The Opening of Genesis Part VII. On the Creation of All Things at the Beginning of Time

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The Opening of Genesis Part VII.

On the Creation of All Things at the Beginning of Time according to

the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215)

With an Exposition of the Text by St. Thomas Aquinas

by

Bart A. Mazzetti

§

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. The Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council.

Cf. the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). Canon 1 complete:1

1. Confession of Faith

We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasur-

able, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit,

three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature. The Father is fromnone, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without

beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding;consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator

of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the

beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is

to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both

spirit and body in common. The devil and other demons were created by God naturally

good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of

the devil.

This holy Trinity, which is undivided according to its common essence but distinct accord-

ing to the properties of its persons, gave the teaching of salvation to the human race throughMoses and the holy prophets and his other servants, according to the most appropriate

disposition of the times. Finally the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, who became

incarnate by the action of the whole Trinity in common and was conceived from the ever

virgin Mary through the cooperation of the holy Spirit, having become true man, composedof a rational soul and human flesh, one person in two natures, showed more clearly the way

of life. Although he is immortal and unable to suffer according to his divinity, he was made

capable of suffering and dying according to his humanity. Indeed, having suffered and died

on the wood of the cross for the salvation of the human race, he descended to the under-world, rose from the dead and ascended into heaven. He descended in the soul, rose in the

flesh, and ascended in both. He will come at the end of time to judge the living and the dead,

to render to every person according to his works, both to the reprobate and to the elect. All

of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now wear, so as to receive according totheir deserts, whether these be good or bad; for the latter perpetual punishment with the

devil, for the former eternal glory with Christ.

There is indeed one universal church of the faithful, outside of which nobody at all is saved,

in which Jesus Christ is both priest and sacrifice. His body and blood are truly contained in

the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread and wine having

been changed in substance, by God's power, into his body and blood, so that in order to

achieve this mystery of unity we receive from God what he received from us. Nobody can

effect this sacrament except a priest who has been properly ordained according to the

church's keys, which Jesus Christ himself gave to the apostles and their successors. But thesacrament of baptism is consecrated in water at the invocation of the undivided Trinity –

namely Father, Son and holy Spirit – and brings salvation to both children and adults when itis correctly carried out by anyone in the form laid down by the church. If someone falls into

sin after having received baptism, he or she can always be restored through true penitence.For not only virgins and the continent but also married persons find favour with God by right

faith and good actions and deserve to attain to eternal blessedness. (emphasis added)

1Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Vol. 1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V (2 vols. London,

1990), I, pp. 222 ff.

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Text and translation:

Canon 1

1. Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur,

quod unus solus est verus Deus, aeternus, im-

mensus et incommutabilis, incomprehensi-bilis,

omnipotens et ineffabilis, Pater, et Filius et

Spiritus sanctus: tres quidem personae, sed unaessentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino;

Pater a nullo, Filius autem a Patre solo, ac Spiri-

tus sanctus pariter ab utroque, absque initio,

semper ac sine fine; Pater generans, Filius

nascens, et Spiritus sanctus procedens; consub-

stantiales, et coaequales, et coomnipotentes, et

coaeterni; unum universorum principium;

creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiri-tualium et corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti

virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de ni-

hilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corpor-

alem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, acdeinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et

corpore constitutam.

Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem

natura creati sunt boni; sed ipsi per se facti sunt

mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit.

CANON 12

We firmly believe and simply confess that there

is only one true God, eternal and immeasur-

able, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible

and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three

persons but one absolutely simple essence, sub-stance or nature. The Father is from none, the

Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit

from both equally, eternally without beginning

or end; the Father generating, the Son being

born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consub-

stantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and co-

eternal; one principle of all things, creator of all

things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the begin-

ning of time created from nothing both spiritual

and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic

and earthly, and then created human beingscomposed as it were of both spirit and body in

common.

The devil and other demons were created by

God naturally good, but they became evil by

their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the

prompting of the devil.

Cf. The First Vatican Council (1870):3

Constitutio dogmatica “Dei Filius”. de fide Catholica.Dogmatic Constitution “Dei Filius” on the Catholic Faith:

But now, with the bishops of the whole world sitting and judging with Us, gathered together

in this oecumenical Synod by Our authority in the Holy Spirit, We, having relied on the

word of God, written and handed down, as We have received it, guarded in a holy way and

accurately set forth by the Catholic Church, from this chair of Peter, in the sight of all, have

determined to profess and to declare the saving teaching of Christ, after contrary errors have

been proscribed and condemned by the power transmitted to Us by God

Chap. I. of God, Creator of All Things

The holy, catholic apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true,living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incompre-

hensible, infinite in intellect and will, and in every perfection; who, although He is one, sing-

ular, altogether simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed distinct in

reality and essence from the world; most blessed in Himself and from Himself, and ineffablymost high above all things which are or can be conceived outside Himself.

2Cf. Norman P. Tanner, op.cit .

3 Cf. Denzinger EN 1599 (http://www.clerus.org/bibliaclerusonline/en/dme.htm [3/17/11]).

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This only true God by His goodness and “omnipotent power”, not to increase his own

happiness, and not to add to, but to show forth His perfection by the blessings which

He bestows on creatures, with most free choice, “immediately from the beginning of

time made each creature out of nothing, spiritual and bodily, namely angelic and

worldly, and then the human, common as it were, composed of both spirit and body”

[Lateran Council IV, can. 2 and 5]

But God protects and governs by His providence all things which He made, “reaching from

end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly” [cf. Wisd. 8:1]. For “all things are nakedand open to His eyes [Heb. 4:13], even those which by the free action of creatures are in the

future.

The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning (or principal) and

end (or goal) of all things can be known, from created things, by the light of natural human

reason: “for the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” [Rom. 1:20]; nevertheless, it has pleased His

wisdom and goodness to reveal to the human race, in another and supernatural way, Himself

and the eternal decrees of His will, as the Apostle says: “God, who at sundry times and in

divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the Prophets, last of all, in these days

has spoken to us by His Son” [Heb. 1:1, can. 1]. (emphasis added)

Compare also the following translation of the text of the Decree: Cf. Concilium Later-

anense IV a. 1215 – Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, J. Alberigo, J.A. Dossetti, P.P.Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi, H. Jedin, (1973), pp. 230 – 271 From H. J. Schroeder, Dis-ciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary , (St. Louis:

B. Herder, 1937). pp. 236-296

We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense,

omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;

three Persons indeed but one essence, substance, or nature absolutely simple; the Father

(proceeding) from no one, but the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Ghost equally

from both, always without beginning and end. The Father begetting, the Son begotten, andthe Holy Ghost proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal, the

one principle of the universe, Creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and cor-

poreal, who from the beginning of time and by His omnipotent power made from no-

thing4 creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic, namely, and mundane, and then

human, as it were, common, composed of spirit and body. The devil and the other

demons were indeed created by God good by nature but they became bad through

themselves; man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil. (emphasis added)

§

4Notice that this translation, as with first excerpted above, leaves the word simul untranslated, whereas the

intervening version has “immediately”; a most interesting choice. See further below.

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2. The text of the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), with my own

translation.

Cf. Canon 1 (= Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 800) (tr. B.A.M.):

Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur,quod unus solus est verus Deus, …unum uni-

versorum principium; creator omnium visibili-

um et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium;

qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio tem-

poris utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam

spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet

et mundanam, ac deinde humanam, quasi com-

munem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam.

Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem

natura creati sunt boni; sed ipsi per se facti sunt

mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit.

We firmly believe, and simply confess, thatthere is only one true God, …one principle of all

things; creator of all things visible and in-

visible, spiritual and corporeal; who, by His

almighty power, established together 5 out of

nothing from the beginning of time both orders

of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal, the

angelic, namely, and the mundane, and then the

human, consitituted as it were in common (with

both)6 from spirit and body.

For the Devil and the other demons were crea-

ted by God good in nature, but became evil by

their own doing. But man sinned at the promp-

ting of the Devil.

3. Commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretal )7 (tr. B.A.M.):8

Est autem considerandum, quod Ariani post-

ponebant filium patri, primo quidem quantum

ad essentiam, dicentes, quod essentia patris est

dignior quam essentia filii: et ad hoc excluden-

dum subdit, consubstantiales, quia scilicet una

est essentia patris et filii in nullo differens.

Secundo vero quantum ad magnitudinem, non

quod in Deo sit magnitudo molis, sed magni-

tudo virtutis, quae est perfectio bonitatis suae.

Dicebant enim patrem esse filio maiorem etiam

secundum divinitatem: et ad hoc excludendum

subdit, et coaequales. Secundum humanitatemvero dominus dicit Ioan. XIV, 28: pater maior me est .

Now it must be considered that the Arians

placed the Son after the Father, first with respect

to essence, saying that the essence of the Father

is of greater dignity than the essence of the Son;

and in order to exclude this he adds, consubstantial , since there is one essence of the Son

and the Father differing in no way whatsoever.

But second, with respect to greatness, not that in

God there is greatness of bulk, but rather

greatness of virtue, which is the perfection of

His goodness. For they used to say that the

Father is greater than the Son also with respect

to divinity: and so to exclude this he adds, andco-equal . But with respect to humanity, the

Lord says in John (14:28): The Father is greater than me.

5

For the the justification of my translation, see further below.6 With both, that is to say, of the foregoing natures. Compare the translation found in the Catechism of the

Catholic Church, n. 337 (= Neuner-Dupuis): “…and then (deinde) the human creature, who as it were sharesin both orders, being composed of spirit and body”. Hence the creature man, as possessing the nature called

human, is understood to be in part ‘angelic’ and in part ‘mundane’. See further below.7 Excerpted from super primam et secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum, in Opera Omnia,Tomus XL (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), pp. E1-E50.8 Note that I have begun with the last section of the preceding part of the Angelic Doctor’s exposition, since

the final point he makes, regarding the lemma “one principle of all things”, is integral to the portion of the

Decree with which we are concerned.

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Tertio quantum ad potestatem, dicentes filium

non esse omnipotentem: et ad hoc excludendumsubditur, et coomnipotentes.

Quarto quantum ad durationem, quia dicebant

filium non semper fuisse: et ad hoc excluden-

dum subdit, coaeterni.

Quinto quantum ad operationem. Dicebant enim

quod pater operatur per filium sicut per instru-

mentum suum, vel sicut per ministrum: et ad

hoc excludendum subdit, unum universorum

principium. Non enim filius est aliud princip-

ium rerum, quasi inferius quam pater, sed ambo

sunt unum principium. Et quod dictum est de

filio, intelligendum est de spiritu sancto.

Deinde accedit ad alium articulum, qui est de

creatione rerum, ubi varias opiniones exclu-dit.

Fuerunt enim aliqui haeretici, sicut Manichaei,

qui posuerunt duos creatores: unum bonum, qui

creavit creaturas invisibiles et spirituales, alium

malum, quem dicunt creasse omnia haec visibil-

ia et corporalia. Fides autem Catholica confite-

tur omnia, praeter Deum, tam visibilia quam in-

visibilia, a Deo esse creata; unde Paulus dicit

Act. XVII, 24: Deus qui fecit mundum et omniaquae in eo sunt, hic caeli et terrae cum sit dom-

inus, etc., et Hebr. XI, 3: fide credimus aptataesse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visi-bilia fierent . Unde ad hunc errorem excluden-dum dicit: creator omnium visibilium et invis-

ibilium, spiritualium et corporalium.

Aliorum error fuit ponentium Deum quidem

esse primum principium productionis rerum, sed

tamen non immediate omnia creasse, sed medi-

antibus Angelis mundum hunc esse creatum: et

hic fuit error Menandrianorum. Et ad hunc

errorem excludendum subdit: qui sua omnipotenti virtute; quia scilicet sola Dei virtute

omnes creaturae sunt productae, secundum illud

Psal. VIII, 4 (3): videbo caelos tuos operadigitorum tuorum.

Third, with respect to power , saying the Son is

not almighty: and to exclude this it is added, co-omnipotent .

Fourth, with respect to duration, since they used

to say the Son did not always exist: and to ex-

clude this he adds, co-eternal .

Fifth, with respect to operation. For they used to

say that the Father worked through the Son as

through an instrument, or through a minister:

and in order to exclude this he adds: one princi-

ple of all things. For the Son is not another prin-

ciple of things, as though He were inferior to the

Father, but both are one principle. And what is

said of the Son here should be understood of the

Holy Spirit as well.

Then he comes to the next article, which con-

cerns the creation of things, wherein he ex-cludes various opinions.

For there were some heretics, like the Manich-

eans, who posited two creators, one good, who

created invisible and spiritual creatures, the

other evil, who they say created all things visi-

ble and corporeal. But the Catholic Faith con-

fesses that all things apart from God, both visi-

ble and invisible, were created by God; and so

Paul says in Acts (17:24): God, who made theworld, and all things therein; he, being Lord of

heaven and earth, etc., and Heb. (11:3): By faithwe understand that the worlds were prepared bythe word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible. And so to

exclude this error he says: Creator of all things

visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal .

There was another error of those holding God to

be the first principle of the production of things,

but nevertheless not to have created all things

immediately, but held this world to be created

through the mediation of angels: and this is the

error of the Menandrites. And in order to ex-clude this mistake he adds: who by His al-

mighty power ; the reason being that every crea-

ture has been produced by God according to the

Psalm (8:3): For I will behold thy heavens, theworks of thy fingers.9

9Likewise, all things were created through the Person of the Son:

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Alius fuit error Origenis ponentis quod Deus a

principio creavit solas spirituales creaturas, et

postea quibusdam earum peccantibus, creavitcorpora, quibus quasi quibusdam vinculis spiri-

tuales substantiae alligarentur, ac si corporales

creaturae non fuerint ex principali Dei inten-

tione productae, quia bonum erat eas esse, sed

solum ad punienda peccata spiritualium creatur-

arum, cum tamen dicatur Gen. I, 31: vidit Deuscuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Unde

ad hoc excludendum dicit quod simul condidit

utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem et

corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

Alius error fuit Aristotelis ponentis quidem

omnia a Deo esse producta, sed ab aeterno, et

nullum fuisse principium temporis, cum tamen

scriptum sit Gen. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus

caelum et terram. Et ad hoc excludendum addit,ab initio temporis.

Alius error fuit Anaxagorae, qui posuit quidem

mundum a Deo factum ex aliquo principio tem-

poris, sed tamen materiam mundi ab aeterno

praeextitisse, et non esse eam factam a Deo,

cum tamen apostolus dicat Rom. IV, 17: quivocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt .Et ad hoc excludendum addit, de nihilo.

Fuit autem alius error Tertulliani ponentis ani-

mam hominis corpoream esse, cum tamen apos-tolus dicat I ad Thess. V, 23: integer spiritusvester et anima et corpus sine querela inadventu domini nostri Iesu Christi servetur ; ubi

manifeste a corpore animam et spiritum distin-guit. Et ad hoc excludendum subdit: deinde, sci-

licet condidit Deus, humanam, scilicet naturam,

quasi communem, ex spiritu et corpore consti-

tutam; componitur enim homo ex spirituali

natura et corporali.

There was another error of Origen, maintaining

that God from the beginning created only spiri-

tual creatures, and afterwards when some of them had sinned, created bodies by which these

spiritual substances were bound, so to speak, by

certain ‘chains’, as though corporeal creatures

were not produced from the principle intention

of God, because it was good for them to be, but

only in order to punish the sins of spiritual crea-tures, whereas it is said in Genesis (1:31): God saw all things which he made, and they werevery good . And so in order to exclude this he

says that He established together both crea-

tures ,10 the spiritual , namely , and the corpor-

eal, the angelic, to wit, and the mundane.

There was another error of Aristotle, maintain-

ing that all things were created by God but from

eternity, and that there was no beginning of

time, whereas it is written in Genesis (1:1): In

the beginning God created heaven and earth .11

And in order to exclude this he adds, from the

beginning of time.

There was another error of Anaxagoras, who

held the world to have been made by God from

some beginning in time, but the matter of the

world to have pre-existed from all eternity, andnot to have been made by God, whereas the

Apostle says in Romans (4:17): who calleththose things that are not, as those that are. And

in order to exclude this he adds, out of nothing .

There was another error of Tertullian, maintain-

ing the soul of man to be corporeal, whereas the

Apostle says in I Thess. (5:23): that your whole spirit, and soul, and body, may be preserved blameless in the coming of our Lord JesusChrist , where he manifestly distinguishes the

soul and spirit from the body. And in order to

exclude this he adds: then, meaning ‘God esta-

blished’, the human, meaning ‘nature’, consti-

tuted as it were in common (with both), from

spirit and body; for man is composed from a

spiritual as well as a corporeal nature.

For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible,

whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him,

and for him. (Col. 1:16)

10 Cp. Sir. 1: 18: Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul , “He who lives forever created all things

together [or ‘in common’ ; LXX koine]”. On the interpretation of simul here, see further below.11 As if to say, the world did not always exist, but had, rather, a beginning, namely, in time.

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Secundum autem praedictum Manichaeorum

errorem ponentium duo principia, unum bonum

et unum malum, non solum attendebatur distinc-tio quantum ad creationem visibilium et invisi-

bilium creaturarum, ut scilicet invisibilia sint a

bono Deo, visibilia vero a malo, sed etiam quan-

tum ad ipsa invisibilia. Ponebant enim primum

principium esse invisibile, et ab eo quasdam

invisibiles creaturas esse productas, quas dicebant esse naturaliter malas: et sic in ipsis An-

gelis erant quidam naturaliter boni ad bonam

creationem boni Dei pertinentes, qui peccare

non poterant; et quidam naturaliter mali, quos

Daemones vocamus, qui non poterant non pec-

care, contra id quod dicitur Iob IV, 18: ecce qui serviunt ei, non sunt stabiles, et in Angelis suisreperit pravitatem.

Similiter etiam circa animas hominum errabant,

dicentes, quasdam esse bonae creationis, quaenaturaliter bonum faciunt, quasdam autem ma-

lae creationis, quae naturaliter faciunt malum,

contra id quod dicitur Eccle. VII, 30 (29): Deus fecit hominem rectum, et ipse immiscuit seinfinitis quaestionibus. Et ideo ad haec exclu-

denda, dicit: Diabolus autem, scilicet princi-

palis, et alii Daemones quidem a Deo natura

creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali ,

scilicet per liberum voluntatis arbitrium: homo

vero Diaboli suggestione peccavit , idest, non

naturaliter, sed propria voluntate.

Now with regard to the aforementioned error of

the Manicheans, holding there to be two prin-

ciples, one good and one evil, not only was adistinction observed with regard to the creation

of visible and invisible creatures, such that the

invisible were from the good God, but the visi-

ble from bad, but even with regard to the in-

visible things themselves. For they held the first

principle to be invisible, and from it certaininvisible creatures were produced, which they

used to call evil by nature: and so among the

angels themselves, some were naturally good

(as pertaining to the good creation of the good

God), who could not sin; and others naturally

evil, whom we call demons, who could not but sin, contrary to what is said in Job (4:18): Be-hold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness.

