The Office of Strategic Services - A Mixed Start to American Intelligence

The Office of Strategic Services: A Mixed Start to American Intelligence

When America went to war in 1941, it stood alone among the allies in having no standing

intelligence agency. The United States had no equivalent to the British Secret Intelligence

Service, the French BCRA, the Chinese Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, or the Soviet

NKVD. In an era when the reach and power of our intelligence agencies such as the CIA and

NSA are greatly debated in public, it is fascinating to learn that the history of American

intelligence agencies goes back less than 75 years. Indeed, there are many people alive today

who were born before the US any professional espionage or covert operations capability.

The American tradition of opposition to tyranny had seen any form of standing

intelligence agency as being equivalent to secret police forces such as the German Gestapo1. The

rudimentary intelligence apparatus that existed before the war was limited to two very limited

agencies. First was the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), which

amounted to having staff officers report when they saw information of possible importance

during their routine duties, such as new equipment on display at foreign parades, to a handful of

clerks in Washington that was more concerned about filing everything away in cabinets than

field work2. Second was the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which focused on analysis of

potential threats to the United States Navy, and had no concept of undercover work or espionage.

In World War I, the United States had used the British Secret Intelligence Service for its

foreign intelligence needs. As World War II was looming the Americans again began relying on

their British allies for support. However, the strategic necessity and political will existed to

1 Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 19382 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 6

create an actual professional intelligence agency with trained spies and large numbers of analysts

to process their reports.

To fill this role, Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild Bill”

Donovan to be the first spymaster of the United States and lead the newly formed Office of

Strategic Services (OSS). William Donovan was a World War I veteran and Medal of Honor

recipient, who earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his daring and recklessness in battle. A

member of the upper-class, his ties to the Ivy League would shape his personnel choices and

policies in the agency he would create, drawing heavily from academia in its leadership3.

Combining his own Ivy League heritage with British training of his agents, William

Donovan would quickly build a world-spanning intelligence agency that was operating in both

theaters of the war, doing everything from propaganda to sabotage, to airdropping counterfeit

ration stamps on the German population to undermine the economy of the Reich, to undercover

operations in Vichy France, to infiltration and spying deep within German territory. When a

cabal of German officers plotted to kill Hitler in 1944, the OSS was aware of the attempt and

made plans for if it should succeed4.

Under British tutelage, the OSS would quickly learn not just the practical aspects of

intelligence analysis, but learn to train commandos and spies for a variety of missions into Nazi-

occupied Europe5. Against orders of his military superiors, and on dubious standing with the

Geneva Conventions, Donovan recruited captured German POW’s to spy on their own nation for 3 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 464 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 495 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 17

the US6. Analysts within the OSS would even piece together the facts of the holocaust, although

their reports and alarms on this issue would not be heeded by their superiors7.

The OSS was an amazing work of organization that built an entire intelligence

infrastructure from scratch in remarkably short time, but it used highly questionable techniques

at points, contradicting both the Geneva Convention and its own manuals and regulations.

Furthermore, the OSS suffered from substantial organizational weaknesses due to the cultural

biases of both the era it emerged in, as well as the military heritage it grew out of.

Existing scholarship has largely been limited to official works of the US government

such as the compilation The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II

produced by George Chalou for the National Archives, or works of members of the Central

Intelligence Agency in their internal journal Studies in Intelligence.

Until recently, the shroud of official secrecy over the organization has limited detailed

study of the agency, which meant that unclassified studies were based off the few official

summary reports released to the public and censored interviews and accounts of veterans.

Joseph Persico, more widely known as Vice President Rockefeller’s speechwriter, has written

two books related to the OSS. Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage

focused on the politics of FDR and how that affected the OSS, while Piercing the Reich

discussed the OSS infiltration of Germany. Interestingly, the most notable historian to be a

veteran of the OSS, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., wrote virtually nothing about the agency and only

6 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 2537 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12

spoke in vague terms about his work for the OSS, only saying that he worked on a classified

publication called “European Political Report”8.

In recent years, a small number of mass-market books have been written on the OSS such

as Douglas C. Waller, who has written popular books about other military-related subjects.

Waller's book Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American

espionage was successful enough to be ranked on the New York Times Bestseller List.

Scholarship into the OSS has long been impeded by the cloak of secrecy which covers its

history and actions. Most prior research into the history of the OSS has been conducted by its

successor, the Central Intelligence Agency, which has had an unabashedly favorable view of the

history of the OSS9. However, with the declassification of a number of OSS manuals and reports

in December 201310, it is now possible to take a more detailed and critical look at America’s first

spy agency.

