The Objective Function in Corporate Finance - Wiley: Home

Aswath Damodaran 1

The Objective Function in CorporateFinance

Aswath Damodaran

Stern School of Business

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First Principles

n Invest in projects that yield a return greater than the minimumacceptable hurdle rate.• The hurdle rate should be higher for riskier projects and reflect the

financing mix used - owners’ funds (equity) or borrowed money (debt)

• Returns on projects should be measured based on cash flows generatedand the timing of these cash flows; they should also consider both positiveand negative side effects of these projects.

n Choose a financing mix that minimizes the hurdle rate and matches theassets being financed.

n If there are not enough investments that earn the hurdle rate, return thecash to stockholders.• The form of returns - dividends and stock buybacks - will depend upon

the stockholders’ characteristics.

Objective: Maximize the Value of the Firm

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The Classical Viewpoint

n Van Horne: "In this book, we assume that the objective of the firm isto maximize its value to its stockholders"

n Brealey & Myers: "Success is usually judged by value: Shareholdersare made better off by any decision which increases the value of theirstake in the firm... The secret of success in financial management is toincrease value."

n Copeland & Weston: The most important theme is that the objectiveof the firm is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders."

n Brigham and Gapenski: Throughout this book we operate on theassumption that the management's primary goal is stockholder wealthmaximization which translates into maximizing the price of thecommon stock.

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The Objective in Decision Making

n In traditional corporate finance, the objective in decision making is tomaximize the value of the firm.

n A narrower objective is to maximize stockholder wealth. When thestock is traded and markets are viewed to be efficient, the objective isto maximize the stock price.

n All other goals of the firm are intermediate ones leading to firm valuemaximization, or operate as constraints on firm value maximization.

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The Criticism of Firm Value Maximization

n Maximizing stock price is not incompatible with meeting employeeneeds/objectives. In particular:• - Employees are often stockholders in many firms

• - Firms that maximize stock price generally are firms that have treatedemployees well.

n Maximizing stock price does not mean that customers are not criticalto success. In most businesses, keeping customers happy is the route tostock price maximization.

n Maximizing stock price does not imply that a company has to be asocial outlaw.

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Why traditional corporate financial theoryfocuses on maximizing stockholder wealth.

n Stock price is easily observable and constantly updated (unlike othermeasures of performance, which may not be as easily observable, andcertainly not updated as frequently).

n If investors are rational (are they?), stock prices reflect the wisdom ofdecisions, short term and long term, instantaneously.

n The objective of stock price performance provides some very eleganttheory on:• how to pick projects

• how to finance them

• how much to pay in dividends

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The Classical Objective Function

STOCKHOLDERS

Maximizestockholderwealth

Hire & firemanagers- Board- Annual Meeting

BONDHOLDERSLend Money

ProtectbondholderInterests

FINANCIAL MARKETS

SOCIETYManagers

Revealinformationhonestly andon time

Markets areefficient andassess effect onvalue

No Social Costs

Costs can betraced to firm

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What can go wrong?

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers puttheir interestsabove stockholders

Have little controlover managers

BONDHOLDERSLend Money

Bondholders canget ripped off

FINANCIAL MARKETS

SOCIETYManagers

Delay badnews or provide misleadinginformation

Markets makemistakes andcan over react

Significant Social Costs

Some costs cannot betraced to firm

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THE REAL WORLD INTRUDES .....I. Stockholder Interests vs. Management

Interests

n Theory: The stockholders have significant control over management.The mechanisms for disciplining management are the annual meetingand the board of directors.

n Practice: Neither mechanism is as effective in discipliningmanagement as theory posits.

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The Annual Meeting as a disciplinary venue

n The power of stockholders to act at annual meetings is diluted by threefactors• Most small stockholders do not go to meetings because the cost of going

to the meeting exceeds the value of their holdings.

• Incumbent management starts off with a clear advantage when it comes tothe exercising of proxies.

• For large stockholders, the path of least resistance, when confronted bymanagers that they do not like, is to vote with their feet.

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Board of Directors as a disciplinary mechanism

n Directors, for the most part, are well compensated andunderworked

Directors' Compensation and Hours Worked Per Year

Year

Ann

ual C

ompe

nsat

ion

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

1985 1988 19920

20

40

60

80

100

120

Hou

rs W

orke

d

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The CEO hand-picks most directors..

n A survey by Korn/Ferry revealed that 74% of companies relied onrecommendations from the CEO to come up with new directors; Only16% used an outside search firm.

n Directors seldom hold more than token stakes in their companies. TheKorn/Ferry survey found that 5% of all directors in 1992 owned lessthan five shares in their firms.

n Many directors are themselves CEOs of other firms.

