, Anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries were appointed by the Soviet

Government and the Comintern as their agents. Many secret agents went under the cover

of Soviet diplomats and representatives of Soviet trade missions, the Red Cross and news

45 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 109. 46 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 145.

27

agencies. Some agents and even agencies had multiple functions. For instance, the Soviet

representative in the United States, L. Martern, opened a "Russian Soviet Bureau" in April

1919, which acted as a diplomatic-cum-trade mission, news agency as well as a centre for

47 directing the Communist movement in the U. S. A.. Some agents were delegated both by

the Soviet Government and the Comintern. For instance, in 1919 M. Borodin was

entrusted with a mission to Mexico and the U. S. A. by Narkomindel and the Comintern as

well. He went to America not only as the first emissary of the Comintern, but also as the

Soviet diplomatic representative. 48

The year 1919 was also seen as a year when a revolutionary whirlwind swept over

several European countries. Soviets or Workers' Councils appeared in a number of cities in

Germany, France, Italy, Austria and other countries. Communist regimes were set up in

Bavaria and Hungary. To some extent, this situation and movement were created and

fostered by the Bolsheviks directly or indirectly. In spite of that, this "high tide" of the

European revolutionary movement aroused a mood of expectancy among the Bolshevik

leaders. Zinoviev expressed his optimism in the first issue of the Communist International,

the organ of the ECCI, which began publishing in May 1919:

The movement is proceeding at such terrific speed that we may say with full

confidence, within a year we shall already begin to forget that there was a

struggle for communism in Europe, because in a year the whole of Europe will

be communist. 49

47 L. W. Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, (New York, 1971), p 634. 4" L. Holubnichy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution. 1923-1925, (Ann

Arbor, 1979), p 45, p 50. 49 M. T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the U. S. S. R., (New York: MacMillan, 1933), p

43. 28

However, in reality, both the Bavarian and Hungarian Soviet Republics were short-

lived, the former collapsing in May and the latter in August 1919. The end of this episode

signalled the failure of the expected European revolution. The Bolshevik leaders now

knew that "the incubatory preparatory period of the revolution in the West may last for a

considerable time. "50

Drawing lessons from the defeat, the Bolshevik leaders considered it necessary to

strengthen the leadership further, in the realms of ideas and organisation, of the European

proletarian movements. As a concrete move in this direction, the Comintern. established

the West European Secretariat in Berlin, the West European Bureau in Amsterdam and the

East European Secretariat in Vienna. The Bolshevik leaders believed that the reluctance of

the European working class to follow the Bolsheviks' example of violent revolution was

due to the influence of opportunists and revisionists and also due to Western Communists'

lack of flexible tactics.

While severely attacking "opportunism", Lenin also criticised the Left in the

international Communist movement. In his famous pamphlet Left-wing Communism - An

Infantile Disorder, Lenin stressed that "to throw only the vanguard into the decisive battle"

without the support and sympathy of the entire working class could not lead to victory. 51

He pointed out that in order to expand the revolutionary forces, Communists should work

among mass organisations, such as trade unions, and should participate in bourgeois

parliaments. Communists should "use all the weapons, all the means and methods, ...

combining illegal fon-n of struggle with every form of legal struggle" in their war with the

50 J. M. Meijer (ed. ), The Trotsky Papers, (London: Mouton & Co. 1964), Vol 1 (11917- 1919), pp 621-27.

51 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 31, pp 92-3. 29

enemy. 52 Furthermore, Lenin realised that the proletariat of the advanced countries could

not be victorious without the aid of the oppressed people in colonial countries. According

to Lenin's theory, the high monopoly profits from the exploitation of colonies and semi-

colonial countries enabled the European capitalists to bribe certain sections of the workers

in the imperialist countries, making revolution more difficult. 53 Hence one of the

Comintern's pressing tasks was to raise revolution in the East to destroy one of the props of

imperialist power. These important ideas led to a change of strategy and tactics at the 2nd

Congress of the Comintern.

The 2nd Congress of the Comintern was held from 23 July to 7 August 1920, and

was attended by 217 delegates from 41 countries. With the gradual consolidation of Soviet

Russia and the extension of the Comintern's political influence, the Bolsheviks felt it was

time to further confirm their leading position among the revolutionary movements of the

world, and to build the Comintern as a "really centralised" leading force and a fighting

organ instead of a "propaganda association". 54 The "Statutes of the Communist

International", adopted at the Congress, defined the Communist International as "a single

communist party of the entire world", and claimed "the parties working in the various

countries are but its separate sections. 05 "The Conditions of Admission to the Comintern"

drafted by Lenin stipulated that every party or organisation which intended to join or had

already belonged to the Comintern must model itself on the Bolshevik Party and must

accept firm control from the Comintern. Alongside these "stiff' principles and discipline,

many "flexible" tactics can be seen in some of the organisation's theses.

52 ibid., Vol 31, pp 96-7. 53 Cf. Lenin, Imperialism. the Highest Stage of Canitalism, (New York, 1970). 54 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 199. 55 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 164.

30

The 2nd Comintern Congress also marked the introduction of the "Theses on the

National and Colonial Questions", which formed the theory and strategy on the revolution

in the East, a subject which will be dealt with in the following section.

Not long after the close of the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, great changes

occurred. The war with Poland, which was not provoked by Soviet Russia but was used by

Lenin in an effort to kindle the world revolution by force, ended with the defeat of the Red

Arrny in October 1920. The vision of imminent revolution in the West faded again. The

Civil War ended with the overthrow of Wrangel in November 1920. Meanwhile, the

Russian people's resentment against the Soviet regime was growing. Waves of workers'

strikes and peasants' uprisings culminated in the revolt of the Kronstadt naval base in

March 1921. Ironically, it was the Kronstadt sailors who had made a great contribution to

the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917 and now they rose up to end the rule of "a small

group of Communist bureaucrats". 56 Their revolt and other uprisings were bloodily

suppressed by the Bolsheviks.

From 1921, to restore Soviet Russiaýs economy and increase the productive forces

became the central task for the Bolsheviks. Around this time, the capitalist world began to

regain some stability and the putsches to overthrow the capitalist system in Western

countries, such the March action in Germany, met with defeat. In the light of these

circumstances, the Bolsheviks made strategic retreats and compromises both at home and

abroad. At home War Communism was replaced by the New Economic Policy, while

abroad, Soviet Russia was trying to build up trade and diplomatic relations with Western

Countries, and head-on confrontation with the capitalist powers became increasingly rare.

56 P. Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, (N. J. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p 229.

31

The 3rd Comintern Congress (June-July 1921) reflected these changes and started a

new stage of international Communist movement. "Theses on Tactics" adopted by this

Congress pointed out that the world revolution would "require a fairly long period of

revolutionary struggle" and need careful political and organisational preparation, as well as

regular propaganda and agitation. However, the Communist party must be "obliged to do

everything it can to lead the workers into this attack [the offensive against capitalist

society] whenever the conditions for this are at hand. 07 Since the Comintern had

proclaimed the cause of Soviet Russia as its own and set the question of Soviet Russia as

the touch stone by which all the organisations of the working class should be tested, the

theses stressed again:

Unconditional support of Soviet Russia remains as before the cardinal duty of

the communists of all countries. Not only must they vigorously oppose any

attack on Soviet Russia, but they must fight energetically to clear away all the

obstacles which the capitalist states place in the way of Soviet Russian trade on

the world market and with other nations. 58

"Theses on the Structure of Communist Parties and on the Methods and Content of Their

Work" imposed the Bolshevik principles on the party, such as democratic centralism, iron

discipline, and various tactics on foreign parties. Although Lenin remarked at the 4th

Congress of the Comintern that this resolution was "too Russian" and was "permeated and

imbued with a Russian spirit", and therefore it was "quite unintelligible to foreigners", he

, 59 believed that it was "an excellent resolution'.

57 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, p 243; p 251. 58 ibid., pp 255-56.

5r - ibid., p 257.

32

It further made the Comintern the supreme body above all communist parties by

stipulating that "the decisions of the Communist International are to be carried out by

affiliated parties without delay in those cases where the requisite changes in the existing

statutes and party decisions can only be made subsequently., '60 By such means, Soviet

Russia's interests were given priority, Bolshevik principles became a model for all

Communist parties, and Moscow could easily control all Communist parties and direct the

international revolutionary movement through the Comintern.

After Lenin died in 1924, the axiom of world socialist revolution was superseded by

Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country". To consolidate the Communist regime

within the Soviet Union became a matter of paramount importance, and to launch or

support revolutionary movements in foreign countries was henceforth subordinated to that

aim. The Comintern became more and more a tool to safeguard the Soviet Union's

interests and to realise their own goals, and it became more inclined to adopt the tactics of

undermining capitalist countries by dividing them against each other and by supporting the

nationalist movements in the Third World.

Section 2. Fundamental Strategy in the East

The Bolsheviks' fundamental policy towards the East derived from Lenin. As a

Marxist, Lenin understood that "For the present, real communism can achieve success only

in the occident. , 61 In spite of this, he considered that the national liberation movements of

the oppressed nations in the backward Eastern countries would become a struggle against

60 ibid., p 269. R-. F-use, Soviet Policy in the Orient, (East Peking: Enjinsha, 1927), p 2.

33

the capitalist system itself and could help the proletariat of the advanced western countries

to achieve power, for he believed, the maintenance of the western imperialist powers was

dependent on the plunder and exploitation of their colonies and semi-colonies. The waves

of the anti-imperialist struggle in Asia, which attracted Lenin's attention, made him

appreciate highly the role which "the awakening of Asia" would play in the world history

of the 20th century. 62 Lenin firmly believed that:

Social revolution can occur only in an entire epoch in which the civil war of the

proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries is joined with the

whole number of revolutionary democratic and national-liberation movements in

the backward and oppressed nations. 63

It seems that such views of Lenin were accepted by other Bolshevik leaders. Only a few

days after the Bolshevik Revolution, Pravda declared:

The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from countless reserves.

The oppressed nations of Asia are as eager for the fall of the regime of

capitalistic oppression as the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse

these forces in a world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the

historic mission of the Workers'and Peasants' Russia. 64

After the Bolsheviks came to power, the Eastern issue became a live political issue

instead of a purely theoretical one, related to the very survival of the Soviet regime. The

Soviet State inherited from Tsarist Russia a vast Asian territory which bordered on Turkey,

Persia, Afghanistan, China, Korea, etc.. Some nationalities living in Russia! s Asian

62 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 19, p 86. 63 Lenin, Sochineniia, XIX, p 221; Quoted from X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, Soviet

Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey, (California: Stanford University Press, 1957), p 45.

64 F. L. Schuman, Russia since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics, (New York: Frederick L. Schuman, 1957), p 96.

34

territory had close links with adjoining Asian countries. Either with the aim of achieving

world revolution or consolidating the Soviet Regime, the Bolsheviks required the

formulation of special policies towards the East, which included both their dealings with

the Asian areas of the ex-Russian empire and Soviet Russia's relations with other Asian

countries.

From the very beginning, the Soviet Government proclaimed the right of national

self-determination and declared all treaties of the Tsarist Government with other

governments null and void. In an appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East on 3

December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars reiterated these principles and further

appealed to the Muslims of Russia to "support this revolution and its authorised

government! " and called upon the Muslims of the East to "overthrow these robbers and

enslavers of your country. s, 65 It is obvious that the Soviet's early policy towards the East

was concerned with the pursuit of dual goals: to defend the "Socialist fatherland" and to

instigate revolution against imperialism. Bukharin later gave a frank explanation of the

Bolsheviks' policies on national and colonial issues:

If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies,

we lose nothing by it. On the contrary, we gain; for the national gain as a whole

will damage foreign imperialism ... . The most outright nationalist movement,

for example, that of the Hindus, is only water for our Mill. 66

The Russian territories bordering onto Asian countries were regarded as bases for the

spread of revolution. At the conference for the constituent congress of the Tartar-Bashkir

Autonomous Soviet Republic in May 1918, Stalin, the Commissar of Nationalities Affairs,

referring to his country's strategic position between imperialist Europe and oppressed Asia,

6*5 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, pp 16-17. 66 Cited from Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution , Vol 3, pp 235-6.

35

pointed out that Soviet Russia would pursue the policy of fraternal support of oppressed

peoples of the East in their struggle for their own liberation. ... let then this autonomous

republic serve the peoples of the Muslim world, as a shining beacon which lights their way

toward liberation. 67

Later, when the Red Army advanced eastward and more Soviet Republics were set

up in the Eastern borderlands, Stalin repeated time and again his idea of building "a citadel

of Soviet power" and planting "a socialist beacon" in the East. 68 Turkestan with its special

geographical position, was considered by Moscow to be "extremely important", and could

"play the role of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India,

Bukhara, and Khiva"; and Red Azerbaijian was regarded as "a revolutionary beacon for

Persia, Arabia and Turkey. , 69

Since many nationalities living within Russian-controlled central Asia were Muslims,

Muslim peoples were among the primary targets of Soviet Russia's Eastern drive. In late

1917, a Muslim Commissariat was set up in the Commissariat of Nationalities with the aim

of directing work among the Muslims of Russia. The Commissariat of Nationalities

Affairs was also in charge of revolutionary work among citizens of Asian countries living

in Russia. These Asian citizens were mainly composed of Turkish prisoners-of-war,

Iranian migrant workers, Chinese war-time labourers and Korean immigrant peasants.

During the period 1917-1920, there were no fewer than one million people in this

category. 70 The Bolsheviks promoted extensive agitation among these foreign citizens, and

67 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 47. 68 j. V. Stalin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,

1953), Vol 4, pp 247-8. 69 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 95-6. 70 M. A. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and some Questions of the

National Liberation Movement, 1918-July 1920', R. A. Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), p 73.

36

from 1918 onwards helped them to form various national revolutionary organisations and

communist groups on Russian territory. Several key Asian Communists were appointed by

Lenin and Stalin as the first commissars in the Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs for the

various national groups. In October 1918, some Communist groups and revolutionary

organisations of the Eastern peoples on Russian territory formed the Union for the

Liberation of the East. Its declared aim was to achieve a united anti-imperialist front and

lead a struggle which would ultimately bring about a federal United States of Asia. 71

In November 1918, the First All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of

Eastern Peoples (also known as the First Congress of the Muslim Communists) was

convened in Moscow. Delegates from the Eastern domestic and foreign Communist

organisations attended this congress. Stalin addressed the gathering as follows:

Our duty is to build a bridge between the people of the West and the East and,

having created the united front of the revolution, to break the ring of imperialism

which encircles us. However, nobody will be able to build a bridge between

West and East so easily and so quickly as you, because the gates of Persia, and

India, Afghanistan, and China are open for you. The liberation of the peoples of

these countries from the yoke of the imperialists would ensure freedom for your

own country and at the same time would undermine imperialism at its very

foundation. 72

At Stalin's suggestion, the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of Eastern Peoples

(Muslims) was set up, headed by Stalin himself, functioning under the direct guidance of

the RCP(B) Central Committee. This Bureau claimed its "sacred work" was "to spread the

ideas of communism quickly in the East and draw all oppressed peoples into the world

71 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 372. 72 Lazitch, et al., ibid., p 374; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 77-78.

37

labouring family. 03 The Bureau also decided to organise a Department of International

Propaganda for Eastern Peoples, which was entrusted to a Turk, Mustafa Subhi. This

Department soon had 12 sections: Arab, Persian, Turkish, Azeri, Bukharan, Kirghiz,

Kalmuk, Caucasian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Indian. By March 1919, the

Department had published 15 newspapers in different languages, 74 and had begun to

dispatch propagandists to Asian countries.

This bustle of activities in the East, was but a sideline to the Bolsheviks'main efforts.

At that time almost all the Bolshevik leaders except Stalin focused most of their attention

on the proletarian revolution in the West and on internal affairs. Although Lenin was the

principal maker of Soviet policy toward the East, he was then actually more interested in

the effects of Eastern revolution on Western countries and had scarcely any time to spend

on the concrete work directed at the East. Trotsky and Zinoviev both maintained that

national liberation in the East was contingent upon a successful European socialist

revolution. Only Stalin, partly due to his Georgian background, partly due to his

responsibilities, had more of an Eastern orientation. He was not only a faithful executor of

Lenin's Eastern policy, but also its main advocate. When he saw that "the eyes of all are

naturally turned to the West, ... the remote East naturally tends to disappear from our field

of vision and is even forgotten, " Stalin published his famous article on 24 November 1918

"Don't Forget the East", in which he argued:

The East should not be forgotten for a single moment for the reason that it

provides inexhaustible reserve and most reliable rear of world imperialism. 75

Nevertheless, Stalin's appeal did not have much echoes.

73 Eudin and North, ibid., p 78. 74 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 375. 75 Stalin, Collected Works, Vol 4, p 174.

38

The founding Congress of the Comintem paid little attention to the East. The

Congress was attended by some Asian representatives, yet none of them had full votes or

became members of the ECCI. This Congress's western orientation was indicated by the

following sentences in the "Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of

the Entire World":

The emancipation of the colonies is possible only in conjunction with the

emancipation of the metropolitan working class. ... Colonial slaves of Africa and

Asia! The hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will also be the hour of

your own liberation ! 76

In general, Soviet Russia and the Comintern did not attach more importance to the

revolutionary potential of the East until the summer of 1919, when the Bolsheviks' attempts

to foment the European revolution ended in miserable failure and the prospects for

revolution in the West were gloomy. Around this time, large scale anti-imperialist

movements were starting up in India, Korea, China, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. With

the victorious advance of the Red Army eastward, the possibilities of a successful

revolution in the East increased. Trotsky, as the Commissar of War, had a thorough

understanding of the general situation. He made a penetrating analysis on the relative

strength of Soviet and enemy forces. In a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(B)

dated 5 August 1919 he wrote:

In any event the European revolution appears to have withdrawn into the

background. But Asia may become the arena of the next uprising. ... The sort of

army which at the moment can be of no great significance in the European scales

can upset the unstable balance of Asian relationships of colonial dependence,

76 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, p 43. 39

give a direct push to an uprising on the part of the oppressed masses and assure

the triumph of such a rising in Asia.

He came to the conclusion:

Our task lies in effecting the necessary switch of the centre of gravity of our

international orientation at the opportune moment. 77

The shift in the strategic orientation started from the summer of 1919. From July to

September of 1919, Narkomindel issued in succession the "Declaration to the Chinese

people and to the Governments of North and South China" (July), the "Declaration to the

Mongolian people and to the Government of Autonomous Mongolia" (August), an "Appeal

to the workers and peasants of Persia" (August), and an "Appeal to the workers and

peasants of Turkey" (September). These demonstrated that Soviet Russia was starting to

make more active gestures to Asian countries.

From the autumn of 1919, Lenin himself began taking an active part in particular

initiatives relating to the East. In October, he drafted a resolution to send a special

commission to Tashkent, and wrote a letter to the Communists of that region. Soon, the

Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which was formed

under Lenin's direction, established an agitation and propaganda sub-division and, in

December 1919, it decided to set up a Council for International Propaganda. Both bodies

were charged with conducting revolutionary work among the Asian peoples on Russian

territory and in the neighbouring Eastern countries. Through these apparatus, the

Bolsheviks gave more effective leadership to the revolutionary movement in the East.

In the Russian Far East, similar work also started. In June 1919, a responsible

member of the Siberian Regional Committee of the RCP(B), F. Gapon, suggested that an

77 Meijer (ed. ), The Trotsky Papers, Vol 1, pp 621-627. 40

Eastern Bureau with the obligatory participation of representatives of the Far Eastern

peoples should be set up in order to establish close contacts with the revolutionary forces of

the Far Eastern countries, including China, Korea, Japan and Mongolia. Although the

Eastern Bureau was not set up at once, some proposals of Gapon's were implemented and

later the Section of the Eastern Peoples was formed. 78 In August of the same year, V. D.

Vilensky put forward a programme on carrying out Communist work among the East

Asian peoples. The Politburo of the RCP(B) soon approved this programme and gave him

the detailed instructions to fulfil it. The main points of the instructions were summed up by

Vilensky as follows: to aggravate the conflict of interests between Japan, America and

China by all possible means; to arouse the masses of Chinese, Mongolian and Korean

people to conscious action aimed at breaking away from the oppression of the foreign

capitalists; to support the revolutionary movement of the Eastern Asian peoples by

establishing firm connections with the revolutionary organisations in Japan, China and

Korea and by publishing pamphlets and leaflets to agitate there; to help the Koreans and

Chinese set up guerrilla forces. In September 1919, Vilensky was dispatched to the

Russian Far East as the plenipotentiary of Narkomindel there, and he did his best to

implement these tasks. 79

Against this background, the Second Congress of the Communist Organisations of

the Peoples of the East was held in Moscow from 22 November to 3 December 1919, with

78 Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Certain Questions of the National Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, pp 86-88.

79 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI on the Work among the People in the Eastern Asia, 1 September 1920', Gon-qchancluoii. Lian-qonabu vu Zhonclquoc

- danaanziliao ieminq

congshu (A Series of Archival Material on the Comintern, All-Union Communist Party (B) and the Chinese Revolution), which is henceforth abbreviated to GLZDC, (Beijing: The Beijing Library Press, 1997), Vol 1, pp 38-9; This volume is the Chinese translation of the first volume of VKP(b). Komintern i Kitaya. Dokuments. 1920-1949, (Moscow, 1994).

41

Lenin himself playing a major role. He made a long and important speech to the assembly,

declaring:

The emancipation of the peoples of the East is now quite practicable. ... Here

contact with the peoples of the East is particularly important. ... Our Soviet

Republics must now master all the awakening peoples of the East and, together

with them, wage a struggle against international imperialism.

Further explaining the nature of revolution in the East, Lenin pointed out that since

the bulk of the population in the Eastern countries were peasants, the task of the revolution

was not directed against capitalism in their own countries, but against "international

imperialism" and "medieval survivals". 80 Stalin's speech at this Congress offered no

further new ideas than had been expressed in his previous utterances. In accordance with

Lenin's spirit, the Congress passed a resolution - "Outline for the Revolutionary Work of

the Communist Party in the East" - which stated:

The revolutionary work of the Communist Party in the East must proceed in two

directions: one direction is determined by the basic class revolutionary program

of the party which, on its part, prompts the necessity of a gradual formation of

communist parties in the countries of the East as sections of the Communist

International. The second direction is determined by the present political and,

naturally, historical, social, and economic position of the East, which

necessitates the support in the East, for a period of time, of the national

movement directed at the overthrow of the rule of Western European

imperialism there - in so faý as such a movement does not contradict those class

80 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 30, p 151. 42

revolutionary aspirations of the international proletariat which are aimed at the

overthrow of international imperialism. 81

We can see that the preliminary theory and strategies for the revolution in the East were

thus put in place. These tentative ideas were to be fully crystallised at the Second Congress

of the Comintern. At this Comintern Congress, the tendency of the preoccupation with the

West was corrected, while Eastern issues were put on the agenda. 17 representatives out of

a total of 25 Eastern delegates had full votes. The ECCI began to accept Asian members.

A special Commission on National and Colonial Questions was formed.

At the opening session of the Second Congress on 19 July 1920, Lenin declared: "It

is one of our most important tasks to find out how we should set about organising the

Soviet movement in the non-capitalist countries. , 82 As he later explained to the Congress:

We must not only form independent cadres of fighters, of Party organisations in

all colonies and backward countries, we must not only carry on propaganda in

favour of organising peasant soviets and strive to adapt them to pre-capitalist

conditions; the Communist International must lay down, and give the theoretical

grounds for the proposition that, with the aid of the proletariat of the most

advanced countries, the backward countries may pass to the Soviet system and,

after passing through a definite stage of development, to Communism, without

passing through the capitalist stage of development. 83

'31 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 164. 82 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, p 138. 83 Cf. The Second Congress of the Communist International (first published by the

Publishing House of the Comintern, Moscow, 1921 and the Publishing Office of the Communist International, America, 1921); other translations also exist.

43

The purpose of establishing these soviets was to form a Federation - "a transitional form

towards the complete union of working people of all nations" which would arise on the

basis of the Soviet system and the Soviet movement. 84

In Lenin's famous "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions", he stated that

"what is essential is to pursue a policy designed to achieve a close alliance of all national

and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. " Communist Parties and the

Comintern must therefore prepare to assist "the bourgeois-democratic liberation

movement" and support peasant movements . 85 By contrast, M. N. Roy, an Indian, in his

theses stressed the need to support the working class and develop Communist movements

in colonies. Clearly, Roy did not understand what was in Lenin's mind. To support

peasant movements and to collaborate with the national bourgeoisie in colonial and

backward countries was a tactic to establish soviet governments in backward countries and

to overthrow the rule of imperialist powers in colonial countries in order to win over the

entire East to Soviet Russiaýs side and to serve the cause of Soviet Russia's survival and

consolidation. With regard to this, the only Asian member of the ECCI, the Korean

delegate Pak Chin-sen, showed that he had fully understood Lenin's intentions, and in his

speech at the Congress he declared that the Congress would "speed the revolutionary

ferment, the revolution, in the East. " His party, the Korean Communist Party, he

continued, would be "one of the main forces that turn enslaved Korea into a part of the

federated World Soviet Republic. J6 In an article entitled "The Revolutionary East and the

84 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 138-144. 85 In the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, adopted by the Second

Congress of the Comintern, Lenin's original term 'bourgeois-democratic liberation movement'was revised to 'revolutionary liberation movement'. 86 Second Congress of the Communist International, Vol 1, pp 141-143.

44

Next Tasks of the Communist International", which Pak Chin-sen wrote during the Second

Congress, he stated:

The industrial proletariat, if we exclude Japan, is too feeble in Asia to permit of

our nourishing any serious hopes of an immediate Communist revolution, but

the victory of an agrarian revolution is undoubted, if we are able to cope with the

immediate problem of the great and bloody struggle. 87

This article of Pak's complemented and supported Lenin's theses.

The Theses on the National and Colonial Questions adopted by the Congress laid a

theoretical foundation for the strategy and tactics on revolution in the East where hardly

any proletariat existed, consequently adding bizarre colours to the international Communist

movement. Putting the theory into immediate practice, the ECCI decided to convene the

Congress of the Eastern Peoples and the Congress for the Toilers of the Far East

respectively. The latter was delayed until January 1922, but the Congress of the Eastern

Peoples was held at Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, in September 1920, soon after the

closure of the Second Congress of the Comintern.

The Baku Congress was attended by 1,891 delegates representing 37 nationalities.

Most of them were Muslims from Russia's borderlands and from the countries of the Near

and Middle East. There were a few delegates from the Far East, including 8 Chinese. 88

87 Pak Din Shoon, 'The Revolutionary East and the Next Tasks of the Communist International', Communist International, (Moscow, June-July 1920) Nos 11-12, pp 2315- 20. This important article was also published in Pravda on 27 July 1920.

88 Up to now, it is still not sure who the Chinese delegates to Baku Congress were. According to Zhang Ximan [Lishi huivi (Historical Reminiscences), (Shanghai, Jidong Publishing House, 1949) p 20], the Chinese delegates included Ling Yue, Jiang Kang- hu and He Han-zhong. Sokolsky learned that at the Congress, China was presented by Li Dazhao. [G. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), p 322]. J. Guillermaz writes in A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921 - 1949 (London: Methuen & Co., 1972, p 39) that Zhang Tai-lei and Liu Shao-zhou attended the Congress. H. F. MacNair's China in Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931, p 204) shows that the name of Chinese representative at the

45

The Comintern's principal leaders, Zinoviev, Radek and Bela Kun, were the main speakers

at this Congress. Faced with such an audience, they talked bombastically about socialist

revolution, building "communist organisation", establishing the "Soviet system" and

creating a "new culture under the banner of communism" . 89 Regardless of these dogmas, a

Turkish delegate declared that all they wanted from Russia were arms. Answering

Zinoviev's question on the identity of the Bolsheviks, the delegate replied that in the

opinion of the Turks, "a Bolshevik is a man who is an enemy of England. " As for

Zinoviev's next question "What do they think about Bolsheviks fighting against the

capitalists and the landlords? " his answer was "that is a matter in which the Turks are not

interested. "90

Of course, those Comintern leaders clearly knew that these Eastern national

revolutionaries had nothing in common with communists. So the key tone of the Baku

Congress was anti-imperialist, especially anti-British. In his speeches, Zinoviev said:

We are ready to help any revolutionary struggle against the English

Government. Our task is to kindle a real holy war against the English and

French capitalists. 91

Another aim of the Congress was to turn the Eastern peoples towards the political strength

of Moscow. As Pavlovich told his listeners:

If the Eastern peoples wish to have on their side the sympathy of the

international proletariat, they must also fight for Soviet power and the principles

proclaimed by Soviet Russia. 92

Congress given in the press was "Lai". "9 C. Mackerass and N. Knight, Marxism in Asia, (London: Croom Heim, 1985), pp

171-3, p 177. 90 Flovinsky, World Revolution and the U. S. S. R., p 60. 91 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, p 105.

46

It was clear that the Bolsheviks' purpose was to mobilise Eastem peoples to throw

themselves into the battle against the Western imperialist powers in the rear and to expand

Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in the East.

In order to fulfil these tasks more efficiently, a permanent auxiliary institute of the

Communist International in the East, the Council of Propaganda and Action for the Peoples

of the East, was established, under the direction of Pavlovich, Stasova and others. This

Council in Baku served as a centre for Communist activities in the Near East. About the

same time, two other similar institutions were set up: the Tashkent Bureau, which was

established in October 1920 in Turkestan, was assigned to work in central Asia; and the

Irkutsk Bureau, which was formed in July-August 1920, became the centre for propaganda

and organisational work in the Far East. Before long the Comintern's branches in Baku and

Tashkent were abolished and the Comintern opened an Eastern Section with headquarters

in Moscow, whose first chief was G. Safarof. The Comintern's Irkutsk branch was later

transformed into the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat.

The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which was originally scheduled as a

sequel to the Baku Congress and later proposed as a counter to the Washington

Conference, was convoked by the Comintern. The preliminary conference was held in

Irkutsk in November 1921, and the Congress officially opened in Moscow in January 1922.

There were 148 delegates representing Communist, nationalist and anarchist parties and

organisations in China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Siberia, India and Indonesia. The Chinese

delegates, numbering 44, constituted the second largest group.

The main themes of the Congress were set forth by Zinoviev and Safarof in their

speeches. Zinoviev in his report "On the International Situation and the Result of the

92 Mackerass and Knight, Marxism in Asia, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p 176. 47

Washington Conference" attacked the Washington Conference had refused to acknowledge

"the legitimate aspirations of the Asian people for independence" and described the Four-

Power Treaty concluded at that Conference as an "alliance of the four bloodsuckers". He

chided certain parties and elements who persisted in looking to the West, especially

America, for the blessings of democracy and progress. He pointed out that only when

areas like Asia were totally free of Western domination, would the world Communist

movement have achieved its primary goals. Hence national liberation could not be

advanced except by reliance upon Soviet Russia and the world proletariat. He further

proclaimed that the entire Far East was "ripe for the soviet system. " Safarof stated that the

Comintern supported every nationalist movement for emancipation, because it was directed

against imperialism and because it was in harmony with the interests of the international

proletariat. Moreover, he stressed the leading role of the proletariat in the national

revolution and the importance of peasants awakening. These Bolshevik speakers

elaborated Lenin's doctrines on the revolution in national and colonial countries, which was

put forward in the Second Congress of the Comintern.

Lastly, the Congress passed a manifesto, which appealed to the Far Eastern people to

form an unbreakable alliance under the banner of the Comintern, to carry out anti-

imperialist and anti-feudal national and democratic revolutions, to establish a fair social 93

system and to place political power in the grasp of the workers and peasants. This

Congress successfully safeguarded Moscow's dominant position in leading the anti-

imperialist and revolutionary movements in the Far East. In the history of the Far Eastern

Communist movement, this Congress had a significant influence.

93 Cf. First Conqress of the Toilers of the Far East, (Petrograd, 1922); Huang Xiu-rong, Gonqchanciuoei vu Zhonciquo geming quanxi shi (The History of the Relations between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), (Beijing: The CCP's Central Academy Press, 1989), Vol 1, p 109.

48

It is not difficult to see that the main direction of the Bolsheviks' penetration into

Asia extended from Russiaýs borderlands to the adjacent Asian countries and from the Near

East toward the Far East. Soviet Russia! s main targets in the East were India and China.

Provoking disturbances in some of its adjacent countries, such as Afghanistan, was treated

as a step towards clearing the way for revolution "in India and China, and on to the bastions

of imperialism - England, America and Japan. 04

Under the supervision of the Bolsheviks, the Communist organisations of the Asian

peoples transfer-red from Russian territory to adjacent Asian countries. The Iranian

Communist Party was founded in June 1920, and the Turkish Communist Party was set up

in September 1920. In other Asian countries Communist groups began to spring up.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks did their utmost to establish diplomatic relations with

neighbouring Asian countries. Moscow adopted friendly policies towards nationalist

governments, such as Kemal's government in Turkey, Amanullah's government in

Afghanistan and the Shah's government in Persia, regardless of these governments'

capitalist or feudalistic character. Chicherin explained this policy in December 1920:

Our policy is ... a compromise between us and the national states which are

struggling for their own independence against the imperialism of the West. 95

In 1921, Soviet Russia signed treaties of friendship with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and

Mongolia. In turn, these actions of Soviet diplomacy further "pave[d] the way for the

Communist International", as Safarof said. 96

The spread of Bolshevik revolution to the East was not solely dependent on peaceful

means, such as undertaking propaganda and agitation through the Comintern and

94 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 77, p 92. 95 Eudin and North, ibid., p 91. 96 Mackerass and Knight, Marxism in Asia, p 180.

49

Communist Parties, or exerting political influence through diplomatic channels. Military

methods were also considered as immediate and effective measures to stimulate Bolshevik

revolutions in the Asian countries. When Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other Bolshevik

leaders talked about Eastern affairs, they always mentioned the military factor. In May

1919, an article in the organ of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, suggested:

Creation of special battalions from among the Russian Muslims in order to

render active assistance to the East in struggle against the British imperialists. ...

Without active assistance from the outside by the fresh untapped forces of

Russia's Muslims it can once again fall into a lethargic sleep of spineless

inertness and apathy. 97

Another article in this journal argued that because "there was no working-class movement

and no knowledge of the findings of sociology, i. e. international socialism in the East, ...

the struggle of an international proletarian detachment in the Soviet Republic has been

placed on a practical footing. ... If Tsarism could plan an invasion and seizure of India via

several hostile countries, then why cannot workers' and peasants' Russia do the same thing

along the same lines in order to give the Indians the Bolshevik ideology? 08 Accordingly,

the Second Congress of the Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East resolved

to organise an Eastern Red Army as a part of the international Red Army in order to

liberate Eastern peoples. 99

Both in word and in deed, such work was, to some extent, undertaken. The Turkish

and Persian Detachments and the International Korean-Chinese Regiment were formed in

97 Zhizn Natsionalnostei (The Life of Nationalities), (26 May 1919) No 19, p 2; Quoted from Ulyanovsky, The Comintern and the East, p 117, and Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 161.

9" Ulyanovsky, Lbiýd., p 118. 99 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 165.

50

the Red Army, whose tasks included liberating their own homelands as well as fighting for

Soviet Russia. 100 In May 1920, Russian troops landed in the Gilan region of Persia to set

up a Soviet Republic there. In the Autumn of 1920, a large number of Indian militants

were organised in Turkestan for military training and they prepared to launch a joint assault

with the Red Army into India through Afghanistan. 101 The following year, a satellite

Soviet state was founded in Outer Mongolia with the "help" of the Red Army. To export

revolution abroad became a pretext for using force to either interfere in or to control other

countries.

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November 1922) specially adopted "Theses

on the Eastern Question". This document further developed the ideas on the national and

colonial questions which Lenin had expounded at the Second Congress. In which, the

slogan of a united anti-imperialist front in the East was proclaimed and the tasks for the

Communist parties of the Eastern countries were put forward as follows: to fight for the

most radical possible solution of the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and to

organise the working and peasant masses for the struggle for their class interests. The

theses claimed that "for backward countries the Soviet system represents the most painless

transitional form from primitive conditions of existence to the advanced communist culture

which is destined to replace capitalist methods of production and distribution throughout

the world economy. " And they further convinced Asian peoples that the backward

'00 Cf. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, pp 70- 137.

101 M. N. Roy, M. N. Roy's Memoirs, (Bombay: Allied Publishers Privated Ltd, 1964), pp 417-421.

51

countries could become members of the international federation of Soviet republics

through an alliance with the proletariat of the West. 102

Surveying the strategy and policies of Soviet Russia and the Comintern towards the

East in this early phase, we find that the Bolsheviks' Eastern policies were imbued with a

spirit more of pragmatism than of idealism. Their efforts to spread Bolshevism were

combined with acts aimed at triggering anti-imperialist movements, with the purpose of

drawing the Eastern People into the world soviet movement and of aggrandising Soviet

RussiXs power and strength in the East. The Menshevik leader Y. 0. Martov remarked

that the Comintern was not being immune from a temptation "to regard the peoples of the

East as pieces on the chessboard of the diplomatic war with the Entente. " 103 Anyhow, the

Bolsheviks' policies and activities had a rather strong influence on the events in many

Asian countries.

Section 3. General Policies towards China

China, being the largest country in the East and sharing a 7,000-kilometre border

with Russia, was naturally Soviet Russia! s most important neighbour in the East. Although

China was not the initial target for revolution in Asia, it became more and more important

for the Bolsheviks' world revolutionary strategy as time passed.

In the past, Tsarist Russia's expansion in the East had brought enormous territorial

acquisitions at the expense of the Chinese Empire. Russia also grabbed various political

and economic privileges within China. In 1898, when Japan and several European powers

102 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 388-9. 103 Quoted from Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 268.

52

were scrambling for spheres of influence and concessions in China, Russia extorted the

right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in Manchuria, which linked up with the

Trans-Siberian Railway. In 1900, Russian troops joined the Eight Powers' Allied

Expedition and entered Beijing to suppress the Boxer Rising. Taking advantage of the

situation, the Russians further invaded Manchuria under the pretext of protecting their

interests and later refused to vacate the territory. In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke

out over the struggle for superiority in Manchuria, and ended with Russia! s defeat in 1905.

As a result, Southern Manchuria passed under the control of Japan, while Northern

Manchuria remained within the sphere of influence of Russia. With other imperialist

powers, Tsarist Russia also had a hold over the Qing Government through long-term loans.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the

Republic of China. But still China could not cast off the yoke of the imperialist powers.

Sun Yatsen, the revolutionary bourgeois democratic leader, had to resign his presidency to

Yuan Shikai, a fonner high-ranking official of the Qing Cabinet, who had the support of

the imperialist powers.

During World War I, European powers were busy with the war in Europe and had

little time to attend to the affairs of the Far East. Under these circumstances, Japan took

advantage of the situation and sent troops to Shandong province to seize Qingdao, which

had previously been occupied by Germany. In 1915, Japan put forward its infamous 21

Demands to China, with the aim of controlling the whole of China. Yielding to the

pressure from Japan, Yuan Shikai accepted most of Japan's demands.

After Yuan's death in 1916, China entered a phase of tangled warfare among

different warlords who were backed by various imperialist powers. In 1917, the Anfu

Clique, headed by Duan Qirui, controlled the Beijing Government, -while

Sun Yatsen

organised a rival government in Guangzhou. At Japan's instigation, the Beijing 53

Government declared war on Germany and joined the Allies. Using the war as a pretext,

the Duan Qirui Government borrowed large amount of loans from Japan. In return, Japan

grabbed more special rights and concessions from China. Complementing its pro-Japanese

policy, the Beijing Government adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet regime from

the very beginning.

Soon after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks in Harbin, the seat of the

Administration of the CER, responding to the order from Petrograd that they should "take

power in the name of the proletariat and the Government", 104 increased their efforts to seize

control of the CER Administration and oust its head, General Horvath. The Bolsheviks in

Harbin even claimed that Harbin was Russian territory and the Soviet officially represented

state power. In December, the Harbin Soviet which had been established there also

received two orders from the Soviet Government, asking them to send personnel to

Manzhouli, Suifenhe Hailar, Kuanchengzi and some other cities to take over customs and

consulates there. 105 These actions led to disturbances in Harbin and Beijing. At the request

of Allied diplomats, the Beijing Government sent troops to suppress the Bolshevik uprising

in Harbin in December 1917. Moreover, in May 1918, the Beijing Government agreed to

sign a Joint Military Defence Pact with Japan for the declared purpose of checking the

threat from Russia. This Pact stipulated that the Japanese troops could enter Manchuria

and Mongolia; the Japanese officers could command and train the Chinese troops; and the

Chinese should engage the Japanese as political, financial and military advisors. The

'04 Leong Sowtheng, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926, (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1976), p 21. Harbin was the junction of the three sections of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the seat of the CER Administration.

105 Li Xinggeng, et a[., Fencivu fupinq -E quo qiaomin zai Zhon-qquo. 1917-1945 (Duckweed in Wind and Rain, Russian Residents in China, 1917-1945), (Beijing, Central Translation Bureau Press, 1997), pp 25-6, pp 28-9.

54

conclusion of this pact kindled the flames of the anti-Japanese movement among Chinese

students.

Faced with the complicated situation in China, the new-born Soviet Russian regime

adopted a multi-pronged policy towards China. On the one hand, it acted in a conciliatory

way towards the officially-recognised Beijing Government, in order to seek "good-

neighbour relations" with China and to break through the "blockade in the East and thwart

the wishes of Japan and other rapacious Entente powers". 106 On the other hand, the

Bolsheviks encouraged the Chinese people's anti-imperialist feelings and promoted a

national liberation movement and even a revolutionary movement in order to overthrow the

pro-Japanese Beijing Government.

No sooner had the Soviet Government declared its "honest, popular, truly democratic

foreign policy" 107 than a new Soviet-Chinese diplomacy unfolded. The first gesture was to

seek formal recognition of the Soviet regime from the Beijing Government. On 18 January

1918, Narkomindel sent a formal note to Liu Jingren, the Chinese Minister in Petrograd,

informing the Chinese Legation that the Soviet Government recognised neither the ex-

Tsarist and later the Russian Provisional Government's diplomatic mission in Beijing,

headed by Prince Kudashev, nor the Tsarist General Horvath as head of the CER

Administration. In place of these Tsarist officials, A. N. Voznesensky, chief of the East

Department of the Commissariat, was appointed Soviet representative to China. 108 Several

days later, Voznesensky and the deputy commissar of Narkomindel, Polivanof, had a talk

with Li Shizhong, the second secretary of the Chinese Legation. Saying "the Soviet

106 V. Vilensky, 'China and Soviet Russia', Izvestiia (News), Moscow, 9 October, 1920.

107 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Poli , Vol 1, p 8. 108 Voznesensky had been deputy consul in Shanghai before 1915 and thus knew

China well. This experience might help to gain him the post, despite the fact that he was a member of the Left-Socialist Revolutionary Party.

55

Government was willing to help the Chinese people" and "China's sovereign rights should

return to the Chinese", they promised that Soviet Russia would abandon extraterritoriality

in China and return the Russian concessions to China. Accordingly, Voznesensky sought

permission to go to China. Several discussions were held afterwards, but without result. 109

Relations between Soviet Russia and China were strained, mainly because the

Beijing Government, acting in concert with the Entente, refused to recognise the Soviet

regime, and even withdrew its legation from Petrograd toward the end of February 1918.

As a result, Voznesensky was unable to proceed to Beijing. In April 1918, Narkomindel

appointed several consuls in the Chinese borderlands, such as Ili, Tacheng and Kulun, but

the Chinese authorities also refused to admit them. ' 10

Nevertheless, some semi-official and informal communications between China and

Soviet Russia still remained. Through the Chinese consulates which continued to operate

on Russian territory and the Chinese local institutions along the Sino-Russian border the

Bolsheviks made contacts with the Chinese authorities. For example, Y. D. Yanson, a

representative of Narkomindel in Irkutsk, and S. G. Lazo, head of the Bolshevik troops in

Trans-Baikal, had meetings with the Chinese authorities on the Manchurian frontier in

1918.111 On the border of Central Asia, similar contacts between the Tashkent Soviet on

the one hand, and the Chinese local authorities and the Xinjiang Governor Yang Zengxin

on the other, were underway from 1918 and Soviet trade agencies and even political

109 The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, (ed. ), Zhong-E quanxi shiliao (Archival Materials on Sino-Russian Relations), [henceforth ZEGXSL, (Taibei: Jinghua Press, 1959-70), Vol 1, pp 244-45; Xue Xian-tian, et al. (eds. ), Zhong-Su

-quo'ia quanxishi ziliao huibian, 1917-1924 (Selected Materials on the History of Sino-Soviet State Relations), [henceforth ZSG G SZHI (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1993), p 29.

"0 Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds), ZSGGZH, p 131. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 485; see also FO 228/2757.

56

agencies were pennitted to be set up at several cities in Xinjiang. 112 It is not true, as

Professor Xiang Qing has suggested, that there were no relations whatsoever between

China and Soviet Russia before the spring of 1920.1 13

While trying to build good relations with the Chinese authorities, the Soviet

Government began its campaign to win the Chinese people's sympathy and support for the

Soviet Russia and to direct Chinese public opinion against the Beijing Government. On 22

February 1918, Narkomindel issued to various local Soviets in Siberia a set of instructions

governing policy towards China and Japan. One instruction emphasised that they were

"laying the first stone in the creation of completely new relations with the peoples of the

East. ... If the Chinese people want to repulse the Japanese-European capitalists and to

fight against tyranny and injustice, they must rally more closely with the Russian people

since the Russians are the oppressed nations' best friends. "114 In July 1918, the newly

appointed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, in his report to the

Fifth Soviet Congress formally announced Soviet policy towards China. He proclaimed

that the Soviet Government intended to renounce the conquests of the Tsarist Government

in Manchuria and to restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory. Chicherin

expressed the Soviet Government's willingness to negotiate with the Beijing Government,

and did not disguise the fact that he had greater faith in the Guangzhou Government.

112 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918-20, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp 158-160; Guo Ting-yi, Zhonghua minquo shishi rizhi (Daily Chronicle of Events in the Republic of China), (Taibei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1979), p 501; FO 405/233, No 222.

113 Xiang Qing: 'An Exploratory Study on the Comintern Relations with the Chinese Revolution', Danqshi vaniiu ziliao, 1981, No 3.

114 Quoted from R. Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (Moscow, 1978), Vol 1, pp 147-9.

57

A few weeks after his report, Chicherin wrote a warm letter in reply to Sun Yatsen,

whom he had met in London several years previously. In this letter, he appealed to "the

friends, the proletariat of South China" for help against the capitalist powers' attempts to

"strangle the Russian revolution", saying:

Our success is your success. Our ruin is your ruin. ... Let us close the ranks in

the great fight for the common interests of the world proletariat.

Meanwhile, he condemned the Beijing Government as "the creature of foreign bankers". 115

In December 1918, a circular by the deputy commissar of Foreign Affairs, L. Karakhan, to

all Soviet deputies cautioned that Chinese democrats should not be treated like members of

the "bourgeois class", for the "Soviet government is doing everything possible to attract

Asian democrats to the common struggle against imperialism. " 116 Both Chicherin and

Karakhan's statements demonstrate that the Bolsheviks regarded Sun Yatsen's Party and

Government as progressive, and proposed a United Front policy to ally with them as early

as 1918.

Soviet Russia's China policy was subordinated to the Bolsheviks' strategy in the Far

East. From the summer of 1918 to the beginning of 1920, war in Siberia was the main

threat to the Soviet regime. The foreign intervention in Siberia began with a Japanese

detachment landing at Vladivostok on 5 April 1918, later joined by American, British,

French and other troops. The Beijing Government also dispatched troops to join the Allied

armed intervention in Siberia in August 1918. Among the various powers involved in this

military intervention, Japan was unique in its ambition to conquer territory from Russia,

and its troops' behaviour was brutal in the extreme. Trotsky commented:

115 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Poli , Vol 1, pp 92-3. 116 Quoted from B. A. Elleman, 'Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China',

Modern China, (1995), No 4, p 453. 58

I, of course, object to both armies [of Gennany and Japan], but if there is no

alternative, I say, better the German army than the Japanese ... if Japan sends an

armed force she will not withdraw it. 117

With the support of Japan, the White Cossack General, A. Semenov led his men on

several incursions into Soviet territory from Manchuria and cut the Bolsheviks'

communication lines. Kolchak, who had been a former Admiral in the Tsarist Navy, and

was supported mainly by Britain and America, assumed the position of the "Supreme

Ruler" of Russia in Omsk on 18 November 1918. Before establishing himself in Siberia,

he had consulted with the foreign missions and ex-Tsarist officials in Beijing and Harbin in

the spring of 1918. About this time, two anti-Bolshevik organisations - the Far Eastern

Committee for the Defence of the Fatherland and the Constituent Assembly - were created

on Chinese soil. ' 18 In addition, the CER was used as a vital line of transport by the Allied

troops. Under these circumstances, the Bolshevik leaders did not want to see China under

the domination of the Entente countries in general and Japan in particular. A change in

China's situation was especially desirable to them.

The opportunity soon arose. Many Chinese initially welcomed the Entente's triumph

in the Great War, but news from the Versailles Peace Conference soon indicated that the

Powers had resolved to transfer all of Germany's interests in Shandong to Japan. This gave

rise to furious protests. In Beijing a students' demonstration on 4 May 1919 marked the

beginning of an upsurge of anti-Japanese and anti-Beijing Government movements

throughout China.

117 L. Fischer, Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreian Relations, 1917- 1941, (New York, 1969), p 20.

Footman, Civil War in Russia, (London, 1961), pp 214-5. 59

The Soviet leaders took advantage of this situation and launched a vigorous

propaganda campaign towards China. In July 1919, the Soviet Government issued the

"Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Northern and Southern China",

which is usually called "the First Karakhan Manifesto" since it was signed by Karakhan. It

was actually a public declaration addressed to all the people of China, rather than a formal

diplomatic note. It reiterated the principles which Voznesensky and Chicherin had earlier

declared. In addition, some new offers were made, the most important being:

The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without any compensation

of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining concessions, forestry,

and gold mines

The main aim of renouncing the CER was given as follows:

Anticipating the return to the Chinese people of the Manchurian Railway, Japan

and its allies seized it themselves, invaded Siberia, and even forced Chinese

troops to help them in this criminal and unparalleled robbery.

Therefore "the return to the Chinese people of what was taken from them requires first of

all putting an end to the robber invasion of Manchuria and Siberia. " The clear implication

here was that the main obstacle to returning the CER to China was the occupation of

Siberia by Allied troops, especially the Japanese, and, moreover, the fault was imputed to

lie with the Beijing Government, because it continued both to join the armed intervention

and "to refuse to have any relations with the Russian Workers'and Peasants' Government. "

The promise to return the CER served to attract Chinese public opinion to favour Soviet

Russia and stimulate anti-imperialist and anti-Beijing Government feelings.

The Karakhan Manifesto also stressed that the Red Army, which was marching

across the Urals to the East, would bring "liberation" and "help" to the Chinese people, and

the Soviet Government would let the people living in Manchuria and other areas which had 60

been conquered by Tsarist Russia "decide within the frontiers of which state they wish to

dwell, and what form of government they wish to establish in their own countries. "' 19 This

passage hinted that Soviet Russia expected to see the Soviet Russia's sovereignty extend to

Manchuria and a change of government in China.

Vilensky-Sibiriakov, who had drafted the Karakhan Manifesto, wrote in a pamphlet

published in 1919:

The creation of Soviet Russiaýs alliance with revolutionary China is one of our

foremost tasks, for the attainment of which we should apply all the energy and

resources at our disposa - 120

Here the prerequisite for such an alliance was the creation of a "revolutionary China". To

achieve this aim, the Bolsheviks tried to utilise every opportunity, every means and every

channel.