They likewise also went astray where the souls

of men were concerned, saying that some wereof the good creation, which they make naturally

good, but some of the evil creation, which they

make naturally evil, contrary to what is said in

Ecclesiasticus (7:29): Only this I have found,that God made man right, and he hath entang-led himself with an infinity of questions . And so

in order to exclude this, he says: But the Devil ,

meaning (their head and) principal, and the

other demons were created by God good in

nature, but became evil by their own doing ,

meaning by their own free will: But man

sinned at the prompting of the Devil , that is,not naturally, but by his own will.

Notice that St. Thomas takes the word simul with the verb condidit rather than as modi-fying the phrase ab initio temporis, leading some commentators (for whom, see the texts

following) to question whether he understood the Decree to be asserting the simultaneous

creation of the spiritual and corporeal creatures, a matter I discuss at length below. I havefollowed the Angelic Doctor in this point.

§

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4. Excursus on St. Thomas’ commentary by William A. Wallace, O.P.

Cf. William A. Wallace, “Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact,”The Thomist , 38 (1974), 485-523 (excerpt), pp. 511-522:

…Why Aquinas chose not to make explicit use of the Fourth Lateran in the texts cited

[in the foregoing discussion of the question of the eternity of the world] is a problem in

its own right that is best left to historians of medieval theological methodology. In any

event, the decrees of the Fourth Lateran were not unknown to him, and in fact were probably the single most important factor shaping his foregoing interpretations of Church

teaching on creation. Evidence in support of this thesis may be marshalled from a brief analysis of a work recently issued in critical edition by the Leonine Commission, namely, St.

Thomas’s Commentary on the First Decretal of Gregory IX.45 This decretal contains the

decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran, itself directed against the heretical teachings of the

Albigensians and the Cathari. Aquinas composed the commentary probably at the instigation

of Giffredus of Anagni, who was socius of the provost of Saint-Omer, Adenulf of Anagni, at

whose request, in turn, Reginald of Piperno published St. Thomas’s lectures on St. John’s

Gospel. Giffredus was archdeacon of Todi from 1260 onwards; as Adenulf’s socius he was

probably present with him in the curia of Urban IV, then residing at Orvieto. It is known that

from 1261 to 1265 Aquinas, being on particularly friendly terms with Urban, was in

residence at the curia during academic terms, and it is probable that Giffredus attended hislectures while there.46 The time of composition is not certain,

45 Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum, in OperaOmnia, Tomus XL (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), pp. E1-E50.46 For details on Giffredus, see A. Dondaine and J. Peters, “Jacques de Tonengo et Giffredus

d’Anagni auditeurs de S. Thomas,” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 29 (1959), pp. 52-72.

page 511

although it seems that Aquinas wrote the commentary for Giffredus when he returned to

Rome to set up the Studium at Santa Sabina from 1265 to 1267, at which time he also began

his masterwork, the Summa Theologiae.

Two decrees are commented on by Aquinas, the first Firmiter as already noted, and the

second Damnamus, which refutes and condemns the libellus of Joachim of Flora directed

against the Trinitarian doctrine of Peter Lombard. Aquinas treats the two quite dif ferently,glossing over the second in summary fashion but analyzing the first precisely and complete-

ly, explaining it lemma by lemma with great care, and using all of the resources of the theo-

logian in so doing. It is difficult to know what historical documents were available to him for

this purpose, for these are not clearly indicated in the commentary, but some reconstruction

will be attempted in what follows. The Leonine editors cite only the commentary of Henry

of Susa (Hostiensis) on the first decretal, to which portions of Aquinas’s exposition bear

some resemblance and which they feel he may have used in preparing it.47

The portion of the text of Firmiter that bears on the problem of creation in time is thefollowing:

Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus . . . , unum uni-

versorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporal-

ium: qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit crea-turam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam; ac deinde humanam,

quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo

quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. . . .48

9



47 Opera Omnia, Tome XL, p. E6. See Henricus de Segusio, In primum decretalium librumcommentaria (Venice: Apud luntas, 1581). A summary description of this work is given by

Pierre Michaud-Quantin, “Commentaires sur les deux premières décrétales du recueil de

Grégoire IX au treizième siècle,” Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ed. Paul Wilpert. Miscel-

lanea Mediaevalia 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1963), pp. 103-109.48 Denzinger-Schönmetzer (hereafter abbreviated DS), 800.

page 512

Each of the phrases or lemmas after the ellipsis, beginning with “unum universorumprincipium,” is the subject of comment by Aquinas and worthy of note for the conciliar

hermeneutics it embodies. Before translating these portions, however, it may be mentioned

that Henry of Susa is extremely brief when commenting on the above passage. At the phrase,

“unum universorum principium,” he merely notes that this is directed against the “Marchion-

istae,” who hold for two principles, one good and one evil. From this he jumps to the phrase,

“simul ab initio,” where he writes, somewhat cryptically, that “the Church which will endure

to eternity, created all things simul, wherefore in the beginning God created heaven and

earth.” He then goes on to note that God’s creation “cannot be said to be simul ” and sum-

marily explains the creation of angels and men: “but he first created angels, and on the sixthday created men, quasi communem, i.e., as an intermediate between the angelic and the

earthly. . . ,”49 As opposed to this brief exposition, Aquinas’s commentary is lengthy and

proceeds articulatim, reading as follows for the successive lemmas indicated in italics:

unum universorum principium

The Son is not another principle of things as if he were inferior to the Father, but both are

one principle. And what is said here of the Son is to be understood of the Holy Spirit

also.50

Instead of taking this phrase as part of the exposition relating to God the Creator, as Henry

had done, Aquinas annexes it to the preceding portion of the decree treating of Trinitarian

doctrine and sees it as directed against an Arian teaching to the

49

Ed. cit., fol. 5v. The text reads as follows: [Universorum.] Contra Marchionistas, quiasserunt duo principia bonum et malum . . . [Simul ab initio] Inde ecclesia, qui manet in

aeternum, creavit omnia simul, unde in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, [simul] et

tamen simul dici non potest. [Humanam] Sed primo creavit angelos et sexto die creavithomines. [Quasi communem], i.e., mediam inter angelicam et mundanam. . . .”12

50 E34.389-393. In this method of citation the figures before the period give the page number

and those following it the line numbers in the Leonine edition.

page 513

effect that God operates through the Son as his instrument or minister. The passage is not

otherwise noteworthy, merely showing that Aquinas does not follow Henry on the inter-

pretation of this lemma, if indeed he used him as the basis for his commentary.

creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium

12To this gloss, cp. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, translated by Mary

C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee, 1949), art. 2, replies to the contrary iii:

iii Furthermore, what is intermediate must have something in common with both of the extremes. But there cannot be anything which is partly corporeal and partly spiritual . Therefore, there cannot be

any medium between soul and body. (emphasis added)

Likewise human nature cannot be such a mean.

10



Some heretics like the Manicheans posited two creators, one good who created invisible

and spiritual creatures, the other evil who they say created all visible and corporeal

things. But the Catholic faith holds that everything apart from God, both visible and in-

visible, has been created by God. Whence Paul says in Acts 17:24, “ God, who made the

world and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, etc.” and Hebrews 11:3,

“By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God, that from

invisible things visible things might be made.”51

The reference here to “two creators” occurs also in two of Aquinas’s other writings. 52 Of

more interest is the identification of “the Manicheans,” which might be taken to mean theancient sect but more probably refers to the Neo-Manicheans against whom the decree was

directed. It is difficult to document the teachings of the latter in detail, since most of their

manuscripts were destroyed by the Inquisition. The essential elements, however, are

recorded in an anonymous Liber de duobus principiis written around the middle of the thir-teenth century, which incorporates a section “ De creatione.” 53 One of the adversaries of the

sect was the Dominican master, Moneta of Cremona, who composed a lengthy AdversusCatharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque at about the same time. The first chapter of Bk. 1 of

this treatise is devoted to a detailed

51

E34.396-407.52 In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 3, a. 6. [cf. also De Articulis Fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis, pars 1. (B.A.M.)]53 A. Dondaine, ed., Un Traité néo-manichéen du xiiie siècle, le ‘Liber de duobus principiis’ .. . (Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1939), pp. 99-109.

page 514

exposition and refutation of their teaching on the two principles.54 Both works accord with

the brief description given above by Aquinas.

qui sua omnipotenti virtute

Another error was that of those holding that God is indeed the first principle of the production of things, but that he did not create this world directly but through the

intermediary of angels. This was the error of the Menandrites, and to exclude this it adds

“qui sua omnipotenti virtute,” because, namely, it is only by the power of God that allcreatures have been produced, according to the Psalmist 8:4, “I shall see the heavens, the

works of your hands ...”55

The reference to the Menandrites Aquinas might have gleaned from the exposition of the

Decretals ascribed to Isidore; they are also discussed by Isidore in the Etymologia and by

Augustine in De haeresis.56

simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem, et corporalem, angelicam videlicet

et mundanam

Another error was that of Origen, holding that God at the beginning created only spiritual

creatures, and afterwards because certain of them had sinned he created bodies to which

he would bind their spiritual substances by some

54 Moneta Cremonensis, Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque, ed. Thomas A.

Ricchini, O. P. (Rome: Typographia Palladis, 1743), pp. 1-35. This edition contains an

account of the life and writings of Moneta, as well as histories of the Cathari and Waldenses.

11



Moneta is best known to Dominicans as the friar in whose cell at Bologna their founder St.

Dominic died in 1221. Already a master of arts at the University of Bologna, Moneta

became a Dominican in 1220 at the urging of Dominic and Reginald of Orleans. Dominic, of

course, had preached against the Albigensians, Cathari, and Waldenses in Languedoc until

1217; then, in 1220 and 1221, enlisting the help of Moneta and others, he launched a similar

mission in northern Italy. He had solicited Innocent III in 1215, precisely at the time of the

Fourth Lateran Council, for confirmation of his new Order of Preachers, for which approval

had been given the following year, on December 22, 1216.55

E34.410-418.56 See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 414.

page 515

kind of bond, as if corporeal creatures were not produced by God’s principal intention

because it was good for them to be, but only to punish the sins of spiritual creatures. For

it is said in Genesis, 1:31, “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good.”57

This passage is extremely important for Aquinas’s exegesis of the decree because of the

way in which he divides the text. Instead of commenting on the entire lemma, “simul ab

initio temporis utramque condidit creaturam,” he deletes the phrase “ab initio tempor-

is“ so that the “simul” need not take on a strict temporal sense but instead is made to

modify the verb “condidit.” Possibly Aquinas here had his eye on the Greek text of the Septuagint, which translates the “simul” of Ecclesiastes 18:1, “Creavit omnia simul,”

with the word “koinē,” thereby permitting a translation such as, “He created all things

equally.” This procedure allows Aquinas to avoid some of the difficulties regarding the

teachings of the Fathers on the simultaneous creation of the spiritual and corporeal

orders, on which there was far from unanimous teaching.58 The exegesis given above, of

course, still permits a temporal interpretation but does not highlight this as strongly as the

text on which Aquinas is commenting with its immediate juxtaposition of “simul” and “ab

initio temporis.”

ab initio temporis

Another error was that of Aristotle, holding that all things were indeed produced by God but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time. But it is written in Genesis

1:1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”59

Here we are back to the key text and the Biblical support used so frequently by Aquinas.

What is most noteworthy is the explicit

57 E34.419-E35.428.58 For some details, see my introduction, notes, and appendices to Vol. 10, Cosmogony, of

the new English translation of St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae (New York: McGraw-Hill

Book Co., 1967).59 E35.432-436,

page 516

identification of Aristotle as the adversary behind the decree. Over a century earlier Peter

Lombard had called attention to this “error” in distinction 1 of the second book of his

Sentences, and already in his commentary on this work Aquinas had identified the opinion as

“heretical.”60 The question that naturally suggests itself is whether Aristotle’s teachings were

being actively proposed by the Albigensians and the Cathari, and thus should be considered

the object of ecclesiastical condemnation. Dondaine’s study of the Liber de duobus principiis provides some evidence of Aristotelian influence in Neo-Manichean doctrines,61

12



but these are scant compared to Moneta of Cremona’s Adversus Cartharos et Valdenses. In

chapter 11 of book 5, entitled “De novitate mundi et de rationibus quibus philosophi probant

mundum esse aeternum” and running to 34 folio pages in the edition of 1743, Moneta

reveals the extent to which his adversaries were indebted to Aristotle and his various Arab

commentators.62 Thus it is not unlikely that this teaching had been taken up by those against

whom the decree was directed and hence was the object of its censure.

de nihilo

Another error was that of Anaxagoras who held that God made the world from some

beginning in time, but that the matter of the world preexisted eternally and was not made by God. But the Apostle, [speaking of God,] states in Romans 4:17, “Who calls those

things that are not, just as those that are.”63

The reference to Anaxagoras here is similar to that to Aristotle in the previous comment andis supported by other identifications in Aquinas’s works, where he traces the teaching on the

eternity of matter back to this Greek philosopher.64 Again there

60 In II Sent, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.61 Ed. cit., pp. 18, 50, 141.62

Ed. cit., pp. 477-501.63 E35.437-443.64 In II Sent., d. 1, q. I, a. 1; In VIII Physicorum, lect. 1, n. 5.

page 517

seems little doubt that this was an Albigensian or Neo-Manichean teaching, for the Liber deduobus principiis teaches that creation does not take place “ex nihilo,” but rather consists in

a type of making (factio) from something as from a pre-existing matter.65 Moneta touches on

much the same material without addressing the speculative issue explicitly but concentrating

on arguments to show that God actually did create the visible, corporeal, and material things

of this world.66

deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam

There was another error of Tertullian teaching that the soul of man is corporeal, but the

Apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, “Let your whole spirit and mind and body serve,”and here he manifestly distinguishes soul and spirit from the body. To exclude this [error]

the decree adds, “then” God created a nature that was “human, as constituted of both

spirit and body”: for man is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.67

Aquinas’s source for Tertullian’s teaching is probably Isidore’s Etymologia and the

comments attributed to him on the Decretals.68 As Moneta shows in detail, the “heretics“ of

his time had developed an elaborate doctrine proposing a traducianist explanation of the

origin of the human soul along lines similar to that taught by Tertullian. 69 Thus Aquinas is

probably correct in also seeing this ancient error, revived in the century previous to hiswriting, as a target of the decree.

diabolus autem et alii daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali

According to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans

13



65 Ed. cit., p. 103; the title of the relevant section reads: “Quod creare et facere sit ex aliquo

tanquam ex preiacenti materia.”66 Ed. cit., Bk. 1, cc. 6, 8 & 9, pp. 69-104.67 E35.444-453.68 See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 444.69 Ed. cit., Bk. 2, ch. 4, pp. 129-138.

page 518

holding for two principles, one good and one bad, not only was a distinction made withrespect to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, namely, that the invisible were

from the good God, the visible from the bad, but also with respect to invisible things

themselves. For they taught that the first principle was invisible and that certain invisible

creatures were produced by it which they said were naturally bad; and so among angels

there were certain who were naturally good pertaining to the good creation of the good

God, who could not sin, and certain others who were naturally bad—whom we call

demons— who could not not sin. This is contrary to what is said in Job 4:18, “Behold

those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness.” 70

With this Aquinas rejoins the Neo-Manichean doctrine with which he started this portion of

the commentary. The teaching on the angels, of course, was a major issue with the Albigen-

sians, and a considerable portion of the Liber de duobus principiis is devoted to this type of teaching.71 Similarly, this is a substantial matter for Moneta, who devotes chapters 4 through7 of his first book to a refutation of the errors it contains.72

The foregoing analysis, while far from complete, should serve to indicate Aquinas’s general

competence as a conciliar exegete and to fill in some of the authoritative sources on which

he probably relied, but which he does not mention, in his various systematic treatments of

creation in time. In presenting the text translated and annotated above the Leonine editors

remark that the literary genre of the work is that of a summary exposition intended for

private use and not a technical work intended for publication.73 Even in spite of this circum-

stance, however, it is still possible to reconstruct some of the apparatus known in a general

way to Aquinas and hence providing the documentary

70 E35.454-470.71 Ed. cit., pp. 82-98.72 Ed. cit., pp. 44-80.73 p. E6.

page 519

background for his commentary. When all this is taken into account it appears that, with one

or two exceptions, his statement of the “Catholic faith” is quite consonant with the positive

teaching and the censures of the Fourth Lateran Council.74

Before returning to recent theologies of creation and their relation to problems raised

by modern science, it may prove worthwhile to pursue briefly the question whether

Aquinas had a true sensus ecclesiae and whether his reading of the Fourth Lateran stillaccords with Church teaching as developed since his time. The principal addition to that

teaching came in the second half of the nineteenth century, when atheistic, materialistic, and

pantheistic teachings were being propagated throughout Europe. The First Vatican Council,

in its constitution Dei Filius, at that time reasserted the doctrine on creation defined by the

Fourth Lateran.75 The major part of the decree bearing on this subject is actually a verbatim

repetition of the text from the Fourth Lateran beginning with the words “simul ab initio tem-

poris“ and concluding with “ex spiritu et corpore constitutam.” The Vatican decree did,

however, amplify the doctrine somewhat, for it added that the world was created by

14



“God alone” (hic solus verus Deus), thereby excluding angels or devils acting as God’s

instruments in the creative act, and that God in so creating acted of his own free will

(liberrimo consilio).76 It also appended five canons condemning specific departures from the

Catholic faith, including materialism, which would assert that nothing exists apart from

matter 77; pantheism, which would identify the substance or essence of all things with God, 78

or would hold that such things emanated from the

74 The exceptions would be the assertions regarding motion, which are made in the context of

Aristotelian physics and thus are quite remote from the matters taught by the Fourth Lateran.75 DS 3002.76 Ibid.; note that these additions incorporate the teachings of St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I,q. 45, a. 5 and q. 46, a. 2, into the statement of the Fourth Lateran.77 DS 3022.78 DS 3023.

page 520

divine substance or are its manifestation in an evolutionary process, etc.79; or some combin-

ation of the two that would deny that the world and all it contains, in both the spiritual andmaterial orders, was produced by God from nothing “according to its entire substance.” 80

The final canon further condemned the teachings of Georg Hermes and Anton Günther,

asserting explicitly that creation was not necessitated in any way but was a completelyvoluntary act of God ordered to the manifestation of his own glory.81

An interesting question arises as to whether, in reasserting the “simul ab initio tem-

poris“ phrase of the Fourth Lateran, the Fathers of the First Vatican Council intended

to make any further precisions in this teaching. Among the documents of the Council is a

disputation by the future cardinal, J. B. Franzelin, S.J., delivered before twenty-four deputed

conciliar fathers and bearing on the schema from which the definition was finally made. 82

There were four different versions of the constitution Dei Filius, but each contained this very

same expression.83 Franzelin pointed out to the conciliar fathers that it was not

completely certain that the word simul in the Lateran decree was meant to define the

temporal simultaneity of the creation of the material and angelic orders. In sub-

stantiation of this he called attention to Aquinas’s commentary on the Decretals and theway in which his exegesis of the text permitted a reading of simul in the sense of the

Greek koinē to mean that all creation proceeded equally from a single divine plan.