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Directors lack the expertise to ask thenecessary tough questions..

n The CEO sets the agenda, chairs the meeting and controls theinformation.

n The search for consensus overwhelms any attempts at confrontation.

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The Best Boards ...

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And the Worst Boards are ..

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Who’s on Board? The Disney Experience

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A Contrast: Disney vs. Campbell Soup

BEST PRACTICES CAMPBELL SOUP DISNEY

Majority of outside directors Only one insider 7 of 17 members

among 15 directors are insiders

Bans insiders on nominating Yes No: CEO is

committee chairman of panel

Bans former execs from board Yes No

Mandatory retirement age 70, with none None

over 64

Outside directors meet w/o CEO Annually Never

Appointment of 'lead director'' Yes No

Governance committee Yes No

Self-evaluation of effectiveness Every two years None

Director pensions None Yes

Share-ownership requirement 3,000 shares None

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So what next? When the cat is idle, the micewill play ....

n When managers do not fear stockholders, they will often put theirinterests over stockholder interests• Greenmail

• Golden Parachutes

• Poison Pills

• Shark Repellents

• Overpaying on takeovers

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What is Greenmail?

n Greenmail refers to the scenario where a target of a hostile takeoverbuys out the potential acquirer's existing stake, generally at a pricemuch greater than the price paid by the raider, in return for the signingof a 'standstill' agreement.

n There are at least two negative consequences for existing stockholders.• the cash payment by the managers makes the firm poorer.

• the payment of greenmail reduces the likelihood of a takeover, whichwould have raised the stock price of the firm.

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The Stock Price Consequences of Greenmail

Stock Price Changes for firms paying Greenmail1

Target Firm Greenmail Date % Change in prices in following month

Stock Market

Phillips Petroleum 3/4/85 -22.60% 1.0%

Patrick Industries 8/5/85 -7.1% -0.8%

Maynard Oil 10/28/85 19.6% 7.1%

Viacom International 5/22/86 -3.8% 3.6%

Enron 10/20/86 -13.3% 3.0%

CPC International 11/5/86 -0.5% 4.5%

Goodyear Tire & Rubber11/20/86 -11.8% -0.8%

Gillette 11/24/86 -25.7% 1.5%

United States Gypsum 12/4/86 -10.7% -0.9%

Average -12.8% 2.2%

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Golden Parachutes

n Golden parachutes refers to provisions in employment contracts, thatallows for the payment of a lump-sum or cash flows over a period, ifthe managers covered by these contracts lose their jobs in a takeover.

n By the mid-eighties, almost 25% of the firms in the Fortune 500 hadincorporated golden parachutes into top management compensationcontracts.• Examples of excesses: The payment of $23.5 million to six officers at

Beatrice in connection with the leveraged buyout in 1985, and $35 millionto the CEO of Revlon, can be considered to be examples of theseexcesses.

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Poison Pills

n A security, the rights or cashflows on which are triggered by anoutside event, generally a hostile takeover, is called a poison pill.• For instance, in a flip-over rights plan, shareholders receive rights to

acquire shares in their firm at an exercise price well above the currentprice. In the event of a takeover, the rights 'flip over' to allow shareholdersto buy the acquirers' stock at an exercise price well below the marketprice.

n Poison pills are generally adopted by the board of directors and do notrequire stockholder approval.

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Shark Repellents (Anti-takeover Amendments)

n Anti-takeover amendments have the same objective as greenmail andpoison pills, i.e., dissuading hostile takeovers, but differ on one veryimportant count. They require the assent of stockholders to beinstituted.

n There are several types of anti-takeover amendments, all designed withthe objective of reducing the likelihood of a hostile takeover. Amongthem are• super majority requirements

• fair-price amendments (where the offer price has to exceed a pricespecified relative to earnings)

• staggered elections to boards of directors

• authorizations to create new classes of securities with special votingrights to dilute the acquirers' holdings.

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Overpaying on takeovers

n The quickest and perhaps the most decisive way to impoverishstockholders is to overpay on a takeover.

n The stockholders in acquiring firms do not seem to share theenthusiasm of the managers in these firms. Stock prices of biddingfirms decline on the takeover announcements a significant proportionof the time.

n Many mergers do not work, as evidenced by a number of measures.• The profitability of merged firms relative to their peer groups, does not

increase significantly after mergers.