The large numbers of Chinese labourers in Russia 121 were considered suitable for

spreading revolution into China. In December 1918, the All-Russian Union of Chinese

Workers was set up in Petrograd; simultaneously, the first Chinese branch of the RCP(B)

was formed from members of the Union. At an international meeting held in Petrograd in

December 1918, a representative of North China declared:

"9 Quoted from Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds. ), ZSGGZH, pp 58-60; A. S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China. 1917-1924, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp 269- 271.

120 Vilensky, Kitai I Sovetskaia Rossia (China and Soviet Russia), (Moscow, 1919), p 14; Quoted from Leong, Sino-Soviet Diolomatic Relations, p 133.

121 During World War 1, there were about 1/2 million Chinese labours working in Russia. Cf. Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Communist Organisations of the Chinese in Russia and Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Jindaishi yaniiu, (Studies in Modern History), (1989), No 5, p 151.1 should state here that, since I have referred to many books and journals in languages other than English, I always give both their original and English names when they are cited for the first time, and then, only the original names in the phonetic alphabet. For readers' convenience, all titles of articles published in journals in other languages are translated into English from the beginning.

61

The Chinese workers would strive together with the Soviet Russia for a

universal revolution, for Soviet power against all exploiters. 122

The leaders of the Union, Liu Shaozhou, Zhang Yongkui and An Enxue, were received by

Lenin and were invited to attend the first two Congresses of the Comintern. Under the

auspices of the RCP(B) and the Soviet Government, the Union and Party organisations of

the Chinese workers undertook extensive propaganda, educational and organisational work

among Chinese labourers in Russia. Numerous Chinese workers and soldiers were trained

in special schools for propaganda and military work. From 1919, many Chinese who had

joined the Bolshevik Party and the Red Army in Russia were sent back along with the

homeward bound Chinese labourers. Although the Japanese, British and U. S.

Governments tried hard to prevent revolutionary-minded Chinese from returning to China,

a large number of the Chinese labourers still managed to arrive in China by various means.

Some of them were engaged in inciting anti-Japanese struggle and anti-Beijing revolt in the

border areas and in the interior of China; 123 some even tried to set up soviets in their home

towns. 124

122 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, Vol 1, p 445. 123 Telegram from Bao Guiqing, 27 January 1919, in the Archives of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs, Quoted from Peng Ming (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandaishi ziliao xuanil (Selected Materials on Modern Chinese History), (Beijing: China People's University Press, 1988), Vol 1, p 613. Note from the Russian Legation to the Chinese Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1919, ZEGXSL, Vol 2, p 22. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 102. Directive No 571 of the Chinese Representation Bureau of the Harbin Railway, in Archives of the Heilongjiang Province's Record Bureau, Quoted from Zhonqquo shixue lunwen huibian (Collection of the Theses on Chinese History), 1979, p 644.

124 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. As early as November 1918, Stalin in an article remarked: "The oppressed colonies and semi-colonies, looking with hope at Russia [are] already organising their own soviets of deputies (India and China)l" [Quoted from Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24, p 107]. But nobody knows which soviets Stalin referred to.

62

Besides these Chinese militants, many Russians, Muslims from Russian Central Asia

and ex-POWs were dispatched to China as agents and agitators. I shall deal with them in

the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that they all shared the same objective of creating a

revolutionary China.

At the beginning of 1920, the triumph of the Red Army over Kolchak's forces turned

the balance in favour of the Bolsheviks in Siberia. But, in view of the strength of the

Japanese occupation troops, who were reinforced after the other Allied powers withdrew

their troops from Siberia, Soviet Russia could not move regular Red Army detachments

beyond Lake Baikal. In February 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP(B) decided that

a clash with Japan should be avoided. 125

A. M. Krasnoshchekov, a prominent Bolshevik leader in Siberia, proposed a plan to

create a buffer state in Siberia and this was approved by Unin and Trotsky. In April 1920,

the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia was founded at Verkhne Udinsk. Later its capital was

moved to Chita. The resulting Government was ruled by a coalition of Bolsheviks and

non-Bolsheviks and purported to be a bourgeois-democratic state. Ostensibly the Far

Eastern Republic existed as a separate entity from the Soviet Russian Republic, but in fact

it was dominated by the government of Soviet Russia and directed by the Central

Committee of the RCP(B). Soviet Russia not only made use of the Far Eastern Republic as

a buffer to avoid a direct military confrontation with Japan, but also used it as an

intermediary to make contact with the Chinese Government and the Chinese people.

In June 1920, the Republic dispatched a delegation to China, headed by M. I. Yurin.

M. Kasanin, the secretary to Yurin, later revealed the Yurin Mission's tasks as follows:

125 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI on the Work among the People in the Eastern Asia, I September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39.

63

Our initial purpose was to establish relations with China, secure recognition and

conclude an agreement. But this was not all: we had been entrusted with the task

of entering into contact with all the forces that could prove efficacious in

averting war with Japan. 126

Owing mainly to the efforts of the Yurin mission, the Beijing Government issued a

mandate on 28 September 1920 to cancel the recognition of all Tsarist representatives in

China. The way to Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations was thus opened. A semi-official

Chinese delegation, headed by General Zhang Si-lin, arrived in Moscow in September and

was given a warm welcome by Lenin and other Soviet leaders. The Zhang mission brought

back to Beijing a Narkomindel note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry which was issued by

Karakhan on 27 September 1920. Since its content was similar to Soviet Russia's first

declaration, it was therefore called the Second Karakhan Manifesto.

Later, other Soviet representatives arrived in China, including Joffe, who had been

described by Lenin as "one of our first and best diplomats" 127 , and Karakhan, who was

vice-Commissar of Narkomindel in charge of eastern affairs. In their negotiations with the

Beijing Government, these Soviet diplomats, following Moscow's orders, not only broke

their early promise to return the CER to China, 128 but also refused to withdraw the Red

Army from Outer Mongolia. On these issues, Soviet Russia virtually continued the

126 Marc Kasanin, China in the Twenties, translated to English by Hilda Kasanina, (Moscow, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 1973), p 57.

127 L. Fischer, The Life of Lenin, (London, 1965), p 532. 128 Following to the decision of the RCP(B) Politburo's meeting on 31 August 1922,

Stalin sent a telegram to Joffe, to the effect that the Party's Central Committee maintained that, in negotiations with China, it could not be permitted to draw instructions directly from the 1919 and 1920's Manifestos; On the issue of the CER, some terms must be stipulated to guarantee our privileges. (GLZDC, Vol 1, p 115); So on 5 November 1922, Joffe announced that Russia was no longer bound by its previous, generous, declarations of 1919 and 1920. [Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China. The Role of Sneevliet, (henceforth abbreviated to OFUFQ , Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991, Vol 1, p 128)

64

imperialist policy of territorial expansion and interference with China! s sovereign rights,

which it had inherited from Tsarist Russia. During 1922-25, some Chinese intellectuals

came to believe that Soviet Russia had become "Red Imperialist" because of its reckless

pursuit of self-interest at the expense of a helpless China, and because of its harmful

Communist propaganda. 129 Even Joffe and the Comintern representative Sneevliet advised

the Soviet Government not to "do anything ourselves that can appear as a disguised

imperialist policy" and to "give the slightest impression of similarity with the policy of the

imperialist states". 130

While dealing with the Beijing government, Soviet Russia! s representatives were

simultaneously engaged in revolutionary work to undermine the same government. Guided

by the Bolsheviks' policy and strategy towards China, these Soviet diplomats joined hands

with covert Comintem agents and made strenuous efforts to bring China into the orbit of

Soviet Russia by both legal and illegal methods.

In view of the fact that China was a backward agricultural country and that it was

impossible to start a proletarian revolution straightaway, the Bolsheviks' immediate tasks

were to promote a national liberation movement and to foster any forces which might lead

to the formation of a pro-Soviet government. Besides pursuing an alliance with Sun

Yatsen's nationalists, the Bolshevik agents also tried to get in touch with prominent people

who had political influence or military strength in China.

129 See Zhang Jin (comp. ), Lian E vu chou E wenti taolunii (The Debate of Friendship or Enmity towards Russia), Beijing, 1927. Quoted from Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, pp 296-98.

"I"' Concerning Our Work in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countres in General and in China in Particular, Theses of Joffe and Maring, (end 1922), Sneevliet Archive, No 294, cited from Saich, OFUFC, p 370; H. R. Isaacs, 'Talks with H. Sneevliet, 19 August 1935', China Quarterly, (1971), No 45.

65

Of course, the Bolsheviks' final goal was the eventual establishment of a Communist

China which would become a member of the world-wide Union of Soviet Republics.

Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for them to initiate and foster a Communist party in

China as a main tool to achieve this object. The Chinese Communists in turn could also

serve Soviet Russia! s interests by increasing Soviet Russia's influence and promoting Sino-

Soviet diplomatic relations. 131

*****

The establishment of the CCP was not an accidental event which could be isolated

from this international background. As this chapter has made clear, after the October

Revolution, the Bolsheviks developed a global strategy and spared no effort to create the

world socialist revolution. In order to exert a unified international leadership of the

Communist movement, the Communist International was founded under the control of the

Bolsheviks. The Comintern first focused its attention on establishing Communist parties in

Western countries and directing the proletariat movement there. However, the world

revolution did not come as the Bolsheviks had expected.

To unleash an anti-imperialist struggle in the East became more vital to the

Bolsheviks after the failure of revolution in Europe. Soviet Russia and the Comintern

131 For example, after the first Karakhan Manifesto was sent to Beijing, a campaign urging the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia was launched in China, and lasted several years. It has been said that "Ui Dazhao was one of the initiators and most active participants in that campaign. 0 [Xu Wanmin, 'Li Dazhao on Sino-Soviet Relations', Far Eastern Affairs, (1990), No 1, p 109]; During the Sino-Soviet negotiations in 1923, U Dazhao persuaded Gu Weijun, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to approve the draft agreement with Karakhan by saying that "the draft agreement was the best one in China's diplomatic history"; in regard to the Outer Mongolia issue, which was a major obstacle to agreement, U argued that "even if Outer Mongolia were dominated and ruled by Soviet Russia, the people there could live a better life. u rGu Weiiun huivilu, (Gu Weijun's Reminiscences), (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1985), Vol 1. p 340.

66

began to pay more attention to supporting national liberation movements in the colonial

and semi-colonial countries and to establishing close ties with Eastern peoples, trying to

cripple imperialist powers in their backyard and to expand their own force and influence.

In line with this shift in orientation, they started to establish Communist parties in Eastern

countries. Establishing a Communist party in China was only one of the Comintem's

efforts to expand Communist forces into the East.

In addition to this, some particular circumstances, such as geopolitical factors should

also be taken into account. As China held a special strategic position, Soviet Russia

adopted rather complex policies towards China. Their aims were to resume diplomatic

relations with the Beijing Government as a way extricating themselves from the isolation

and encirclement by imperialist powers; to forrn an alliance with the Chinese Nationalists

headed by Sun Yatsen for the common struggle against imperialism; and to establish the

Communist party in order to kindle the Communist movement in this neighbouring

country.

With the lapse of time, China became more and more important in the eyes of the

Bolsheviks. In a telegram to Stalin dated 30 August 1922, Joffe pointed out:

This place [China] will be to our advantage, ... China, beyond doubt, is a focus

of international conflicts and the place where international imperialism is

weakest. I believe that, when imperialism is undergoing a crisis in Europe and a

revolution is coming there, to strike blows against imperialism in the place

where it is weakest will be of significance. 132

In their endeavours to export revolution abroad, Soviet Russia and the Comintern's

intervention in China was on a larger scale than it had been in any other colonial or semi-

132 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 112. 67

colonial country. The greatest success they won in Asia was the appearance of a

Communist China.

68

CHAPTERTWO

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE COMINTERN'S AGENTS IN CHINA,

1918-20

It is widely acknowledged that the Bolshevik Revolution had a significant

influence on the Chinese Communist movement. But it is more problematic to

discover when it was that Soviet Russia and the Comintern began to exert direct

influence by sending their agents into China.

The prevailing view amongst historians is that there were no direct relations or

regular contacts between the Bolsheviks and the Chinese revolutionaries until the

spring of 1920. Xiang Qing, an authoritative Chinese scholar of Sino-Soviet relations,

asserts:

After the Russian October Revolution, the transport connections between

China and Russia were cut entirely. Meanwhile the relationship of the two

countries was disrupted, making it impossible for revolutionaries of the

two countries to communicate.

He insists that "the spring of 1920 when G. Voitinsky visited China was the starting

point for the relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese revolution"! This

viewpoint is shared by many experts on the history of the Chinese Communist Party,

both in China and abroad. A. Dirlik concurs with Xiang's assessment of early Sino-

Soviet relations:

Xiang Oing, Gonqchancluoii vu Zhonqciuoqemin i, p 81. -q

Guanxi Lunwenil 69

As long as the Russo-Chinese border remained closed, neither the October

Revolution nor the Comintern had any appreciable influence on Chinese

radicals. This situation changed drastically with Voitinsky's arrival. 2

J. Guillennaz goes so far as to state that "1920 saw the appearance of the first Soviet

envoys or Comintern agents in China. 0 Many other works on the CCP and the

Comintern regard Voitinsky as the first Bolshevik emissary to China.

It seems that there is a missing link in the history of Sino-Soviet relations from

the time of the October Revolution to the Spring of 1920.1 have already made a

general survey of Soviet RussiSs and the Comintern's global strategy and policies

towards the East, and outlined the Bolsheviks' activities in many countries, both in the

West and the East, during that time. It is hard to believe that the Bolsheviks should

have made an exception of China and left it alone. It is true that the Sino-Russian

border was partly blockaded between 1918 and 1920, as a result of foreign armed

intervention, the White Guards' revolt and the operations of Chinese troops, but such a

long border could not have been blockaded entirely and continuously, and thus

communications between China and Soviet Russia could not have been completely

severed.

Section 1. Emissaries Dispatched during 1918-1919

2 A. Didik, The Oriclins of Chinese Communism, p 192. 3 J. Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949, (London:

Methuen & Company, 1972), p 39. 70

In January 1918, the Chinese Government issued a circular to the officials on

the frontier with Russia, warning them that the Bolsheviks were dispatching agents to

China, and asking them to take precautionS. 4 This circular might be interpreted as

reflecting nothing more than Beijing's imaginary worries, since it offered no evidence.

But from the following month, there were signs indicating that Soviet Russia was

indeed dispatching agents to China. In a telegram dated 16 February 1918 to the

British Minister in Beijing, the Military Attach6 of the British Consulate in Harbin,

Captain Denny, reported that, according to General Semenov's information, three

representatives from the Soviet Government, who were travelling to Tokyo and

5 Beijing, had been caught at Manzhouli Station. In March, a Bolshevik delegation

consisting of seven men headed by S. Lazo, arrived in Manzhouli to negotiate with the

Chinese authorities. Lazo was the military chief of the Harbin Soviet, which was

established after the October Revolution, and he was later appointed to command

Bolshevik troops in the Transbaikal and Maritime areas. 6

In April, other reports recorded that a Bolshevik emissary named Verestchak

had been an-ested by the Russian authorities at Harbin. This man was believed to be

associated with Makaroff, who was said to have been sent by the Soviet Govemment

to China on investigation and propaganda assignments. 7 Makaroff arrived in Shanghai

on 5 May 1918 and carried with him a letter written by the head of the Eastem

Department of the Narkomindel, Voznesensky, to the head of the Soviet at

Vladivostok, Sukhjamov. Although Makaroff was not a Bolshevik, he was sent to

4 ZEGXSL, 22 January 1918, No 35. 5 FO 228/2755, Telegram No 43. 6'Disorder in Harbin and the CER', Zhonavan- YanoiuVuan jindaishi Yaniiusuo Jikan

(Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), Taibei, No 9; FO 228/2757,10 March 1918; Who Was Who in the USSR, (New Jersey, 1972), p 340.

7'FO 228/3214, No 206,25 April 1918; FO 405/228, No 157. 71

China as an emissary because he had lived in China at an earlier period. It seems,

however, that Makaroff only intended to resume his work at the Shanghai branch of

the Russo-Asiatic Bank where he had been employed before World War 1, and that he

was evidently reluctant to fulfil the task assigned to him by the Bolsheviks. Instead of

delivering Voznesensky's letter to Sukhjamov, he handed it over to the Russian

Consul-General in Shanghai. The content of this letter revealed that, since

Voznesensky himself could not proceed to China, Popov and Podvoisky were to be

sent to discover what was happening in Shanghai and Beijing. 8

Among the first batch of Bolshevik agents, M. Popov was conspicuously

active and successful. Accounts of Popov have appeared in some early books on the

Chinese revolution. For example, H. 0. Chapman, in his book The Chinese

Revolution wrote:

In 1919 M. Popov arrived in Shanghai, having been sent out from Russia

for the definite purpose of exploring the situation and its possibilities, and

reporting to headquarters. After a few months' investigation he returned,

and in 1920 agents from Russia thoroughly organised the Communist

Party of China. 9

T'llis book considered that Popov's activities had a certain bearing on the forming of

the CCP. Afterwards similar accounts were given in books published in the 1930s. 10

8 FO 22at3214,16 May 1918. Popovs name is sometimes written as "Popoff". Since many of the Russian names referred to in this thesis were found in non-Russian sources, it has not been possible to convert all Russian names according to one of the standard systems of transliteration.

9 H. Owen Chapman, The Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927 (London: Constable and Co., 1928), p 45. W. Levi mentioned in his work Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolies: The University of Minnesota Press, 1953, p 174) that the first prominent Soviet agent to China was Pavlov, but, unfortunately, he did not give any further details.

'0 See, for example, H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution. An Analysis of Politics and 72

However, without ftirther corroborative evidence, the story was told less and less with

the passing of the time. The most recent works on the CCP hardly mention Popov at

all. By way of exception, C. A Wilbur and J. Y. How in their monograph on the

missionaries of Soviet Russia in China make passing reference to Popov, but only in a

footnote. " In another book, Wilbur cites Sokolsky's "Reminiscences" that Popov

came to Shanghai in May or June 1919, at the time of the student strike, under an

assumed name. 12

In the archives kept in the British Public Record Office, there are plenty of

detailed records on Popov. According to these dossiers, Michael Popov had studied

Japanese and Chinese in Petrograd before he became a colonel attached to the General

Staff of Soviet Russia, 13 and later he was appointed inspector of Bolshevik propaganda

in the Far East. Popov's first visit to China was reportedly made in May 1918, when

he stayed in Shanghai for several days and then left for Harbin. 14 One cannot be sure

whether Podvoisky came to China with Popov, but later a Russian named Pudhorosky

or Podgursky appeared in Shanghai and was engaged in Bolshevik activities. 15

In August 1918, another Bolshevik agent, Joseph Malkin, who was said to

have worked on a newspaper in Petrograd, reached Shanghai by the S. S. Simbirsk. As

this man was suspected of being engaged in espionage, the local police requested the

Militarism under the Republi ; Fang FuEan, Chinese Labour, (Shanghai, 1931); Lowe ChuanZhua, Facing Labour Issues in China, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1934).

" C. M. Wilbur and J. Y. How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China. 1920-1927, (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), p 64, note 16.

12 USIDS 761,93/142, quoted from C. M. Wilbur, Sun Yatsen: Frustrated Patriot, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p 326.

13 The All-Russia Supreme Staff was founded in May 1918; The General Staff was not named until 1935; cf., J. Erickson, Soviet High Command, (London, 1962), p 34.

'4 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918; FO 228/3211, April 1921; FO 405/233, September 1921.

15 FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 405/233, September 1921. 73

Russian Consulate to take him into custody on the arrival of the steamer, and then send

him back to Vladivostok by the same vessel. 16

According to the information originated in Vladivostok, British Intelligence

reported that following the downfall of the Soviets in Siberia in the summer of 1918

numerous Bolshevik commissars fled to China with large funds, "agitating for a

Bolshevik rising and the boycotting of Japanese goods. "17 Around this time, many

Bolsheviks came to China as refugees, continuing their work for the Soviet cause.

Generally speaking, it was rather difficult for the Russian Bolsheviks to reach

China, but many foreigners who had been prisoners-of-war in Russia and later began

to serve Soviet Russia were dispatched to China. On 15 April 1918, an official of the

Chinese Consulate at Irkutsk, Wu Mingrui reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry:

According to reliable information, some Bolsheviks and German and

Austrian prisoners disguising themselves as Poles, sneaked into South

Manchuria, Korea and other bordering areas and agitated on the sly in

order to cause chaos. 18

From January 1918, the British Intelligence Department in Bombay and Shanghai

began to receive the following infonnation:

Russian passports were being freely issued to Germans, many of them had

arrived at Shanghai via Vladivostok intending to disembark and, if

possible, to carry on political work. 19

'6 FO 228/3211, Series of September 1918; FO 228/3214, No 375,29 August 1918. 17 ZEGXSL, 3 July 1918, No 480; FO 228/3211, August 1919. is XSL, Vol 1, No 371, pp. 373-74. 19 -F05 -22k2l 1, April 1918, No 93. According to this report, the commandant in

Irkutsk was Ruettin, whose chief-of-staff was a German POW, Colonel Stremburg. This Ruettin was in fact E. M. Riutin who had assumed the Chairmanship of the Harbin Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in 1917 and had been expelled by the

74

There was some substance to these rumours. Some time before March 1918, an ex-

prisoner carrying the rank of Captain had been to Shanghai and then moved to Tianjin

holding a Russian passport in the name of Aromovitch. Another former POW, Janes

de Mezey, who had been a lieutenant in a Hungarian regiment, went to China from

Irkutsk in early 1918. After travelling around Harbin, Changchun, Tianjin, Shanghai

and Hong Kong, he gave himself up to the British authorities in Hong Kong and

confessed that "the prisoners at Irkutsk had a soldiers' committee, ... they drew lots of

men to go to China to agitate. I was one of these. Others were to organise troops to

help the Bolsheviks against Japan. , 20 This man's confession is supported by the

famous British journalist Thomas F. Millard, the editor of Millard's Review. Millard

also noticed that numerous released German, Austrian, Hungarian and Czech-Slovak

prisoners in Siberia, who had intended to escape repatriation and further military

service, joined the Bolsheviks and became their agents in Manchuria. 21

Early in 1919 a Hungarian Communist, A. A. M01ler, who could speak

Chinese and English, was sent by the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) to Qiqihar,

where he conducted revolutionary agitation and education work in a Chinese guerrilla

force. Later he arrived in Tianjin. 22 That winter, a Turk named Fakiruddin arrived in

China from Omsk where he had been held as a POW. He was very familiar with a

Chinese troop from Harbin. cf. SowEtheng Leong, Sino-Soviet Diolomatic Relations, 1917-1926, p 18. In October 1921, Ruettin was dispatched to China by the Far Eastern Secretariat of the ECCI. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 82.

20 FO 228/3214, No 313,4 July 1918. 21 T. F. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question (London, 1919), p 302; Millard

also remarked that there were also many agents of the Central Powers in Manchuria, who worked for their own governments to sow dissension among the Allies, and especially to play upon China's fear of Japan and Japan's jealousy of America.

2 Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 7he Communist Organisations of the Chinese in Russia and Some Issues on the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Jindaishi vanjiu, (1989), No 5, p 170; A. A. MOller, Plameni Revoliutssi, 1917-1920 (in the Flames of the Revolution, 1917-1920), (Irkutsk, 1957); Quoted from Far Eastern Aff2ýirs, (Moscow, 1988), No 5, p 105.

75

conference held a short time previously in a place near Ufa which had been attended

by representatives of most of the Asiatic races. 23 Fakiruddin visited a group of Turks

who were staying in Shanghai from 1919 to 1920. These Turks aroused the suspicion

of the local police because they advocated Pan-Islamic and anti-British movement and

had connections with Turks co-operating with Bolsheviks in Central Asia. Many

papers in Chinese were found in their rooms. 24 In December 1919, a report from

Tashkent indicated that eight Germans who had intimate knowledge of oriental affairs

and knew different oriental languages had recently been dispatched from Moscow to

China. They travelled incognito as pilgrims or tramps. 25 It was also reported that in

early 1920 the civil governor of Sichuan tried to use some German engineers as

inten-nediaries with the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia. 26

Those former European POWs might have been dispatched by the Federation

of Foreign Groups of the RCP(B), and the Turkish POWs were probably sent by the

Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of Eastern Peoples of the RCP(B).

The foundation of the Comintern in March 1919 served to accelerate the pace

at which agents were dispatched to various countries including China. It was reported

that the Lenin Government in Moscow sent some important figures to Shanghai in that

year. 27 Later in March, the Second Siberian Conference of the RCP(B) was secretly

held in Omsk. It decided to organise a bureau of infori-nation and propaganda with the

aim of contacting the communists of Asia and America to exchange information with

23 The conference he attended might have been the 2nd Congress of the Communist Or

2ýanizations of the Peoples of the East.

FO 228/3214,19 June 1919,4 March 1920; FO 228/3211, Series of December 1919, Series of February 1920.

25 FO 228/3211, Series of December 1919. 26 FO 405/228, No 157. 27 Yang Zengxin's Telegram to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, ZEGXSL. Xinuiang

Frontier Defence, p 300. 76

them and to conduct all kinds of agitation. 28 Afterwards, the foreign diplomatic

missions in Beijing obtained information that a Bolshevik conference was to be

convened in Shanghai at the end of March, and one of the subjects for discussion

would be to incite revolutionary movements in China, Japan and America. They also

heard that the Bolshevik delegates to this conference were on their way, travelling in

groups of four. 29 Whether this conference was held in Shanghai or not is still

uncertain. However, according to a reliable report, a group of four Russians - Tolstof,

Semesheko, Khodorov, and Massing arrived in Shanghai from Siberia in April 1919,30

and each of them bore a special responsibility in China: Colonel Tolstoff was said to

be Soviet Russia! s military representative in Shanghai and to live with Wilde, the

Comintern's liaison man in Shanghai; in 1923 he was consulted by Joffe and received

a large sum of money from him; 31 Massing was an ardent Bolshevik engaged in

educational work in Shanghai, and this person might be identified with a representative

of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia to Beijing in 1921, whose name was transcribed

as Clossing; 32 Semesheko and Khodorov were prominent propagandists in China, both

of whom will be discussed later.

When the outbreak of the May 4th Movement was brought to the Bolsheviks'

attention, the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) sent N. Burtman to Tianjin to find out

28 M. A. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement, 1918-July 1920', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 86.

29 The Dispatch to Shanghai Hujunshl and Tepaiyuan, 21 March 1919, and Telegraph from Shanghai Hujunshi, 1 April 1919, ZEGXSL, 1917-1919, No 190,234; FO 228/3214,27 April 1919.

30 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 31 Cf. The daily reports of 24 and 25 January 1923 of Shanghai Public Settlement

Municipal Council Police Report, which kept in the Shanghai Archives; Quoted from Dangshi vanmiu ziliao (Materials for the Study of the Party History), (Beijing), Vol 5.

32 The Conversation between the Chinese Foreign Minister Yan and Cblossing [Clossing] and Gorodetyski, 20 December 1920, ZEGXSL, 1921, No 810.

77

what was happening in the Movement and to make contact with the Chinese. Burtman

was also described as a Russian refugee who had escaped from Vladivostok when it

was occupied by Kolchak's troops. 33 In any event, the two versions are not

contradictory. Perhaps Burtman was dispatched to Tianjin after he had escaped to

Harbin. Even if Burtman came to China as an emigr6, one cannot rule out the

possibility that he was assigned certain duties in China. Information from Russia

indicated that the Red Army sent many partisans to infiltrate the eastward flow of

Russian refugees. 34 Having grown up in Harbin, Burtman was familiar with Chinese,

and was therefore a suitable person for the task in hand. It was this man who later

became the Chairman of the Presidium of the Section of the Eastern Peoples under the

Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee, and the Executive manager of the

Council of Ministers of the Far Eastern Republic after his return to Siberia in early

35 1920 .

In September 1919, a Russian named D. E. Komaroff reached Shanghai by the

S. S. Dilwars. He himself claimed that he had been a military clerk of the Russian

forces in Mesopotamia. When the authorities discovered that he was connected with

the Bolsheviks, Komaroff was sent back to Vladivostok. He can probably be

identified with Kumaroff, a Bolshevik commissar in charge of propaganda work in

Afghanistan and India. 36 Two other Russian Bolsheviks who later took charge of the

33 P. Korovyakovsky and N. Rusanov, 'Zhang Tailei, A Trail-Blazer of the Chinese Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1988), No 5, p 105; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 15.

34 The official letter from the Division of Frontier Defence Affairs, dated 22 August 1919, ZEGXSL, Vol 2, No 287, p 467.

35 K. V. Shevelyov, 'On the history of the Formation of the Communist Party of China', The Far Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 128; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, plý 14-15;

6 FO 228/3214,25 September 1919; Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 244. 78

Comintern's Eastern affairs also came to China in 1919. One was K. N. Sokelov-

Strolakhov, who did underground work in China during 1919-21, and then assumed

the post of secretary of the Far Eastern Department of the ECCI. 37 Another was V. L.

Hoholovkin, who came to China as an emissary in the fall of 1919. He visited China

again in autumn 1920 as secretary of the Chinese Office of the Eastern Peoples Section

of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B). 38

In autumn 1919, an important figure from the Comintern arrived in China, a

Korean named Pak Chinsen. Pak had settled in Russia prior to World War I and had

studied at Moscow University. Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, he rallied to the

Bolshevik cause and was appointed by the Soviet leaders to be Korean Commissar at

the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Under the direction of the Bolshevik

Krepkov, Pak Chinsen helped Yi Tunghui found the Korean Socialist Party in

Khabarovsk in June 1918. After the Party's first congress, which was held in

Vladivostok in April 1919, Pak, as general secretary, went to Moscow to register his

party with the Comintem. and participated in the work of the ECCI. Lenin and other

Bolshevik leaders received Pak and other Korean representatives, and reached an

agreement that the Korean revolutionaries should use funds from the Comintern for the

liberation of Korea and the espousal of the communist cause . 39 In August 1919, Pak

Chin-sun left Moscow for the Far East with a large amount of money, arriving in

China in November. 40

37 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 64. 38 -Fenq Shuzhi xUgr-Ci (Selected Works of Peng Shuzhi), (Hong Kong: The October L

Press, 1983), Vol 1, p 43; GLZDC, Vol 1, p 54. 39 B. Lazitch and M. M. Drachkovitch (ed. ), Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern,

(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1973) p 350; R. A. Scalapino and C. S. Lee, Communism in Korea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp 7-10.

40 Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, (Princeton, N. J.: 79

The Western border of China was also a gateway for Bolshevik agents. From

January 1919, there were some reports that the Bolsheviks sent their agents to Xinjiang

(Chinese Turkestan) and the agents even set up local organisations in some towns to

start a revolutionary movement there. Later, several Bolsheviks were arrested by the

Chinese authorities. 41 In February, the Chinese authorities found that Turkish

Bolsheviks were sent to Xinjiang to preach revolution among the Muslim peoples

there. 42 In June, the Omsk Government also informed the Chinese Government that

the Bolsheviks in Turkestan were using Xinjiang and Tibet as a route to establish

communications with adjacent Asian countries. 43 Before December 1919, a Russian

Jew had stayed in Gansu for several months and had established close relations with

the local Muslim leader. 44 Most agents coming from Russian Central Asia were

probably sent by the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organisations of the RCP(B).

Some Bolsheviks did not come direct from Russian territory. For one reason

or another, they reached China via other foreign countries. Many of them came from

Japan for they could not stay in Japan any longer. In July 1918, a Russian Pole named

Fuchs arrived in Shanghai from Japan, where he had been detained for his Bolshevik

activities . 45 It is not certain if this man was the Comintern agent who worked under

the name of Fuchs in Henan and Hebei provinces between 1921 and 1922.46 One

Princeton University Press, 1967), p 11; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'angsun, Hanquk Konqsan Chuui Undonsa (The History of Korean Communist Movement), (Seoul, 1986), p 169.

41 ZEGXSL, 21 January 1919; FO 228/2986,26 April 1920; FO 228/3216,15 November 1920.

42 Shen bao (Shanghai Paper), 8 May 1919. 43 note from the Foreign Ministry of Omsk Government to the Chinese General

Consulate in Omsk, 18 June 1919; ZEGXSL, 1917-1919, No 525. 44 FO 228/2986,26 April 1920. 4 '5 FO 228/3214,11 July 1918. 46 FO 228/3140, p 118.

80

month later, J. E. Tobinson and his wife reached China having been expelled from

Yokohama for "spreading Bolshevik ideas". The Japanese Home Office stated that

Tobinson was the younger brother of one of the Bolshevik leaders. 47 This suggests

that his elder brother might have been the famous Bolshevik leader in Siberia A. M.

Krasnoschekov, who sometimes used the assumed name Stroller Tobinson in America

and Siberia. 48 Immediately on arrival in Shanghai J. E. Tobinson contacted Massing,

a friend of Semesheko, Khodorov and Tolstoff. For this reason, the British

Intelligence in Shanghai considered that Tobinson was probably one of that group. 49 It

could also be conjectured that this group of Russians had connections with the

Bolshevik leaders in Siberia, including Krasnoschekov himself. There was a

prominent figure from Japan - A. S. Potapov. This man was an ex-Major General in

the Tsarist Army who, while serving his term of military service, went to several Far

Eastern countries. During the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, he openly

defected to the Soviet side and became the first high-ranking military officer to raise

the red flag among the Guard Regiments. His past career made it dangerous for him to

remain in Russia, and he therefore went abroad to work for the Bolshevik Regime as

an important agent. At the end of 1919, he was urged by the Japanese Authorities to

leave Tokyo and went on to live in the French Concession of Shanghai. 50

47 FO 228/3214,21 August 1919. 48 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, pp 218- 222. 49 FO 228/3214,21 August 1919. 50 Li Yuzhen, Sun Zhonqshan vu Gonqchanquogi (Sun Yatsen and the Comintern),

Taibei: the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996, p 56; FO 228/3211, Series of May 1920; FO 228/3214,18 March 1920; 8 April 1920; FO 405/228, p 232. It is still not sure if this Potapov can be identified with N. M. Potapov, who was also a former general, and after the February Revolution, who became the President of the Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, ahd who later worked for Soviet Russia as a agent abroad. Cf. A. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, (Princeton, 1980), p 233; R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (ed. ), The Russian Provisional Government, 1917, (Stanford, 1961), p 848; D. V. Lehovich, White

81

Some other Russians arrived in China after they had been involved in

revolutionary movements in America, Australia, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and so on.

For example, Samuel Ran, a Russian Jew who had been naturalised in America,

reached China from Saigon on 10 January 1919. He spent much time on the

dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda and the expression of violent anti-British

views. He held that the principles of Bolshevism would ultimately conquer the

51 world.

China, reduced to semi-colonial status by various foreign powers, had many

free ports and foreign concessions in her territory. In addition, foreigners living on

Chinese soil enjoyed extraterritorial rights, so the Chinese authorities had very little

control over them. This made it very easy for foreigners to enter and settle in the

country, especially in port cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Harbin, Hankou, Qingdao

and Guangzhou. That is why many Russian Bolsheviks who had been deported from

other countries could remain in China.

News on the Bolsheviks' dispatches and activities in China by the year of 1919

can be seen in many contemporary newspapers and periodicals, both within China and

abroad. For example, an editorial of the Japanese Daily News (Nichi Nichi Shimbun)

wrote that Russian Bolsheviks were sending partisans to China who were propagating

their doctrines within her borders, and so "China will become a breeding ground of

Bolshevism. , 52 Even Tan Pingshan, who joined the Communist movement the

following year, expressed his fear of the arrival of the Bolsheviks in China in an article

against Red (New York, 1973), p 429. 5' FO 228/3211, Series of March 1919. 52 Quoted from Chen bao (Beijing Morning Post), (Beijing), 17 June 1919.

82

published in Xin Chao (New Tide). 53 A Reuters' correspondent reported an interview

with a Chinese official, who admitted:

It is true that the Bolsheviks have sent agents to China, Korea and

Japan. ... They are endeavouring to create a vast oriental movement

which would throw many countries into flames. 54

These warnings were not merely rumours. According to a Japanese police

report in January 1920, by the beginning of the 1920, in Shanghai alone, there were

55 at least ten Bolsheviks. The evidence shows that Soviet Russia and the Comintern

never gave up sending agents to China even during the crisis period of between the

spring of 1918 and the end of 1919, and nothing could hinder them from attempting to

spread revolution into China, contrary to the suggestion of many historians.

Section 2. Agents Recruited in China during 1918-20

During the years immediately following the October Revolution, there was not

enough time for Bolsheviks to train agents who were familiar with China and the

Chinese language, therefore some left-wing Russian residents in China were entrusted

with the tasks of finding out about the situation in China and making contacts with

progressive Chinese elements.

r '3Tan Mingqian, 'Discussion on Democracy', An chao (The Renaissance), (Beijing, I MU 1919), Vol 1, No 5.

The Pekinq and Tientsin Times, (Tianjin), 14 January 1920. The Ministry of Culture and Education of the Republic of Korea (ed. ), Han-auk

Doknib Undonsa (The History of the Korean Independence Movement), (Seoul, 1970), Vol 3, p 400.

83 4ý

Russian residents in China included both Russians who had lived in China

before the October Revolution and those who came to China as refugees or 6migr6s

during the turmoil of revolution and the ensuing civil war. These groups were of

diverse social status and held various political beliefs. Amongst them were some

Bolsheviks, who, of course, had a strong desire to work for the Bolshevik cause.

Moreover, there were some Russian democratic socialists, anarchists and even ex-

Tsarist officials, who, despite their political convictions, were willing to help their

fatherland to vanquish the foreign armed intervention. These Russians were also

easily recruited by Soviet Russia and the Comintem though they might have had

different motives: some were attracted by the ideal of social progress or patriotism and

some were just out to earn money as a means of livelihood.

According to the Section of the Eastern Peoples of the Siberian Bureau of the

RCP(B) Central Committee's report to the ECCI, before Voitinsky's team arrived in

China, certain work had been done by several Russian residents, including Polevoy,

Ivanov, Khodorov and Agarief. 56

A. A. Ivanov was an anarchist. In his younger days, he had been arrested for

revolutionary activities before contriving to emigrate to Paris, where he learned

Chinese at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes (School of Oriental languages)

and became associated with the famous anarchist P. A. Kropotkin. When the February

Revolution of 1917 broke out, he returned to Russia and obtained a diplomatic

appointment from the Russian Provisional Government as a student interpreter in the

56 GLZIDC Vol 1, p 50; A. 1. Kartunova., 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-1922, ' Problemy Dal'neqo Vostoka (Problems of the Far East), (Moscow, 1973), No 1; Quoted from its Chinese translation by Ma Guifan in Gonqchan-Quoii yu Zhonqquo qeminq - Sulian xuezhe lunwen xuanyi (The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution - Selected Translations of the Treatises by Soviet Scholars), (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1987), p 50.

84

Russian Legation in Beijing. On 5 December 1917, Narkomindel issued a circular

telegram to all Russian diplomatic missions abroad, demanding that they immediately

answer whether they would like to carry out Soviet foreign policies; and ordering that

whoever did not intend to work for the Soviet regime should leave their posts and

transfer diplomatic business to the persons who now agreed to serve the new

government regardless of their position. 57 Ivanov was the only person at the Russian

Legation in Beijing who declared his desire to serve the Soviet regime. Thereupon, as

he told Kasanin, "He found himself promoted suddenly from the lowest place to the

highest, as the sole representative of the new revolutionary government. , 58 However,

Ivanov could not hold his post long, since ex-Tsarist diplomats threatened him with

arrest. He left the Legation and afterwards became a contributing editor to a French

magazine Journal de Pekin. From September 1919, Ivanov was employed as a lecturer

at Beijing University. All the time, he continued working for Soviet Russia and later

joined the RCP(B) and became an advisor to the Yurin Mission. 59

One of Ivanov's Russian colleagues at Beijing University, S. A. Polevoy, also

served Soviet Russia. Polevoy had been a sinologist of the Oriental Institute in

Vladivostok and one of his research subjects was Chinese periodicals published after

57 Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds. ), ZSGGZH, p 130. ý'8 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, pp 44-5. A similar case can also be seen in Persia

where a former Tsarist diplomat, Karl Bravin, was appointed in January 1918 to act as an unofficial Soviet representative in Teheran until an ardent Bolshevik was selected for this role; cf. Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 93-4.

59 These accounts on Ivanov's early experiences are mainly based on V. N. Nikiforov, Sovetskie Istoriki 0 Problemakh Kitaya (Soviet Historians on the Problem of China), henceforth abbreviated to SIOPK (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), and Kasanin, China in the Twenties. Kasanin was the interpreter and assistant representative of the Yurin mission, and he was also a close friend of Ivanov. The other references are the following: Ernestine Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (America, December 1922), Vol 22, No 12, p 1012; 'The Table of the Foreign Employees at Beijing University' in the official note to the Chinese Education Ministry from Beijing University, dated 22 September 1924.

85

19 11.60 According to Zhang Ximan, Polevoy claimed to be a sinologist researching

the ancient Chinese text, Shiiin (The Book of Songs), and he came to China for

further study of the Chinese language; later, he became a Comintern agent in charge of

the work to liaise with Chinese cultural circles. 61 Zhang Ximan had a close

relationship with Polevoy: they both graduated from the Oriental Institute in

Vladivostok and became lecturers at the Beijing Russian Language Institute and the

Russian Department of Beijing University, therefore Zhang's information about

Polevoy is very valuable. Nevertheless, most historians in mainland China have

ignored Zhang's first-hand account and denied that Polevoy was an agent of the

Comintern; they would rather believe the recollection of Bao Huiseng, who saw

Polevoy only once, and who described Polevoy as a "White Russian" who

of sympathised" with the Russian Revolution and Soviet Russia. 62 In fact, "White

Russian" refers to Russians who were against the October Revolution and the

Bolsheviks, and afterward escaped from Soviet Russia. Polevoy was born into a poor

family and left Russia before the October Revolution. 63 He was probably sent to

China by the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, since as a usual practice, the Institute

used to send students to relevant oriental countries for further language study. 64

60 Nikiforov, SIOPK, pp 37-8. 61 Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi (Historical Reminiscences), (Shanghai: Jidong Press,

1949), p 4; Here I should thank Zhang Xiaoman, the daughter of Zhang Ximan, who provided me with some material about her father. It is quite possible that Polevoy came to China for further study as Zhang said.

62 Cf. Qiwu Laoren (Bao Huiseng), 'Before and After the Formation of the CCP', Xin guancha (New Look), (Beijing, 1 July 1957).

63 Probably relying on Wu Nanru's recollection, Hua Yang in his article 'The Early Activities of Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei' [Zhon-q-qon-q vaniiu (The Studies of the CCP), (Taibei, July 1977), Vol 10, No 7] wrote that Polevoy came to China in July 1917.

64 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 135; Kasanin himself was a graduate of this Institute. M. Sladkovsky in 'The First Centre of Sinology in the Far East and Its Graduates in the 1920s' [Far Eastern Affairs, (1980) No 1] mentions that at the 25th anniversary of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, some old graduates recalled their

86

Moreover, he sympathised with the October Revolution. So in any sense, Polevoy was

definitely not a "White Russian". Perhaps Polevoy was a citizen of White Russia

(Belorussia) or he intentionally told others that he was a "White Russian" in order to

conceal his true identity. Nevertheless, a Beijing Government detective Guan Qian

and some of Polevoy's other acquaintances, such as Cao Jinghua and Mao Yiheng

claimed that Polevoy was employed by the Soviet Government. 65 According to newly

published Comintern archives, Polevoy had been a member of the RCP(B) and worked

for Soviet Russia before the arrival of Voitinsky in spring 1920.66

Another well-known Russian 6migr6 in Beijing was B. Turgashev, a former

Menshevik. Turgashev had studied in Paris and had then been an engineer with a

responsible position at the Russo-Asiatic bank in Harbin. He was subsequently elected

first chairman of the Harbin Soviet of Workers' Deputies after the February

Revolution. Shortly after, he retired from politics and moved to Beijing. Later he was

involved in working for Soviet Russia and became the Commercial Attache of the

Yurin Mission. 67

There were many Russians living in South China, especially in Shanghai.

Shanghai had a large Russian community, numbering approximately 5,000 by 1920.68

early study trips to China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. (p 133) After the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Treaty in 1896, the graduates of the Oriental Department of St. Petersburg University were even sent to China for three years to perfect their knowledge of China and the Chinese language. (p 130)

65 The secret reports by Guan Qian are kept at the Second Chinese History Archives in Nanjing. See Zhonq-quo wuzhencifu zhuyi he Zhonqquo shehui clang (Chinese Anarchism and the Chinese Socialist Party), (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1981), p 86; Guan Shanfu, 'Some Matters on Polevoy and Ivanov', Dangshi tonqxun (The Bulletin on the History of the CCP), (Beijing, 1984), No 3, p 59.

66 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 50. 67 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 64; FO 228/3291. 68 FO 228/3563, September 1920; Note from Official for Foreign Affairs of Jiangsu

Province to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 October 1921, ZEGXSL, 1921, p 580.

87

It is difficult to distinguish between those Russians who were dispatched from Russia

and those who were recruited in China.

As early as September 1918, some radical Russian residents' activities also

attracted the attention of the local authorities in Shanghai. It was reported that some

young Russians in Shanghai had subscribed to Bolshevik principles and were

convinced that Bolshevism would save Russia, and then China and India from the

"yoke of British imperialism". These men intended to establish a "Socialistic Society"

in order to keep in touch with the Bolsheviks in Russia. 69 It is not certain whether the

Socialistic Society was founded or not, but there is no doubt about the existence of

certain Russians in Shanghai who put themselves at the service of Soviet Russia. Not

later than 1920, a revolutionary Russian 6migr6s' organisation - "Fhe Bureau of the

Russian 6migr6s" was formed in Shanghai, and its secretary was a Bolshevik,

Kaufman. 70

J. Lizerovitch was an important left-wing Russian resident in Shanghai.

Before 1917 Lizerovitch had previously made himself conspicuous by his radical

views and his connections with socialists and anarchists in England and afterwards he

came to Shanghai, where he was employed by Jardine Matheson, a British firm. As

the following evidence suggests, he became a Bolshevik agent in Shanghai not later

than spring 1919. Around that time a Korean, Yo Un-hong, 71 was sent from Shanghai

to Siberia to seek Bolshevik assistance for the Korean independence movement and

met a Bolshevik representative there. On his return to Shanghai, Yo and other

69 FO 228/3214, No 412,20 September 1918. 70 VKNDK, Vol 1, Index. 71 Vo Un-hong was Yo Un-hyong's brother, who had been graduated from Leicester

University in England. See Japanese Foreign Office (ed. ) Gendai Chosen Jinme! Dal ýLiten (A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Korean).

88

Koreans reportedly "established contacts with John Ruzaruichi, a Russian Bolshevik in

Shanghai. 02 This Ruzaruichi is obviously a homophonic name of Lizerovitch, since

many East Asians make no distinction between the pronunciation of 'R' and '1;. His

identity was later confirmed by Voitinsky, who once remarked that Lizerovitch as a

"comrade" and had been receiving special instructions from Soviet Russia. Later an

official of the Bolshevik Propaganda Bureau at Chita praised Lizerovitch as a "noble

worker" for the Soviet cause. 73 Despite this, Lizerovitch has never been mentioned in

any works on the CCP before.

From 8 February 1920, there were several meetings in Shanghai attended by

Russian residents who were sympathetic to the Bolshevik regime. The main topic for

discussion at these meetings was to form a committee to take control of the Russian

Consulates and the branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in China. 74 Prominent speakers

at these gatherings were Poliak, Smolensky and Lunden. At one of the meetings

Sokolsky was mentioned. V. E. Poliak (or Polejack and Polialk) was a Bolshevik

agitator, and his overt occupation in Shanghai was a tailor. Poliak's careers is worth

noting: he joined the RCP(B) in 1918 and graduated from the Oriental Department of

the Military Academy of the Red Army; in 1923 he became a member of the Joffe

Mission, and later worked under M. Borodin and held the post of chief advisor to

Huangpu Military Academy. 75 A. M. Smolensky was also reported to be a Bolshevik.

D. A. Lunden was a Russian Jew, a graduate of King's College, London. Following

72 Ku Dae-yeol, Korea under Colonialism, (Seoul, 1985), p 233. 73 FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 228/3216, No 37,6 November 1920; FO

228/3140, p 78. 74 FO 228/3214,19 February 1920,13 March 1920, FO 405/233, No. 107. T5 Huang Xiurong, Goncichan

-quo'i vu Zhonqquo -qeminq quanxi shi, p 332; Wang

Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xumu (The Prelude of the Sino-Soviet Diplomacy), (Taibei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1963), p 338; Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925, p 256, p 259.

89

the Revolution in 1917, he went to Petrograd where he met most of the leading

politicians. Subsequently he reached Vladivostok, where he acted as a representative

of the Times, and then proceeded to China. In July 1919, he expressed his neutral

political attitude, supporting the Russian democratic socialists against both the White

Guards and the Bolsheviks. But later he became a close friend of Lizerovitch and

went over to the Bolshevik cause. In May 1920 he embarked on a mission to Moscow

via the U. S. A. and England. 76

G. Sokolsky, an American of Russian extraction, was a mysterious person. As

the editor of the English language Russian Daily News in Petrograd, Sokolsky

witnessed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and became acquainted with Unin,

Trotsky and Bukharin. In his reminiscences written in his old age in America,

Sokolsky claimed that he had been evicted from Russia in March 1918 and then

arrived in China. But in a conversation with a Dane on a steamer from Hankou to

Shanghai in April 1919, Sokolsky told the latter that he was a Bolshevik and was keen

to disseminate Bolshevik ideas in China. He also boasted that he had been in close

contact with Lenin and Trotsky. The American Consulate was soon informed of these

claims. Sokolsky was reported to be working on behalf of Soviet Russia and had close

relations with Bolshevik agents. But if that was the case, it was rather surprising that

Sokolsky reported the activities of the Bolsheviks to the American consulate in

Shanghai from the spring of 1920. Perhaps he was a double agent or simply changed

his political stand. 77

76 FO 228/4313,19 February 1920,18 March 1920, May 1920; FO 405/228, No 157; FO 405/233, No 107.

77 Sokolsky, 'Reminiscences', USIDS, 761,93/142, quoted from Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot; FO 228/3214,1 May 1919; FO 405/228, No 157. Hu Shi recorded in his diary that Sokolsky was very concerned himself with Chinese politics in 1921, [Hu

90

There were several Russians residing in other cities who offered to help the

Soviet Regime. For example, Pankratoff, who had graduated from the Oriental

Institute in Vladivostok and knew Chinese very well, was an associate professor in

Hankou and, started to work for the Bolsheviks on Polevoy's recommendation. 78 F.

W. Thompson, who had been a naturalised American citizen, changed his name to G.

L Mikulin and reverted back to Russian nationality in 1918. Later he became a

Bolshevik worker while working as an Examiner on the staff of the Customs in

Shantou. 79

By virtue of their familiarity with the Chinese and English languages and

social environment, those Russians who were recruited by Soviet agents in China used

to act as intermediaries between the Russian Bolsheviks and potential Chinese

revolutionaries, and hence sometimes accomplished more than the agents sent from the

Soviet Russia, as we will see in the following chapters.

Section 3. Arrival of the Voitinsky Group and Other Emissaries in 1920

1920 was a turning point in the history of Soviet Russia as well as in Sino-

Soviet relations. The Bolshevik regime had survived the Civil War and foreign

armed intervention. Regular traffic between Soviet Russia and China gradually

resumed from the beginning of 1920.

Shi de 1E (The Diary of Hu Shi), (Beijing, 1985) p 198, p 203]. In his The Tinder Box of Asia, which was published in 1933, Sokolsky showed his sympathy for the Chinese revolution.

78 Pankratoff later became a famous Sinologist and Tibetanlogist. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 28; Hu Sh! de riii, 4 July 1921.

