The nuclear threat: a two-level analytical framework to assess the likelihood of nuclear terrorism

Chapter 2 - The nuclear threat: a two-level analytical framework to

assess the likelihood of nuclear terrorism

B. Volders

Department of politics, Antwerp University

Introduction

Gary Ackerman wrote in 2005 that research on WMD terrorism “seems to

have reached something of an interpretive impasse…the scholarly and

policy-related literature has increasingly begun to recycle the same

interpretations and staid shibboleths…truly novel insights into WMD

terrorism are becoming few and far between” (Ackerman, 2005, p.

140). This is in line with the idea of “conflicting intuitions” – as

outlined in the previous contribution in this edited collection

(Volders & Sauer). The bulk of traditional research primarily

focuses on specific terrorist organizations, their motivation to

pursue nuclear terrorism and/or particular nuclear security

vulnerabilities (e.g. Daly, Parachini & Rosenau 2005; Mowatt-Larssen

2010, Clarke 2013, Lieber 2013, Podvig 2014). Conventional

assumptions, perspectives and interpretations are often repeated in

contemporary threat assessments.

This paper aims to go beyond this narrow theoretical approach by

redirecting the focus towards the subtle challenges in organizing a

nuclear terrorist project. Building on an extensive literature

analysis - and entangled by empirical data to support the argument -

a two-level analytical framework is presented as a tool to adapt on

particular cases. We illustrate the value of this framework by means

of referral to the construction and detonation of crude nuclear

device. Yet, the framework can be applied to other types of nuclear

terrorism as well.

The structure of the paper is as follows. After outlining the

weaknesses in current nuclear threat assessments, we take the

strategic paradigm within terrorism studies as a starting point of

the two-level analytical framework. Contemplating the collective

rationality of a terrorist organization, we argue that nuclear

terrorism threat assessments should first take into account the

organizational willingness versus opportunity trade-off. This (decision-)

process to go nuclear, however, is to a large extent influenced by

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the second level in the analytical framework: the technical and

organizational challenges related to implementing the construction and

detonation of a crude nuclear device. A better understanding of both

levels - and their interaction - is necessary to comprehensively

assess the likelihood of terrorist organizations actually carrying

out a major nuclear terrorist attack.

Contemporary nuclear threat assessments

Scholars and policy-makers primarily focus attention on three

independent variables to assess the likelihood of terrorist

organizations constructing and detonating a crude nuclear device:

(1) the motivation of a terrorist organization to construct and

detonate a crude nuclear device; (2) the availability of knowledge

on nuclear materials and designs, and (3) the availability of

nuclear materials. A prime example is the U.S. Bureau of

Counterterrorism’s countries report (2013, p. 233). It stated that

“CBRN materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat

as demonstrated by terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use

these material (1)… the ease with which information on these topics

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now flows (2); and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies

and material (3).”

The intent of terrorist organizations to go nuclear is often topic

of discussion. Bunn (2006) assessed that terrorist groups interested

in getting and using nuclear weapons is in the range of one or two:

Al Qaeda and possibly some subsets of Chechen terrorists have been

the usual suspects. They are perceived to inflict as much pain as

possible – as the wreckage of the World Trade Center and the school

in Besla, Russia demonstrate (Tobey, 2014).1 Experts also voice

concern over today’s possibility that the Islamic State will go

nuclear (Budowksy 2014; Sans 2014). We cannot discount the

possibility that they might pursue unconventional weapons. Michael

Levi (2007), however, argues that the high risk of provoking a

strong response might lead terrorist organizations to opt for a

different course. There might be better – conventional -

alternatives than nuclear terrorism. Similarly, there are diverging

opinions on the ease with which terrorist organization could design

and construct a crude nuclear device. The so-called “Nth-country

experiment” in the mid-1960s tested if capable physicists - with

access only to the unclassified technology literature - could

produce a credible nuclear weapon design.2 They successfully

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concluded the project with a set of blueprints for engineers (Frost,

2005). Terrorist organizations also already demonstrated their

capability to recruit scientists and engineers. In an exemplary

incident on May 12, 2011, police forces in Pakistan announced the

arrest of four students “Applied Physics and Computer Science” at

Karachi University under suspicion of being member of Tehrik-i-

Taliban (Rehman, 2012).3 However, former Senior Associate Director

for National Security at Los Alamos Stephen M. Younger stated that

it is simply wrong “to assume that nuclear weapons are now easy to

make”. He stressed that uranium, for instance, is “exceptionally

difficult to machine” (Mueller, 2010, p.174). Finally, the

incomplete global security framework concerning weapons-usable

material appears to be a major challenge to preventing nuclear

terrorism (NTI index report, 2014). The Y-12 security incident -

where a 82-year old nun succeeded to penetrate deep into a nuclear

security administration facility  - demonstrates this case in point.