• An even more damning indictment is that a large number of mergers arereversed within a few years, which is a clear admission that theacquisitions did not work.

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A Case Study: Kodak - Sterling Drugs

n Eastman Kodak’s Great Victory

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Earnings and Revenues at Sterling Drugs

Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?

0500

1,000

1,500

2,0002,500

3,000

3,500

4,0004,500

5,000

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Revenue Operating Earnings

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Kodak Says Drug Unit Is Not for Sale(NYTimes, 8/93)

n Eastman Kodak officials say they have no plans to sell Kodak’sSterling Winthrop drug unit.

n Louis Mattis, Chairman of Sterling Winthrop, dismissed the rumors as“massive speculation, which flies in the face of the stated intent ofKodak that it is committed to be in the health business.”

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Sanofi to get part of Kodak Drug Unit (6/94)

n Taking a long stride on its way out of the drug business, EastmanKodak said yesterday that the Sanofi Group, a French pharmaceuticalcompany, had agreed to buy the prescription drug business of SterlingWinthrop, a Kodak subsidiary, for $1.68 billion.• Shares of Eastman Kodak rose 75 cents yesterday, closing at $47.50 on

the New York Stock Exchange.

• Samuel D. Isaly an analyst , said the announcement was “very good forSanofi and very good for Kodak.”

• “When the divestitures are complete, Kodak will be entirely focused onimaging,” said George M. C. Fisher, the company's chairman and chiefexecutive.

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Smithkline to buy Kodak’s Drug Business for$2.9 billion

n Smithkline Beecham agreed to buy Eastman Kodak’s SterlingWinthrop Inc. for $2.9 billion.

n For Kodak, the sale almost completes a restructuring intended torefocus the company on its photography business.

n Kodak’s stock price rose $1.25 to $50.625, the highest price sinceDecember.

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II. Stockholders' objectives vs. Bondholders'objectives

n In theory: there is no conflict of interests between stockholders andbondholders.

n In practice: Stockholders may maximize their wealth at the expense ofbondholders.• Increasing leverage dramatically

• Increasing dividends significantly

• Taking riskier projects than those agreed to

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1. Increasing leverage dramatically and makingexisting bonds less valuable

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2. Increasing dividends significantly

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

t:-15

-12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15

CAR (Div Up)

CAR (Div down)

EXCESS RETURNS ON STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND DIVIDEND CHANGES

Day (0: Announcement date)

CAR

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3. Taking projects which are significantly riskierthan those the bondholder assumed that you

were going to take.

n Bondholders base the interest rate they charge on the perceived risk ofthe firm's projects.

n If the firm takes on riskier projects, they will lose.

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III. Firms and Financial Markets

n In theory: Financial markets are efficient. Managers conveyinformation honestly and truthfully to financial markets, and financialmarkets make reasoned judgments of 'true value'. As a consequence-• A company that takes on good long term projects will be rewarded.

• Short term accounting gimmicks will not lead to increases in marketvalue.

• Stock price performance is a good measure of management performance.

n In practice: There are some holes in the 'Efficient Markets'assumption.

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Is Information Unbiased?

n The information revealed by companies about themselves is usually

o honest and truthful

o biased

o fraudulent

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1. Managers control the release of informationto the general public

n There is evidence that• they suppress information, generally negative information

• they delay the releasing of bad news– bad earnings reports

– other news

• they sometimes reveal fraudulent information

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Evidence that managers delay bad news..

DO MANAGERS DELAY BAD NEWS?: EPS and DPS Changes- byWeekday

-6.00%

-4.00%

-2.00%

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday

% Chg(EPS) % Chg(DPS)

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2. Even when information is revealed tofinancial markets, the market value that is setby demand and supply may contain errors.

n Prices are much more volatile than justified by the underlyingfundamentals• Eg. Did the true value of equities really decline by 20% on October 19,

1987?

n financial markets overreact to news, both good and bad

n financial markets are short-sighted, and do not consider the long-termimplications of actions taken by the firm• Eg. the focus on next quarter's earnings

n financial markets are manipulated by insiders; Prices do not have anyrelationship to value.

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Are Markets Short term?