Arguing from this and similar documents, most theologians

79 DS 3024.80 DS 3025; the Latin text reads “secundum totam suam substantiam,” which echoes

Aquinas’s teaching in the Commentary on the Physics, Bk. 8, lect. 2, cited supra, p.81 Ibid., cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 44, a. 4.82 Document 554; see J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 53

vols. in 60 (Paris: 1889-1927), Vol. 50, p. 337, n. 6.83 These are given in an appendix to Jean-Michel-Alfred Vacant, Études théologiques sur les

constitutions du Concile du Vatican d’après les actes du concile, 2 Vols. (Paris: Delhommeet Briguet, 1895), Vol. 1, pp. 686-687; see also pp. 690-693.

page 521

hold that Vatican I did not intend to go beyond the Fourth Lateran in making more

precise the time at which angels and the material universe were created. They did in-

tend to affirm, however, that such creation took place broadly at the beginning of time

and that man was not created until some later period .84 From this it should be apparent

that Aquinas’s exegesis of the decree Firmiter is not only consonant with the

15



constitution Dei Filius but was possibly influential in the way in which the latter was

formulated and hence can throw light on how it is to be understood. Moreover, that the

teaching of the Catholic Church on creation in time has not changed since Vatican I is clear

from the encyclical letter Humani Generis, which lists the denial of the world’s having had a

beginning (mundum initium habuisse) among theses contradictory to the decrees of the First

Vatican Council.85 Finally, in the preparatory schema for a dogmatic constitution of Vatican

II to be entitled De deposito fidei pure custodiendo, it was proposed to devote chapter 8 to

the creation and evolution of the world and therein to assert again and explain more fully the

world’s creation at the beginning of time.86

Because of the decision to concentrate on pas-toral rather than dogmatic matters, however, this schema was never adopted and thus did not

become part of the Second Vatican’s decrees.

<…>

84 E. g., Vacant, op. cit., pp. 221-227; see also the article on the angels by the same author inthe Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant et al., 15 vols. (Paris: 1903-1950),

Vol. 2, cols. 1267-1272.85 DS 3890.86 Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus.Series prima, cap. 3, n. 12. Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum Secundum

(Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis, 1962), p. 33. (emphasis added)

§

16



5. Comments on the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) taken from the

exposition of St. Thomas Aquinas.13

Cf. William A. Wallace, “Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact,”The Thomist , 38 (1974), 485-523; excerpted from pp. 513-519:

Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus . . . , unum uni-

versorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporal-

ium: qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit crea-

turam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam; ac deinde humanam,

quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo

quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. . . .48

48 Denzinger-Schönmetzer (hereafter abbreviated DS), 800.

unum universorum principium

The Son is not another principle of things as if he were inferior to the Father, but both areone principle. And what is said here of the Son is to be understood of the Holy Spirit

also.50

50 E34.389-393. In this method of citation the figures before the period give the page number

and those following it the line numbers in the Leonine edition.

creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium

Some heretics like the Manicheans posited two creators, one good who created invisible

and spiritual creatures, the other evil who they say created all visible and corporeal

things. But the Catholic faith holds that everything apart from God, both visible and in-

visible, has been created by God. Whence Paul says in Acts 17:24, “ God, who made the

world and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, etc.” and Hebrews 11:3,

“By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God, that from

invisible things visible things might be made.”51

51 E34.396-407.

qui sua omnipotenti virtute

Another error was that of those holding that God is indeed the first principle of the

production of things, but that he did not create this world directly but through the inter-

mediary of angels. This was the error of the Menandrites, and to exclude this it adds “qui

sua omnipotenti virtute,” {“who by His almighty power”} because, namely, it is only by

the power of God that all creatures have been produced, according to the Psalmist 8:4, “I

shall see the heavens, the works of your hands ...”55

55 E34.410-418.

simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem, et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam

13 Cf. Expositio super primam decretalem “De fide catholica et sancta Trinitate” et super secundam “Dam-

namus autem”, 1259-1268, Leonine 40E, 1969.

17



Another error was that of Origen, holding that God at the beginning 14 created only

spiritual creatures, and afterwards because certain of them had sinned he created bodies

to which he would bind their spiritual substances by some kind of bond, as if corporeal

creatures were not produced by God’s principal intention because it was good for them to

be, but only to punish the sins of spiritual creatures. For it is said in Genesis, 1:31, “God

saw all that he had made, and it was very good.”57

ab initio temporis

Another error was that of Aristotle, holding that all things were indeed produced by God

but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time. But it is written in Genesis1:1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”59

59 E35.432-436.

de nihilo

Another error was that of Anaxagoras who held that God made the world from some

beginning in time, but that the matter of the world preexisted eternally and was not made

by God. But the Apostle, [speaking of God,] states in Romans 4:17, “Who calls those

things that are not, just as those that are.”63

63 E35.437-443.

deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam

There was another error of Tertullian teaching that the soul of man is corporeal, but the

Apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, “Let your whole spirit and mind and body serve,”

and here he manifestly distinguishes soul and spirit from the body. To exclude this [error]the decree adds, “then” God created a nature that was “human, as constituted of both

spirit and body”: for man is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.67

67

E35.444-453.

diabolus autem et alii daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali

According to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans holding for two principles, one

good and one bad, not only was a distinction made with respect to the creation of visible

and invisible creatures, namely, that the invisible were from the good God, the visible

from the bad, but also with respect to invisible things themselves. For they taught that the

first principle was invisible and that certain invisible creatures were produced by it which

they said were naturally bad; and so among angels there were certain who were naturally

good pertaining to the good creation of the good God, who could not sin, and certain

others who were naturally bad—whom we call demons—who could not not sin. This iscontrary to what is said in Job 4:18, “Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and

in his angels he found wickedness.” 70

70 E35.454-470.

14 a principio, literally, “from the beginning”, sc. “of time”, as the next lemma indicates, and so which is

noncommittal with respect to the simultaneity or otherwise of the creation of the two orders.

18



6. On the three orders of creature God created in the beginning.

Cf. the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) (= Canon 1; Denzinger-

Schönmetzer, 800) (tr. B.A.M.):

Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur,quod unus solus est verus Deus,

…unum universorum principium; creator om-

nium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et

corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul15

ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit

creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicamvidelicet et mundanam,

ac deinde humanam, quasi communem exspiritu et corpore constitutam.

We firmly believe, and simply confess, thatthere is only one true God,

…one principle of all things; creator of all

things visible and invisible, spiritual and cor-

poreal; who, by His almighty power, establi-

shed together out of nothing from the begin-

ning of time both orders of creature, the spiritual

and the corporeal, the angelic, namely, and the

mundane,

and then the human, consitituted as it were in

common (with both)16 from spirit and body.

7. Anatomy of the argument.

By His almighty power the one true God from the beginning of time established together

out of nothing

1. the spiritual (order of) creature, and

2. the corporeal

that is

(a) the angelic and

(b) the mundane (both being sorts of nature, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains in hiscommentary)

and then

3. the human,

constituted, as it were in common (with both [of the foregoing natures]),

from spirit and body.17

And so, in addition to the angelic and mundane natures, there is

(c) a nature in part angelic and in part mundane.

15 I address the meaning of simul below.16 Sc. of the foregoing natures. As noted above, I take the “common” here to regard both the angelic and the

mundane natures.17 The “as it were” indicating that the nature called ‘human’ is not constituted from an angel and a body as its

composing parts, but rather shares in the natures of the spiritual and corporeal orders of creature.

19



In sum, it is the teaching of the Decree that from the beginning of time God established to-

gether out of nothing

1. the spiritual creature, understood as possessing the nature called ‘angelic’, and

2. the corporeal, the nature of which is ‘mundane’ or ‘this worldly’,

and then

3. the creature in part spiritual and in part corporeal —that is say, the order of creaturehaving something in common with the angelic or ‘other-worldly’ nature, as well as

the mundane or ‘this-worldly’, which is the creature man.

In this regard, compare the following:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 50, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English DominicanFathers):

Post haec considerandum est de distinctione

corporalis et spiritualis creaturae. Et primo, de

creatura pure spirituali, quae in Scriptura sacra

Angelus nominatur; secundo, de creatura pure

corporali; tertio, de creatura composita ex cor-

porali et spirituali, quae est homo.

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal

and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely

spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is

called angel; secondly, the creature wholly

corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature,

corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

That is to say, after the foregoing matters have been treated, the distinction between the

corporeal and the spiritual creature is to be considered. And first , (a consideration is to be

made) about the purely spiritual creature, angel ; second , about the purely corporeal crea-ture (left unnamed here, but which is properly called body), and third , about the creature

composed of the corporeal and the spiritual (which is to say, having a composite nature),

which is man.

Cf. ibid., Ia, q. 75, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis etcorporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex

spirituali et corporali substantia componitur.

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man,

who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal

substance.

That is to say, after the consideration of the spiritual and the corporeal creature, the next

subject to be considered is man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance.

•The three orders of creature in sum, then, are the spiritual ( angel ), the corporeal(body), and the thing composed, in a manner of speaking, of both (man).

• Their three natures in sum: the angelic, the mundane, the human.

• Their order of creation: the spiritual and the corporeal established together at thebeginning of time, and then the creature partaking of both orders, and hence, so tospeak, common.

§

20



8. Texts where simul is translated.

Cf. F.J. Sheed, Theology and Sanity (New York, 1947; 5th impression 1951), Ch. XI, The

Created Universe:

The Church has amplified this. The Fourth Council of the Lateran defined that God

…by His almighty power created [out of nothing] together18 in the beginning of time

both creatures, the Spiritual and the Corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly,

and afterwards [deinde] the human, as it were a common creature, composed of spirit and

body.

Cf. J.F. Clarkson et al. eds., The Church Teaches (St. Louis: Herder, 1955), p. 146:

…who, by his almighty power, from the very beginning of time simultaneously created

out of nothing both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, that is, the angelic and the

mundane. And afterwards he formed the creature man, who in a way belongs to both orders,

as he is composed of spirit and body.

Cf. Josef Neuner, S.J. and Jacques Dupuis, S.J., eds., The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church (New York , 1982) (= CCC, n. 327):

…who by His almighty power from the beginning of time made at once (simul ) out

of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic

and the earthly, and then (deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders,

being composed of spirit and body.

Cf. The First Vatican Council (1870). Dogmatic Constitution “Dei Filius” on the Catholic Faith, Ch. 1. Translation taken from Norman P., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Vol.1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V (2 vols. London, 1990), I:

Chap. I. of God, Creator of All Things

<…>

This only true God by His goodness and “omnipotent power”, not to increase his own

happiness, and not to add to, but to show forth His perfection by the blessings which He

bestows on creatures, with most free choice, “immediately19 from the beginning of time

made each creature out of nothing, spiritual and bodily, namely angelic and worldly,

and then the human, common as it were, composed of both spirit and body” [LateranCouncil IV, can. 2 and 5]

Cf. Pascal P. Parente, “The Angels: Morning Stars of Creation”, being Chapter 1 of his book The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Rockford, IL, 1994):20

18 Note that translating simul by ‘together’ neither commits one to the simultaneity of their creation nor

precludes it, thereby making it a most suitable choice.19 Note that if the word is so translated, it could be taken to mean “without the mediation”, sc. of any

creature.20 (http://www.ewtn.com/library/mary/angel1.htm [3/17/11])

21



(God) “by his almighty power created together in the beginning of time both creatures, the

spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly , and afterwards the human,as it were an intermediate creature, composed of body and spirit .”

9. Texts where simul is not translated.

Cf. H.J. Schroeder, Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary, (St. Louis, 1937):

…who from the beginning of time and by His omnipotent power made from nothing

creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic, namely, and mundane, and then human,

as it were, common, composed of spirit and body.

Cf. Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Vol. 1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V

(London/Washington, D.C., 1990):

…who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both

spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created

human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common.

§

22



10. Towards a defensible interpretation of simul .

For the commonly accepted view, cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, “The Angels: Morning Stars of

Creation”, being Chapter 1 of his book The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition(Rockford, IL, 1994):

Pure spirits, the closest image and likeness of the Creator, were the effect of a divine act of creation. A spirit world was produced, at once, in its fullness and in its grandeur. When,

at the word of the Almighty, light’s first rays lit up the primeval, shapeless world, still

“wrapped in a mist as in swaddling clothes,” a wondrous song, a joyful melody filled the

new heavens with never-ending strains. The Lord recalls these primordial times when He

asks: “Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? . . . When the morning stars

praised me together, and all the sons of God made joyful melody.”[1] These “sons of God,”

living witnesses of the creation of the material universe, were our Angels, the morning stars

of creation. It is an article of faith, firmly established in Scripture and Tradition, and clearly

expressed in Christian Doctrine from the beginning, that this spirit world, our Angels, began

with time and was created by God. This traditional belief of both the Old and the New

Testament was given a more formal and solemn expression in the fourth Lateran

Council in 1215: (God) “by his almighty power created together in the beginning of time

both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly, and

afterwards the human, as it were an intermediate creature, composed of body and

spirit .”[2] From this definition we learn that the Angelic spirits were created when time

began and not from eternity. Like all other creatures they were produced by the almighty

power of God, out of nothing.

<…>

The wording of the definition by the Lateran Council, reported before, which seems to

be opposed to the opinion of priority of creation of the Angels, creates no difficulty

whatever. It is said there that God “created together (simul ) in the beginning of time

both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly.” It

is commonly admitted that the word “together” (simul ) in this case has not the meaning

of parity of time or simultaneousness, but parity of action. The expression was takenfrom Scripture where it is said: “He that liveth forever created all things together,”[12]

meaning not that all things were created at the same time, but that all things were likewise

created with no indication of time. Saint Thomas points out that this definition of the

Lateran Council was aimed at a Manichaean heresy of emanation. 21 It did not bear on

the time of creation of the Angels but on the fact that they were produced by the act of

creation, just like the corporeal, earthly creatures.[13]

ENDNOTES

1. Job 38:4, 7. As a matter of fact, the Greek version of the Septuagint of the book of Job,which is a rendition of the accepted sense rather than of the letter of the text, translates “sons

of God” of our Vulgate as “Angels,” and the same verse reads as follows: “When the starswere made, all my angels praised me with a great voice.”

2. D. 428. A similar definition was given in the Vatican Council in 1869, D. 1782, 1801.

<…>

12. Ecclus. 18:1.

13. Opusculum XXIII. (emphasis added)

21 On the contrary, as we have seen, the Manichean heresy St. Thomas references held that there were two

independent creators, one good, one evil, a doctrine which has nothing to do with emanationism.

23



For an expression of the same view by an older theologian, cf. A Manual of Catholic Theo-logy: Based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik”, Volume 1 By Matthias Joseph Scheeben, JosephWilhelm, Thomas Bartholomew Scannell (London, 1903), Book 3, sec. 118:

V- The Fourth Lateran and the Vatican Councils have defined that Angels were not created

from all eternity, but that they had a beginning. “God ... at the very beginning of time made

out of nothing both kinds of creatures, spiritual and corporal, angelic and mundane” (sess.

iii., c. 1). That the creation of the Angels was contemporaneous with the creation of the

world, is not defined so clearly, and, therefore, is not a matter of Faith. The words“simul ab initio temporis,” according to St. Thomas (Opusc. xxiii.), admit of another

interpretation, and the definition of the Lateran Council was directed against errors

not bearing directly on the time of the creation of the Angels. The probabilities, however,

point in the direction of a simultaneous creation: the universe being the realization of one

vast plan for the glory of God, it might be expected that all its parts were created together.

(emphasis added)

Cf. also F. H. Reusch, Nature and the Bible: Lectures on the Mosaic History of Creation(Edinburgh, 1886), Ch. VII, pp. 108-109:

Again, appeal has been made in this controversy to a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council in

the year 1215. But this decree was not intended to define the meaning of Gen. L 1. In it God

is described as “the One Principle of all things, the Creator of all invisible and visible,

spiritual and corporeal beings, Who by His almighty power has in the beginning of

time brought forth both creations from nothing, the spiritual and corporeal, the angelic

and the earthly, and then the human,” etc. 1 This declaration was directed principally

against the heresy of the Kathari and Waldenses, who held that the visible world was not

created by God, but traced its origin to a second, essentially evil Principle.2 Against this error

the Church urges the revealed doctrine that God is the One Principle of all things, and has

created the material as well as the spiritual world. There was no occasion for declaring that

this revealed doctrine is “plainly taught” or “purposely hinted at” in the first verse of Gene-

sis; or that the spiritual world was meant by the word “heaven” in this verse; and I can see no

justification for finding this in the Decree of the Council.3

1 [omitted]

2 [omitted]

3The Council did not even assert the simultaneous creation of the angels and of

matter; and therefore did not reject the opinion held by [108-109] many of the

Fathers, and especially by most of the Greek Fathers, that the angels were created a

long time before the material world. Klee, Dogmatik, ii. p. 220. Michelis, Entwie-

klung, etc., p. 10. The simul in the Lateran Decree no doubt comes from the phrase,

Sir. xviii. 1: Qui manet in aeternum, creavit omnia simul, i.e. The Eternal created all

things at once, all things without exception, e)/ktioj ta\ pa/ntaj koinh=.

(emphasis added)

For the text of Sirach, cf. Louis Lavalle, “Augustine and Orthodoxy in the Creation Day

Debate” (The Presbyterian Witness. Fall, 1998), p. 3:

Although we do not share Augustine’s view of the Apocrypha, his rationale from Sirach 18:1

disappears if one examines the original Greek on which the Old Latin was based. The Old

Latin reads, according to Taylor, the translator of Augustine’s commentary, “He who

lives forever created all things together,”11 or “at the same time,” from the Latin simul ,

from which we get simultaneous.

24



The original Greek reads, “He who lives forever created all things in common,” from

the Greek, koine, the same word used in speaking of the common or koine Greek of the

time of Christ. The RSV which included a new translation of the Apocrypha from the Greek

paraphrased this into, “created the whole universe.” There is no extant Hebrew text of Sirach

18:1.(emphasis added)

Cf. Pete Holter, “Re: Augustine and creation?”. Posted to Catholic Answers, 26 Dec.

2009:22

In his The Literal Meaning of Genesis: An Unfinished Book , 7:28, Augustine quotes from

Sirach 18:1, “He Who lives forever created all things simultaneously” (Latin: “Qui manet inaeternum creavit omnia simul ”), and this understanding of this verse becomes one of his

interpretive keys to Genesis 1. Likewise, in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 5, 3:6,

he quotes from this verse in Sirach again as he is working out the meaning of Genesis 2:4.

Cf. Louis Lavalle, “Augustine and Orthodoxy in the Creation Day Debate” (The Presby-terian Witness. Fall, 1998), pp. 2-4:

However, particularly in his earlier commentary, Augustine’s interpretation of Scripture

was influenced by Greek philosophy and science. Through both Neoplatonist philosophyand the “science” of spontaneous generation, Augustine saw three phases of creation: the“unchangeable forms in the Word of God,” “seminal [reasons]” created in the instant of

creation, and a later “springing forth” in the course of time. <...>

How did these secular beliefs affect Augustine’s view of the six creation days? In thewords of Louis Berkhof, Augustine “was evidently inclined to think God created all

things in a moment of time, and that the thought of days was simply introduced to aid

the finite intelligence.”8 Looking at Augustine’s own words, taken from his Genesis com-

mentary, we read, “In this narrative of creation Holy Scripture has said of the Creator thatHe completed His works in six days, and elsewhere, without contradicting this, it has been

written of the same Creator that He created all things together . . . Why then was there any

need for six distinct days to be set forth in the narrative one after the other? The reason isthat those who cannot understand the meaning of the text, He created all things together,cannot understand the meaning of the Scripture unless the narrative proceeds slowly step by

step . . . For this Scripture text [2-3] that narrates the works of God according to the days

mentioned above, and that Scripture text that says God created all things together, are both

true.”9

Augustine’s references to Sirach, an Apocryphal book, have been italicized for emphasis.