The United States did not have a tradition of espionage agencies before the Second World

War. There had been limited ad-hoc intelligence gathering during previous wars, and a

partnership agreement in the First World War to let the US gain access to information from the

British intelligence agencies, but no standing intelligence apparatus had been established by the

United States. With the looming war, and it being apparent that the United States would play a

more key role than it did in the prior World War, it was clear that some kind of professional

intelligence agency would be needed. The British government had been pressuring the United

8 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 64.9 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992) p. 3210 Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 1

States to develop its own standing foreign intelligence before the American entry to the war11.

The appraisal of American intelligence capabilities by Rear Admiral John Godfrey of the Royal

Navy was that the United States had only a “small and uncoordinated” intelligence capability,

which he described as “amateurs without special qualification and without training.” 12

Into this void, first J. Edgar Hoover tried to step. Hoover politically lobbied President

Roosevelt to expand the FBI from domestic law enforcement into being a full-fledged

intelligence agency with responsibility for foreign intelligence as in addition to domestic

investigations. President Roosevelt disapproved of the idea of giving Hoover and the FBI that

much authority and flatly refused Hoover’s request13.

To that end, on June 18, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild

Bill” Donovan to be the “Coordinator of Information”. His title was carefully chosen, as the

term “Intelligence” was nowhere in the name. The existing Army and Navy intelligence

functions objected to a new intelligence apparatus that they feared might replace them, and felt

that any civilian intelligence agency would be interference with their role in waging war14. At

first, Donovan was given a specific and limited mandate: to coordinate the intelligence efforts of

the FBI, War Department and Department of the Navy to prevent overlap or conflicting

assignments.

11 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 4812 Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 8113 Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 3614 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 50

Colonel Donovan was a respected military officer who was a World War I veteran and

Columbia University alumni. He had earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his brave and reckless

actions on the battlefield, which had culminated in receiving the Medal of Honor for his actions

on October 14, 1918 in leading an infantry charge in France15. His credentials as a leader were

impeccable, and he had an Ivy League education and had served as the Deputy Attorney General

of the United States in the 1920’s. President Roosevelt gave Colonel Donovan an initial charge

to coordinate intelligence gathering and analysis functions of the FBI, ONI, and MID to prevent

overlap and allow for interchange of information. The British responded to this modest increase

in American intelligence capability by having Commander Ian Fleming of the Royal Navy (who

would find fame after the war as the author of the James Bond novels) speak with Colonel

Donovan about coordinating US and UK intelligence efforts and helping the US develop a more

robust intelligence service than the modest Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI)16.

The OCI did not change immediately after the US entered World War II in December

1941. However, their scope of operations began to move from simply coordinating the efforts of

the existing agencies to undertaking their own operations. In January 1942, the OCI began a

program of covert burglaries into the Spanish Embassy in Washington D.C., with the intent of

files from the records of the Axis-affiliated Franco government. However, the rivalry of

Donovan and Hoover undermined the effort, as in April 1942 the FBI used their knowledge of

these operations to interrupt a OCI burglary by having marked FBI squad cars arrive at the

Spanish Embassy during one of the burglaries and had FBI agents warn the Spanish that burglars

15 United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 192216 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 47

were trying to break in to the Embassy. The OCI agents barely escaped from both the Spanish

Embassy personnel and FBI agents attempting to arrest them17.

In the aftermath of this incident, it became clear that the OCI needed expansion and a

clear mandate from the President to conduct covert operations. With the rapid expansion of

military capabilities from the mobilization to wartime, the reorganization of the OCI into the

OSS was undertaken. President Roosevelt issued the formal order on June 13, 194218. President

Roosevelt followed that order in December with Executive Order 9241, which gave the OSS the

same wartime powers to purchase goods and services without a formal bidding process or

executive oversight that had been granted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September19.

Colonel Donovan was promptly promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, and given

command of the Office of Strategic Services, established as a special joint military agency,

outside the normal chain of command, that would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

Directive gave General Donovan the responsibility to rapidly build an agency that would be

tasked with intelligence analysis, special operations behind Axis lines, and morale operations

(often called propaganda, but distinct from the propaganda of the Office of War Information).

Its status as a joint agency would give the OSS the ability to recruit from all the armed services

as well as directly recruit specially qualified civilians20.

17 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p.1818 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D. Roosevelt, “Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942” 19 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of the Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)20 Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 6

General Donovan was given a particularly broad mandate. While his agency was to be

based on the British model, the British had divided the functions he was to accomplish into four

separate agencies. Donovan was expected to create an American equivalent to the British MI6,

Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Executive, and Political Office of Research21.