FO 228/3211, November 1920 and April 1921; FO 405/233, September 1921. 91

With regard to this situation, A. Kushnaryov and M. Sakhyanova, the

leaders of the underground Far Eastern Regional Committee of the RCP(B) in

Vladivostok, wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in January

1920, explaining that they were planning to establish permanent relations with

Chinese revolutionaries. 80 The following month, Vilensky, came to Vladivostok,

assuming the leading position of the Vladivostok Committee of the Far Eastern

Bureau (the Dal'buro) there and taking the responsibility for directing the RCP(B)

and the Comintern's local organisations to undertake revolutionary work in China.

At Vilensky's suggestion, the Bureau set up a Foreign Section at the beginning of

1920 .81 From then on, more agents were sent to China and many of them were

dispatched directly from Siberia.

According to a secret telegram from the Chinese Cabinet to the Governors of

Shanghai and Jiangsu province, Lenin's government had dispatched emissaries to

Shanghai and a number of Bolsheviks had come to Jiangsu at the beginning of

1920. British intelligence agents later discovered that these Bolsheviks had

established themselves in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province, in the early

spring of 1920.82 In February, a Bolshevik agent called Puglebesky reached

Shanghai from Vladivostok with a large sum of money and five Chinese

assistants. 83 The following month, a Russian Bolshevik representative reportedly

came to Shanghai with one Chinese and two Koreans. The identity of the Russian is

not known, but it is clear that he later made contact with General Potapov. The

80 Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China', Far Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 129.

'3' GLZDC, Vol 1, p 38, p 50. 82 TO 228/2986, p 357. 83 FO 405/233, No 107.

92

three Asians had been participants in the Second All-Russia Congress of

Communist Organisations of Peoples of the East in November 1919. The Chinese

was Xia Qifeng, a journalist, who had gathered news at the Paris Peace Conference

before he returned to China via Russia, where he attended the Congress as a

Chinese labour representative. 84 In April, the Chinese Ministry of Internal Affairs

informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a Bolshevik named Di-Er-Na-Fu had

brought a huge sum of money into China and was trying to stir up revolt among the

Chinese troops. Possibly he was the same man as a certain N. E. Doienin who

turned up in a British intelligence report. 85

The arrival of Voitinsky's group in China is a well known affair. Many

historians have already recognised the important role played by Voitinsky in the

Chinese Communist movement. G. N. Voitinsky (alias Zarkhin) was bom in 1893.

As an emigrant, he had lived in the U. S. A. and Canada and had been a member of

the American Socialist Party before he returned home. He joined the RCP(B) in

Siberia in 1918 and was arrested and sentenced to hard labour in Sakhalin in the

following year. After an uprising by the prisoners there, he went to Vladivostok,

where he worked at the Foreign Section of the Vladivostok Committee of the

Dal'buro. In April 1920, Voitinsky with two other members of the Section, Titov, a

graduate from the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, and Selebryakov, actually a

Korean Communist named Kim, were sent by Vilensky to China; this mission had

been previously approved by the leadership of the Comintern. 86 Kasanin reminisced

84 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 14; Jean Chesneaux, Chinese Labour Movement, 1919-1927. (California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p 160.

_EGXSL, 1926, --No 164; FO 405/233, No 107.

86 GLZDC, p 48; Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Communist Party of China', The, 93

that he had heard an interesting story about Voitinsky during his stay in Beijing in

the early 1920s, namely that when Voitinsky was on a train approaching Harbin, the

Chinese police, acting on the advice of an informer, boarded the train to seize the

"Russian agent". Since it was too late to burn the documents and ciphers which he

was carrying, Voitinsky locked himself in his compartment and swallowed all the

papers. The Chinese police detained him as a suspect, but later had to release him

because no evidence was found. 87 If this story is true, it means that Voitinsky had

probably already tried and failed to reach China before his arrival in spring 1920.

Besides his assistants Titov and Selebryakov, Voitinsky came to China with

his wife M. Kuznetsova and a Chinese interpreter Yang Mingzhai. Yang Mingzhai

(original name Yang Haode) was born in Shandong province and moved to Siberia

before World War 1. After the Bolshevik Revolution he joined the RCP(B) and

became the head of the Union of Chinese Residents in Vladivostok.

Some other agents who were dispatched to China during the spring and

summer of 1920 also joined Voitinsky's team. One of these was K. A. Stoyanovich

(alias Minor), who had worked for the Cheka before coming to China and could

88 speak French. He left Harbin for Tianjin in the spring of 1920. Sakhyanova, one

of the leading members of the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the RCP(B) in

Far Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 12. 87 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 224. 8ýý VKNDK, Vol 1, Index. Stoyanovich subsequently became one of Borodin's co-

wor s. Holubnychy wrongly holds that Stoianovich is Eugene Pick, who became a defector in 1927. cf. Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 252; In fact, Eugene Pick in his book China in the Grip of the Reds, (Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd., 1927) did not mention this and only wrote that, "Five years ago, the USSR sent Stoianovich. to Canton for the express purpose of persuading Dr. Sun Yat-sen to accept Borodin as adviser. " See also in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 142.

94

Vladivostok, also came to Beijing to work alongside Voitinsky for a short term. 89

Another member of the Foreign Section, I. K. Mamayev, who could speak Chinese,

later participated in the work of Voitinsky's team. 90 L. A. Perlin also worked under

Voitinsky's direction. According to Liang Bing-xuan, Perlin was a young American

Communist. 91

At the end of June 1920, Vilensky, the instigator of Voitinsky's mission,

crossed the Sino-Russian border. Vilensky was born in Siberia in 1888. He began

to engage in revolutionary activities in 1903 and became a Menshevik in 1912.

After the February Revolution he was elected Chairman of the Yakutsk Central

Executive Committee of Soviets. He soon joined the Bolsheviks and became a

Commissar in the Siberian Council of People's Commissars. With the downfall of

the Soviet Government in Siberia, he escaped to Moscow in April 1918, where he

worked in the Soviet Government on Siberian and Far Eastern affairs and wrote for

Izvestiia and became the commissar of the Military Academy of the Headquarters of

General Staff of the Red Army. After taking part in the defeat of Kolchak, he

headed the Soviet Government Mission for Foreign Affairs in Siberia. 92 Within the

leading circle of Bolsheviks, Vilensky was apparently an important policy maker on

Chinese affairs and it was he who drafted the Karakhan Manifesto to China in the

89 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan quo'i yu Zhonqquo geming quanxi shi p 58. 90 Although Mamayev did not join Voitinsky's team from the beginning, he later

worked with them. See 'Bao Huiseng's Recollection', Yida gianhou (The Period of the First Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: People's Press, 1981). In 1921, Mamayev became the head of the Chinese Section of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk.

91 M. A. Persits, 'From the History of the Making of the Communist Party of China', Narodv Azij Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa), [Henceforth NAAJ, (Moscow, 1971), No 4, p 49; Haiyu guke (Liang Bingxuan's penname), Jiefan-q bielu 'An Alternative Record of the Liberation', Zivou ren (Free People), Hong Kong, 1951.

92 Cf. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, p 290. 95

summer of 1919. Therefore, Vilensky's visit to China was undoubtedly an event of

significance, although he asked the Chinese authorities' permission only to

"investigate industrial and commercial conditions in China in a private capacity". 93

Until now, most Chinese historians have not paid sufficient attention either to

Vilensky's visit to China or to the man himself. M. M. Abramson, the head of the

Foreign Section of the Dal'buro, accompanied Vilensky as his Chinese interpreter. 94

When Vilensky, under the assumed name of Gusev, with Abramson tried to enter

Kiakta, a town located on the Russian and Mongolian border, they were detained by

the Chinese frontier guards. On their release, they joined Yurin's party, but

managed to arrive in Beijing before the Yurin mission. 95

Besides Voitinsky's and Vilensky's teams, other Bolshevik emissaries

continued to be dispatched to China. Amongst others, the following examples were

recorded in British archives.

In May 1920 a Bolshevik mission, comprising eight persons headed by

Levitas, who was from Moscow, came to Ku1ja to negotiate a trade agreement with

the Chinese authorities of Xinjiang. It was agreed that Soviet Russia could establish

a political agency as well as a trade agency there. Before long, Limeref, Borchark

96 and Kolikof, who were Soviet political agents, came to Ku1ja one after another. In

August 1920 a Bolshevik team was on its way to Xinjiang. The party consisted of

93 Telegram from Shao Hengrui, the Chinese Consul at Vladivostok, to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 17 June 1920, ZEGXSL, 1920, p 50.

94 Abramson (alias Mazurin) joined the RCP(B) in 1918. He became the head of the Chinese Department of the Section of the Eastern People under the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and a secretary at the Foreign Ministry of the Far Eastern Republic from 1921. Cf. Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 134.

0 -Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 28. 96 FO 405/233,25 October 1921. Kolikof had been a consul in Afghanistan before he

came to Xinjiang. 96

one Russian Bolshevik, two Tartarised Jews, a Cossack and an Indian with an escort

of 20 men. With the party were three Muslim agitators, all of whom had been

serving in the Comintern's Propaganda Department in Tashkent. 97 Later, a

Bolshevik agent named Yusuf, who had been deported by the Indian Government,

arrived in Kashgar. 98 Also, in September 1920, a Bolshevik agent named Karinof or

Kernoff arrived in China. He could speak Mandarin and was in possession of a

large quantity of funds. He travelled between Shanghai and Tianjin, and on his

second visit to Shanghai was accompanied by delegates from the Chinese

Communists in Russia. 99

The above are only some of the numerous Soviet and the Comintern agents

who arrived in China during 1920. According to a report of the Section of Eastern

People of Siberian Bureau dated 21 December 1920, there were over ten Russian

Bolsheviks who had had responsible positions working in China. 100 By the end of

1920, the Bolsheviks had scattered throughout many cities and regions, including

Harbin, Manzhouli, Fengtian, Heihe, Mohe, Iffi, Ining, Kashgar, Beijing, Qingdao,

Yantai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuhan, Zhangzhou, Shantou and

Guangzhou. 101 Owing to limitations of space, it is impossible to give details on all

of them, but several further cases will be introduced later in the course of this study.

Section 4. Bolshevik Organisations and Centres in China

97 FO 228/3216, Nos 27-28, (August 1920). 98 FO 228/3216, No 38,11 November 1920. 99 FO 228/3211, November 1920; FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 228/ 3216, No

40,27 November 1920; FO 405/233, September 1921. 100 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 53. 101 See source materials in ZEGXSL and FO archives.

97

There is much evidence to show that, from 1919 to the beginning of 1921,

many Russian Bolshevik groups and organisations were set up and operating in

China. In February 1919, a secret report received by the Beijing Government

recorded that "the Russian Bolsheviks had established an organisation in Tianjin

and were operating surreptitiously. " 102 Another report claimed that around the

summer of 1920 there was a central society of Russian Bolsheviks in Shanghai with

branches in Beijing, Ningbo, Hankou, Shantou, etc. 103

Alert to the existence of Bolshevik organisations, the Chinese military

authorities issued an order on 19 February 1921 banning the organisations set up by

Russian Bolsheviks and outlawing Bolshevik activities in China. 104 Nevertheless,

these organisations could never be successfully prohibited, since most of them had

gone underground.

Among the Bolshevik organisations in China there were some important

bodies which served as the leading centres of the activities of the agents of Soviet

Russia and the Comintem.

In order to direct the work in the East Asian countries more efficiently, the

East Asian Secretariat of the Comintern was set up in Shanghai in May 1920 at

Vilensky's suggestion. In some books on the Communist movements in the Far

East, the Secretariat used to be denominated as the "Shanghai Bureau". 105 This

102 'Beijing Government to the Governor of Zhili, Cao Rui', February 1919; the document kept in the China Second Historical Achives in Nanjing; quoted from Lai Xinxia (ed. ), Tianiin iindai shi (The Modern History of Tianjin), (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 1987), p 278.

103 ZEGXSL, 26 September 1920, p 241; FO 228/3216, No 27,21 August 1920. 104 Wang Yijun, Zhong Su Waiiiao de Xumu, p 174. 105 G. M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945,

98

Comintem provisional central institution was run by Voitinsky and was directed by

a Bureau of three Russian Bolsheviks, including Vilensky. 106 After the

establishment of the Section of the Eastern People under the Siberian Bureau of the

RCP(B) in Irkutsk in August 1920, which later became the Far Eastern Secretariat

of the ECCI in early 1921, the Shanghai Bureau became a subordinate body of it.

No later than 17 August 1920, the East Asian Secretariat's subsidiary

sections - the Chinese Revolutionary Bureau and the Korean Revolutionary Bureau

- were established. In making preparations for setting up the Japanese section, the

Secretariat dispatched a Korean, Yi Ch'un-suk, in June 1920 to Tokyo to contact

Japanese socialists and anarchists. 107 Besides the Russians, the Secretariat's staff

included Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, an Indian and even an Englishman. 108

The responsibility of the Secretariat was to conduct and finance the Chinese

revolutionary movement and the equivalent Korean and Japanese movements, and

(California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p 31; R. A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p 17, p 72; Scalapino and Lee, Eo-ýnmunism in Korea, p 13.

106 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 36. "' 7v-oitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B), 17

August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 31-33; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'ang-sun, Han-quk Konqsan Chuui Undonsa, p 231; Beckmann and Genji, The Japanese Communist Ea p30. *8

John Pavlovich Clark was born in Moscow. In 1908 he went to Europe with his parents and in 1914 he became an British citizen. After the Russian Revolution he returned to Russia and joined the Bolshevik Party. He first served at the American Red Cross in Vladivostok, and lived on the false passport as Boris Gray. After the downfall of Kolchak, he became the secretary to the Far Eastern Committee of the RCP(B) and the Home Minister of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. Later he was invited to Moscow and soon was sent to Shanghai as the chief of the Military Revolutionary Council of Kamchatka. In 1921 the East Asian Secretariat dispatched him to Japan, where he was detained and then deported. Cf. 'The Immigration Section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Minister, 2 December 1922', and 'The Japanese Consulate to the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 January 1922', in The Archives of the Japanese MinistrV of Foreiqn Affairs.

99

to establish Communist parties in those Far Eastern countries. Being a major port-

city in East Asia, Shanghai was the ideal centre for such operations.

Firstly, Shanghai was a city where the Chinese working class and radical

intellectuals were concentrated, and the Chinese authorities' control over the place

was relatively loose. Secondly, after the I March Uprising in Korea in 1919,

several thousands of Korean nationalists took refuge in Shanghai and established a

Korean Provisional Government there. 109 The Korean Socialist Party's headquarters

also moved to Shanghai from Siberia and its chairman Yi Tunghui became the

Prime Minister of the Provisional Government. So it was easy for the Secretariat to

keep in close contact with the Korean Socialist Party as well as the Korean

Provisional Government. 110 Thirdly, it was also convenient for the Secretariat to

send agents to Japan and other Asian countries, for various shipping lines ran from

Shanghai to different ports of these countries regularly. According to Maring's

report to the ECCI in 1922, the time needed to travel from Shanghai to Japan was

under 5 days; to the Philippines, 6-7 days; to Singapore, 10 days, and to Indonesia,

14 days. "'

From Shanghai, the Secretariat also supported the revolutionary movements

in some other Asian countries. Voitinsky and his assistants enlisted some Indians to

the anti-British cause, asking them to provide news from India and criticisms of

British rule in India, which the Russians sent on to Moscow. 112 A Russian

'09 Cf. Nym Wales and Kim San, Song of Ariran, A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution, (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1941), p 112; Ku Daeyeol, Korea under Colonialism, p 95.

7-'O-Cf. Suh Dae-sook, The Korea Communist Movement, 1918-1948; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea.

GLZDZC, Vol 2, p 224. FO 405/228, No 160 (August 1920).

100

Bolshevik Kernoff declared at a meeting of Chinese Socialists that the Bolsheviks

had sent two million rupees to the Indian revolutionaries and that he himself had

met an Indian Communist in Bokhara. After a short stay in Shanghai, Kernoff left

for Java to meet some prominent figures there. Other agents in Shanghai also

contributed to the promotion of the revolution in India. One tried to start

publication of a newspaper in Shanghai for Indians. 113 Therefore, Shanghai was

regarded by the Comintern as the "centre of the Revolutionary work in the Far

East". 114

Before May 1920, the Bolsheviks' most important outlet in Shanghai was

Shanghai Life, a Russian newspaper published for the Russian community. Its

founder, G. Semesheko, was an ex-priest, who was later dismissed from a Russian

newspaper for drunkenness. He then became a reporter for a socialist newspaper

and was arrested by the Tsarist Government on a charge of sedition. Coming to

China, Semesheko founded Shanghai Life in 1917, which, at first, was a small-scale

paper with no Bolshevik connections. Sometime later he went back to Russia,

returning to China in April 1919 with Khodorov, Massing and Tolstoff, all of whom

served Soviet Russia. 115 It was reported that Semesheko consulted Vilensky in

Vladivostok in February 1920 and that the latter purchased Shanghai Life for $

5,000 and appointed Semesheko as editor-in-chief. From then on, Shanghai Life

became a completely Bolshevik newspaper. 116 Even after Shanghai Life's Russian

113 FO 228/ 3214, September 1920; FO 228/3216, No 40. 114 'Riutin's Report to the Far Eastern Secretariat of ECCI to China, 6 April 1922',

GLZIDC, Vol 1, p 83. 115 FO 405/233, No 107; FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 116 The Shanghai Municipality once even consulted with the Russian Consul and

attempted to expel Semesheko from China. Cf. Official Note from the Chinese Ministry of the Internal Affairs to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1920; FO 228/3211,

101

financial support was withdrawn in October 1922 and used to set up an English

language journal the New Russia, A Political and Economic Weekl , it continued

publishing independently for a while and was still a pro-Soviet paper. 117

There were about thirty staff on Shanjzhai Life between 1920 and 1921.

Most of them were pro-Soviet Russian 6migr6s and some were sent from Soviet

Russia directly. M. 1. Baranovsky (Bemofsky) was a leading writer and editor, who

began to write for Shanghai Life before the spring of 1920 and had close relations

with the Bolshevik emissaries. ' 18 From 1922 Baranovsky became a secretary at the

Publication Department of Narkomindel and between 1923 and 1928 he worked as

an interpreter at the East Department of the ECCI. 119 N. K. Novitsky was also an

important contributor, who was entrusted by Joffe in 1922 with the task of starting

publication of the English paper, New Russia. 120 For a short period of time,

Voitinsky was an editor and a correspondent for the newspaper. 121 Around August

1920, ShanRhai Life was temporarily edited by Kaufman, who was the secretary of

April 1921; ZEGXS , 30 April 1920, No 164. According to an agent of the Red Army Intelligence Service in China in 1920s, one of the editors of Shanghal Life during the Great Chinese Revolution was Veprentseff, who had worked for the Soviet Government and came to China as a Comintern agent. See Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds, p 16.

117 In Sneevliet Archive No 312, there are two receipts from Wilde, who received from Sneevliet, dated 5 December 1922: one of $ 2,206-74 (Mexican dollars and cents) for the liquidating commission of Shanghai Life, and one of $ 1,500 for the journal "New Russia". Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, p 348.

118 FO 405/228, No 157. 119 See Index of VKNDK, Vol 1. In the USSR Baranovsky published several articles

about China, including: 'China's struggle to Annul Unequal Treaties', Morovoe Khoziaistvo I Mirovaia Politika, No 12,1926, quoted from R. C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, (California: Stanford University Press, 1963), p 422; 'The Anglo- American Capitalists - Stranglers of the Taiping Rebellion', Voprosv Istorii, (11952), No 1, quoted from K. F. Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, (New Jersey: Rut er University Press, 1962).

12 9

FO 405/233, September 1921; GLZDC, Vol 1, p 131. 121 'A Letter from Comrade Lingshuang', Gongyu (After Work), (Paris, April 1923), No

16. 102

the paper's office. 122 Popov was also taken onto the editorial staff of Shanghai Life

during Kaufman's absence in Beijing. 123 One of the active workers on Shanghai

Life and its financial controller was Goorman or Gurman, who later became a

member of both the Joffe and Borodin missions. 124 The head of the Printing

Department, Fiapkin or Tiapkin, was previously the controller of the Soviet Printing

Press in Petrograd. 125 Other Soviet agents who worked on Shanghai Life were

Lizerovitch, Khodorov, Agariev, Stopany, Orjeschko, Sinolinkof, Podhorsky,

Doienin and Angarrosky.

The offices of ShanRhai Life were located at No. 716, Xia Fei Road in the

French Concession and Edward Road in the British Concession. 126 The staff of

Shanghai Life were reported to hold frequent meetings. For example, on 28

September 1920, a secret meeting of about thirty Russians was held in the office of

Shanghai Life, passing a resolution that the Chinese Government be petitioned to

allow the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to appoint consuls in place of the

122 Between 1920 and 1921, Kaufman was a member of the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to China. Between March 1921 and 1924, he first worked at the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern and afterwards at the Eastern Department of the ECCL Cf. FO 228/3211, March 1920; FO 228/3216, No 27,21 August 1920; VKND , Vol 1, Index. Kaufman published an article entitled 'Japanese Imperialism and Korea' in Novyi Vostok (New Orient), (Moscow, 1924), Vol 5.

=FO 228/3214, October 1920. 124 FO 405/233, No 107; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xumu, p 338; Holubnychy,

Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 259. In Sneevliet Archives No 543. Goorman is described as an editor of Shan-qhai Life, and in March 1922 Sneevliet lived in his house in Shanghai. (Saich, OFUFQ ,p 248) In September 1922, when Geker (Joffe Mission's military Attache) and Sneevliet talked with Sun Yat-sen, Goorman was their interpreter. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 135.

125 FO 405/233, No 107. 126 'Yuan Zhenying's Recollections', Ge Maochun, Jiang Jun and LI Xingzhi (eds. ),

Wuzhen-qfu zhuyi sixiang ziliao xuan ,

(Selected Materials on Anarchist Thought), (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1984), p 976; From 1923, the Office of Shanghai Life located at No 1119 North District; cf. 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', 19 January 1923', kept in the Shanghai Archives.

103

Tsarist representatives. 127 Sometimes the office sent emissaries to Vladivostok and

Harbin and it was also frequently visited by Bolshevik agents from Vladivostok,

Chita, Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou. 128 Many Bolshevik activities in southern

China were related to Shanghai Life.

After the East Asian Secretariat was established, Shanghai Life engaged in

propaganda under its direction and was sometimes used as a front to hide its

activities. For example, when Voitinsky's team came to China, they all pretended to

be journalists of Shanghai Life and Voitinsky's overt profession was editor of the

paper. 129 An agent in Zhangzhou, Mikulin, did his work under instructions coming

from Shanghai Life. 130

Two other peripheral institutions around the East Asian Secretariat with

specific functions were the Shanghai branches of the Centrosoyus (the Russian

Central Union of Co-operative Stores) and of the Zakoubsbit (the Russian Co-

operative Union).

They had close relations with each other and had different duties. The

Centrosoyus mainly acted as a medium for financial transactions. 131 The

Centrosoyus was the Soviet Government's Economic Bureau, and its agencies and

representatives in Shanghai and later in Hankou were constantly in receipt of large

sums of money from the Comintern, which they used to finance Soviet agents and

127 FO 228/3214, series of September 1920. 128 FO 405/233, No 107, September 1921. 129 Ye Yonglie, Zhonc gong ic - zhi Chu (The beginning of the CCP), (Hong Kong:

Cosmos Book, 1991), p 119; 'A Letter from Comrade Lingshuang', Gonqvu, (April, 1923), No 16.

130 FO 228/3211, April 1921. 131 FO 228/3214, April 1921.

104

the Communist movement in China. 132 The Zakoubsbit was often used by the

Bolsheviks as a contact point. The above bodies were actually parts of the same

organisation and were all Bolshevik institutions. 133

The first manager of the Centrosoyus was I. P. Tarasoff, who was designated

to receive funds from Moscow. In 1921 Tarasoff was relieved of his post and

succeeded by M. A. Kossolapoff. Both of them were closely connected with the

offices of Shanghai Life. 134 The police reports of Shanghai Public Settlement

Municipal Council and Shanghai French Concession Municipal Council recorded

that in January 1923, when Joffe arrived in Shanghai, he met several times with

Kossolapoff, who was considered a "leading figure of the Bolshevik movement in

Shanghai", and, on his suggestion, Joffe allocated large sums of money to

Semesheko of Shanghai Life and other Soviet agents. 135 Gorigoriyev of the

Centrosoyus undertook responsibility for transferring publications received from

Moscow and Siberia to Voitinsky. 136 B. A. Vykhristof, the chief accountant of the

Centrosoyus and assistant to Tarasoff, was concurrently president of the Russian

Democratic Club, which was an open meeting place for Russian residents in

Shanghai. 137 S. L. Wilde, who became the chief accountant of the Centrosoyus

later, acted as a Comintern liaison man between Shanghai and Russia. 138

132 Pick, China in the Grip of the Red, p 25. 133 FO 405/233, September 1921. 134 'Voitinsky's letter to the Section of the Eastern Peoples of the Siberian Bureau of

the RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 35; In Index of VKNDK, Vol 1, Tarasoff is mistakenly identified as Voitinsky. FO 228/3214, April 1921; FO 405/233, No 107. Up to 1927, Tarasoff ran a boarding house in Shanghai to provide temporary accommodation for Soviet agents. Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds, p 11.

135 These security reports are kept in the Shanghai Archives. 13r3 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 35. 137 FO 405/233, September 1921. 13" GLZDC, Vol 1, p 83, p 361.

105

Besides Shanghai, Bolshevik liaison stations were set up in Tianjin, 139

Beijing and other cities too, and sometimes Soviet diplomatic bodies were also used

for liaison. 140

The Rosta and Dalta News Agencies were important Soviet institutions in

China. "Rosta" is the abbreviation of Rossiiskoe Telegrafhoe Agentstvo (The

Russian Telegraph Agency), and it was set up in September 1918 as the central

information organ of the Soviet Government. 141 After the Far Eastern Republic was

founded, it was considered more convenient to call it "Dalta" (The Far Eastern

News Agency). The Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in China were actually one

and the same, and their recognised Chinese names were Hua-E Tongxun She (the

Sino-Russian News Agency) and Yuandong Tongxun She (the Far East News

Agency).

Wang Ruofei, an early leader of the CCP, said in a report meeting in Yanan

in 1943: "The Comintern sent its agents to China as early as 1919, and the first one

was director of the Soviet Sino-Russian News Agency. " 142 With regard to this,

Professor Xiang Qing has firmly denied that there was a possibility that a Soviet

News Agency existed in China prior to the Beijing Government's withdrawal of

recognition for Kudashev's Legation as the official diplomatic mission of Russia on

23 September 1920, and also considered it as sheer nonsense that a head of such a

news agency could be sent to China before 1920.143 In contrast, some other Chinese

139 The Tianjin contact point's address was: Mr Leoff c/o Gershevitch, No 10b Woodrow Wilson Street, Tianjin. GI 7DC, Vol 1, p 35;

140 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 84, p 361. 141 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol 22, p 294. 142 Wang Ruofei, 'On the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Great

Revolution', Jindaishi vanLu, (1981), No 1. 143 Xiang Qing, 'An Exploratory Study on the Issue of When the Comintern Started

106

historians attach importance to Wang's account, but they have been unable to

substantiate it or to establish the identity of the person Wang referred to. In fact, in

1966, a Russian scholar V. N. Nikiforov ascertained that a Russian named A. E.

Khodorov was in Beijing from 1919 and became director of Rosta's Beijing branch

in that year. 144

Khodorov had participated in the anti-Tsarist revolutionary movement while

he was a student in the Law Faculty of Odessa University. After graduation he

became a qualified barrister. Khodorov joined the Menshevik during the early

months of the Russian Revolution, but soon converted to the Bolshevik cause. In

1917, he went to the front, and later moved on to Vladivostok where he edited a

newspaper called DalekUa Okraiina (The Far Frontier). 145 Khodorov arrived in

Shanghai in April 1919 and began working with Shanghai Life. Then he moved to

Tianjin, where he was known as a correspondent of the "Comintern's News

Agency". 146 It is possible that during his stay in Tianjin, Khodorov managed to set

up the Rosta News Agency with headquarters in Beijing.

The establishment of the Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in Beijing was

made known to the public by 7 June 1920, when The Befling Daily News, the

English-language newspaper of the Beijing Government, reported that "Mr.

Khodorov, representative and correspondent of Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in

Establishing Relations with the Chinese Revolution', Dancishi vanjiu ziliao (Sources on the Study of Party History), (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1981), No 3, p 127.

144 V. N. Nikiforov, 'A. E. Khodorov' NAA, (1966), No 5, p 219; and in his later work SIOPK (pp 91-92), Nikiforov wrote definitely that "during 1919-1922, he [Khodorov] was the head of the branch of Rosta in Beijing. "

145 Nikiforov, 'A. E Khodorov' NAA, (1966), No 5, p 219; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, P 45.

146 -* U Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCP', I February 1930, Zhonqqon- danqshi q- baoqao xuanbian (Selected Reports on the History of the CCP), Henceforth abbreviated to ZDBX, (Beijing: the CCP's Central Academy Press, 1982), p 211.

107

China, has now established himself at 21 Chin Kiang Hutung, Peking. " When the

Yurin Mission came to Beijing, the Agency moved to Dehua Hutong. 147 The Rosta

News Agency's Beijing branch was its Chinese headquarters and Khodorov was

actually head of the Rosta-Dalta in China. The second head of Rosta! s Beijing

branch was Slepak, who had worked for the Comintern as Voitinsky's assistant. 148

The news agency's equipment was installed in the legation quarter; it

included a radio transmitter-receiver, which could relay news and secret messages

to and from Moscow via Kiakhta and Chita. 149 Since Beijing was the political

centre of China and the seat of diplomatic envoys to China, it was an ideal place for

quick access to important information and news; in addition, the legation quarter

was beyond the Chinese authorities' control, so that the location made it easier to

conceal the Agencies' activities.

Rosta's staff in Beijing included Russians and Chinese. Two Russians

named Kharnsky and Uyashenko did compilation work. According to Kasanin, they

were ex-Russian army officers, but "had thoroughly revised their views and whole-

heartedly devoted themselves to revolutionary Russia and her destiny. " 150

Prominent among the Chinese assistants were Huang Ping and Xue Hanyue. Huang

had graduated from a secondary school attached to the YMCA and could speak

147 A newspaper cutting kept in FO 228/2987; secret reports in ZEGXSL, 1921. 148 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-22', Problem

Dal'neqo Vostoka, (1973), No 1; GLZDC, Vol 2, p 440, note 2. 149 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 46; FO 228/3216, No 22,17 July 1920;

Ernestine Evans's 'Looking East from Moscow` wrote that during her stay in Moscow, she saw a copy of the official wireless in the room reserved for foreign correspondents at Narkomindel. The directions for broadcasting, at the head of the message, read: '... Chita, Dalta, relay Khodorov, Peking'; Asia, (New York, December 1922) Vol 22, No 12, p 1020. It may be worth noting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 20 March 1920 protested against the wanton installation of radio station(s) in China by foreigners; see Guo Tingyi, Zhonghua minquo shishi rizhi, p 488.

150 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 85. 108

fluent English. He had worked for the Beiiing Daily News and the Beiiing Leader,

two English-language newspapers before becoming a translator for the Rosta. 151

Xue Hanyue was an anarchist, who was very active during the May 4th Movement

when he was a student at Nankai School in Tianjin. As an interpreter, Xue often

accompanied Khodorov on visits to VIPs, and on Khodorov's recommendation, Xue

became an advisor on foreign affairs to Wu Peifu in 1922.152 After Xue's departure,

some other Chinese joined the staff of the Rosta-Dalta, including Liu Renjing,

Liang Naixian, Ruan Yongzhao and a person named Li. 153 The main tasks of the

employees of the Rosta-Dalta were to translate items received from Soviet Russia or

the Far Eastern Republic, and to prepare materials obtained from the Chinese and

foreign press for transmission. Wu Nanru's recollections indicate that Polevoy's

office in Tianjin also employed several Chinese youths, including Wu himself, to

translate materials from Chinese newspapers and magazines into English. 154 It

151 In 1924 Huang joined the CCP and then went to study in Moscow. After returning to China, he worked for Borodin as a translator and in 1927 he became the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs of the Guangzhou Soviet. Later he went to Moscow as one of the representatives of the CCP to the Comintern in 1930. At the 5th and 6th Congresses of the CCP, he was selected as an alternate member of the Central Committee. In 1933 he was arrested and soon recanted. cf. Huang Ping, Wangshi huivi (Recollections of Past Events) (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), p 3; and Zhonqauo Oinýiandai renminq dacidian (A Biographical Dictionary of Modern China), (Beýing: China International Broadcast Press, 1989), p 606.

15 Wusi aiquo Vundonq dang'an ziliao (Archival Materials on the May 4th Patriotic Movement), (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1979), p 655-7; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 107; Huang Ping, Wanqshi huivi, p 3; Bai Jianwu riLi (The Diary of Bai Jianwu), (compiled by Du Chunhe and Geng Laijin, published by Jiangsu Ancient Books Press), the Diary of 27 June 1922; GLZDC, Vol 1, p 196.

153 Huang Ping, Wangshi huivi, pp 3-4; Liu Renjing was a student of Beijing University and a member of the Society for the Study of Marxism there. In 1921, he attended the founding Congress of the CCP. According to Shi Cuntong, Run Yongzhao was also a member of the CCP, and at the end of 1922, he and Liu Renjing became members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Socialist Youth League. [Yida gianhou, Vol 2,72]. Li was put to death by hanging with Li Dazhao in 1927.

1 54 Hua Yang, 'The Deeds of Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei in Early Times - Wu Nan- ru's Reminiscences', Zhonqqonq vaniiu, July 1976, Vol 10, No 7; Wu Nanru was Zhang

109

seems that there was a Rosta branch located in Tianjin. Around this time another

branch was set up in Harbin.

Before long, Rosta-Dalta extended into South China. Khodorov went to

Shanghai again in April 1920, at the same time as Voitinsky's team also went

there. 155 In the summer of 1920, a branch of Rosta, called "Hua-E tongxun she"

(the China-Russia News Agency) was established in Shanghai and was nominally

headed by Yang Mingzhai. Its main tasks were to collect and dispatch news about

Chinese revolutionary movements to Soviet Russia and the Comintern. 156 In

autumn of the same year, Stoyanovich (Minor) and Perlin, set up a branch of the

Rosta News Agency in Guangzhou. 157

According to an order of the Republic of the Far East, all correspondents of

Rosta-Dalta in China could exercise the functions and duties of consuls, and

perhaps this was the reason why Khodorov was sometimes regarded as a "semi-

official delegate of the Russian Soviet Government". 158

The Yurin mission, which arrived in Beijing in August 1920, was the first

Bolshevik diplomatic delegation to China. This mission at first operated ostensibly

as a trade delegation of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. In fact, as its secretary

Kasanin admitted, it was virtually "the pioneer of Soviet diplomacy in China" and

Tailei's classmate at Beiyang University in Tianjin and later became a member of the Socialist Youth League which was organized by Zhang.

155 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 156 Li Xin and Chen Tiejian, Weida de kaiduan (The Great Beginning), (Beijing:

Chinese Social Sciences Press. 1983), p 33. 157 The Recollections by Liu Shixin and Tan Zuyin in Yida gianhou, (Beijing, 1980),

Vol 3. '58 Shi Keqiang (Shevelyovs Chinese name), 'Sun Yat-sen and the Dalta News

Agency', Sun Zhonqshan he ta de shidai (Sun Yat-sen and His Era), (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1985), Vol 1, p 562; FO 228/3214,22 April 1920.

110

"all that had been successful in the legation's work stemmed from that well-thought-

out plan dictated by Chita, itself inspired by Moscow. " 159

Yurin's real name was G. Dzevaltovsky. He was a high-ranking officer of

the Red Army after the October Revolution and then became the vice-Minister of

the Defence Ministry of the Far Eastern Republic. 160 The delegation had a cipher-

clerk named Mishar Guyanov, who came from the Defence Ministry. His duty was

to communicate with Verkhneudinsk and later Chita for receiving instructions and

reporting their work. Yurin's counsellor, Gromov, was a veteran Bolshevik, whom

Yurin had to consult before making any decision. Together with P. Khretin and

Kasanin, the secretaries and interpreters to Yurin, he frequently went to the Rosta

News Agency to conduct publicity work. Once when Gromov came to Beijing from

Fengtian (in Manchuria), he brought with him many documents and propaganda

materials which were found and seized by the Chinese police. 161 Another old

Bolshevik named E. Ozarnin was a member of the Legation but did not hold any

definite post. He was later appointed Special Representative of the Far Eastern

Republic in Manchuria and Consul-General in Harbin, where he was charged with

directing and financing the Chinese revolutionary movement. Alexis F. Agariev, an

envoy sent from the Temporary Government of the Maritime Province, later joined

the Yurin legation as deputy representative and assumed Yurin's duties in his

absence. By April 1920, Agarief was already in Shanghai and engaged in the work

159 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 144. After the government of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia moved out of Verkhne Udinsk, Chita became the new capital of the Republic.

'60 H. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, (London, 1923). 161 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 64, p 115; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su wai'iao de

xumu, p 319; GEGXS , 1921, Nos 124-179, No 559. III

of Shanghai Life and Rosta as well. 162 According to some accounts, Agarief, ex-

mayor of Vladivostok, was a leading member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party

in Siberia, but Soviet historians maintain that Agarief was a member of the RCP(B)

when he was sent to China. 163 The delegate from the Amur River Region was an

experienced Party worker, Yakovlev. The representative of the Russians in the

CER area was Gorchakovsky. The Commercial Attache to the Yurin Legation,

Tugashev, subsequently went to Shanghai. Another worker under Yurin, Apistain,

was also deputed to Shanghai for propaganda work and connected with Shanghai

Life. 164

To conclude an agreement with the Beijing Government was not the sole

purpose of the Yurin legation. It also shouldered the tasks of guiding the activities

of the Bolshevik agents and promoting revolutionary movements in China. In July,

Vilensky operated in Beijing under the cover of secretary to the Yurin Mission and

convened a meeting of the Russian Bolsheviks in China. 165 Not long after the Yurin

mission had settled in Beijing, they interfered in the work of the East Asian

Secretariat and cut off its links with the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian

Bureau of the RCP(B), which brought complaints from the latter. 166

162 Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, p 148; FO 228/2773,14 December 1920; FO 405/233, p 438.

163 Agarief was an old revolutionary. While a student, he had taught in revolutionary workers' circles. Later he lived in Australia as a political emigre until 1917 when he returned to Vladivostok. After he left China in 1921, he became one of the principal organisers of the Propaganda Bureau in Chita, and an advisor to the Foreign Ministry of the Far Eastern Republic. FO 228/3214,22 April 1920; FO 228/3216, No 27; M. S. Kapitsa, 'Soviet-Chinese Relations during 1920-1921', translated by Huang Jilian in Jindaishi ziliao (Historical Materials on Modern History), (Beijing, February 1991), No 78; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xuMu, p 184, p 209; FO 228/3140, p 76.

164 FO 405/233, No 107; FO 228/3211, April 1921. 165 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 166 The Report to the ECCI on the Issues of the Organisation and Work of the

Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of RCP(B), 21 December 1920', 112

Many important Soviet agents in China co-operated with the Yurin legation.

Khodorov and Ivanov became Yurin's "right hand men" and "unofficial advisers". 167

In October 1920, Voitinsky, Kaufman and Lizerovitch were summoned to Beijing

and held discussions with Yurin. 168 Bolshevik activities and agents from Moscow

or Siberia also visited Yurin. For example, in September 1920, one of the important

Bolshevik leaders in Siberia, D. Shilov, who was Commander of the Eastern Trans

Baikal partisan force in 1920, with seven other Bolsheviks, came to stay at the

Yurin legation and held several secret meetings with Yurin. 169 When the member of

the ECCI of the Comintern, Pak Chinsen, returned to China at the end of 1920, he

with Kim Rip, the vice-leader of the Korean Communist Party, visited Yurin in

Beijing. ' 70

The Yurin mission's activities were so conspicuous that the Beijing

Government suspected that they were engaged in conspiracies with ulterior political

motives. 171 A French missionary, who came to Beijing in September 1920 and met

some of the staff of the Yurin legation, wrote: "the Bolshevists are sparing no

efforts. Their emissaries are well supplied with money and are working hard at

their cause in every large town. " 172 He might have exaggerated the case; however,

GLZDC, Vol 1, p 54. 167 FO 405/233, No 107; Kasanin, China in the Twenties. 1&ý FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 405/233, No 107. 169 Erickson, The Soviet Hic1h Command, p 221; Zhang Zuolin to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2 September 1920, ZEGXSL, 1920, No 144; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, pp 91-92.

170 Paý arrived in Beijing with his Russian wife in the end of 1920. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 21; 'Note of the Police Chief of the Japanese Viceroy's Office in Korea to the Vice-Minister of the Japanese Foreign Office, 1922 - On the State of the Korean Communist Party in Shanghai', in Japanese Achieves.

171 Wang Yijun, Zhong Su wai*iao de xumU, p 197. 172 Abel Bonnard, In China, 1920-1921, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1926),

pp 125-126. 113

his account can still give us a rough idea about the situation after the advent of the

Yurin mission.

Although Soviet Russiaýs diplomatic legations were forbidden by the

Bolshevik leaders to engage in revolutionary work publicly after the fall of 1921,

Soviet Russia's diplomatic missions and legations in China still engaged in secret

work to incite revolutionary movements. During the Great Chinese Revolution of

1924-27, the Soviet embassy became one of the headquarters directing the

Revolution.

The Bolsheviks also established their intelligence services in China. As

early as 1918, the Soviet Government planned to set up an intelligence bureau in

China. Voznesensky declared in his letter that the Soviet Government "would send

Popov and Podvoisky to found a secret intelligence bureau to learn what was doing

[happening] in Shanghai and Peking. " 173 In order to investigate and report on the

situation and the possibilities for revolution in the Far East, Popov, who was also in

charge of intelligence work, made frequent trips to China, Japan and Siberia. He

visited China at least three times between 1918 and 1920, staying mainly in

Shanghai, where he collected his correspondence at the off-ice of Shanghai Life.

Popov was a man of considerable resourcefulness and when in danger he took

precautions to throw his pursuers off the scent. 174 He had some special co-workers,

including Harowits and Fortunatoff. 175

173 FO 228/3214,16 May 1918. 174 FO 228/3214, August, September, 1920. 175 FO 405/233,26 September 1921; Fortunatoff's main task was to collect

information about the anti-communist activities of the White Russians and other foreigners in China. He once received funds from Joffe (Tolice Report of the Municipality of the Public Settlement in Shanghai', 25 January 1923; kept in the Shanghai Archives); In 1925 Fortunatoff became the doctor of the Soviet Embassy in

114

General Potapov was an important Soviet secret agent abroad. 176 According

to Kartzoff, a Lieutenant-General under Kolchak, Potapov had established agencies

in Yokohama, Shanghai and Manila by the spring of 1920.177 During his stay in the

French Concession in Shanghai, Potapov was under surveillance by the French

police and therefore rarely went out. But he received visitors almost every day and

kept in contact with Moscow. In March 1920, when a Russian Bolshevik

representative came to Shanghai with some Koreans and a Chinese, they got in

touch with Potapov directly. ' 78

The Rosta-Dalta News Agencies also served as an intelligence agency, for

one of their tasks was to collect and translate various items of information and news

relating to China and some other countries from newspapers published in China and

then transmit it to Moscow. 179 Sometimes, they also collected oral information. For

example, Khodorov managed to approach Chinese officials, bankers, journalists and

several important foreigners, including an advisor to the Beijing Government for

Blinl_ 16q.

(VKND , Vol 1, Index) iang Bingxuan once heard that General W" (Potapov) had been a Tsarist general

before the Revolution and therefore incurred the hatred of some revolutionaries in Russia. So Lenin, as his good friend, asked him to work abroad. [Haiyu guke, Jiefanci bielu. Between 1922 and 27, under the arrangement of the Foreign Department of the GPU, he accompanied A. A. lakushev (Soviet agent)to travel abroad as the emissaries of Trust (the ostensibly monarchist organisation, which was dreamed up by Dzerzhinsky) to establish liaisons with the overseas monarchist 6migr6 underground organisations and "to deceive his old acquaintances and colleagues in exile. " [V. Lehovich, White against Red, (New York, 1973), p 429] But according to VKNDK, Vol 1's Index, Potapov started to be engaged in teaching work from the end of 1920.

177 FO 228/3211, May 1920. IM FO 228/3214,18 March 1920; 8 April 1920; USDS, 893.00/3376; Scalapino and

Lee, Communism in Korea, p 14. 179 Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq dacidian (Dictionary of the CCP), (Beijing: China

Broacicast and TV Press, 1991), p 561; Zhýnqqonq vangiu, Vol 10, No 7. 115

potential information. 180 Stoyanovitch on 29 September 1920 reported that the

Rosta agency in Guangzhou branch was sending information to Russia. 181

The intelligence personnel used to be planted at Soviet diplomatic legations

and consulates. For example, Maring found that there were some agents of the

Cheka working with Soviet diplomats in Beijing in 1921. E. Pick was appointed to

the Shanghai Consulate as a secret agent for the GPU in 1924.182 In a report to the

Eastern Department of the ECCI dated 20 May 1922, Riutin suggested that agents

who were engaged in liaison work should also collect intelligence. 183

The Bolsheviks' intelligence services in China provided the Soviet

Government and the Comintem with much useful information and helped them to

make relevant decisions with regard to China. 184

********

Contrary to the prevailing view that hardly any Soviet agents were sent to

China and hence "the Russian and Chinese revolutions were at the state of complete

180 Shi Keqiang, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Dalta News Agency', Sun Zhonqshan he ta de shidal, Vol 1, p 562; Kasanin, China in the Twenties p 61. =6LZDC, Vol 1, pp 42-3. In 1923, Maring was appointed the head of the Rosta

agency in Guangzhou. Although he did not accept the appointment, he saw the value in the agency's role in gathering information and asked Zhang Tailei to take over the work. Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, P 167.

182 H. R. Isaacs, "Talks with SneevIiet', GLZIDC, Vol 2, p 252; Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds, p 3. The Cheka was replaced by the GPU (OGPU) in 1922, which existed till 1926. Cf. S. Wolin & R. M. Slusser (eds. ), The Soviet Secret Police, (London: Methuen & Co., 1957). In the above statements, Maring said that he saw the agents of the State Security Committee in 1921, and Pick claimed that he worked for the Cheka in 1924.

183 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 85. 184 For example, Chapman believes it was the result of Popovs investigation that

Soviet agents were sent from Russia in 1920 and organised the CCP. See his The Chinese Revolution p 45. Li Da recalled the dispatch of Voitinsky's team by the Comintern was based on information from Vladivostok. Yida qianhou Vol 2, p 6.

116

segregation" due to the blockage of the Sino-Russian border until spring 1920 ,1 85

the foregoing delineation has clearly shown that no matter what obstacles and

difficulties the Bolsheviks faced, nothing could prevent them from sending agents to

China nor hinder them from trying to spread revolution to China. The Bolsheviks

started to send their agents to China in the early months of 1918. From then on, a

considerable number of agents arrived in China via different border areas and ports.

Those agents dispatched from Russia or recruited in China belonged to

various central and local organisations, such as the RCP(B)'s Central and various

local committees and its Federation of Foreign Communist Groups; the Comintern's

Executive Committee, its subordinate bureaus in Irkutsk, Tashkent and Baku, and

its auxiliary organisations including the Red Trade International and the Young

Communist International; Soviet Government apparatuses, such as the

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs and

their relevant institutes in the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia; the Red Army, the

Cheka and their local units. At an early stage, especially during the period of the

Civil War, there used to be no unified planning for work in China among those

organisations, and therefore their activities lacked co-ordination. Different

organisations each sent their own agents for carrying out their respective tasks. 186

185 Xiang Qing, 'An Exploratory Study on the Issue That When the Comintern Started Establishing Relations with the Chinese Revolution', Danqsh! vanjiu ziliao, (1981), No 3, plý 122-23.

86 For example in a report to the ECCI (dated 21 December 1920), the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B) complained that the Comintern had dispatched Pak Chinsen and Liu Shaozhou to China and that Narkomindel had allocated money and valuables to the Korean Socialist Party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Tibet without consulting with them. GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 56-7. Similarly, the Comintern agent Minor did not know that General Potapov had been in China as a Soviet representative. Haiyu guke, Jiefan-q bielu,.

117

In spite of the fact that those agents came from different channels and

different organisational systems which may not have been accountable each other,

or even from organisations which were in conflict, ' 87 once in China, most of them

joined hands together, trying to achieve a common objective.

Some agents worked for several organisations and held different posts

concurrently. For instance, Voitinsky worked for the East Asian Secretariat of the

Comintern, Rosta and Shanghai Life; Khodorov worked for the Rosta, Shanghai

Life and the Yurin Legation. Many agents concealed their true identities with the

overt professions of journalists, teachers, businessmen and tailors.

It seems inconceivable that some agents were not pure Bolsheviks. In fact,

since there were not enough Bolsheviks who could speak Chinese or English and

who could be sent to China, Soviet Russia and the Comintern did not stick to one

pattern when choosing agents to send to China or recruiting agents in China.

Among these agents, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists, ex-POWs,

radical Muslims, the former diplomats of the Provisional Government, clerks of the

Russo-Asiatic Bank and the Chinese Customs, even ex-Tsar army officers were

enlisted, whatever their beliefs and status, so long as they were willing to serve

Soviet Russia or their motherland. Some scholars are inclined to infer that an "ex-

tsarist officer" or a "white Russian" could not become a "Soviet representative" or a

"Comintern agent". 188 They seem not to have considered the complexities of human

nature and specific historical terms: the fluidity of political allegiances which is

187 For instance, the Dal'buro of the RCP(B) headed by Krasnoschekov in Chita and the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern headed by Shumiasky in Irkutsk were in conflict. Cf. Waring's Report to the ECCI', 11 July 1922', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 229.

18" See Xiao Lin's article 'The Motive and Effects of Lenin's Letter to Chen Jiongming', Fuiian dangshi vuekan (The History of the CCP in Fujian, Monthly), (1990), No 12] and Ye Yonglie's book Zhonggonq zhi Chu, p 121.

118

perhaps especially great at a turning point of changing regimes. A metaphysical

mode of thinking has blinded these scholars to the historical facts that were not at

all "either this or that" or "either red or white".

Those agents who arrived in China or who were recruited before 1920 were

active in China at a remarkably early stage and their endeavours paved the way for

the operations of the Voitinsky team. Certainly the Voitinsky team strengthened the

influence of Bolshevism and hence advanced the cause of revolution in China. But

it is beyond doubt that Voitinsky's arrival was not the starting point of the activities

of Soviet Russia and the Comintern in China. Clearly such activities were well

underway before that.

As has been already indicated, the Soviet and Comintern agents in China

were well-organised and there were several institutions around a few leading

centres. Although these organisations belonged to different networks, each with its

own particular duty, nearly all of them were linked together and co-ordinated their

activities and sometimes even shared a common pool of staff.

The circumstances of Bolshevik agents in China at this early stage which I

have described above may appear unimaginable, but are nevertheless based on

factual records and accounts. These agents played a significant role in the rise of

the Communist movement in China.

119

CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE CHINESE

Making contact with the Chinese was one of the tasks of many of Soviet

Russia's and Comintern agents who came into China during the period in question.

The actual contact usually happened immediately after these agents' arrival. In the

summer of 1919, the Politburo of the RCP(B) gave instructions that the Bolsheviks

should establish firm ties with revolutionary organisations in the Far Eastern

countries! Subsequently, making contact with Chinese, Japanese and Koreans

became a pressing matter for the Bolsheviks in the Far East, and more agents were

dispatched to China for this purpose. Without question such contacts took place at

an early stage, and it was not the case that "the progressive elements in China were

not able to make contact with the Russian Revolution and the Comintern until

Soviet Russia smashed the Allied armed intervention in 1920. '92 The main

questions which merit further research here are what kinds of people the agents got

in touch with and for what purposes.