Sirach 18:1 was Augustine’s key verse to defend that everything recorded in Genesis 1 and 2

had been created simultaneously. It provided the Biblical support for his philosophy and

science. A Platonic god could not be involved in his creation on a day by day basis. And

spontaneous generation provided for things coming into existence after creation, but not just

in six days, since everyone knew that it was still occurring.

Augustine reasoned he was giving priority to the authority of Scripture because he accepted

the Apocrypha as Scripture. The Apocrypha was part of the Old Latin version upon whichAugustine depended, for he could not read Hebrew and was not proficient in Greek when he

wrote his commentary. This hindered his study of Scripture and limited his access to the

early Greek fathers, such as Theophilus of Antioch, who defended six-day creation.10

22(http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?p=6096831&postcount=12 [4/7/11])

25



Although we do not share Augustine’s view of the Apocrypha, his rationale from Sirach 18:1

disappears if one examines the original Greek on which the Old Latin was based. The Old

Latin reads, according to Taylor, the translator of Augustine’s commentary, “He who

lives forever created all things together,”11 or “at the same time,” from the Latin simul ,

from which we get simultaneous. The original Greek reads, “He who lives forever

created all things in common,” from the Greek, koine, the same word used in speaking

of the common or koine Greek of the time of Christ. The RSV which included a new

translation of the Apocrypha from the Greek paraphrased this into, “created the whole

universe.” There is no extant Hebrew text of Sirach 18:1.

Since Jerome did not accept the Apocryphal books as canonical, he never retranslatedSirach. The Roman Catholic church, which kept the Apocrypha in the Bible, incorporated

the Old Latin text of Sirach into the Vulgate. [See Figure 1.] Perhaps due to his corres-

pondence with Jerome and his study of Greek, Augustine appears to have moderated his

position in The City of God . <…> Sirach 18:1, the key verse in his commentary, was never mentioned in his lengthy discussion of creation in The City of God . [3-4]

Figure 1

Sirach 18:1, Augustine’s Key Verse in his Commentary

OL & VG Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul.

tr. he who lives forever created all things simultaneously.

LXX Ho zon eis ton aiona ektisen ta panta koinei

tr. He who lives forever created all things in common.

There is no extant Hebrew text.

Key: OL-Old Latin; VG-Vulgate; LXX-Septuagint; tr.-author’s translation.

8

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977(1938), 127.9 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 4.33-34, 52-53.10 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 271. See

Theophilus, To Autolycus, 2.4, 10, 15, Oxford Early Christian Texts, and author’s “The

Early Church Defended Creation Science,” Impact No. 160, Institute for Creation Research,

October 1986.11 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 254. (emphasis

added)

In addition to the foregoing, cf. John B. Jordan, “Stanley Jaki on Genesis 1,” Biblical Chronology, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1998:

In his third lecture, Jaki surveys the interpretations offered by the early Church writers. Hissurvey is interesting. It shows that the early Church firmly believed in a literal six-day

creation week, though many preached the passage typologically and/or allegorically. Some,such as Basil, tried to reconcile the passage with the scientific-philosophical thinking of their

day, but never denied its historicity. Augustine was an exception. He held that the work of

the week of creation took place instantaneously, because of a verse in the apocrypha that he

took to mean that. The cosmogony in Genesis 1, however, he took quite literally, and ex-

pounded at length on what it meant as regards the actual arrangement of the universe. All

this Jaki finds regrettable.

26



(The Wisdom of Ben Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus, says in 18:1, “He who lives forever created

the universe.” In the Latin version that Augustine used, however, this statement was mis-

translated as “He who lives forever created all things simultaneously.”)23

Suggesting a very different interpretation is the following: cf. the Catechism of the Cath-olic Church. Part One. The Profession of Faith. Section Two. The Profession of the Chris-

tian Faith. Chapter One. I Believe in God the Father, nn. 325-327:

Article I

“I Believe In God The Father Almighty, Creator Of Heaven And Earth”

Paragraph 5. Heaven and Earth

325 The Apostles’ Creed professes that God is “creator of heaven and earth”. The Nicene

Creed makes it explicit that this profession includes “all that is, seen and unseen”.

326 The Scriptural expression “heaven and earth” means all that exists, creation in its

entirety. It also indicates the bond, deep within creation, that both unites heaven and earthand distinguishes the one from the other: “the earth” is the world of men, while “heaven” or

“the heavens” can designate both the firmament and God’s own “place” – “our Father in

heaven” and consequently the “heaven” too which is eschatological glory. Finally, “heaven”refers to the saints and the “place” of the spiritual creatures, the angels, who surround God.186

327 The profession of faith of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) affirms that God

“from the beginning of time made at once (simul ) out of nothing both orders of cre-

atures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then

(deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders, being composed of

spirit and body.”187

186 Ps 115:16; 19:2; Mt 5:16.

187 Lateran Council IV (1215): DS 800; cf. DS 3002 and Paul VI, CPG § 8. (emphasis added)

Note that, however one translate simul , it must be taken in opposition to ac deinde; but thelatter, meaning “and then”, is a temporal expression, determining the former also to have atemporal meaning, in which case it could not express merely the note of “parity of action”,

as Parente supposed above. Again, whereas the text of the Decree makes explicit that thehuman came after the other natures, no such before and after is marked out with respect tothe preceeding two, leading one to suspect that no mention is made of such an order in

their case because there was none. Again, one may also argue that, just as the natures

belonging to the two orders are found together in man, so they were created together byGod at the beginning of time. Again, St. Thomas’ interpretation of certain lemmas of the

Decree tends in that direction, as, for instance, the overthrow of Origen’s position takes

away a reason for supposing the bodily nature to have been created at an indefinite time

after the spiritual. Finally, additional reasons for understanding simul to mean “at the sametime” are to be found in the following texts of the Angelic Doctor:

23One should note here that St. Augustine’s concern is not with the question of the simultaneity of the

creation of the sprititual and the corporeal orders of creature in precision from every other creation, but with

the larger question of whether or not the work represented as taking place over the Six Days was actually

accomplished in one, in which case the two orders would indeed have been created at once.

27



11. St. Thomas Aquinas on whether all things were created at the same time.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12. In Thomas Aquinas,Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny

(London, 1998), art. 2-3:

Article 2: Are all things created simultaneously, distinct in their species?

It seems that they are.

1. It is said in Sirach 18:1, ‘He who lives for ever created all things together.’

2. Moreover, there is more distance between the spiritual and corporeal creature than

between two corporeal creatures. But spiritual and corporeal things are held to have been

made at the same time. Therefore much more so must all corporeal things.

3. Moreover, as is said in Deuteronomy 32:4, ‘The works of God are perfect,’ nor can any

reason be given why their perfection should be deferred in time, something a creature cannot

achieve by itself nor from any one other than God. Therefore since species are distinguished

by their specific perfections, it seems that from the beginning all things are created distinct

in species.

4. Moreover, the work of creation manifests the divine power. But the power of an agent

shows less when its effect is completed successively than when it is produced immediately

in its perfection. Therefore it seems that all things are distinct from the beginning.

5. Moreover, it is clear that God produced the whole work of one day in one moment.

Therefore it seems ridiculous to say that he stopped acting for a whole day until the

beginning of the next, as if he were exhausted. Therefore it seems that creatures are not

distinguished by the succession of days, but from the beginning of creation.

6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially

dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without

the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth andafterwards the stars were made.

ON THE CONTRARY:

Augustine says that the authority of Scripture at the beginning of Genesis is greater than the

most perspicacious human genius. But there it is written that different creatures came to be

over the course of six days. Therefore it seems necessary to maintain this. Moreover, nature

imitates the activity of the creator, but in natural activity there is a process from the

imper-fect to the perfect. Therefore it seems that this should be so also in the work of

creation. Therefore it seems that all things are not distinct from the very beginning of

creation.

RESPONSE:

It should be said that what pertains to faith is distinguished in two ways, for some are as

such of the substance of faith, such that God is three and one, and the like, about which

no one may licitly think otherwise. Hence the Apostle in Galatians 1:8, ‘But even if we or

an angel from heaven should preach a gospel to you other than that which we have preached

to you, let him be anathema!’

28



Other things are only incidental to faith insofar as they are treated in Scripture, which

faith holds to be promulgated under the dictation of the Holy Spirit, but which can be

ignored by those who are not held to know scripture, such as many of the historical works.

On such matters even the saints disagree, explaining scripture in different ways. Thus with

respect to the beginning of the world something pertains to the substance of faith, namely

that the world began to be by creation, and all the saints agree in this. But how and in what

order this was done pertains to faith only incidentally insofar as it is treated in scripture, the

truth of which the saints save in the different explanations they offer. For Augustine holds

that at the very beginning of creation there were some things specifically distinct in their proper nature, such as the elements, celestial bodies and spiritual substances, but others

existed in seminal notions alone, such as animals, plants and men, all of which were

produced in their proper nature in that work that God governs after it was constituted in

the work of the six days. Of this work we read in John 5:17, ‘My Father works even

until now, and I work.’ With respect to the distinction of things we ought to attend to

the order of nature and doctrine, not to the order of time.

As to nature, just as sound precedes song in nature, though not in time, so things which are

naturally prior are mentioned first, as earth before animals, and water before fish, and so

with other things. But in the order of teaching, as is evident in those teaching geometry,

although the parts of the figure make up the figure without any order of time, still the

geometer teaches the constitution as coming to be by the extension of line from line. Andthis was the example of Plato, as we are told at the beginning of On the Heavens. So too

Moses, instructing an uncultivated people on the creation of the world, divides into parts

what was done simultaneously.

Ambrose, however, and other saints hold the order of time is saved in the distinction of

things. This is the more common opinion and superficially seems more consonant with

the text, but the first is more reasonable and better protects Sacred Scripture from the

derision of infidels, which Augustine teaches in his literal interpretation of Genesis is

especially to be considered, and so scripture must be explained in such a way that the

infidel cannot mock, and this opinion is more pleasing to me. However, the arguments

sustaining both will be responded to.

Ad 1. It should be said that, according to Gregory, all things are said to be created

together in the substance of matter not in specific form, or even in its likeness, such as

the rational soul, which is like the angels and is not produced from matter.

Ad 2. It should be said that all corporeal things share in matter, whether it be one or several,

and because matter does not precede the compound [composite], therefore in order that the

order of time might respond to the order of nature, corporeal matter is first made and then

distinguished by forms. But corporeal nature is not produced from the spiritual either as from

matter or as from efficient cause, and therefore the argument does not work.

Ad 3. It should be said that just as the creature does not have existence of itself neither

does it have perfection, and therefore in order to show both, God wills that the creaturedoes not exist at first and after wards does, and similarly it was first imperfect and

afterwards perfect.

Ad 4. It should be said that not only power should be shown in creation, but also the order

of wisdom, such that the things which are prior in nature are first created.

29



Ad 5. It should be said that in order to show the diverse natures of distinct things, God

willed that one day should answer to each distinction of things, not out of any necessity or

weariness of the agent.

Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfected and

in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires that all

es-sential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the making of

the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other parts, and yet

in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other members.

Ad 7. It should be said that the authority of Sacred Scripture is not derogated when it is

differently explained, the faith being saved, because the Holy Spirit made it fruitful with a

greater truth than any man can discover.

Ad 8. It should be said that it is due to the imperfection of nature that it comes from the

imperfect to perfection, since without doubt it would give the ultimate perfection of which

it is capable, saving, however, the condition of the work. Therefore it is not necessary that

in this the divine work be similar to the operation of the creature. (emphasis added)

12. Whether the spiritual creature was created before the corporeal.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 61, art. 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Whether the Angels Were Created before the Corporeal World?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Obj. 1. It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome

says ( In Ep. ad Tit. i. 2): Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God? Damascene also says ( De Fide Orth. ii):

Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologiandeclares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was themaking thereof.

Obj. 2. Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal

natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time.

Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.

Obj. 3. Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one cor-

poreal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the

six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more,

therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Now,

this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels werenot created before corporeal nature.24

24 Cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Charlotte, NC, 1994), Ch. 1:

Thus, for example, Saint Epiphanius: “The word of God clearly declares that the Angels were

neither created after the stars nor before heaven and earth. It must be regarded as certain and un-

shakable the opinion that says: None of the created things did exist before heaven and earth,

because ‘in the beginning God created heaven and earth’ so that this was the beginning of all

30



I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the

Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as

corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a

universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one

universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because

the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is

perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose

works are perfect, as it is said Dt. xxxii. 4, should have created the angelic creature

before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous;especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian

doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also

the case with the doctrine of Athanasius, as Jerome says.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom

hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.

Reply Obj. 2. God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within

Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of

the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3. All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree withthem in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in

a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of

the universe.

If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Genesis i., In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the words, In the beginning, must be interpreted, “In the Son,” or “In the

beginning of time”: but not, “In the beginning, before which there was nothing,” unless we

say, “Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures.” (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 61, art. 4, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

I answer that, As was observed (Article [3]), the universe is made up of corporeal and

spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some

relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence

it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding

over all corporeal nature…. (emphasis added)

Now as I show in my commentary on the Work of the Six Days, the co-existence of the

angelic world is repeatedly implicated throughout the Mosaic account of creation, lendingsupport to St. Thomas’ view; but for the present, the following texts will further streng-

then our claims:

13. Supplemental texts expounding the beginning of all things according to Genesis 1:1.

creation, before which none of the created things existed.”[8]

8. Adversus Haereses, Panar., 65, 5. (emphasis added)

Notice how the foregoing statement decides the question solely by drawing out the implications of

Genesis 1. See further the supplemental texts given just below.

31



Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 46, art. 3. c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers;

slightly rev. B.A.M.):

I answer that , The words of Genesis (1:1), “In the beginning God created heaven andearth,” are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said

that the world always was, and that time had no beginning ; and to exclude this the words

“In the beginning” are explained—viz. “of time.” And some said that there are two

principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which “In

the beginning” is explained—“in the Son.” For as the efficient principle is appropriatedto the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son

by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), “Thou hast made all things

in wisdom,” it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning—that is,

in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), “In Him”—viz. the Son

—”were created all things.” But others said that corporeal things were created by God

through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is explained thus: “In the

beginning”—i.e. before all things—“God created heaven and earth.” For four things

are stated to be created together—viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is

meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of

God by Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD,1952), q. 4, art. 2, replies to the contrary 3:

3. The disposition of a thing that is already complete is not the same as its disposition

while yet in the making: wherefore although the nature of a perfect and complete

world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist together , it could be other-

wise when the world was as yet in its beginning: thus in a complete man there cannot be

a heart without his other parts, yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is fashioned

before any other part . It may also be replied that in this beginning of things the

heavenly bodies and all the elements with their substantial forms were produced

together with the angels, all of which are the principal parts of the universe; and that on

the following days, something was done in the nature already created, and pertaining

to the perfec-tion and adornment of the parts already produced. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, Book II.

In Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and

notes by Ralph McInerny (London, 1998), dist. 12, art. 2, obj. 6, ad 6:

6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially

dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without

the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth and

afterwards the stars were made. <…>

Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfectedand in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires

that all essential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the

making of the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other

parts, and yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other

members. (emphasis added)

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But with respect to the meaning of ‘beginning’ here, we have seen Epiphanius explain the

words of Genesis 1:1 as follows:25

Thus, for example, Saint Epiphanius: “The word of God clearly declares that the Angels

were neither created after the stars nor before heaven and earth. It must be regarded as

certain and unshakable the opinion that says: None of the created things did exist before

heaven and earth, because ‘in the beginning God created heaven and earth’ so that this

was the beginning of all creation, before which none of the created things existed.”[8]

8. Adversus Haereses, Panar., 65, 5. (emphasis added)

Hence, the angels must have been created at the same time as the mundane world, a con-clusion we may let stand as our final word on this subject.

§

25 Cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Charlotte, NC, 1994), Ch. 1.

33



14. Supplement: On the division of the Creed into articles.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 8, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

I answer that , As stated above (Articles [4],6), to faith those things in themselves belong,

the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life.

Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead,

to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, “by Whom we

have access” to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rm 5,2. Hence it is written (Jn

17,3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ

Whom Thou hast sent.” Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some

concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human

nature, which is the “mystery of godliness” (1Tm 3,16). Now with regard to the majesty of

the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to

which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer,

corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of

which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters

concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the

order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning theresurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the

Godhead. In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human nature, there are seven articles, the

first of which refers to Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth;

the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to

His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so

that in all there are fourteen articles. Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six

pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three

about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they

divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the

body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one

article.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretal ) (tr. B.A.M.):

…In the last place one must consider that the articles of the Christian Faith are reckoned by

some to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For according to those who reckon them to be

fourteen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but seven to the humanity [of Christ]. But

those which pertain to the Godhead are distinguished as follows: There is one article on theunity of the divine essence, which the Symbol touches on when he says: I believe in oneGod . A second concerns the Person of the Father, which is touched on when it says: the Father, the Almighty. A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is touched on when it

says: and in Jesus Christ His Son. A fourth concerns the Person of the Holy Spirit, which istouched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit . A fifth concerns the effect by which we are

created in nature, which is touched on when it says: Creator of heaven and earth. A sixth

concerns God’s effect according as we are created again in grace, which is touched on when

it says: the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins ; the

reason being that by grace we are gathered into the unity of the Church, we communicate in

the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of sins. A seventh article concerns God’s

effect by which we are perfected in the being of glory both with respect to the body and with

respect to the soul; and this is touched on when it says: the resurrection of the flesh, the lifeeverlasting .

34



But the seven articles pertaining to the Incarnation are distinguished as follows: The first

concerns the conception of Christ, which is touched on when it says: who was concealed bythe Holy Spirit . But the second concerns His birth, which is touched one when it says: bornof the Virgin Mary. The third concerns His passion, which is touched on when it says:

suffered, died, and was buried . The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: he descended intohell ]; the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he rose again from the dead ]; the sixth His

ascension: he ascended into Heaven; the seventh His return in judgment: He will come againto judge the living and the dead . But others holding there to be twelve articles, put down one

article concerning the Three Persons; and the article concerning the effect of glory theydivide into two, so that there is one article concerning the resurrection of the flesh, and

another concerning eternal life: and thus the articles pertaining to divinity are six. Again,they include the conception and birth of Christ under one article; and so the articles con-

corning His humanity are also six, so that all told they are twelve.

§

35



15. On the error of Origen.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 47, art. 2, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Art. 2. Whether the inequality of things is from God?