Mueller (2010), on the other hand, signals that improving safeguards

and accounting practices significantly reduce the likelihood of

theft. The situation has improved considerably – look at the impact

of the Nuclear Security Summitry - and is envisaged to positively

develop even more.

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While this paper does not intent to denigrate the value of this work

and discussions, it is necessary to situate these discussion in a

broader perspective. To be precise, these three independent

variables should be contextualized in a well-developed

organizational framework. First, like every conventional

organization, terrorist organizations need to effectively and

efficiently assign, control and coordinate tasks, powers and

responsibilities. Constructing and detonating an Improvised Nuclear

Device (IND) requires a large scale of operations and corresponding

coordination needs: an adequate quantity of fissile material must be

found and acquired. Skillful experts need to assemble the bomb –

taking into account the particular quantity and type of fissile

material that has been acquired. The crude nuclear device must be

smuggled to the target, and, finally, it must be detonated by a

suicide-team. Nothing significantly may go wrong during this complex

endeavor. There may not be leaks, detections or defections.

Otherwise, the organization runs the risk to compromise the

operation – in the best-case scenario – or compromise the

organization as such – in the worst-case scenario (Mueller, 2010).

Second, any nuclear project should fit the terrorist organization’s

strategic objectives. Any terrorist organization contemplating an

nuclear attack needs to calculate whether or not the benefits to be

gained by such a project are worth the efforts and risks related to

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this process. The particular implementation challenges in

constructing and detonating a crude nuclear device will strongly

impact the organization’s decision-process.

Unfortunately, this organizational dimension receives scant

attention in today’s threat assessments. For instance, Toby &

Zolotarev (2014) state: “with highly enriched uranium, a gun-type

bomb is very plausible within the capabilities of a sophisticated

terrorist organization.” Yet the authors do not elaborate on the

concept of a “sophisticated terrorist organization.”4 This is a

critical gap. Merely focusing on terrorist organizations, their

motivations and/or particular nuclear security vulnerabilities

inherently implies the tendency to start from worst-case scenarios

(Zanders, 1999). Hence, nuclear threat assessments should take into

account that terrorist organizations successfully completing all the

steps in the nuclear armament dynamic is as much about organization

as it is about motivational or techno-centric challenges.

A two-level analytical framework

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This paper adopts the terrorist organization as the main unit of

analysis, and assumes they act upon a “collective rationality”

(Crenshaw, 1998). Terrorist organizations use violence as “a means

of achieving political end” (Neumann & Smith, 2008, p.6). Although

the morality of an actor’s ends or means is open to discussion, the

act of terrorism is generally perceived to benefit some of the

collective preferences and values of the terrorist organization. It

serves a rational purpose for the group.5 Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006)

Management of Savagery is probably the best known example of terrorist

organizations contemplating the best way to reach their goals. This

Islamist strategist explicitly describes the “path for establishing

an Islamic State” and the “mastery of the art of management” for Al

Qaeda en other Jihadists. This respectively refers to two types of

organizational objectives. On the one hand, terrorist organizations

pursue strategic political objectives: the IRA aimed to establish an

independent Ireland, Aum Shinrikyo aimed to destabilize the Japanese

government, and the Islamic State is currently aspiring to

consolidate and extent their Islamic reign in Iraq and Syria. On the

other hand, terrorist organization continuously strive for

organizational survival and power (Krause, 2013). Effective

allocation and maximization of resources are of key-importance for

any terrorist organization. It enables them to achieve their

political objectives. The well-thought out beheadings by the Islamic

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State, for instance, are partly intent to polarize its audience and