Hoover, however, would not quietly accept the creation of a new intelligence agency.

The MID, a modest organization, growing rapidly after Pearl Harbor, was lead by General

George Strong, a close friend of Hoover. Hoover and Strong feared Donovan’s new agency

would pose a threat to the power and influence of the FBI and the MID. Hoover and Strong

lobbied to have Donovan relieved of his position and have the OSS placed under General

Strong’s command as a subordinate branch of the MID. President Roosevelt denied the

request22.

General Donovan began to staff his agency largely with his colleagues from the Ivy

League. Donovan expressed great admiration for an Ivy League education, believing that their

tradition of secret societies prepared a student for intelligence work. He also believed that their

academic rigor was superior and produced a more refined mind. General Donovan also

appreciated the athletic tradition of the Ivy League schools and felt that Ivy League students

were more physically fit, which made them ideal for military or paramilitary duties23. The

overall recruitment for the OSS was heavily biased towards white male Protestants, with women,

21 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 2622 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 31323 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 23.

non-white, and non-Protestant personnel being rare exceptions24. Donovan recruited heavily

from academia in staffing the OSS. Most of the supervisors and civilian analysts were drawn

from the faculty and alumni of the Ivy League and transitioned their academic research skills

into intelligence analysis skills.

The OSS initially experimented with recruiting criminal figures, under the concept that it

would take a remorseless killer to perform the deeds of a guerilla or spy. However, after a

disastrous operation in Italy early in the war where members of organized crime that were

recruited by the OSS had failed their mission, the idea of using criminal figures was discarded.

The selection process for civilian recruits then turned to elaborate psychometric testing and

evaluations to find those who were suitable for undercover work and guerilla warfare25.

The OSS found success in recruiting agents from refugees from occupied Europe. These

people were strongly motivated to fight the Nazis, and knew the language and culture of the

areas they were being sent to infiltrate26.

All OSS personnel were put through a condensed 4-week basic military training course.

Even those that were already in the military had to repeat the course of basic training, and those

that were assigned to be analysts in the Special Intelligence branch and thus not field personnel

were also sent to this training. The school largely taught the same curriculum as the US Army

did in its normal basic training, but at an accelerated rate, with changes to the curriculum to

emphasize guerilla warfare instead of conventional infantry tactics27, as well as adding subjects

24 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 2425 Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 2126 Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 23

that would be unique to intelligence work such as conducting body searches28. OSS agents were

also trained in various methods of committing sabotage29.

All OSS personnel would also be given training in the culture of their adversaries,

particularly Germany30. Those OSS agents to be assigned to undercover work would receive

additional weeks of training in how to maintain a cover identity, culminating in an examination

where they would be interrogated while in their cover identity to see if they could maintain their

cover while being questioned31. Personnel assigned to Special Operations groups would be given

extensive training in sabotage. OSS doctrine considered the assassination of an individual to be

regarded as “Sabotage applied to individuals”32.

Although it was highly unconventional in America for the time, the OSS training was

gender-integrated with the few female agents that had been recruited receiving training at the

same sites33. This mimicked the British practice of gender-integrated intelligence training34.

The eight OSS training camps were established in remote parts of US Park Service lands

in Virginia and Maryland, chosen for being isolated but accessible within a day’s drive of

27 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic Services. 28 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services.29 Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944) p. 1030 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic Services. 31 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic Services. 32 Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)33 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 12334 Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive in the Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 64

Washington D. C35. The camps included hastily erected barracks where classes of approximately

30 recruits would conduct conventional military training, combined with instruction in

intelligence tradecraft. They were based on similar British MI6 and SOE training camps which

was conducted at country estates of the aristocracy, within a day’s drive of London36.

In London, the OSS established its support facilities for operations in Europe. The

centerpiece of this operation was the Research and Analysis branch. R&A was an office

complex in London that was staffed with a mixture of Donovan’s Ivy League academics and

soldiers trained in intelligence analysis. The Central Information Division of the Research and

Analysis Branch was tasked with keeping track of the massive amounts of information that the

OSS was gathering. They were required to index the information, cross-reference it, and keep it

readily accessible for analysts. This was a substantial achievement for an era predating modern

information technology. The elaborate card index system they developed was so efficient that it

is still studied by archivists as an example of highly efficient indexing and archival storage37.

The analysts of the OSS combed through all available information to deduce everything

they could about their adversaries. This included detailed review and analysis of German

newsreels38, and detailed economic study of the Reich39. The OSS also studied how the Germans

35 John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”, Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) p. 336 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 1737 Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”, The American Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 28738 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of Strategic Services39 Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War II”, The Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109

used propaganda to control public and military morale40. OSS analysts also developed an

elaborate system of sorting all intelligence information by the reliability of the source and

estimated accuracy of the information41.