<…>

I answer that , When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of

things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning

all things were created equal by God . For he asserted that God first created only the

rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some

being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away

from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were

promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who

were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their

sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to

this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect

of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the

punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: “God saw all the things that He had

made, and they were very good” (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says ( De Civ. Dei ii, 3):

“What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the

one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but

that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, therewould be a hundred suns in the world?” (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 65, art. 2. c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

I answer that, Origen laid down [* Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not

made according to God’s original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritualcreatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only,

and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,

and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower

rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to

different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away . But this position is

erro-neous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the

produc-tion of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, “God saw that it was good” (Gn.1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to

be. But according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was

good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it

would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise

from mere chance. For it the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for a

punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual

creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created,

that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is

altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the

entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. (emphasis

added)

36



Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book II: Creation I. Translated, with an

Introduction and Notes by James E. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap 44:Chapter 44

THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS DOES NOT HAVE ITS SOURCE IN THE

DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS

[1] We now have to show that the distinction among things did not result from diverse

movements of free choice in rational creatures, as Origen maintained in his Peri Archon. For he wished to oppose the objections and errors of the early heretics who

endeavored to prove that the heterogeneous character of good and evil in things has its

origin in contrary agents. Now, there are, as Origen saw, great differences in natural as

well as human things which seemingly are not preceded by any merits; some bodies are

luminous, some dark, some men are born of pagans, others of Christians, etc. And having

observed this fact, Origen was impelled to assert that all diversity found in things resulted

from a diversity of merits, in accordance with the justice of God. For he says that God, of

His goodness alone, first made all creatures equal, and all of them spiritual and

rational; and these by their free choice were moved in various ways, some adhering to

God more, and some less, some withdrawing from Him more, and some less; and as a

result of this, diverse grades in spiritual substances were established by the divine

justice, so that some were angels of diverse orders, some human souls in variousconditions, some demons in their differing states. And because of the diversity among

rational creatures, Origen stated that Cod had instituted diversity in the realm of

corporeal creatures so that the higher spiritual substances were united to the higher

bodies, and thus the bodily creature would subserve, in whatever other various ways,

the diversity of spiritual substances.

[2] This opinion, however, is demonstrably false. For in the order of effects, the better a

thing is, so much the more is it prior in the intention of the agent. But the greatest good inthings created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things; for

always the perfection of the whole has precedence of the perfection of the individual parts.

Therefore, the diversity of things results from the original intention of the first agent, not

from a diversity of merits.

[3] Then, too, if all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, it must be said

that one of them would not depend, in its action, upon another. But that which results from

the concurrence of diverse causes, one of which does not depend on another, is fortuitous. In

accordance with the opinion just cited, therefore, this distinction and order of things is

fortuitous. Yet this, as we have proved above, is impossible.

[4] Moreover, what is natural to a person is not acquired by him through the exercise of his

will; for the movement of the will, or of free choice, presupposes the existence of the willer,

and his existence presupposes the things proper to his nature. If the diverse grades of rational

creatures result from a movement of free choice, then the grade of none of them will be

natural, but every grade will be accidental. Now, this is impossible. For, since the specificdifference is natural to each thing, it would follow, on that theory, that all created rational

substances—angels, demons, human souls, the souls of the heavenly bodies (Origenattributed animation to these bodies)—are of one species. The diversity of natural actions

proves the falsity of this position. For the natural mode of understanding proper to the

human intellect is not the same as that which sense and imagination, the angelic intellect,

and the soul of the sun, require-unless, perhaps, we picture the angels and heavenly bodies

with flesh and bones and like parts, so that they may be endowed with organs of sense;

37



which is absurd. It therefore remains that the diversity of intellectual substances is not the

consequence of a diversity of merits, resulting from movements of free choice.

[5] Again, if natural things are not acquired by a movement of free choice, whereas a

rational soul owes its union with a certain body to preceding merit or demerit in keeping

with the movement of free choice, then it would follow that the union of this soul with this

body is not natural. Neither, then, is the resulting composite natural. Nevertheless, according

to Origen, man and the sun and the stars are composed of rational substances and such and

such bodies. Therefore, all these things—which are the noblest among corporeal sub-stances —are unnatural.

[6] Moreover, if the union of a particular rational substance with a particular body befits that

substance, not so far as it is such a substance, but so far as it has merited that union, then it is

not united to that body through itself, but by accident. Now, no species results from the

accidental union of things; for from such a union there does not arise a thing one throughitself; thus, white man is not a species, nor is clothed man. From the hypothesis in question,

therefore, it would follow that man is not a species, nor is the sun a species, nor the moon,

nor anything of the kind.

[7] Again, things resulting from merit may be changed for better or for worse; for merits and

demerits may increase and diminish-a point particularly stressed by Origen, who said thatthe free choice of every creature can always be turned to either side. Hence, if a rational soul

has obtained this body on account of preceding merit or demerit, then it is possible for it to

be united again to another body; and it will follow not only that the human soul may take to

itself another human body, but also that it may sometimes assume a sidereal body—a notion

“in keeping with the Pythagorean fables according to which any soul could enter any body.”

Obviously, this idea is both erroneous as regards philosophy, according to which determinate

matters and determinate movable things are assigned to determinate forms and determinate

movers, and heretical according to faith, which declares that in the resurrection the soulresumes the same body that it has left.

[8] Also, since multitude without diversity cannot exist, if from the beginning any multitude

at all of rational creatures existed, then there must have been some diversity among them.And this means that one of those creatures had something which another had not. And if this

was not the consequence of a diversity in merit, for the same reason neither was it necessary

that the diversity of grades should result from a diversity of merits.

[9] Every distinction, furthermore, is either in terms of a division of quantity, which exists

only in bodies—so that, according to Origen, such distinctness could not exist in the

substances first created; or in terms of formal division. But without a diversity of grades

there can be no formal division, since division of this kind is reduced to privation and form.

Necessarily, then, one of the reciprocally divided forms is better and the other less good.

Hence, as Aristotle remarks, the species of things are like numbers, one number being in

addition to or in subtraction from the other. Therefore, if there were many rational

substances created from the beginning, there must have been a diversity of grades amongthem.

[10] Then, too, if rational creatures can subsist without bodies, there was no need to have

introduced distinctness in the realm of corporeal nature on account of the different merits of

rational creatures; because, even in the absence of a diversity of bodies, diverse grades in

rational substances could be found. If, however, rational creatures cannot subsist without bodies, then the corporeal creature also was produced from the beginning simultaneously

with the rational creature. Now, the corporeal creature is more remote from the spiritual than

38



spiritual creatures are from one another. So, if God from the beginning established such a

great distance among His creatures without any antecedent merits, it was unnecessary for a

diversity of merits to have been acquired previously in order that rational creatures might be

constituted in diverse grades.

[11] Again, if, corresponding to the multiformity of rational creatures there is multiformity

in corporeal creatures, then, for the same reason, corresponding to the uniformity of rational

creatures, there would be uniformity in the corporeal nature. Consequently the corporeal

nature would have been created, even if multifarious merits of rational creatures had not preceded, but a corporeal nature uniform in character. Hence, prime matter would have been

created—a principle common to all bodies—but it would have been created under one formonly. But prime matter contains potentially a multiplicity of forms. On the hypothesis under

consideration, prime matter would therefore have remained unfulfilled, its one form alone

being actualized; and this is at variance with the divine goodness.

[12] Moreover, if the heterogeneity of corporeal creatures arises from the various

movements of the rational creature’s free choice, it will have to be said that the reason why

there is only one sun in the world is that only one rational creature was moved by its free

choice in such a way as to deserve being joined to such a body as the sun. But, that only one

rational creature sinned in this way was a matter of chance. Therefore, the existence of only

one sun in the world is the result of chance; it does not answer to a need of corporeal nature.

[13] The spiritual creature, furthermore, does not deserve reduction to a lower status except

for sin; and yet, by being united to visible bodies, it is brought down from its lofty state of

being, wherein it is invisible. Now, from this it would seem to follow that visible bodies are

joined to spiritual creatures because of sin—a notion seemingly akin to the error of the

Manicheans who asserted that these visible things originated from the evil principle.

[14] This opinion is clearly contradicted by the authority of sacred Scripture, for in regard toeach production of visible creatures, Moses says: “God saw that it was good,” etc. (Gen. 1);

and afterwards, concerning the totality of His creatures, Moses adds: “God saw all the things

that He had made, and they were very good.” By this we are clearly given to understand that

the corporeal and visible creatures were made because it is good for them to be; and that thisis in keeping with God’s goodness, and not because of any merits or sins of rational

creatures.

[15] Now, Origen seems not to have taken into consideration the fact that when we give

something, not in payment of a debt, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if we give

unequal things, without having weighed the difference of merits; although payment is due to

those who merit. But, as we have shown above, God brought things into being, not because

He was in any way obliged to do so, but out of pure generosity. Therefore, the diversity of

creatures does not presuppose a diversity of merits.

[16] And again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, the best

maker is not he who diminishes the good of the whole in order to increase the goodness of some of the parts; a builder does not give the same relative value to the foundation that he

gives to the roof, lest he ruin the house. Therefore, God, the maker of all things, would notmake the whole universe the best of its kind, if He made all the parts equal, because many

grades of goodness would then be lacking in the universe, and thus it would be imperfect.

(emphasis added)

§

39



Cf. Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity. Book XV,

Chapter 21.— Of the Likeness of the Father and of the Son Alleged to Be in Our Memory

and Understanding. Of the Likeness of the Holy Spirit in Our Will or Love.

40. I have undoubtedly taken pains so far as I could, not indeed so that the thing might be

seen face to face, but that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how small a

degree soever, by conjecture, in our memory and understanding, to intimate God the Father

and God the Son: i.e. God the begetter, who has in some way spoken by His own co-eternalWord all things that He has in His substance; and God His Word Himself, who Himself has

nothing either more or less in substance than is in Him, who, not lyingly but truly, has begotten the Word; and I have assigned to memory everything that we know, even if we

were not thinking of it, but to understanding the formation after a certain special mode of the

thought. For we are usually said to understand what, by thinking of it, we have found to be

true; and this it is again that we leave in the memory. But that is a still more hidden depth of

our memory, wherein we found this also first when we thought of it, and wherein an inner

word is begotten such as belongs to no tongue—as it were, knowledge of knowledge, vision

of vision, and understanding which appears in [reflective] thought; of understanding which

had indeed existed before in the memory, but was latent there, although, unless the thought

itself had also some sort of memory of its own, it would not return to those things which it

had left in the memory while it turned to think of other things.

41. But I have shown nothing in this enigma respecting the Holy Spirit such as might appear

to be like Him, except our own will, or love, or affection, which is a stronger will, since our

will which we have naturally is variously affected, according as various objects are adjacent

or occur to it, by which we are attracted or offended. What, then, is this? Are we to say that

our will, when it is right, knows not what to desire, what to avoid? Further, if it knows,

doubtless then it has a kind of knowledge of its own, such as cannot be without memory and

understanding. Or are we to listen to any one who should say that love knows not what itdoes, which does not do wrongly? As, then, there are both understanding and love in that

primary memory wherein we find provided and stored up that to which we can come in

thought, because we find also those two things there, when we find by thinking that we both

understand and love anything; which things were there too when we were not thinking of them: and as there are memory and love in that understanding, which is formed by thought,

which true word we say inwardly without the tongue of any nation when we say what we

know; for the gaze of our thought does not return to anything except by remembering it, and

does not care to return unless by loving it: so love, which combines the vision brought about

in the memory, and the vision of the thought formed thereby, as if parent and offspring,

would not know what to love rightly unless it had a knowledge of what it desired, which it

cannot have without memory and understanding.

Chapter 22.— How Great the Unlikeness is Between the Image of the Trinity Which We

Have Found in Ourselves, and the Trinity Itself.

42. But since these are in one person, as man is, some one may say to us, These three things,memory, understanding, and love, are mine, not their own; neither do they do that which

they do for themselves, but for me, or rather I do it by them. For it is I who remember bymemory, and understand by understanding, and love by love: and when I direct the mind's

eye to my memory, and so say in my heart the thing I know, and a true word is begotten of

my knowledge, both are mine, both the knowledge certainly and the word. For it is I who

know, and it is I who say in my heart the thing I know. And when I come to find in my

memory by thinking that I understand and love anything, which understanding and love were

there also before I thought thereon, it is my own understanding and my own love that I find

40



in my own memory, whereby it is I that understand, and I that love, not those things

themselves. Likewise, when my thought is mindful, and wills to return to those things which

it had left in the memory, and to understand and behold them, and say them inwardly, it is

my own memory that is mindful, and it is my own, not its will, wherewith it wills. When my

very love itself, too, remembers and understands what it ought to desire and what to avoid, it

remembers by my, not by its own memory; and understands that which it intelligently loves

by my, not by its own, understanding. In brief, by all these three things, it is I that remember,

I that understand, I that love, who am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but who

have them. These things, then, can be said by a single person, which has these three, but isnot these three. But in the simplicity of that Highest Nature, which is God, although there is

one God, there are three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 23.— Augustine Dwells Still Further on the Disparity Between the Trinity Which is

in Man, and the Trinity Which is God. The Trinity is Now Seen Through a Glass by the Help

of Faith, that It May Hereafter Be More Clearly Seen in the Promised Sight Face to Face.43. A thing itself, then, which is a trinity is different from the image of a trinity in some

other thing; by reason of which image, at the same time that also in which these three things

are is called an image; just as both the panel, and the picture painted on it, are at the same

time called an image; but by reason of the picture painted on it, the panel also is called by

the name of image. But in that Highest Trinity, which is incomparably above all things, there

is so great an indivisibility, that whereas a trinity of men cannot be called one man, in that,there both is said to be and is one God, nor is that Trinity in one God, but it is one God. Nor,

again, as that image in the case of man has these three things but is one person, so is it with

the Trinity; but therein are three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father,

and the Spirit of both Father and Son. For although the memory in the case of man, and

especially that memory which beasts have not— viz. the memory by which things intelligible

are so contained as that they have not entered that memory through the bodily senses — has

in this image of the Trinity, in proportion to its own small measure, a likeness of the Father,

incomparably unequal, yet of some sort, whatever it be: and likewise the understanding inthe case of man, which by the purpose of the thought is formed thereby, when that which is

known is said, and there is a word of the heart belonging to no tongue, has in its own great

disparity some likeness of the Son; and love in the case of man proceeding from knowledge,

and combining memory and understanding, as though common to parent and offspring,whereby it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in that image, some, however

exceedingly unequal, likeness of the Holy Spirit: it is nevertheless not the case, that, as in

that image of the Trinity, these three are not one man, but belong to one man, so in the

Highest Trinity itself, of which this is an image, these three belong to one God, but they are

one God, and these are three persons, not one. A thing certainly wonderfully ineffable, or

ineffably wonderful, that while this image of the Trinity is one person, but the Highest

Trinity itself is three persons, yet that Trinity of three persons is more indivisible than this of

one. For that [Trinity], in the nature of the Divinity, or perhaps better Deity, is that which it

is, and is mutually and always unchangeably equal: and there was no time when it was not,

or when it was otherwise; and there will be no time when it will not be, or when it will be

otherwise. But these three that are in the inadequate image, although they are not separate in

place, for they are not bodies, yet are now in this life mutually separate in magnitude. For that there are therein no several bulks, does not hinder our seeing that memory is greater than

understanding in one man, but the contrary in another; and that in yet another these two areoverpassed by the greatness of love; and this whether the two themselves are or are not equal

to one another. And so each two by each one, and each one by each two, and each one by

each one: the less are surpassed by the greater. And when they have been healed of all

infirmity, and are mutually equal, not even then will that thing which by grace will not bechanged, be made equal to that which by nature cannot change, because the creature cannot

be equalled to the Creator, and when it shall be healed from all infirmity, will be changed.

41



44. But when the sight shall have come which is promised anew to us face to face, we shall

see this not only incorporeal but also absolutely indivisible and truly unchangeable Trinity

far more clearly and certainly than we now see its image which we ourselves are: and yet

they who see through this glass and in this enigma, as it is permitted in this life to see, are

not those who behold in their own mind the things which we have set in order and pressed

upon them; but those who see this as if an image, so as to be able to refer what they see, in

some way be it what it may, to Him whose image it is, and to see that also by conjecturing,

which they see through the image by beholding, since they cannot yet see face to face. For

the apostle does not say, We see now a glass, but, We see now through a glass.

§

42



St. Thomas Aquinas

On the First Decretal of Gregory IX

A Partial Translation

by

Bart A. Mazzetti

(c) 2013

43



Sancti Thomae de Aquino

Expositio super primam et secundam Decretalem

ad archidiaconum Tudertinum

Textum Leoninum Romae 1968 editum

ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas

denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit

De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica

[69293] Super Decretales, n. 1

Salvator noster discipulos ad praedicandum

mittens, tria eis iniunxit.

Primo quidem ut docerent fidem; secundo ut

credentes imbuerent sacramentis; tertio ut

credentes sacramentis imbutos ad observandum

divina mandata inducerent.

Dicitur enim Matth. ult. 19: euntes, docete om-nes gentes, quantum ad primum; baptizanteseos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti ,quan-tum ad secundum; docentes eos servareomnia quaecumque mandavi vobis, quantum ad

tertium.

Inter quae tria decenter fidei doctrina prae-

mittitur. Est enim fides omnium bonorum spiri-

tualium fundamentum, secundum illud apostoli

Hebr. XI, 1: est autem fides substantia (idestfundamentum) sperandarum rerum. Est etiam

fides per quam anima vivificatur per gratiam,

secundum illud apostoli Galat. II, 20: quod autem nunc vivo in carne, in fide vivo filii Dei ;

et Habac. II, 4: iustus autem ex fide sua vivit .

Ipsa est per quam anima a peccatis purgatur,

Act. XV, 9: fide purificans corda eorum.

Ipsa est per quam anima iustitia ornatur, Rom.

III, 22: iustitia autem Dei est per fidem IesuChristi.

Ipsa est per quam anima Deo desponsatur,

Oseae II, 20: sponsabo te mihi in fide.

On the Highest Trinity and the Catholic Faith

On the Decretals, n. 1

Our Savior, when sending out his disciples to

preach, enjoined upon them three things:

first , that they teach the faith; second , that they

impart the sacraments to believers; third , that

believers to whom the sacraments have been im-

parted be led to observing the divine command-

ments.

For with respect to the first, Matthew (28:19-20)

says: Going, therefore, teach ye all nations;26

but with respect to the second, baptizing them inthe name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit ; but with respect to the third,

Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.

Under these three headings the doctrine of the

faith is suitably introduced. For faith is the foun-

dation of every spiritual good, according to the

Apostle (Heb. 11:1): Now faith is the substance(that is, the foundation) of things to be hoped for . And it is also faith by which the soul is

made to live, according to the Apostle (Gal.

2:20): (And) that I live now in the flesh, I live inthe faith of the Son of God ; and Habacuc (2:4): But the just lives [Vulg. shall live] by his faith.

—The very thing by which the soul is purged of

its sins (Acts 15:9): Purifying their hearts by faith.

—The very thing by which the soul is adorned

with justice (Rom. 3:22): (Even) the justice of God, [is] by faith in Jesus Christ .

—The very thing by which the soul is espoused

to God (Hos. 2:20): (And) I will espouse thee tome in faith.

26 Where feasible, all quotations from Scripture have been taken from the Douay-Rheims version.

44



Ipsa est per quam homines in Dei filios

adoptantur, Ioan. I, 12: dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius.