recruit potential Jihadists through propaganda by the deed.6

The assumption of the terrorist organization as a rational actor -

acting in favor of the collective preferences of the group - is

sensible: there is a high likelihood that the senior leadership of

any terrorist organization will be closely involved in such an high-

impact endeavor as a collective decision-maker. Mohammed Atta also

considered targeting a nuclear facility before the 9/11 plot. Yet,

the other perpetrators were not in favor of the idea because, a.o.,

it had not been discussed with senior Al Qaeda leaders, and

“therefore did not have the requisite blessing” (9/11 commission

report, 2004, p.245). Moreover, the nuclear armament dynamic is

often simply too complex for one individual. The scale of operations

requires the collective effort and decision-making of (a selected

part of) the organization.7

The relevant question then is whether or not nuclear terrorism fits

the collective rationality of a terrorist organization. This paper

propounds a more robust, two-level analytical framework to answer

this question: we first account for the fact that the organization’s

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decision process to go nuclear is function of the group’s

willingness versus opportunity tradeoff. This tradeoff, however, is

to a large extent driven by the second level of the framework: the

implementation of the technical and organizational challenges

related to the nuclear armament dynamic. The interplay between both

levels will determine the collective rationality of a terrorist

organization with respect to nuclear terrorism.

Deciding to go nuclear? The willingness versus opportunity trade-off

The first level of the analytical framework specifically focuses on

the terrorist decision-process to go nuclear. Considering state

nuclear projects, Jo & Gartzke (2007) identified “willingness” and

“opportunity” as two interrelated determinants of nuclear

proliferation. A similar claim can be made for a terrorist nuclear

project: criminal opportunity theory proclaims that various types of

criminal behavior are dependent on the collusion in time and place

of motivated perpetrators - referring to the willingness of

terrorist organizations - and suitable targets and absence of

capable defenders – referring to the opportunity for terrorist

organizations. (Wilcox, Land & Hunt, 2003, p. 2). Admittedly,

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criminal opportunity theory of ordinary common law crime - despite

increasing linkage between terrorism and regular crime - cannot be

blindly applied to (nuclear) terrorism: the rationality of ordinary

law is most often the accumulation of economic assets or control

over other persons. They prefer that their acts remain largely

invisible. The collective rationality of a terrorist organization on

the other hand is designed to further their political goals. They

want their crimes to be visible. This implies that the utility

function of an act of terror is more complex and varied than for

perpetrators of common law crime. Achieving political goals is much

more complicated than the mere generation of profit – which is a

simple function of the value of stolen goods (Lynch, 2011, p.165).

Yet, it remains true that the willingness versus opportunity

tradeoff – despite being more subjective and complex – will

determine the collective rationality of the terrorist organization

with respect to nuclear terrorism. A terrorist organization

calculates the costs and benefits of an act of (nuclear) terrorism

contemplating both the eagerness to carry out the attack and the

given opportunity (Crenshaw, 1987, p. 14).

Figure 2.1: Willingness versus opportunity 8

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<FIGURE 2.1. HERE>

The willingness to construct and detonate a crude nuclear device is

one determinant of terrorist nuclear proliferation. This

determinant, on its turn, is result of two dimensions: first, the

value of nuclear weapons as such. These weapons could cause massive

physical, psychological, and socio-economic destruction. Terrorist

organizations are often attributed to this type of indiscriminate

violence. Yet, second, it is vital to understand that these

consequences may not be in line with the ideology and corresponding

strategic and organizational objectives of the terrorist

organization. Drake (1998, p. 53) already indicated that ideology

sets the initial dynamic for actions, and sketches the (moral)

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framework in which they operate. The 9/11 commission report (2004,

p. 251) described a schism that emerged among the senior leadership

of Al Qaeda by July 2001. Weighty figures in the organization –

reportedly including Mullah Omar, Sheikh Saeed al Masri and Sayf al

Adl – initially considered the idea that an attack against the

United States might be counterproductive because it could draw the

Americans into a war against them. It would not fit their long-term

strategic objectives. Aum Shinrikyo, to give a reverse example, did

not have any (moral) qualms about chemical and biological Weapons

(CBW). This is clearly demonstrated by the high number of preceding

CBW attacks before their 1995 Sarin attack. This apocalyptic sect,

however, could work on their CBW program for about six years without

any intrusive investigations by the police. The building known as

Satyan 7 housed a moderately large-scale chemical weapons production

facility. Relatively weak Japanese domestic intelligence operations

never targeted this (Danzig & Sageman, 2011). This refers to the

second determinant.