Another key activity of the OSS was their production of forged German identification

papers for undercover agents. Undercover agents would need flawless replica papers to survive

Gestapo scrutiny. In recruiting forgers, the OSS drew from the best workers at the Bureau of

Engraving and Printing and in commercial printing firms. The suggestion was made to use the

best criminal forgers in prison, but Donovan flatly refused that request, noting that if they were

the best forgers, they wouldn’t have been caught42. At the same time, the OSS was attempting to

undermine German efforts to counterfeit American identity documents and currency that their

own spies were using43.

A key problem with forging German identity documents was that the Reich had

developed a special high-security ink to thwart counterfeiting, that had unique properties under

different types of light. The OSS could not find a way to replicate the ink. Thus, they proceeded

to obtain the ink directly from the Germans. The OSS forged requisition forms for the ink, and

had an OSS agent that was undercover in a Vichy French government office submit the forms.

40 Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of Strategic Services.41 Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 442 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 2543 Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2. (2002) pp 41-53 p. 44

The secure ink was promptly delivered, where it was picked up by OSS agents and escorted to

London to allow the OSS regular production of German secure documents44.

One of the innovations of the Research and Analysis branch was the concept of strategic

bombardment. Previously in warfare, bombers attacked enemy formations on the battlefield, or

indiscriminately targeted cities rather than targeting specific war-related industries or resources.

At their London field office, the R&A branch of the OSS refined the doctrine of specifically

targeting industrial capability to cripple the German ability to sustain the war45.

Albert Speer would later credit the strategic bombardment concept invented by the OSS

with crippling the German war machine and turning the tide of war. Specifically, he noted that

American bombing targeting Luftwaffe fuel refineries and the mines that produced a handful of

strategic metals used in aircraft construction had effectively disabled the Luftwaffe46.

The Research and Analysis Branch was a combination of academics and soldiers, and this

division did not go unnoticed. The military members of R&A were usually junior-ranking

soldiers, and they complained that the senior officers that comprised OSS leadership frequently

ignored their findings due to their low rank. Some intelligence analysts complained that they

spent more time performing janitorial duties, such as mowing lawns and picking up trash than

they did performing intelligence duties47.

44 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 3645 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 4646 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books, 1970), p. 54747 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 102

OSS operations in France focused heavily on providing aid to the Maquis resistance

movement against the Nazi occupation48. Many OSS agents worked undercover, posing as

French civilians. These operatives helped to arm and equip the Maquis, sabotage German forces,

as well as help prepare the French coast for the invasion that was to come.

Elizabeth Pack was one OSS operative in France who provided a vast amount of

intelligence for the OSS. Her specialty was to seduce Vichy French officials to gain access to

encryption codes and other government secrets49. After the war, General Donovan actively

denied that anyone in the OSS ever used such tactics, claiming “We did not rely on the seductive

blonde or phony mustache” when discussing OSS methods50. Female OSS agents operating in

France regularly complained of highly sexist behavior and treatment from French resistance

members they dealt with51.

One highly unconventional operation of the OSS was known as Operation Iron Cross.

The goal of this was to have teams of double agents act as saboteurs to do as much damage as

possible to the German war effort, and ideally to capture any senior German officers or

government officials they may encounter52. This was accomplished by taking those German

prisoners of war that they felt could be turned into double agents, equipping them with new

48 Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1985) pp 60-6549 Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of World War II (New York, Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 23050 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.4251 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.15652 Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001) p. 253

uniforms and equipment, and forged identifications giving them new identities, and then

releasing them into German-held Europe as a wandering military unit. While the exact scale of

Iron Cross is unknown because full records did not appear to have been preserved after the war53,

the few surviving records noted that the plan had been declared an overall success54.

In Italy, the OSS found most of its work being helping anti-Fascist partisans. Mussolini’s

rise to power left many who strongly dissented with fascism, but could not safely express that

dissent. The OSS found it advantageous to supply them with weapons, organize them, and let

them act as reinforcements in the fight to retake Italy. By March 1944, over 20,000 Italian

Partisans had been organized and equipped by the OSS, who sabotaged the German retreat from

Italy by destroying key rail lines, and bolstered advancing Allied forces55.

Lt. William Colby, USNR, who would later become the director of the Central

Intelligence Agency, spent most of his service with the OSS undercover in Germany as a

member of Project Jedburgh. Jedburgh teams, including Lt. Colby, engaged in both intelligence

gathering and sabotage operations throughout occupied Europe. Colby was awarded the Bronze

Star Medal for infiltrating several German cities, including Berlin itself56.