In the past, many Chinese historians focused their attention on the contacts

with Chinese Marxists. In fact, there was hardly any one who could be called a

Marxist in China when the initial contacts were made. What we can see in a large

number of original records is that the scope of the contacts was wide-ranging. It

was not limited only to the so-called progressive elements, who later became the

2 'Vilensky's Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39. Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Communist Organizations of the Chinese

Residents in Russia and Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Jiandaishi Yaniiu, (1989), No 5, p 152.

120

Chinese Communist leaders, but also included persons belonging to other parties

and organisations, which held different political stands, and various circles. As

Zhou Enlai remarked in his report on "the Comintern and the Chinese Communist

Party":

No sooner had the Comintern been founded in March 1919 than it began to send its

delegates to various countries to visit prominent personages and to do work. In

China they did not only meet Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, but also Jiang Kanghu,

Huang Jiemin and Dai Jitao. In the North they visited Wu Peifu and in the South

they visited Sun Yatsen. 3

The Chinese Zhou referred to above can be classified as radical democrats,

socialists, anarchists and nationalists by their beliefs and teachers, journalists,

politicians and warlords by their professions. Such contacts reflected the

Bolsheviks' deliberate tactics. Since China was dominated by several imperialist

powers, the Bolsheviks tried firstly to attract as many forces as possible who might

be willing to join hands with Soviet Russia against the other foreign powers

regardless of their social position or political beliefs. As Japan was Soviet Russia's

main threat in the Far East, the Bolshevik agents were entrusted with the task of

entering into contact with all the forces that could help the Bolsheviks in their

struggle against Japan. The Comintern leader Radek even declared that "In China,

whoever is against Japanese imperialism is fighting for the Chinese revolutionary

development.,, 4 This meant that in China whoever was against the Japanese and

3 Zhou Enlai xuanii (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: People's Press, 1980), Vol 2, p 303.

4 Gonachan quoui youguan Zhonclquo geming de wenxian ziliao (Documentary Sources of the Comintern on the Chinese Revolution), (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1981), p 63.

121

other imperialist powers could be counted among Soviet Russia's friends for that

period of time. In addition, the Bolsheviks tried to seek some individuals who could

become their faithful followers to conduct Communist revolution and to serve

Soviet Russia's interests.

Section 1. Contact with Radical Intellectuals

In the first place, the objects of examination will be some of the founders of

the Chinese Communist Party. It may be interesting to see how they were

approached by Soviet and Comintern agents and how they became Communist

leaders.

Li Dazhao is known as the first person in China to have advocated

Bolshevism and Marxism. However, Li's original political stance was not radical.

Li Dazhao opposed any revolution which aimed to overthrow existing governments.

What he appreciated was evolutionism, nationalism, reformism and compromise.

Towards the end of 1912, he joined Jiang Kanghu's "Chinese Socialist Party", 5

which stood for moderate social refonn. From 1913 to 1916 Li studied law in Japan

where he was influenced by the Western ideas of liberal democracy and where he

edited a magazine Minyi (National Spirit). After returning to China Li Dazhao

became a close friend of Tang Hualong and Sun Hongyi, the leaders of the Chinese

Progressive Party, a party which mainly consisted of the persons who had advocated

constitutional monarchy during the last years of the Qing dynasty. Later, Li also

5 Cf. LO Mingzhuo, Li Dazhao sixianq van*iu (The Studies of Li Dazhao's Thoughts), (Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1983), pp 96-115; Liu Minshan, 'Ll Dazhao and Tianjin', Tianiin wenshi ziliao xuanii (Cultural and Historical Material on Tianjin), No 40.

122

attended the founding meeting of the Society for Constitutional Research, which

was organised by several leaders of the Progressive Party, and was widely known as

"the Research Clique". While he edited the magazine Jiaygn (Tiger), Chenzhong

(Morning Bell) and Xin Qingnian (New Youth), Li's articles written before the fall

of 1918 showed no sign of interest in Marxism. 6 In January 1918, Li assumed the

post of director of the Library of Beijing University and afterwards his views

changed.

In the autumn of 1918, Li Dazhao published "The Victory of the Common

People" and "The Victory of Bolshevism" in which he eulogised the Russian

October Revolution with immense zeal. This has puzzled many of the historians

who have engaged in research on Li Dazhao and the CCP. They have suggested

various explanations. B. Schwartz believes that Li Dazhao's vision of a "global

rebirth" and his interest in a "universal solution" induced him to accept the

messianic message of Lenin. 7 M. Meisner thinks that Li's "historical image of

century-long revolution waves was a prominent feature of his response to the

,, 8 Bolshevik Revolution. And Dirlik asserts that "a prior exposure to anarchism

may have contributed to Li's response to the Russian Revolution in 1918. "9

Perhaps these scholars have neglected some important source material. Li Dazhao's

6 In the past Ll Dazhao was said to have learned Marxism from Kawakami Hajime in Japan. But actually Kawakami was in Europe while Li was studying in Japan. And Kawakami was not even a Marxist then. (Yang Kuisong: 'Li Dazhao and Kawakami Hajim', Dangsh! vaniiu (Studies of the CCP's History , (Beijing, 1985), No 2. Li Dazhao told a Japanese teacher in 1918 that he had met the Japanese socialist Abe [so in Tokyo and had been influenced by his ideas. Abe was even farther away from Marxism. (Jin Anping, 'The Chinese Student in Japan in Modern Times and the Early Communist Movement in China'Jindaishi yanjiu), 1990, No 2.

7 B. 1. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp 12-15,18-19,21-22.

8 M. Meisner, I-I Ta-chao and the Oriqins of Chinese Marxism, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p 61.

9 A. Dirlik, The Oriqins of Chinese Communism, p 26. 123

intimate friend, Gao Yihan, 10 gave the reason for Li Dazhao's sudden change in

ideas as follows:

1918 was a year of crucial importance in the course of Shou Chang's (Li Dazhao's

original first name) conversion to Marxism. ... News about the Russian October

Revolution of 1917 had continually spread into China, and Shou Chang got to know

a Russian diplomat. ... This deepened Shou Chang's understanding of Marxism and

the October Revolution. It was in November of this year that he wrote the article to

laud the victory of the Bolsheviks. "

Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to Gao's memoir, even though it

provides us with the very important information that Li Dazhao was acquainted with

a Russian diplomat not long after the October Revolution. The question then arises:

who was this Russian diplomat Li was in contact with?

As we have seen, before August 1920 there existed only the old Russian

diplomatic legation headed by Prince Kudashev. So the Russian diplomat whom Li

Dazhao met in 1918 or thereabouts must have belonged to the Kudashev Mission.

In Chapter 11 mentioned a Russian called A. A. Ivanov, the only one at the

Legation who identified with the Soviet regime and who afterwards became the sole

Soviet representative there. Even after being expelled from the Legation, he still

continued working for the Soviet Government. Ivanov was probably the person

who contacted Li Dazhao in 1918, because Ivanov's dwelling place was rather near

to the Library of Beijing University, and Li had showed an interest in Russian

10 Gao Yihan got to know Li Dazhao in Japan where they edited a magazine. After returning to China they still edited several magazines together. Later, both became professors at Beijing University. Therefore, Gao was very familiar with Li's career. " Gao Yihan, 'Memories of Li Dazhao during the May 4th Period', Wusl yundong hLi ýyilq (Memories of May Forth Movement), (Beijing, 1959) pp 339-342.

124

affairs. 12 As an anarcho-syndicalist, Ivanov might also have conveyed his anarchist

beliefs to Li during their talks. Perhaps this was the reason why in his famous

article "The Victory of Bolshevism" Li Dazhao displayed anarchist tendencies:

Bolshevism is the ideology of the Russian Bolsheviks. What kind of ideology is it?

... There will be no congress, no parliament, no president, no prime minister, no

cabinet, no legislature and no ruler. There will be only the joint soviets of

labourers, which will decide all matters. All enterprises will belong to those who

work therein. 13

Later, even after he had declared himself a Marxist, Li Dazhao still

advocated Kropotkin's theory of "mutual aid", syndicalist "direct action", the

Russian populists' "going among the people" and Tolstoy's Pan-labourism, which

might have been influenced by certain Russians including Ivanov.

In addition, we have further evidence from an old member of the CCP, Lin

Boqu, which confirms that Li Dazhao disseminated ideas and booklets from Soviet

Russia: "Around March or April 1918 1 received several letters from Li Dazhao one

after another. He introduced the Russian October Revolution to me and enclosed

some pamphlets and documents. " 14 These publicity materials could not come from

anyone but Soviet Russian agents.

In summer 1919, Ivanov became a lecturer at Beijing University, the most

famous University in China. This provided ample opportunities for him to contact

12 The Library of the Beijing University was located at Shatan, Dongsi, near Ivanov's home in Yanyue hutong, Dongsi; both were in the East District of Beijing. Li Dazhao had already written articles to introduce the Russian February Revolution.

13 Xin gingnian, Beijing, November 1918, Vol 5, No 5. 14 Lin Boqu's talk with Wang Laidi in October 1956, quoted by Wang Laidi in her article

'Some Questions on the Early Organization of the CCP. ', Zheiianq- xuekan (The Academic Journal of Zhejiang University), (Hangzhou, 1981) No 3.

125

Chinese intellectuals. In the following years, Ivanov was reported to be "in touch

with some of the Chinese interested in Bolshevism. "15

Ivanov's friend Polevoy, a liaison man for the Comintern, also had close

relations with Li Dazhao. Polevoy was a lecturer at the Beijing Russian Language

Institute in 1918 and later he took up a post teaching Russian at Beijing University

on the recommendation of Li Dazhao. At first he only taught several hours each

week at the University, but from January 1921 he became a formal lecturer there. 16

Zhang Guotao, a student at Beijing University then recalled that Polevoy "had

frequent contacts with Mr. Li Dazhao". 17

The historian Jin Yufu, in his article "Li Dazhao and the May 4th

Movement", writes:

Soon after Li Dazhao became the Director of the Library of Beijing University, he

began to have dealings with Soviet Russia's personnel in Beijing. After the Russian

October Revolution, Soviet Russia often sent working personnel to Beijing to make

contact with progressive Chinese people. At first there were two Russians who

frequently met with Mr. [Li] Dazhao. [They] often visited the Library of Beijing

University. 18

Unsure as to who the two Russians were, Jin Yufu believes that they

might have been Voitinsky and Polevoy. Jin was an old professor at Beijing

University and before writing the article in question in 1950 he made inquiries

15 FO 228/3216, No 41,4 December 1920. 16 Huang Xiurong, Gonc c ichan -quoii yu Zhonqciuo gerning - luanxi shi. p 58; *The List of

the Foreign Employees of the Beijing University, Dancishi ton-clxun (The Bulletin of the History of the CCP), (Beijing, 1983), No 19.

17 Zhang Guotao, 'My Recollections', Yida qianhou, Vol 2, pp 128-29. 18 WUSi yundong huivilu (Collected Reminiscences of the May 4th Movement),

(Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1979), Vol 1, pp 349-360. 126

among several members of Beijing University's staff who had had close relations

with Li Dazhao, such as Zhang Shizhao, Mang Shenfu, Zhu Shangrui and Wang

Xiying. It is possible that one or more of Jin's informants had seen two Russians

entering Li's office but did not know who they were. Nevertheless, in the light of

our present knowledge it is likely that the two Russians were Ivanov and Polevoy,

since both were in Beijing in 1918 and later taught at Beijing University, therefore

they could have frequently entered the University Library without arousing

suspicion, while Voitinsky could not have appeared at the library until 1920. Most

people only knew that Li had relations with Polevoy and did not mention Ivanov.

The reason may be that Polevoy used the cover of being a "White Russian, "

whereas Ivanov's political status had already been exposed. Therefore, Polevoy

was in a better position than Ivanov to engage in open activities in Beijing and to

get in touch with Chinese people. In spring 1920, when Voitinsky's team arrived

in Beijing, Ivanov and Polevoy immediately introduced them to Li Dazhao and his

followers. 19 This confirms that both Ivanov and Polevoy already had close

connections with Li Dazhao and also knew his political stance very well.

Soon after Burtman and other Bolsheviks came to Tianjin on commission

from the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) in the early summer of 1919, they

started making contact with Chinese intellectuals, including Li Dazhao. Several

months later, when Mfiller came to assist Burtman, he found that "Burtman, even

before my arrival, had fairly wide ties with progressive Chinese students from the

19 Dalin, Zhonqquo huivilu, 1921-1927 (China Memories, 1921-1927), (Beijing, 1981). 127

higher educational institutions and colleges in Tianjin and Beiiing, and personally

,, 20 with Professor Li Ta-chao, whom Burtman spoke of as an excellent Marxist ...

There are also some other records about Li Dazhao's connection with the

Bolsheviks. One of the early leaders of the CCP, Peng Shuzhi, in his old age

reminisced about what Li Dazhao had told him during their stay in Moscow in

1924:

At the end of 1919, a Russian named Hohonovky, who was a member of the

RCP(B), on the recommendation of Polevoy, came to Beijing University to visit me.

At our first meeting he said: 'How do you do, Comrade Li Dazhao. ' Before the

guest told me the purpose of his visit, I declared: 'I am still not qualified to be called

your cornrade. ' But the guest answered quickly: 'We know that you are a Marxist,

since you have written a lot of articles to introduce Marxism and to praise

Bolshevism, so you have already become our cornrade. '

About Hohonovky, Peng Shuzhi added the following note: "Hohonovky was born in

Harbin and could speak Chinese fluently. He understood the situation after the May

4th Movement, and was therefore sent by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern

to China. Later this man became a professor in the Chinese class of the Communist

University for the Toilers of the East. When Li Dazhao attended the 5 th Congress of

the Comintern in Moscow in 1924, he met the man again by chance .,, 2 1 This man,

according to Qin Baopu, who studied at the Communist University for the Toilers of

the East in 1921-1922, was dean of the Far East Department of the University. 22

20 MOller, Plameni Revoliutsii. 1917-1920; quoted from Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p 105.

21 Peng Shuzhi, 'How the First Communist Group Take Form? ' Peng Shuzhi xuanii,, Vol 1, pp 48-9.

22 Qin Baopu called this man "Hoholofukin". See Oin's'Travels in Red Russia', Chen 128

Zhang Zhi's recollections reveal that, together with some other Chinese, Li

Dazhao visited a Soviet Russian representative at the No. I special district of Tianjin

on the occasion when Li escorted Chen Duxiu to Shanghai via Tianjin. The

meeting lasted over one hour. 23 Some Chinese historians assert that the Russian

whom Li Dazhao met was Burtman. But according to Kasanin, Burtman left for

24 Siberia in January 1920, while Chen went to Shanghai the following month.

However, it seems more likely that this man could have been Khodorov, who was

living in Tianjin during that time and was widely regarded as a "semi-official

delegate of the Russian Soviet Government". 25 Hence it is quite possible that the

"Soviet Russian representative" whom Li and others met in Tianjin was Khodorov.

In the light of this albeit sketchy information, we can see that at least five

Soviet or Comintern agents had dealings with Li Dazhao prior to Voitinsky's

arrival. Their contacts with Li Dazhao should not be seen simply as chance affairs

or personal initiatives, and they were probably approved by Moscow. There can be

no doubt that these contacts exerted influence on Li's thinking and on his

subsequent actions, particularly with regard to his activity in organising the CCP.

Before becoming the first top leader of the CCP, Chen Duxiu had been an

active revolutionary for a long time. During his studies in Japan Chen joined such

revolutionary organisations as Qingnian hui (the Youth Society) and Yue wang hui

(the Warrior Yue Society). He also organised a number of societies in China after

his return in 1903. He took part in the Revolution of 1911 and afterwards became

bao (Morning Post), 27 August 1924. 23 Zhang Jingru, Zhonqciuo qonqchandanq de chuangli (The Founding of the CCP),

(Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1981) p 121. 24 Kasanin, China in the Twenties. 25 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920.

129

the head of the Anhui Provincial Secretariat. 26 Later he felt that the new Republic

existed only in name and insisted that if political changes stood any chance of

success, Chinese traditional thought, culture and customs should be rejected.

Therefore Chen started publication of a journal Oingnian zazhi (Youth Magazine)

in 1915, whose name was changed to Xin gingnian (New Youth) with the French

title "La Jeunesse" one year later. In 1917 Chen was invited by Cai Yuanpei,

Chancellor of Beijing University, to become dean of the Faculty of Literature at the

University. The editorial office of the magazine moved with him to Beijing.

As an iconoclast, Chen Duxiu severely attacked almost all Chinese national

heritage, especially Confucianism. He claimed in his famous article published in

September 1915 "Call to Youth": "Now our country still has not awakened from its

long dream, and isolates itself by going down the old rut. ... All our traditional

ethics, law, scholarship, rites and custom are survivals of feudalism. " These

46poisonous germs" were destroying China. While attacking the "old and rotten"

Chinese traditions, Chen introduced the "fresh and vital" Western ideas of

"Democracy and Science" to the Chinese people. 27 . In Chen's opinion, the most

powerful weapon in the arsenal of change was the cultural weapon. In this way a

New Cultural Movement was launched in China, with Xin ginRnian as its main

focus and Chen Duxiu as its initiator and standard-bearer.

Since Chen Duxiu was seen as a trail-blazer among the progressive

intellectuals, it was natural that he would attract the attention of Soviet agents.

Although the relevant historical records are scarce, one can still unearth evidence of

26 Wang Guangyuan, Chen Duxiu nianbiao (A Chronicle of Chen Duxiu's Life), (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1987).

27 Quoted from the English translation in Vera Simone, China in Revolution, (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp 128-34.

130

this. In April 1927, the warlord Zhang Zuolin's troops seized many documents

from the Soviet Union's embassy in Beijing and among them there was A Brief

HistoEy of the CCP. This booklet was written by a Russian, but a Japanese historian

Otsuka Reizo believed that Li Dazhao was credited with drafting the preliminary

text as a report to the Comintern. 28 Anyway the Brief History is actually a most

reliable and valuable first-hand historical source on the early history of the CCP- In

this book we read that "in 1918 Chen was the only person who was engaged in

Communist work. "29 At first glance, this account of Chen's activity seems patently

wrong because he was not even a believer in Communism at the time. Hence, in a

strict sense, it is not possible that Chen was engaged in Communist work in 1918.

However, what the writer of the above had in mind was probably something

different. It is likely that Chen was involved in some work assigned by Soviet

agents such as Ivanov and Polevoy, either in person or through his intimate friend

and colleague Li Dazhao. At first Chen might not even have been aware of what he

was doing, whereas Li was fully conscious of what he was engaged in.

Chen Duxiu not only joined the Marxist Research Society organised by Li

Dazhao but also became one of the editors of Meizhou PinOun from the fall of

1918. In June 1919 Chen was arrested for distributing leaflets with Gao Yihan and

Deng Chu in Beijing. Some sources say that the real reason for his arrest was that

2'3 This book is normally credited to the Russians Kisselev or Frunse. According to the research of V. Nikiforov, the book was written by Navmov, a Russian advisor in Huangpu Military Academy during 1926-27, based entirely on the source materials offered by the Chinese Communists. See his'The Chinese Labour Movement and the Birth of the CCP', Problemy Sovet Istoriya,

_(1 982), No 1, translated into Chinese by Lin

Yincheng, in Gonqchanciuoei vu Zhoncl-quo geming - Sulian xuezhe lunwen xuanyl, p 293. Otsuka Reizo, Shina Kvosanto Shi (The History of the_Communist Party in China), (Tokyo, 1940), Part 1, p 8.

29 'A Brief History of the CCP', in Wilbur and How (eds. ), DCNSAC, p 48. 131

he was involved in the production of Bolshevik literature. 30 This is not entirely far-

fetched because the "Declaration to Beijing Citizens" he was distributing went

beyond the most radical demands made by students during the May 4th Movement

and some of its expressions were similar to those used by the Bolsheviks. For

example, in the "Declaration" the following two demands were made among others:

"3. To abolish the Headquarters of the Army and Headquarters of the Police in

Beijing; 4. The defence force in Beijing to be replaced by organisation of the

citizens;,, 31 which is quite similar to some slogans in Lenin's April Theses:

"Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy. ... The standing army to be

02 replaced by the arming of the whole people. Of course, these are also Marxist

principles, but at that time Chen knew nothing about Marxism. Where he obtained

these ideas is questionable. As further background to Chen's arrest, at the same

time as he was circulating the "Declaration", the Beijing Police Department found

another "extremist" (Bolshevik) leaflet entitled "The Declaration of the

Representative Organisation in the East". 33

According to Hu Shi, a Soviet representative came to Beijing and invited Hu

Shi to discuss matters relating to the establishment of a Communist party in China.

Since Hu had something else to do and could not go to meet this representative on

the appointed day, Chen Duxiu had a chance to talk with him and later became the

leader of the CCp. 34 It is not clear if this was Chen's first contact with the

30 FO 228/3214,17 July 1919. 31 'Materials on Chen Duxiu's Arrest', Bei'ing dang'an shiliao (Archival Materials on

Beijing's History), (Beijing, 1986) No 1. 32 Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 24, p 23. ; '3 Note from the Office of the Beijing Police Department, 1919, No 39; Shi bao

(Shanghai Times), 1 July 1919. 34 Luo Ergang, 'Some Facts about Hu Shi', Yan Zhenwu (ed. ), Hu Shi yaniiu conglu

132

Bolshevik agents, however, it probably happened between the fall of 1919 and the

beginning of 1920. In early 1920 Chen met a correspondent of the Comintern's

News Agency in Tianjin when Chen went there to give a lecture to students. 35

These two contacts must have taken place before Chen's departure to Shanghai.

On his arrival in Shanghai in February 1920 Chen Duxiu at once got in

touch with some Chinese who had relations with the Bolsheviks there, such as Li

Hanjun, Zhang Mochi and Huang Jiemin. On 2 March Chen delivered a speech at a

meeting of the Ship and Godown Workers' Union, with which a Soviet agent

Stopany had already established firm relations. 36 After Voitinsky's team came to

Shanghai, they approached Chen immediately. Afterwards Chen kept in close

contact with the Bolshevik agents in Shanghai. The British Intelligence Reports

showed that, Chen Duxiu had "a number of doubtful Russian friends and among

others the staff of ShanRhai Life"; and he was in "close touch with the Bolshevik

agents and particularly with Lizerovitch. 9937 Many scholars considered that the

period from the spring to the summer of 1920 marked a decisive turning point in

Chen's political life - an important stage in Chen's conversion to Marxism. What is

beyond doubt is that this conversion occurred under the influence of the Bolsheviks.

Another important figure who had connections with Bolshevik agents at an

early stage was Li Hanjun, who was one of the main founders of the CCP. Li had

studied in Japan for fourteen years. While at Tokyo Imperial University he studied

some Marxist books. On his return to China Li participated in the New Culture

(Collected Articles on Hu Shi Studies), p 13. 35 Li Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCP', (Moscow, 1 February 1930), Yida

gianhou, Vol 3. 36 FO 228/3214,4 March 1920. 37 FO 405/233, No 107.

133

Movement. Since his elder brother was a founding member of Tongmeng hui, Li

had close relations with some nationalist leaders, and could therefore join the

editorial office of Xingqi 12inglun (Sunday Review), a paper of GMD (the National

Party). By October 1919 the British Intelligence Bureau was informed that there

were two Chinese Bolsheviks living in the French Concession in Shanghai and their

names were given as Ho Hyau Lieu and Lee Jen Jehy. 38 Nothing more is known

about Ho Hyau Lieu, but we can be confident that Lee Jen Jehy was Li Hanjun, for

his original name was Li Renjie and the intelligence report also pointed out that Lee

had been a student in Japan. Yang Zhihua's memoirs provide additional evidence

about Li's relations with radicals from Russia and other countries:

In the vacation of 1919,1 went to the office of Xinqi Pinglun in Shanghai.

Li Hanjun was the leading spirit of the office in the area of ideas. ... [He] had

connections with the Communists of Japan and Korea then. ... My aim in

joining the office of Xinggi Pinglun was to go to Soviet Russia to study, and

Li Hanjun gave me a lot of help in this. He took me to the home of some

Japanese and Korean progressive friends and also introduced me to a Russian

friend to learn Russian. 39

Yang's memoirs indicate that Li Hanjun was well acquainted with certain

progressive Russians, although she was not specific about whether they were

Bolsheviks or not. From the British archives it is clear that Li at least knew the

Russians Lizerovitch and Lundon at the time. Lizerovitch was a Soviet agent and

Lundon was Lizerovitch's intimate friend and also served Soviet Russia. Later Li

33 FO 405/228,7 April 1920. 39 'Yang Zhihua's Recollections', Yida qianhou, Vol 2, pp 25-6. Yang later became

Qu Qiubai's wife. 134

attended several meetings held by Voitinsky. Perhaps due to his close connections

with these Bolshevik agents, he was chosen to be the first chairman of the Red

Trade Union of the Far East, which was based in Chita. 40

Zhang Tailei was a unique figure in the process of establishing the CCP. He

acted as a faithful assistant and interpreter for the Bolshevik representatives in

China. In spring 1921 he went to Irkutsk and assumed the post of head of the

Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. He often carried

out special tasks in the Far East as a representative of the Comintern and was thus

the first delegate of the CCP to attend the P Comintern Congress. It is interesting

to know the reason why Zhang could inspire such trust from the Russian

Bolsheviks. In autumn 1918, when Zhang was still a poor student at the Law

Faculty of Beiyang University in Tianjin, he met Polevoy and kept in touch with

him afterwards. 41 About this time Polevoy was enrolled as an agent of Soviet

Russia and later became the Comintern's liaison man in Tianjin. Zhang helped

Polevoy with his work in various ways, including translating, for he had learned

English at a Christian school. Zhang Tailei probably also met Burtman in 1919.

According to MUller, Burtman "had direct links with the students' demonstration in

Tianjin within the framework of the May 4th Movement ... Circles of students

attended political gatherings in his flat one after another. 42 Regrettably MUller did

not record the names of the students who visited Burtman's flat. In their article on

Zhang Tailei, the Soviet scholars P. Korovyakovsky and N. Rusanov assumed

4" Li Danyang and Liu Jianyi (eds. ), Li Haniun vaniiu ziliao (Research Materials on Li Hanjun), compiled in 1981, unpublished.

41 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhang Tailei weni (Collected Works of Zhang Tailei), (Beijing, 1981).

42 Quoted from Meisner, U Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p 115. 135

Zhang to be one of them, on the grounds that he later worked at the Far Eastern

Secretariat, which was initiated by Burtman himself. 43 This seems a reasonable

assumption. Moreover, Zhang set up a student organisation - the Society for Social

Reconstruction in February 1919, and was one of the student leaders in Tianjin

during the May 4h movement. Given this background, it is not difficult to

understand why, when Voitinsky's team arrived in Beijing, Zhang was summoned

there to act as their interpreter.

Besides Zhang Tailei there must have been some other Chinese students in

Tianjin who had relations with Burtman and other Bolsheviks. According to Zhu

Molin, there was a 'New Poetry Society' in the British Concession of Tianjin during

1919-1920 and its members are reported to have included Zhou Enlai, Zhang

Wentian, Han Linfu, Deng Yingchao and some Russians. 44

Qu Qiubai's rise to the leading position within the CCP after August 1927

was supported by the Comintern. Why Moscow chose him as key leader of the

CCP in place of Chen Duxiu can be explained by his early career. In 1917 Qu

began to learn Russian at the Beijing Russian Language Institute, where one of his

lecturers was Polevoy, with whom he maintained close relations. 45 Maybe it was

through Qu that Polevoy got to know Zhang Tailei, because Qu and Zhang were

classmates and close friends at Changzhou Secondary School and they kept in touch

43 Korovyakovsky and Rusanov, 'Zhang Tai Lei, A Trail-Blazer of the Chinese Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (11988) No 5, p 105.

44 Wang Jianmin, Zhonqquo Gonqchandanc gao (A Draft History of the Chinese 1 shic Communist Party), Taibei, 1965; In 1991 1 asked Deng Yingchao, through her secretary, for confirmation of this. She denied it.

45 Guan Shanf u, 'Some Facts on Polevoy and Ivanov', Dangshi tun-qxun, (11984), No 3. pp 58-9.

136

even after they enrolled at different institutions of higher education. 46 With their

special connections with Soviet agents, both Qu and Zhang joined Li Dazhao's

Marxist Research Society in 1920 and became the only members who did not

belong to Beijing University. 47

In the early summer of 1920, Qu was chosen to visit Soviet Russia as a

correspondent of Chen bao (the Morning poSt). 48 When he stopped over in Harbin,

Qu attended the celebration of the P anniversary of the October Revolution, at

which he told some Russian friends that there were several societies for studying

socialism and Marxism in China. 49 After he arrived in Chita Qu wrote a report to

the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, which was published under the pen-

name Strakhov in the first issue of the Bulletin of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the

Comintern in February 1921. In this report he wrote that with Voitinsky's help, the

first branch of the CCP had been founded in Shanghai and that in North China

Voitinsky had been engaged in organising Communist circles with the help of

Professor S. A. Polevoy's group. 50 These indicate that Qu was very familiar with

the process of the formation of the CCP's early organisations and with the activities

of the Soviet agents. 51 Yet many Chinese historians have not paid attention to this

46 Chen Tiejian, Ou Qiubai zhuan (The Biography of Qu Qiubai), (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1986).

47 Liu Nongchao, 'The Chief Commander in Leading the May Fourth Movement - Comrade Li Dazhao', Wusi vundonq lunwenii (Collected Theses on the May 4 th Movement), (Wuhan, 1959).

48 As early as June 1920, the news that the Chinese journalists would visit Soviet Russia appeared in Moscow. However, Qu and other journalists left for Soviet Russia in October 1920.

49 Qu Qiubai wenii (Writings of Qu Qiubai , (Lite ratu re), _(Beijing: The People's

Literature Press, 1985), Vol 1, p 62. 50 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, pp 415-6; V. 1. Glunin, 'The

Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 283.

Dov Bing believes that Qu wrote this letter in Beijing while Voitinsky was still there; 137

report by Qu and thus believe that Qu became involved in the Communist

movement only after he reached Soviet Russia or after he joined the CCp. 52 In fact,

Qu Qiubai had been committed to the Russian way before his departure to Russia.

During his trip to Moscow, Qu wrote "E xiang jicheng" (Journey to the Land of

Hunger), in which he described his journey as a trip towards the "gate of freedom"

and his mission as "shouldering the responsibility of developing ideas for China

during its rebirth", and extolled Moscow as the "lighthouse" in his heart. 53 On

arrival in Moscow, Qu and some other Chinese journalists claimed that they were

"the disciples of Karl Marx". 54 During his stay in Moscow, Qu got acquainted with

some Soviet and Comintern officials, and made a good impression on them.

Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei were the individuals within the CCP who

enjoyed the trust of the Bolsheviks most and were regarded as "long-tested, faithful,

reliable and exemplary Chinese Communists" . 55 This position much helped their

future careers within the CCP.

So far, I have made a brief survey of the early connections which existed

between Bolshevik agents and some key founders of the CCP. Besides these the

agents also contacted other Chinese radicals. The advent of Voitinsky's team in

China rendered the range of contacts wider and more open. As a result of these

efforts, more Chinese were drawn into the Communist movement. Voitinsky was

Dov Bing, 'Voitinsky and the Foundation of the CCP', Feiging vuebao (Taibel, November 1976) Vol 19, No 5.

52 There are arguments on the time Qu Qiubai joined the CCP: Some say that it was summer 1921; others say spring 1922; cf. Lu Yuan, 'On the Time When Qu Qiubai Joined the CCP', Dan-qshi vianaiu ziliao (Collected Materials on the CCP's History), (Shanghai, 1980), No 4.

53 QU Qiubai wenui (Writings of Qu Qiubai), (Literature), Vol 1. 54 in and Nortý, Soviet Russia and the East, p 89. *5,5'Vilensky to Radek, 6 April 1922', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 80.

138

so satisfied with it that he once stated that the list of educated young Chinese in

Shanghai who had pledged themselves in writing to the support of the Russian

Soviet and Communist principles was growing everyday. 56 The Bolsheviks'

endeavours to convert the Chinese to Communism were the main driving force

which gave the impetus to radical Chinese as they moved towards Bolshevism.

Section 2. Contact with Sun Yat-sen and His Party

Soviet Russia's contact with Sun Yat-sen and his followers is an interesting

subject for many scholars both in China and abroad, and much has been written on

this topic. But since the relevant materials have not been searched sufficiently, the

accounts are incomplete. In particular, there has been insufficient analysis of the

purpose which lay behind the contacts and its links with the establishment of the

CCP.

Sun Yat-sen was a great nationalist democratic revolutionary. He organised

Xingzhong hui (The Society for Reviving China) in 1894 and formed Tongmeng

hui (the Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905. His early political programme can be

summed up in his slogan: "Drive out the Manchus; Restore the Chinese Nation;

Establish a Republic and Equalize Land Ownership. " Sun called himself a socialist

and read socialist literature widely. In May 1905 he even visited the Executive

Bureau of the Second International in Brussels with the purpose of gaining

56 FO 228/3214, September 1920. 139

membership for his party. 57 Sun's ideas and his career endowed him with

considerable prestige, so Sun was elected the first Provisional President of the

Republic of China in January 1912. Before long Sun's Tongmeng hui changed its

name to Guomin Dang (the Nationalist Party, abbreviated to GMD). After moving

to oppose Yuan Shikai in the so-called "Second Revolution", Sun reorganised his

party in Japan in 1914 calling it Zhonghua Geming Dang (the Chinese

Revolutionary Party). In October 1919, the Party resumed its former name -

Guomin Dang.

The victory of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 drew the attention of Lenin

and the Bolshevik party to Sun Yat-sen and his party. In 1912, the Russian Socialist

Democratic Labour Party at its 6th conference hailed "the revolutionary republicans

of China" and recognised "the world-wide importance of the revolutionary struggle

,, 58 of the Chinese people. In the same year, after reading an article written by Sun

Yat-sen in Brussels' socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, Lenin commented on it in his

article "Democracy and Narodism in China", in which he praised Sun as "a

revolutionary democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class that is

rising" in addition to criticising Sun's economic programme aimed at forestalling

capitalism in China and thus similar to that entertained by the Russian Populists . 59

In November 1912 Lenin again wrote a piece on the political parties of China and

expressed himself favourably towards the GMD: "The Nationalist Party is

predominantly a party of the more industrially-developed and progressive southern

57 Hu Sheng, 'On Sun Zhongshan's Socialist Thoughts', Sun Zhongshan he ta de ahýidaj (Sun Yat-sen and His Era), Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1985, Vol 1, p 45.

5'3 Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 17, p 485. 59 in, Collected Works, Vol 18, pp 163-169.

140

part of the country. ... Its leaders are intellectuals who have been educated

abroad. '960 After the October Revolution the Bolsheviks believed that Sun Yat-sen

and his followers might become their allies in China. In one of the early

instructions issued by Soviet Russia's Council of People's Commissars to guide the

local soviets in Siberia on the policy toward the Far East, Sun's Guangdong

Government was portrayed as progressive. 61

For his part, Sun Yat-sen followed with interest the development of the

Russian Revolution and, while he was in exile kept in touch with such Russian

revolutionaries as E. Volkholvsky, N. K. Sudzilovskii and G. Chicherin. 62 After

becoming the provisional president of the Republic of China, Sun received the

Vice-Consul of the Russian Consulate General in Shanghai, Voznesensky, who was

a Socialist Revolutionary at that time and later the head of the Eastern division of

Narkomindel. Sun said to him: "The necessary condition for achieving the

complete success of social revolution is that Russians, Indians and Chinese must

participate in the revolution together. "63 When he heard news of the outbreak of the

February Revolution in Russia, Sun Yat-sen sent a congratulatory telegram to

Petrograd but received no reply. 64 On 25 October Sun despatched Wang Shuwen,

one of his staff, to Siberia in order to investigate the situation in Russia and report

back . 65 In a speech at a dinner party on 28 January 1918 Sun Yat-sen expressed his

60 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 18, p 401. 61 Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relation. p 33. 62 WU Xiangxiang, 'Soviet Scholarly Works on the Father of the State', Zhuanni

wenxue (Biographical Literature), (Taibei), Vol 23, No 3. 63 S. L. Tikhvinskii, 'Sun Yat-sen and Soviet Russia', Sun Zhon-qshan he ta de shidai,

Vol 1, p 532. 64 U Yunhan, Cong ronciciong dao gingdang (From the Admission of the Chinese

Communists to the Purification of the GMD), (Taibei: Commercial Press, 1966) p 110. 65 'Sun Yat-sen Sent a Person to Russia for Investigation of the Situation of the

141

hopes for the Russian Revolution along the lines that "If the revolutionary regime in

Russia can be consolidated, our revolution can be expected to develop rapidly in

ý66 67 China. ' In the summer of that year , at a time when Soviet Russia was isolated, ý

Sun Yat-sen sent a telegram in the name of the parliament of South China and the

Chinese Revolutionary Party, which expressed congratulations on the victory of the

Russian Revolution and stated: "Because of the Russian Revolution, mankind of the

world has found great hope. ... The revolutionary parties of China and Russia

should unite for a common struggle. t968

Upon receiving it, Ixnin was said to have been deeply moved and to have

regarded the message as "the light from the East". 69 On I August, Chicherin,

Commissar of Narkomindel and an old friend of Sun Yat-sen, replied to Sun in an

open letter. Here Sun Yat-sen was described as the Chinese revolutionary leader

and an honoured teacher. Chicherin also wrote that "The Russian working classes

turn to their Chinese brothers and call them on to the common fight. "70

It was these common concerns and mutual sympathy and understanding

which both sides demonstrated that became the basis of the early contacts between

Russian Bolsheviks and Sun Yat-sen's party. Actual contact was initiated by Lenin

October Revolution', Tuaniie bao (Unity Paper), (Beijing, March 30,1985). 66 Shao Yuanchong, 'Daily Record of the Constitution Defending Movement in

Guangdong', Jianguo vuekan (State Construction Monthly), (Nanjing, June 1935), Vol 12, No 6.

67 According to a news report in the Minguo ribao of 13 May 1918, Sun dispatched a telegram to the Soviet Government from Shanghai that May. But many scholars have thought that the telegram was sent in summer 1918.

68 Sun Zhongshan quan'i (Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen), (Beijing: People's Press, 1985), Vol 4, p 500; Song Oingling Xuanii (Selected Works of Song Qing-ling), (Beijing: People's Press, 1992), Vol 2, p 52.

69 Zou Lu, Zhonqquo Guomin danq shigao (Draft History of the GMD), (Chongqing, 1944), p 304; Quoted from Leng Shao-chuan and N. D. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism., (London, Thames & Hudson, 1961), p 48.

Degras (ed. ) Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, p 93. 142

in 1918 when he enquired whether it would be possible "to find among the Chinese

workers [in Russia] some brave men who could establish contact with Sun Yat-

sen". According to Voznesensky, "a reliable man" was sent to Guangzhou to

deliver Chicherin's letter at the end of 1918.71 Since Sun had already left

Guangzhou for Shanghai by then, his later claim not to have received the letter

might well have been true.

The Bolsheviks never gave up their efforts to get in touch with Sun Yat-sen

and his party. In June 1919, a Japanese newspaper reported that "Lenin's

Government sent a secret emissary to meet Sun Hongyi and there are signs that Sun

Hongyi also dispatched a secret emissary to Lenin's Government.,, 72 Sun Hongyi

had been Sun Yat-sen's plenipotentiary in Shanghai since November 1917 and kept

close relations with Sun Yat-sen. Therefore, the contact with Sun Hongyi could be

considered as a means of establishing contact with Sun Yat-sen. Several months

later, an intelligence report showed that five Chinese, one Japanese and one Korean,

all of whom were Bolshevik emissaries, had recently arrived in Shanghai to call on

Sun Yat-sen. The report added: "recently a Soviet emissary sent Sun Yat-sen a

letter urging a Soviet revolution in China. "73 In the same month Reuters reported

similarly and further noted that Mr. Zhongshan (Sun's alias) had denied that he had

any contact with Bolshevik agents. 74 Despite Sun's denial, the British Intelligence

Bureau offered detailed information to the effect that "Sun Yat-sen has been in

71 Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925, pp 137-138. Perhaps the "reliable man'was Zhu Zhaisheng, who was born in Russia and acted as a liaison between Moscow and Sun Yat-sen. See Wu Yingguang, 'The Alliance of Sun Yat-sun and Wu Peifu and the Soviet Policy in China during 1920-23', Sun Zhon-qshan y; pýi_ý (Studies of Sun Yat-sen), p 109.

73 Min-quo ribao (The Republic Daily), 20 June 1919. FO 228/3211,2 November 1919.

74 Min-quo ribao, 26,27, November 1919. 143

communication with the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia through the medium of

his secretary. ', 75

At the end of 1919, a Russian named N. Matveev Bodryi, head of the

Labour Society, which was organised by Russian 6migres in Shanghai, visited Sun.

Later, Bodryi went back to Russia and reported on his interview with Sun. On

returning to Shanghai he called on Sun again and talked with him about the Russian

and Chinese Revolutions. 76

Sun Yat-sen yearned to learn from the Bolsheviks' revolutionary experience

and even arranged for several important cadres of his Party, such as Liao Zhongkai,

Zhu Zhixin, Li Zhangda and Li Langru, to learn Russian in 1919, in order to send

them to Soviet Russia for this purpose. Since Russia was in serious crisis, they

failed to go there. 77 As news from Russia gradually filtered through to China, Sun

became aware of Bolsheviks' conduct of War Communism, rule by terror and so

forth. Such a turn of events did not accord with Sun's ideas of moderate social

reform. Sun came to consider that the Bolshevik regime arose from "acutely

abnormal" circumstances and thus Bolshevism was a kind of "unsound" doctrine. 78

Sun did not believe that communism could be successfully achieved in Russia in

this way. 79 However, the Bolshevik's military victory in the Civil War was

75 FO 228/3211,2 November 1919. 76 Matveev Bodryi, 'Two Meetings with Sun Yat-sen', Quoted from Zhou Gu, 'The

Early Relations between Sun Yat-sen and Russian Revolutionaries', Zhuanii wenxue March, 1991) Vol 85, No 3.

77 He Xiangnining, 'Some Recollections of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Weida de Sun Zhonashan (The Great Sun Yat-sen), (Hong Kong, 1957), p 39.

" Sun Yat-sen also talked about the dangers of the spread of Bolshevism in China. Dai Jitao, 'Mr. Sun's Talks during My Visits', Xinggi ginglun (Sunday Review), (Shanghai), 22 June 1919.

79 Sun expressed this opinion repeatedly during his talks with Potapov. See 'Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48.

144

undoubtedly inspiring to Sun and his followers, who had suffered one defeat after

another since 1912. So Sun was still willing to follow the Russian situation and

Bolshevik experience.

In March 1920 Sun Yat-sen had a long conversation with Lundon, a Russian

emigre, on the subject of Bolshevism. In the same month Sun admitted that he was

indirectly in touch with the Bolsheviks from Russia. 80 Some accounts indicate that

it was in March 1920 that "two Bolshevik agents came to Shanghai from

Vladivostok and visited Sun Yat-sen vý8 1 Although they are not specific on the

identity of the two men, according to Sokolsky, early in 1920 Colonel Popov, "who

came with credentials from the Commander of Bolshevik troops of the Amur

district", visited Sun with General Potapov, "who had been posing as a Bolshevik,

but had no credentials". Popov and Potapov discussed with Sun the plan for co-

operation between the GMD and the Bolsheviks. 82 They also tried to persuade Sun

to approve the Karakhan Manifesto but failed as Potapov wrote later that Sun was

too timid to respond to the Manifesto publicly, fearing that it would harm the

revolutionary work he was doing and make trouble for his stay in the foreign

settlement if his contacts with Moscow would thereby be revealed. 83 During the

meetings with Sun Yat-sen, Potapov expressed his desire to visit Chen Jiongming, a

military leader of the GMD in Zhangzhou.

80 FO 228/3214,18 March 1920. 81 FO 228/3214,25 March 1920.

82 'The Reminiscences of George Sokolsky, Manuscript, dated 1956 and 1963, Oral History Collection, Columbia University, Quoted from Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, p 115; Potapov had met Sun before this visit in March 1920. Luo Gang (ed. ), Zhonqhua minquo quofu shilu (The Factual Account of Sun Yat-sen), 6 Vols., Taibei: Zhengzhong Publishing House, 1988, Vol 5, p 3544.

83 'Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48. 145

General Chen Rongming's troops in South China were Sun Yat-sen's only

important military force at that time. The siege of southern Fujian by the troops of

General Chen in August 1918 was seen by some in Moscow as the beginning of a

Soviet revolution in South China. 84 Before long, Chen's troops occupied an area in

Southern Fujian with Zhangzhou as its centre, which was regarded by Sun Yat-sen

as an important base area of revolution. Chen Jiongming was interested in

socialism. He carried out a programme of propaganda and the encouragement of

64 new culture" and "new social customs" in Southern Fujian and this area was

, 85 therefore called "the Russia of Southern Fujian' . In Shantou, Zhangzhou's

neighbouring city, there was a Soviet agent who reported on Zhangzhou's situation

to the Soviet Government and disseminated news about Soviet Russia in the area. 86

Soviet leaders attached much importance to Chen, for they considered that Chen

held real power and had military strength and believed that to establish relations

with Chen would be very useful for them.

In spring 1920, the Bolsheviks in Shanghai established relations with Chen

Jiongming via Lu Shikai, an assistant of Stopany. 87 Nearly at the same time that

Potapov asked Sun Yat-sen to help him meet Chen Jiongming, the Comintern agent

84 Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet Dinlomatic Relations, p 132. 85 Ru Shan, 'What I Saw and Heard during My Visit to Zhangzhou', Beining daxue

xuesheng zhoukan (Beijing University Students' Weekly), (May 1st 1920) No 14. 116 Fuiian dangshi vuekan., (11990) No 12. According to the above article all these were

done by the Russian consulate in Shantou. In fact, there was definitely no Soviet consulate at that time; instead, a Russian, Mikulin, who worked at the Chinese Maritime Customs in Shantou, was serving Soviet Russia; see FO 228/3211, November 1920.

117 'Report from K. J. McEuen, the Commissioner of Police in Shanghai', in American State Archives, Class 800,1920; quoted from LO Fang-shang, Geming zhi zaiqi, (Resurgence of the Revolution), (Taibei, The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1989), p 93.

146

Polevoy informed General Chen, through a Chinese named Jiang who was working

in Zhangzhou, that a Soviet representative would visit Zhangzhou. 88

On 29 April 1920, General Potapov with his team, including a Swedish lady

named Mrs Michemach and a Korean named Yo Unphyong, arrived in Zhangzhou

via Shantou. They met Chen Jiongming and other prominent GMD members, such

as Zhu Zhixin and Liao Zhongkai, who were assisting Chen in Zhangzhou at the

time. Potapov presented Chen with a letter from Lenin in which Lenin expressed

his concern for the Chinese revolution and his admiration for Chen. Potapov

proposed that Soviet Russia could provide Chen's troops with ordnance if Chen

needed such supplies. The two sides signed a memorandum on their talks. When

89 Potapov left Zhangzhou he took Chen Jiongming's reply to Lenin. In this letter

Chen congratulated Lenin on the achievements of the Russian Revolution, approved

the Karakhan Manifesto and declared: "I firmly believe that Bolshevism will bring

happiness to human beings. I will do my best to spread the principles of

Bolshevism over the world and to fulfil this system in the world. Our task is to

reform China and the whole of Eastern Asia. " This letter was later published in

Vestnik Narkomindel (Bulletin of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) in March

1921. Chen was therefore praised by Russian Bolsheviks as a "convinced

communist", "not only a revolutionary general ... but a brilliant organiser, receiving

88 Haiyu Guke, Jiefanq bielu, 89 Liang Bingxuan writes in Jiefang bielu that he forgot the envoy's name and only

remembered that the name began with a letter V; Chen Qiyou, Chen Jiongming's chief of staff, writes in 'Soviet Russia Dispatched A Delegation to Zhangzhou in 1919' (Wenshi ziliao xuanii, (Beijing, 1980, No 24) that the Russian general who visited Zhangzhou was named "Lu Bo". Both "Wand "Lu Bo" were actually Potapov, as many historians have demonstrated.

147

the sympathies of the masses, " etc. 90 This indicates that the Bolshevik leaders were

in favour of Chen Jiongming and their relations with Chen seemed quite warm.

Later, Vilensky, Voitinsky, Stoyanovichy, Maring and some other Soviet agents

also approached and talked with Chen Jiongming, believing he had socialist

inclinations.

Around this time, Voitinsky and other Soviet agents made contacts with

many of Sun Yat-sen's followers, such as Dai Jitao, Li liejun, Cao Yabo, Zhu

Zhuowen, Shen Xuanlu, Xu Qian, Wu Shan, Shao Lizi and Lin Boqu. 91 They tried

to urge some of these persons to form a Communist Party in China. However, most

of them were loyal adherents of Sun Yat-sen and therefore refused to go along with

the plan because they did not want to betray their leader.

Over a long period, some leading cadres of Sun's Party, such as Zhu Zhixin,

Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, Dai Jitao, Feng Ziyou and Lin Yungai conducted

research into socialism and Marxism. Their knowledge of socialism and Marxism

was even greater than Li Dazhao's and Chen Duxiu's before 1920. And these

people also appreciated the Bolsheviks' spirit of hard work and their well-organised

Party and Army; they believed that Soviet Russia's foreign policy, which claimed to

abandon the Romanov dynasty's policy of aggression against China and to abrogate

all secret treaties, was "of benefit to China, "92 and welcomed the fact that "the new

Russian Government's focus is to abolish the monopoly of the capitalists and the

brutality of the officials", and declared that "China should learn from it. " 93

Nevertheless, they believed that Sun's People's Livelihood Principle, which

90 Vestnik Narkomindel, (Moscow, 1922), Nos 1,2. 91 Geming renwu zhi (Biographies of Revolutionaries), (Taibel, 1969). 92 Xinggi vinglun, 30 November 1919. 93

_ nquo ribao (National Daily), 27 May 1919. 148

included two essential policies of "the equalisation of land ownership" and "the

restriction of capital", was the best form of socialism. In line with this, Sun and his

party never adopted an attitude of either total and uncritical acceptance or total

repudiation of Soviet Russia's experience.

Encouragement to advance the cause of socialism in China also came from

Britain. In June 1920 Sylvia Pankhurst, a British Communist leader and a

participant in the Comintern, wrote a letter to Lizerovitch with whom she had close

links. She desired him to get in touch with Sun Yat-sen and urged him to do his

utmost for socialism in China. After Pankhurst's message was delivered to him,

Sun in his reply, which was passed on by Lizerovitch, too, stated in effect that

though his sympathies were with Soviet Russia, he was not at present able to

proclaim his feelings openly, as owing to the political situation he was temporarily

dependent on the capitalists; but as soon as he could dispense with their assistance

he would again work for the socialist cause in China. 94

In the same month, Sun Yat-sen was invited to visit Soviet Russia by a

telegram, which was drafted by Chicherin, from Liu Zerong [Shaozhou], Chairman

95 of the All Russian Union of Chinese Workers. Another telegram which came

from Lenin himself also urged Sun to see how they had done in Russia. 96 Both

these invitations were sent to China on the eve of the Second Congress of the

Comintern and the obvious hope behind them was that Sun would attend the

Congress. However, Sun turned the invitations down. Sun's attitude towards

Soviet Russia was circumspect not only because he felt dissatisfaction with Russia's

94 FO 228/3214, June 1920; FO 228/3216, No 29,4 September 1920. 95 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan cluoii vu Zhonqcluo geming quanxi shi, p 72. 96 Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, p 117.

149

Communism but also because of he was afraid that his close relations with Soviet

Russia would complicate his attempts to gain support from other Western countries.