Terrorist nuclear proliferation is also dependent on their

opportunity to pursue a nuclear capacity. In 1990, the Tamil Tigers

in Sri Lanka decided to use chlorine against an Sri Lankan Armed

Forces’ fort when they ran low on conventional weapons. Chlorine

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containers from a nearby paper mill provided them with the

opportunity to use this toxic weapon on the immediate battlefield.

In the further continuation of the conflict – up to 2009 - the

Tigers never used chemicals again due to a lack of willingness to

use these weapons. According to Parachini (2003, p. 43), interviews

with former members of the Tamil Tigers and Sri Lankan intelligence

officials made clear that they were worried about the loss of

support from their constituency as well as that of the Tamil

diaspora community – which was essential for the organization’s

fundraising. Opportunity refers to two dimensions: first, the

capabilities of a terrorist organization. Cragin & Daly (2004)

distinguish between operational and organizational capabilities.9

Operational capabilities refer to particular assets - both tangible

and intangible - to effectively realize terrorist attacks. Fissile

material, a well-developed machine-shop and nuclear engineers would

be a few of the required operational capabilities to successfully

carry out a nuclear attack. Organizational capabilities are needed

to ensure the effective functioning of a terrorist organization in a

clandestine environment. An efficient recruitment strategy,

effective command and control systems, and a high level of security

awareness would be a few of the organizational capabilities to

successfully complete the nuclear armament dynamic (infra). Second,

a terrorist organization is to a large extent dependent on the

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social environment in which they operate in order to develop and

exploit these capabilities. The activity of law enforcement agencies

and the vulnerability of particular operational assets and/or

targets may lead terrorist organization to opt for one particular

alternative of action. For instance, terrorist organization may

decide to go nuclear if the required fissile material would prove

not to be well-protected.

Both dimensions have ramifications for each other. As mentioned in

the introduction to this edited collection, three questions are

essential: What is the benefit or value to be gained? What are the

costs of an attempt and/or its failure? And what are the

consequences of inaction, and the probability of success? (Crenshaw,

1987, p.14). The 9/11 commission report, for instance, stated that

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) – the mastermind of the 9/11 plot –

originally envisaged a grandiose plan: “A total of ten aircrafts to

be hijacked, nine of which would crash into targets on both coasts –

they included those eventually hit on September 11 plus CIA and FBI

headquarters, nuclear power plants, and the tallest building in

California and the state of Washington. KSM himself was to land the

tenth plane at a U.S. airport and, after killing all adult male

passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech

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excoriating U.S. support for Israel, the Philippines, and repressive

government in the Arab world.” Al Qaeda leaders were however

skeptical about the scale and complexity of this proposal. Bin Laden

himself – who was receiving numerous ideas for potential operation -

was not convinced that the proposal was practical (9/11 commission

report, 2004, p.154). The senior leaders did not believe that the

benefit to be gained was worth the costs of an attempt or the

consequences of inaction.10

This leads us to the question of the actual costs related to a

nuclear project: how much time, resources and capabilities should be

allocated to a nuclear project, and what does this imply for their

collective preferences towards nuclear terrorism?11 A terrorist

organization needs to be sufficiently eager to invest these costs.

Would they deem a crude nuclear device as a favorable option to

achieve their strategic and organizational goals? Aum Shinrikyo was

motivated to obtain a nuclear device. Yet, after various acquisition

challenges – Russian officials remained wary to help, they could not

mine sufficient uranium in Australia, nor acquire fissile material

in the U.S. or Japan – they opted to make use of their better

developed chemical program (Daly, Parachini & Rosenau, 2005, p. 21).