One of the more daring projects of the OSS within German borders was Project

Cornflakes. This was the effort to forge propaganda letters which would demoralize German

citizens, complete with forged postage stamps that mocked Hitler but superficially resembled

53 Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 5754 Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 16255 Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998), p. 10056 Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 36

legitimate postage, and insert mailbags full of these letters into the German postal system to be

delivered. This allowed the OSS to deliver demoralizing messages directly to the mailboxes of

German households with the postal service as an accomplice57. The use of agent provocateurs to

spread “poison pen” letters with forged stamps was an ideal case of the use of most of the

doctrinal standard methods of morale operations that the OSS’s own manuals approved of58.

The OSS office in Bern was based out of the United States Embassy, and was headed by

John Allen Dulles, who carried the title “Special Assistant to the Minister” to justify his

presence. Dulles had to walk a fine line, as the Swiss guarded their neutrality carefully, and

being caught in espionage activities in Switzerland would likely get the US embassy closed. As

Switzerland was neutral territory, agents of virtually every power in the war, including Japan,

had a presence in Bern, all trying to avoid the Swiss “foreign police” who enforced the neutrality

of Switzerland59.

When senior German officers engaged in their famous plot to assassinate Hitler, the OSS

had received advance warning. Hans Gisevius, a German intelligence officer who the Americans

had given the codename “Breaker” had travelled to Switzerland and at great risk to himself and

the plot, communicated the intent of the group to the OSS, hoping for American support. When

the plot failed, he escaped to Switzerland and, using forged documents provided by the OSS, was

evacuated. This made him one of the few conspirators to survive the War60.

57 Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report.58 Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1943), p. 259 Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, p. 2060 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 282

In Scandinavia, the OSS operations focused mainly on assisting local resistance units and

sabotage against Nazi occupation. Lt. Colby was also present in Norway in April 1945,

sabotaging railroads to prevent Wehrmacht forces in Norway from travelling to Germany to

reinforce defenses there during the final push to Berlin61. Colby also helped to establish OSS

safehouses in Sweden and Norway62.

The OSS had a very limited role in South America. Early in the war, J. Edgar Hoover

objected to any presence or action by the OSS in South America, stating that he already had

undercover FBI agents in multiple South American countries as part of ongoing investigations.

Hoover used this claim to argue that an OSS presence would interfere with FBI investigations

that predated the war. Donovan felt that this was just another attempt by Hoover to fight with

the OSS over power and his ongoing campaign to undermine the OSS.63 Meanwhile, Hoover felt

that this was part of a plot by Donovan to have the OSS replace the FBI, or for Donovan to be

appointed as the Director of the FBI and replace Hoover64.

The situation was eventually resolved when President Roosevelt issued a direct order to

the OSS that they could not engage in any undercover operations or covert activities south of the

American border. Any OSS agents would have to not operate under cover, and the FBI was

given territorial jurisdiction for covert US operations in Central and South America65. This

61 William E. Colby. "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000), 5462 Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 2863 Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 1764 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). P. 29565 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p.17

ultimately meant that the role of the OSS in South America was very limited. Officially, no

covert OSS activities were taken in South America, pursuant to the Presidential directive.

Much as in South America, the OSS had a reduced role in the Pacific Theater of

Operations. Both General Douglas MacArthur66, and Admiral Chester Nimitz67, as the senior

military commanders in the Pacific would not tolerate OSS tactical operations in their area. Both

felt that the OSS was in competition with their own intelligence activities and did not want an

independent paramilitary force operating in their area of operations outside their jurisdiction.

Due to these restrictions, the special operations branch of the OSS was restricted from

operating in the Pacific Theater of Operations. OSS activity related to the Pacific theater was

restricted to intelligence analysis at stations outside the Pacific theater. However, technically the

China-Burma-India theater was a separate military theater than the Pacific, one largely

dominated by the British that the OSS had a good relationship with, and had not been prohibited

under the orders that Nimitz and MacArthur gave restricting them from the Pacific theater68.

Without prohibition against operating in mainland Asia, the OSS established Detachment 101,

lead by Colonel Carl Eifer to conduct operations in that theater.

Operational groups like Detachment 101 were the most military-like element of the OSS,

which often avoided military trappings whenever possible69. The small unit, only a few hundred

members, created a network of saboteurs to undermine Japanese occupation, supported the 66 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 7967 Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 29468 CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies in Intelligence (September 1993)69 Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Republic of China army, and established safe houses and a network for recovering downed allied

aircrews and returning them to friendly territory. Detachment 101 also organized 3,000 Kachin

people of northern Burma into the paramilitary resistance force known as the Kachin Rangers70.