Regardless of Sun Yat-sen's absence in the 2nd Congress of the Comintern,

Moscow still considered him a very important person with whom they could co-

operate. In addition, they sought to influence Sun ideologically. The Communist

International of August 1920 carried an article which said: "Sun Yat-sen is

especially valuable to us, " for he was "the leader of the Chinese youth, which is

growing more and more left wing; " and it continued that Soviet Russia and the

Comintern must help him "by teaching him simple, clear, proletarian tactics in the

internal theoretical-political struggle; so that he can break all connections, not only

with the old past of his own country, but with the entire bourgeois world, and

undeviatingly adopt the point of view of the Communist International This

article reflected the Comintem's hope: to push the GMD to become a socialist party

affiliated to the Comintem.

The Chinese Communist organisation in Russia which was under the

direction of the RCP(B) also considered Sun Yat-sen and his party as their

"comrades". In Summer 1920 the Central Organisational Bureau of Chinese

Communists in Russia drafted a plan for an armed drive on Beijing from three

directions: Xinjiang, Manchuria and South China. At the beginning of September

1920, Liu Qian (Russian alias Fedorov), a member of the Bureau, reached Shanghai

to talk with Sun Yat-sen on two or three occasions and tried to reach an agreement

on a co-operative military operation of the forces of Soviet Central Asian, the Far

Eastern Republic, and South China with a city in the Russian Far East as the leading

97 R. 'The Situation in Eastern Asia', The Communist International, (Moscow, August 1920), No 13.

150

centre in order to overthrow the Beijing Government. 98 On Sun's recommendation,

he met various important members of the GMD in Shanghai and other places. Liu

Qian also brought a message from the Chinese Communists in Russia to the

Chinese youth stating that Lenin had promised to help China if the Chinese helped

themselves by understanding the new world tendencies and joining the socialists,

and give up their dependence on foreigners. " The last remark was obviously

directed to the GMD, since the latter always looked to other foreign countries for

aid. Although Sun Yat-sen and the GMD did not "join the socialists" as Moscow

hoped, they certainly intended to join hands with Russia in military operations and

Sun sent Li Zhangda as his representative in the Russian Far East to fulfil this

plan. 100

In November 1920, Voitinsky visited Sun Yat-sen and the topic of their talk

focused on how to combine the struggle in South China with the struggle in remote

Russia. In order to implement this goal, they also discussed the possibilities of

establishing a radio link between Soviet Russia and Guangzhou. 101 Shortly after

this meeting, Sun Yat-sen moved to Guangzhou and established his second

Southern Government there. From then on Soviet Russia's relations with Sun

accordingly entered a new phase. Around this time, a Soviet representative, I. I.

9" Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists of Russia and Some Questions of the National- Liberation movement, 1918-July 1920', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 114; 'Liu Qian's Report to the RCP(B)'s Amur Committee', GLZIDC, Vol 1, p 44. Luo Gang (ed. ), Zhonghua min-quo quofu shilu, Vol 5, p 3544.

99 FO 228/3214, September 1920. 100 Yang Kuisong in his 'Sun Zhongshan's Plan for A Military Operation in the North-

West and Its Failure' I'Llshi vaniiu (Historical Studies), (Beijing, 1996), No 3] does not mention that the military plan Was also proposed by the Chinese Communists in Russia.

101 S. L. Tikhvinskii, Sun Yat-sen: His Views on Foreign Policy and His Practice, (Moscow, 1964), p 535.

151

Stelahov, entered to China and met some GMD leaders in Beijing and Shanghai. In

a report he wrote later, Stelahov suggested that Soviet Russia should "establish a

relationship with the Guangzhou Government as soon as possible. " According to

him, the purpose for that was "to find some elements in the Guangzhou Government

who can arouse the people of the whole country to rise up against the capitalist

[powers'] oppression in the Far East", and to use the Government "as a tool to carry

out national revolutions in the East. " 102

Not long after the GMD's troops led by Chen Jiongming regained

Guangdong in the fall of 1920, Soviet Russia and the Comintern sent several

representatives there in order to establish a closer relationship with the United

Provincial Government in Guangzhou. A Japanese journalist, K. Fuse, wrote:

"When Sun Yat-sen was proceeding to Canton from Shanghai, he met a Soviet

representative and discussed with him a certain action to be taken in concert with

Soviet Russia. ... Soon, the Military Government sent its representative to Moscow,

and Moscow specially detailed a Communist member in the person of Alexieff. " 103

Some historians, while citing Fuse's work, only mention Alexieff and neglect the

Soviet representative Sun met before Alexieff. 104 It is clear that they have misread

Fuse's above phrase. However, the British archives offer detailed information

about Soviet representatives in Guangzhou around that time. Some reports

102-S. Stelahov's Report on Guangzhou Government', GLZIDC, Vol 1, pp 63-64. 103 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 224-5. 104 Wilbur in Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot and Cui Shuqin in Sun Zhongshan yu

Gonqchan Zhuvi (Sun Yat-sen and Communism), (Hong Kong: the Asia Press, 1954) say so. They also state that Alexieff opened a branch of the Rosta in Guangdong. In fact, as early as the autumn of 1920, a branch of the Rosta-Dalta was established in Guangzhou by Stoyanovitch and Perlin. cf. 'Report of the Canton Communist Group, 1921', Zhonaquo Gonqchan danq divici daibiao dahui danclan ziliao (Archival Sources for the First Congress of the CCP), (Beijing, 1984); 'Tan Zuyin's Memoirs', Yida clianhou,, Vol 3.

152

indicated that a Bolshevik delegate named Remankauff had arrived in Guangzhou

by January 1921 and he later altered his name to Stark. This Russian had a good

speaking knowledge of Mandarin and Hakka and was living in a monastery not far

from Guangzhou, where he was very often in consultation with Sun Yat-sen at

Sun's Yamen (office building). 105 Probably as one of the results of the talks

between Remankauff and Sun, the mutual exchange of resident representatives took

place. According to the British archives, Sun issued a mandate to appoint the

representative of the United Provincial Government, Hsien Chen Feng, to go to

Russia in March. 106 Alexieff reached Guangzhou at about the same time. Perhaps

Alexieff was the famous Russian Sinologist of the same name, for during that time

there was only a limited number of Russians who had knowledge of China and

Chinese languages and they thus tended to be enlisted in the Bolshevik cause in

China. It is worth noticing that Professor V. M. Alexieff's research topic between

1920 and 1922 was "the Republic of China", 107 and he was also said to be in close

touch with the Comintern. 108

Fuse wrote further that Alexieff concluded an agreement with Sun Yat-sen

in March 1921 and he even provided the text of the agreement which had been

preserved in the form of a memorandum. Cui Shuqin, the author of Sun Yat-, sen

and Communism, denies there was any such agreement. Wilbur and How also write

in their book Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China

that "for this we have no substantial evidence". But in the British Archives, a

document of April 1921 enclosed a "Moscow-Canton Agreement", which originally

'05 FO 228/3211, January and February 1921. 106 FO 228/3211, March 1921. 107 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 84, p 371. 108 FO 228/3211, October, 1921.

153

came from the vernacular press. 109 The content of this agreement is basically the

same as the one given by Fuse. The following are the terms which sum up the two

texts: the Soviet Government of Russia and the United Provincial Government of

the Republic of China (U. P. ) agreed: (1) to recognise each other's sovereignty; (2)

to resume their commercial relations at once; (3) to permit the diffusion of

Communism in the territory under the U. P. Government's control; (4) to ensure

that the Soviet Government would give financial assistance whenever the U. P.

Government required it; (5) to ensure that the people of the respective countries

would be treated according to the most favoured nation provision! 10 If the report of

the Chinese newspaper is true, this would have been the first agreement between

Moscow and the GMD or a draft of it. Soon the Far Eastern Republic started to

give the Guangzhou Government "material support". "'

On the occasion of Sun Yat-sen's inauguration as President of the U. P.

Government in April 1921, the correspondents of Rosta-Dalta, Khodorov and

Stoyanovich interviewed Sun. 112 They talked about the situation in Soviet Russia

and the Far Eastern Republic and also Russia's revolutionary experiences. In June

1921 Sun Yat-sen received another letter from Chicherin, which was written the

previous October, and urged China to "enter resolutely the path of good friendship

with us [Soviet Russia]" and proposed to set up trade relations between the two

sides at once. The Far East Republic's "material support" and Soviet Russia's

"financial assistance" were what Sun Yat-sen needed urgently to make up for what

log FO 228/3211, April 1921. 110 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 225-6; FO 228/3211 April 1921. 111 M. A. Persits, Sun Yat-sen. 1866-1966, (Moscow, 1966). 112 Khodorov also visited Sun twice in 1920. Shi Keqiang (Sheveliaov), 'Sun Yat-sen

and the Dalta Agency, Sun Zhon-qshan he ta de shidai, Vol 1, pp 562-563. 154

he was unable to obtain from the Western powers. Although Sun was willing to

obtain substantive aid from Soviet Russia, he did not want to see Soviet diplomats

dealing with the Beijing Government.

On 7 November 1921, in a reply to a letter from Chicherin concerning

Soviet Russia's relationship with Sun Yat-sen, Lenin directed: -"[We] should treat

Sun Yat-sen as warmly as possible and write to him frequently but all this must be

kept secret. Our representative should be sent to Guangzhou. " 113

The first formal Comintern delegate Sun Yat-sen met was a Dutch

Communist named Sneevliet (alias Maring), who had had considerable

revolutionary experience in Indonesia. After participating in the founding congress

of the CCP in July 1921, Maring remained in Shanghai for several months and got

in touch with the GMD headquarters there. After talks with Zhang Ji and several

other prominent members of the GMD, he formed a very good impression of their

party. Then Maring travelled to Guilin, where Sun Yat-sen's military headquarters

for the Northern Expedition campaign had been set up. In January 1922, with

Zhang Tailei as his interpreter, Maring had talks with Sun Yat-sen on several

occasions and lectured Sun and his cadres on the Russia Revolution and Lenin's

recent New Economic Policy. They discussed the possibilities of co-operation

between Soviet Russia and the GMD. 1 14 After his visit to Guilin and Guangzhou,

Maring believed that most GMD leaders were inclined towards socialism, that some

of them were even willing to propagate communism within the Party, and that the

GMD supported the labour movement. Therefore Maring suggested that only the

113 'Lenin to Chicherin', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 67. 114 H. Sneevliet, 'My Association with Sun Yat-sen, Some Personal Memoirs', The

China Quarterl No 48. 155

GMD was qualified to lead the national liberation revolution at that stage and that

the CCP should work with them. ' 15 In August 1922, the ECCI approved Maring's

suggestion that the Chinese Communists organised Communist groups within the

GMD in order to form a United Front. 116 Dov Bing attributes the polices of co-

operation between the CCP and the GMD to Sneevliet, calling it the "Sneevlietian

S trategy". 1 17 In fact, that Communists should support the national liberation

movement and form an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial and

backward countries was the pre-existing policy and strategy formulated by Lenin,

and Maring's own contribution was merely to put them into practice in China using

his own method of instructing the Communists to join the GMD as individuals.

Soviet Russia's and the Comintern's purposes for their numerous contacts

with Sun Yat-sen and his Party varied at different stages: to draw the Chinese

nationalists into common anti-imperialist struggle led by Moscow; to urge the

Southern Government to support Soviet diplomacy in order to use it as a bargaining

counter in negotiations with the Beijing Government; to enlist the GMD as a

socialist party under the control of the Comintern; and to persuade Sun Yat-sen

himself and some of his followers to form a Communist party. 118

"5 Maring, 'My Visits to the Revolutionaries in South China', 30 July 1922, Dan-qshi Yaniiu Ziliao, (1981), Nos 6-7; 'Report of Comrade Maring for the ECCI, 11 July 1922', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 239.

T _16ý Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China, August 1922, Sneevliet Archive, No 224, quoted from Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, pp 328-9.

117 Dov Bing, 'Revolution in China: SneevIietian Strategy', (MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1968).

"" Sun Yat-sen once said to Han Linfu, a Communist who then was a member of the GMD's Central Committee, that Lenin had originally intended to ask Sun himself to become the founder of the CCP. [Cited from Yang Kuisong, Zhon-qqonq yu Mosike de

-quanxi (The CCP's Relations with Moscow, 1920-60), Taibel: Dongda Publishing

House, 1997, pjý3j. 156

Sun Yat-sen and his party were finally brought into an alliance with Soviet

Russia and the Chinese Communist Party in 1923. But they did not give up their

own political programme and doctrines. Sun believed that the pressing matter of the

moment was to overthrow the reactionary Beijing Government and to unify the

whole China by military force; to develop China's industry and to carry out social

reform with moderate means. With the adoption of the New Economic Policy, Sun

believed that Soviet Russia had discarded unrealistic "Communism" and had

embarked on a policy in line with his own Principle of the People's Livelihood and

his Plan of Industrial Development. ' 19 This shift in Soviet policy made the alliance

possible.

In 1923, Sun Yat-sen and Joffe, the Soviet Plenipotentiary, issued an Joint

Statement. Its first clause read:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot

actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for

the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. 120

This statement clearly showed Sun's attitude towards Communism and

Soviet system. All of Sun's and other GMD leaders' responses to Soviet Russia and

the Comintern demonstrated that they did not intend to co-operate with Soviet

Russia unconditionally, did not accept the Bolsheviks' entire proposals

unreservedly, and never had any intention to become uncritically obedient to the

Bolsheviks.

119 Sun expressed this view to Liao Zhongkai. See Li Yunhan, Cong ronqqon-cl dao gingdang, p 116.

120 Cited from Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 141. 157

Although Soviet Russia and the Comintern did succeed in forging a United

Front of the Communists and the Nationalists, they failed to make the GMD fully

obey orders from Moscow.

Section 3. Contact with Anarchist Groups

As one school of socialist thought, anarchism had a significant influence

upon the Chinese radicals during the first two decades of the century. Recently

some foreign scholars have focused their attention on this aspect of Chinese

radicalism. They correctly point to the fact that Chinese anarchists not only helped

to introduce socialism to China but also played an important part in the radical

organisations during the May 4 Ih period and that many anarchists even joined in the

early Communist groups. 121 Since the anarchist movement in China had such close

connections with the origins of the CCP, it is necessary to review briefly its history

up to 1920.

Anarchism as a trend of modern thought was introduced into China at the

beginning of the 20 th century. In 1903, a number of books and booklets on

anarchism from Japan were published in Chinese translation. Afterwards, many

young intellectuals, especially those who were abroad, inclined to anarchism, and

some of them took steps to form anarchist societies. The first Chinese anarchist

group, consisting of Li Shi-zeng, Wu Zhi-hui, Chu Min-yi and Zhang Jing-jiang,

121 A. Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); R. A. Scalapino and G. T. Yu, The Chinese Anarchist Movement, (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1961).

158

appeared in Paris in 1906 and published in Paris an anarchist weekly magazine in

Chinese entitled Xin Shiji (the New Century). The following year, some Chinese

students studying in Japan, such as Zhang Ji, Liu Shi-pei and Jing Mei-jiu, formed a

Society for the Study of Socialism in Tokyo. The purpose of this Society was

actually the study of anarchism. Japanese anarchist pioneers such as Kotoku Shusui

and Osugi Sakae often gave lectures at the meetings of the Society. 122 The Chinese

anarchists in Tokyo published Tianyibao (Natural Justice) and Henjzbao (Balance).

Through these anarchist publications, and thanks to students returned from abroad,

the seeds of anarchism were sown in China.

Liu Si-fu, better known as Shi Fu, was an important promoter of the

anarchist movement in China. Liu converted to anarchism in 1905, at nearly the

same time that he joined Sun Yat-sen's Tongmeng Hui. Shi Fu returned to China in

1906 and organised the Chinese Assassination Corps in 1908, whose aim was to kill

high-ranking officials of the Qing dynasty. When the Republic of China was

founded, Shi Fu organised Huiming Xueshe (the Society of Crowing in the Dark),

which started to publish Huiming Lu (the Record of the Society of Crowing in the

Dark) in 1913, and after a few issues changed its title to Min Sheng (People's

Voice), thus the Society was later called Minsheng She ( People's Voice Society).

In 1914, Shi Fu founded the Anarchist Comrades' Association which soon had

branches in several cities. When Shi Fu died in 1915 the Chinese anarchist

movement lost a dynamic figure, but efforts to spread anarchism continued. More

anarchist societies were established. Among them the most famous were Shi She

(Real Society), Qun She (Mass Society) and Ping She (Peace Society). These three

122 Gao Jun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfuzhuvi zai Zhonqquo (Anarchism in China), (Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1984), Vol 1, p 22.

159

societies merged with the People's Voice Society into Jinhua She (Evolution

Society) in 1919, and around the same time Zhen She (Truth Society) and Fendou

She (Struggle Society) were set up. Each society published a magazine and various

booklets and therefore, a prolific anarchist literature was widely distributed in

China.

The teachings of various anarchist thinkers - Proudhon, Stimer, Bakunin,

Kropotkin and Tolstoy - were introduced to China, but most Chinese anarchists'

favourite theory was Kropotkin's anarchist communism. As an ideology imported

from abroad, anarchism could take root in China rapidly not only because it was in

harmony with Chinese traditional Taoist thought, but also because the anarchist

teachings of opposition to authority and oppression had a strong appeal for radical

Chinese youth, who felt these ideas were simple and direct. For a period of time,

anarchism became the mainstream of Chinese radical thinking.

The GMD theorist Dai Jitao made a penetrating analysis on why anarchism

became an ideological trend among Chinese youths:

After a set of significant reforms ... over the previous 20 years and more,

China's politics were still not clear; the system was not improved yet; the state

could not be unified; social life was still rather poor; and education and

culture could not be popularised. However, oppression from the surrounding

world was increasing day by day. People were anxious about whether the

nation would disintegrate, and the disaster of national subjugation and racial

extermination would come soon. As they felt quite helpless, nobody could

find a way to struggle. Therefore, the youth's thinking naturally tended to a

mentality which cast aside politics, despised law, hated the army . ... The

160

ideological trend of anarchism from 1914 to 1917/1918 demonstrates a

situation where the Chinese people had come to the end of their tether. 123

After World War 1, many progressive Chinese intellectuals lost faith in the

democracy of a Western-style Republic and turned to socialism. Anarchism then

became the most popular and pervasive of all forms of socialism in China.

Therefore many radical individuals and organisations were affected by anarchism to

a greater or lesser extent. At first when the Bolshevik agents came to China they

could not find Marxists or Communists in China. The most radical revolutionaries

they could find were anarchists or persons influenced by anarchism and hence the

latter naturally became the target and allies of the Bolsheviks.

The Chinese anarchist who became the first to co-operate with the Russian

Bolsheviks was perhaps Zhang Mochi. Zhang Mochi (alias Zhang Minquan and

Sheng Guocheng), was an editor of Minsheng's Esperanto edition from 1914 .1 24

Before 1917, Zhang was sent abroad as a representative of the Chinese anarchists to

attend some anarchist conferences in Europe. He happened to be in Moscow at the

time of the October Revolution. Soon he began to work on behalf of Soviet Russia

and returned to China in late spring or early summer of 1918 when the student

movement against the Sino-Japanese Joint Military Defence Pact reached its climax.

About 3,000 students who had been studying in Japan returned to China in protest at

the military pact and a number of them organised the Returned Students' National

Salvation League. Zhang joined the League in Shanghai and became the leader of a

sub-organisation, the Slide-Show and Lecture Team.

123 Dai Jitao, Oingnian zhi lu (The Road of Youth), (Guangzhou, 1942), pp 6-7. 124 'The Recollection of Zheng Peigang', (February-May, 1964), Gao Jun, et al. (eds. ),

Wuzhenqfu zhuvi zai Zhonqquo, Vol 1, p 515. 161

Zhang Mochi admitted later that "he was a friend of Colonel Popov", 125 but

did not indicate when he had come to know Popov. However, Popov's first visit to

Shanghai almost coincided with Zhang's return and they both then concentrated on

the same target - the Japanese imperialists. Zhang was also a member of the

Chinese Socialist Party, to which Li Dazhao also belonged. In the Spring of 1919,

Zhang presented several books and pamphlets on socialism to Bai Jian-wu, one of

Li Dazhao's close friends. 126

Another Chinese whom Popov visited was someone called Chin, who was

reported to be an "anarchist working on a Chinese paper of Shanghai. ", 27 Since the

British Intelligence report only gives the surname of this man, it is difficult to

identify "Chin". It is worth noticing that, when Joffe arrived in Shanghai in 1923 he

wrote a letter to a Chinese of the "New Russia Society" in Shanghai, whose

surname was "Ch'in". 128 In the Wade alphabetic transcription, "Chin" and "Ch'in"

can be rendered "Jin" or "Qin". There were certain Chinese anarchists with such

surnames. For example, Jin Jiafeng and Qin Baopu, both of whom joined the

Socialist Youth League organised by Soviet agents in 1920. Besides them, another

possibility is that the "Chin" in question was Jing Meijiu, an old anarchist and an

old member of the GMD, who was a member of parliament and the editor in chief

of several anarchist papers. From time to time Jing translated several works from

Esperanto into Chinese with Zhang Mochi as co-translator. One can surmise as

much since, in another report of the British Intelligence Bureau in Shanghai, a

Chinese named Chin Mei-cheu in 1921 was living with a Korean Communist leader

125 FO 228/3140, p 76. 126 Bai Jianwu riii, the diary of 3 April 1919. 127 FO 405/233, No 107. 121) 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', 24 January 1923.

162

Pak Chin-sun. 129 Pak was then in China as a representative of the Comintern. No

matter who this "Chin" or "Chin" was, it indicated that the agents of Soviet Russia

and the Comintern were successful in gaining the co-operation of some important

Chinese anarchists.

Since Esperanto was a language many Chinese anarchists knew, and was

used in some Chinese anarchist periodicals, the Soviet agents tried to have a hand in

Esperanto teaching in Shanghai and Beijing. In February 1920, a Soviet agent V. A.

Stopany, who had formerly been a bookkeeper with the Russian Publishing and

Printing Company and was working on the Shanghai Life, started a free night

school for teaching Esperanto in Shanghai with Lu Shikai, an old Chinese anarchist

scholar of Esperanto and one of Zhang Mochi's close friends. The night school was

held at the New China School (Xinhua Xuexiao), which was a peripheral

organisation of the Anarchist Comrades' Association. 130 All the teachers at the

Night School were anarchists. It was said that there were at most one hundred

students attending the classes. Stopany often expounded his Communist ideas to his

students, and encouraged "the study of Esperanto as a knowledge of that language

would enable them to promote internationalism and Communism. " 131 Soon the

Esperanto Night School and the activities of its staff aroused the suspicion of the

authorities in Shanghai. In a secret interview, Lu Shikai admitted that he and his

Russian confrere were working in the interests of the Bolsheviks. 132

129 FO 228/3140, p 71. 130 'Report from the Commissioner of Police in Shanghai', Reports of the American

Consul General in Shanghai, Class 800,1920; Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhen-qfu zhuvi sixian_q ziliao xuan, p 961.

131 FO 228/3214,4 march 1920; FO 405/233, No 107. 132 FO 228/3214,19 February 1920.

163

In North China, the Bolshevik agents also got in touch with the Chinese

anarchists, and especially with the members of the Evolution Society and Huzhu

Tuan (Mutual Aid Corps), which mainly consisted of anarchists at Beijing

University and Beijing Normal University. Polevoy, as a liaison man for the

Comintern, had very close relations with Huang Ling-shuang and was on intimate

terms with Chen De-rong, who even lived with Polevoy in the same compound in

Beijing for a period of time. 133 In Tianjin, some Bolshevik agents who were living

in that city made contacts with anarchists, especially the members of Zhen She

(Truth Society) there. Jiang Banruo and Zhang Zhi are cases in point. They used to

talk together about how to do revolutionary work.

Polevoy and other agents ardently desired to expand their contacts with

anarchists and other radicals throughout China. In a letter to Zheng Peigang, an

important member of the People's Voice Society in South China, Polevoy claimed

that he was a Bolshevik and was willing to liaise with the Chinese anarchists in

order to make joint efforts for social revolution; and that he hoped the Chinese

anarchists would join hands with the Russian Bolsheviks. 134 For this purpose, the

Bolshevik agents used to make use of certain anarchists as intermediaries. For

example, Huang Lingshuang accompanied Soviet agents to South China as an

interpreter on several occasions; Chen Derong was sent to Jiangsu to make contact

with a group of youths there; and Jiang Banruo went to Zhangzhou as a liaison man

between Soviet agents and Chen Jiongming.

133 'Guan Qian's Report, 28 February 1921', in [Beiyang Military Archives (24) 199], Jindaishi ziliao, (Beijing, 1957) No 5.

""4 Zheng Peigang, 'Some facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan, p 956; From Zheng Peigang's whole account, we can see that Polevoy's letter was posted not later than the beginning of 1920; Haiyu Guke, Jiefan-q bielu.

164

Chen Jiongming was a believer in anarchism and had been a member of the

China Assassination Corps led by Liu Sifu many years before. Towards the end of

1919, Chen invited anarchists such as Liang Bingxuan, Liu Shixin, Yu Keshui and

Xu Zhenfeng to Zhangzhou to promote "social revolution". They edited Min xing

(Fujian Star) in order to propagate new ideas. By the spring of 1920 Zhang Mochi

also went to Zhangzhou from Shanghai to take up a position as Chen Jiongming's

advisor on education. 135 From the end of April to the beginning of May 1920,

General Potapov's team visited Zhangzhou and they held several talks with the

anarchists as well as with General Chen. In a talk, Potapov said:

If you understand socialism and admit the necessity of social revolution, no matter

which way you go and what action you take, you are our Russian Bolsheviks'

comrades. Therefore, we should work together and help each other. The Soviet

Government wish to have friendship with all revolutionaries in the world, especially

in Asian countries. 136

Some members of Voitinsky's team also plunged into work among the

Chinese anarchists. Some anarchists recalled that a Bolshevik "Stromisky"

organised a set of discussion meetings attended mainly by anarchists such as Yuan

Zhenying, Yu Keshui, Zheng Peigang, Jin Jiafeng, Ye Tiandi and Shen Zhongjiu. 137

In Autumn 1920, Voitinsky sent Stoyanovich and Perlin to Guangzhou to work

among anarchists including Liang Bingxuan, Liu Shixin and so on.

From around the summer of 1920, Lizerovitch began to devote his main

energy to getting in touch with young Chinese anarchists. In September 1920

135 FO 228/3214,12 April 1920; FO 228/2987,26 April 1920. 136 Haiyu Guke, Jiefang bielu. 137 Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfu zhuyi sixianq ziliao xuan,, Vol 2.

165

Lizerovich and other Bolshevik agents attended a conference of anarchists from

Shanghai, Hangzhou and Suzhou. During the sessions they worked assiduously

with the help of some Chinese to convert those attending to Bolshevism. 138 In April

1921, Lizerovich with his friend Maher, a Portuguese, went to Wuhan, where they

were joined by two Chinese anarchists Huang Lingshuang and Yuan Zhenying.

Their purpose was to contact Yun Daiying and his friends, most of whom were

believing in anarchism then. 139 Prior to this, Voitinsky's assistants Mamayev and

Polevoy had also undertaken similar work in Wuhan. 140

The Soviet agents also made contact with anarchists in some other cities, but

it is not necessary to go into the same detail in each case. Suffice it to say that their

goals were to enlist the help of the Chinese anarchists for their revolutionary

propaganda campaign; to use their organisational network for the establishment of

the Socialists' League (see Chapter 6) and early Communist groups and to persuade

some of the anarchists to change their beliefs and to become Communists. Those

activities, again, are outside the range of my discussion at this point, and will be

dealt with in later chapters.

Why was it that the largest groups of Chinese radicals whom the Soviet

agents got in touch with at first were anarchists? To answer this we must take into

account the special historical background and Soviet Russia's policies towards

anarchists at that time. By doing so we will see then that what the Bolsheviks did

among the Chinese was by no means accidental.

13" FO 228/3216, No 37; No 41. 139 'Yuan Zhenying's Recollections', Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhengfu zhuvi

swang ziliao xuan; FO 228/3211, May 1921. ... Bao Huiseng, Bao Huiseng huivilu, (Collected Memoirs of Bao Huiseng), (Beijing:

People's Press, 1981). 166

Firstly. as has been shown. anarchism was a type of radical socialist thought

hich had long been disseminated and therefore had widespread influence in China.

Anarchists were the only formation in China at that time to advocate a social

revolution from below. In all. there were more than fifty anarchist societies in

China during the Nby 4th periodL Moreover. all anarchists arc internationalists.

Without exception, the Chinese anarchist movement kept close links with the

international anarchist movement. With this tradition, the Chinese anarchists were

attuned to accepting aid from foreign countries and, conversely. offering help to

their foreign comrades.

Secondly. anarchist and Marxist ideologies have certain points in common.

Both advocate social revolution to overthrow capitalist rule and eliminate the

system of exploitation. Ibcir ultimate aim is to rcalisc an ideal society without

classes or states. Anarcho-communism's principle of production and distribution in

a future communist society. namely "from each according to his ability, to each

according to his needs". is identical with that of Marxism. Originally anarchism

and Marxism wcrc different schools within the same working class movement, as

KIM-! hen correctly pointed ouL Marxists and anarchists belonged to "the same

category but to different schools". 141

'Mirdly. many anarchists sympathised with and supported the Bolshevik

Revolution from the very beginning. Since the events of the October Revolution

followed in some wa)s the pattern anticipated by the anarchist theorists, for

instance. the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, seizure of the means of production

and establishment of workers' control and abolition of class distinctions and civil

141 1A sheng (People's Voice), 1921, Vol 31. 167

ranks. some anarchists regarded them as having met -certain fundamental principles

and methods of Anarchist CommuniSM. "142 The Chinese anarchists also hailed

Russia's social revolution. A Chinese anarchist periodical Laodong (Labour

Monthly) m-rote: -Now China's ncighbour Russia has waged a just and honourablc

social revolution to make equal the rich and the poor. " 141 Another article in this

periodical even described the Russian Bolsheviks as espousing anarcho-communism

and thus regarded them as their "Russian brothcrs". 144 Zhu Qianzhi, an anarchist

student at Beijing University, expressed the opinion of many Chinese anarchists

when he wrote that: "at that time the ordinary youths in China who advocated

revolution. admired Russia's success and tried to use violent force to achieve the

goals [of anarchism]. "' 45

Fourthly. the Bolsheviks made efforts to draw support from anarchists

internationally. Since most anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists glorified revolution

and advocated "direct action" by the masses to destroy capitalist rule, Lenin counted

on them to play an important role in the "World Revolution-. Ilie Bolsheviks

adopted quite different tactics towards anarchists in Russia and their co-thinkcrs in

other countries. Not long after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks began their

suppression of the Russian anarchist movement because the anarchists were

denouncing the Bolsheviks' dictatorship. On the other hand, in their activities

abroad the Bolsheviks were inclined to treat foreign anarchists in a friendly fashion.

Lenin believed that proletarian elements were driven to anarchism by a natural

'42 Alexander Berlanan, The Russian Tragedy (Orkney, 1976). p 37. 143 Chi Ping. 'Biographical Sketch of Lenin - the Pioneer of Russian Social

RevOlution', Laodong (Labour MonthJy), (Shanghai, 20 April 1918), No 2.

2. '44 Y1 Chun. 'Policies and Tactics of Russian Bolsheviks'. Laodong (20 April 1918), No 14S hm - 1120.9M (People's M), (1923), Vol 4. No 4.

168

hatred of the opportunism and reformism of the Second International and he

therefore thought that, once their misunderstanding of Marxism was cleared up,

they would become sincere supporters of Soviet power. Some workers'

organisations with anarcho-syndicalist leanings, such as the L W. W. of America,

Britain and Australia and the organisations within the French syndicalist movement,

were invited to join the Comintern and the Bolsheviks also sent emissaries to

establish close relations with them. In a letter to the British Communist Sylvia

Pankhurst in August 1919 Lenin pointed out that many anarchist workers had

proved to be "our best comrades and friends, the best of revolutionaries". 146 In

September 1919. the ECCI issued a "Circular Utter on Parliament and Soviets".

which read:

In France. America. England. Germany, as the class struggle grows more acute, all

revolutionary elements arc joining the communist movement by merging or co-

ordinating their activities under the slogan of Soviet power. The anarcho-

s)mdicalist groups, and the groups which just call themselves anarchist, are joining

in the general trcndL Tbc ECCI welcomes them most cordially. 147

It is clear that the Bolsheviks made use of anarchists abroad to serve their own

Purposes: to overthrow the capitalist governments in their respective countries; to

check the armed intervention and economic blockade of Soviet Russia by the main

imperialist powers*. to cripple the 'revisionist' forces of the Second International;

and to expand the Communist forces of the Tbird International led by the Russian

Bolshcviks.

146 Lenin, Conected Works, Vol 29. p 562. Degras, The Communist Intemabonal. 19 19-1943, Vol 1, pp 66-67.

169

Finally, some Soviet agents were themselves anarchists or had had strong

relations with anarchists before. For example, Ivanov was a disciple of Kropotkin

and was also said to be an anarcho-sydicalist; '4s while ljzcrovitch was reported to

have been on good terms with British anarchists before he came to China in 1917 . 149

Stopany made known his belief in an article published in Min sheng in 1921:

1 am in extreme favour of anarchism, I believe that only by the realisation of

anarchism can real happiness and freedom be attained. ... Non-govcmmcnt

state is our goal, but if we wish to realisc the goal, we have to be engaged in

various movements. ... I am a Bolshevik and Bolshevism is merely a way to

reach the first stage of achieving our goal. So we cannot criticisc the Russian

Rcvolution. lso

Uke Stopany. many Russian anarchists rendered their help to the Bolsheviks at

certain periods. In the October Revolution numerous Russian anarchists, alongside

workers and sailors, many imbued with a strong spirit of anarchism, joined the

insurrection to overthrow Kercnsky's regime. During the Civil War many

anarchists helped the Bolsheviks defend the Revolution against the White Guards

and the foreign interventionists in spite of their difference of views with the

Bolsheviks and their suffering under the Bolshevik dictatorship. Some of them

even joined the RCP(B) and were called "Anarcho-Bolsheviks". In August 1919

Lenin was moved to remark that many anarchists were "becoming the most

148 Kropotkin's theory is anarcho-corrimunism. whereas anarcho-syndicalism is the doctrine of Bakunin. Perhaps Ivanov believed in both schools of anarchism.

14" This might be a reason why Lizerovitch sometimes was not trusted by other BOLsheviks. One report said that Lizerovitch Is now only indulging the same passions Wit! "IOUt being in the confidence of the Bolshevik Govemment. '(FO 405/228, No 160).

'50 Min sheng No 31, p 406. 170

dedicated supporters of Soviet power. " 15 1 But once the Civil War was over and in

particular after the Soviet Government had suppressed the Kronstadt Rebellion and

began to adopt the NEP, the Russian anarchists met merciless suppression. The

famous anarchist Alexander Berkman expressed the feeling of most anarchists: "it is

socialist ideals and the fate of the Revolution which are being destroyed. 9152 In

March 1921 Stopany committed suicide and nobody knew the reason. It is more

than likely that he had heard about these developments and the anarchists' fate in

Russia and felt that his hopes had been shattered. 153

As has been explained, many Soviet agents in China had connections with

the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia and some of them were sent from there.

Initially the highest Bolshevik leader in Siberia was A. M. Krasnoschekov, who

became the President of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars in

February 1918 and later becamd General Secretary of the Dal'buro of the RCP(B)

holding a concurrent post as President of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. This

man had joined the I. W. W. when he was in exile in America and this was one

reason why he was sometimes attacked by his opponents within the RCP(B) for

"having a smack of anarcho-syndicalism". 154 He even summoned to Siberia the

famous anarchist Bill Shatov, who had been a member of the Military-

Revolutionary Committee at the time of the October insurrection, and appointed

him Minister of Transport in the Far Eastern Republic. 155 With such leaders as

151 Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, pp 196-199. 152 Berkman, The Russian Tracled ,p 66. 153 His article in Min sheng continued: "Once an elite holds the state power, in the

meantime controlling all enterprises and property, it will be liable to emerge as new caotalists again. ' (No 31, p 406).

Kasanin, China in the Twenties. Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, p 197.

171

Krasnoschekov, it is not surprising that the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia should

have recruited anarchists as their agents in China. Logically, such agents would be

likely to seek out Chinese with anarchist inclinations, too.

The above factors may help to explain why Soviet agents came into contact

with large numbers of Chinese anarchists, and why the Chinese anarchists were

willing to co-operate with the Bolsheviks. Some scholars have noticed the

Bolsheviks' "intimate contact with the anarchists in China7 156 and the "important

parV' played by the Chinese anarchists in "the early organisational activities" of the

CCp, 157 but they have failed to point out the reasons for this phenomenon and to

indicate that this was one of the results of applying Lenin's tactics of allying with

the anarchists abroad. 158

Section 4. Contact with People of Other Political Forces and of Various Circles

As early as June 1920, Voitinsky proudly claimed that since his team had

come to China, their work to enhance the connections had "made headway", and

they had "already made contact with all leaders of the Chinese revolutionary

movement. " 159 As I have pointed out, their contacts were not confined to

revolutionary organisations and elements. Besides the GMD, anarchist groups and

some radical intellectuals who later became the founders of the CCP, the Soviet

156 Scalapino and Yu, The Chinese Anarchist Movement, p 44. 157 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 4. 1-r'8 The same situation can be seen in Japan. The first persons the Comintern

contacted in Japan were anarchists, among them Osugi Sakae. '59'Voitinsk)(s Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 28.

172

agents also established relations with other political parties and factions in China.

These included the Chinese Socialist Party, led by Jiang Kanghu; 160 the Research

Clique, headed by Liang Qichao; the Communication Clique, headed by Liang

Shiyi; and some warlords such as Wu Peifu 16 1 and Zhang Zuolin 162 among the

Beiyang military forces. In addition, Soviet agents had good relations with some

liberalistic intellectuals, such as, Cai Yuanpei, Hu Shi and Tao Mehe. Since such

contacts were fairly limited and had no bearing on the origins of the CCP, I need not

recount them here in any detail. Arranging those Chinese with whom the Bolshevik

agents made contact by occupation, we find that they belonged to various circles:

educational, journalistic, business, industrial, military, political and so on. It should

be noted that some people had relations with different political forces and belonged

to more than one category. For examples, Li Dazhao had close relations with

radical intellectuals, the Chinese Socialist Party, the Research Clique and the Zhili

Faction; while Huang Jiemin, a GMD member and an anarchist, was active among

students and also in educational, journalist, industrial and political circles. Such

people naturally attracted the attention of the Bolsheviks and were used by the

160 One of leaders of the Central Organisational Bureau of the Chinese Communists in Russia once called Jiang Kang-hu as "intimate comrade" in 1920. (Li Yuzhen, Sun Zhongshan yu Gonqchanquoii, p 85). The Comintern invited Jiang to attend the F Congress of the Comintern in 1921.

161 Wu Peifu was a general of the Zhili faction of warlords, who not only directed his anti-foreign feeling against the Japanese, but also accused the Beijing government of being subservient to all foreigners. After Wu brought down Duan Qirui's Beijing government with the use of military force in July 1920, he intended to adopt a pro- Russia policy in order to curb the Japanese and therefore was once regarded by Russians as an ally. Subsequently, Soviet agents Voitinsky, Vilensky, Polevoy and Khodorov visited Wu and his officers. Cf. GLZDC and Bai Jianwu riii. 162 Zhang Zuolin was the head of the Mukden faction of warlords, whose troops were mainly stationed in Manchuria. Soviet leaders believed that Zhang was a "running dog" of the Japanese, but they still sent several representatives to negotiate with him.

173

Bolsheviks as intermediaries in their dealings with various political forces and

professional circles within Chinese society.

In addition to the wide range of contacts they established, the Bolsheviks

adopted flexible tactics when forging links with the Chinese. They sometimes

showed little discrimination with regard to the class status, political standing and

religious beliefs of those whom they approached. Nevertheless, it can be found

from the above that the group they most frequently contacted were intellectuals. As

Borodin told Song Meiling, the Comintern had worked out various plans for

working in different countries, but the first common measure was to recruit

intellectuals to serve the Comintern and Soviet Russia; the best way to attract them

was to make them believe that they were working for the poor and the oppressed

and to stimulate their enthusiasm to struggle for an ideal society of Communism

rather than use material benefits or bribes; and another method was to work among

the religious groups which inclined to the left, because they were usually naive and

less suspicious, and might possibly be won over to Communism. 163 Incredible as it

may appear, there are several cases which illustrate the Bolsheviks' work with some

Chinese with religious beliefs. For example, Zhang Tailei, Xu Qian and Huang

Ping were Christians when they were first met by the Russian agents, and Chen

Duxiu praised Christianity on the eve of becoming a disciple of Marx. Although

Xu Qian did not become a Communist, he did a great deal of work for Soviet Russia

and was later entrusted by Borodin, the chief Soviet advisor, with the highest post in

the Wuhan Government. P. Mif, chief Comintern representative in China in the

163 Cf. Jiang-Song Meiling, Yu Bao Luoting tanhua de huivi (Recollections of Talks with Borodin).

174

1930s, pointed out that during the early stage, the CCP contained several Christian-

Socialists. 164

******

The Soviet agents contacted different sorts of Chinese at different periods

for various purposes. For instance: they made use of the GMD mainly in their

struggle against imperialism and the Beijing Government; they co-operated with the

anarchists mainly for revolutionary propaganda and actions in order to destroy the

old social order; Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin and Chen Jiongming were useful to them

when they were establishing a foothold in China; and Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu

were treated as their instruments for founding a Communist Party in China.

Soviet Russia's and the Comintern's relations with different forces in China

varied according to changes in the political and military situation in the Far East and

in Russia. When they felt that some people or organisations were no longer of use,

relations with them would soon break down, as can be seen the way they treated

anarchist organisations and many nationalists. In turn, once certain organisations or

individuals realised they had become mere tools of Soviet Russia, they usually

turned against both Russia and its creation, the CCP. This explains why some

people, such as Zhang Ji, Zhu Zhuowen, Huang Lingshuang and Qin Baopu for

example, who had been friends of Soviet agents at an early stage, later became

resolute opponents of both the Communists and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,

many Chinese people were convinced by Soviet Russia's "friendly" gestures, and to

that extent China was opened wide to Bolshevik penetration.

'64 P. Mif, Fifteen-vears of Heroic Stru-qqle, (Moscow, 1934, in Russian). Similar cases can also be found in the early Korean and Japanese Communist movements.

175

CHAPTER FOUR

PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION IN CHINA

PeoPle normally consider that the October Revolution had a great influence

upon radical Chinese ideology, and Bolshevik propaganda played an important role in

the rise of the Communist movement in China. An authoritative Chinese historian, He

Ganzhi, points out: "The October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to the

Chinese people, and showed them the way to their own liberation. "' This statement is

similar to Mao Zedong's and remains the orthodox point of view in mainland China.

But until now, scant evidence has been given to back this sweeping statement.

Therefore it has recently been challenged by some historians. For example, Xiang

Qing rejects any significant Leninist influence on China before the spring of 1920 and

argues:

It was not the case that the Russian revolutionaries came to China after the

October Revolution and placed the works of Marx and Lenin into the

hands of Chinese progressive elements. ... Instead, the Chinese progressive

elements obtained news of the victory of the Russian Revolution from the

news agenciesof the bourgeoisie. Under the condition of the blockade of

Sino-Russian communication, such a history of disseminating Marxism-

Leninism continued until March 1920 when Sino-Soviet communication

was resumed. 2

' Ho KanEchih, A Historv of the Modern Chinese Revolution, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1959), pp 21-2.

2 Xiang Qing, 'The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution in the Period of the Foundation of the CCP', Jinclaishi yanLu (1980), No 4.

176

M. Luk develops the argument:

There was little doctrinal influence from Russia before the summer of

1920. ... The early influence of the October Revolution was therefore a

product of the self-generated interest of the Chinese themselves in that

revolution, which was seen and analysed through their own spectacles.

Soviet propaganda and Leninist ideas were definitely unimportant at this

stage. 3

Regardless of the different dates they give for the beginning of Soviet propaganda,

both Xiang and Luk consider that there was no direct Soviet propaganda in China, or

that Soviet propaganda was unimportant at this early stage and stress the initiative of

Chinese radicals in accepting Marxism-Leninism and in following the way opened up

by the October Revolution. Moreover, Luk confuses influence with propaganda.

Influence is intangible and cannot be measured, and Soviet influence could have

appeared before Soviet propaganda or might have been the result of the latter. The

main reason why Xiang and Luk cannot see the early Soviet propaganda or even

influence (aside from lack of evidence) is that they hold a narrow view of propaganda.

Propaganda is a systematic, deliberate effort to disseminate ideas, information

or rumours with the intention of persuading numbers of other people to do or think as

the propagandist wishes in order either to further or to damage a cause. Sometimes it

is difficult to draw a clear distinction between propaganda and agitation. To Lenin,

agitation denoted the activity of inciting the masses to action by playing on their

instincts and passions, whereas propaganda referred to the educational activity of

spreading Communist doctrines and methods. Since the Bolsheviks always

3 M. Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp 33-4.

177

emphasised the practical effects of propaganda, the content of their propaganda was

not confined to doctrinal matters. In the early stages of Bolshevik activity, little

dissemination of Marxism and Lenin's theory was conducted. Hence, if one limits

oneself to a discussion of the dissemination of Communist ideology or Bolshevik

doctrines, one will indeed find no propaganda. However, if one applies a broader

definition of propaganda, different results emerge. In this chapter, I sometimes may

use the term "propaganda" widely so that it encompasses agitation and, indeed, so that

it covers both the ideological aspect and manipulative aspect of Soviet political

communication.

Before discussing the subject, I have to point out that the introduction of

Marxism into China did not start with the October Revolution. As early as 1899, Karl

Marx's name and his doctrines were briefly mentioned in Wanguo gongbao (The

Globe Magazine), which was published in Shanghai by English and American

Christian missionaries. From 1901, translations from Japanese books were the main

channel for the introduction of socialist ideas, including Marxism. Froni 1907 several

Marxist works were translated into Chinese. However, those Chinese who introduced

Marxism in this period merely regarded Marxism as one school of socialism, and

nobody completely accepted or believed in it. It is true that the October Revolution

helped arouse greater interest in Marxism among radical Chinese, because the

Bolsheviks claimed to be adherents of orthodox Marxism and their achievement was

regarded as the victory of Marxism. But in fact, the doctrines the Bolsheviks tried to

inculcate into China were mainly Leninism, a synonym for Bolshevism.

The main issues I am going to investigate in this chapter are: the Bolsheviks'

early propaganda in China and its main content; the intensive propaganda during the

178

CCP's founding period of 1920-21; and the tactics, means and effects of such

propaganda.

The Bolsheviks always attached great importance to propaganda. In their

struggle for World Revolution, the spoken and written word played a more continuous

and vital role than did bullets or roubles. An observer remarked that the whole of early

Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy could be summed up by one word - propaganda. 4

The Comintern in its first year, as Zinoviev declared, "was nothing but a propagandist

society" .5 Although the initial focal point of Bolsheviks' propaganda was the West,

they did not neglect the East for they believed that the East was the backyard of

imperialist countries. In November 1919, at the Second Congress of the Communist

Organisations of the Eastern Peoples, Lenin pointed out that the immense task

confronting the Eastern Revolutionaries was "to continue to ensure that Communist

propaganda is carried on in every country in a language the people understand. o, 6

Bukharin also declared that, "We must pursue the tactics of universal support of the

,, 7 international revolution,... by propagating revolts and insurrection in the colonies ... .

Some Bolsheviks even believed, "In comparison with the already corrupted West, the

virgin land of the East is readily receptive to Communist ideas, "8 and they therefore

considered the East was a better area to propagate Communism.

From 1918 several special institutions were established by the Bolsheviks to

run propaganda work in the East, such as the Department of International Propaganda

4 J. B. Whitton and A. Larson, Propaganda, Towards Disarmament in the War of Words, (New York, 1964), p 27.

3'-D-egras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 166. 6 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 30, p 162. 7 Quoted from Whitton and Larson, Propaganda, towards Disarmament in the War of

the Words, p 26. T-Z--hizn ýatsionalnostei, 7 December 1919.

179

under the Central Bureau of Muslim Organisations of the RCP(B), the Information and

Agitation Bureau under the Siberian Regional Committee of the RCP(B), the Council

for International Propaganda under the Turkestan Commission of the Central

Executive Committee of the RCP(B) and the Council for Propaganda and Action of

the Peoples of the East under the ECCI. All of them were charged with spreading

propaganda in China as well as in other Eastern countries and some of them even had

Chinese sections. Many schools for training propagandists and agitators selected the

Chinese in Russia to undergo a course in the principles and practice of Bolshevism and

taught Chinese language to the people of other races. 9 In addition to the schools, a

number of propaganda trains were formed, fitted with cinema apparatus and equipped

with literature to meet the requirements of the various races. Once a train which was

"composed of ten cars laden with literature intended for Korea, China, Mongolia and

India" was reported to have left Moscow for the borderlands. ' 0 In August 1920, Radek

spoke before the Congress of Eastern Peoples at Baku: "We have already called

attention to the intense activity of the Bolshevik propaganda throughout the different

countries of the East, extending as far as China and Japan, From the

propaganda bases in Soviet Russia's borderlands and from Moscow, the apostles of

Bolshevik principles spread to and penetrated nearly every Asian country. 12 China

was certainly one of their destinations.

In fact, Communism was not the major subject of Bolshevik propaganda

during the period when Soviet Russia was suffering from foreign armed intervention

9 In Turkestan alone, there were 54 such schools which opened before 1920. FO 228/3211, Series of February 1920.

10 Chapman, The Chinese Revolution,, p 60; China Advertiser, (Tianjin), 21 February 1920.

" Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 1613. 12 Chapman, The Chinese Revolution,, p 60.

180

and economic blockade. In the early stages, their propaganda in China mainly played

a supporting role in the Soviet Government's Far Eastern strategy and was conducted

in accordance with Soviet policies towards China. The main menace to the Bolsheviks

in Siberia and the Far East at that time was Japan's invasion. The Bolsheviks also

worried that Japan would collude with the Chinese Government, based on the Sino-

Japanese "mutual defence" pact, to use Chinaýs territory and troops for attacking

Russia. So, their propagandists' first task was to incite the Chinese people to fight

against imperialist Japan as well as other Western powers and to overthrow the pro-

Japanese Chinese Govemment; the other task was to gain the friendship of the Chinese

people and to establish diplomatic relations in order to help overcome the Bolshevik

regime's isolation in the world. In the light of this, the gist of Narkomindel's

instructions in February 1918 to local Soviets in Siberia was to employ "every

opportunity in the press, at meetings, and in leaflets" to exhort the Eastern people to

look to Socialist Russia as their "salvation" from the dangers of invasion, violence and

lawlessness of the Japanese-European capitalists and aggressors. 13 In August 1919,

when Vilensky was dispatched to the Russian Far East, the Politburo of the RCP(B)

instructed him to arouse the masses of China, Mongolia and Korea to break away from

the oppression of foreign capitalists; to strengthen agitation work in the East Asia by

publishing books, pamphlets and leaflets. 14

Under such instructions, early Soviet propaganda was centred on the theme of

anti-imperialism, especially against the Japanese. For example, when Popov, who

acted as an inspector of propaganda in the Far East, first came to China in May 1918,

13 R. Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution', The Far Eastern Affair, (1978), Vol 1, p 147.

14 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 38-9. 181

he published an "Appeal from a Russian Proletarian" in a paper in Shanghai, attacking

Japan and the White leaders of the Russian colony in Shanghai. 15 After the downfall

of the Soviets in Siberia and the Russian Far East in summer 1918, many Russian

Bolsheviks went to China with proclamations translated into Chinese to agitate for the

boycotting of Japanese goods. 16 In August 1919, a leaflet was found entitled "Appeal

to Chinese Workmen", which was mainly circulated among Chinese workers along the

CER in the North East of China. It pointed out that the Paris Peace Conference had

passed a resolution to put Shandong province under Japan's control, so Chinese land

was going to be annexed by expansionist Japan and warned that 'we Chinese' would

become the slaves of Japan. However, "our compatriots must not be disappointed by

our isolated position, since Soviet Russia! s workers and peasants who are fighting

against the Russian capitalists and the White Army have shown sympathy for the

Chinese; ... The Russians ... are not only fighting for themselves, but also fighting for

the freedom of all oppressed races of the world. " It went on to appeal to Chinese

workers to co-operate with their Russian comrades in strikes and to unite as one to

combat the aggressor Japan. 17

As for general Soviet propaganda on Chinese territory, it began at nearly the

same time as the advent of the first Bolsheviks. Nearly all agents who were dispatched

from Soviet Russia to China in 1918, such as Verestchak, Makaroff, Popov,

Aromovitch and Janes de Mezey, were entrusted with the task of propaganda and

agitation.