2. Focusing on market prices will lead companies towards short termdecisions at the expense of long term value.

o I agree with the statement

o I do not agree with this statement

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Are Markets Short Sighted? Some evidencethat they are not..

n There are hundreds of start-up and small firms, with no earningsexpected in the near future, that raise money on financial markets

n If the evidence suggests anything, it is that markets do not valuecurrent earnings and cashflows enough and value future earningsand cashflows too much.• Low PE stocks are underpriced relative to high PE stocks

n The market response to research and development andinvestment expenditure is generally positive

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Market Reaction to Investment Announcements

Type of Announcement Abnormal Returns on

Announcement Day Announcement Month

Joint Venture Formations 0.399% 1.412%

R&D Expenditures 0.251% 1.456%

Product Strategies 0.440% -0.35%

Capital Expenditures 0.290% 1.499%

All Announcements 0.355% 0.984%

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IV. Firms and Society

n In theory: There are no costs associated with the firm that cannot betraced to the firm and charged to it.

n In practice: Financial decisions can create social costs and benefits.• A social cost or benefit is a cost or benefit that accrues to society as a

whole and NOT to the firm making the decision.– -environmental costs (pollution, health costs, etc..)

– Quality of Life' costs (traffic, housing, safety, etc.)

• Examples of social benefits include:– creating employment in areas with high unemployment

– supporting development in inner cities

– creating access to goods in areas where such access does not exist

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Social Costs and Benefits are difficult toquantify because ..

n they might not be known at the time of the decision (Example:Manville and asbestos)

n they are 'person-specific' (different decision makers weight themdifferently)

n they can be paralyzing if carried to extremes

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A Hypothetical Example

n Assume that you work for Disney and that you have an opportunity toopen a store in an inner-city neighborhood. The store is expected tolose about $100,000 a year, but it will create much-neededemployment in the area, and may help revitalize it.

n Questions:• Would you open the store?

• If yes, would you tell your stockholders? Would you let them vote on theissue?

• If no, how would you respond to a stockholder query on why you werenot living up to your social responsibilities?

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So this is what can go wrong?

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers puttheir interestsabove stockholders

Have little controlover managers

BONDHOLDERSLend Money

Bondholders canget ripped off

FINANCIAL MARKETS

SOCIETYManagers

Delay badnews or provide misleadinginformation

Markets makemistakes andcan over react

Significant Social Costs

Some costs cannot betraced to firm

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Traditional corporate financial theory breaksdown when ...

n The interests/objectives of the decision makers in the firm conflictwith the interests of stockholders.

n Bondholders (Lenders) are not protected against expropriation bystockholders.

n Financial markets do not operate efficiently, and stock prices do notreflect the underlying value of the firm.

n Significant social costs can be created as a by-product of stock pricemaximization.

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When traditional corporate financial theorybreaks down, the solution is:

n To choose a different mechanism for corporate governance

n To choose a different objective:

n To maximize stock price, but reduce the potential for conflict andbreakdown:• Making managers (decision makers) and employees into stockholders

• By providing information honestly and promptly to financial markets

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An Alternative Corporate Governance System

n Germany and Japan developed a different mechanism for corporategovernance, based upon corporate cross holdings.• In Germany, the banks form the core of this system.

• In Japan, it is the keiretsus

• Other Asian countries have modeled their system after Japan, with familycompanies forming the core of the new corporate families

n At their best, the most efficient firms in the group work at bringing theless efficient firms up to par. They provide a corporate welfare systemthat makes for a more stable corporate structure

n At their worst, the least efficient and poorly run firms in the group pulldown the most efficient and best run firms down. The nature of thecross holdings makes its very difficult for outsiders (includinginvestors in these firms) to figure out how well or badly the group isdoing.

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The Porter Alternative

n Michael Porter, in his ode to the Japanese system in the 1980s, arguedthat the Japanese system was superior to the U.S. system because itallowed managers to be long term in their decision making, whereasthe focus on stock prices made U.S. firms short term. Implicitly he isassuming that

o Managers are smarter than stock holders

o Market prices tend to be based on short term earnings rather than longterm value

o Managers have the long term interests of the firm in mind and arerewarded based upon the long term health and success of theircompanies

o All of the above

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Choose a Different Objective Function

n Firms can always focus on a different objective function. Exampleswould include• maximizing earnings

• maximizing revenues

• maximizing firm size

• maximizing market share

• maximizing EVA

n The key thing to remember is that these are intermediate objectivefunctions.• To the degree that they are correlated with the long term health and value

of the company, they work well.

• To the degree that they do not, the firm can end up with a disaster

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Maximize Stock Price, subject to ..

n The strength of the stock price maximization objective function is itsinternal self correction mechanism. Excesses on any of the linkageslead, if unregulated, to counter actions which reduce or eliminate theseexcesses

n In the context of our discussion,• managers taking advantage of stockholders has lead to a much more

active market for corporate control.