Ipsa est per quam ad Deum acceditur, Hebr. XI,

6: accedentem ad Deum oportet credere.

Ipsa denique est per quam homines aeternae

vitae bravium consequuntur, secundum illud

Ioan. VI, 40: haec est voluntas patris mei quimisit me, ut omnis qui videt filium et credit ineum, habeat vitam aeternam.

Convenienter igitur Christi vicarius propositurus

mandata quibus Ecclesia per apostolorum prae-

dicationem fundata pacifice gubernatur, titulum

de fide praemittit.

Sed considerandum est, quod cum multi sint

articuli fidei, quorum quidam videntur ad ipsam

divinitatem pertinere, quidam vero ad humanam

naturam, quam filius Dei in unitatem personae

assumpsit, alii vero ad diviniatis effectus,

fundamentum tamen totius fidei est ipsa prima

veritas divinitatis, cum omnia alia ea ratione

contineantur sub fide, inquantum ad Deum ali-

qualiter referuntur.

Unde et dominus discipulis dicit Ioan. XIV, 1:creditis in Deum et in me credite; per quod datur

intelligi quod in Christum creditur inquantumest Deus, quasi fide principaliter de Deo

existente.

Inter ea vero quae de Deo fide tenemus, hoc estsingulare fidei Christianae ut Trinitatem person-

arum in unitate divinae essentiae fate-amur. Sub

hac enim professione Christo per Baptismum

sumus consignati, ut patet per id quod supra in-

ductum est: baptizantes eos in no-mine patris et

filii et spiritus sancti.

Alia vero quae de Deo asserimus, nobis et aliis

communia esse inveniuntur; puta, quod Deus sit

unus, omnipotens, et si qua alia de Deo fide

tenentur; quae etiam Iudaei et Saraceni non

diffitentur.

—The very thing by which men are adopted as

sons of God (John 1:12): He gave them power to becomes sons of God, to them that believe inhis name.

—The very thing by which an approach is made

to God (Heb. 11:6): (For he that) cometh toGod must believe (that He is, and is a rewarder

to them that seek Him).

—The very thing, then, by which men attain to

the reward of eternal life, according to John

(6:40): (And) this is the will of my Father that sent me: that everyone who seeth the Son and believeth in Him, may have life everlasting .

Fittingly, therefore, the Vicar of Christ when he

is about to propose the commandments by

which the Church founded by the preaching of

the Apostles is peacefully governed, gives [his

undertaking] the title On the Faith.

But it must be considered that, since there are

many articles of faith, some of which appear to

pertain to the Godhead itself, but some to the

human nature which the Son of God assumes in

the unity of the Person, but others to the effect

of His divinity, still, the foundation of the whole

of faith is the First Truth itself, since by reason

of it all other things are contained under faith,

inasmuch as they are somehow referred to God.

And so the Lord says in John (14:1): You be-lieve in God, believe also in me, by which we

are given to understand that one believes inChrist inasmuch as He is God, as though faith

were principally about God.

But among those things which we hold by faith,this is unique to the Christian Faith, that we

confess a Trinity of Persons in the unity of the

divine essence. For we are marked out under

this [sign] by professing Christ through bap-

tism, as is clear from what was adduced above:

Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost .

But other things which we assert about God are

found to be common to us and to others; for

example, that God is one, almighty, and other

things held by faith about God if such there be,

which not even the Jews and the Saracens deny.

45



Unde ad insinuandum proprium et singulare

dogma fidei Christianae, non praetitulavit fidei

tractatum de Deo, sed de Trinitate.

Addit autem, summa, quia divina Trinitas arcem

quandam tenet inter plurimas Trinitates ab ea

derivatas. Derivatur enim ab illa Trinitate divina

quaedam Trinitas in anima nostra, secundumquam ad imaginem Dei sumus secundum mem-

oriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem.

Derivantur etiam ab ipsa aliae Trinitates in sin-

gulis creaturis, prout modum quendam et speci-

em et ordinem habent secundum quae in eis di-

vinae Trinitatis quasi quoddam vestigium inven-

itur, ut Augustinus docet in libro de Trinitate.

Ad discretionem igitur omnium harum Trinita-tum quae a divina descendunt, dicitur de summaTrinitate.

Sed de hac Trinitate divina diversi haeretici

diversa errantes senserunt: quorum Sabellius

abstulit personarum distinctionem dicens patris

et filii et spiritus sancti esse unam essentiam et

unam personam, sed solum differre nominibus;

Arius vero posuit trium personarum esse diver-

sas substantias, et dignitate et duratione differ-

entes: quae omnia et consimilia fides condemnat

Catholica.

Quia igitur de summa Trinitate et aliis ad fidem pertinentibus hic tradere intendit quod fides

Catholica tenet, ideo additur, et fide Catholica.

Dicitur autem fides Ecclesiae Catholica, idest

universalis, ut Boetius dicit in libro de Trinitate,tum propter universalium praecepta regularum,tum propterea quia eius cultus per omnes penemundi terminos emanavit ; haereticorum vero

errores sub certis terrarum angulis includuntur.

Quia de fide sanctae Trinitatis considerandum

est, primo oportet scire, quod duplex est actus

fidei, scilicet corde credere et ore confiteri,

secundum illud Rom. X, 10: corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem.

And so in order to suggest the proper and uni-

que dogma of the Christina Faith, he has entit-

led his treatment of faith not On God , but rather On the Trinity.

But he adds, the Highest , because the divine

Trinity holds a certain supremacy among the

many Trinities derived from it. For from the

divine Trinity derives a certain ‘trinity’ in our soul, according to which we take on the image

of God with respect to memory, intelligence,

and will.

Other ‘trinities’ also derive from it in particular

creatures, according as they have a certain

mode, species, and order with respect to which a

certain trace of the divine Trinity is found in

them, as Augustine teaches in his book On theTrinity (XV. 21ff.).

In order, therefore, to distinguish all these trini-ties which descend from the divine one, [this

work] is called On the Highest Trinity.

But with respect to this divine Trinity different

heretics went astray thinking different things;

one of whom, Sabellius, took away the distinc-

tion of Persons, saying the Father and the Son

and the Holy Spirit are one essence and one Per-

son, but differ solely by the names; but Arius

held the three Persons to be diverse substances,

differing by dignity and duration, all of which

and similar things the Catholic Faith condemns.

Since, therefore, he intends to hand on what theCatholic Faith holds about the highest Trinity,

as well as other things pertaining to the faith, he

therefore adds, and the Catholic Faith, that is to

say, ‘universal’, [for,] as Boethius says in his book On the Trinity [cap. I], [this faith is called

‘Catholic’ and ‘universal’] both by reason of the precepts of its universal rules, as well as be-cause its cultus has spread to nearly all the endsof the earth, whereas the errors of the heretics

are restricted to certain corners of the earth.

But because faith in the Holy Trinity is to be

considered, one must first understand that the

act of faith is twofold, namely, to believe with

the heart, and to confess with the mouth, accor-

ding to Romans (10:10): With the heart we be-lieve unto justice; but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.

46



Uterque autem actus aliquid requirit ad sui per-

fectionem. Nam interior actus fidei exigit firmi-

tatem absque omni dubitatione, quae firmitas provenit ex infallibilitate divinae veritatis, cui

fides innititur; unde dicitur Iac. I, 6: postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans.

Sed confessio fidei debet esse simplex, idestabsque simulatione, secundum illud I ad

Timoth. I, 5: finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta.

Debet etiam esse simplex, idest absque erroris

permixtione, secundum illud I ad Thessal. II, 3:

exhortatio nostra non fuit de errore.

Debet etiam esse absque variatione, II ad Cor. I,

18: sermo noster qui fuit apud vos, non fuit inillo est et non.

Quantum ergo ad primum dicit, firmiter credi-mus; quantum ad secundum et simpliciter confitemur .

Ulterius autem considerandum est quod fidei

Christianae articuli a quibusdam duodecim, a

quibusdam quatuordecim computantur. Secun-

dum enim illos qui computant quatuor-decim,

septem articuli pertinent ad divinitatem, septem

vero ad humanitatem.

Illi autem qui ad divinitatem pertinent, sic dis-tinguuntur,

ut unus sit articulus de divinae essentiae unitate,

qui tangitur in symbolo cum dicitur: credo inunum Deum.

Secundus est de persona patris, qui tangitur cum

dicitur: patrem omnipotentem.

Tertius est de persona filii, qui tangitur cum

dicitur: et in Iesum Christum filium eius.

Quartus est de persona spiritus sancti, qui tangi-

tur cum dicitur: et in spiritum sanctum.

But both acts require something for their perfec-

tion. For the interior act of faith stands in need

of firmness apart from any doubt, which firm-ness arises from the infallibility of the divine

truth, which the Faith makes known; and so it is

said in James (1:6), But let him ask in faith, no-thing wavering .

But the confession of faith should be simple,that is, without any dissimulation, according to I

Tim. (1:5): The end of the commandment ischarity from a pure heart and a good con- science, and an unfeigned faith.

But it should also be simple in the sense of

being without any admixture of error, according

to I Thess. (2:3): For our exhortation was not of error, nor in deceit .

But it should also be without variation, II Cor.

(1:18): Our preaching which was to you, wasnot It is and It is not.

With respect to the first, therefore, he says, We firmly believe; with respect to the second, and simply confess.

In the last place one must consider that the arti-

cles of the Christian Faith are reckoned by some

to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For ac-

cording to those who reckon them to be four-

teen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but

seven to the humanity [of Christ].

Now those which pertain to the Godhead aredistinguished as follows:

There is one article on the unity of the divine

essence, which the Symbol touches on when hesays: I believe in one God .

A second concerns the Person of the Father,

which is touched on when it says: the Father,the Almighty.

A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is

touched on when it says: and in Jesus Christ His Son.

A fourth concerns the Person of the Holy Spirit,

which is touched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit .

47



Quintus est de effectu, quo a Deo creamur in

esse naturae, qui tangitur cum dicitur:

creatorem caeli et terrae.

Sextus de effectu Dei secundum quod recreamur

in esse gratiae, qui tangitur cum dicitur: sanc-tam Ecclesiam Catholicam, sanctorum commu-nionem, remissionem peccatorum. Quia per

gratiam Dei in unitatem Ecclesiae congrega-mur, sacramenta communicamus et peccatorum

remissionem consequimur.

Septimus articulus est de effectu Dei quo perfi-

cimur in esse gloriae et quantum ad corpus et

quantum ad animam; et hic tangitur cum dicitur:

carnis resurrectionem, vitam aeternam.

Articuli vero septem ad incarnationem pertinen-

tes sic distinguuntur,

ut primus sit de Christi conceptione, qui tangitur

cum dicitur: qui conceptus est de spiritu sancto.

Secundus autem est de eius nativitate, qui

tangitur cum dicitur: natus ex Maria virgine.

Tertius est de eius passione, qui tangitur cum

dicitur: passus, mortuus et sepultus.

Quartus est de descensu ad Inferos:

quintus de resurrectione:

sextus de ascensione: ascendit ad caelos.

Septimus de adventu ad iudicium: inde venturus

est iudicare vivos et mortuos.

Alii vero ponentes duodecim articulos, ponunt

unum articulum de tribus personis; et articulum

de effectu gloriae dividunt in duos, ut scilicet

alius sit articulus de resurrectione carnis, et alius

de vita aeterna: et sic articuli ad divinitatem

pertinentes sunt sex.

A fifth concerns the effect by which we are cre-

ated in nature, which is touched on when it says:

Creator of heaven and earth.

A sixth concerns God’s effect according as we

are created again in grace, which is touched on

when it says: the Holy Catholic Church, theCommunion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins;

the reason being that by grace we are gatheredinto the unity of the Church, we communicate in

the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of

sins.

A seventh article concerns God’s effect by

which we are perfected in the being of glory

both with respect to the body and with respect to

the soul; and this is touched on when it says: theresurrection of the flesh, the life everlasting .

But the seven articles pertaining to the Incar-

nation are distinguished as follows:

The first concerns the conception of Christ,

which is touched on when it says: who was con-ceived by the Holy Spirit .

But the second concerns His birth, which is

touched one when it says: born of the Virgin Mary.

The third concerns His passion, which is

touched on when it says: suffered, died, and was

buried .

The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: hedescended into hell ];

the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he roseagain from the dead ];

the sixth His ascension: he ascended into Heaven;

the seventh His return in judgment: He will

come again to judge the living and the dead .

But others holding there to be twelve articles,

put down one article concerning the Three Per-

sons; and the article concerning the effect of

glory they divide into two, so that there is one

article concerning the resurrection of the flesh,

and another concerning eternal life: and thus the

articles pertaining to divinity are six.

48



Item conceptionem et nativitatem Christi sub

uno articulo comprehendunt; et sic etiam articuli

de humanitate sunt sex: unde omnes sunt duo-decim.

Primo igitur prosequitur articulum primum de

essentiae unitate; unde primo ponit unitatem

divinae essentiae: unus est solus verus Deus,

secundum illud Ioan. XVII, 3: ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum. Deut. VI, 4: audi Israel,dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est : per quod ex-

cluditur error gentilium ponentium multos deos.

Dicitur autem verus Deus, quia est essentialiter

et naturaliter Deus; dicuntur enim aliqui dii non

veri, per adoptionem, vel per participationem

divinitatis; sive nuncupative, secundum illud

Psalm. LXXXI, 6: ego dixi: dii estis. Dicuntur

etiam aliqui dii secundum opinionem errantium,secundum illud Psalm. XCV, 5: omnes dii gen-tium Daemonia.

Deinde ostendit excellentiam divinae naturae

sive essentiae. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod

non comprehenditur tempore: quod significatur

cum dicitur, aeternus. Dicitur enim aeternus,

quia caret principio et fine, et quia eius esse non

variatur per praeteri-tum et futurum. Nihil enim

ei subtrahitur, nec aliquid ei de novo advenire

potest.

Unde dicit ad Moysem Exod. III, 14: ego sumqui sum, quia scilicet eius esse non novit prae-

teritum nec futurum, sed semper praesentialiter

esse habet. Et apostolus dicit ad Rom. ult. 26:

nunc patefactum est per Scripturas prophe-tarum secundum praeceptum aeterni Dei.

Secundo ostenditur quod Dei magnitudo excedit

incomparabiliter omnem magnitudinem crea-

turae, cum dicitur, immensus. Illud enim men-surari potest per aliquid aliud, quod si excedat inmagnitudine, tamen excessus est secundum ali-

quam proportionem. Sicut binarius mensurat

senarium, inquantum ter duo faciunt sex. Sen-

arius autem excedit binarium secundum aliquam

proportionem, secundum quam binarius men-

surat senarium, quia est triplum eius.

Again, they include the conception and birth of

Christ under one article; and so the articles con-

cerning His humanity are also six, so that alltold they are twelve.

He proceeds therefore first to the first article

concerning the unity of the divine essence; and

so he puts down first the unity of the divine

essence, (saying): there is only one true God ,according to John (17:3): That they may knowthee, the only true God . (And) Deut. (6:4)

(adds): Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is oneGod : whereby the error of the Gentiles positing

many gods is excluded.

Now he says true God , because He is essentially

and naturally God; for some are called ‘gods’

not in truth, [but] by adoption, or by partici-

pation in divinity; or as being so named, accord-

ing to the Psalm (81:6): I have said: You are

gods. They are also called ‘gods’ according tothe opinion of those laboring under a mistake,

according to the Psalm (95:5): All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.

Then he shows the excellence of the divine na-

ture or essence. And first with respect to this,

that He is not comprehended by time: which is

meant when it says eternal . For that is called

‘eternal’ which lacks a beginning and an end,

and because its being is not varied by ‘past’ and

‘future’. For nothing is withdrawn from it, nor

can anything come to it anew.

And so He says to Moses in Ex. (3:14): I amWho am, since His being is not made new either

in the past or in the future, but He always has

being in the present. And the Apostle says in his

Letter to the Romans (16:26): Which now ismade manifest by the Scriptures of the Pro- phets, according to the precept of the eternal God .

Second, that the greatness of God incomparably

exceeds every greatness of the creature is shown

when it says, immense. For that can be measur-ed by something else which, if it exceed ingreatness, still, the excess is according to some

proportion. In this way the double measures the

sextuple, inasmuch as three times two makes

six. But the sextuple exceeds the double accor-

ding to a certain proportion, according as the

double measures the sextuple, because it is three

times it.

49



Deus autem excedit magnitudine suae dignitatis

omnem creaturam in infinitum; et ideo dicitur

immensus, quia nulla est commensuratio vel proportio alicuius creaturae ad ipsum; unde

dicitur in Psalm. CXLIV, 3: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis; et Baruch IV [III], 25, dicitur: magnus est et non habens finem, excelsus et immensus.

Tertio ostenditur quod excedit omnem muta-

bilitatem, cum dicitur, incommutabilis , quia sci-

licet nulla est apud ipsum variatio, secundum

illud Iacob. I, 17: apud quem non est trans-mutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.

Quarto ostenditur quod sua potestas transcendit

omnia, cum dicitur, omnipotens, quia simpliciter

omnia potest; unde ipse dicit Gen. XVII, 1: ego Deus omnipotens.

Et si quis obiiciat id quod apostolus dicit II ad

Tim. II, 13: ille fidelis per-manet, negare seipsum non potest , et ita non est omnipotens:

dicendum, quod negare seipsum, est deficere a

se ipso, non posse autem deficere non est ex

defectu potentiae, sed ex potentiae perfectione,

sicut etiam apud homines ex magna fortitudine

est quod aliquis vinci non possit. In hoc ergo

vere Deus omnipotens ostenditur quod omnia

potest facere, et in nullo potest deficere.

Quinto ostenditur quod excedit omnium

rationem et intellectum, cum dicitur, incompre-hensibilis. Illa enim comprehendere dicimur

quae perfecte cognoscimus, quantum cogno-

scibilia sunt. Nulla autem creatura tantum potest

Deum cognoscere quantum cognoscibilis est, et propter hoc nulla creatura potest eum compre-

hendere; unde dicitur Iob XI, 7: forsitanvestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentemusque ad perfectum reperies? Quasi dicat, non.

Et Ierem. XXXII, 18, dicitur: dominus

exercituum nomen tibi, magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu.

Sexto ostenditur quod excedit omnem locutio-

nem, cum dicitur, ineffabilis, quia scilicet nullus

potest sufficienter effari laudem ipsius: unde

dicitur Eccli. XLIII, 33: exaltate illum quantum potestis; maior est enim omni laude.

Now God infinitely exceeds every creature in

greatness by reason of His dignity; and so He is

called immense, because there is no commonmeasure or proportion of any creature to Him;

and so it says in the Psalm (144:3): Great is the Lord,…: and of his greatness there is no end ;and Baruch (3:25) says: It is great, and hath noend: it is high and immense.

Third, that He surpasses every kind of change is

shown when it says unchangeable, because

there is no variation in Him, according to Jas.

(1:17): with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

Fourth, that He surpasses everything by His

power is shown when it says almighty, because

He can do all things without qualification; and

so He Himself says in Genesis (17:1), I am God almighty.