15 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918; FO 228/3211, April 1921. 16 FO 228/3211, Series of September 1919. 17 FO 228/2020, No 37,12 August 1919.

182

In 1919, Bolshevik propaganda in China had advanced noticeably. In March

1919 the Chinese Government was alerted to a Bolshevik conference in Shanghai for

the purpose of spreading Bolshevik propaganda in China. 18 In the same month the

Russian Minister to Beijing, Kudashev, informed the Chinese authorities that several

Bolsheviks were agitating in Beijing and Tianjin. 19 Although the Chinese Government

ordered local authorities to ban Bolshevik propaganda, it seems that they were unable

to halt it. According to a report in the Japanese newspaper Nichi Nichi Shinbun (Daily

News) of II April 1919, a Russian propagandist travelled up the Yangtze River from

Shanghai. In the meantime five or six sorts of secret Bolshevik literature were

circulating in Shanghai. The editorial of the paper expressed the fear that "China will

become a breeding ground of Bolshevism. , 20 On 16 June another Japanese paper

Osaka Mainichi Shinbun (Osaka Daily News) reported that "the Russian Bolsheviks

have sent many partisans to the interior of China to preach Bolshevism., '21 Bolshevik

agents were also said to be spreading propaganda among the Muslim population in

Xinjiang. 22 Although these warnings obviously exaggerated the facts, not all of the

reports were merely rumours.

Some Soviet agents who could speak Chinese, English or Esperanto began

their propaganda activity among Chinese intellectuals. Polevoy introduced the

October Revolution and Soviet publications to certain Chinese intellectuals, such as Li

Dazhao and Zhang Tailei, from 1918.23 Ivanov, who started teaching Russian at

18 ZEGXSL, 21 March 1919; FO 228/3214,27 March 1919. 19 TE--GXSL, 26 March 1919. 20 Z5-hen bao, 17 Jun 1919. 21 - 3ým`wen bao (Shanghai Newspaper), June 19,1919. 22 =EGXSEL, 118 June -1919; FO 228/2767,5 June 1919. 23 Cf. the relevant paragraphs in Section 1 of Chapter 3.

183

Beijing University in September 1919, sometimes expounded Lenin's theory of

imperialism. 24

Contrary to Xiang Qing's assertion, the Russian Bolsheviks did really put the

works of Marx and Lenin into the hands of the Chinese before the spring of 1920. The

first of such works brought into China might have been Lenin's Imperialism, the

Highist Stage of Capitalism. MOller's memoirs tell that, in 1919 Burtman and MUller

himself "acquainted the Chinese students [in Tianjin and Beijing] with Lenin's work

Imperialism the Highest Stage of Cgitalism, often touching on problems relating to

China. to25 Certain Chinese familiarised themselves with Lenin's main points on

imperialism from this work. Luk mentions that from early 1919, many Chinese

intellectuals were aware of the connections between capitalism and imperialism, but he

unconvincingly asserts that "their understanding of the subject was not derived from

Lenin but from Hobson" before the summer of 1920, simply on the grounds that

Hobson's work was published in a Chinese paper in 1919.26

Nevertheless, there were not many Russians or ex-POWs available to

participate in propaganda work in China because of the language barrier. Moreover,

their Western features made it hard for them to approach ordinary Chinese. Therefore,

these propagandists' activities were limited in scope and effect. There was hence an

urgent need to use the Chinese who were in Russia to do agitation and propaganda

work.

In January 1919 Lenin issued a decree placing Chinese labourers in Russia

under the particular protection of the Soviet Republic and organised a special

24 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 146. 25 Quoted from Meisner, U Ta-chao and the Oriclins of Chinese Marxism, p 115. 26 Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 27; p 57.

184

department for Bolshevik propaganda in China under a Chinese named Shun Yun-

sun. 27 Several Chinese papers, such as Hua gong (The Chinese Labourers), Daton

bao (Great Harmony), Zhendong bao (Shaking the East) and Gongchanzhuyi zhi xing

(Communist Star), which were edited by the Chinese in Russia and subsidised by the

Soviet Government, were published. These papers were mainly for the Chinese Red

soldiers and workers in Russia, and some of them were also distributed along the Sino-

Russian border or carried into China. According to the first Chairman of the All

Russian Union of Chinese Workers, Liu Shaozhou, as soon as the Union's organ

Datong bao (which sometimes carried poems praising Lenin and published the First

Karakhan Manifesto to China) was off the press, Soviet military units transported large

numbers of the paper for circulation along the Sino-Russian border. 28 Soon the

Chinese press reported that the Soviet Government was distributing tens of thousands

of copies of the Manifesto in Chinese. 29 Many other leaflets were also printed for

propaganda purposes in China. In October 1919 the French Minister to Beijing

informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that "the Bolshevik Government has

distributed many leaflets all over China which urge the Chinese people to oppose

Britain, France and America. 00 Around this time, numerous Bolshevik leaflets

directed at ordinary Chinese were circulated in several places in China.

Literature distribution was closely combined with oral agitation. From the

beginning of 1919, many Chinese labourers who had been trained at propaganda

schools or had joined the Red Army were sent to China to engage in propaganda

27 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 244. 28 Liu Shaozhou, 'My Experiences in Soviet Russia before and after the October

Revolution', Wenshi ziliao xuanoi (Selected Materials on Chinese History and Culture), (Beijing, March 1971), No 60, pp 217-8.

29 Shi bao, 20 September 1919. 30 YEGXSL, 17 October 1919.

185

31 activities with the help of the Soviet authorities. It was reported that many militants

among the homeward bound Chinese labourers carried large amounts of money and

propaganda materials, which were hidden in double-bottomed suitcases, thermos

flasks, clothes and hats. 32 As early as January 1919, the Chinese authorities in

Manchuria found that "many Chinese labourers who had worked in Russia and

03 supported the Bolsheviks agitated for Socialism on their return. The agitation was

first carried on in the border regions, and later, it was brought right into the interior as

these labourers returned to their home towns. Soon reports reached Beijing about

these Chinese "carrying out Bolshevik propaganda activity" among the workers on

railways, in factories, down coal mines and even among soldiers. 34 The Beijing

Government was worried in particular about trouble in the 5th Division of the Army,

whose soldiers reacted favourably to Bolshevism when it was recommended by some

Shandong men who had been in Russia. 35 This division's soldiers also issued some

agitation leaflets which circulated among other military units. 36

Zhong Yong-song, who was in charge of propaganda, dispatched many

agitators to distribute copies of Lenin's photograph and to make speeches among the

Chinese people in the border regions; in their speeches, Lenin was described as a

reborn Genghis Khan, who would rule Asia and conquer Europe again. 37 There was

31 'Rosta wireless dispatch of 8 January 1919', as quoted by Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, p 36.

'? Telegram of Bao Guiqing to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Beijing Government, 27 January 1919; Zhonq-quo x1andaishi ziliao xuanii, Vol 1, p 613.

33 Archives of the Frontier Defense Section of the Chinese Government, 29 January 1919.

34 Archives of the Ministry of the Army of the Chinese Government, 29 January 1919. 35 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 36 Shi bao of 29 May 1919 reported that the troops in Hubei Province received radical

leaflets issued by the soldiers of the 5th Division. 37 ZEGXSL, 5 April 1919.

186

also evidence that several Chinese Muslims in Russian Central Asia slipped into

Xinjiang in June 1919 with leaflets and funds to preach the principles of Bolshevism

among Chinese Muslims, and to incite them to rebel. 38

According to one report, a Chinese delegation consisting of five

representatives headed by Li Houng, who had lived in Kashgar, was received by the

Soviet Government in Moscow in December 1919. After this interview, the Oriental

Department of Narkon-tindel decided to give more funds for the edition and publication

of brochures, pamphlets, etc. in Chinese and for the establishment of propagandist

groups. A special commission composed of Lokhov, Vladimiroff and Evdokimoff

was put in charge of propaganda for China. Afterwards Soviet propaganda was said to

be concentrated in Kashgar in Xinjiang, Yarkend and Aksou in Manchuria and to be

intense in some internal areas of China. 39

In spring 1920, several hundred Chinese from Moscow (most of them had

joined the Red Army) established a "Council" (Soviet) in Tashkent and Osh and drew

many Chinese from Kashgar into the Council. These Chinese made public speeches

among the Chinese in border areas. Yang Zengxin, the Governor of Xinjiang, in his

telegram to the Central government expressed his concern: "Those extremists advocate

equality and freedom, agitate for the abolition of class distinctions between officials

and common people, and of barriers between different countries and races. ... I am

afraid that extremism [Bolshevism], with which the frontier area is going to be

contaminated, will also penetrate the interior and finally spread all over China. io4O

38 Yang Zengxin, Buguo zhai wendu (Papers of the Buguo Study), Vol 4, p 32. 39 FO 228/2987, Political Report from Geneva, 23 February 1920. 40 Telegraph of Yang Zengxin to the President of Republic of China, 28 March 1920,8

June 1920; Archives of the Ministrv of Internal Affairs of the Chinese Government. 187

Although there were advantages in having Chinese undertake agitation, most

Chinese labourers were illiterate and could not carry out protracted propaganda work

without instructions and financial aid from the Russian Bolsheviks. Gradually, most

of them gave up the work under the pressure of circumstances or because of the need

to make a living.

In order to conduct propaganda more effectively on a large scale, the

Bolsheviks left no means untried. The press was a useful and convenient medium for

them to carry out propaganda.

Several Soviet agents contributed articles individually to foreign papers which

were published in China or foreign language papers edited by Chinese and tried to

make use of these journals for their own purposes. Journal de Min was a French

magazine published in Beijing and was owned and edited by A. Nachbour, who had

formerly been secretary to Albert Thomas, a noted French socialist and member of the

cabinet during the War. Having been expelled from the Russian Legation in 1918,

Ivanov started working on Journal de Min and publishing articles under the pen name

Ivin. Nachbour depended on Ivanov for Russian news, which Ivanov received from

Soviet Russia or obtained by interviewing Siberian 6migr6s. 41 Asa Russian historian

remarked, Journal de Min "held high the banner of supporting the Soviet Far Eastern

Policy" from autumn 1918 and was once the only outlet in the Far East to publish

"correct information about Soviet Russia"; and through this journal, Ivin told the

41 Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (December 1922), Vol 22, No 12, p 1012. In his Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau, dated 17 August 1920, Voitinsky mentioned: "Your telegraph to Journal de P6kin has been received. " GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. Later, this journal was suspended by the French legation because it had released telegraph news from Moscow. ZEGXSL, 16 October 1920.

188

Chinese people and the whole world the truth about Soviet Russia. , 42 Millard's

Review was an influential English paper in the Far East which was published in

Shanghai. In May 1918, Popov anonymously contributed an article to this paper

entitled "Appeal from A Russian Proletarian". 43 China Press was an American daily

newspaper published in Shanghai. In Spring 1920, Agarief wrote several articles on

Russian affairs for it. 44 Voitinsky also provided this paper with Bolsheviks' articles

including "Appeal to the Revolutionary People of the World" which was published in

June 1920.45 Sokolsky, who once admitted that he was disseminating Bolshevik ideas

in China, worked on North China Star in Tianjin and Shanghai Gazette during 1918-

20. On the latter paper (the GMD's English-language paper), he reported information

from Soviet Russia on the Russian section he edited and expressed his radical and pro-

Bolshevik views therein. 46

Soviet propagandists also published articles in the Chinese papers. For example,

in September 1919, Sokolsky wrote an article for Xin Zhongguo (New China). 47

Lizerovitch contributed an article entitled "May Day" to Xinggi pinglun of 25 April

1920, which reads:

The ruling class gradually realise that their fate will not be long in coming,

... the working class will dominate everything in the end. ... At present, the

whole world is sick ... There is no peace in the world. ... Poland,

compelled by imperialistic France, is making an attack upon Soviet

Russia. ... Shandong province of China was taken over by another country.

42 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 145. 43 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918. 44 FO 405/233 No 107. 45 'Voitinsky's Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29. 46 FO 228/3285, September 1919; FO 405/228, No 157,7 April 1920. 47 Xin Zhonaguo, Vol 1, No 1.

189

... The working class declares: 'We can change this status and we will

change this situation !, 48

Articles by Voitinsky, Stopany and other Bolshevik agents can also be found in

Chinese magazines.

The organ of the Bolsheviks was an important tool for their propaganda. Lenin

regarded the newspaper of the Party as "not only a collective propagandist and

collective agitator - it is also a collective organiser. v, 49 It was also vital to the

Bolsheviks to have their own media in China. In February 1920, Vilensky bought

Shanghai Life, a progressive Russian paper in Shanghai and turned it into an entirely

50 "Bolshevik organ which was propagating Bolshevism". Shanghai Life carried news

from Soviet Russia and many articles by Bolshevik propagandists. Most articles were

directed at Russian residents in China, but some were obviously aimed at the Chinese.

For example, an article published in March 1920 claimed:

Foreign influence is so strong in China that it keeps people fighting among

themselves. Not long ago the position of Russia was similar, but

conditions there are now improving. The country has been freed from

foreign intervention, and the date is not far distant when Russia will appear

in the world as a strong and united nation. Can China hope for such an

ending to her present troubles? 51

"The Karakhan Manifesto" was actually a propaganda document aimed at winning the

Chinese people's good opinion of Soviet Russia. On 31 March 1920 Shanghai Life

published the whole text of the Manifesto soon after it was formally wired to Beijing.

48 Xinggi pinglun, No 47. 49 Lenin, What Is to Be Done? 50 ZEGXSL, No 164,30 April 1920. *' FO 228/3214,25 March 1920.

190

Its last paragraph states: "If the Chinese people want to escape from a position which

will bring them down to the level of Korea and India, the only people from whom they

can expect assistance are the Russian workers and the Red Army. iM This Russian

version and its Chinese translation were published by the Chinese journal Zhengheng

(La Critique de la Politique) on the following day.

In his report to the ECCI dated I September 1920, Vilensky said that Shanghai

Life was owned by the East Asian Secretariat. 53 The Office of Shanghai Life was not

only a Bolshevik organ, but also an organisation for conducting propaganda in China.

Sinolinkoff, a reporter on Shanghai Life, sometimes travelled in the interior of China

spreading Bolshevism. 54 Mikulin, who could speak Chinese, carried out propaganda

55 in Fujian on the instructions of the staff of Shan hai Life. Khodorov, Ivanov and

Agarief in Beijing all kept close connections with the Office of Shanghai Life for

propaganda purposes. Shanghai Life also had two correspondents in Western

countries, both of whom had formerly worked on the paper in China. One was A.

Rosenberg in New York, who was "a constant correspondent on Bolshevik affairs" and

sent "Red literature" from America. Another was Gerkovitch in Paris, who wrote

regularly to Shanghai about the Bolshevik work that was being undertaken in France. 56

In addition to Shanghai Life, there were some other Bolshevik or pro-

Bolshevik Russian papers in other cities. For example, Advance in Harbin, Red Fla

and Peasants' Truth in Vladivostok, from where it was easy to smuggle the

52 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 53 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 54 FO 228/3211, April 1921. 55 FO 405/233, (16 September, 1921). 56 FO 228/3211, April 1921; FO 405/233, No 107,16 September 1921.

191

publications into China. 57 Since Russian language paper naturally limited its impact in

China, from 1921, the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a daily paper in English in

Shanghai. For this, Khodorov and Turgarshief first tried to enlist an American woman

58 Mrs Bena to help, but failed. In the fall of 1922, the Comintern allocated funds to

publish a weekly journal in English entitled New Russia to replace Shanghai Life.

Joffe entrusted Maring, Lconidov and Novitsky (a leading writer on Shanghai Life)

with this task. It was said that this journal was under the editorship of Bouffier. 59

In order to extend Soviet Russia's political influence, the Bolshevik

propagandists endeavoured to make use of some Chinese papers as their medium. Luo

Jialun 's memoirs reveal the Soviet agents' early connections with certain Chinese

journals. He recalled: "At first, the Comintern sent somebody to China to organise a

Communist Party in China. Having no way of doing this, he decided to whip up

public opinion and then turned to dealing with press circles. Yet there was still no

result. At last this person found a journal called Jiefang yLl gaizao (Emancipation and

Reconstruction) when he arrived in Shanghai. He felt that the title of the journal suited

their persuasion, and hence made contact with that journal . 60 Luo specifically

mentioned that the person in question arrived in China earlier than Voitinsky.

Jiefang yg. Raizao started publication in September 1919 under the Beijing New

Society, which belonged to the Research Clique. Its editors Zhang Dongxun and

Zhang Junmai were inclined to Guild socialism. In spite of this, the journal introduced

various schools of socialism, including Marxism. It carried numerous articles about

57 Wang Yijun, Zhong-E waiiiao de xumu, p 173. 58 FO 405/233, September 1921. '59 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 131; 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', 19 January

1923. 60 Taibei lianhe bao (United Daily News), (Taibei), 3 July 1957.

192

Soviet Russia, in which the authors expressed admiration for the October Revolution

and "Lenin's noble doctrines and his courageous actions" and called Lenin the

"forerunner of social revolution". 61 Jiefang y2 gaiZao was among the first Chinese

journals to report the foundation of the Comintern and to publish Lenin's works. It

carried translations of Lenin's Political Parties in Russia and the Task of the Proletariat,

The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government and ran articles such as "Lenin,

Trotsky and Their Doctrines". The journal also published the Soviet Constitution, as

well as laws on land, on the organisation of production, on the 8-hour working-day and

on marriage. It also reported nearly every aspect of the circumstances of Soviet

Russia. Zhang Dongxun, who later resolutely opposed Bolshevik-style Socialism,

admitted at the end of 1920 that he had previously held the view that "China should

form an alliance with Russia to establish a Workers' and Peasants' Country and

overthrow world capitalism by the power of the two nations. , 62

Besides Jiefang y! j gaizao, other papers of the Research Clique all showed an

inclination towards the left between 1919 and 1920. Shishi xinbao (Current News

Daily) and its literary supplement Xue den (Learning Light) carried many articles

which advocated socialism, introduced Soviet Russia and reported news of the world

revolutionary movement. Xue deng published "The Leader of the Bolshevik Party -

Lenin", "Trotsky's Autobiography" and Trotsky's "The Bolsheviks and World Peace"

in 1919. In October 1920 Xue deng carried portraits of Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov,

Kalinin and Lunacharsky, and pictures of the flag of Soviet Russia and the insignia of

the Red Army. The general manager of Guomin gongbao (The Citizens' Gazette), Lan

Gongwu, was a professor at Beijing University and was on good terms with Chen

61 Jiefanq vu gaizao, (November 1919), Vol 1, No 6. 62 Xin gingnian, (i December 1920), Vol 8, No 4.

193

Duxiu and Li Dazhao. 63 Among the letters they took from Chen Duxiu's house in June

1919, the police found a letter written by Lan to ask Chen Duxiu to seek some students

at Beijing University who would write articles for Guomin gongbao and Shishi

xinbao. 64 In October 1919, Guomin gongLao was closed down by the Beijing police

and its editor Sun Jiyi was arrested because it carried some radical articles such as

"Communist Hungary" and "The History of the Russian Revolution" and expressed

sharply anti-Japanese views. 65 From spring 1919 Chen bao (Beijing Morning Post)

and its supplement showed an extraordinary pro-Bolshevik stand. In April 1919, an

article pointed out that since Bolshevism "grew out of Marxism, if anybody wants to

understand Bolshevism, he must study Marxism seriously". The following month, a

special column - "Marxism Studies" - was established in the supplement.

Furthen-nore, Lenin's "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" and

biographies of Lenin, Trotsky, F. A. Bebel, K. Liebknecht and R. Luxemburg also

appeared in this paper. It is worth noting that from 27 March 1919, Chen bao began to

report news about the First Congress of the Comintern, and in August it carried "The

Manifesto of the Third International". A review of current affairs, published in Chen

bao on 13 April, gave food for thought:

At present, all newspapers, magazines, news agencies, as well as the state

apparatus, are in the hands of the bourgeoisie, so the dominant information

about Russia circulated over the world is opposed to Lenin's Government.

... Some Chinese who have never studied Bolshevism have just heard that

63 After 1949, Lan Gongwu became vice-chief of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the PR China. After his death, Lan was posthumously admitted as a member of the CCP.

64 Beiiing dangan shiliao (Archival Materials on the History of Beijing), (1987), No 1; Lan Gongwu later became the editor-in-chief of Shishl xinbao.

65 ibid., (1987), No 4. 194

the British and Americans do not like Bolshevism and then followed them

blindly.

Another article in Chen bao on I March 1919, entitled "Studies of Russia", pointed out

that the Chinese press always obtained news of foreign countries from Reuters, the

Japanese newspapers, the English papers and several news agencies in Shanghai,

which tended to distort the facts. Thus if the Bolsheviks' doctrines and deeds were

judged from these news sources, it would lead to misunderstanding. The author

further suggested that a news agency should be set up by various journals' offices

jointly to subscribe to Russian newspapers, so that editors could learn and report the

current situation in Russia correctly.

The above passages suggest that the author(s) seemed to be familiar with

Bolshevik views on the press: the press is in the hands of the bourgeoisie so long as

they remain in power; they also hint that this author(s) at least, exceptionally, had

found other channels to gain access to news about Soviet Russia and Bolshevik

publications.

Since the number of articles on Soviet Russia, its leaders and socialist theories

carried by the Research Clique's journals in 1919 surpassed those found in Xin

gingnian and other progressive journals in China, their radical tendency made people

look at them with new eyes. The historian, Li Yunhan, was surprised to see that "these

conservative papers suddenly took an interest in the new ideas of socialiSM. "66 This

odd phenomenon is hard to explain and it suggests that certain Soviet propagandists

might have dealt with the journals of the Research Clique, and either supplied them

with materials directly or via Li Dazhao, who participated in editing Chen bao's

66 Li Yunhan, Cong rongoong dao gingdang, p 82. 195

supplement after February 1919, or Zhang Zhi, who was a correspondent with Shishi

xinbao and Chen bao, and some other radical journalists. It also helps to explain why

the first delegates of the Chinese Journalists' Association who were selected to visit

Soviet Russia were all from the journals belonging to the Research Clique. One was

Qu Qiubai, who went as a correspondent for Chen bao, and others were Yu Songhua

and Li Zongwu, who represented Jiefang yM gaizao and Shishi xinbao respectively.

Though they set off for Russia in October 1920, their plan to visit the country had been

made known to Moscow sometime before 24 June, when Izvestiia reported this news.

On arrival in Moscow, these Chinese journalists declared that they were "disciples of

Karl MarX". 67

Turning our attention to the progressive journals, such as Meizhou pinglun

(Weekly Critic) in Beijing, Xinggi vinglun (Sunday Review) in Shanghai, Xiangiian

pinglun (Xiang River Review) in Changsha and Xinggiri (Sunday) in Chengdu, which

were all weekly review journals, related to each other and with same edition formats,

we find that these papers, in the main, defended and argued in favour of the Bolsheviks

and their doctrines. For example, in an article in Meizhou Vinglun in March 1919, Li

Dazhao satirised those who were afraid of Bolshevism. "How did they know what

Bolshevism is? " he asked and went on: "in order to open these gentlemen's minds, we

have to translate several Bolshevik works to let them read them. "68 Li Dazhao was not

alone. In XianOiang 12inglun, Li's former assistant Mao Zedong, reproved the

bureaucrats and politicians who were against Bolshevism, asking: "What is the

Bolshevik Party? What are their doctrines and who are their leaders? Can those who

67 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 89. 613 Meizhou vinglun, (March 1919), No 11.

196

threaten that the Bolsheviks have come to China answer? , 69 The editors of Xingqiri

(Sunday) wrote in the foreword to a translation of "The Bolsheviks' Education

Programme" that "there are rather few books which have been translated directly from

Russian, so we are not able to know the real facts regarding Bolshevism. Therefore,

we cannot blindly follow others and join in the chorus of slander of Bolshevism. 00 If

we examine these journals more carefully, we can see that they reported similar news

about Soviet Russia, foreign affairs and international movements, for example, the

Communist regimes in Germany and Hungary, the uprising in Afghanistan and the

situation in Siberia. Even Mao Zedong, who did not know any foreign languages,

reported on this type of news from abroad positively. It is not easy to explain how

they can have obtained such news.

It can now be confirmed that Xingqi Pinglun, at least, received publicity

materials from Soviet agents. Before April 1920, Potapov handed Trotsky's article(s)

and a pamphlet in English which contained documents such as the Soviet Constitution

and Law on land to Xinggi vinglun. 71 And Lizerovitch, who received revolutionary

literature from foreign countries and Vladivostok, passed some of them on to Xinggi

pinglun and several other papers in Shanghai. 72 On 22 April 1920, Xinggi Pinglun

69 Xiandiang ginglun, (21 July 1919), No 2; on No 1 of the journal there was an article entitled "To Study the Bolshevik Party".

70 Xinggiri, No 21,30 November 1919. 71 'Potapov to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48. 72 FO 405/228, No 157,7 April 1920; FO 228/3211, April 1921; Those papers included

Xinhan qinqnian and Zhentan, the journals in Chinese edited by activists of the Korean independent movement, which contained a good deal on Bolshevik matters and demonstrated that they were in favour of socialism and opposed to Japanese and British imperialism and to the Chinese Warlords. Wusl shicii qikan fieshao (Introduction to the Periodicals of the May 4 th Movement) Beijing: People's Press, 1958-59, Vol 2, pp 179-185.

197

carried an article about Bernard Shaw's utterances in favour of Bolshevism, which was

a translation from a British Socialist paper supplied by Lizerovitch.

Using newspapers and periodicals which were published other than in Russia

for propaganda purposes seemed more effective and less likely to arouse suspicion.

What Lizerovitch obtained from abroad included Workers' Dreadnough 3, The Ca1174

Daily Herald75 and New York CaIl76 . The first three British leftist papers used to be

73 Workers' Dreadnouqhts editor was Sylvia Pankhurst, the leader of the Workers' Socialist Federation, which was extremely active in rallying support for the October Revolution and Soviet Russia. In June 1919 the WSF decided to rename itself the Communist Party. The Workers' Dreadnought carried some articles and speeches by Bolshevik leaders and the news on revolutionary movements over the world, including news from China and India. From January 1920 the emblem of the hammer and sickle appeared on the paper's masthead and from June 1920 the paper became an organ of the British Communist Party.

74 The Call was the British Socialist Party's weekly journal, edited by F. Willis, one of the Party leaders. From Spring 1919 the BSP together with some other leftist parties in Britain began to discuss the formation of a single united Communist Party. With the foundation of the Communist Party of Great Britain in August 1920, the paper was replaced by The Communist, the official organ of the CPGB. (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, (London, 1986), Vol 1, p 214). Before that The Call was regarded as "a Communist organ". (L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist PaU. its Origin and Develooment until 1929, Britain: Macgibbon & Lee, 1966, p 256)

" The Daily Herald was a journal of the Independent Labour Party in Britain. Russian affairs were then of major interest to the paper. One article of 20 October 1919 praised Soviet Russia as "the great hope of the world; ... the definite proof that a Socialist state can be successfully organised and administered. " In January 1920, its editor-in-chief G. Lansbury visited Soviet Russia and later wrote What I saw in Russia, in which he wrote that Lenin was a man of "devotion to the cause of humanity" and that "real democracy" was being fashioned in Russia. The

, Daily Herald was once financed by the Comintern.

(S. R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924, p 170, footnote 23). In 1920, part of the staff of the Dailv Herald were drawn into the preparation of the Communist Party. (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Vol 1, p 24)

" The New York Call was first published by the Working Men's Cooperative Publishing Association and later became the organ of the American Socialist Party. After the October Revolution, the Call in its editorials urged support for the Bolsheviks, "from a sincere conviction that the Soviet government championed the cause of the working class in Russia and elsewhere" (14 September 1918). It was therefore attacked for "favoring the Soviets". (T. Draper, The Roots of American Communism, New York: The Viking Press, 1963, p 112). It carried Lenin's "Appeal to the World's Workers" (August 20 1919) and other Bolshevik pamphlets. In the issue for 1 January 1919, M. Hillquit wished a happy new year to "the proletarians of Russia - the pioneer warriors of human rights and human dignity, for liberty and bread". Although Hillquit was considered by the Comintern as a "notorious opportunist", ironically, he helped

198

provided with Lenin's works such as The Collapse of the Second International, State

and Revolution, Proletarian Revolution and the Reneizade Kautsk and numerous other

articles and news by the People's Russian Information Bureau in London and the

Socialist Information and Research Bureau in Scotland - the two information centres

established by Soviet Russia. 77 The New York Call was the organ of the American

Socialist Party (and later the Communist Party), which had relations with the Russian

Soviet Information Bureau in the USA and the Comintern representatives there. 78 By

the spring of 1920, these journals were being circulated among young Chinese

intellectuals in Shanghai and some articles within them were translated into Chinese. 79

In addition to these progressive papers, some articles which had been published in

some Western countries' "bourgeois" papers, such as the Manchester Guardian,

National Week] and New Republic were also issued to the Chinese press by the

Bolsheviks for propaganda purposes . 80 As far as I know, around 1919-20, several

Chinese papers published reports on the Russian situation by Westerners who had

visited Soviet Russia, these included, the head of the Intelligence Bureau of the

American Army, W. C. Bullitt, the Manchester Guardian's correspondent, A.

Ransome, and an American, W. K. Humphrie. For the Bolsheviks, these reports on

Soviet Russia and the Comintern's first representative in America, Martens, to set up the Russian Soviet Information Bureau and Hillquit himself became the head of the legal department of the Bureau. (Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 634, pp 643- 34.

7 J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968, Vol 1, p 53.

78 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, pp 634-644; Draper, The Roots of American Communism, p 427.

79 FO 405/228, No 157, April 7 1920. 80, Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the

RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 32. 199

Soviet Russia by foreigners, who had no apparent bias, would be more likely to

influence Chinese people.

From the evidence above, we can see that it is by no means true that the

Chinese were obliged to rely only on the bourgeois news agencies and press abroad to

obtain information about Soviet Russia before the spring or summer of 1920, as some

scholars have asserted .81 As to the Bolshevik leaders' articles, it was impossible that

their publication in China was due solely to bourgeois channels. Rather, news and

articles on Soviet Russia and Bolshevism were provided by Soviet agents directly or

indirectly via the journals of the Communist or Socialist parties of Western countries.

The Bolshevik propagandists sometimes also intentionally took passages favourable to

Soviet Russia from the bourgeois press.

From May 1920, when the East Asian Secretariat was established, the

Bolsheviks' propaganda work in China entered a new phase. Under the Secretariat's

leadership, the Propaganda and Information Section and Publication Section were set

up within the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau. 82

One important task for them was to supply news regularly to the press in

China. According to a report by Vilensky in September 1920, the East Asian

Secretariat made use of some legal news agencies and set up several media services in

Shanghai, Beijing, Harbin and Vladivostok. 83 It is not clear what can be counted as a

"legal news agency". So far as I know, in addition to the formal Soviet news agency

81 Those scholars include Dirlik, Mirovitskaya and Xiang Qing. In his article 'On the Channels for Introducing Marxism into China' Zuo Yuhe said that the first article propagating the October Revolution which was translated from Russian directly was one published in Xin gingnian in December 1920. [Mao Zedong sixiang L van iu (Studies of Mao Zedong Thought), (Chengdu, 1991), No 1, p 135]. 82 'Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31.

83 Wilensky's Report to ECCI', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 200

in China, some local media services, such as "the China Bureau of Public Information"

(Zhonghua Gongtong Tongxun She) founded by Sokolsky and Tang Jiezhi in

Shanghai in August 1919, and "News Edition and Translation Service" (Xinwen

Bianyi She) created by Shao Piaoping84 in Beijing often reported news from Soviet

Russia in positive terms.

In June 1920, Rosta and Dalta News Agencies formally opened a branch in

Beijing, headed by Khodorov. The Beijing branch, as the headquarters of the

Agencies in China, received news items from Moscow and Chita via Kiakhta through

the wireless, translated them into Chinese and English, and then supplied them to the

Chinese, English and American press in the Far East. 85

From the limited information available, we can see that Rosta! s Beijing branch

had extensive contacts with the Chinese Press, which were not only confined to the

progressive papers. After Yurin's delegation arrived in Beijing, Khodorov's Rosta-

Dalta periodically arranged for Yurin to hold press conferences and large receptions

for Chinese and foreign journalists. According to a report, at one such conference the

Chinese journalists who were invited were from Chen bao, Yishi bao, Weivi bao, JinR

bao, Shanghai xinbao, Zhonghua xinbao, Dalu bao, Zhongxin bao, Jingshi bao, Minfu

bao and the Beijing News Agency. 86

84 Shao was a key member of Beijing Universitys Press Studies Society. After his paper Jing bao was closed down by the Beijing Government in 1919, Shao escaped to Japan, where he wrote "New Russia Studies" and "Soviet Government and China". In 1926, he was executed by Zhang Zuolin on a charge of "colluding with Red Russia and propagating Bolshevism. " Cf. Zeng Xubai, Zhonqquo xinwen shi (The Chinese Press History), (Taibei: Commercial Press, 1966), Vol 1, p 328; Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 44, No 4.

115 Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (1922), Vol 22, No 12; FO 228/3216,21 August 1920, No 27.

86 Chen bao, 18 September 1920; 'Detective's Report', ZEGXS , 27 February 1921.

201

As for the foreign press which received news and documents from Rosta-

Dalta, Kasanin recalled that Khodorov had built up extensive contacts with the editors

of several English-language journals, such as W. S. Ridge of the Befling Daily News,

G. Clark of the Beijing Leader, C. J. Fox of the North China Star, T. C. Millard of

Millard's Review, W. H. Donald of the Far Eastern Review and the correspondents of

The Times and Reuters. These journalists are said to have liked publishing news and

communiqu6s provided by Rosta-Dalta because they were "paid well". 87 Such papers

were read not only by foreigners in the Far East, but also by Chinese who knew

English; and some news and articles from them were translated and reprinted by the

Chinese papers.

After meeting Khodorov in Beijing in August 1920, Lizerovitch spoke highly

of the former saying that he "is doing really good work to enlighten the Chinese on the

truth about Soviet Russia; the propaganda is being conducted very carefully and

successfully in Beijing. " He added that the Soviet agents had enlisted the co-operation

of a few well-educated Chinese, who were spreading the gospel of labour and

revolution in the interior. 88 This suggests that the Beijing branch of Rosta-DalUs

propaganda work was conducted effectively.

In the Summer of 1920, the East Asian Secretariat established Hua-E

Tongxunshe (the China-Russia News Agency), which could be identified with Rosta. 89

As an affiliated institute of the

87 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 11, p 102. 8'3 FO 228/3214, August 1920. "9 'Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the

RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 31-2. Rosta's Beijing branch was sometimes also called Hua-E Tongxunshe publicly by the Chinese. See ZEGXSL'S several reports in 1921. One of the staff of the Comintern, Slepark, who succeeded Khodorov as director of Rosta Beijing branch in 1922, was also seen as director of Hua-

202

Section of Propaganda and Information of the Revolutionary Bureau, the China-Russia

News Agency, under Yang Mingzhai's direct leadership and Voitinsky's instructions,

conducted propaganda with a more overtly Communist ideology. The East Asian

Secretariat demanded that the Soviet Russia Telegraph Agency - Rosta - in Moscow

supply not less than 1,000 words'news to them every day. 90 The China-Russia News

Agency organised several radical Chinese to translate news from Moscow and articles

from The Communist International, Soviet Russia and the journals of Communist

Parties in Western countries, and then provided at least thirty one Chinese papers with

translated materials that included "The History of the Bolshevik Party", "The

Biography of Lenin" and "Lenin's Reply to an English Journalist". 91 According to

incomplete figures, from July 1920 to July 1921, over 140 pieces of news and articles

about Soviet Russia and the international Communist movement issued by the China-

Russia News Agency were published in the Chinese press. 92 Voitinsky once even

boasted that they could employ nearly all the newspapers and periodicals in China for

propaganda. 93 Rosta-Dalta's branches in Guangzhou and Harbin also supplied news

and other publicity to local papers.

The Russian Press Review, which was described as "a weekly journal to

provide information regarding Soviet Russia for the free use of editors and journalists",

and which was published in English under the direction of the Soviet Government, was

E Tongxunshe's Beijing branch. Cf. Huang Ping, Wanqshi huivi, p 4; GLZDC, Vol 2, p 440.

90'Vilensky's Letter to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 37. 91 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'neqo

Vostoka, (1973), No 1; Ye Yonglie, Zhonqqonq zhi chu, p 175. U2 W-aýg Dong (ed. ), Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq dacidian (The Dictionary of the Communist Party of China), (Beijing: The Press of the Chinese Broadcast & TV, 1991), p 561.

93 'Voitinsky's Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29. 203

circulated throughout the world and copies of it were also found in Asia around that

time. It is difficult to know which Chinese journals received materials from Rosta-

Dalta and the Russian Press Review, for not much evidence can be found.

Nevertheless, the British Intelligence Bureau found that Rosta-Dalta supplied news-

sheets regularly to some journals in Guangzhou and Shanghai, especially Oun bao

(Masses Paper), Laodong yll fUnti (Labour and Women) and Minguo ribao during

1921. Those papers' news columns often reported the situation in Soviet Russia,

strikes and labour organisations, women's emancipation in China and abroad, and their

articles advocated socialism and communism. 94

Not content with supplying news to the press, the Bolsheviks even turned

certain Chinese journals into their own propaganda organs. According to Vilensky's

report to the ECCI dated I September 1920, the East Asian Secretariat owned a

weekly journal, a socialist daily, and Xin gingnian in Shanghai and Xin Zhongguo

(New China) in Beijing. Vilensky also counted Xin chao (The Renaissance) and

BeiiinR daxue xuesheng zhongkan (Beijing University Students' Weekly), both of

which had been published by the students in Beijing, as publications controlled by the

Secretariat. 95 Bolshevik agents were more likely to use these Chinese papers to

publicise Soviet Russia's achievements and to spread the Bolsheviks' stand and views.

When Xin gingnian became an organ of the early Chinese Communist

organisation in September 1920, it was aided financially by the Comintern. 96 It had a

special column - "New Russia Studies", which reprinted many articles about Soviet

Russia which had been published in Soviet Russia, Pravda and other Communist

94 FO 228/3211, Series of September, 1921, No 530; Wus! shigi gikan fleshao. 9" GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 40-1. 96 'Sokelov-Strolakhov's Report, 21 April 1921', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 58.

204

journals, such as La Vie Ouvriere and Le Revue Communiste, etc.. Since most of

these articles came from Soviet Russia, Hu Shi, one of the former editors of Xin

gingnian, satirised the periodical saying that "today's Xin gingnian has virtually

become a Chinese edition of Soviet Russia. 07 Soviet Russia was actually "an official

organ of Soviet Russia's Information Bureau" in New York, which was "devoted to

spreading the truth about Russia. 08 Xin gingnian alone, between September 1920 and

April 1921, published 137 articles about the October Revolution, the Bolshevik party

and Soviet Russia. 99

The "weekly journal" Vilensky referred to in his report of September 1920 was

probably Xinggi pinglun (Sunday Review). In his speech at the 2nd Congress of the

Comintern, the Chinese delegate Liu Shaozhou mentioned that a weekly newspaper in

Shanghai "uninterruptedly propagates socialist ideas". He gave an example: "In its

issue of the first of May we can find the slogans 'Those who do not work should not

eat', and 'The whole world should belong to the proletariat'. " 100 These slogans were

precisely the ones Xingqi vinglun carried in its special issue on Labour Day in 1920.

Xin, -qi pinglun was a paper of the GMD and had close relations with Lizerovitch and

Voitinsky. Besides advocating the doctrines of the GMD, this paper published many

articles on Marxism, socialism, Soviet Russia and the labour movement. Its New Year

issue of 1920 published a poem entitled "A Red New Year", which reads:

Suddenly a red light is passing through the dark.

97 Zhang Jinglu (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandai chuban shiliao, (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1954), Vol 1, p 10.

9'3 The Communist International, Nos 16-7, p 134; Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 641; T. Draper Arneýican Communism and Soviet Russia, (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p 175.

99 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1978), No 1, p 156.

100 Second Congress of the Communist International, Vol 1, p 139. 205

What is it?

That is a new tide which came from the remote North,

Sweeping past the Near East and then reaching the Far East.

Above the waves there are many hammers and hoes,

Which will remove the unfair and unjust in the World.

Greeting the light of the rising sun,

The whole land will turn into red in a moment.

The hammer and sickle was a symbol of Soviet power. In spite of the author's misuse

of hoe instead of sickle for his imagery, this poem conjured up the image of a

Bolshevik tide spreading towards the East which would soon reach China. It

expressed well the political tendency of Xinggi Vinglun.

Xin Zhongguo, which started publication in May 1919, claimed to be a paper

without any party affiliation. The contributors to this paper included several famous

journalists, such as Shao Piaoping, He Haiming, Hu Lin, Zhang Junmai, Sun Jiyi and

Bao Tianxiao, and some professors, such as Hu Shi, Gao Yihan, Chen Qixiu and

Zhang Houzai. The first issue of Xin Zhongguo carried Sokolsky's "The First Days of

the Bolsheviks in Power" and He Haiming's "The Chinese Labourers and the

Bolsheviks". This journal carried articles from Russian magazines, such as Sun, and

Russian novels, which were translated by Geng Jizhi, Qu Qiubai and Zheng Zhenduo.

Befling daxue xuesheniz zhoukan, which started publication in January 1920,

was a magazine run by the Student Union of Beijing University. Its editors and

regular contributors were almost all anarchist students belonging to the Beijing

University Students' Mutual Aid League, such as Huang Lingshuang and Chen

Youqin, who were on good terms with Polevoy. A periodical review points out that

this journal's distinguishing feature was "exposing and attacking publicly the evils of 206

the Chinese warlord government, and openly advocating revolution. " 10, The journal

called on people to "rise in revolt against the warlord government" (No 6) for the

editors believed that "the present government in China is actually a Japanese

Government and no longer the government of the Republic of China. " (No 7). The

journal advocated Bolshevik doctrines. In the special issue for May Day in 1920, one

article remarked: "Since Lenin and Trotsky waged the class struggle, labourers have

become aware as if awakening from a dream that social revolution cannot be avoided

and that class struggle is a convenient way to emancipate the proletariat. " Another

article in Issue 10 affirmed that the Soviet Government's motives were "to reform the

political system and to strive for the well-being of the great majority of the people. So

their action cannot be described as violence. " 102 Since the content of Beijing daxug

xueshena zhoukan was quite radical, the journal was considered by the Chinese

authorities and British Intelligence as "one of the publications of a Bolshevik nature"

and an "extreme" one. 103

Having started publication under the help of Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Hu

Shi in January 1919, Xin chao carried several articles which advocated the Bolshevik

Revolution. For example, in its first issue, the paper's editor Luo Jialun in "Today's

New Tide in the World" wrote:

At the present, there is a vast and mighty wave coming from Eastern

Europe. ... The new starting point for this new tide is the Russian

Revolution, the Austro-Hungarian Revolution and the German Revolution.

101 Wusi shiai aikan iieshao (Introduction to the Periodicals of the May 4th Period), (Beijing: People's Press, 1958-59), Vol 2, p 243.

102 Lbid., Vol 2, pp 245-252. 1 03 Tianjin Police Bureau's Report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 1920; Quoted

from Zhang Jinglu, Zhon-qauo xiandal chuban shiliao, Vol 1, p 48; FO 405/225, No 160, 12 August 1920.

207

The French-style revolution was a political revolution, the Russian-style

revolution afterwards is a social revolution.

Another editor, Fu Sinian, also said: "From then on, the French-style revolution -

political revolution - partly became an event of past; and the Russian-style revolution -

social revolution - will spread everywhere. " 104 It seems that they accepted Li Dazhao's

view of the Bolshevik Revolution. Li repeatedly expressed the view that "The French

Revolution of 1789 heralded the world revolution in the 19th century, and the Russian

Revolution of 1917 heralded the world revolution in the 20th century. " 105 We can see

that the wording used for commenting on the October Revolution was quite similar to

what the Bolsheviks themselves were propagating at this time. Luk has also noticed

this, but he believes that this vision showed "that Chinese intellectuals had been

predisposed to look at the October Revolution in such a perspective", because "there is

no evidence to suggest that the Chinese had been influenced by the propaganda of the

Russians. " 106 This conclusion of Luk's is a bit too assertive, for we should not rule out

the possibility that Xin chao and some other journals' editors were influenced by

Soviet agents' propaganda either directly or via some Chinese such as Li Dazhao

whether orally or in writing.

In addition to making use of the existing Chinese press, Soviet propagandists

tried to create some new papers. In May 1920, the Foreign Section of the Dal'buro in

Vladivostok discussed the possibility of starting up new newspapers to enhance

Bolshevik influence in China with Yao Zuobin, a representative of the China National

104 An chao, (January 1919), Vol 1, No 1. 105'The Victory of the Common People', Xin gingnian, (1918), Vol 5, No 5. 106 M. Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 20.

208

Student Union. 107 Between 1919 and 1920, many new journals started publication.

Luo Jialun remarked in May 1920:

Since May 4th of last year new journals in China have suddenly increased to

more than 400. But most of them are not mature. Mrs Dewey once asked

me: 'In America it is not easy to start a periodical, it may need several years'

preparation; why is it so easy to increase the number of journals to several

hundred within several months in ChinaT 108

Luo could not answer this question and maybe nobody can answer it. Although most

journals were started by the Chinese themselves, there is no hiding the fact that some

were started at the suggestion of Soviet agents, or were sponsored by them. One case

can be confirmed by an intelligence report: in February 1920 at a meeting which was

held at the restaurant of the Yong An Hotel in Shanghai, Zhu Zhuowen told the

participants that some of the "true well-wishers of China" had suggested that "a

magazine should be started for the propagation of Bolshevism and for the purpose of

giving news of Soviet Russia. " The proposal was adopted, the new magazine was

named "The Worker" and it was planned to publish 3,000 copies in Chinese. 109 It can

be inferred that the "true well-wishers of China" were foreigners, probably Soviet

agents, for Lizerovitch attended the meeting. "The Worker" was not published in the

end, but the plan was significant. In August 1920, LaodonR iie (Labour Circle) started

publication and was edited by Li Hanjun, one of those present at the above meeting.

From then on, numerous magazines were launched with similar titles, such as Laodonz V

107 'The Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B)'s Report to the ECCI, 21 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 50.

108 Luo Jialun, 'Our Student Movement's Success and Failure in the Past Year and Our Guiding Principles in the Future', Xin chao,, May 1920.

log FO 405/228, No 157 (April 7 1920). 209

zhe ("the Labourer", started in Guangzhou in October 1920), Lai bao ("Labour Paper",

started in Tianjin in October 1920) and Laodong yin ("Labour Voice", started in

Beijing in November 1920). The following year similar magazines commenced

publication in Changsha, Wuhan and Jinan. To the best of our knowledge, at least

Laodong iie, Laodong yin and Laodong zhe were sponsored and subsidised by the

Comintern agents. 110 All of thesejournals were weekly magazines with similaredition

formats, and they all reported news of Soviet Russia and the international labour

movements. These magazines for labourers were edited by the Communist groups as

their mouthpiece to propagate among the Chinese workers.

The Bolsheviks in China had their publication transfer system. At first, some

propaganda materials and publications were brought into China by the Bolsheviks

themselves. For example, Luo Zhanglong recalled that at their first meeting with the

Chinese radicals at Beijing University, Voitinsky "brought them some journals, such

as The Communist International, which were available in English and German editions

as well as Russian edition, in order to enable people who did not know Russian to read

them; he also brought several books, one of which was Ten DUs That Shook the

World written by an English [American] joumalist. "111 However, it was impossible

for such publications to be brought into China regularly in this way. Luo Zhanglong

remembered that before Voitinsky's departure from Beijing, he jotted down the

110 Laodong iie was a paper published by the Publication Section of the Revolutionary Bureau of the East Asian Secretariat. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 32; the other papers were also financed by the Comintern agents. See Liu Shixin, 'Recollections of the Anarchists' Activities in China', Ge Maochun, et al., Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan,, Vol 2, p 936.

... Luo Zhanglong, 'Recollections of the Society for Studying Marxism in Beijing University', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 198.

210

addresses of Luo and others, and later they received publications in foreign languages

from abroad continuously. 112

Before long, the East Asian Secretariat set up channels to receive publications

regularly from Moscow via Irkutsk to China or from Vladivostok to China. These

publications included newspapers and periodicals which were issued by the Russian

Newspapers and Periodicals Distribution Office and books which were published in

Moscow. The publications were posted to Voitinsky c/o Grigoriyev of the

Centrosoyus in Shanghai. ' 13 In North China, it was said that Polevoy obtained

revolutionary pamphlets and Russian journals through his mother in Moscow and he

could therefore often supply the Chinese radicals with pamphlets published in

Moscow; once he gave the Library of Beijing University an English-language edition

of ABC of Communism by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. 114 Publications were also

sent to Stoyanovitchy in Guangzhou through Harbin. 115 Around this time,

International Press Correspondence published by the Comintern for international

propaganda was also available among radical Chinese both in Shanghai and Beijing. 116

As to other countries' Communist or progressive publications, possible channels were

through the overseas correspondents of Shanghai Life and Lizerovitch, who received

revolutionary literature from London, New York and Copenhagen, where a centre was

set up by the Comintem to collect political literature from Western countries. 117

112 'Luo Zhanglong's Memoirs on Voitinsky', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 110. 113 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 35-7. "' Zhang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Part , Vol 1, p 93; Guan

Shanfu, 'Some Facts on Polevoy and Ivanov, Dangshi ton-qxun, (1984), No 3. More likely, Polevoy pretended that he received the publications from his mother. '15'Stoyanovitchys Letter, 29 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 43.

116 'Liu Renjing's Recollection', April 1957, Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 117. 117 FO 405/228,7 April 1920; FO 228/3214, June 1920; FO 228/3211, July 1920; Cf.

Lazich and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, p 145. 211

Nevertheless, it was obviously difficult either to mail or bring large quantities

of Communist publications into China. In view of the inconvenience of smuggling

large amounts of literature, the Bolsheviks decided to establish their own printing

plants or to make use of some Chinese printing plants. Vilensky's report to the ECCL

dated I September 1920, said that the East Asian Secretariat attached great importance

to publishing Chinese, Korean and Japanese editions of the books published in

Moscow and had set up several publishing and printing centres, in Shanghai, Beijing,

Harbin and Vladivostok by then. According to him, Harbin was a basis for publishing

English, Chinese and Japanese propaganda literature, and had published about 20 sorts

of such materials; ' 18 about 50 Moscow-published pamphlets were reprinted in

Vladivostok; while Shanghai was the main centre for the Chinese Communist

publishing cause! 19 Voitinsky's report of 17 August 1920 revealed that the publishing

department of the Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai had its own printing plant and

nearly all literature posted from Vladivostok had been translated and printed there.