The US Army had such little interest in unconventional warfare such as this in World

War II that they refused to undertake their own special operations or commando activities, that

was left to the Army elements assigned to the OSS. The modern US Army Special Operations

Command traces its history to the OSS Special Operations groups such as Detachment 10171.

Much like the OSS in Europe used German POW’s for intelligence purposes,

Detachment 101 found a way to use Japanese prisoners of war for their own ends in translating

and adapting propaganda to be distributed in the theater to demoralize Japanese forces. Japanese

POW’s were used as translators and for cultural reference in ensuring that the morale operations

of Detachment 101 had optimum effect in demoralizing Japanese troops. Flyers and leaflets that

were distributed mocking the Japanese were found throughout the entire theater, in many cases

hundreds of miles from where they were originally distributed72.

By the end of the war Detachment 101 had been responsible for the rescue of 541 allied

airmen, killed 5,428 Japanese soldiers, and only suffered 22 American casualties73. Despite

General MacArthur’s distaste for the OSS, he was impressed enough by their performance in the

70 Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter 2001 71 United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992, p. 772 Jack B. Pfeifer, “OSS Propaganda in Europe and the Far East”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1984) pp 4373 William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220

China-Burma-India theater to award Detachment 101 the Distinguished Unit Citation after the

war for their collective achievements in the war effort74.

The OSS maintained professional relations and communications with the Soviet

intelligence and security service, the NKVD, despite J. Edgar Hoover’s anticommunist paranoia

casting a shadow over the relations. In early 1944, the OSS and NKVD had brokered a deal to

actively coordinate efforts in the field and exchange espionage technologies, but Hoover, along

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued against the deal in a letter to Roosevelt on February 22,

1944, saying it was an attempt at Communist infiltration of the OSS. Shortly after Hoover’s

letter was received, President Roosevelt cancelled the deal75.

Even though President Roosevelt had cancelled the pending deal, General Donovan had

already gone through with much of the terms of the arrangement. Although he never reported it

to Washington, and the records revealing were only found after his death years later, Donovan

had transferred a large quantity of microdot manufacturing systems, miniature cameras and other

espionage gear to the NKVD in anticipation that the arrangement would be approved76.

Shortly after the deal was cancelled, in May 1944, OSS and NKVD relations collapsed

when Soviet forces reached Romania and Bulgaria. The Soviets occupied those territories

immediately, and the territories had OSS agents already in them. On September 25, 1944, the

Soviet Union officially demanded that all OSS personnel leave these countries, stating that they

74 United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 194675 Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983), p. 34076 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 312

were now the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union, and not axis territory77. The OSS

negotiated a deal to remain in Bulgaria and Romania after that ultimatum, but they proved to be

of little intelligence value in the war. The main role of the agents that remained in those

territories was to observe the actions of the USSR in the areas they were occupying.

The OSS agents in Bulgaria and Romania reported as the USSR immediately moved to

suppress all non-Communist political parties, nationalize all industries, and suppress all dissent

or public statements against the USSR or Soviet occupiers. OSS intelligence analysts concluded

that it was the intent of the Soviet Union to annex all territories in Eastern European that they

were taking from Nazi control, and were already actively converting those countries to

communism78.

The OSS had a strained relationship with the Free French Forces. After the war, the head

of intelligence operations for the French, Major Andre Dewavrin (also known by his nom de

guerre “Colonel Passy”) actively considered the idea of any study of the OSS in France to be

useless, saying “The OSS did virtually nothing in France”79. During the war, female OSS agents

working in France reported that they were not taken seriously by French resistance fighters

because they were women, and that the Free French forces would refuse to work with them80.

77 Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983), p 350.78 Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983), p. 35279 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 24880 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 156

The OSS had a very good working relationship with the British intelligence services.

The British had encouraged the creation of the OSS, and had fostered and guided its initial

organization and training. Once established, the OSS developed agreements with MI6 and the

British Special Operations Executive that all infiltration of Europe should be done jointly

between the British and Americans81. The British had even developed a method for secretly

accessing the contents of sealed diplomatic pouches, and shared this technology with the

Americans, letting them access the diplomatic messages of other countries82.

However, due to Hoover’s political interference, the OSS was prohibited from having

professional ties or liaison connections to MI5, whom Hoover argued should communicate with

the FBI as their U.S. counterpart. Hoover argued that since the OSS did not handle domestic

security, they should not interact with MI583. President Roosevelt agreed with Hoover on that

point, and prohibited the OSS from maintaining a liaison with the British MI5.