And if someone object that the Apostle says in

II Tim. (2:13): If we believe not, he continueth faithful, he cannot deny himself , and that He is

not [therefore] almighty, it must be said that to

deny Himself is to fall short of Himself, but He

cannot fall short from a lack of power, but from

the perfection of His power, just as among men

someone cannot be overcome due to his

greatness of courage. But that God is truly al-

mighty is shown in this, that He can do every-

thing, and falls short in nothing.

Fifth, that He exceeds every reason and under-

standing is shown when it says, incomprehensible. For we comprehend those things which

we know perfectly, to the extent things are cap-

able of being known. Now no creature can know

God to the extent that He is knowable, and for this reason no creature can comprehend Him;

and so it says in Job (11:7): Peradventure thouwilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? as if to say, “no”.

And Jer. (32:18-19) says: the Lord of hosts is

thy name. Great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought .

Sixth, that He exceeds every utterance is shown

when it says ineffable, since no one can suf-

ficiently offer Him praise: and so it is said in

Ecclesiastics (43:33): exalt him as much as youcan; for he is above all praise.

50



Deinde accedit ad articulum Trinitatis, ponens

quidem primo nomina trium personarum, cum

dicit: pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, quaequidem exprimuntur Matth. ult., 19: doceteomnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patriset filii et spiritus sancti.

Sed circa haec tria nomina diversimode aliquierraverunt.

Sabellius enim dixit, quod pater et filius et

spiritus sanctus solis nominibus disting-uuntur,

dicens, eundem in persona esse, qui quandoque

dicitur pater, quandoque filius, quandoque

spiritus sanctus, propter rationes diversas; et ad

hoc excludendum subditur: tres quidem personae: alia est enim persona patris, alia filii,alia spiritus sancti.

Arius vero posuit, quod pater et filius et spiritussanctus sicut sunt diversa nomina, ita sunt

diversae substantiae; et ad hoc excludendum

subdit: sed una substantia. Verum quia substan-

tia secundum usum vocabuli aliter sumitur apud

nos et aliter apud Graecos, ne circa hoc possit

esse aliqua deceptio, subdit, seu natura. Apud

Graecos enim hypostasis, idest substantia,

accipitur, sicut apud nos persona, pro re aliqua

subsistente, quam dicimus suppositum vel rem

naturae, sicut hic homo est suppositum, vel res

humanae naturae. Apud nos vero secundum

communem usum loquendi, substantia dicitur essentia vel natura rei, secundum quod humani-

tas dicitur natura hominis.

Sic igitur datur intelligi, quod in divinitate tressunt subsistentes, scilicet pater et filius et spiri-

tus sanctus, sed una numero simpliciter natura

est in qua subsistunt: quod in rebus humanis

contingere non potest. Petrus enim et Paulus et

Ioannes sunt quidem tres subsistentes in natura

humana: sed natura humana, etsi sit una speciein istis tribus, non tamen est una et eadem

numero; et ideo sunt tres homines, non unus

homo. Quia vero in patre et filio et spiritu

sancto est una numero natura divina, dicimus

quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unus

Deus, et non tres dii.

Then he comes to the article on the Trinity, first

putting down the names of the Three Persons

when it says: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit ,which are expressed in Matt. (28:19-20): Going,therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them inthe name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

But with respect to these three names, somemen have gone astray in different ways.

For Sabellius said that the Father, the Son, and

the Holy Spirit are distinguished solely by their

names, saying that the one who at times is called

‘Father’, at times ‘Son’, at times ‘Holy Spirit’,

are the same Person, by reason of di-verse

notions; and to exclude this he says: three Persons: for one is the Person of the Father,

another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit.

But Arius held that, just as ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and‘Holy Spirit’ are different names, so they are

different substances: and to exclude this he

adds: but one substance. But because ‘sub-

stance’ according to the use of the word is taken

in one way among us [Latins] and in another

way among the Greeks, lest there be some de-

ception concerning this, he adds, or nature. For

among the Greeks hypostasis, that is, substance, is taken the same way ‘Person’ is among

us, [namely,] for something subsisting, which

we call a ‘supposit’ or ‘thing of nature’, just as

this man is a supposit, or thing of human nature.But according to the common manner of speak-

ing among us, ‘substance’ means the essence or nature of a thing, according to which ‘humanity’

means the ‘nature’ of man.

Thus, therefore, we are given to understand thatin the divinity there are three subsisting things,

namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,

but there is one nature simply in which they

subsist, which cannot happen in human things.

For Peter and Paul and John are indeed three

things subsisting in human nature: but humannature, even if it be one species in these three, is

nevertheless not one and the same in number,

and thus they are three men and not one man.

But because in the Father, the Son, and the Holy

Spirit there is one divine nature, we say that the

Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one

God, and not three gods.

51



Posset autem aliquis prave intelligere unam

essentiam trium personarum, ita scilicet quod

una pars illius naturae esset in patre, alia in filio,alia in spiritu sancto; sicut si diceremus unam

aquam esse in tribus rivis defluentibus ab uno

fonte, ita scilicet quod una pars aquae est in uno

rivo, alia in alio, tertia in tertio.

Si autem sic esset una natura trium personarum,

sequeretur quod divina natura esset composita

ex pluribus partibus: et ideo ad hoc excluden-

dum subdit, simplex omnino, idest nullam com-

positionem habens. Omne enim compositum

posterius est his ex quibus componitur; sic ergo

aliquid esset prius Deo, quod est impossibile.

Sed posset aliquis quaerere: si trium personarum

est una simplex natura, unde ergo tres personae

distinguuntur? Et ideo ad hoc respondens sub-dit: pater a nullo, filius a patre solo, ac spiritus sanctus pariter ab utroque.

Ubi considerandum est, quod quidquid in divi-

nis absolute dicitur, commune est et unum in

tribus personis: sicut quod dicitur Deus bonus,

sapiens et omnia huiusmodi. Ibi vero solum in-

venitur distinctum, ubi aliquid invenitur perti-

nens ad relationem originis, quia scilicet pater a

nullo est, et secundum hoc innascibilis dicitur.

Filius vero a patre est per generationem, secun-dum illud Psal. II, 7: ego hodie genui te, et

secundum hoc patri attribuitur paternitas, et filiofiliatio. Spiritus autem sanctus ab utroque pro-

cedit; et secundum hoc spiritui sancto attribuitur

processio, patri vero et filio communis spiratio,

quia scilicet communiter spirant spiritumsanctum.

Sic igitur quinque sunt notiones secundum quas

distinctiones personarum designantur in divinis:

scilicet paternitas, per quam ostenditur quod a patre est filius, filiatio per quam ostenditur quod

filius est a patre; processio per quam ostenditur

quod spiritus sanctus est a patre et filio; innasci-

bilitas, per quam dignoscitur quod pater a nullo

est; communis spiratio, per quam ostenditur

quod pater et filius communiter spirant spiritum

sanctum.

But someone could understand one essence in

three Persons in a debased manner, such that

one part of that nature would be in the Father,another in the Son, another in the Holy Spirit,

just as if we were to say there is one water in

three streams flowing from one spring, such that

one part of the water is in one stream, another in

another, and a third in a third.

If, however, there were one nature in three Per-

sons in this way, it would follow that the divine

nature would be composed of many parts: and

so in order to exclude this he adds, entirely simple, that is, involving no composition. For every

composite is subsequent to the things from

which it is composed; in this way, then, some-

thing would be before God, which is impossible.

But someone might ask: If there are three Per-

sons in one simple nature, how, then, are the

Three Persons distinguished? And so respon-ding to this he adds: the Father from none, theSon from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit equally from both.

Where it must be considered that whatever is

said absolutely in the Godhead is one and com-

mon in the three Persons, just as God is called

‘good’, ‘wise’, and everything of the sort. But

something distinct is found there only where

something is found pertaining to the relation of

origin, because the Father is from none, and in

this respect He is called ‘unbegotten’. But theSon is from the Father by generation, according

to the Psalm (2:7): This day I have begotten you,and in this respect ‘fatherhood’ is attributed to

the Father, and ‘sonship’ to the Son. The Holy

Spirit, however, proceeds from both, and with

respect to this to the Holy Spirit ‘procession’ isattributed, but to the Father and the Son in com-

mon, ‘spiration’.

There are thus five notions according to which

the distinctions of the Persons are designated in

the Godhead: namely, fatherhood , by which it isshown that from the Father is the Son; sonship,

by which it is shown that the Son is from the

Father; procession, by which it is shown that the

Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; be-ing unbegotten, by which it is shown that the

Father is from none; common spiration, by

which it is shown that the Holy Spirit is spirated

by the Father and the Son in common.

52



Sed rursus posset alicui occurrere falsa cogi-

tatio, ut quia in rebus humanis filius a quodam

principio temporis incepit a patre generari, etgeneratio eius non semper durat, sed certo ter-

mino temporis finitur, sic etiam sit circa origi-

nem divinarum personarum: ut scilicet filius ab

aliquo tempore inceperit a patre generari, et ali-

quo tempore eius generatio fuerit finita, et

similiter de spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad hoc exclu-dendum subdit: absque initio semper ac sine fine pater generans, filius nascens, spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedens.

Cuius exemplum aliqualiter in creaturis inveniri

potest licet imperfectum. Videmus enim quod

radius a sole procedit, et statim quod fuit sol,

radius processit ab eo, nec unquam desinet ab eo

radius procedere quandiu sol erit. Sic autem

filius procedit a patre, ut radius a sole, undedicit apostolus ad Hebr. I, 3: qui cum sit splendor gloriae; spiritus autem sanctus ab

utroque procedit, sicut calor a sole et radio,

unde dicitur in Psal. XVIII, 7: nec est qui seabscondat a calore eius.

Sed hoc exemplum deficit quantum ad hoc quod

sol non semper fuit, et ideo nec radius eius

semper ab eo processit: quia vero Deus pater

semper fuit, semper ab eo processit filius, et ab

utroque spiritus sanctus.

Potest et aliud exemplum poni in anima hu-mana, in qua verbum interius conceptum, a

memoria procedit, et ab utroque procedit amor.

Et ita etiam a patre procedit filius sicut verbum

eius, et spiritus sanctus sicut amor communisutriusque.

Sed hoc exemplum deficit in duobus. Primo

quidem quia intellectus humanus non semper

fuit; secundo, quia non semper verbum in corde

suo actualiter concipit. Sed intellectus divinussemper fuit, et semper absque intermissione in-

telligit, unde semper in eo oritur verbum, quod

est filius, et procedit amor, qui est spiritus san-

ctus. Quia vero haeretici Ariani filium patri

postpone-bant, et spiritum sanctum utrique, ideo

hoc consequenter excludit.

But additionally, a false thought might occur to

someone [along these lines], seeing that in

human things a son begins to be generated by afather at a certain point in time, and his genera-

tion does not go on, but is limited by a certain

term, so also in the case of the origination of the

divine Persons, so that the Son will have begun

to be generated from the Father at some definite

point in time, and at some definite point in timehis generation will have come to an end, and

likewise with the Holy Spirit. And so to exclude

this he adds: eternally without beginning or end the Father generating, the Son being born, the Holy Spirit proceeding from both.

An example of this, albeit an imperfect one, can

be found in creatures. For we observe that a ray

proceeds from the sun, and as soon as there was

a sun, the ray proceeded from it, nor will the ray

ever cease to proceed from it as long as the sun

exists. Now thus does the Son proceed from theFather as a ray does from the sun, and so the

Apostle says in his Letter to the Hebrews (1:3):

who is the brightness of his glory; but the Holy

Spirit proceeds from both as heat does from the

sun, and so it is said in the Psalm (18:7): thereis no one that can hide himself from his heat .

But this example falls short insofar as the sun

did not always exist, and so neither did its ray

always proceed from it: but since God the

Father always was, the Son always proceeds

from Him, and the Holy Spirit from both.

Another example is given in the human soul, inwhich the word conceived within proceeds from

memory, and love proceeds from both. And so

also from the Father proceeds the Son just as

His word, and the Holy Spirit as the love com-mon to both of them.

But this example falls short in two respects:

First of all because the human understanding did

not always exist; second, because the word is

not actually conceived in his heart. But thedivine intellect always was, and always under-

stands without interruption, and so a word al-

ways arises in it, that is the Son, and a love pro-

ceeds, which is the Holy Spirit. But because the

Arian heretics had the Son coming after the

Father, and the Holy Spirit after both, he there-

fore excludes it consequently.

53



Est autem considerandum, quod Ariani post-

ponebant filium patri, primo quidem quantum

ad essentiam, dicentes, quod essentia patris estdignior quam essentia filii: et ad hoc excluden-

dum subdit, consubstantiales, quia scilicet una

est essentia patris et filii in nullo differens.

Secundo vero quantum ad magnitudinem, nonquod in Deo sit magnitudo molis, sed magni-

tudo virtutis, quae est perfectio bonitatis suae.

Dicebant enim patrem esse filio maiorem etiam

secundum divinitatem: et ad hoc excludendum

subdit, et coaequales. Secundum humanitatem

vero dominus dicit Ioan. XIV, 28: pater maior me est .

Tertio quantum ad potestatem, dicentes filium

non esse omnipotentem: et ad hoc excludendum

subditur, et coomnipotentes.

Quarto quantum ad durationem, quia dicebant

filium non semper fuisse: et ad hoc excluden-

dum subdit, coaeterni.

Quinto quantum ad operationem. Dicebant enim

quod pater operatur per filium sicut per instru-

mentum suum, vel sicut per ministrum: et ad

hoc excludendum subdit, unum universorum principium. Non enim filius est aliud princip-

ium rerum, quasi inferius quam pater, sed ambo

sunt unum principium. Et quod dictum est defilio, intelligendum est de spiritu sancto.

Now it must be considered that the Arians

placed the Son after the Father, first with respect

to essence, saying that the essence of the Father is of greater dignity than the essence of the Son;

and in order to exclude this he adds, consubstantial , since there is one essence of the Son

and the Father differing in no way whatsoever.

But second, with respect to greatness, not that inGod there is greatness of bulk, but rather

greatness of virtue, which is the perfection of

His goodness. For they used to say that the

Father is greater than the Son also with respect

to divinity: and so to exclude this he adds, and

co-equal . But with respect to humanity, the

Lord says in John (14:28): The Father is greater than me.

Third, with respect to power , saying the Son is

not almighty: and to exclude this it is added, co-

omnipotent .

Fourth, with respect to duration, since they used

to say the Son did not always exist: and to ex-

clude this he adds, co-eternal .

Fifth, with respect to operation. For they used to

say that the Father worked through the Son as

through an instrument, or through a minister:

and in order to exclude this he adds: one principle of all things. For the Son is not another

principle of things, as though He were inferior

to the Father, but both are one principle. Andwhat is said of the Son here should be under-

stood of the Holy Spirit as well.

Deinde accedit ad alium articulum, qui est de

creatione rerum, ubi varias opiniones excludit.

Fuerunt enim aliqui haeretici, sicut Manichaei,

qui posuerunt duos creatores: unum bonum, qui

creavit creaturas invisibiles et spirituales, alium

malum, quem dicunt creasse omnia haec visibil-

ia et corporalia. Fides autem Catholica confite-tur omnia, praeter Deum, tam visibilia quam in-

visibilia, a Deo esse creata; unde Paulus dicit

Act. XVII, 24: Deus qui fecit mundum et omniaquae in eo sunt, hic caeli et terrae cum sit dom-inus, etc., et Hebr. XI, 3: fide credimus aptataesse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visi-bilia fierent .

Then he comes to the next article, which con-

cerns the creation of things, wherein he ex-

cludes various opinions.

For there were some heretics, like the Mani-

cheans, who posited two creators, one good,

who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the

other evil, who they say created all things visi-

ble and corporeal. But the Catholic Faith con-fesses that all things apart from God, both visi-

ble and invisible, were created by God; and so

Paul says in Acts (17:24): God, who made theworld, and all things therein; he, being Lord of heaven and earth, etc., and Heb. (11:3): By faithwe understand that the worlds were prepared bythe word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible.

54



Unde ad hunc errorem excludendum dicit:

creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium.

Aliorum error fuit ponentium Deum quidem

esse primum principium productionis rerum, sed

tamen non immediate omnia creasse, sed medi-

antibus Angelis mundum hunc esse creatum: et

hic fuit error Menandrianorum. Et ad hunc er-rorem excludendum subdit: qui sua omnipotentivirtute; quia scilicet sola Dei virtute omnes

creaturae sunt productae, secundum illud Psal.

VIII, 4 (3): videbo caelos tuos opera digitorumtuorum.

Alius fuit error Origenis ponentis quod Deus a

principio creavit solas spirituales creaturas, et

postea quibusdam earum peccantibus, creavit

corpora, quibus quasi quibusdam vinculis spiri-

tuales substantiae alligarentur, ac si corporalescreaturae non fuerint ex principali Dei inten-

tione productae, quia bonum erat eas esse, sed

solum ad punienda peccata spiritualium creatur-

arum, cum tamen dicatur Gen. I, 31: vidit Deuscuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Unde

ad hoc excludendum dicit quod simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

Alius error fuit Aristotelis ponentis quidemomnia a Deo esse producta, sed ab aeterno, et

nullum fuisse principium temporis, cum tamenscriptum sit Gen. I, 1: in principio creavit Deuscaelum et terram. Et ad hoc excludendum addit,

ab initio temporis.

Alius error fuit Anaxagorae, qui posuit quidem

mundum a Deo factum ex aliquo principio tem-

poris, sed tamen materiam mundi ab aeterno

praeextitisse, et non esse eam factam a Deo,

cum tamen apostolus dicat Rom. IV, 17: quivocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt .

And so to exclude this error he says: Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal .

There was another error of those holding God to

be the first principle of the production of things,

but nevertheles not to have created all things

immediately, but held this world to be created

through the mediation of angels: and this wasthe error of the Menandrites. And in order to

exclude this mistake he adds: who by Hisalmighty power ; the reason being that every

creature has been produced by God according

to the Psalm (8:3): For I will behold thyheavens, the works of thy fingers.27

There was another error of Origen, maintaining

that God from the beginning created only spiri-

tual creatures, and afterwards when some of

them had sinned, created bodies by which these

spiritual substances were bound, so to speak, bycertain ‘chains’, as though corporeal creatures

were not produced from the principle intention

of God, because it was good for them to be, but

only in order to punish the sins of spiritual

creatures, whereas it is said in Genesis (1:31):

God saw all things which he made, and theywere very good . And so in order to exclude this

he says that He established both creatures t o- gether,28 the spiritual , namely , and the corpor-eal, the angelic, to wit, and the mundane.

There was another error of Aristotle, maintain-ing that all things were created by God, but from

eternity, and that there was no beginning of time, whereas it is written in Genesis (1:1): Inthe beginning God created heaven and earth .29

And in order to exclude this he adds, from thebeginning of time.

There was another error of Anaxagoras, who

held the world to have been made by God from

some beginning in time, but the matter of the

world to have pre-existed from all eternity, and

not to have been made by God, whereas theApostle says in Romans (4:17): who calleth

27Likewise, all things were created through the Person of the Son:

For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible,

whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him,

and for him. (Col. 1:16)

28 For other translations of this oft-disputed passage, see further below.29 As if to say, the world did not always exist, but had, rather, a beginning (sc. in time).

55



Et ad hoc excludendum addit, de nihilo.