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Technical and organizational challenges of the nuclear armament dynamic

In general, there are two options for terrorist organizations to

build a crude nuclear device. First - with a gun-type design - a

subcritical piece of HEU is targeted rapidly onto another

subcritical piece of HEU – shooting it at each other. When these two

subcritical parts meet, they become supercritical and the nuclear

chain reaction begins. Second - with an implosion-type design -

explosives are arranged around a subcritical mass of HEU or

plutonium. By detonating these explosives, the material is crushed

together. The density of the mass increases until it reaches a

supercritical stage - setting of the nuclear chain reaction. Both

ways of constructing and detonating a crude nuclear device require

to get a supercritical mass of material together sufficiently fast

in order to prevent the reaction from blowing apart the material

before it can produce an appreciable explosive yield (Bunn & Wier,

2006).12 Besides the need for material resources, technical knowledge

and skills, terrorist organizations would also need to plan,

coordinate and control the nuclear armament dynamic. The tools to

organize such an endeavor often comprise risks for the (operational)

security of the terrorist organization. Their use of coordination

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tools – such as wireless and material communication modes, personal

electronic devices, mobile computing, or standardized routines,

rules and procedures – may be disrupted and exploited by

counterterrorism efforts (Don et al, 2007, p. 54). A prime example

is the CIA’s success in killing Osama Bin Laden after they managed

to trace Bin Laden through its courier. His attempts to steer his

organization proved to be lethal (Bergen, 2012).

This paper acknowledges three essential steps throughout each

nuclear weapons project - whether the terrorist organization opts

for a gun-type design or implosion-type design: acquiring fissile

material, constructing the crude nuclear device, and transporting

and detonating the IND.13 There are various technical and

organizational challenges related to each of these three steps.

Figure 2.2: Two-level analytical framework

< FIGURE 2.2. HERE>

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First, a terrorist organizations needs to acquire sufficient fissile

material. For a gun-type design, experts assume that a terrorist

organization would need about 40 kg to 50 kg of weapons-grade or

near-weapons-grade HEU. For an implosion-type design, experts

believe that a functioning weapon would require approximately 25kg

of weapons-grade HEU or roughly 8kg of plutonium in the highest

density phase. There are various pathways to acquire this fissile

material: the deliberate transfer of the material by a national

government, unauthorized assistance from a senior official, insider

help by production workers and/or custodians, or the seizure of

fissile material without insider help. Political unrest can always

be a facilitating circumstance. Dependent on the chosen pathway,

terrorist organizations will need a different level of financial

resources, technical competence, material power and organizational

skills (Ferguson & Potter, 2006).14 The surveillance and securing of

the target must be well-organized and backed by sufficient

resources. Perpetrators must be selected, receive operational

guidance, and remain motivated to completely plan and execute the

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attack. Thereafter, they need to organize the succesful transfer of

the fissile material – probably under the scrutiny of intense law

enforcement efforts. Throughout this process, they may not fall

victim to sting operations. Al Qaeda is perceived to be deterred

from exploiting certain opportunities to acquire fissile material

due to bad experiences on the black market. They are wary for scams

(U.S.-Russia joint threat assessment, 2011,p.33). Moreover, there is

a constant need to retain the perpetrators loyal to the cause. KSM

stated that Al Qaeda originally envisaged to use 25 or 26 hijackers

to carry out 9/11. Due to people backing out, visa problems, or

removal of the operation by Al Qaeda, they ended up with 19

hijackers (9/11 commission report, 2004, p.235). Depending on the

amount of information they had, these people could have proven to be

an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to detect and interdict

the operation. Similar risks are probably at play throughout the

obtainment of fissile material for a terrorist nuclear project.

Second, if a terrorist organization would be able to obtain an

adequate amount of fissile material, they need to actually construct

the crude nuclear device. Considering both the gun-type and

implosion-type nuclear weapon, terrorist organizations would need to

develop/acquire a feasible bomb design (taking into account the

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fissile material they obtained), perform at least some modest

chemical processing of the material, cast the nuclear material in

the desired shapes, machine the cast pieces, make and shape the

explosives used in the bomb, and acquire or manufacture other

components – such as the detonator (the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat

Assessment, 2011). Besides the organizational efforts in merely

setting-up a functioning machine shop - where sensitive material is

often subject to export controls - a terrorist organization would

also need to be able to recruit skillful scientists and engineers.