With the end of the war in Europe, the OSS found a role in the closing affairs of the

theater and the prosecution of Nazis for the war crimes that were committed. With the surrender

of the German military on May 7, 1945, the OSS found that they now had a role in piecing

together what had happened that they were not aware of, and helping with the orderly closing of

the loose ends of the war.

A looming question that arose when Allied forces liberated the concentration camps was

to wonder why there hadn’t been alarms or notice of this made by the OSS or other intelligence 81 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 29882 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1483 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 150

agencies during the war itself. When asked about why the OSS had not discovered the

Holocaust during the war, General Donovan replied that official policy was to focus on the

defeat of Germany above all else and that anything not explicitly related to achieving victory was

not the focus of the OSS84. Schlesinger had also insisted that the Research and Analysis branch

of the OSS had absolutely no knowledge of the Holocaust85.

The fact that all intercepted German communications that referred to the Holocaust used

coded phrases and euphemisms gives some small degree of plausible deniability to these

claims86. However, the fact that the OSS had been receiving reports from the Polish resistance

fighters regarding what they had seen at the concentration camps and reports of ongoing

extermination operations as early as November 1942 indicates either willful ignorance, or

actively distrusting the reports they were receiving from the Poles87.

While General Donovan repeatedly denied that the OSS had any knowledge of the

Holocaust, two intelligence analysts at the OSS did file reports concluding that Germany was

engaged in a systematic program of genocide of the European Jewish population, including

specifying the various camps at which the action were taking place. Abraham Duker and Charles

Dwork were low-ranking intelligence analysts in the OSS Research and Analysis office in

London who had repeatedly filed reports on the ongoing genocide, and had their work repeatedly

84 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)85 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 6686 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3187 George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 108

ignored88. The fact that both Duker & Dwork were Jewish cannot be overlooked in the

ramifications of this ongoing pattern of neglect.

With the war over, the OSS had found itself subject to both post-war cutbacks and the

changing political landscape. President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9621 on

September 20, 1945 that disbanded the OSS, transferring their tactical functions to the War

Department, and their research and analysis functions to the US State Department89. On that day,

President Truman wrote a polite letter thanking General Donovan for his service, and explicitly

stated that his intent as President was to create a permanent post-war intelligence agency as a

regular government agency and not an ad hoc wartime organization90.

When Truman signed the order to close the Office of Strategic Services, he had received

a report compiled by President Roosevelt’s military attaché, Colonel Richard Park Jr, a longtime

friend of Hoover's ally General Strong91. This report accused the OSS of incompetence,

nepotism, and numerous botched operations92. President Truman had developed such a low

opinion of General Donovan that he actively avoided complementing Donovan in speeches after

the war, to the point of even crossing him off prepared lists of people to thank or compliment93.

88 David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996), p. 2189 Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)90 Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, “Letter to General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic Services”91 Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 31492 Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 493 Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 5

At the war crimes trials that closed the European Theater of the war, the OSS found a

role. General Anton Dostler was placed on trial for following Hitler’s “commando order” that

any infiltrators or saboteurs must be shot. On March 26, 1944, General Dostler had ordered the

execution of 15 captured OSS agents. The agents were wearing US Army uniforms, thus were to

be considered prisoners of war under the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. For his

role in ordering the execution of 15 OSS agents, General Dostler was the first member of the

Nazi regime to be convicted of war crimes, and was executed on December 1, 194594.

Even though the OSS did not officially acknowledge the events of the holocaust during

the war, and that they were officially disbanded in late 1945, former OSS analysts who were

reassigned to the War Department continued to produce reports on the events of the holocaust for

review, using the OSS name to identify for whom they were working. They produced long,

elaborate reports summarizing the events that occurred at the various concentration camps, with

interviews of survivors and elaborate accounting of what happened95.

After the war, there was also the question of what should be done with the records of the

OSS. There was substantial debate to whether or not what the OSS did should even be recorded

or preserved, or if the acts of the OSS should be allowed to be forgotten as a wartime secret.

After the transfer of OSS tactical capabilities to military jurisdiction, Fleet Admiral William D.

Leahy ended the debate by commissioning a report on the history of the OSS on July 26, 1946.

This “War Report of the OSS” was a broad, general history of the OSS that remained Top Secret

94 United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S. Military Commission at Rome, 1945)95 Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes, Technical Sergeant John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946.

until 1976. It provided just a summary of its actions96. It was careful to omit information that

did not cast the OSS in a positive light. What little was revealed immediately after the war was

heavily censored.