The Communist Manifesto, What Kind of People Are the Communists?, On the

Communist Youth Movement in Russia were already off the press and fifteen other

pamphlets and leaflets were waiting to be printed. 120 Besides the press of Shanghai

Life, which could only print books and pamphlets in Russian, 121 a Chinese printing

plant in Shanghai named "Youxin" was sponsored by a Comintern agent, Strornisky,

11'ý Perhaps, there were several printing houses working for the Bolsheviks. According to a British intelligence report of 1922, the Bolsheviks got into an agreement for a large reward with a Chinese press named Fei-tschan at Mongolskaya street in Harbin in order to print the propaganda literature from Moscow. FO 228/3140, 'Agents' Information', 16 May 1922, p 59.

119 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 40-1. 120 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. 121 The publications which were printed by the press of Shanghai Life included

Khodorov's World Imperialism in China, which was read by Lenin. See Nikiforov, SIOP ,p 92.

212

who transmitted 2,000 Yuan to Zheng Peigang via Chen Duxiu as starting funds. The

first task the plant undertook was to print the Chinese translation of The Communist

Manifesto. 122 Besides Communist pamphlets, journals such as GonRchan dan (The

Communist Monthly) 123 and Laodong jie, some other revolutionary periodicals and

leaflets were also printed by this plant. Kartunova listed several pamphlets published

in China during that time, which included The Progamme of the Russian Communist

Party, The Biography of Lenin, ABC of Communism, The Constitution of the Soviet

Socialist Republic of Russia, On Trade Unions, What the People Gained from the

October Revolution and Russia's Education. 124 Some other pamphlets in Chinese

without date or place of publication were found by British Intelligence, and included

Methods of Communist Teaching in Russi , China and the Russian October

Revolution and The Manifesto of the American Communist Party. 125

In Beijing, the Revolution Bureau made use of the Beijing University Press

thanks to the help of some professors. 126 Those professors perhaps included the

Bureau's members Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, and the director of Beijing University

Press, Li Xinbai. 127 It is still not clear how Beijing University Press was used for

122 Zheng Peigang, 'Some Facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Mao-chun, et al., (eds. ), Wuzhen-qfu zhuyi sixiang ziliao xuan,, Vol 2, pp 958-59.

'2*3 "Gongchan dang" means "the Communist Party", but on the front cover of this magazine, the English title was "Communism". One of the early members of the CCP, Shan Yanbing noticed that and pointed out the fault to LI Da, the editor of the

, Gonqchan

dang, but Li did not correct it. 'Shan Yanbing's Talk', recorded by LI Danyang in August 1980 (unpublished).

124 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, (1971), No 1. T2*5 FO 228/3211, September 1921. 126 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China'. 127 Li Xinbal kept good terms with Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Polevoy, and he

participated in several revolutionary activities together with them. See Mao Chaoran, 'The CCP's Foundation and Beijing University', Beiiing daxue zhexue shehui kexue vouxiu lunwen xuan (Selected Highly Rated Theses on Philosophy and Social Sciences of Beijing University), Vol 2, p 48.

213

publishing Communist publications. However, from some journals which were

printed by the Press, we can see traces of Bolshevik propaganda. In addition to Xin

chao, Xin Zhonjzguo and BeijinR daxue xueshenjj zhoukan which I have mentioned

above, Xin shenRhuo (New Life), edited by Li Xinbai, was a journal which agitated for

anti-Japanese causes and against Chinese warlords. On National Day 1919 Xin

shenghuo printed tens of thousands of extra copies of the journal and many more

leaflets, hoping readers could help to distribute them to "every province, every county

and every village". 128 Some other periodicals, such as Guomin (The Citizens), Xin

, ahehui (New Society) and Shuggan (Dawn Light) also showed a radical tendency and

were edited by people who had close relations with Polevoy and Li Dazhao, and who

later became Communists, such as Deng Zhongxia, Qu Qiubai and Song Re.

A part of propaganda literature in Chinese language from Moscow was also

printed in District C of Tianjin. 129 Copies of Soviet documents and propaganda

literature were often carried from Tianjin by Polevoy in person or via Zhang Tailei to

Beijing. Around 1920, nearly every time Zhang Tailei arrived in Beijing from Tianjin,

he "carried two suitcases which contained revolutionary leaflets and pamphlets. No

sooner had Zhang reached Beijing University's 'Dong Zhai' (the Eastern Dormitory)

than he put the two cases under the bed of one of his friends. " 130 In 192 1, Zhang also

frequently carried propaganda literature with him from Tianjin to Changxindian. 131

On 2 February 1920, the State Council of the Chinese Government issued a

public notice warning that over 83 Bolshevik publications had been found in China.

128 WUSi shigi aikan aieshao, Vol 1, p 300. 129 FO 228/3140, 'Agents' Information' (16,5,1922) p 59. 130 Lin Hongnuan, Zhanq Tailei zhuan

, (A Biography of Zhang Tailei), Guangzhou:

Guangdong People's Press, 1981, p 18. 131 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhang Tailei wen'i.

214

Among them were Lenin's The State and Revolution, Marx's Capital, The

Biographical Sketch of Lenin and The Autobiography of Trotsky in Chinese. 132 Since

nobody in China had openly published a translation of The State and Revolution

before then, the fact that such books were circulating raised doubts. It indicated that

the publishing work of the Bolsheviks might have started before the foundation of the

East Asian Secretariat.

Soviet agents endeavoured to enlist the help of radical Chinese intellectuals in

translating propaganda materials. From the autumn of 1918 Polevoy asked Zhang

Tailei to translate "socialist documents". 133 Lizerovitch tried to engage the services of

Cao Yabo (western name Abel Tsao) and some other Chinese in translating Bolshevik

literature in 1920.134 Potapov handed some pamphlets and articles in English to a

Chinese named Li, who translated them into Chinese. 135 Some other Chinese

intellectuals such as Huang Lingshuang, Shen Yanbing, Yuan Zhenying, Luo

Zhanglong, Geng Jizhi and Zheng Zhenduo also offered to help translate Communist

literature from English, German and Russian into Chinese.

With regard to the translation of The Communist Manifesto, there are some

facts many historians have neglected. Chen Wangdao began to translate the work

towards the end of 1919 at the suggestion of the Office of Xinggi 12inglun, which had

close relations with Lizerovitch. Around this time a Korean, Yo Un-hyong, who was

also on good terms with Xinggi Vinglun and Lizerovitch, started to translate the same

132 Most of the pamphlets in the list were anarchist publications. Wusi aicluo yundong dangan ziliao, pp 633-35.

133 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhanq Tailei wen'i, p 327. 134 Cao did not undertake this work for he was busy. FO 405/228, April 7 1920, No

157. 135 *Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 49. The

footnote writes that this "Li" perhaps was Li Zhenying. It was probably wrong. This "Li" was more likely to be Li Hanjun.

215

work, too. Chen Wangdao's translation was first published by "the Society for

Studying Socialism" in April 1920. Little is known for certain about this Shanghai-

based Society around that time. However, in spring 1920 a Korean, Kim Man-gyom,

who had come to Shanghai from Vladivostok as a Comintern propaganda agent and

brought 40,000 yuan for sponsoring various Communist activities and publications,

together with An Pyong-chan, another Korean who carried 300,000 roubles from

Soviet Russia, established a "Society for Studying Socialism" in Shanghai. At nearly

the same time as Chen Wangdao's translation of The Communist Manifesto was

completed, the Korean translation by Yo Un-hyong, who then became the head of the

Translation Service of the Koryo Communist Group, was also published in Shanghai

in May 1920.136

The Communist and revolutionary pamphlets and leaflets which were printed

by the presses I mentioned above were read by numerous Chinese, especially young

students. Mao Zedong remembered that he first read the Chinese translation of The

Communist Manifesto and some other books on Communism and Soviet Russia in

1920.137 Certain pamphlets were sometimes presented to young intellectuals free of

charge; 138 and leaflets were mainly for circulating among ordinary people. It was

recorded that students and workers in Beijing and Tianjin started in spring 1920 to

distribute leaflets in which they publicised the successes of Soviet Russia. 139 On 10

136 Kim Chun-yop and Kim Chang-sun, Hanquk Kongsan Chuui Undonsa, p 175; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp 16-17; Nym Wales and Kim San, Song of Arýiran, p 117. The Society for Studying Socialism also started publication of a periodical entitled The Communist in Korean.

137 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (London: Vicar Gollancz, 1937). 1313 Wang Jueyuan, 'What I Knew about Chen Duxiu', Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 30, No 5, p

42. 139 Friendship with The Soviet Union Is the Basis of Freedom and Inder)endence of

the Peonle's Democracy, (in Chinese, Beijing, 1950), p 30; Quoted from Far Eastern 216

October 1920, the National Day of the Republic of China, large quantities of

Bolshevik and anarchist leaflets were distributed in Shanghai. One leaflet claimed:

"When the fuse is lighted the governments and capitalists of the whole world will all

be removed. " And it asked people: "Do you want real happiness? Rise quickly!

Revolt to do away with the government! " One young Chinese, Hu Jiating, was

arrested for the distribution of those leaflets. Fifty thousand pieces of propaganda

literature and a number of Bolshevik books were found in his room. Hu was a teacher

at the Esperanto school run by Stopany, so this propaganda campaign was believed to

have links with the Bolsheviks. 140 At the Far Eastern Games which was held in

Shanghai in autumn 1920, tens of thousands of leaflets in Chinese, English and

Japanese were distributed. According to Wang Weizhou, the Koryo Communist Party

sponsored and participated in this activity. 141 On October 9h of this year, several

members of the Beijing University Students' Mutual Aid League distributed leaflets,

whose content is for anti-warlord Government in Beijing, and two of them were

arrested. 142

The Bolsheviks always devoted much attention to conducting agitation and

propaganda among workers and soldiers as well as students. There were a few cases

of oral propaganda conducted directly by the Bolsheviks among Chinese labourers.

Stopany once made a speech before an audience of some forty employees on ships and

godowns on 29 February 1920, saying:

Shanghai is a great industrial centre where the working classes are

exploited to an appalling extent. The majority of the labourers here have

Affairs, (1978), No 1, p 156. W-F6 228/2989,15 October 1920; FO 228/3216, No 42. 141 Wang Weizhou, 'My Memoirs', Zhonqqonq danqshi ziliao, (1982), No 1, p 83. 142 Hu Qingyun, 'What Is the Socialists' League', Dan-qshi vaniiu ziliao, 1993, No 10.

217

to toil 14 hours per day and the wages they receive are not a tenth part of

the value of their work. The capitalists enrich themselves by sweating the

workers, and lavish their ill-gotten money on motor cars, carriages and

other luxuries. This state of affairs has already existed too long.

Stopany pointed out that the introduction of Communism was the only way to end it

and explained the meaning of Communism; then he gave a brief account of its success

as applied in Russia. Finally, he expressed the view that he saw no reason why the

workers in Shanghai should not improve their status in the same way, provided they

were united and prepared to make sacrifices. 143 A more efficient method was to

use the media to propagate among workers. As we have seen, the Bolsheviks created

and subsidised several weekly magazines produced specially for Chinese workers. On

the third anniversary of the October Revolution, Voitinsky, using the assumed Chinese

name of Wu Tingkang, wrote an article entitled "Chinese Labourers, and Soviet

Russia" for Laodong fie and stated that three years before, Russian workers and

peasants had overthrown the capitalists and warlords, and established a Soviet

Republic. Now, there were no capitalists and landlords in Russia. Workers and

peasants all over the world had shown their sympathy for it and supported it. He went

on to appeal:

Our Chinese workers and peasants! If we intend to break away from the

oppression of the capitalists both in China and abroad, and to relieve

ourselves from our sufferings under the rule of the warlords, ... we,

workers and peasants, must unite and then ally ourselves with our

counterparts in other countries and must do what the Russian workers and

143 FO 228/3214,4 March 1920. 218

peasants have done. ... The brave and awakened Russian workers and

peasants! Hurry to help your Chinese fellows who are still living in an

abyss of misery. 144

Since young intellectuals were more susceptible to such propaganda, the East

Asian Secretariat was busy imbuing radical students with Communist and Soviet ideas

first and training some of them to do propaganda work among workers and soldiers. 145

"The Conditions of Admission to the Communist International" specially

demanded "systematic and energetic propaganda in the army. " 146 In China Bolshevik

propaganda in the army was not empty talk. As we have seen, Chinese labourers from

Russia carried out agitation in the army from 1919. From May 1920, when the

Chinese Section of the East Asian Secretariat was set up, it was instructed to conduct

Communist propaganda in the Chinese Army. 147

The Secretariat-funded Youxin Printing plant printed numerous leaflets, one of

them calling on soldiers in the army to defy orders, kill officers and go over to the

people's side. According to Voitinsky, one of such leaflets entitled "Bingshi xuzhi"

(What Soldiers Should Know) was written by a Chinese revolutionary. 148 In fact, the

leaflet "Bingshi xuzhi" was first printed by Zhenli She (the Truth Society) in April

1919. Later, "Yige bing de tanhua" (Words of A Soldier) and "Mubing xuzhi" (What

Soldiers Should Know) were printed by Sanwu Xueshe (Three Nihilists Society) in

144 Laodong iie, (7 November 1920), No 13. 145 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29, p 32, p 40. 146 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 169. 147 'Vilensky's Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 148 Zheng Peigang, 'Some Facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et al. (ed. )

Wuzhencif u zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan, Vol 2, p 959; 'Voitinsky's Letter to the the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLDZC, Vol 1, p 31.

219

Shanghai between 1920-21 and their content was the same as "Bingshi xuzhi". 149 The

author, in the guise of a soldier narned Li Desheng, wrote:

One of my fellow villagers came from Harbin and told me that Guoji

Dang (the Bolshevik Party) in Russia is an organisation consisting of

peasants, workers and soldiers. They rose in revolt against the officials

and landlords. It was a revolution of common people. It is called a

Russian-style revolution. ... Recently the common people of Germany and

Austria have also risen in revolt. ... It is the will of Heaven that our

Chinese labourers in Europe have got in touch with them. If a revolution

of common people is initiated by our soldiers, and we can justify it, I

believe that nobody in this land would dare to fight us, for all lives and

weapons are in our hands.

It also contrasted the Russian Revolution with the French Revolution, saying the latter

was a bourgeois revolution, while the former was a working-class revolution. 150

Around this time similar articles and leaflets such as "Gao, junren" (Appeal to

Army Men) published in Beijing daxue xuesheng zhoukan in February 1920, "Ku

junren" (The Miserable Army Men) and "To Our Brothers among the Armed

Forces"15 I were also distributing among troops.

149 Fang Qingqiu, 'Some Issues on Mutinies under the Rule of the Beiyang Warlords', Lishi dancian (Historical Archival Materials), (Beijing 1982), No 1, pp 104-9.

150 Ge Maochun, et al. (ed. ), iNd., Vol 1, pp 392-6. 151 Eugene E. Barnett, an American missionary in Hangzhou and Shanghai, recalled

that he received one day in 1920 a batch of tracts issued by Chinese Communists, among others, such as 'To Our Dear Fellow-Students" and 'To Our Comrades and Blood-Brothers of Labor", there was a tract entitled 'To Our Brothers in the Armed Forces". Eugene E. Barnett, My Life in China. 1910-1936, East Lansing: Michigan State University, P 188.

220

Certainly, no one could deny that these leaflets showed an anarchist inclination

and were circulated by anarchist groups, yet it is not known that Zhenli She, San Wu

Xueshe and the editorial staff of Beiiiniz daxue xuesheng zhoukan were all anarchist

groups which had close ties with the Bolsheviks. For example, the head of Sanwu

Xueshe, Fei Zhewen, had been in Vladivostok before he organised the Society with

Chen Jianai at the instigation of a Bolshevik called "Gorkov". This Society aimed for

a revolution by the common people and tried to recruit soldiers into the Society. 152 1

will discuss Zhenli She in the next chapter. Li Huang pointed out that the Chinese

anarchists, who did not know what the Bolsheviks' Communism was, "offered a lot of

help to the Russian Communist Party's propaganda in China. " 153 In such cases,

Bolshevik ideas were unavoidably mingled with anarchism.

Further evidence shows that the Bolsheviks actually participated in the

agitation in the Chinese army. In spring 1920, a detective found that a Bolshevik

named Diernav and several Chinese radicals were holding a meeting at the Hongyun

Restaurant in Shanghai, and discussing how to disseminate Bolshevism among the

Chinese troops and incite soldiers to rise in rebellion. It was reported that Diernav had

brought in large sums from Russia and would provide funds for these kind of

activities. 154 Later, anarchists Zhang Mochi, Suo Fei and so on, engaged in

revolutionary activities among the troops in Baoding, Handan and other places. 155 In

1,52 Zhonciquo wuzhenqfu zhuvi he Zhonqquo Shehuidang, pp 82-84. 153 uang, Xuedun shi huivi Lu (Memoirs of the Xuedun Study), (Hong Kong:

Min I

pbao Press, 1979), p 110. 'Note from Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April

1920', ZEGXSL, No 164. 155 Lu Zhe, Zhonaguo wuzhenqfuzhuvi shigao (A Draft History of Anarchism in

China), Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1990, p 253.

221

1921, a lecturer who was teaching Russian language at Beijing University wrote a

report to the Bolsheviks in Russia, which reads:

The university students in China are all youngsters, who are very keen and

sensitive. At present, most of them favour radical action. However, it is a

pity that there are no such persons in the army, and therefore, armed

struggle cannot start or spread for a short while. ... If soldiers are told the

ideas of Communism and egalitarianism, they are sure to be glad to follow

US.

He went on, "If we did so, our cause would certainly succeed within a hundred

days. " 156 This report was intercepted by the Chinese authorities and hence offers an

absolute proof of the Bolsheviks' desire to instigate armed uprisings in China.

The propaganda and agitation in the army exerted a certain influence upon

soldiers. For example, the troops at Gaoyang in Hebei ran riot and issued and

distributed the "Mutiny Song", in which they appealed to soldiers of other Chinese

troops "to fight against the Government; ... Four hundred millions of compatriots will

have the same happy life as in Russia. " 157 By the spring of 1920, the soldiers of the

5th Division in Shandong, of the Longhua and Shanghai Garrisons in Jiangsu and the

158 troops in Manchuria had secretly formed popular societies. The Chinese troops

stationed at the lower reaches of the Amur river showed sympathy for the Bolsheviks,

as a result of which they regularly received Bolshevik publications. 159

156 Tu Baishan's Report to the Head of the Infantry Headquarters, Shen Zhenlin, 12 April 1921', Quote from Fang Qingqiu, 'Some Issues concerning Mutinies under the Rule of the Beiyang Warlords', Lishi danqan, (1982), No 1. 157 Quoted from Wusi aiguo vundonq dangan ziliao, p 643. 158 FO 228/3214,1 Aprill 920.

'59 TedoroVs Report to the Amur Committee of the RCP(B), 5 October 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 46. Fedorov was the Russian name of Liu Jiang, who was a leader of

222

In 1921, the Bolsheviks' propaganda activities increased in intensity. A

propaganda bureau under the Dal'buro of RCP(B) was established in Chita, conducting

propaganda in China and other Far Eastern countries. The head of the Bureau was

Vorvosky, who had had a successful Communist career in Europe. 160 In a report to the

Comintem dated II April 1921, the head of the Dal'buro, Krasnochokov (Tobelson)

claimed:

We have achieved in no way a looser [lesser] success in the results of the

work of our propaganda section. The significance of which is obvious. ...

Our section has lately considerably increased its activities in Shanghai,

Tianjin ... .

161

It was the eve of the foundation of the CCP. Beyond doubt, their propaganda activities

had a significant bearing on Chinese radicals' fervour for Bolshevism and therefore

prepared the way for the birth of the CCP.

*****

To surnmarise Soviet Russia and the Comintern's propaganda and agitation in

China, which started in 1918 and was intensified during 1920-21, its guiding

principles, contents, tactics and effects should be dealt with briefly.

1. Contents and Principles

the Chinese Communists in Russia. 160 FO 228/3211, July 1921. Some Bolsheviks who had worked in China, such as

Agarief, joined this Bureau; and some Chinese, such as Zhang Minquan, also worked for it. FO 405/233, p 438; FO 228/3140, p 75.

161 FO 228/2774, No 244. 223

Soviet propaganda could be roughly divided into two aspects: an ideological

aspect and a manipulative aspect. The Bolsheviks laid emphasis on different aspects at

different times.

Generally speaking, the manipulative aspect of Soviet propaganda was used to

associate the goals and policies of Soviet Russia with non-Communist symbols in

order to secure for Soviet policies the maximum possible support from non-

Communists. 162 Since the function of the Eastern people's in a world socialist

revolution was first defined by the Bolshevik leaders to aid in the general assault upon

the capitalist-imperialist powers, the most important aspect of their early propaganda

in China was to stimulate the Chinese people to throw themselves into the anti-

imperialist, especially anti-Japanese movement.

As to the ideological aspect of the propaganda, it was initially considered

unwise to attempt to spread Communist ideology in China, for Lenin did not believe

that Chinese coolies could wage a socialist revolution in a backward country like

China. 163 So in the early stages, only a little Communist ideology was contained in

Soviet propaganda. Hence, one cannot consider that there was no Bolshevik

propaganda merely because no dissemination of Communism was visible. The

doctrines with which the Bolsheviks first tried to make the Chinese familiar were

Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Soviet Government's policy towards national

self-determination. In April 1920 British intelligence observed that Bolshevism was

spreading, and "it is made peculiarly acceptable to the oriental by its advocacy of race

equality and self-determination. " 164

162 Cf. F. C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreiqn Propaganda, (Princeton, 1964), p 17. 163 Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, p 544. 164 FO 405/228,7 April 1920.

224

Once Soviet Russia and the Comintern began to switch their global strategic

centre of gravity from the West to the East, they not only encouraged people in

colonial and backward countries to form national liberation movements against

imperialism, but also attempted to "apply communist tactics and policy in pre-

capitalist conditions" and to establish soviets and to build socialist societies in

backward countries. 165 Thereafter, ideological elements, such as socialist and

communist theories became an important part of Soviet propaganda. The Bolsheviks

began to supply the Chinese with more works by Lenin and other Soviet leaders,

Comintern documents and Soviet materials containing glowing accounts of the Soviet

system and the new way of life in Russia, which sought to offer an appealing and

convincing ideology, theory and model for the Chinese.

2. Means and Tactics

In order to ensure the widest possible dispersion of Soviet propaganda, the

Bolsheviks resorted to every conceivable means: speeches, leaflets, pamphlets, the

press and so on. One of the Comintern theses on the methods and content of the

Communists' work pointed out that the principal forms of Communist propaganda and

agitation were regular verbal personal persuasion and agitation combined with

literature distribution. 166 As we have seen, Bolshevik propagandists sometimes made

speeches before Chinese audiences or tried to convert people personally and handed

out pamphlets to the Chinese. However, verbal agitation and literature distribution

were mainly carried out by Chinese propagandists from Russia and Chinese anarchists

165 Lenin, 'The Second Congress of the Communist International', Collected Works, Vol 31, p 242.

166 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 261-2. 225

who were made use of by Soviet agents. Among various means, perhaps the most

successful one was to employ the press in China, since the press, whose existence was

based on a public demand for news and information, afforded an ideal channel.

Soviet propaganda could also be divided into direct and indirect ways. Direct

propaganda could easily be seen, while it was hardly possible to identify indirect

propaganda. Concealing its source was a customary tactic of Bolshevik propaganda.

Sometimes Bolshevik propagandists contributed articles under assumed names as if

they had been written by Chinese or non-Communist authors; sometimes they bribed

newspapers and periodicals to publish their news or articles; 167 what is more, they

created and subsidised journals, which appeared to be pure Chinese journals and which

would not be perceived as Bolshevik publications. For example, in 1921, the

representative of the Red Trade Unions International in China had a plan to start

publication of a weekly journal with "an unnoticeable title". 168 It was just what Lenin

had demanded "to overcome all obstacles, to found legal press organs ... under the

most varied names, and when necessary to change the name frequently. "' 69 In these

ways, the Bolsheviks extended their influence and moulded "public opinion", while

most of those influenced were unaware of the motives or even the identity of the

propagandists.

167 For example, in 1922-23 the Joffe Mission bribed several newspapers in China with money under the pretence of offering travel subsidies. [Wang Yijun, Zhonq E waiaiao cle xumu, pp 341-42]; In 1927 Voitinsky once used large funds to reverse the trend towards anti-Communism in the Chinese press. [Pick, China in the Grin of the Reds, p 10].

16" Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nea-o Vostoka, (1973), No 1; This weekly journal was Laodong zhoukan (Labour Weekly), the orv.

9an of the Chinese Labour Organisations' Secretariat of the CCP.

Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 123-4. 226

The Bolshevik propagandists aimed at a wide range of target audiences

belonging to different classes, different political cliques, different circles and different

educational levels. For the ordinary masses, normally oral agitation or popular

literature were provided, for they could not be expected to master abstruse theories and

could only be expected to be aroused to action. On the other hand, since the radical

intelligentsia were capable of studying and accepting Marxism and Bolshevism, they

were therefore considered capable of being trained as future Communist leaders in

China. Journalists in particular found favour in the Soviet propagandists' eyes, since

they were in a position to influence others once they responded favourably to Soviet

propaganda. That was why Soviet propagandists first built up close relationship with

many Chinese j ournalists and why the main founders of the CCP, such as Chen Duxiu,

Li Dazhao, Li Hanjun, Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei, had all been editors orjournalists.

In What is to be Done? Lenin wrote that the revolutionary propagandists

should "speak literally different languages. " The Bolsheviks were quite flexible in

their choice of language for propaganda, adapting to various circumstances, to diverse

targets and for different purposes. For example, when addressing labourers, their main

topic was to expose capitalist exploitation and the evils of the capitalist system; to the

nationalists, they warned of the dangers of Japanese encroachment and aroused their

anti-imperialist sentiment; and to the anarchists, they preached social revolution and

described the magnificent prospects of communism. After the Versailles Conference

resolved to transfer Shandong to Japan, the Bolsheviks took the opportunity this

presented, issuing the Karakhan Manifesto and other publicity to convince the Chinese

people that only Soviet Russia was an unselfish friend of China and the liberator of the

Eastern peoples. In these ways, the Bolsheviks won over many Chinese in favour of

Soviet Russia. 227

By speaking the "language the people understand" 170 , the Bolsheviks

resourcefully adapted their propaganda message to the conditions in China, to the

particular historical juncture, and to the needs, desires and sentiments of the Chinese

people. What they said seemed to be in the interests of the Chinese people and the

tone of their writings seemed Chinese in style and viewpoint, therefore most Chinese

people at the time were not aware of the existence of Soviet propaganda, and even

many present-day historians have failed to notice its significance in the early stages.

3. Effects and Influences

To judge the effects and influences of Soviet propaganda in China, one must

examine whether the purposes of the propaganda were achieved and analyse whether

the propagandists' language and mode of thinking were adopted.

We can see that Soviet Russiaýs summons to fight against Japanese and

European imperialists brought forth a favourable response from the Chinese people.

As a British intelligence report indicated, "the Bolshevik creed of anti-imperialism

with its cry for the liberation of Asia from European domination strikes a sympathetic

note in China. " 171 Lenin's theory on imperialism and the Comintern's call to fight

against imperialist powers were accepted by more and more Chinese people, and the

Bolsheviks' anti-imperialist slogan was conducive to forming and pushing forward the

Chinese national liberation movements.

The Bolsheviks' messages that Soviet Russia was the sole country which

would not commit aggression against other states and would emancipate all people in

oppressed and colonial circumstances attracted many Chinese, and convinced them

170 Lenin's Collected Works, Vol 30, p 162. 171 FO 405/228,1920, No 82.

228

that Soviet Russia stood for "justice and humanity", and that the Bolsheviks were

fighting for the "freedom, equality and well-being" of all people. 172 Soviet Russia

therefore enjoyed a considerable reputation for several years, and as Mirovitskaya,

pointed out, "the prestige and popularity of the land of Soviets increased and grew

stronger in China between 1919 and 192 I. ttlD Many Chinese believed that to form an

alliance with Soviet Russia would be of benefit to China.

In 1920 a high tide in the propagation of socialism emerged in China. On his

return from abroad, Pan Gongzhan found, to his astonishment, that "socialism seems to

have become a pet phrase these days; newspapers and magazines spare no efforts to

advocate socialism. Recently, even some people who know nothing about socialism

parade themselves as socialists, too". 174 Feng Ziyou believed that this was "the great

effect of various propaganda activities". 175 Between 1919 and 192 1, large quantities of

books, pamphlets and journals propagating socialism including Marxism, and

providing information about Soviet Russia, appeared in China. Pan Gongzhan thus

remarked:

This year (1920) the trend of socialist thought in China is like the rising

wind and scudding clouds. Articles expounding Marxism and discussing

Bolshevism have been published in newspapers and magazines

everywhere. 176

172 Zhonqquo xiandaishi ziliao huibian (Collected Source Materials of Modern Chinese History), (Hong Kong: Cultural Material Supply Service, 1978), p 40-41.

173 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, 1978, Vol 1, pp 153-154.

Pan Gongzhan, 'Random Thoughts on Return to the Mother-Land', Taining van- q (The Pacific), (Shanghai, August 1920), Vol 3, No 6.

175 Feng Ziyou, Shehuizhuvi W- ZhonqquO (Socialism and China), (Hong Kong, April 1920); quoted from LO Fangshang, Geming zhi zaiqi, p 320.

176 Doncifang zazhi (The Oriental Miscellaneous), Shanghai, 25 February 1921, Vol 229

This showed that among various brands of socialism the dissemination of Marxism

and Bolshevism was rather conspicuous. According to incomplete statistics, between

1919 and 1920 out of around 400 Chinese journals there were over 200 journals which

had socialist tendencies in varying degrees; 177 and from 1919 to 1921, over 300

Marxist works, and works by Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders came off the press or

were published in periodicals of various political inclinations. 178 The articles about

Soviet Russia were too many to be counted. These publications "were widely

circulated in all parts of the country and produced immense repercussions. "' 79

The socialist publicity drive has been regarded as an important sign in the

spread of Marxism-Leninism in China caused by the upsurge in socialist ideas after

World War I and the October Revolution. This is true, yet the evidence provided

above demonstrates that this string of such publications cannot be considered as a

totally spontaneous tendency of the Chinese towards Marxism and Bolshevism or their

"self-generated interest" in the Bolshevik Revolution without the factor of Soviet

propaganda.

Beyond doubt, the dissemination of information and doctrines of the

Bolsheviks exerted a widespread influence on Chinese people. Chen Boxi wrote in an

article published in 1920:

Since the May 4th Movement last year, ... tens of publications on new

thoughts have been published. The Chinese people then began to know

about various deeds of the Lenin Government and the Bolsheviks in

18, No 4. '77 Zhu Hanguo, et al., Zhonqquo qonqchandanq iianshe shi (History of the

Establishment of the CCP), (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1991), p 5. 1713 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October

Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (11978), No 1, p 155. 179 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 128.

230

Russia. Many of them therefore would welcome the advent of the

Bolsheviks in China at once in order to put Bolshevism into practice. 180

His statement was not a distortion of the facts. Even foreigners in China noticed the

phenomenon. A Christian missionary H. T. Hotking found that Bolshevism was

widespread among Chinese youth; 181 some others also observed that Bolshevism had

taken "a firm hold of the mind of thousands of young would-be reformers in China. " 182

Soviet propaganda served to influence people's ideology and it converted many

radical intellectuals to Bolshevism as well as preparing the ground for the

establishment of the CCP. To a certain extent, the Bolsheviks achieved the goals of

their propaganda in China.

180 Da guang bao (Bright Light Paper), (Hong Kong, 1920), quoted from LO Fangshang, Gerning zhi zaicli. 1 '31 A. Ivin, China and Russig, (Moscow, 1924), p 19.

182 FO 22 1,31 March 1920. 231

CHAPTER FIVE

WORKING TOWARDS UNITY AND ORGANISATION

Organisation was the Bolsheviks' main weapon, as Lenin pointed out: "Our

fighting method is organisation. We must organise everything, take everything into

our own hands. "' For the Bolsheviks, organisation was also an important task in

China and other parts of the East. In November 1919, Lenin told the Eastern

revolutionaries that the task confronting them was "to arouse the working masses to

revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organisation, regardless of the

level they have reached. v12 As a first step, Lenin and the Comintern considered that in

their work among the masses of the Eastern people, the Communists had to set up

national revolutionary mass organisations of working people, which would be "non-

party organisations". 3 Since the Chinese proletariat as a whole was rather weak at the

time, the work of organisation was conducted firstly among radical intellectuals and

then among the working class.

In the following sections I will discuss some typical organisations which were

formed around 1918 to 1920 and were related to the Bolsheviks or the foundation of

the CCP.

Section 1. Societies for the Study of Marxism and Socialism

1 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 23, p 133. 2 ibid., Vol 30, p 162. 3 -A-716. Reznikov, 'The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International in the

National and Colonial Question', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 153. 232

1. The Marxist Research Society

Initial organisational activity relating to the birth of the CCP can be traced back

to 1918. According to "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party", Chen

Duxiu engaged in "Communist Work" by "grouping around himself the best

revolutionaries" as early as 1918.4 One may well object that the author emphasised

only Chen Duxiu's role and did not mention Li Dazhao at all. The best explanation for

this omission is that Li, as the person who drafted the "Brief History" deliberately

chose not to push himself forward. With regard to organisational activities, the "Brief

History" further indicates that "prominent individuals step forward, organise

themselves into groups, and attract the best elements of society... " In fact this wasjust

what Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu did. It is certain that from 1918 Li and Chen began

to rally many radicals around them and organised various groups. It was from among

these groups that the CCP emerged. In this loose sense Li and Chen can be said to

have been engaged in Communist work since 1918.

The first group to emerge from these activities was the Marxist Research

Society, organised by Li Dazhao at Beijing University some time around the end of

1918. Some historians, both in China and elsewhere, have accepted the emergence of

this Society at this time as a historical fact. In the main, they have based their

assertions on a Japanese book -Shina

Kyosan Undo (The Chinese Communist

Movement) published in 1933, which claimed that "in 1918, Li Dazhao, a Professor at

Beijing University ... organised the Marxist Research Society. This was the precursor

Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 48. 233

of the Communist groups in China. 0 More recently, however, some authoritative

books on the history of the CCP published in China have denied or ignored this

society's existence in 1918. For example, Zhongguo Gongchandang de Oishi Nian,

which was written under the direction of the Central Committee of the CCP, asserts

that "the first group in China to study and research Marxism" was the Marxist

6 Research Society organised by Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia in March 1920. Dirlik

provided the following explanation for this: "None of the later Communist recruits

who were students at Beida [Beijing University] and participated in the indisputable

Society for the Study of Marxist Theory established in 1920 can recall the existence of

such a society in 1918. J He cited Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing's memoirs as

examples to confirm his views. But Dirlik and some other historians have neglected

the recollections of 2hu Wushan, another Communist student at Beijing University

during that time and a member of the Marxist Research Society in 1920. Zhu Wushan

wrote in his "Recollections of the Marxism Research Society" that he remembered that

Li Dazhao, together with another Beijing University professor Gao Yihan, had

organised a society for researching Marxism in 1918. Initially, this society did not

carry out much work and hence did not draw many revolutionary youths into its

organisation. 8 Zhu's account is credible because he maintained a personal friendship

5 Quoted from Sima Lu, Zhonclqonq de chengli yu chuqi huodong (The Founding and Initial Activities of the CCP), (Hong Kong: Zilian Press, 1974), p 252.

6 The CCP History Research Institute, Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq de qishl nian (Seventy Years of the CCP), (Beijing: The CCP History Press, 1991), p 19. Some other authorized works published recently, such as Zhonq-quo Gonqchandanq lishi (The History of the CCP), and Zhonqcluo Gonqchandanq lishi dacidian also hold the same point of view.

7 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 44. 8 Gonqchan zhuvi xiaozu '

(The Communist Groups), (Beijing: The Press of the Historical Materials of the CCP, 1987), p 326.

234

with Li Dazhao for many years. Gao Yihan's memoirs are perhaps even more

valuable. Gao recounted with certainty:

Less than six months before May 4th [1919], Shou Chang organised a

Marxist Research Society at Beijing University. We used the name of Ma-

Er-Ke-Si instead of Marx, in order to befuddle the police. When the

police authorities received reports that there was a society for studying [the

theory of] "Malthus" (confused with Ma-Er-Ke-Si), they considered it to

be a society for researching population theories, and therefore did not

interfere in the affairs of our Society. This Society was initially open to

the public, but soon became a secret society. Its internal activities

consisted of studying Marxist theory, while its external work consisted of

holding lectures. ... At the end of 1918, we began publishing Meizhou

Pinglun,... .9

From Gao's recollection we can gather that the Society must have started in November

or December 1918 before Meizhou Pinglun (Weekly Critic) started publication on 12

December and that the participants were mainly Beijing University professors and

lecturers, some of whom later became Meizhou Pinglun's editors and contributors,

people such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Shenfu and Gao Yihan. From then on,

translations of Marx's and Engels'works and articles on Marxism appeared in Meizhou

pinglun and Xin gingnian.

Another firm collateral evidence is from Dai Jitao, who wrote in Xingi pinglun

of 7 September 1919: "Why was Meizhou Pinglun closed down? Didn't you see that

newspapers say that they [the Government] tried to prohibit the dissemination of 'Ma-

9 Gao Yihan, "Memoirs of Comrade Li Dazhao during the May 4th Period", Wusi vundonq huivilu, pp 340-41.

235

er-ge-shi-zhuyi' [Marxism]? " Dai's article actually reveals that there was a group of

people related to Meizhou Pinglun had propagated Marxism before the middle of

1919. In view of the fact that the members of the Marxist Research Society in Beijing

had very close connections with Meizhou viniziun, it is hard to deny the existence of

the Marxist Research Society in Beijing before 1919. It is not at all surprising why

many radical students from Beijing University, such as Zhang Guotao, Liu Renjing

and Luo Zhanglong were unaware of the existence of this Marxist Research Society.

Although some students might well have attended the Society's lecture meetings, they

would not have known who sponsored them. However, Qu Qiubai, then a student at

the Beijing Russian Language Institute, remembered that he had attended meetings of

the Marxist Research Society as a Chinese Marxist observed, towards the end of 1919

or at the beginning of 1920.10

In fact, the Marxist Research Society of 1920, which I shall deal with later, can be seen

as a continuation of the society of the same name that had been organised in 1918.

It is difficult to understand why Li Dazhao organised the Marxist Research

Society at the end of 1918, when he understood so little about Marxism. Many

scholars have demonstrated that there was no hint in Li's articles before then that he

had any knowledge of Marxism. Hence, simply by reference to his ideas alone, it is

difficult to believe that he could have established such a society on his own initiative at

that time. What is more likely is that he received an impetus from elsewhere. It is

worth noting that the establishment of the Marxist Research Society and the

publication of Li Dazhao's famous articles "The Victory of Bolshevism" and "The

Victory of the Common People" occurred almost simultaneously. In the latter article

Li seemed to be applying Lenin's theory on imperialism to the analysis of the nature of

the World War. Since Li could not possibly have read Lenin's works at this time, it is

'0 Qu Qiubai, Duovu de hua (Surplus Words), quoted from Sima Lu, Zhonqqonci de chenqli vu chuqi huodonq.

236

reasonable to surmise that he learned some views from Soviet agents. Of course, this

can be verified only by finding more historical evidence, but from the data available so

far one can only draw the inference that the establishment of the Marxist Research

Society in 1918 was connected with the efforts of Soviet agents as well as with Soviet

Russia.

Davidson-Houston, a western historian, writes: "Marxist ideas had already

been introduced into China at the end of the World War by well-known scholars such

as Chen Duhsiu and Li Tachao, who had contacts with Moscow. "" AsIhaveshown

in Chapter 2, before Li organised the Marxist Research Society he had already been in

contact with Soviet agents Ivanov and Polevoy, who worked under direction from

Moscow.

Since the Marxist Research Society in 1918 was a small group most of whose

members were not really converted to Marxism, and since the scope of its activities

was narrow, it did not make a notable impact on Chinese thinking. Nevertheless, the

emergence of such a society in China was an event of a symbolic significance.

11. The Socialist Studies Society

In the second half of 1919, a Socialist Studies Society emerged in Beijing. It

had a larger membership than the Marxist Research Society, but few historians have

paid attention to it. None of the books on the subject of the origins of the CCP

published in PRC have mentioned it. Certainly my knowledge of this society is still

far from complete and further research is required. Nevertheless, various points can be

made in connection with it.

11 J. V. Davidson-Houston, Russia and China, From the Huns to Mao Tse-tung (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1960) p 108.

237

First of all, it is necessary to make clear the background to the Society's

formation. The Socialist Studies Society was set up by Zhang Ximan, a member of the

GMD who had studied Russian at the Oriental Language Institute in Vladivostok in

the period 1911-1914. Between 1917 and 1918, Zhang often visited some Bolsheviks

in Harbin and said to them that Chinese should learn from the Russian Revolution. 12

In winter 1918, Zhang went to the Russian Far East and Siberia to investigate the facts

regarding the dispatch of Chinese troops to Siberia in accordance with the Sino-

Japanese Mutual Defence Military Convention. According to Zhang Ximan's

reminiscences, during his stay in Siberia, he wrote a letter to Cai Yuanpei, Chancellor

of Beijing University, and Wan Fuhua, an old member of the Tongmeng Hui,

suggesting that they organise a Socialist Studies Society in China. Cai and Wan

approved the suggestion and sent a telegram inviting Zhang to return to Beijing as

soon as possible, in order to make preparations for the setting up of the Society. In

July 1919, Zhang went to Beijing and worked with Cai Yuanpei and Li Dazhao 13

(Wan Fuhua had died before Zhang's return) to found the Socialist Studies Society.

The purpose of organising the Society was to "learn the organisational methods and

experiences of the great Russian October Revolution, in order to help to bring about

the achievement of the Chinese national revolution. " 14 From the way in which the

12 This is on the basis of the recollection of one of those Bolsheviks, Rilomsky; quoted from Zhang Xiaoman's letter (6 January 1998).

13 Li Dazhao told Zhang Guotao in 1920 that before the May 4th Movement he had thought about organising a Socialist Research Society to study Marxism and a Russian Research Society to study the Russian Revolution. But he had never actually done anything about organising them. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Partv, Vol 1, p 94; This could not rule out the possibility that Ll joined the Socialist Studies Society after the May 4th Movement.

14 Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi, p 126. 238

Socialist Studies Society was formed, we can see that Zhang Ximan's trip to Russia

was the key to the foundation of the Society.

During the period he studied the Russian language in Vladivostok Zhang read

a few works by Plekhanov and Lenin and learned about the Russian Revolution of

1905, but he did not become a socialist. Before his second trip to Russia, he had not

the slightest intention of organising a Socialist Studies Society in China. So it is

reasonable to suspect that the idea of founding such a society came from someone else.

During his stay in Siberia and the Russian Far East in 1918,2hang obtained the

Programme of the Russian Communist Party (B) and other important Bolshevik and

Soviet documents and news about the Bolsheviks' activities. On his return Zhang

conveyed the message to Sun Yatsen that the Bolsheviks intended to convene the first

congress of international socialist parties in February 1919 and persuaded him to send

a delegate of his Party to attend the Congress in Moscow. A recent article by Zhang

Xiaoman (Zhang Ximan's daughter) reveals that Zhang Ximan made contacts with

Russian revolutionaries during this visit. 15 These events suggest that Zhang might

have received some ideas from the Bolsheviks, including that of establishing the

Socialist Studies Society.

The Socialist Studies Society was formed clandestinely in Beijing, probably

between July and October 1919, some time after Zhang Ximan arrived in Beijing in

July and before Xu Deheng left Beijing in October. Xu Deheng, a student of Beijing

University, later remembered that he had attended a meeting of a group of the Socialist

Studies Society at Beijing University before he left Beijing for France in October

"9 Zhang Xiaoman (ed. ), Zhancl Ximan 'inian wenii, (Collected Articles in Memory of Zhang Ximan), (Beijing: The Chinese Culture and History Press, 1995), p 197. This book shows that Zhang Ximan was a secretary at the Soviet Russian Legation in Beijing in 1923 (p 428).

239

1919.16 Hence we can be sure that the Socialist Studies Society must at least have

been in existence by October.

At first the Society's meeting place was not fixed, but later it held regular

meetings in the Library of Beijing University. The society's members worked

carefully among the youth in order to avoid interference by the Beijing Government.

Before long the Society expanded into other large cities and its membership increased.

Zhang Ximan remembered that the members of the Society included: Li Dazhao, Chen

Duxiu, Chen Guyuan, Fan Tiren, Xu Liuji, Guo Mengliang, Yi Keyi, Yi Junzuo, Meng

Shouchun, Zhu Qianzhi, Fei Juetian, Deng Zhongxia, Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai, Mao

Zedong and Zhou Enlai. 17 Since its members held different political views and

convictions, there were within its ranks splinter groups of varying persuasions. For

example, one could cite the Society for Studying Guild Socialism, the Society for

Studying Syndicalism and the Society for Studying Anarchism. In addition, some of

those who followed the Bolsheviks formed a Marxist Studies Society in Beijing in

March 1920 and a Russian Research Society in Changsha in August 1920. Although

the Socialist Studies Society was thus fractured along ideological lines, nominal unity

was maintained. At the end of 1920 its main branch at Beijing University made itself

known to the public and issued its general regulations, in which its aim was described

as "mustering the comrades who believe in socialism and have the ability to help each

other with researching and spreading socialism. " It further defined its main methods

of work as "the translation and compilation of a series of books on socialism and the

16 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshi ziliao 2 xuan 1, (1979), No 61, p 18. iý, *i

Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi, p 144. 240

publication of treatises on socialism. "18 The public notice gave a list of the names of

Society members. Many of these were mentioned by Zhang Ximan in his

recollections, but nearly all the persons in the list with the exception of Li Dazhao

were in fact inclined to Guild Socialism and Syndicalism. Maybe some of the

members who joined the Marxist Studies Society in March 1920, had broken away

from the Socialist Studies Society. 19 In 1921, the Socialist Studies Society ceased to

exist as its members moved on ideologically. At any rate, the Society completed its

mission as a transitional organisation and helped to bring about the birth of the CCP.

Section 2. Mass Organisations Which Emerged during the May 4th Period

Many historians have noticed that the Chinese Communist Party's early groups

in 1920 took shape around a national network of previously existing radical

associations which had come into being in the course of the May 4th movement.

These radical organisations, whose members had believed in various ideologies, later

came to serve as the nuclei of the Communist organisation. Further investigation is

required into how the various radical groups scattered in different geographical

locations came to be unified into certain nation-wide associations; how such

associations' national network was used as the basis of the first Communist

organisations; and whether the unification and conversion was a spontaneous process

or not.

"' Befling daxue xueshen-q rikan (Beijing University Students' Daily), 4 December 1920.

19 A possible reason why LI Dazhao remained in the Socialist Studies Society was that he intended to unite more socialists.

241

1. Some Societies Founded in Beijing before the May 4th Demonstration

It is an accepted fact that Beijing University was the cradle of Chinese

Communism. Around the May 4th period many radical student societies were formed

at Beijing University and some nation-wide youth organisations were started up by

people based there. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu played important roles in the

formation of some of these organisations.

In the summer of 1918 Li Dazhao supported the students of Beijing University

and of some other universities and colleges in Beijing in setting up the Students'

Patriotic Association, which was a nation-wide organisation initiated by the Returned

Students' National Salvation League. The catalyst for the establishment of this

organisation was the Sino-Japanese Joint Military Defence Convention. In January

1919 the Association's organ Guomin (The Citizens) started publication and its main

aims were to propagate anti-imperialism and to oppose the warlords' government. The

Society of Citizens' Magazine was set up in October of the previous year, and most of

its members were students at Beijing University with Li Dazhao as their supervisor. In

December 1918, a famous literary society, the Renaissance Magazine Society, which

was formed by some Beijing University students, such as Luo Jialun, Fu Sinian and

Kang Baiqing, invited Li Dazhao to became one of its advisors. Li set aside a room in

the University Library for the Society to use; Chen Duxiu, dean of the Faculty of

Literature, also lent the Society important support. 20 In January 1919 the Renaissance

Magazine started publishing Xin chao. In March 1919, with Li Dazhao's help, some

Beijing University students, such as Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui and Xu Deheng,

20 Fu Sinian, 'The Renaissance's Review and Prospects', An chao, (1919), Vol 2, No 1, pp 199-200.

242

founded the Common People's Educational Lecturing Corps, which was affiliated to

the Students' Patriotic Association. When the Corps set up a school for railway

workers at Changxindian, Li Dazhao, with Polevoy, Li Xinbai and other teachers at I

Beijing University, donated money to it.

Most students belonging to the above organisations were very active in the

May 4th Movement. The Society of the Citizens Magazine was an important

organisation which initiated the May 4th demonstration. On May 3rd 1919, it was this

Society that convoked a meeting of students of Beijing University and student

representatives of thirteen other universities and colleges, and at this meeting the May

4th demonstration was decided on. Many members of the Society, such as Xu

Deheng, Duan Xipeng, Huang Rikui, Meng Shouchun and Xia Xiufeng played active

roles in the demonstration.

Li Dazhao took an important part in directing the movement. According to

Luo Zhanglong, "On the eve of the May 4th Movement the radical elements

represented by Li Dazhao had already formed an organised power, which was the

antecedent for the Marxist Studies Society [in 1920]; they initiated and led the May 4th

Movement ideologically and organisationally. , 21 Zhang Guotao gave a detailed

account of how Li Dazhao directed students during the Movement: "In the 1919

summer vacation, Li regularly went to his office in the Library, and I saw him more

often than anyone else. Not only did he give me many valuable suggestions, but he

often drafted important documents for me. He also did his best to co-ordinate the

views of teachers and students, while maintaining constant contact with the press. 42

21 Luo Zhanglong, 'Recollections of the Marxist Studies Society at Beijing University', Yida gianhou, Vol 3, pp 187-8.

Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 67. 243

In 1920 when Li became a professor at Beijing University, he tried to exert more

influence on the students. No other teachers at the University lent a hand to students'

organisations or played such an important part in the movements as Li did. Zhang

Shizhao, a former professor at Beijing University and Li's immediate predecessor as

Director of the Library, said of Li that "Shouchang assumed the directorship of the

Library first, and became a professor afterwards ... . While the democratic movement

in Beijing was germinating, Shouchang aspired to get a position at Beijing University,

in order to direct, instruct and control ... . Having entered Beijing University ...

Shouchang behaved as if he were running an army ... and made banners and flags

change their colours. , 23 Zhang was not exaggerating when he wrote this, since Li

Dazhao spared no efforts to do organising work. In April 1919, in a letter to Hu Shi,

who was then an advisor to the Renaissance Society, Li expressed the idea that so long

as members of these progressive societies headed for the light, it would not matter if

they held different views. 24 In such a way, Li Dazhao grouped around himself many

young radicals in Beijing.

Li Dazhao's organisational activities were not confined to Beijing. In June

1918 Li Dazhao participated in the establishment of the Young China Association,

which was a nation-wide organisation. The Young China Society was formed at a

time when large numbers of Chinese students were returning from Japan in protest

against the Joint Military Defence Convention between China and Japan. Before their

return, some of these students, such as Zeng Qi, Zhang Mengjiu and Lei Meisheng,

23 Zhang Cixi, Li Dazhao xianshenq zhuan (Biography of Mr. Li Dazhao), (Beijing, 1951), p 3; Since Zhang Shizhao knew Li well, he was invited to write the preface to the above book.