They need to work in a secure environment throughout the whole

construction process. Although not impossible, recruitment of this

highly-skilled team would not be easy. Even clandestine advertising

for these people comprises security risks: people that are

approached might turn to law enforcement agencies. Pakistan, for

instance, keeps careful watch after their scientists after the

revealing of the A.Q. Khan network (Mueller, 2008).15 These

specialists – with the necessary tacit and intacit knowledge -

should remain devoted to the cause throughout the whole process.16

Carson et al. (1987) believe that “their number could scarcely be

fewer than three or four and might well have to be more.” To achieve

rapid turnaround (that is, the device would be ready within a day or

so after obtaining the material), careful preparations extending

over a considerable number of weeks (more probably months) would

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have to have been carried out. The time could be much longer if the

specifications of the device had to be revised after the material

was in hand (Carson et al, 1987). In addition, although not

subjected to the severe safety measures of a state nuclear project,

terrorist organizations need to safeguard the laboratory and its

scientists to some extent. Scientific laboratories can be dangerous

places to work. A terrorist organization would want to avoid

attention-tracking accidents - which might also destroy valuable

material and/or kill or disable scientists and engineers. These

people would be difficult to replace in a group with few experts

(Mueller, 2010).

Finally, if a terrorist organization would succeed in building the

bomb, the success of the project will “hinge on the ability of its

operatives to carry out the attack” (U.S.-Russia joint threat

assessment, 2011, p. 34). The crude nuclear device could be smuggled

in the target country as a whole, or be assembled in the country

itself. It most probably needs to be encased in lead shielding, and

the terrorist organization would want to avoid “significant shakeups

in the treacherous process of transportation.” They would not want

the untested and much-traveled IND prove to be a dud (Mueller, 2010,

p. 178).17 Such an unprecedented attack would create various unknowns

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and uncertainties for the terrorist organization: which target to

attack? How to ensure discretion by the attack team? How to best

cross international borders with such an exceptional package? They

would need a loyal, highly flexible, creative and focused team - and

team leader - to carry out this high-end WMD attack. Considering the

9/11 attacks, Muhammad Atta was the driving person and leading

figure in this plot. He executed his tasks almost flawlessly (U.S.-

Russia joint threat assessment, 2011). A similar level of expertise

will be necessary for a terrorist nuclear project.

The exact significance of these technical and organizational

challenges will depend on the ideology, operational objectives,

capabilities and social environment of the terrorist organization.

Building on the willingness versus opportunity trade-off, each

terrorist organization will handle a different collective rationality with

respect to the technical and organizational challenges to construct

and detonate a crude nuclear device. This is an subjective equasion.

Yet, current threat assessments often overlook the importance of

this organizational variable.

Conclusion

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The presented two-level framework is no mathematical formula. The

collective rationality with respect to nuclear terrorism is

contingent on various – subjectively interpretable - variables.

Different circumstances and situations will lead to different

outcomes. Yet, the developed theoretical tool aims to integrate an

often overlooked variable: the organizational dimension.

Today’s counterterrorism efforts often focus on the own security

vulnerabilities. They increase the (technical) challenges of a

nuclear project by tackling the opportunity for terrorist

organizations to pursue a nuclear capability – e.g. protection of

fissile material – and degrade terrorist capabilities to

successfully complete such an endeavor. This is of essential

importance, and is also reflected in the other contributions to this

edited collection. Various chapters (e.g. Pomper & Gluck, Fanielle &

Andrzejewski, Hoodbhoy & Mian) focus on specific tools to subvert

the opportunity for terrorist organizations to set-up a succesful

armament dynamic. This paper is by no means an objection to these

chapters. In contrast, we aim to contextualize their excellent

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contributions, and suggest even more comprehensive counterterrorism

efforts.

Adopting an organizational perspective propounds the better

development of various other tools to prevent nuclear terrorism. Two

specific measures come to mind: first, the organizational

perspective emphasizes the importance of stimulating diverging

behavior by (potential) individual terrorists. This hinders the

recruitment and control over individual terrorists, and enables

better exploitation of any (moral) qualms within the organization.

Counter-ideological narratives, the provision of exit-options to

terrorists, and the public monitoring of nuclear engineers and

scientists are a few examples on how to increase diverging behavior

by individual terrorists. Second, politicians should clarify that

even the detonation a crude nuclear device will not help the

terrorist organization in achieving their goals, or will even

accelerate the devolution of the terrorist organization. This would

drastically influence the eagerness of any terrorist organization to

pursue such a complex project (Shapiro, 2013).