• stockholders taking advantage of bondholders has lead to bondholdersprotecting themselves at the time of the issue.

• firms revealing incorrect or delayed information to markets has lead tomarkets becoming more “skeptical” and “punitive”

• firms creating social costs has lead to more regulations, as well as investorand customer backlashes.

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The Stockholder Backlash

n Investors such as CalPERS and the Lens Funds have become muchmore active in monitoring companies that they invest in anddemanding changes in the way in which business is done

n Individuals like Michael Price specialize in taking large positions incompanies which they feel need to change their ways (Chase, DowJones, Readers’ Digest) and push for change

n At annual meetings, stockholders have taken to expressing theirdispleasure with incumbent management by voting against theircompensation contracts or their board of directors

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The Hostile Acquisition Threat

n The typical target firm in a hostile takeover has• a return on equity almost 5% lower than its peer group

• had a stock that has significantly under performed the peer group over theprevious 2 years

• has managers who hold little or no stock in the firm

n In other words, the best defense against a hostile takeover is to runyour firm well and earn good returns for your stockholders

n Conversely, when you do not allow hostile takeovers, this is the firmthat you are most likely protecting (and not a well run or well managedfirm)

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The Bondholders’ Defense Against StockholderExcesses

n More restrictive covenants on investment, financing and dividendpolicy have been incorporated into both private lending agreementsand into bond issues, to prevent future “Nabiscos”.

n New types of bonds have been created to explicitly protectbondholders against sudden increases in leverage or other actions thatincrease lender risk substantially. Two examples of such bonds• Puttable Bonds, where the bondholder can put the bond back to the firm

and get face value, if the firm takes actions that hurt bondholders

• Ratings Sensitive Notes, where the interest rate on the notes adjusts to thatappropriate for the rating of the firm

n More hybrid bonds (with an equity component, usually in the form ofa conversion option or warrant) have been used. This allowsbondholders to become equity investors, if they feel it is in their bestinterests to do so.

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The Financial Market Response

n While analysts are more likely still to issue buy rather than sellrecommendations, the payoff to uncovering negative news about afirm is large enough that such news is eagerly sought and quicklyrevealed (at least to a limited group of investors)

n As information sources to the average investor proliferate, it isbecoming much more difficult for firms to control when and howinformation gets out to markets.

n As option trading has become more common, it has become mucheasier to trade on bad news. In the process, it is revealed to the rest ofthe market (See Scholastic)

n When firms mislead markets, the punishment is not only quick but it issavage.

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The Societal Response

n If firms consistently flout societal norms and create large social costs,the governmental response (especially in a democracy) is for laws andregulations to be passed against such behavior.• e.g.: Laws against using underage labor in the United States

n For firms catering to a more socially conscious clientele, the failure tomeet societal norms (even if it is legal) can lead to loss of business andvalue• e.g. Specialty retailers being criticized for using under age labor in other

countries (where it might be legal)

n Finally, investors may choose not to invest in stocks of firms that theyview as social outcasts.• e.g.. Tobacco firms and the growth of “socially responsible” funds

(Calvert..)

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The Counter Reaction

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers of poorlyrun firms are puton notice.

1. More activistinvestors2. Hostile takeovers

BONDHOLDERS

Protect themselves

1. Covenants2. New Types

FINANCIAL MARKETS

SOCIETYManagers

Firms arepunishedfor misleadingmarkets

Investors andanalysts becomemore skeptical

Corporate Good Citizen Constraints

1. More laws2. Investor/Customer Backlash

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So what do you think?

n At this point in time, the following statement best describes where Istand in terms of the right objective function for decision making in abusiness

o Maximize stock price or stockholder wealth, with no constraints

o Maximize stock price or stockholder wealth, with constraints on beinga good social citizen.

o Maximize profits or profitability

o Maximize market share

o Maximize Revenues

o Maximize social good

o None of the above

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The Modified Objective Function

n For publicly traded firms in reasonably efficient markets, wherebondholders (lenders) are protected:• Maximize Stock Price: This will also maximize firm value

n For publicly traded firms in inefficient markets, where bondholders areprotected:• Maximize stockholder wealth: This will also maximize firm value, but

might not maximize the stock price

n For publicly traded firms in inefficient markets, where bondholders arenot fully protected• Maximize firm value, though stockholder wealth and stock prices may not

be maximized at the same point.

n For private firms, maximize stockholder wealth (if lenders areprotected) or firm value (if they are not)