Fuit autem alius error Tertulliani ponentis ani-

mam hominis corpoream esse, cum tamen apos-

tolus dicat I ad Thess. V, 23: integer spiritusvester et anima et corpus sine querela inadventu domini nostri Iesu Christi servetur ; ubi

manifeste a corpore animam et spiritum distin-guit. Et ad hoc excludendum subdit: deinde, sci-

licet condidit Deus, humanam, scilicet naturam,

quasi communem, ex spiritu et corpore consti-tutam; componitur enim homo ex spirituali

natura et corporali.

Secundum autem praedictum Manichaeorum

errorem ponentium duo principia, unum bonum

et unum malum, non solum attendebatur distinc-

tio quantum ad creationem visibilium et invisi-

bilium creaturarum, ut scilicet invisibilia sint a bono Deo, visibilia vero a malo, sed etiam quan-

tum ad ipsa invisibilia. Ponebant enim primum

principium esse invisibile, et ab eo quasdam

invisibiles creaturas esse productas, quas dice-

bant esse naturaliter malas: et sic in ipsis An-

gelis erant quidam naturaliter boni ad bonam

creationem boni Dei pertinentes, qui peccare

non poterant; et quidam naturaliter mali, quos

Daemones vocamus, qui non poterant non pec-

care, contra id quod dicitur Iob IV, 18: ecce qui serviunt ei, non sunt stabiles, et in Angelis suis

reperit pravitatem.

Similiter etiam circa animas hominum errabant,

dicentes, quasdam esse bonae creationis, quae

naturaliter bonum faciunt, quasdam autem ma-

lae creationis, quae naturaliter faciunt malum,contra id quod dicitur Eccle. VII, 30 (29): Deus fecit hominem rectum, et ipse immiscuit seinfinitis quaestionibus. Et ideo ad haec exclu-

denda, dicit: Diabolus autem, scilicet princi-

palis, et alii Daemones quidem a Deo natura

creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali ,scilicet per liberum voluntatis arbitrium: homovero Diaboli suggestione peccavit , idest, non

naturaliter, sed propria voluntate.

those things that are not, as those that are. And

in order to exclude this he adds, out of nothing .

There was another error of Tertullian, maintain-

ing the soul of man to be corporeal, whereas the

Apostle says in I Thess. (5:23): that your whole spirit, and soul, and body, may be preserved blameless in the coming of our Lord Jesus

Christ , where he manifestly distinguishes thesoul and spirit from the body. And in order to

exclude this he adds: then, meaning ‘God estab-

lished’, the human, meaning ‘nature’, consti-tuted, as it were, in common [with both] from spirit and body; for man is composed from a

spiritual as well as a corporeal nature.

Now with regard to the aforementioned error of

the Manicheans, holding there to be two prin-

ciples, one good and one evil, not only was a

distinction observed with regard to the creation

of visible and invisible creatures, such that theinvisible were from the good God, but the

visible from bad, but even with regard to the

invisible things themselves. For they held the

first principle to be invisible, and from it certain

invisible creatures were produced, which they

used to call evil by nature: and so among the

angels themselves, some were naturally good

(as pertaining to the good creation of the good

God), who could not sin; and others naturally

evil, whom we call demons, who could not but sin, contrary to what is said in Job (4:18): Be-

hold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness.

They likewise also went astray where the souls

of men were concerned, saying that some were

of the good creation, which they make naturally

good, but some of the evil creation, which theymake naturally evil, contrary to what is said in

Ecclesiasticus (7:29): Only this I have found,that God made man right, and he hath entang-led himself with an infinity of questions . And so

in order to exclude this, he says: But the Devil ,

meaning (their head and) principal, and theother demons were created by God good innature, but became evil by their own doing ,meaning by their own free will: But man sinned at the prompting of the Devil , that is, not natur-

ally, but by his own will.

Deinde accedit ad articulum incarnationis; et Then he comes to the article on the Incarnation;

56



quia Evangelium Christi, sicut dicit apostolus

Rom. I, 2: Deus ante promiserat per prophetas suos in Scripturis sanctis, ideo praemittit de praenuntiatione prophetarum, circa quam etiam

quidam erraverunt.

Nam Manichaei et alii quidam haeretici vetus

testamentum dixerunt non a bono Deo, qui est

pater Christi, sed a malo Deo esse traditum, et per consequens doctrinam veteris testamenti

semper fuisse mortiferam; quod manifeste

falsum ostenditur per hoc quod dominus dicit

Ioan. II, 16, de templo Iudaeorum loquens:

nolite facere domum patris mei domumnegotiationis, ubi manifeste patrem suum dicit

Deum veteris testamenti, qui in templo

Iudaeorum colebatur.

Ariani vero dixerunt, in veteri testamento

diversis visionibus filium apparuisse, non autem

patrem: quod manifeste falsum ostenditur per hoc quod Abrahae in figuram Trinitatis tres viri

apparuerunt, ut legitur Gen. XVIII.

Cathaphryges etiam posuerunt, prophetas veteris

testamenti quasi arreptitios esse locutos, non

intelligentes quae loquebantur, contra id quod

dicitur Dan. X, 1: intelligentia opus est invisione. Ad hos igitur errores excludendos dicit,

quod haec sancta Trinitas, de qua scilicet dic-

tum est, quae scilicet est secundum communemessentiam individua, et secundum personales

proprietates discreta per Moysem et sanctos prophetas aliosque famulos suos.

Ubi videtur distinguere vetus testamentum,

scilicet in legem quae per Moysem data est et in

prophetas, sicut fuit Isaias, Ieremias, etc. et in

eos qui Agiographa conscripserunt, sicut fuitSalomon, Iob, et alii huiusmodi, quos famulos

Dei hic nominat; secundum quam distinctionem

dominus dicit Lucae ult. 44: oportet impleri om-nia quae scripta sunt in lege et prophetis et Psalmis de me. Iuxta ordinatissimam dispositi-

onem temporum: quod ponitur ad excludendumobiectionem gentilium, qui fidem Christianam

irridebant ex hoc quod post multa tempora,

quasi subito Deo in mentem venerit legem

Evangelii hominibus dari.

Non autem fuit subitum, sed convenienti

ordinatione dispositum, ut prius humano generi

per legem et prophetas fieret praenuntiatio de

and because the Gospel of Christ, as the Apostle

says (Rom. 1:2):

xx

57



Christo, tanquam hominibus tunc parvulis et

minus eruditis, secundum illud Gal. III, 24: lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo, et hoc estquod dicit, quod iuxta ordinatissimam dispositi-onem temporum doctrinam humano generitribuit salutarem, non mortiferam, ut Manichaei

dicebant.

His igitur praemissis, accedit ad ipsum incar-nationis mysterium explicandum, in quo etiam

diversos errores excludit. Ubi primo sciendum

est, quod Sabelliani confundentes divinas perso-

nas concedebant patrem esse incarnatum, quia

dicebant eundem in persona esse patrem et

filium.

E contrario autem Ariani dividentes substantiam

divinitatis, ex hoc quod filius est incarnatus, et

non pater, volebant concludere aliam esse

essentiam patris et filii, et aliam operationem

utriusque. Fides autem Catholica media via inter utrumque incedens, propter distinctionem

personarum dicit filium solum esse incarnatum

(est enim facta incarnatio per unionem in

persona, non in natura, ut infra determinant);

propter unitatem autem naturae et operationis in

tribus personis, dicit totam Trinitatem operatam

fuisse incarnationem; et hoc est quod dicit: et tandem unigenitus Dei filius Iesus Christus atota Trinitate communiter incarnatus.

Fuit etiam error Helvidii, qui posuit Mariam

quidem virginem concepisse et peperisse, sed post partum non semper virginem permansisse,

sed ex Ioseph postmodum alios filios genuisse;et ad hoc excludendum dicit: ex Maria semper virgine.

Alii vero, scilicet Ebionitae, gravius erraverunt,dicentes etiam Christum ex Ioseph semine esse

conceptum; ad quod excludendum subditur:

spiritu sancto cooperante est conceptus.

Fuerunt autem alii, scilicet Manichaei, qui

dixerunt Christum non veram carnem accepisse,sed phantasticam, contra id quod dominus

discipulis aestimantibus post resurrectionem

eum phantasma esse, dixit, Luc. ult. 39: spirituscarnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtishabere; ad quod excludendum dicit, verus homo factus.

Ariani vero dixerunt quod filius Dei assumpsit

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solam carnem sine anima, et quod verbum fuit

carni loco animae.

Sed postea Apollinaristae dixerunt eum habere

animam sensitivam tantum, contra id quod

dicitur Matth. XXVI, 38: tristis est anima meausque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, 18: potestatemhabeo ponendi animam meam; et ideo ad hoc

excludendum dicit, ex anima rationali.

Alii vero, scilicet sequaces Valentini, posuerunt

corpus Christi non esse assumptum de virgine,

sed de caelo allatum, contra id quod dicitur ad

Gal. IV, 4: factum ex muliere; et Rom. I, 3: qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem.

Et ad hoc excludendum dicit, et humana carnecompositus.

Circa ipsam autem unionem contrarie erraverunt

Nestorius et Eutyches; quorum Nestorius posuit

unionem esse factam solum secundum inhabita-tionem gratiae, sicut etiam in aliis sanctis Deus

dicitur esse per inhabitantem gratiam, ut sic Dei

et hominis sit alia et alia persona, contra id quod

dicitur Ioan. I, 14: verbum caro factum est , idest

filius Dei factus est homo; quod non potest dici

de aliis quos per gratiam inhabitat.

Eutyches vero posuit, quod facta est unio Dei et

hominis in unam naturam, ita scilicet quod

Christum asserebat esse quidem ex duabus

naturis, non autem in duabus quia scilicet inten-

debat quod ante incarnationem erant duaenaturae, Dei et hominis; sed post incarnationem

facta est una natura. Unde ad utrumqueexcludendum dicit: una in duabus naturis persona viam vitae manifestius demonstravit .

Fuerunt enim quidam Eutychis sectatores,scilicet Theodosius et Gaianus, qui ponentes

unam naturam in Christo, quasi ex divinitate et

humanitate confectam, diversimode erraverunt:

nam Theodosius posuit illam naturam esse cor-

ruptibilem et passibilem; Gaianus autem incor-

ruptibilem et impassibilem. Et ad hos erroresexcludendos, subdit: qui cum secundum divini-tatem sit immortalis et impassibilis, secundumhumanitatem factus est passibilis et mortalis.

Deinde accedit ad articulum passionis,

dicens: qui etiam pro salute humani generis in

ligno crucis passus et mortuus. Post quem

ponit articulum de descensu ad Inferos, dicens:

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descendit ad Inferos. Postea vero ponit

articulum de resurrectione Christi: et resurrexit a mortuis. Ac deinde ponit articulum deascensione, dicens, ascendit in caelum. Sed

notandum est quod horum articulorum veritatem

praedictus Arii et Apollinaris error salvare non

potest. Si enim Christus animam non habuit, sed

verbum fuit carni loco animae, et in morte

separatum fuit a carne, consequens est quodillud quod carni convenit, de filio Dei dici non

possit: unde non potest dici quod filius Dei

iacuit in sepulcro, vel quod a mortuis resurrexit.

Similiter etiam dici non poterit quod ad Inferos

descendit, quia divinitati secundum seipsam,

cum sit omnino immobilis, ascendere et

descendere convenire non potest. Et ideo ad

excludendum praedictum errorem, praedictorum

articulorum veritatem explicat subdens: sed descendit in anima, et resurrexit in carne,ascenditque pariter in utroque. In morte enim

Christi anima est separata a carne, sed divinitasindivisibiliter utrique, scilicet animae et carni,

mansit unita. Unde cum anima Christi descendit

ad Inferos, dicitur filius Dei descendisse

secundum animam sibi unitam. Similiter etiam

cum caro Christi, quae in morte quodammodo

ceciderat, resurrexit ad vitam, dicitur filius Dei,

qui secundum divinam naturam mori non

poterat, secundum carnem resurrexisse, per hoc

quod caro iterato animam resumpsit; et sic

secundum utrumque, idest secundum animam et

corpus, ascendit in caelum.

Deinde ponit articulum de adventu ad

iudicium, dicens: venturus in fine iudicare

vivos et mortuos. Dicit autem vivos eos qui

reperientur vivi in adventu iudicis, mortuos

autem eos qui ante fuerunt praemortui: quod

non est sic intelligendum, quasi aliqui sint futuriqui non moriantur, sed quia in ipso adventu

iudicis morientur et statim resurgent. Vel vivos

et mortuos intellige spiritualiter, idest iustos et

peccatores. Et quia aliqui fuerunt ponentes quod

in finali iudicio aliqui salvabuntur non propriis

meritis, sed precibus aliquorum sanctorumdonati; ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit: et redditurus singulis secundum merita sua, tamreprobis quam electis.

Deinde ponit articulum resurrectionis

generalis, quae pertinet ad effectum gloriae,

dicens: qui omnes tam reprobi quam electi cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quae nunc

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gestant : quod ponitur ad excludendum quorun-

dam haereticorum errorem, qui dicunt, quod

resurgentes non habebunt eadem corpora quaenunc per mortem deponunt, sed quaedam

corpora de caelis allata; quod est contra illud

apostoli I ad Cor. XV, 53: oportet corruptibilehoc induere incorruptionem. Consequenter

assignat rationem resumptionis corporum, cum

dicit: ut recipiant secundum opera sua, sivebona fecerint, sive mala. Quia enim homo aut

bene aut male operatus est in anima simul et

corpore, iustum est ut in utroque simul

damnetur aut praemietur. Et quia Origenes

posuit quod poena damnatorum non erit

perpetua, similiter nec gloria beatorum; ideo ad

hoc excludendum dicit: et illi cum Diabolo poenam aeternam, et isti cum Christo gloriam sempiternam. Sicut enim invidia Diaboli mors

intravit in orbem terrarum, ut dicitur Sap. I, 24,

ita per gratiam Christi reparamur ad vitam,

secundum illud Ioan. X, 10: ego veni ut vitamhabeant, et abundantius habeant .

Deinde accedit ad articulum qui est de

effectu gratiae: et primo tangit effectum gratiae

quantum ad Ecclesiae unitatem, cum dicit: unaest fidelium universalis Ecclesia, extra quamnullus salvatur omnino. Unitas autem Ecclesiae

est praecipue propter fidei unitatem: nam

Ecclesia nihil est aliud quam congregatio

fidelium. Et quia sine fide impossibile est

placere Deo, ideo extra Ecclesiam nulli patet

locus salutis.

Salus autem fidelium consummatur per Ecclesiae sacramenta, in quibus virtus passionis

Christi operatur, et ideo consequenter exponit

quid fides Catholica sentiat circa Ecclesiae

sacramenta. Et primo circa Eucharistiam, cumdicit: in qua scilicet Ecclesia ipse idem Christusest sacerdos et sacrificium, quia scilicet ipse

obtulit semet ipsum in ara crucis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis, ut dicitur ad

Ephes. V, 2, in cuius sacrificii commemorat-

ionem cotidie in Ecclesia offertur sacrificiumsub sacramento panis et vini. Circa quod

sacramentum tria determinat. Primo quidem

veritatem rei sub sacramento contentae, cum

dicit: cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramentoaltaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur . Dicit autem veraciter , ad

excludendum errorem quorundam qui dixerunt

quod in hoc sacramento non est corpus Christi

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secundum rei veritatem, sed solum secundum

figuram, sive sicut in signo.

Dicit autem: sub speciebus panis et vini, ad

excludendum errorem quorundam qui dixerunt

quod in sacramento altaris simul continetur

substantia panis, et substantia corporis Christi;

quod est contra verbum domini dicentis, hoc est

corpus meum. Esset enim secundum hoc magisdicendum: hic est corpus meum.

Ut ergo ostendat quod in hoc sacramento non

remanet substantia panis et vini, sed solum

species, idest accidentia sine subiecto, dicit: sub speciebus panis et vini.

Secundo ostendit quomodo corpus Christi

incipiat esse sub sacramento, scilicet per hoc

quod substantia panis convertitur miraculose in

substantiam corporis Christi, et substantia vini

in substantiam sanguinis; et hoc est quod dicit:transubstantiatis pane in corpus Christi et vinoin sanguinem potestate divina, ut ad mysterium perficiendum unitatis, idest ad celebrandum hoc

sacramentum, quod est ecclesiasticae unitatis

signum, accipiamus ipsi de suo quod accepit ipse de nostro. In hoc enim sacramento

accipimus de corpore et sanguine Christi, quae

filius Dei accepit de nostra natura.

Tertio determinat ministrum huius sacramenti,

in quo etiam tangit ordinis sacramentum, et hoc

est quod dicit, et hoc utique sacramentum nemo potest conficere, nisi rite fuerit sacerdos ordin-atus: quod est contra haeresim pauperum Lug-dunensium, qui dicunt quemlibet hominem istud

sacramentum posse conficere.

Addit autem: secundum claves Ecclesiae, quasipse concessit apostolis et eorum successoribus Iesus Christus. Quod dupliciter potest intelligi:

vel quia sacerdos rite ordinatus claves Ecclesiae

suscipit, vel quia secundum potestatem clavium

sacerdotalis ordo confertur. Sunt autem claves

Ecclesiae auctoritas discernendi et potestasiudicandi.

Deinde accedit ad sacramentum Baptismi;

circa quod primo tangit formam, cum dicit:

sacramentum vero Baptismi quod ad invocatio-nem individuae Trinitatis, videlicet patris et filiiet spiritus sancti; haec est enim forma Baptismi:

ego te baptizo in nomine patris et filii et spiritus

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sancti, ut traditur Matth. ult. 19.

Secundo ponitur materia, cum dicitur, conse-cratur in aqua. Non enim in alio liquore potest

hoc sacramentum perfici, nisi in vera aqua.

Tertio ostendit quibus sit conferendum hoc

sacramentum, cum dicit: tam parvulis quam

adultis: quod ponitur ad excludendum erroremPelagianorum, qui dicebant parvulos non habere

peccatum originale, propter quod oporteat eos

ablui per Baptismum.

Quarto tangit ministrum huius sacramenti, cum

dicit: in forma Ecclesiae a quocumque ritecollatum proficit ad salutem; quod est contra

errorem Donatistarum, qui baptizatos ab haere-

ticis dicebant non suscipere verum Baptisma,

sed esse rebaptizandos. Fides autem Catholica

recognoscit verum Baptisma a quocunque fuerit

collatum in forma Ecclesiae supradicta.

Deinde accedit ad sacramentum poenitentiae,

dicens: et si post susceptionem Baptismi quis-quam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram poenitentiam semper potest reparari; quod

ponitur ad excludendum errorem Novatianorum,

qui dicebant quod peccantes post Baptismum

non possunt reparari per poenitentiam.

Deinde accedit ad sacramentum matrimonii,

dicens: non solum autem virgines et

continentes, verum etiam et coniugati, per fidemrectam et operationem bonam placentes Deo,ad aeter-nam merentur pervenire beatitudinem;quod ponitur ad excludendum errorem

Tatianorum et Manichaeorum, qui nuptias

damnabant. De aliis autem sacramentis

mentionem non facit, quia circa ea non fuitspecialiter erratum.

§