24 Li Dazhao wenii (Selected Writings of Li Dazhao), (Beijing: People's Press, 1959), Vol 2, p 936.

244

had dreamed of founding an organisation similar to "Young Italy". On arrival in

China, they frequently consulted Chen Yusheng, Li Dazhao, Zhou Taixuan and Wang

Guangqi about this plan. At first they could not make up their minds whether to

establish a political party or a society. Zhang Mengjiu recalled that they felt that

building a party was a major undertaking, and moreover, they followed differing

ideologies: Li Dazhao and Chen Yusheng were inclined towards Soviet Russia and

favoured Communism, while the others favoured anarchism and narrow nationalism

[Guojia zhuyi]; therefore, they decided to form an association as a compromise. 25

The Young China Association came into being in July 1918. Since the

Association's head was an anarchist, Wang Guangqi, Li Dazhao's original plan was

thus not realised. As he told Zhang Guotao later, he had hoped that this Association

would shoulder the responsibility for publicising Marxism, but some of its members

did not believe in Marxism. 26 Nevertheless, after the formation of the Young China

Association, Li Dazhao tried his best to exert an influence on the thinking of other

members of the Association. According to Li Huang, a member of this Association,

from about November 1918 Li Dazhao "began to speak approvingly of the Communist

Revolution in Russia, and believed it to be of more significance than the French

Revolution of 1789, for the Russian Communist Party supported the liberation

movements of small and weak nations. ... [therefore] it was better to learn from the

Russian Communist Party. , 27 When expressing such opinions, Li Dazhao was

challenged by Wang Guangqi, however, his views seemed to have been accepted by

some other members of the Association, including Mao Zedong. From October 1918

25 Zhang Mengjiu, 'Reminiscences of the Young China Association', Zhuanji wenxue, Vol 53, No 1, p 144.

26 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 94. 27 Li Huang, Xuedun shi huivilu, pp 46-7.

245

to February 1919, Mao worked at Beijing University Library as an assistant librarian

under the direction of Li Dazhao; he joined the Young China Association after Li

recommended him to the group. Mao later acknowledges the influence of Li by telling

Edgar Snow, the American journalist: "Under Li Ta-chao as assistant librarian at

Peking National University, I had rapidly developed towards MarxiSM. "28 Although

there is no proof that Mao was converted to Marxism until late 1920, it remains clear

that Li Dazhao's words left a deep impression on him, so that he decided to learn from

Russia. In a "Questionnaire of the Future Causes and Careers of the Members of the

Young China Association", Mao indicated that he intended to study in Russia for at

least five years . 29 Li Dazhao also tried to win over Wang Guangqi and others.

Sometimes, he invited Wang to his office, 30 and accompanied by Chen Duxiu and Gao

Yihan, visited Wang and Zhao Shiyan's dwelling place - Penglu - to talk with them. 31

The Association published its own journals Shaonian Zhongguo (Young

China) and Shaonian shiiie (Youth World). Li Dazhao was director of the editorial

department of Shaonian Zhongguo, which mainly published members' articles

reflecting their various beliefs and views. Shaonian shiiie carried a large number of

articles on Soviet Russia and the international labour movement. An article by Zong

Zhihui published in Shaonian Zhongjyuo in December 1919 stressed that it was

necessary to "unite the youth over the whole of China in order to form a large

organisation ... to wage a revolution ... to break down the oppression of all reactionary

28 Snow, Red Star over China, p 154. 29 Quoted from Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 35, No 2, p 145. 30 Fu Sinian, 'Recollecting Wang Guang-qi, Wang Guanc a iinian ce lqi xianshenc

(Memorial Book for Mr. Wang Guanggi), (Beijing, 1936), p 55. 3' Guo Youshou, 'Wang Guangqi in penglu', ibid, p 28. Zhao Shiyan was the

President of Sichuan Students' Union in Beijing, and was also an anarchist then. 246

forces. 02 One of the Young China Association's slogans was "small groups which can

forrn a great union". In actual deeds, the Young China Association played an

important role in uniting radical youth groups scattered in different cities. This

Association had connections with many youth organisations and drew key members of

those organisations in as its own members. In this way, the Young China Association

became a nation-wide organisation with more than one hundred members, who were

dispersed around Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanjing, Chengdu and Xian,

as well as Beijing. Some of its Beijing members also belonged to the Society of the

Citizens' Magazine, the Renaissance Society and the Common People's Education

Lecture Corps, while its members in other cities were leading elements in the New

Citizens Studies Society in Changsha, the Coexistence Society in Wuhan, the

Awakening Society in Tianjin and the Society of the Sunday Magazine in Chengdu.

Later, nearly all of them attended the Youth Labour-Leaming Mutual Aid Corps in

various cities.

As one of the leaders of the Young China Association, Li Dazhao did all he

could to exert his influence on other societies and to bring them together. In

September 1919, just a few days after the Awakening Society was founded, Li Dazhao

went to Tianjin to discuss the October Revolution and Marxism with the members of

the Society there, and to establish a relationship with Zhou Enlai and other Tianjin

radicals. Later, Li Dazhao invited several members of the Awakening Society to

Beijing to talk with them. Zhang Zhi, a member of the Young China Association, may

have been the intermediary between Li and the Awakening Society, because Zhang

was editor-in-chief of Nankai rikan (Nankai Daily), which was the journal of Nankai

32 Shapnian Zhonqguo, (Beijing, March 1920), Vol 1, No 5. 247

Secondary School. Most members of the Awakening Society belonged to the School.

Both 2hang Zhi and Li Dazhao had close contacts with Soviet agents. Li Dazhao also

attended the joint meeting of the Young China Association, the Dawn Light Society, 33

the Humanity Society, 34 the Awakening Society and the Youth Labour-Learning

Mutual Corps in Beijing in August 1920 and told the participants that "every

organisation must have a clear ideology. 05 Two days later the representatives of these

organisations held a meeting at Beijing University Library and decided to form an

organisation named "Reform and Unite". The aim of this new organisation was to

, 36 unite organisations in various locations "in order to realise social refonn. '

At the same time, Li Dazhao urged the Young China Association to tum in the

direction he desired. At a meeting of the Young China Association on the day after the

above-mentioned Joint meeting, Li Dazhao emphasised: "We have researched

earnestly for two years. It is necessary now to clarify the doctrine of our

Association. 07 What is of particular relevance to my theme is that Li Dazhao, Deng

Zhongxia, Gao Junyu and Huang Rikui, who had by then become the members of the

Communist Group in Beijing, attended the Congress of the Young China Association

in Nanjing in July 1921 and urged the Association to adopt Marxism and Bolshevism.

Because of this, Li did not attend the Founding Congress of the CCP, which was also

33 The Dawn Light Society was made up of Song Jie, Ou Shiying (Qu Qiubai's uncle), Geng Jizhi, Zheng Zhenduo and so on. They were editors of Shucluang (The Dawn Light).

,4 Its members were the editors of Rendao (Humanity), the predecessor of which was Xin Shehui (The New Society). Qu ubal was editor of both magazines. 7"'- -Cen ýiaocen, 'Recollections of the May 4th Movement in Tianjin and the Awakening Society, Tianiin wenshi ziliao (Selected Materials on the Culture and History of Tianjin), (Tianjin, 1979), No 3, p 23.

'16 Zhou Enlai nianpu (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Life), (Beijing, 1989). 37 -F-7--- Ulvuan tonqxun, (The Circular Letters of the Members of the Young China

Association), (1922), Vol 2, No 11. 248

convened in July 1921. This showed how much importance Li attached to the

conversion of the Young China Association's members to Bolshevism. However, in

the end, the Young China Association could not resolve to accept a single ideology

and it therefore split into several factions. But this still left a considerable number who

became key members of the CCP, including Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui,

Gao Junyu, Zhao Shiyan, Liu Renjing, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong, Yun Daiying,

Zhang Wentian, Shen Zemin and Yang Xianjiang.

The Young China Association finally dissolved. Nevertheless it was

successful as a nation-wide progressive youth organisation which "united with other

societies to form a joint front", and "played a certain role in the May 4th Movement",

as Xu Deheng remarked. He went on, "it was possible to form fighting forces during

the May 4th period thanks to the unity of various forces; at first the unity of [youth]

within Beijing University, and then the unity of the youth of the whole country. "38

In his book on Chinese Communism, Dirlik noted the sense of unity during the

May 4th period, which had no common ideology as its basis; consequently he only

sees the "patriotic reasons" involved in the yearning for unity. 39 He failed to see other

reasons and forces which motivated it. Xue Deheng pointed out: "It was Comrade Li

Dazhao who brought about the unity,, 40 Li's efforts in organising cannot be seen as

merely his personal actions intended only to strengthen the patriotic movement; they

also contributed to developing Communist organisations as "A Brief History of the

CCP" indicates: "The work of the three years from 1918-1920 was concentrated on

313 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshl ziliao xuan*i, (1979), No 61, p 18.

39 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 258, p 265. 40 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshi ziliao xuanii,

No 61, p 18. 249

grouping together individual revolutionaries and organising them into small units

capable of serving as [Communist] nuclei at different places. "1 According to this

explanation, several radical societies, which were organised by or had connections

with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu around the May 4th Movement, can be classified into

the category of such nuclei, from which the first batch of Chinese Communists were

produced. In a sense, it is right to say that the May 4th Movement provided the future

Communist movement with cadres. There is thus also no difficulty in comprehending

why some early CCP leaders regarded the Young China Association, the New Youth

Society, the Sunday Review Society, the New Citizens'Study Society, the Awakening

Society, the Coexistence Society and the New China Society 42 as "having close

connections to the birth of the CCpto43 and as "the [original] cells of the CCPII . 44

11. The National Students' Union, Trade Unions and the National Federation of

All Circles of the People

The National Students' Union, which was brought into existence during the

high tide of the May 4th Movement, mainly originated from the Students Salvation

Association, which, in turn, was initiated by the Returned Students National Salvation

League. Soon after establishing its headquarters in Shanghai on 12 May 1918, the

League dispatched teams to Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou and other cities to contact

students there. As a result, the Students Patriotic Association was organised in Beijing

and Tianjin. During the summer vacation, the Association established ties with

41 Quoted from Wilber and How, CNSAC, P 51. 42 The New China Society here may refer to the Society which edited New China;

around the same time, Kang Baiqing and Meng Shouchun, who were members of the Young China Association, organised a New China Society.

43 LI Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCF, ZDBX, p 211. 44 Qu Qiubai, 'Outline of the History of the CCP', ibid., p 200.

250

student organisations in Tianjin, Jinan, Wuhan, Jiujiang, Nanjing and Shanghai. At the

end of July, Shanghai students also held a meeting about organising the Students'

Patriotic Association, which was attended by representatives of the Associations of

Beijing and Tianjin. In this way, the Students' National Salvation Association (the

name was changed from the Students' Patriotic Association) was finally founded on

10th October, the National Day of 1918, and it was the start of uniting the students

organisations throughout China. The Students' National Salvation Association

commenced publication of its organ Guomin, which worked in concert with the

Returned Students National Salvation League's organ Jiuguo Ribao (The National

Salvation Daily), which started publication in Shanghai in July 1918, to undertake

propaganda work against the Japanese aggression.

R. Mirovitskaya believes that the students who participated in the anti-

Japanese movement before the May 4th demonstration were inspired by the October

Revolution and armed themselves with some of the ideas and principles of the

Revolution. She gives the following illustrations: the students decided to make use of

methods "to try to arouse the people" and "to establish contacts with all the strata of

the people"; that they seemed have understood the importance of unity in action; and

that their press publicised the foreign policy principles and practices of the Bolsheviks,

and presented Soviet Russia as an ally in the struggle to liberate China from Japanese

rule. 45 Her argument is not groundless. A circular issued by one branch of the

Students National Salvation Association, the New Society of Guangdong, definitely

stated that the Society had for its object the establishment of a Soviet Government in

China, supported by the working and trading classes. The circular claimed further:

45 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1978), No 1, pp 148-9.

251

The recent movement among the students in Beijing was caused by the

influence of recent events in Russia, and the students have taken one step

further in the direction of Bolshevism. ... As announced by the students,

both the Northern and Southern governments will be disowned and a

Soviet government will be set up. 46

This showed that the October Revolution and Soviet Russia exerted a certain influence

on some student organisations formed before May 4th 1919, such as the National

Salvation Association, as well as on the May 4th Movement itself.

In June 1919, the National Students' Union was founded in Shanghai on the

same political and organisational basis as the National Salvation Association and under

the auspices of the Shanghai Students' Union. The establishment of the latter on II

May was inspired by the May 4th demonstration and was also encouraged by a

member of the Returned Student National Salvation Ixague, Li Guo, who suggested

that the students in Shanghai should show their power through a general strike. 47 The

first statement of the Shanghai Students' Union declared its desire to organise a

national students' union. On June Ist a preparatory meeting attended by student

representatives from Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing and Shanghai was held at the Global

(Huanqiu) Chinese Students Union's building, which was also the temporary office of

the Shanghai Students'Union.

Having founded its headquarters in Shanghai, the National Students Union's

network was set up all over the country on a grand scale and there were about 193

affiliated local student unions. The president of the Union was Duan Xipeng, a student

46 FO 228/3211, September 1919; FO 405/228, Enclosure 2 in No 169. 47 Cheng Tianfang, 'Four Years at the Li's Temple', Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 1, No 7, p

26; Liu Yongming, Quomin dangren vu Wusi yunclong (The Members of the GMD and the May 4th Movement), (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990), p 160.

252

of Beijing University and a member of the Students' National Salvation Association;

the vice-president was He Baoren, who also held the post of president of the Shanghai

Students' Union simultaneously. The leading bodies of the Union were the Pingyi Bu

(the Presidium) and the Zhixing Bu (the Executive Committee). The former

committee consisted of 18 representatives of local student unions and overseas

students; the latter had 6 people from various major cities. Some historians have

considered that the National Students' Union was so "well-organised" that no other

organisations or parties, even the GMD, could compare with it. 48 Vilensky also valued

the National Students' Union highly, which, he said, "had strict discipline and was

founded on the basis of a rigid system of centralisation. , 49

The National Students' Union played an important role in leading the anti-

Japanese and anti-warlords movement. As a strong permanent organisation, it

continually extended the scope of its activities and changed its front to undertake what

it regarded as its patriotic and revolutionary tasks.

The Bolsheviks, of course, tried to make use of this important organisation.

With regard to this, K. Fuse remarked: "It goes without saying that the Bolsheviki left

no stone untumed for shaking hands with the Federation [The National Students'

Union] in proceeding with their policy in China. " But he believed that the Bolsheviks

50 approached the Union from 1922 onwards. In fact, during the time when the Union

was still under preparation, the Russian Bolsheviks already had their hands on it.

Around this time, the Global Chinese Students Union's office, where the preparatory

4" Li Jiannong, Zhonqquo iinbainian zhenqzhi shi (Chinese Political History in the last Hundred Years), (Taibel: Commercial Press, 1968), Vol 2, p 606; LO Fangshang, Geming zhi zaiqi, p 414.

49 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die Kommunistische Internationale, (Petrograd, 1921), No 16.

50 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 286. 253

work for the National Students Union was being carried out, was sometimes visited by

Sokolsky, who was once found talking with the Shanghai Students Union president,

He Baoren and the Global Chinese Students'Union leader Zhu Shaoping, 51 who both

played an important role in the creation of the National Students' Union. Although

Sokolsky was not a Bolshevik, he acted as an intermediary between some Chinese

radicals and the left-wing Russians and Bolsheviks. These Russians tried to enlist

some Chinese organisations' support in their protest against Japanese action in

Siberia. 52 A delegate from the Russian Far East even joined the Presidium of the

National Student Union. 53 In February 1920, the Russian Students' Union of

Vladivostok sent an appeal to the Shanghai Students' Union, saying: "We extend the

hand of friendship to the Chinese students who form the vanguard of the protectors of

the rights of their mother country, who are fighting against the foreigners; ... Demand

of your Government most resolutely the withdrawal of their troops from Russian

territory and form a solid foundation for the construction of a new life. " The appeal

ended with the slogan "Long live the world-wide fire of revolution !,, 54

After the expiry of the first term of the Union's leading body, some persons

who had direct or indirect relations with the Comintern agents became important

leaders of the National Students'Union. Yao Zuobin was one of them and he actively

51 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', dated 7 June 1919, Ouoted from Wus! yundong zai Shanghai shiliao xuanii (The Selected Materials on the May 4th Movement in Shanghai), (Shanghai: People's Press, 1960), p 844.

52 'The General Police Officer of the Shanghai Concession to the British Consul General, 7 June 1919', Wusi ai-quo yundonq (The May 4th Patriotic Movement), Vol 2, pp 311-12; George E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), p 321; FO 405/228, No 157.

53 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16.

54 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 254

directed the student movement. 55. On I March 1920, several Russian Bolsheviks were

found at the head office of the National Students' Union talking with Yao Zuobin, Xu

Deheng and others. 56 As a representative of the Union, Yao Zuobin reached

Vladivostok in May 1920 to discuss with the Bolshevik representative of the local

committee of the Dal'buro of the RCP the possibilities of aiding the Chinese labour

movement and helping Chinese students to study in Soviet Russia. 57 The Bolsheviks

and their followers also tried to approach some other key members of the Union. In

the spring of 1920, Voitinsky invited the leaders of both the National Students' Union

and the Shanghai Students' Union Di Kan, Cheng Tianfang and He Shizhen, to his

house to find out about the situation of the student movement and to urge the students

to bring about social revolution. 58 Around the same time, Chen Duxiu asked Gong

Debai, the President of the National Students' Union's Presidium, to his house and

unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Gong to become a Communist adherent. 59

Recently published Comintem archives show that the East Asian Secretariat did a lot

of work to exert direct influence upon student organisations, especially the National

Students' Union and tried to take them under their control, and by this way, they could

"give ideological and organisational leadership to the revolutionary student

movement. "60

55 Cf. Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 'History of the Phony Chinese Communist Party', Hvofu (Strong Wind), (Kyodo, December 1994), No 30.

56 'Lu Yongxiang to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 13 March 1920', Wusi aiquo vundonq dangan ziliao, pp 618-9.

" Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-1922', Problemv Dal'neqo Vostoka, (1973), No 1.

" Cheng Tianfang, 'Four Years at the Li's Temple', Zhuanji wenxue, Vol 1, No 7, p 27. 59 Gong Debai huivilu (Gong Debai's Reminiscences), Hong Kong: News World

Press, 1963, Vol 1, p 50. 60 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 40, p 54.

255

During the high tide of the May 4th Movement, Chinese labourers took part in

the movement by way of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations in many big cities.

Trade unions and other workers' organisations mushroomed throughout China. It was

reported that there were 26 unions in Guangzhou and over fifty in Shanghai by the end

of 19 19.61 In Shanghai, China! s industrial centre, many such organisations' names

were preceded with "Zhonghua" or "Quanguo" and claimed to represent labourers or

industrial circles in the whole of China. Among them the important ones were: the

All-China Industrial Federation, 62 the Chinese Trade Union (later the General Society

63 64 of Chinese Trade Unions), the Chinese Labour Party, the Chinese Labourers'

Alliance '65 and the All-China Society for Labour Harmony and Advance. 66 In fact,

61 Lowe Chuan-hua, Facing Labour Issues in China, (London, 1934), p 39. 62 In February 1919, the Federation was organized by Feng Ziyou, Cao Yabo and

Huang Jiemin, who were all members of the GMD. Huang and a key member of the Federation, Li Danian, were also members of the Returned Students' National Salvation League.

63 It was set up by Chen Guoliang, a representative of workers returned from France, and some workers' representatives of other industrial and service trades, with the help of Chen Jianai, a member of the GMD. The first preparatory meeting was held on 28 May 1919. The first president was Chen Kong, who was followed by Chen Jianal. Many former members of the Labour Party joined the Union.

64 The Chinese Labour Party was established by Xu Qiwen and Huan Hui in 1912 with Zhu Zhiyao as its president and Sun Yat-sen as honorary leader. It had about seventy branches before it was dissolved under Yuan Shikai's order of suppression. In June 1919, Shen Ruoxian, an anarchist and a member of the GMD, and some workers re-established the Labour Party by publishing a declaration. But the revived Party seemed to have no real organisation, and itjust issued a few leaflets. On 8 March 1919 Shen Ruoxian wrote a letter to Jiefanq Vu qaizao concerning the strike of rickshawmen, in which he warned the capitalists not to oppress the workers too hard, otherwise the fate of the Russian capitalists would befall them.

65 It was organised in July 1919 by members of the National Salvation League, such as Yan Juewu, Tan Xiajun, Fei Zhemin, Shen Ruoxian, and Zhao Shilong. Most of them were anarchists. According to Fei Zhemin, the formation of the Federation was actually initiated by Shen Ruoxian, who was mainly responsible for reestablishment of the Labour Party. Shen later became a Communist. See Fei Zhemin, Can'ia geming de huivi (11919-25) (Recollections of My Revolutionary Career, 1919-25), (The Posthumous Manuscripts of Fei Zhemin, collated by Fei Minsheng in 1980, unpublished). 66 This Society, which was founded in July 1919, was created by important members of the GMD, such as Hu Hanmin, Dai Jitao, Liao Zhongkal, Zhu Zhixin, Cao Yabo and Huang Jiemin. It was very active in enlightening labourers and in working for labourers'

256

those organisations could hardly be called labourers' organisations or trade unions,

since most of them were controlled by non-proletarian elements and even members of

the bourgeoisie. For example, Cao Yabo of the Industrial Federation and Zhu

Zhuowen, a key member of the Labour Party, were factory owners; Wu Canhuang of

the Industrial Federation was the manager of a newspaper. Moreover, some

organisations did not consist of real workers. For example, most members of the

Industrial Federation were foremen; the Chinese Labour Union, the revived Chinese

Labour Party and the Chinese Labour Federation even had no constituent labour

unions or workers' organisations at the basic level, and were therefore just empty

boxes; 67 and some were actually phoney unions concerned with publicity.

From 5 June 1919, massive workers' political strikes, which were directed

against the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Beijing Government, were staged in

Shanghai. But it was not a totally spontaneous movement by the labourers: most of

the strikes were the result of organised actions which were instigated and "utilised by

9 68 students and politicians'. After careful research, Jean Chesneaux, a Marxist scholar,

who studied the Chinese labour movement during this period, pointed out: "At first

glance, these strikes give the impression of having been sudden and spontaneous. In

each concern, they were initiated by the zealous few who persuaded the rest to follow

welfare and even planned to set up a school and a hospital for labourers. The source of their financial support aroused suspicion. Cf. Ma Chaojun, Zhong-guo laogong yundong shi (History of the Labour Movement in China, (Taibel, 1959), p 139.

67 This was the comment by a contemporary labour leader, Ma Chaojun, on the Chinese Labour Union. In his opinion, other similar organisations were also merely nominal. See Ma Chao-chun, History of the Labour Movement in China, (Taibei, 1955) P 111.

6" Cai Hesen, 'The Historical Development of the CCP', (1926), ZDBX, p 5. 257

SUit. "69 The famous sociologist Chen Da also considered that the strikes were

"infected with the new tide of thoughts or were made use of by some persons. "70

Between 1919 and 1920, several leaders of important Chinese labour

organisations had close ties with the Bolsheviks. They included Chen Jianai 71 the

president of the General Society of the Chinese Trade Union, Cao Yabo and Huang

Jiemin of the All-China Industrial Federation and the All-China Society for Labour

Harmony and Advance, Zhu Zhuowen, who was then in charge of the GMD's labour

activities and was called by Sun Yat-sen a "labour movement specialiSt"72, Xia

Qifeng, 73 the president of the Returned Chinese Labourers' Association, Cao Futang, 74

the promoter of the Ship and Godown Workers'Union, and Fei Zhemin, 75 one of the

founders of the Chinese Labour Federation.

According to a Shanghai Police Commander's report of December 1919, a

Bolshevik arrived in Shanghai to contact some of the leaders of the Chinese Labour

Party and the All-China Society for Industrial Harmony and Advance, Sun Wen (Yat-

sen), Chen Jianai, Cao Zixiang and Yu Yalong, in order to organise an All-China

Peasants'and Workers' Council. The Council's draft constitution stated that it strove to

establish the direct rule of peasants and workers, and that the central and local powers

69 Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, p 152. 70 International Labour Review, 1927, No 3. 71 Several Bolshevik agents contacted Chen. Cf. A document of the State Council

kept in the China Second Archives, quoted from Zhonq_quo wuzhen-qfu zhuyi he Zhonqciuo Shehui dang, p 84; 'Note from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs', 30 April 1920, ZEGXSL.

72 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, p 83. Zhu Zhuowen had good terms with Lizerovitch.

73 Xia Qifeng was a journalist and went to Paris to report the news of the Paris Peace Conference. In spring 1920, he reached Shanghai via Siberia with a Russian Bolshevik and two Koreans. See Scalapino and Lee, The Origins of Korean Communism, p 14.

74 In the British archives, this man's name is given as "Tsang Foh Daung", who had close relations with Stopany; FO 228/3214,4 March 1920.

75 Fei Zhemin, Caniia gerning de huivi (1919-25). 258

must be controlled by the Peasants' and Workers' Councils; all lands, forests, mines

and others must be turned over to the whole society in order to prevent the exploitation

of man by man; the Council decided to arm working people and form a national army

of volunteers; during the period of transition, the Union aimed to establish a dictatorial

government in order to destroy capitalism and to realise socialism. 76 It is clear that the

so-called "Peasants' and Workers' Council" was a synonym for Soviet, and its

constitution was brimming with Bolshevik language.

The foregoing evidence shows that the Bolsheviks had a hand in several labour

organisations.

Not confining their activities to students' and workers' organisations, the

Bolsheviks targeted all circles. In a letter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lu

Yongxiang, the Chinese officer in charge of Songjiang and Shanghai, reported in

March 1920 that about twenty Bolsheviks had come to Shanghai and attempted to

make contact with Chinese in industrial, agricultural, commercial, educational and

military circles and they had already got in touch with several delegates to the National

Federation of All Circles of the People. 77

The National Federation of All Circles of the People was founded under the

sponsorship of the National Students'Union in November 1919. Its first chairman was

Yu Yuzhi, who was a member of the GMD and vice-director of the Returned Students'

National Salvation League. The Federation proclaimed its aim was "to unite all circles

of the whole of China in order to pool their wisdom and efforts, ...; to organise a

76 'Order No 9 of the Frontier Defence Affairs Supervisory Section of the Beijing Government', Quoted from Peng Ming (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandalshi ziliao xuanii, pp 415- 6. The order mistakenly regarded Chen Jianai as the leader of the Chinese Labour Party. Actually Chen was the President of the General Society of the Chinese Trade Unions. Perhaps some leaders of the Labour Party also took part in this plan. 77 Wusi aiquo vundonq dan-q'an ziliao, p 618.

259

genuine institution of the will of the people for making statements on foreign affairs

and for making decisions on domestic affairs. 08

On I March 1920, some Soviet agents such as Potapov and Rosanov 79 held a

meeting with several delegates to the Federation, including Chen Jianai, Yao Zuobin,

Cao Yabo and Xu Deheng, in the presence of prominent members of the GMD, Sun

Hongyi and Dai Jitao. The main subjects under discussion were how to organise

branches of the National Federation of All Circles of the People in several other cities,

to distribute leaflets and to rouse the entire people over the country to act in unison. 80

Between April and May of 1920, after the Karakhan Manifesto reached China,

many mass organisations issued open letters in reply to the Soviet Government.

Among these letters, the one by the National Federation of All Circles of the People

was worthy of notice, stating:

We are very pleased to receive the Soviet Government's Manifesto, and

we believe that the Chinese people, except for a few stubborn and

decadent bureaucrats, warlords and politicians, are willing to co-operate

with the Russian people. ... Hence the dreams of the old politicians and

capitalists can no longer come true; and the time when the people of the

world break down the barriers between different countries, different races

and different classes will come soon. ... At present, the awakening

78 Minquo ribao, 19 October 1919. 79 It is not sure who Rosanov was. The British Archives recorded that a Bolshevik

agent named Roosanof was sent to Shanghai from Vladivostok before 1921 for special propaganda work. (FO 405/233, No 107); In a Memorandum by the Dutch acting Consul-General of Shanghai, dated 11 April 1922, when Maring was living at 6 Wayside Road in the International Settlement in Shanghai in 1921, a Russian woman Rjazanoff, Sudakoff's daughter, was his landlady for a lengthy period. (Saich, OFUFC, p 270).

80 'Lu Yongx1ang to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (13 March 1920)', Wusl aiquo vundonq clang'an ziliao, pp 618-9. This report added that the meeting had also discussed the issue of propagating Bolshevism and Communism.

260

Chinese people are preparing to fight against the stubborn and decadent

bureaucrats, warlords and politicians. The latter have only an army of a

few tens of thousands of people to rely on, whom we plan to awaken to

our cause. 81

The interesting thing is that the open letters of the National Students' Union, the

National Journalists'Union and some other mass organisations contained the following

similar sentences: "Hoping that the peoples of China and Russia will develop a good

friendship and devote every effort to eliminate the disparities between countries, races

and classes. A2 Since the language used in those letters was so similar to that of the

Bolsheviks, 83 it aroused the Chinese authorities' suspicions. A spy who was sent to the

head office of the National Federation of All Circles of the People found that the

Federation, the National Students' Union and some trade unions representatives, such

as Xia Qifeng, Chen Jianai, Ming De and Yao Zuobin, were holding a meeting to

discuss the issue of replying to the Karakhan Manifesto. The Russians Potapov and

Stopany, the Chinese Lu Shikai, who worked for the Bolsheviks, and some Koreans

and Japanese also attended the meeting. It was reported that an agreement was

reached at the meeting: if the Central Government refused to accept the Soviet

Government's telegram, they would organise an alliance of Chinese, Koreans,

8' Shi bao (Shanghai Times), 11 April 1920. 82 Zhonqquo x1andaishl ziliao huibian 0 919-45) (Collection of Source Materials of the

Chinese Modern History, 1919-45), (Hong Kong: Cultural Materials Supply Service, 1978) p 40-1.

83 'The Platform of the Communist International' pointed out that the proletariat should use "the class power of its mass organisations, its Soviets, to abolish the privileges of the bourgeoisie and to ensure the transition to the classless communist society. " ... "abolish State frontiers, change the entire world into one co-operative community. " (Degras, Communist International, pp 19-20. )

261

Japanese and Russians in Shanghai to overthrow the warlords' rule. 84 Although the

National Federation of All Circles of the People published an article denying the

report, from the content of these open letters we can see that these mass organisations

seemed to act in unison; and from the Chinese who attended the meeting we know that

these organisations' representatives, with the exception of Ming De (who has not been

identified so far), all had close connections with Soviet agents. With regard to the idea

of an alliance of Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and Russians, it was not merely a rumour.

Around this time an article published in Shanghai Life said that the fates of China,

Japan and Korea were closely allied; all three nations suffered from foreign

interference, and the people of the three countries should learn from Russia! s example

85 to free themselves from foreign intervention. This demonstrated that the Bolsheviks

intended to ally themselves with the Far Eastern peoples.

The May 4th Movement, like the Rice Riot in Japan and the March Ist

Uprising in Korea, was one of the most remarkable events of the time in the Far East.

Mao Zedong emphasised: "The May 4th Movement actually took place at the

summons of the world revolution, of the Russian Revolution, and at the call of Lenin.

It was part of the world proletarian revolution of the time. Although the Communist

Party had not yet come into existence, there were already large numbers of

intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had the rudiments of

Communist ideology. , 86 Some scholars, especially those in Taiwan, argue that Mao

was wrong in saying that the events in Russia sparked off the May 4th Movement. In

their opinion, the most important motivating force behind the May 4th Movement was

84 Xinwen bao (Shanghai News Post), 5 May 1920. 135 An extrac m Sl"ýanghai Life; FO 228/3214,25 March 1920. 86 Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy', Mao Zedonq Xuanil, Vol 3, p 86.

262

nationalism, rather than CommuniSM. 87 They are quite right to stress the role played

by nationalists. But in doing so they might run the risk of forgetting that supporting

and promoting national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in Eastern countries

like China was an important strategy of Soviet Russia and the Comintern. I also

believe that the May 4th Movement was an authentic mass patriotic movement that

could not have been initiated by a few Bolshevik agents. However, we cannot rule out

the possibility of the Bolshevik agents' incitement of and intervention in the

Movement. For example, after the downfall of the Soviets in Siberia and the Russian

Far East in summer 1918, many Bolshevik commissars fled to China and the majority

were agitating for the boycotting of Japanese goods. 88 As we have seen, the

Bolsheviks really had a hand in some important mass organisations during the May 4th

Movement, especially the later stages of it. It was quite clear that if the Bolsheviks did

not cause the sea to surge, they at least made a stormy sea stormier.

According to the "Brief History of the CCP", the forces in the May 4th period

were "properly utilised by the true revolutionaries who joined the Communist

movement as individuals for the purpose of organising an embryo for the future

Communist Party. "89 Here, "the Communist movement" implied the international

Communist movement directed by Moscow, because there was no Communist

movement in China in 1919, while the "true revolutionaries" referred to were actually

Li Dazhao, Huang Jiemin and their like. These radical Chinese, who were influenced

by the October Revolution and who had close ties with Bolshevik agents, took the lead

in the movement.

87 Chou Yusun, 'The May 4th Movement and the Chinese Communist Party', Issues and Studies, (Taibei, July 1989), Vol 25, No 7.

"" FO 228/3211, No 271. 89 Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 43.

263

The Bolsheviks had plenty of experience of carrying out organisational work in

a planned way. Lenin even pointed out: "The whole of society would be converted

into a network of front organisations; ... controlled and guided by the conscious

leadership. "90 Such exactly was the case in China, where various Chinese radicals

rallied together in "mass" and "non-party" organisations. In his report to the ECCI,

dated I September 1920, Vilensky wrote that the organisational task for the newly

established Chinese Section (the Revolutionary Bureau) of the East Asian Secretariat

was: "to carry out the work of organising the Party in China by establishing

Communist basic cells among the students' organisations and the workers'

organisations in the coastal industrial areas. "91 In Vilensky's mind, as he mentioned in

a later article, these students' organisations were the National Students' Union in

Shanghai and some students' unions in North China, including some societies at

Beijing University; as to the workers' organisations, he mainly referred to the workers'

organisations in Shanghai. 92 In October 1920, Liu Jiang, the representative of the

Chinese Communists in Russia, also reported to the Amur Committee of the RCP(B)

after his visit to China that the central student organisation [the National Students'

Union] and several workers' organisations in Shanghai were supporting socialiStS. 93

Beyond doubt, working in those mass organisations was the first step to forming

radical organisations which would lead to the establishment of the Communist Party.

90 Lenin Collected Works, Vol 5, p 189. 91 Z; -LZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 92 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die

Kommunistische Internationale, (1920), No 16. Those organisations were also mentioned by other Bolshevik agents of that time.

93 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 45. 264

Section 3. The Great Harmony Party and the Truth Society

Among various revolutionary organisations, the Bolsheviks attached

importance to Datong Dang (the Great Harmony Party) and Zhenli She (the Truth

Society). In "On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China",

Vilensky pointed out specifically that Datong Dang and Zhenli She were "two parties"

formed from among the organisations which had been set up since the October

Revolution. 94 In some Comintern agents'eyes, the Great Han-nony Party and the Truth

Society could be used for a period of time as bases to develop into Communist

organisations. Yet these two organisations have never been mentioned in any books

on the Chinese Communist Movement. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with them in

detail here.

1. The Great Harmony Party (Datong Party)

The name of the Datong Party came from the word "Datong" (Great Harmony

or universal concord). Originally, "Datong" was an ancient political concept of an

ideal society. Realising great harmony in the whole world was also Sun Yatsen's

ultimate aim; and to him, Datong was a synonym for Communism. "

In the programme of the Datong Party, its guiding principle was the "human

equality and world harmony" and its general plan relating to China was divided into

two parts: the internal policy was to denounce all warlords' rule and the temporary

military govemment in particular; to convene a National Conference to decide state

94 Die Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 95 CUi Shuqin, Sun Zhongshan vu Gongchan zhuvi, p 90; Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-

sen and Communism, p 97. 265

affairs; or to raise a common people's revolution to resolve all problems. The external

policy was to denounce all unequal treaties between China and foreign governments,

the foreign concessions and consular jurisdiction in China. Internationally, they

denounced the imperialist powers'rule in Korea, Taiwan, India, Vietnam and all other

weak nations. On the basis of the programme, Wang Jueyuan argues that the Datong

96 Party was a nationalist organisation. But in Vilensky's opinion, the Datong Party

was a "Socialist party" or "International Socialist Party", and "Communist ideology

infiltrated into the party". 97 As an "International Socialist Party", the Party consisted

of Koreans, Indians and Vietnamese and Taiwanese as well as Chinese.

The Datong Party was closely connected with the Comintern. In 1941, a

Chinese Communist author gave the following account:

At the beginning of 1920, the Comintern dispatched a Korean comrade

named Kim Sen who had attended its first congress to China in order to

lay the groundwork for the organisation of a Communist party. When he

arrived in China, he contacted Huang Jiemin, a member of the Datong

Party, and twenty-one anarchists, and organised a Communist party which

98 elected a Central Executive Committee of nineteen.

According to Li Danyang's research 99, "Kim Sen" here might be Pak Chin-sen, the

general secretary of the Korean People's Socialist Party. Although Pak did not attend

96 Wang Jueyuan, Zhonciguo dancipai shi (The History of the Parties of China), (Taibei: Zhengzhong Press, 1983), pp 94-5.

97 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die kommunistische Internationale, (1920), No 16.

9" Liu A sheng, Zhonaguo minzu minzhu qeminci vundon-q shi iiaochen-q (A Textbook on the History of the Chinese National Democratic Revolutionary Movements), (North Shanxi, 1941); Quoted from C. Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, (Cambridge

, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp 21-2.

99 Li Danyang, 'Pak Chin-sen's Efforts on the Establishment of A Party in China', 266

the first congress of the Comintern, he occasionally took part in meetings of the ECCI

as Korean representative between the spring and summer of 1919 while he was in

Moscow. 100 After meeting certain Soviet leaders, who promised to provide Comintern

funds for the Korean independence movement, Pak and other Korean representatives

pledged themselves to espouse the Communist cause. In November 1919, Pak,

carrying a large sum from the Comintem fund, arrived in Shanghai. 101

Pak Chin-sen's purpose in China was not only to establish relations with the

Korean Provisional Government and to direct the Korean People's Socialist Party,

which moved its headquarters to Shanghai in the autumn when the Party's chairman Yi

Tong-hui was elected the premier of the Provisional Government, but also to set up a

Chinese party which would be subordinate to the Comintern. 102 Actually, the work of

establishing a Chinese party was not performed by Pak Chin-sen alone, because Pak

only stayed in Shanghai about two months on his first visit to China. Yi Tong-hui and

other Korean Communists also played an important role, acting as a "chief channel for

the Comintern's contact with the Chinese and the Japanese. " 103 Besides Pak Chinsen,

the Comintern. also sent other Koreans to China with money for promoting the

Communist movement there. 104 These people included Kim Man-gyom, who also

contacted Huang Jiemin and his comrades and provided them with Comintern funds.

Jindaishi vianjiu,, (11992), No 4, pp 162-76. 'uu Lazitch and Drachkovitch (ed. ), Biog aphical Dictionarv of the Comintern, p 350. 101 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 11; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in

Korea, pp 9-10; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'ang-sun, Han-quk Kon-gsan Chuui Undonsa, p 169.

102 D. W. Treadgold, 'Russia and the Far East', 1. J. Lederer (ed. ), Russia Foreign Polic , (Yale University Press, 1962), p 555.

103 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 17. 104 j. P. Harrison, The Long March to Power, (London: MacMillan, 1972), p 27.

267

Huang Jiemin, whose original name was Huang Jue, was a member of the

GMD and an anarchist. In 1918, as a returned student from Japan, Huang became one

of the contributing editors of Jiugllo ribao and also took charge of liaison matters at the

paper. 105 Apart from Huang Jiemin, some other active workers in the Datong Party,

such as Wen Li and Yao Zuobin were also returned students from Japan and worked

on Jiuguo ribao. Wen Li (original name Wen Jincheng) was the editor-in-chief of

Jiuguo ribao and was an important leader of the student movement. Yao Zuobin was a

member of the GMD, he joined the Chinese Revolutionary Army (Zhonghua Geming

Jun) in 1916.106 Since Jiuguo ribao's aim was "to arouse people's patriotic feelings

and consciousness" to fight against the Japanese, 107 and it often reported news about

the Korean independence movement, this paper thus attracted the attention of Korean

nationalists and socialists and had close ties with them. Cho Tong-woo, who was then

a member of the Korean Provisional Government and later became a leader of the

Korean Communist Party, was a correspondent for Jiuguo ribao. The Korean People's

Socialist Party regarded Jiuguo ribao as one of the principal socialist papers in

China. 108 Some members of the Datong Party such as Kang Baiqing, Wang Dexi and

Yao Zuobin were key workers in the National Students' Union,. Kang Baiqing was a

member of the Young China Association and the New Tide Society in Beijing and

Wang Dexi was one of the leaders of the Nanjing StudentsUnion. A source show that

Wang Ping was a member. 109 According to Potapov's report, Sun Yat-sen's secretary

105'Yu Yuzhi's Oral Account, recorded by Yu AnIan', 1992-93. 106 See the caption under a photograph of the exhibition at Sun Yat-sen's Memorial

Hall in Taibei. 107 Guomin, Vol 1, No 3. 108 R. ýThe Situation in Eastern Asia', The Communist International, (August 1920),

No 13. "R" is said to be R. W. Kim; '09 Kimura Ikujiro's Chvo-qoku Rodo Undou Shi Nenpvo (Chronicle of Events in the

268

and financial minister were members of the Datong Party, and Potapov himself also

joined the Party in 22 May 1920 and became a member of the Central Committee. 110.

Some questions about the organisation of the Datong Party, such as, when the

Datong Party was founded and what its activities were, have so far remained

unanswered. According to Wang Jueyuan, the Datong Party had a history of ten years,

but he does not give the date when the Party was founded. "' 2hangGuotao recalled

that when he was in Shanghai between the end of 1919 and spring 1920, he heard that

Huang Jiemin was trying to organise a Datong Party. 112 However, Liu A Sheng's book

shows that the Datong Party already existed before Pak Chin-sen came to China in the

fall of 1919. U Huang's reminiscences offer a very interesting story about Huang

Jiemin and his party. On his arrival in Shanghai in January 1919, Li Huang was

recommended to meet Huang Jiemin, who called himself an anarchist and was trying

to enlist as many gallant people as he could. Huang talked to Li incessantly about the

world revolution. Some Korean revolutionaries were also present and they asked Li to

assist in the Korean revolution against Japan. Afterwards, Huang wrote Li's name

onto a piece of paper and then burnt it. These were the formalities with which Li

Chinese Labour Movement), (printed in 1966 but unpublished, one copy is kept in the Library of Cambridge University, p 85) showed that Wang Ping and Yao Zuo-bin as members of the Chinese Communist Party received Eizo Kanto, a Japanese Communist in Shanghai. Minquo ribao of 6 October 1920 reported that Wang Ping attended the sponsoring meeting of the Shanghai Machinery Workers' Union with Chen Duxiu, U Hanjun, U Qihan and other people, who were members of the CCP. But there was no mention of Wang Ping in any name list of the early members of the CCP. So Wang was probably a member of the Communist party which was derived from the Datong Party.

110 'Potapovs Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48; 'Potapov's Explanation about His Reporf, Quoted from U Yuzhen, Sun Zhonqshan Vu

on ch Mguo i, L uo*-i p 57. Wang Jueyuan, Zhonaguo dan-qpai shi, p 94. Yang Kuisong writes in his article

'Some Facts concerning the Communist Organisations in China in the Early Period' that according to Wang Jueyuan, the Datong Party was established by Yao Zuobin in September 1921. (Dan-qshi vaniiu ziliao, 1992, No 4. )

12 Chang Kuofao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol 1, p 89-90. 269

Huang was admitted into Huang's party. ' 13 Li Huang did not give the Party's name,

and only mentioned that it was an "anarchist" party. This might refer to the Datong

Party, because many members of the Party believed in anarchism and thus it was

called a "Utopian Party". Moreover, the Datong Party also had Korean members. In

addition, around this time, the Korean nationalists also secretly formed a "Datong

League" or "Datong Party" in the spring of 1919, which consisted of Koreans of

various circles. After its leaders were arrested by the Japanese authorities, many of its

members escaped to China. 114

In light of the above facts, the Datong Party might have been set up at the

beginning of 1919, at the latest before Pak Chinsen's first visit in autumn 1919. The

Party Huang Jicmin was trying to establish around the beginning of 1920 was perhaps

a "Communist party" based on the Datong Party. In fact, the Communist Party was

the Datong Party's descendant and most likely they were never separated. The Datong

Party could not have lasted for ten years, as Wang Jueyuan claimed, for some persons

in the know, such as Yo Un-hyong and 2hang Guotao, believed both the Datong Party

and the "Communist Party" were short-lived! 15

Nobody can give any evidence of the operations and activities of the Datong

Party. Yet its programme stipulated that the Party's primary scope of activity was in

the educational and industrial fields. Since the Datong Party was a secret party, an

indication of its activities is best seen in some mass organisations which were

113 U Huang, Xuedun shi huivilu, Part 1. p 80. 114 Hanauk Donanir) Undonsa, Vol 3, p 98; Jin Jiu, Baifan v1zhi -(Kim

Ku's Autobiography). translated by Zhang Minghui, Beijing: Democracy and Construction Pressý 1994, p 200.

115 Chang Kuo-rao. The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol 1, p 122; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 29.

270

associated with iL So far as I know, nearly aH the members of the Datong Party

belonged to either trade unions or students'unions.

The key members of the Datong Party were involved in the labour movement

and tried to lay the foundation of the Party among the working classes. For example,

Huang Jiemin was one of founders of both the All-China Industrial Federation and the

All-China Society for Labour Harmony and Advance. As the only national

organisation in industrial circles founded on the eve of 4 May, the All-China

Industrial Federation in collaboration with several organisations of other circles

convened an emergency meeting on 5 May 1919 to prepare a mass rally of the

Shanghai citizens and to start up the movement. The Industrial Federation actively

undertook the work of mobilising and organising workers in the patriotic movement.

Many members of the Federation took the lead, going on strikes and boycotts. In July,

the Industrial Federation took a more radical stand "to overthrow the Beijing

Government and to organisc a new government by the Chinese people in order to

strive for national independence. " 116 On 27 January 1920 the representatives of the

All-China Industrial Federation, the Electrical Workers' Union, (which had close ties

with the Industrial Federation, ' 17 ) and three other labour organisations held a meeting

in Shanghai with the object of forming a central organisation "The Chinese Labourers'

"I Uu Yongming. Guomindangren yu Wusi yundong, p 236. 11 7 The President of the Union was an electrician LI Henglin, a Protestant. He was

active in the AH-China Industrial Federation around the May 4th. (Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement ,p 160, p 457) While organising the Electrical Workers' Union in June 1919. Li was ýrrested. After he was released, the Union formally was set up on 9 August 1919. Four representatives of the All-China Industrial Federation attended the founding meeting and one of them made a speech on behalf of the Sponsors. (Uu Yongming, Guomindangren yu Wusi vundonq . This demonstrates that the Union was established by the Industrial Federation.

271

Union" and later a further meeting was held to discuss details of the amalgamation. 118

In the same month, the Union of Allied Chinese-Korean Labourers was formed in

Shanghai to undertake anti-Japanese activities and propagate "Extremism"

(Bolshevism). ' 19 The unification of Chinese labour organisations and co-operation

between the Chinese and the Koreans seemed to be steps leading to the formation of a

party. On 29 January 1920 an article entitled "Labour Organisation and the Political

Party" was published in Nlinzuo ribao, with the author, Shao Lizi, suggesting that the

labour organisations themselves should "form one large party. " 120

Around this time 2hang Guotao heard that Huang Jiemin "enjoyed discussing

socialism" and that he "was trying to organise a TaTung (Utopian) party on the

platrorm that all Socialists in China should unite, co-operate with the Korean

revolutionafics, and establish connections with Russia. " 121 In fact, at this time Huang,

as Liu A Sheng pointed out, was setting up a Communist party basing the organisation

on the Datong Party, with the All-China Industrial Federation as its front.

The All-China Industrial Federation, which was administered by a committee

of twenty five peoples, claimed more than ten thousand members. As the resident

director, Huang was in charge of the day-to-day work of the Industrial Federation. In

March 1920, he managed to rcorganise it as a truly national trade-unions' federation

and appointed Zhang Guotao, as the general secretary.

To a certain extent, the Chinese National Students' Union was also influenced

by the Datong Party through its members. Merely in the Union's leading body there

1 'a FO 228/3214,29 January 1920. 119 Hanauk Donanir) Undonsa Vol 3, p 400. '20 Shao LIA was an old meýber of the GMD and also a founding member of the

CCP. '2' Chang Kuo-fao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist PaV, Vol 1, p 84, pp 89-90.

272

were several members of the Party, such as Kang Baiqing, Wang Dexi and Yao

Zuobin.

Labourers' organisations headed by the Industrial Federation and students'

organisations headed by the National Students' Union frequently acted in concert.

From January to April 1920, several major strikes and demonstrations took place in

Shanghai to oppose the Beijing Government dealing directly with Japan on the

Shandong issue and to protest against the beating of students by the Chinese

authorities in Tianjin and Shanghai. During this period, the National Students Union

called all-China students' strikes several times. With extraordinary zeal, Yao Zuobin

of the Executive Committee of the Union participated directly in making the decisions

and leading these actions, 122 and afterwards he went to consult with the Bolshevik

representative in Vladivostok on the possibilities of giving aid to the Chinese labour

movcmenL

The students' strikes soon caused citizens'. especiafly workers' , strikes. In

April, some of the students and workers who were on strike in Shanghai marched

along the streets and urged shopkeepers to strike. 123 'Mis period was regarded as the

second high tide of the mass movement after 4 May 1919. He Fenglin, the Acting

Military Commanding Officer (Hujun Shi) of the Songjiang and Shanghai regions,

considered that "this unrest" was "coerced and agitated by certain labour organisations'

leaders who were the henchmen of the Bolsheviks. " 124

122 Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 'The Whole Story of the Phoney Chinese Communist Party, LIM, (1994), No 30, pp 93-4.

Wusi vundona zal Shanahai shiliao xuanii, pp 564-574. 124 ibid. p 579.

273

With the upsurge of the movement, the All-China Industrial Federation

convened a meeting on 18 April 1920 to make preparations for a mass rally on May

Day. Besides the Industrial Federation, representatives of six other labour

organisations attended the meeting and agreed to sponsor the May Day

commemoration rally. Huang Jiemin, the convenor and chairman, addressed the

meeting. Cao Yabo, Chen Duxiu and the representatives of the Shanghai Students'

Union were also present at the meeting.

Before the May Day rally, the Industrial Federation printed and distributed a

large number of leaflets, appealing to workers to attend the rally. The National

Students Union also published a circular summoning students from all regions to join

in unity with labourers in Labour Day celebrations. On I May 1920, the army and

police took stringent measures to prevent the mass rally and parade. Owing to

pressure from the authorities, the commemorative rally could not be held at the

proposed assembly place and only lasted five minutes. Nevertheless, a large number

of pamphlets were distributed, and one of them urged workers "to overthrow the

Government and the capitalists; and to establish a new government. " 125 Such a slogan

reflected the political stand of the organisers of this rally.

An open letter on behalf of aH the workers of China to the Soviet Government,

which could not be read out at the May Day rafly, as originally planned, was published

in the newspapers afterwards. It proclaimed: "We are trying to create a new, happy

and permanently peaceful world for humankind and are determined to shoulder the

responsibility for it with you. " It further expressed the hope that the working class in

Soviet Russia would offer "vigorous" aid and guidance to their fellow labourers in

125 Zhonaguo gonawn shiliao (Historical Materials on the Chinese Labour Movement), (Beijing. 1984), Part 2 p 17.

274

China, India, Korea and Vietnam, who were still under the oppression of the capitalist

class. 126 This gives us a clue that this letter might have been drafted by someone of the

Datong Party, because the Party consisted of Koreans, Indians and Vietnamese, as well

as Chinese. A leaflet entitled "May Day", which was issued by the Beijing

Communist Group in May 1921, indicated that the May Day celebration on I May

1920 was held by various trade unions and the Socialist Party. 127 We may remember