24

25

1End notes

Ferguson & Potter (2004) furthermore identify apocalyptic, nationalist groups and

single-issue groups as categories of concern. Yet, the latter two groups are

perceived to be less inclined to go nuclear, and there currently do not seem to

exist apocalyptic terrorist organizations of serious concern.

2 This does not even account for the infamous nuclear black market led by Pakistani

nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. According to a study by the

International Institute for Strategic Studies (Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan,

A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks - A net assessment, 2007), he sold

nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to Iran, North-Korea, Libya and possibly

other countries – over almost two decades. This suggests that ‘nuclear technology

is no longer the monopoly of industrially advanced countries, but possibly can be

purchased off-the-shelf by both states and terrorist groups’.

3 The prime example is, obviously, Aum Shinrikyo’s successful recruitment of

scientists and engineers in their WMD program.

4 Another illustrative example is the limited focus of the Nuclear Security

Summitry (NSS). These summits are top-level political events - started in 2010 in

Washington, followed up in Seoul 2012, and just recently took place in The Hague

2014 – aiming at combatting the threat of nuclear terrorism. The third NSS - which

gathered 53 world leaders and 4 heads of international organizations – identified

as main targets to ‘reduce the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world,

improve the security of all nuclear materials and radioactive sources, and improve

international cooperation’. These targets are clearly state-centered and focus on

the own nuclear security vulnerabilities.

5 This does not imply that an individual’s goals and objectives are always in exact

line with the collective preferences and objectives. They can, for instance, join

the terrorist organization our of social solidarity reasons rather than one of the

political objectives of the organization.

6 In addition, one could also argue it fits their political goal to consolidate the

Islamic Caliphate because it deters opponents by means of psychological warfare.

One act of terrorism can serve both organizational goals. I furthermore refer to

Patrick Henry’s detailed analysis of the James Foley beheading to demonstrate the

rationality of these beheadings: This can be found on:

http://aegisacademy.com/community/james-foley-beheading/

7 This does not imply that individual rationality does not matter at all. Their

exact behavior might play an important role in the implementation of the nuclear

armament dynamic (infra: technical and organizational challenges).

8 This basic analytical framework is primarily based on the work of Gary Ackerman

(2007) and Jean Pascal Zanders (1999). While Ackerman outlined a basic threat

assessment schema in his study on ‘assessing terrorist motivations for attacking

critical infrastructure’, Zanders outlined an assimilation model for CB weapon

armament programs, which can be used as a basis for nuclear armament programs of

terrorist organizations (see also chapter Zanders).

9 Note that this distinctions is in line with the strategic paradigm and the

distinction between operational and organizational goals of the terrorist

organization.

10 Note that this political and organizational cost-benefit calculus will be

different for highly capable group than the calculus of a less capable group.

11 Note that the particular technical and organizational challenges will also play

an essential role in determining the likelihood that a terrorist organization can

successfully complete the nuclear armament dynamic once the decision has been made

to pursue a nuclear capability. They still have to overcome the various technical

and organizational challenges.

12 It is widely agreed by experts that a gun-type design would pose the least

difficulties to a terrorist organization. With implosion bombs, precision timing in

exploding the conventional explosives is essential to ensure the fissile material

gets effective crushed.

13 These general steps can be subdivided in various steps. Mueller (2010), for

instance, identifies 20 different steps.

14 It is agreed on by experts that the enrichment of uranium is far beyond the

capabilities of any terrorist organization. Furthermore, the deliberate transfer of

the material by a national government is also often perceived to be very unlikely.

15 Moreover, suspicions might be generated among friends, family, the neighborhood

or law enforcement agencies when they would agree to participate in the nuclear

project.

16 For a good description on the need of intacit knowledge, this author refers to

B. Sims, ‘Revisiting the Uninvention Hypothesis: A Transactional View of Tacit

Knowledge in Nuclear Weapons Design’, unpublished paper, 2007, p. 6

http://public.lanl.gov/bsims/pdf/4S%20tacit%20knowledge.pdf (accessed on 16 April

2014); D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, ‘Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the

Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons’, the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No1, 1995.

17 Although it is true that even a dud can prove to be a success for terrorist

organizations. From a terrorist perspective, the nuclear explosion does not

necessarily need to have a high yield in order to achieve its goal.

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