Ultimately the OSS was a triumph of organization and planning. General Donovan built

an organization of around 13,000 individuals on short notice, organizing them into a worldwide

intelligence agency, with an archival system that is still notable many decades later97. This

agency combined the roles of what the UK used four agencies with separate missions to

accomplish, drawing from both the very best in academia and the military.

However, the shortcomings of the Office of Strategic Services must also be noted. The

OSS inherited the hierarchical structure of the military, meaning that lower-ranking members

found their input ignored or overlooked easily, such as analysts Duker & Dwork having their

reports on the holocaust repeatedly ignored due to their low military rank. This hierarchical

structure was clearly reinforced by the tendency of the OSS to recruit from the Ivy League

colleges, as the leaders of the OSS were recruited from the protestant members of upper social

classes. The internal political strife in American government at the time also greatly hindered

the ability of the OSS to perform intelligence work in the entire Pacific Theater and South

America were closed to OSS activity due to Donovan’s rivalries with Hoover and MacArthur.

The OSS also inherited the problems of racism and sexism that were inherent to

American society in the 1940’s. The racial and sexual prejudices of the era worked to limit the

effectiveness of the OSS by reducing the available talent they had to draw from.

96 United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic Services by Kermit Roosevelt, 1947. 97 Dawidoff, Nicholas. The Catcher was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg ( New York: Vintage Books, 1994) p. 240

Furthermore, the OSS clearly had to engage in numerous espionage activities that were

well outside the normal scope of espionage and crossed into violations of international law as

well as their own policies. The breaching of diplomatic pouches was a violation of standards of

diplomatic relations, even if it would not be formal international law until after the War98. That

the OSS violated not only international law against the use of prisoners of war as double-agents,

but violated its own classified internal regulations regarding the issue casts light on the reasons

of why there was talk of destroying OSS records and why the records of operations such as Iron

Cross were fragmentary at best. It also puts more context on the actions of President Truman to

disband the OSS and his ostracism of General Donovan after the war. The OSS turning over

espionage equipment to the NKVD as part of an exchange program that had been prohibited by

Presidential order is another example of an extremely questionable espionage activity.

The Office of Strategic Services achieved great things during World War II, albeit at

ethical costs. The OSS violated international law, domestic regulations and policies, and ancient

diplomatic traditions. The history of the OSS, both successes and failures in espionage, is further

besmirched by the taint of the prejudices of the time, which caused the leaders of the Office of

Strategic services to discount the achievements or information gained by some of the agents due

to their gender, religion, or socio-economic status.

98 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962, p. 2

Bibliography

Government Manuals:

Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1943)

Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch, 1944)

Intelligence Reports:

Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes, Technical Sergeant John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946. Accessed February 14, 2015 http://www.paperlessarchives.com/FreeTitles/DachauOSSSection7thArmyReport.pdf

United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic Services by Kermit Roosevelt, 1947. Accessed February 14, 2015 http://www.ossreborn.com/files/War%20Report%20of%20the%20OSS%20Volume%201.pdf

Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report. Accessed February 14, 2015 http://research.archives.gov/description/595125

Personnel Files:

Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, Accessed February 14, 2015 http://media.nara.gov/oss/Dulles_Allen.pdf

Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, Accessed February 14, 2015 http://media.nara.gov/oss/Casey_William_J.pdf

Court Cases:

United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S. Military Commission at Rome, 1945)

Treaties

United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962

Executive Orders and Presidential Letters

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D. Roosevelt, “Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942”

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of the Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)

Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)

Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, “Letter to General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic Services”

Award Citations:

United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 1922

United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 1946

Government Training Films:

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veMVDEodFCY

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbuF_QwRP-E

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ezxtb2zcfhU

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdQSYXBHBJY

Government Briefing and Intelligence Report Films

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJlXUdayHxQ

Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Lg8WDozHI

Books:

United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992

Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011)

Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005)

Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001)

Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001)

Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive in the Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007)

Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979)

David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996)

George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992)

William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220

Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of World War II (New York, Pantheon Books, 1992)

Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983)

Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books, 1970)

Newspaper Articles:

Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1938

Journal Articles:

CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies in Intelligence (September 1993) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm Accessed 04/15/2015

Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter 2001

John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”, Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) pp 1-28

Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 21-34

Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 57-66

Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1985) pp 60-65

Jack B. Pfeifer, “OSS Propaganda in Europe and the Far East”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1984) pp 41-46

Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2. (2002) pp 41-53

William E. Colby, "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000): 53-60;

Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 95-103

Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”, The American Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 287-308

Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War II”, The Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109-150